

Iraq VNSA Cases, Part 1: 1946-2004
Last Updated: 22 April 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T1420	KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY-IRAQ	1961	1946	1998
T1405	ISLAMIC ACTION ORGANIZATION		1961	1984
T481	TAKFIR WAL-HIJRA (EXCOMMUNICATION AND EXODUS)		1966	2011
T73	ARAB LIBERATION FRONT (ALF)		1969	1980
T1924	SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ (SCIRI)	1982	1972	2005
T310	MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ (MEK)	1979	1972	2011
T2051	ARMY OF ANSAR AL-MUSLIMIN		1974	0
T263	KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK)		1974	2012
T3	ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION (ANO)		1974	1998
T1445	YAKETI NISHTIMANI KURDISTAN	1976	1975	2002
T261	KURDISH PATRIOTIC UNION		1975	0
T292	MAY 15 ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE		1979	1984
T1169	MARTYR ABU JA'FAR GROUP		1980	1982
T2271	BADR BRIGADES		1980	2005
T563	COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA - MAOIST (CPI-M)		1980	2012
T222	IRAQI DEMOCRATIC FRONT		1982	1982
T225	MOVEMENT OF ISLAMIC ACTION OF IRAQ		1982	1982
T1518	KURDISTAN NATIONAL UNION		1987	1987
T2072	ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS		1987	2011

T233	ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT (Algeria)		1989	1997
T345	AL-TAWHID	2004	1990	2012
T1743	IRAQI REVOLUTIONARY FORCES		1992	1992
T2325	IRAQI ISLAMIC VANGUARDS FOR NATIONAL SALVATION (IIVNS)		1994	1999
T1360	AL-QA`IDA IN THE LANDS OF THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQLIM)		1996	2012
T1393	GREEN BRIGADE OF THE PROPHET		1998	0
T1960	AL-MURABITUN BRIGADES		1998	0
T232	ISLAMIC RESISTANCE BRIGADES		1999	0
T2333	FREE FIGHTERS COMMAND		2000	2000
T2112	JUND-UL-ISLAM (SOLDIERS OF GOD)		2001	0
T51	ANSAR AL ISLAM	2004	2001	2012
T53	ANSAR AL-SUNNA		2001	2011
T226	ISLAMIC ARMY OF IRAQ (IAI)	2005	2002	2009
T2698	ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ	2004	2002	2012
T1	SALAFI ABU-BAKR AL-SIDDIQ ARMY		2003	2010
T1509	ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF IRAQI MUJAHIDEEN		2003	0
T16	AL-FARUQ BRIGADES		2003	0
T1958	JAISH AL-FURQAN		2003	0
T1971	KURDISTAN FREE LIFE PARTY		2003	2012
T1993	NATIONAL ISLAMIC RESISTANCE		2003	0
T2	ABU HAFS AL-MASRI BRIGADES		2003	2011
T2026	IRAQI HAMAS/ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT		2003	0
T2027	AL-RASHIDIN ARMY		2003	0

T2262	ARMED VANGUARDS OF A SECOND MOHAMMED ARMY		2003	2003
T229	ISLAMIC JIHAD BRIGADES		2003	2005
T283	JAISH AL-MAHDI	2004	2003	2009
T524	USD ALLAH		2003	0
T649	ABU AL-ABBAS		2003	0
T826	JAISH AL-TA'IFA AL-MANSURA		2003	2005
T939	1920 REVOLUTION BRIGADES		2003	2007
T1362	ANSAR AL-DIN		2004	2004
T1374	BRIGADES FOR THE DEFENSE OF HOLY SHRINES		2004	0
T1382	MUJAHEDeen CORPS IN IRAQ		2004	2009
T1386	FALLUJAH MUJAHIDEEN		2004	0
T1402	IRAQI LEGITIMATE RESISTANCE		2004	0
T1406	ISLAMIC AL-WAQQAS BRIGADE		2004	0
T1407	ISLAMIC FRONT FOR IRAQI RESISTANCE - SALAH-AL-DIN AL-AYYUBI BRIGADES		2004	2007
T1410	ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF HOLY WARRIORS		2004	0
T1411	ISLAMIC RAGE BRIGADE		2004	0
T1430	MUJAHEDeen ARMY		2004	2006
T1431	SARAYA USUD AL-TAWHID		2004	0
T1437	OMAR BIN KHATTAB GROUP		2004	2005
T153	DIVINE WRATH BRIGADES		2004	0
T1976	BLACK BANNER BRIGADE		2004	2004
T1977	MUTASSIM BELLAH BRIGADE		2004	2004
T1992	SALAFIAH AL-MUJAHIDIAH		2004	0
T2238	AL ZAWAHIRI LOYALISTS		2004	2004

T2344	JIHAD MARTYR'S COMPANIES IN IRAQ		2004	2004
T2375	MUJAHEDDEEN BRIGADES		2004	2004
T2377	MUJAHEDDEEN GROUP		2004	2004
T262	KURDISTAN FREEDOM HAWKS (TAK)		2004	2012
T449	SARAYA AL-SHUHUADA AL-JIHADIYAH FI AL-IRAQ		2004	0
T488	HOLDERS OF THE BLACK BANNERS		2004	2004
T52	ANSAR AL-JIHAD		2004	2004
T644	BRIGADES OF THE VICTORIOUS LION OF GOD		2004	0
T839	BRIGADES OF MARTYR AHMED YASSIN		2004	0
T854	KARBALA BRIGADES		2004	0
T91	ARMY OF THE FOLLOWERS OF SUNNI ISLAM		2004	0
T978	KHALID IBN WALID BRIGADE		2004	2004

I. KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY-IRAQ

Min. Group Date: 1946

Max. Group Date: 1998

Onset: 1961

Aliases: Kurdish Democratic Party-Iraq (Kdp), Kurdish Democratic Party, Kurdish Democratic Party - Iraq, Kurdish Democratic Party - Iraq (Kdp), Kurdish Democratic Party-Iraq, Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdistan Democratic Party (Kdp), Partiya Demokrat A Kurdistan

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4572, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- Gleditsch et al, "Non-State Actor Data," 2011, p. 19-21, http://privatwww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
- "Kurdish Democratic Party," Para-Military Groups, Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kdp.htm>
- Schmid and Jongman, "Iraq," Political Terrorism, 1988, p. 505
- "Kurdish Democratic Party," FAS, 1998, <https://fas.org/irp/world/para/kdp.htm>

- Gunter, Michael M. "The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq." *Middle East Journal* 50, no. 2 (1996): 224-41. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328927>.
- Richard Spencer, "Who are the Kurds? A User's Guide to Kurdish Politics," Telegraph, 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11198326/Who-are-the-Kurds-A-users-guide-to-Kurdish-politics.html>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The KDP was formed in 1946 by Mullah Mustalafa al-Barzani in order to form an independent Kurdish state (FAS 1998). The group is pro-Western and pro-capitalist (Spencer 2015). The group rose to attention after the 1958 coup overthrew the Iraqi monarchy (FAS 1998).

Geography

The KDP claims territory in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Initially, the group operated from northern Iran ("Republic of Mahabad") from 1945-1946 and launched attacks into Iraq (FAS 1998). After 1946, Barzani went into exile with several other soldiers. He returned to Iraq in 1958. Later, the group operated out of northern Iraq (Spencer 2015).

Organizational Structure

Initially, Mulla Mustafa Barzani led the KDP; Hamza 'Abdallah was the secretary-general. The group had approximately 10,000 fighters. This number was relatively constant from 1945, persisting through the conflict in the 1980s/1991 uprising (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 20-21). The group was initially relatively unorganized and lacked any political organization (Gunter 1996, 227). By 2015, the group was now led by Masoud Barzani (Spencer 2015).

External Ties

The group initially had strong external support from the Soviet Union (Gleditsch et al. 2011). In 1946, the Kurdish region of Iran declared independence from Iran; KDPI represented Kurdish interests and secured external backing by the Soviet Union. Iran could not fight nor repress KDPI due to Soviet backing. The Iranian government requested the Soviet Union to withdraw, which it did after international pressure. KDPI backed down shortly after.

The KDP also supports Turkey although there is no evidence of external support from the latter (Spencer 2015).

Group Outcome

The rise of the Ba'athist party in Iraq in 1963 led to a massive counterinsurgency campaign against the Kurds. Iraq launched large indiscriminate military campaigns to destroy the KDP, but this seven year effort eventually failed to remove the group (FAS 1998). The KDPI nearly disappeared when a Kurdish rebellion was crushed in 1966-67. During the late 1970s and 1980s, Iraq began to focus on fighting Iran, enabling the KDP to resume recruitment and mobilization efforts to make up for their losses (FAS 1998). In 1979, the group launched a second rebellion after the Iranian Revolution. The group made some territorial gains and then was beaten by a large IRGC offensive in 1980. The leader of the KDPI was assassinated by Iranian intelligence agents in 1989 which led to a clash between government and KDPI forces in September/October 1989. Ceasefire reached in 1996. The group is still active today, but violent activity has declined.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Republic of Kurdistan

Group Formation: 1946

Group End (Outcome): 2015 (Active)

II. ISLAMIC ACTION ORGANIZATION

Min. Group Date: 1961

Max. Group Date: 1984

Onset: NA

Aliases: Islamic Action Organization, Islamic Action Organization (Iao), Islamic Task Organization, IAO

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4066, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- "Islamic Task Organization," Global Security, n.d., <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ito.htm>
- Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. 8, 1983-84, Moshe Dayan Center, 1986, p. 171, <https://books.google.com/books?id=t32OO3DkDikC&pg=PA171&lpg=PA171&dq=ISLAMIC+ACTION+ORGANIZATION&source=bl&ots=VYswRYbclS&sig=5oo5yswoWLURj-tnC5KOYDnyI3c&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEw8p2XuJPRAhWI0FQKHZmQAkYQ6AEISTAI#v=onepage&q=ISLAMIC%20ACTION%20ORGANIZATION&f=false>
- GTD, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2366>

- Schmidt, W. E. (1991, Mar 18). Iraq rebels say saddam hasn't crushed them / fierce fights and protests reported. San Francisco Chronicle (Pre-1997 Fulltext) Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/302625394?accountid=14026>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

IAO was formed in 1961 by Muhsin al-Husanyi to fight for the creation of an Islamic state in Iraq and later overthrow the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein (Global Security n.d.; MIPT 2008). The group ascribed to an Islamic ideology and was primarily Shia (MIPT 2008). It came to attention in 1980 for an assassination attempt (Global Security n.d.)

Geography

The group launched attacks in and around Baghdad (Middle East Contemporary Center 1986, 171). It was founded in Karbala and has an external base of operations in Iran (Global Security n.d.). It maintains headquarters in Karbala (Global Security n.d.)

Organizational Structure

IAO was led by Ridha Jawad Taqi and Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarissi. IAO membership was diverse; it included "Iraqis, Iranians, Bahrainis, Afghans, and North Africans" (Middle East Contemporary Center 1986, 171). The group's primary tactic was suicide bombings (Middle East Contemporary Center 1986, 171). There are no estimates about the group's size.

External Ties

The IAO coordinated with the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (Middle East Contemporary Center 1986, 171). It also aligned itself with the Islamic Dawa Party which supported similar goals (MIPT 2008). It receives external funding from Iran and Syria (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

The group splintered in the 1990s into two factions (MIPT 2008). Muhsin al-Husanyi was assassinated in 1980 (Global Security n.d.). The U.S. military arrested al-Mudarissi in 2003 (Global Security n.d.). The group later merged with other Shia groups to form the United Iraqi Alliance in 2005 (MIPT 2008).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Munazzamat al-'Amal al-Islami

Group Formation: 1961

Group End (Outcome): 2005 (merger)

III. TAKFIR WAL-HIJRA (EXCOMMUNICATION AND EXODUS)

Min. Group Date: 1966

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: NA

Aliases: Takfir Wal-Hijra (Excommunication And Exodus), Anathema And Exile, Excommunication And Emigration, Excommunication And Exodus, Martyrs For Morocco, Rejection Of Sins And Exodus, Takfir Wa Hijara, Takfir Wa Hijra, Takfir Wal Hijra, Takfir Wa'l Hijra

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4477, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- Anneli Botha, "Terrorism in the Magrheb," ISS Africa, 2008, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/103660/MONO144FULL.pdf>
- Hayder Milli, "Jihad without Rules," Jamestown Foundation, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=822&tx_tnews%5BbackPid%5D=181&no_cache=1
- Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, "Takfir wal-Hijra," <http://timep.org/esw/profiles/terror-groups/takfir-wal-hijra/>
- Joshua Gleis, "National Security Implications of al-Takfir Wal-Hijra," al-Nakhlah, Spring 2005
- Chelsea Daymon, "The Egyptian Sinai: A New Front for Jihadist Activity," Small Wars Journal, 2013
- "Islamist militant group resurgent in Egypt," 2011, CNN, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/08/09/egypt.islamists/index.html?iref=allsearch%29>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra is a transnational terrorist group which provides support to different cells across Europe and northern Africa (Mili 2006). The group was founded in Egypt by Shukri Mustafa in the late 1960s (Gleis 2005).

Geography

The group re-emerged after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in the Rafah and Sheikh Zuwaid regions of the Sinai Peninsula (Daymon 2013).

Organizational Structure

The group was founded in Egypt by Shukri Mustafa in the late 1960s (Gleis 2005). Mustafa was heavily influenced by the teachings of sheikh Ali Ismael; Ismael argued Muslims and Islam was being suppressed by Egyptian President Nasser (Mili 2006). Mustafa formed the group to punish apostates, wage jihad, and create an Islamic caliphate (Mili 2006; CNN 2011). He was anti-modernity and Salafi jihadi.

Mustafa and his followers moved to the desert in order to practice Islam and get around what they deemed “illegitimate” Egyptian law.

One of the group’s most prominent members was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi which is what ties it to Iraq (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

The group may have influenced the ideology of GIA in Algeria as well as Takfiris in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco (Mili 2006). It may also have had a tacit alliance with the GIA and Al-Qaeda (Daymon 2013; TOPS).

Group Outcome

In 1977, Mustafa was executed by Egyptian police after which the group went underground. During the 1980s and 1990s, ATWAH cells emerged in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Kenya, and Morocco (Mili 2006). Today, the group operates as a set of decentralized cells with little coordinated oversight (Daymon 2013).

The Egyptian government has typically “turned its head the other way” about violent activities in the Sinai and done little to address the concerns of Bedouins living in the Peninsula about economic discrimination (Daymon 2013). The group re-emerged after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in the Rafah and Sheikh Zuwaid regions of the Sinai Peninsula (Daymon 2013). It came to attention through a set of prominent attacks around El Arish, Egypt (CNN 2011). Egyptian intelligence officials said the group had members from Palestinian factions

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: “late 1960s”

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

IV. ARAB LIBERATION FRONT (ALF)

Min. Group Date: 1969

Max. Group Date: 1980

Onset: NA

Aliases: Arab Liberation Front (Alf), ALF, Jabhat Al-Tahrir Al-'Arabiyya

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Arab Liberation Front," Global Security, n.d., <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/alf.htm>
- Eugene Ipavec, "Arab Liberation Front (Palestine)," CRW Flags, 2007, <http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/ps%7Dalf.html>
- IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Current status of Jabhat al-Tahrir al-'Arabiyya (Arab Liberation Front); treatment of current/former members/supporters by the Jordanian authorities [JOR43348.E], 04. Februar 2005 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
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- "Abdel-Rahim Ahmed; Leader of Arab Liberation Front," Los Angeles Times, 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-01/news/mn-1045_1_arab-liberation-front

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

ALF was formed in 1969 to fight Israel. It is leftist, but has no religious affiliation (Ipavec 2007).

Geography

The group had its headquarters in Baghdad, Iraq, but was also present in Ramallah, Iraq (Los Angeles Times 1991; Ipavec 2007).

Organizational Structure

The ALF was led by Zayd Haydar and later Rakad Salem (Global Security n.d.). Another ALF leader, Abdel-Rahim Ahmed, supported the group until his death in 1991 (Los Angeles Times 1991). The group was initially composed of Iraqi Ba'athist members (Ipavec 2007). The group had approximately 250 members in 1986 (Los Angeles Times 1991). It is considered "a small marginalized group" due to competition from Fatah, Hamas, and PIJ (Ipavec 2007). It funded itself through financial support from the Hussein regime (Ipavec 2007).

External Ties

The group received large support from the Hussein regime. The group sought to be an umbrella organization for Iraq, Fatah, Egypt, and Syria (Ipavec 2007).

Group Outcome

The group primarily funded Palestinian suicide bombers through laundered funds from the Hussein government (Canada IRB 2005; Ipavec 2007). After the Hussein regime fell in 2003, the group went underground and moved to Jordan where it was thought to be operating as late as 2005/2007 (Canada IRB 2005; Ipavec 2007).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1969

Group End (Outcome): 2007 (disappear)

V. SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ (SCIRI)

Min. Group Date: 1972

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: 1982

Aliases: Supreme Council For Islamic Revolution In Iraq (Sciri), Supreme Council For The Islamic Revolution In Iraq, Supreme Council Of The Islamic Revolution In Iraq (Sciri), SCIRI

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Supreme Iraq Islamic Council." New York Times. n.d. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/s/supreme_iraqi_islamic_council/index.html
- Martha Crenshaw. "Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq." Mapping Militants Organization. 2012. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/405?highlight=Mahdi+Army>
- "SCIRI." FAS. 1998. <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/sciri.htm>
- "Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)." Global Security. n.d. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/sciri.htm>
- Nasr, Vali. "When the Shiites rise." Foreign Affairs (2006): 58-74.
- Shahram Akbarzadeh. (2005) [Where is the Islamic republic of Iran heading?](#). Australian Journal of International Affairs 59:1, pages 25-38.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

SCIRI was formed in 1982 to overthrow Saddam Hussein in response to the Dujail Massacre (Crenshaw 2012). The group is primarily Shiite and advocated for Hussein's replacement with an autocratic state (Global Security n.d.).

Geography

The group primarily operates from northern Iraq (Crenshaw 2012). During the Iran-Iraq war, the Badr Brigade fought in "southern Iraq" in the marshlands near Iran and Saudi Arabia (FAS 1998).

Organizational Structure

SCIRI was formed by a group of Shiite exiles (Crenshaw 2012). It was led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim (Crenshaw 2012). SCIRI was very well-organized with a general assembly and military wing. It had a political wing, executive bureau, and central committee (Global Security n.d.). It also had a foreign relations unit, military unit, social services, propaganda, and financing wings (Global Security n.d.). The group has a military wing called the Badr Brigade (Crenshaw 2012). The Badr Brigade had many experienced Iraqi military veterans who left in the 1960s/1970s (FAS 1998). The group allegedly had 10,000 members in 2003 (Crenshaw 2012). Another estimate argues the group had 4000-8000 members during the Iran-Iraq War during the late 1990s (FAS 1998).

External Ties

The Badr Brigade received training and financial support from the IRGC (Crenshaw 2012). After the Iran-Iraq War, the group tried to distance itself from Iran due to allegations it was just an Iranian puppet (Crenshaw 2012).

It had alliance agreements with the PUK and KDP (FAS 1998). It was a rival of the Mahdi Army until 2009 when it decided to ally with it (Crenshaw 2012).

Group Outcome

The group was active during the Iran-Iraq war and persisted during the 1990s. After Hussein fell in 2003, the group changed its goals to gaining political influence in the new government and reorganized as a political party (Crenshaw 2012). Hakim died in 2009 (Crenshaw 2012).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, ISCI, Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (ISCI)

Group Formation: 1982

Group End (Outcome): 2012 (active?)

VI. MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ (MEK)

Min. Group Date: 1972

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: NA

Aliases: Mujahedin-E Khalq (Mek), Mojahedin Khalq Organisation, Mojahedin-E Khalq (Mko), Mujahedin-E-Khalq (Mek), Mujahideen E Khalq, Mujahideen-E Khalq Organisation (Mko), Mujahideen-I-Khalq (Mk), Muslim Iranian Student's Society, National Council Of Resistance Of Iran (Ncri), National Liberation Army Of Iran (Nla), People's Mujahideen, People's Mujahideen Of Iran (Pmoi), PMOI, MEK, MKO, NLA, NCRI, MK

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3632, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- Jonathan Masters, "Mujahedeens-e-Khalq," Council on Foreign Relations, 2014, <http://www.cfr.org/iran/mujahadeen-e-khalq-mek/p9158>
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- Daniel Benjamin, "Yes, we do know the MEK has a Terrorism Past," POLITICO, 2016, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/mek-backtalk-iranian-group-214526>
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- Kristian Gleditsch et al. "Non-State Actor Data." 2011. UCDP. http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
- GTD Perpetrator 470. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=470>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

MEK was formed in 1965 to oppose the Iranian regime led by the Pahlavi family (Masters 2014). The group today fights to overthrow the Islamic regime in Iran. The

group's ideology is Marxist-Islamist (Masters 2014). They adhere to a Shi'a conception of Islam (Gleditsch et al. 2011). The group came to attention in the late 1960s/early 1970s for its guerrilla fight against the Pahlavi regime (Gleditsch et al. 2011).

Geography

The group's political wing, National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) initially operated in Tehran before moving to Paris (Masters 2014). MEK operated in exile from Paris, France from 1981-1986 (Masters 2014). The group then moved to set-up a base of operations in eastern Iraq starting in 1986 near the Iran-Iraq border (Global Security n.d.; Masters 2014). In 2004, the group was active near Khalis, Iraq; Jalawla (Jalula), Iraq; Kut, Iraq; Basra, Iraq; Am-Amarah, Iraq; Miqdadiyah, Iraq. Today, the group is primarily concentrated at Camp Liberty near the Iraqi capital although this functions more as a refugee camp (Masters 2014).

Organizational Structure

The MEK's leader was Massoud Rajavi until his imprisonment in the 1970s by the Shah (Masters 2014). His wife, Maryam Rajavi, oversaw the commander corps. The group was originally composed of different students, but grew to include a more diverse membership (Masters 2014). The military wing was known as the National Liberation Army (Global Security n.d.). The group's political wing, National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) initially operated in Tehran before moving to Paris (Masters 2014).

UCDP said there were about 4500 members in 1991 reaching a peak of 15000 by 2001 (Gleditsch et al. 2011). The group had approximately 5000-10000 members in 2011 (Masters 2014). 30-50% of all members are fighters (Global Security n.d.). Saddam Hussein primarily financed the group during the 1980s and 1990s (Masters 2014). Today, the group funds itself through support from politicians in the US and other diaspora offices (Masters 2014).

External Ties

The MEK worked with different protest groups during the 1979 Iranian Revolution to overthrow the Shah (Masters 2014). It split around 1981 (Masters 2014).

The group was supported by Saddam Hussein with arms to help fight against Iran in the Iran-Iraq war (Masters 2014). This support included weapons, sanctuary, and protection from cross-border raids (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

The Iranian regime arrested several MEK members in the early 1970s and executed others (Masters 2014). Masoud Rajavi disappeared in 2003; it is unknown whether he is still dead or alive (Masters 2014).

After the 1979 revolution, the new regime cracked down on the MEK for its leftist ideology forcing it to go into exile (Masters 2014). The Iranian regime “arrested and executed thousands of Mujahedeen, who retaliated by assassinating dozens of senior government officials” (Masters 2014). The counterinsurgency campaign culminated with Operation Eternal Light in which the IRGC killed 2000 MEK members (Masters 2014).

The US listed the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization until 2012 following a legal challenge (Masters 2014).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: National Council of Resistance, PMOI, MKO, NCRI, Muslim Iranian Students, Society, Organization of the People,s Holy Warriors of Iran, the National Liberation Army, Sazeman-e Mujahideen-e Khalq Iran

Group Formation: 1965

Group End (Outcome): 2014 (active)

VII. ARMY OF ANSAR AL-MUSLIMIN

Min. Group Date: 1974

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Note: translates to generic muslim army

Part 1. Bibliography

- No information could be found about this group
- Proquest, name + iraq
- Proquest, name + 1974
- Proquest, “ansar al muslimin”

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

No information could be found about this group.

Geography

No information could be found about this group.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about this group.

External Ties

No information could be found about this group.

Group Outcome

No information could be found about this group.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: A new proposed formation date if different than above

Group End (Outcome): A new proposed end date with the reason for ending in parentheses

VIII. KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK)

Min. Group Date: 1974

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Kurdistan Workers' Party (Pkk), Argk, Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan (Argk), Kadek, Kongra Gele Kurdistan, Kongra-Gel (Kgk), Kongreya Azadi U Demokrasiya Kurdistan, Kurdish Workers' Party (Pkk), Kurdistan Freedom And Defense Congress, Kurdistan Freedom And Democracy Congress, Kurdistan National Liberation Front (Ernk), Kurdistan National Liberty Army, Kurdistan People's Conference, Kurdistan Workers Party, Kurdistan Workers' Party, Kurdistan Worker's Party, Kurdistan Workers Party (Pkk), Kurdistan Worker's Party (Pkk), Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (Pkk), People' S Liberation Army Of Kurdistan (Argk), Peoples Congress Of Kurdistan, People's Congress Of Kurdistan, Peoples Defense Force, People's Defense Force, Peoples Liberation Army Of Kurdistan, People's Liberation Army Of Kurdistan, Peoples Liberation Army Of Kurdistan (Argk), People's Liberation Army Of Kurdistan (Argk), Pkk/Kongra-Gel, The Peoples Congress Of Kurdistan, The People's Congress Of Kurdistan

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The PKK began in 1974 in Diyarbakir by a group of Kurdish students organized as the National Liberation Army (UKO) (karaca 2010, 38). The UKO was renamed to be the PKK in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan with a goal to fight for an independent Turkish state (Australian National Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Ocalan was inspired by Marxist ideology (Mackenzie Institute 2016). After the fall of the Soviet Union, the group began to emphasize Kurdish nationalism more than Marxism (Karaca 2010, 37). The group came to attention in 1984 when it launched an armed struggle against the Turkish state (Mackenzie Institute 2016; Australian National Security n.d.).

Geography

The group claims territory in southeastern Turkey as part of Kurdistan including Hakkari province, Siirt, Adiyaman, Sirnak, and Agriman (Australian National Security n.d.). The

PKK bases are located in the “PUK and KDP-controlled regions of the KRG” (Karaca 2010, 76). The HPG operates out of the Qandil mountains (Karaca 2010, 35).

The group primarily operated out of southeastern Turkey until 1991 when it began to move into western Turkey (Karaca 2010, 39).

In Iraq, the group uses Sinjar as a base of operations (Tastekin 2016).

Organizational Structure

PKK was initially led by Abdullah Ocalan who decided to form the PKK as a university student in the 1970s (Mackenzie Institute 2016). After his arrest, he was replaced by Murat Karayilan (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The PKK has evolved into a very well-organized group. The armed wing is called the People’s Defence Forces (HPG) (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The Central Executive Committee oversees everything including the Military Wing (ARGK), External Wing (ERNK), and other subcommittees (Karaca 2010, 33). The ERNK is in charge of propaganda, training, funding, contacts with other armed groups, and intelligence on Turkish security forces (Karaca 2010, 34). It has a women’s wing called YAJK as well.

From 1984-1986, the PKK purposely targeted noncombatants that did not support their movement (Karaca 2010, 38).

It has approximately 7000 members (Mackenzie Institute 2016). It primarily funds itself through donations from supporters throughout Kurdistan as well as a Kurdish diaspora in Europe (Mackenzie Institute 2016). Members are primarily drawn from the Kurdish ethnic group and in rural areas often through personal connections (Australian National Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group primarily fought against other armed groups in the late 1970s (Karaca 2010). It had an alliance with DHKP/C from 1991 to 1998 (Karaca 2010, 39).

The group received external support from Greece including diplomatic, political, and funding, Syria, Russia, Iran, and Armenia (Karaca 2010, 46-51).

Group Outcome

Until 1980, the PKK mainly fought against other armed groups in Turkey and Kurdish tribal leaders (Karaca 2010, 38). After the 1980 military coup, the PKK reorganized to create a formal military wing and in 1984 launched its “people’s revolution” against the government (Karaca 2010, 38). Turkish counter-terrorism was largely ineffective at

destroying the PKK until 1991 when it launched a series of offensives which pushed the PKK out of villages and towards the Qandil mountains (Karaca 2010, 40-41).

Ocalan was arrested by Turkish police in 1999 and sentenced to death, but it was later commuted (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The arrest had little effect on the group's actions. In 2013, the PKK announced a ceasefire with Turkish forces (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: KADEK, Kurdistan Halk Kongresi (KHK)

Group Formation: 1974

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

IX. ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION (ANO)

Min. Group Date: 1974

Max. Group Date: 1998

Onset: NA

Aliases: Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), ANO, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Arab Revolutionary Council, Fatah Al-Majlis Al-Thawri, Fatah Al-Qiyadah Al-Thawriyyah, Fatah Revolutionary Council, Fatah Revolutionary Council (FRC/ANO), FRC/ANO, Revolutionary Organization Of Socialist Muslims, Revolutionary Council, Revolutionary Council of Fatah, Al-Fatah Revolutionary Council, Fatah-the Revolutionary Council, Black June, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, Black September, Egyptian Revolution, Arab Fedayeen Cells, Palestine Revolutionary Council, Organization of Jund al Haq, Arab Revolutionary Council.

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170264.htm>

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

ANO was founded in 1974 by Sabri al Banna as a splinter from the PLO (Martin 2011, 5). The group fought to destroy Israel in order to create a separate Palestinian state (Martin 2011, 5; CFR 2009). It was more extremist than Fatah, which in 1974 announced it would be willing to support a two-state solution (Martin 2011, 5). The group was heavily influenced by the Baathists in Iraq (Martin 2011, 5). It came to attention in 1973 following a hijacking at the Rome airport (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

Geography

The group operated out of Baghdad, but was involved in attacks throughout Iraq, Israel, and Europe (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The group constructed a vast operation of resources in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. It had both a political and a military wing of which the former was also responsible for recruitment, propaganda, and financing (Mackenzie Institute 2015). Banna helped the group partially fund itself through the establishment of a trade and investment company in Warsaw which engaged in arms deals during the Iran-Iraq War (Mackenzie Institute 2015). The group had approximately 500 members and was active in 20 countries across northern Africa, the Middle East, and Europe (Martin 2011, 5). Banna may have “coup-proofed” parts of his organization in 1989 to remove dissidents (Martin 2011, 5).

External Ties

ANO operated out of Baghdad and received external support from Saddam Hussein in exchange (Martin 2011, 5). The group also received external support from Libya and Syria (FAS 2004). The group was expelled from Baghdad in 1983, but was allowed to return after the Iraq-Iran war ended (CFR 2009). In 1999, Egypt and Libya banned the ANO from operating in the country (Mackenzie Institute 2015). Libya did so in order to secure partial sanctions relief (CFR 2009). The Jordanian government responded to ANO with threats to kill Banna and his family if he did not cease operations (Martin 2011, 5). Iraqi and Libyan support for the ANO fell after the Cold War and Banna was forced to retrench to Egypt (Martin 2011, 6).

Group Outcome

Banna was killed in 2002 (Martin 2011, 5). The group is thought to be inactive with former leadership hiding in Lebanon (CFR 2009).

Note: Banna seems to have cult of personality here, loss of external support/base is devastating

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1974

Group End (Outcome): 2002 (loss of leadership)

X. YAKETI NISHTIMANI KURDISTAN

Min. Group Date: 1975

Max. Group Date: 2002

Onset: 1976

PUK

Aliases: Patriotic Union Of Kurdistan (Puk), Patriotic Union Of Kurdistan, Yaketî Nishtimani Kurdistan

Part 1. Bibliography

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http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The PUK was formed in 1975 as a splinter group of the KDP (BBC 2003). It arose after Hussein/Iraq defeated the KDP (Kurdish Project 2015). The group came to attention in 1991 as part of the Kurdish uprising in Iraq; it controlled territory before Iraqi forces re-seized it (BBC 2003). The group's goal is to create an independent Kurdish state (NPR 2006).

Geography

Initially formed in Damascus, Syria in 1975. The PUK was transnational operating in both Turkey and Iraq (Global Security n.d.; Gleditsch et al. 2013). It gets most of its support in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq (Kurdish Project 2015). The group primarily operates out of Iraq, evading detection from Turkish security forces which tend to hunt the PKK instead (NPR 2006).

Organizational Structure

The PUK was led by Jalal Tabani (BBC 2003). Members generally arose from urban Kurdish areas (Global Security n.d.). PUK claims to have 150,000 members, but it's unclear how many of these are militants (BBC 2003). It gets most of its support in Sulaymaniyah (Kurdish Project 2015).

External Ties

The PUK allied with the KDP throughout much of the 1980s, but after the 1991 Kurdish uprising, the PUK began to fight the KDP for power (BBC 2003). During the 1990s, the PUK and KDP fought against each other until the US negotiated a ceasefire in 1998 (NPR 2006).

The PUK receives CT assistance from the US after 9/11 (van Wilgenburg 2010).

Group Outcome

The group fought against the Iraqi government then entered into negotiations with Hussein in 1991. The result was a series of elections in Iraqi Kurdistan (BBC 2003). The group remains active, having merged with the KDP to form a united party in 2005, 2009,

and 2013 (Kurdish Project 2015). The PUK formed its own counterterrorism unit - the CTG (Counterterrorism Group) - to fight other potential armed groups in and around Kurdistan (van Wilgenburg 2010).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 1975

Group End (Outcome): 2012 (active)

XI. KURDISH PATRIOTIC UNION

Min. Group Date: 1975

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: na

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda*. The RAND Corporation, 2008. 153.
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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

Geography

This is an alias for Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

External Ties

This is an alias for Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK

Group Formation: This is an alias for Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

Group End (Outcome): This is an alias for Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

XII. MAY 15 ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

Min. Group Date: 1979

Max. Group Date: 1984

Onset: NA

Aliases: MAY 15 ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, ARAB ORGANIZATION OF MAY 15

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=297>
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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

15 May Organization was formed in 1979 as a splinter of the PFLP Special Operations Group (FAS 1998). The PFLP Special Operation groups had been headed by Waddia Haddad (Schweitzer 2011). Haddad enjoyed some relative success in organizing attacks for the PFLP until a series of failures in the mid-1970s, culminating with a failed airplane hijacking in Mogadishu of Lufthansa Flight 181 in 1977. With these failures, Haddad's faction lost internal support. When Haddad died in 1978, remaining supporters from Haddad's faction broke off to create the 15 May Organization for the Liberation of Palestine. They aimed to continue Haddad's focus on tactically innovative incidents such as airplane hijackings (Schweitzer 2011). The group was part of the larger Palestinian movement (BBC 2014). The group's first known attack was in 1980 (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group was active in London, Rome, Istanbul, Athens, Vienna, Rio de Janeiro, Honolulu, and Aleppo (FAS 1998; GTD). It had a base of operations in Baghdad (FAS 1998).

Organizational Structure

The group was led by Muhammed al-Umari who was a known bomb expert in the Palestinian Territories. The group had approximately 50-60 members in the early 1980s. Its members were Palestinian, but there is not much evidence about the organizational structure of the group beyond that (FAS 1998).

External Ties

The group allegedly received financial support and training from Iraq until 1984 (FAS 1998). It was never affiliated with the PLO (Global Security n.d.)

Group Outcome

The group fell apart in the mid-1980s after the defection of several members to Colonel Hawari's Special Operations Group of Fatah (FAS 1998).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1979

Group End (Outcome): "mid-1980s"/1984 (GTD)

XIII. MARTYR ABU JA'FAR GROUP

Min. Group Date: 1980
Max. Group Date: 1982
Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2950>
- Sonoko Sunayama, "Syria and Saudi Arabia: Collaboration and Conflict in the Middle East," IB Tauris, 2007, <https://books.google.com/books?id=LvoBAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA84&lpg=PA84&dq=MARTYR+ABU+JA%27FAR+GROUP+iraq&source=bl&ots=s0tb3NQgAI&sig=m0PLE7Dr1w-GQwIRPFdur9AiuV8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiD6eLpwJjRAhXMIVQKHYNIDH0Q6AEIN DAG#v=onepage&q=MARTYR%20ABU%20JA'FAR%20GROUP%20iraq&f=false>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when Martyr Abu Jafar Group formed. It first came to attention in 1980 when it bombed a Saudi Arabian Embassy in Lebanon (Sunayama 2007). The group argued the bombing was the first in a series of attempts to coerce Saudi Arabia to "declare complete neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War" (Sunayama 2007, 84). A second attack occurred in 1982 in Baghdad when the group bombed the Iraqi News Agency (GTD n.d.)

Geography

The attacks occurred in Beirut and Baghdad (Sunayama 2007, 84; GTD n.d.).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the group's organizational structure.

External Ties

No information could be found about the group's external ties.

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happens to the group. It disappeared after the 1982 incident.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1980

Group End (Outcome): 1982 (disappear)

XIV. BADR BRIGADES
Min. Group Date: 1980
Max. Group Date: 2005
Onset: NA

Aliases: Badr Brigades, Badr Brigade, Badr Corps, Badr Organization

Part 1. Bibliography

- Martha Crenshaw, "Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development," Mapping Militants Project, 2016, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/435>
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- "Badr Corps," Paramilitary Groups SCIRI, Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/badr.htm>
- "Badr Organization," Counter Extremism, n.d., <http://www.counterextremism.com/threat/badr-organization>

Part 2. Narrative

For information on the Badr Organization from 1983 to 2012, see SCIRI.

Group Formation

The Badr Brigade was initially the armed wing of SCIRI until it splintered from the group in 2012 (Crenshaw 2016).

The Badr Brigade originally formed in 1983 (Crenshaw 2016). Like ISCI, it fights for the creation of a Shiite state in southern Iraq (Crenshaw 2016). In 2003, it changed its name to appear less militant to the Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development in order to avoid US counterinsurgency operations (Beehner 2006).

Geography

The group is primarily active in Diyala, Babil, Baghdad, and parts of IS-controlled Syria (Foreign Policy 2014; Crenshaw 2016). It also fought in Jurf al-Sakhar near Baghdad and Amerli where it helped expel IS fighters (Foreign Policy 2014).

Organizational Structure

Hadi al-Amiri is the leader of the Badr organization (Foreign Policy 2014; Crenshaw 2016). Its membership primarily included soldiers who had defected from the Iraqi military because they were Shi'ite (Crenshaw 2016). It is organized as a conventional force (Crenshaw 2016). The group had approximately 10,000 members as of 2009-2014 (Crenshaw 2016). According to Amiri, members undergo extensive training and are prohibited from kidnapping, executing, or otherwise abusing Sunnis although HRW disputes this (Foreign Policy 2014).

Amiri claims the group serves as a counterbalance to the Iraqi military and a more effective fighting force against ISIS (Foreign Policy 2014).

It has an active political wing today and has several seats in the Iraqi Parliament (Crenshaw 2016).

External Ties

Badr had strong ties to the Iran government and received approximately \$3 million in funding, weapons, and training (Crenshaw 2016). In 2016, it was reportedly using US military equipment, but it is unknown where it got it from.

The group fought the Mahdi Army in Iraq (Crenshaw 2016). It has also allied with Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Hezbollah, Shi'ite militias, to fight ISIS (Crenshaw 2016).

Group Outcome

The group splintered from ISCI in 2012 and is active today in the fight against ISIL (Crenshaw 2016).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development

Group Formation: 1983

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

XV. COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA - MAOIST (CPI-M)

Min. Group Date: 1980
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Communist Party Of India - Maoist (Cpi-M), Communist Party Of India (Maoist), Communist Party Of India Maoist (Cpi/M), Communist Party Of India Maoist (Cpi-M), Communist Party Of India Maoists, Communist Party Of India Maoists (Cpi/M), Communist Party Of India Maoists (Cpi-M), Communist Party Of India-Maoist, Communist Party Of India-Maoist (Cpi/M), Communist Party Of India-Maoist (Cpi-M), Communist Party Of India-Maoist (Cpi-Maoist), Communist Party Of India-Maoists (Cpi/M), Communist Party Of India-Maoists (Cpi-M), Cpi-Maoist

Part 1. Bibliography

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- GTD Perpetrator 20132. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20132>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The CPI-M formed in 2004 from a merger between the People's War Group (renamed the CPI-ML) and the Maoist Communist Center of India (SATP n.d.). The group formed

in response to renewed counterinsurgency operations against the individual groups and the creation of the Jharkhand state (SATP n.d.). The group's first violent attack occurred in 2005 (GTD 2017). The group's goals were to launch a traditional peasant rebellion to overthrow the Indian government (Gupta 2006; SATP n.d.). They ascribe to a Maoist ideology (Gupta 2006; SATP n.d.).

Geography

The CPI-M conducted attacks primarily in Jharkhand, Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh in eastern India (GTD 2017; Gupta 2006). The CPI-M is estimated to be active in 13 states, and is reportedly making efforts to gain footholds in Gujarat, Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh as well (SATP n.d.). The group is not transnational (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group's main leaders are Muppalla Lakshmana Rao, Katakam Sudarshan, Cheruri Rajkumar, and Mallojula Koteswara Rao (Kennedy and Puroshotham 2012). Members of the group were ex-militants from the PWG and MCC (SATP n.d.). The total estimated size of the group at an unknown date was 6500-7000 fighters (SATP n.d.). It promoted the rights of the advisai tribes although it is unclear if that is also where recruits came from (Kennedy and Puroshotham 2012). The group has a political wing known as the Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army.

External Ties

The group was a merger between the People's War Group and MCC (SATP n.d.). There is no evidence of external support for the group by another state. The group has a working alliance with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (SATP n.d.). The group is opposed to the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the CPI-Marxist (SATP n.d.).

Group Outcome

The group engaged in preliminary peace talks with the Andhra state government, but were unable to reach a peaceful solution (Kennedy and Puroshotham 2012). The government in Andhra Pradesh deployed special forces known as Greyhounds to administer counterinsurgency (Kennedy and Puroshotham 2012). The national government launched Operation Green Hunt in 2009 to counter the insurgency, but encountered resistance by elites in local governments in Jharkhand (Kennedy and Puroshotham 2012). The group was still active in 2017 (GTD 2017).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2017 (According to SATP, there have been incidents relating to the CPIM as far as 2017).

XVI. IRAQI DEMOCRATIC FRONT

Min. Group Date: 1982

Max. Group Date: 1982

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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- IECI announces iraqi polls results, UIC leads national assembly vote count. (2005, Feb 13). BBC Monitoring Middle East Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/459198941?accountid=14026>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the Iraqi Democratic Front first formed, but it came to attention in 1982 for two attacks in Vienna, Austria (GTD n.d.). The group fought to overthrow Saddam Hussein (Yemma 1991).

Geography

The group's primary attacks were in Vienna (GTD n.d.)

Organizational Structure

Alexander Dawoody was the secretary of the Iraqi Democratic Front (Yemma 1991). The group was Kurdish although it is unclear how many members it might have had (Los Angeles Times 1991).

External Ties

The group is either an umbrella organization of many Kurdish groups or has ties to other Kurdish opposition groups (Los Angeles Times 1991). It is unclear if it received any external support.

Group Outcome

The group remained active after its initial violent attacks. In 2005, the group won several thousand votes during one of the first rounds of elections in Iraq post invasion (BBC 2005).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1982

Group End (Outcome): 2003 (politics)

XVII. MOVEMENT OF ISLAMIC ACTION OF IRAQ

Min. Group Date: 1982

Max. Group Date: 1982

Onset: NA

Aliases: Movement Of Islamic Action Of Iraq, Islamic Action In Iraq, Organization Of Islamic Action In Iraq

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4067, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- GTD, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2960>
- Bomb hits iraqi embassy in paris. (1982, Aug 12). The Atlanta Constitution (1946-1984) Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1623097324?accountid=14026>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group was founded, but it first came to attention in 1982 during a series of two attacks in Bangkok and Paris (GTD n.d.). The group is Shiite Muslim (Atlanta Constitution 1982). Their original goal was to overthrow the Hussein government (MIPT 2008).

Geography

According to TOPS, the group was very active during the 1991 uprising and captured Kirkuk, Duhok, Karbala, Samawa, and Naseriya (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

It is unknown how large the group was or how it was organized during the 1980s and 1990s. In 2005, when it became a political party, it announced Alaa Hamoud Salih was its leader (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

The group allegedly has ties with Hezbollah and receives external support from Iran (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

The Hussein government fought back against the group during the 1991 uprising and successfully defeated them (MIPT 2008). After the 2003 invasion, the group renamed itself the Organization of Islamic Action in Iraq and became a political party which participated in the 2005 elections (MIPT 2008).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1982

Group End (Outcome): 2003 (politics)

XVIII. KURDISTAN NATIONAL UNION
Min. Group Date: 1987
Max. Group Date: 1987
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- FBIS. "Near East/South Asia Report." DTIC. (1983).
- GTD, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2556>
- Arthur S. Banks, Alan J. Day, Thomas C. Muller, Political Handbook of the World 1998," Springer. 2016.
<https://books.google.com/books?id=D6mFCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA442&dq=kurdistan+national+union&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiGwKqcy5jRAhUjl1QKHb78AjEQ6AEILTAD#v=onepage&q=kurdistan%20national%20union&f=false>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for PUK (Banks et al 2016).

Geography

This is an alias for PUK (Banks et al 2016).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for PUK (Banks et al 2016).

External Ties

This is an alias for PUK (Banks et al 2016).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for PUK (Banks et al 2016).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: PUK, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Group Formation: This is an alias for PUK (Banks et al 2016).

Group End (Outcome): This is an alias for PUK (Banks et al 2016).

XIX. ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS
Min. Group Date: 1987

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

This name is too vague for research.

Geography

This name is too vague for research.

Organizational Structure

This name is too vague for research.

External Ties

This name is too vague for research.

Group Outcome

This name is too vague for research.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: A new proposed formation date if different than above

Group End (Outcome): A new proposed end date with the reason for ending in parentheses

XX. ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT

Min. Group Date: 1989

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Islamic Salvation Front, Al-Jabha Al-Islamiyah Lil-Inqadh, Armee Islamique Du Salut (Ais), Army Of Islamic Salvation, Front Islamique Du Salut, Islamic Salvation Army, Islamic Salvation Front (Fis), AIS, FIS

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 288, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- Hafez, Mohammed M. 2000. "Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria," *Middle East Journal* 54, no. 4. Autumn 2000.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329544>
- Dalacoura, Katerina. 2011. *Islamic Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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<http://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/f5vtl5h9a73d5ls97540430kj/resources/artlm3.pdf>
- Serres, Thomas. 2014. "En attendant Bouteflika. Le président et la crise de sens en Algérie," *L'Année du Maghreb*. <http://anneemaghreb.revues.org/2027#text>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The group's goal was to establish an Islamic State in Algeria and was solidly Salafist. The group began as a Salafist political party in 1989 – the Front Islamique du Salut or FIS – that the government banned in 1992. The government also arrested a number of FIS leaders, including the third in command. After the ban and the emergence of other jihadist groups in the region (notably GIA), the remaining then-underground FIS officials brought together fighters from MIA and other smaller Salafist groups to form the AIS, the armed wing of the party in 1993 (for the Western wing, under Ahmed Ben Aicha) and 1994 (for the Eastern wing, under Madani Mezraq). The group then engaged in traditional guerrilla warfare, notably against state officials that specifically kept the FIS from operating legally. They sent death threats (though whether or not they carried through with them is unclear) to said employees as well as attacking government buildings, though reports vary on whether any given act was the fault of the AIS or the GIA.

Geography

The group operated solely in Algeria and avoided the center of the country (GIA territory), though it had significant but tenuous control over the outer regions from 1994 to 1997.

Organizational Structure

Very little information exists about the group's leadership: while scholars seem to agree that Ben Aicha and Mezraq led the two portions of the AIS, the nature of their leadership and their backgrounds remain unclear. Most scholars call them "amirs" (see: Hafez) but this term seems to just refer to their relative power over the group. Interestingly, Ben Aicha himself has also said that while the AIS was the armed wing of the FIS, they were not completely controlled by the political party but rather had a significant amount of autonomy when conducting their operations. As a guerilla group, the group operated in a fairly concentrated way (as in, there seemed to be some sort of militaristic hierarchy in place), though different units operated in more cell-like ways and the FIS was, after being banned, an underground cell itself. The group started as a political party that became violent after legal civic engagement became impossible. Most if not all of their supporters were Algerian Islamic fundamentalists who were discontent with the way the country practiced democracy, though they did not come from one specific ethnic group or class.

External Ties

The FIS received many legal donations from external actors including private individuals in other countries while it was a legal political party but many of those financial sources seemed to have dried up once the party was forced underground. The AIS specifically was in many ways a splinter of MIA.

Group Outcome

As of 2012, the Armée Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Army or AIS) was no longer active. State responses were varied: the Algerian government arrested many of the guerrillas as well as party leadership, negotiated with the group, and attacked them via banning the FIS and media criticism.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1989

Group End (Outcome): 1999 (civil war ends)

XXI. AI-QA'IDA IN IRAQ
Min. Group Date: 1990
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: 2004

Aliases: Al-Qa'ida In Iraq (Tawhid And Jihad), Al Qaeda In Iraq, Al Qaeda In Iraq (Aqi), Al Qaeda In Mesopotamia, Al Qaida In Iraq, Al Qaida In Iraq (Aqi), Al Qaida In Mesopotamia, Al-Bara Bin Malek Brigades, Al-Bara Bin Malek Martyrs' Brigades,

Al-Qa`ida In Iraq, Al-Qaeda In Iraq, Al-Qaeda In Iraq (Aqi), Al-Qaeda In Mesopotamia, Al-Qaeda In The Land Of Two Rivers, Al-Qaeda Organization In The Land Of The Two Rivers, Al-Qaeda Organization In The Land Of Two Rivers, Al-Qaeda Organization In The Land Of Two Rivers, Tawhid And Jihad, Al-Qaida In Iraq, Al-Qa'ida In Iraq, Al-Qaida In Iraq (Aqi), Al-Qaida In Mesopotamia, Al-Tawheed Wal-Jihad, Al-Tawhid, Al-Zarqawi Network, Group Of Monotheism And Jihad, Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad (Jtj), Jamaat Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad, Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad, Monotheism And Holy Struggle, Organization Of Jihads Base In Mesopotamia, Organization Of Jihad's Base In Mesopotamia, Organization Of Jihad's Base In The Country Of The Two Rivers, Tanzim Qaidat Al-Jihad Fi Bilad Al-Rafidayn, Tanzim Qa'idat Al-Jihad Fi Bilad Al-Rafidayn, Unification And Jihad

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4338, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- Kirdar, M.J. "Al Qaeda in Iraq." Center for Strategic and International Studies. Case Study Number 1. 2011.
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- Bobby Ghosh, "A Short Political History of the terrorists who call themselves the Islamic State," Quartz, 2014,
<http://qz.com/248787/a-short-political-history-of-the-barbaric-terrorists-who-call-themselv-es-the-islamic-state/>
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<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/zarqawi.htm>
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3677658.stm
- Lee Husdon Telik, "Profile: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," CFR, 2006,
<http://www.cfr.org/iraq/profile-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/p9866>
- "Islamic state: a chronology of developments," DW, n.d.,
<http://www.dw.com/en/islamic-state-a-chronology-of-key-developments/a-17920159>
- Aaron Zelin, "The War between ISIS and Al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2014.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf
- Martha Crenshaw. "The Islamic State," Mapping Militants Project. 2016.
<http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1>
- Ebeb Kaplan. "Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, Zarqawi's Mysterious Successor (aka Abu Ayub al-Masri). Council on Foreign Relations. 2006.

<http://www.cfr.org/iraq/abu-hamza-al-muhajir-zarqawis-mysterious-successor-aka-abu-ayub-al-masri/p10894>

- Kristian Gleditsch et al. "Non-State Actor Data." 2011.
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

JTJW (later AQI) was founded in 1999 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to initially overthrow the Jordanian government (Zelin 2014; DW n.d.). Al-Zarqawi had tried to form the group in Jordan after he returned from the Soviet-Afghan War as 'Jund al Sham', but was arrested and sentenced to jail for seven years in 1992. The group is Sunni Islamist and changed its goals several times. It later became Salafi jihadist (Teslik 2006). The group came to attention for its media strategy to publicize very gruesome attacks as well as its role in the Iraqi insurgency following the US invasion (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Crenshaw 2016). Today, the group's goal is to create a pan-Arab caliphate which entails the overthrow of several regional governments including Iraq (Mackenzie Institute n.d.).

Geography

Zarqawi had a base in Herat, Afghanistan, as well as the al-Faruq training camp near Kandahar (Global Security n.d.). Zarqawi also initially operated out of Jordan (Crenshaw 2016). Later, AQI had bases in Raqqa, Fallujah, Mosul, Palmyra, and Ramadi (Crenshaw 2016).

Organizational Structure

AQI was initially led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian ex-criminal, who was radicalized in prison during the 1980s (Teslik 2006). After he was killed in a US airstrike in 2006, Zarqawi was replaced by Abu Ayub al-Masri (Kaplan 2006). Counterintelligence officials had little knowledge about the organizational structure due its clandestine nature (Gleditsch et al. 2011).

The members of JTJW were initially much poorer and less educated (Zelin 2014). There was no established political wing at the time of onset (Gleditsch et al. 2011). The group initially had only a few hundred members; in 2005, it was estimated to have 1,000 members. These fighters included a large number of foreign fighters from Jordan, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (Crenshaw 2016). When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over the group, it grew rapidly and today has an estimated 20,000-32,000 members (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

The group primarily funds itself through oil revenues, kidnapping, foreign donations, and money laundering in and around Iraq/Syria (Crenshaw 2016).

External Ties

There is no evidence of the group receiving state support. By 2006, there was evidence it had received some weapons from Iran (Crenshaw 2016). In 2004, Zarqawi formally allied with AQ, renaming itself AQI (Zelin 2014; Mackenzie Institute 2015; Crenshaw 2016). AQ provided some funding until the relationship ended over ideological differences in 2013 (DW n.d.; Crenshaw 2016).

Group Outcome

US counterinsurgency efforts concentrated on extirpating AQI and later ISIS from its strongholds through targeted raids (Crenshaw 2016). In 2006, Zarqawi was killed. Al-Masri replaced him and created a splinter, more extremist group called the ISI (Islamic State Iraq). Today, the group remains active and controls extensive territory in northern Iraq and eastern Syria (Zelin 2014; Mackenzie Institute 2015; Crenshaw 2016).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: JTWJ, Daesh, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, ISIL, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS, Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham

Group Formation: 1999

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (Active - IS)

XXII. IRAQI REVOLUTIONARY FORCES

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 1992

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1832>
- Searched proquest, "iraqi revolutionary forces", "iraqi revolutionary forces" 1992, iraqi revolutionary forces + 1992

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the Iraqi Revolutionary Forces formed. They first came to attention in 1992 for a series of attacks in Basra assassinating a Chief Security Officer and Infantry Brigade Commander (GTD n.d.).

Geography

The two known attacks occur in Basra, Iraq (GTD n.d.).

Organizational Structure

There is no information about the organizational structure of the Iraqi Revolutionary Forces.

External Ties

There is no information available about any potential external ties for the Iraqi Revolutionary Forces.

Group Outcome

The Iraqi Revolutionary Forces are not heard from again after these attacks in Basra(GTD n.d.). It is unknown what happens to them.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 1992

Group End (Outcome): 1992 (disappear)

XXIII. IRAQI ISLAMIC VANGUARDS FOR NATIONAL SALVATION (IIVNS)

Min. Group Date: 1994

Max. Group Date: 1994

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Group says it set bombs. (1994, Oct 21). New York Times Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/429911322?accountid=14026>

- Iraqi bomb claim. (1994, Oct 21). The Guardian (Pre-1997 Fulltext) Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/293521649?accountid=14026>
- The New York Times. (1994, Oct 21). U.S. buildup: Smaller the better? MILITARY: As the threat from saddam diminishes, U.S. officials are worried about cost. Orange County Register Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/272721203?accountid=14026>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in October, 1994, for an attack in Baghdad against the Ministry of Religious Affairs (New York Times 1994). The group does not issue a clear goal, but threatens to continue attacking the Hussein government. They have no defined ideology (Orange County Register 1994).

Geography

The group's primary attack occurred in Baghdad, but they issued a communique from Beirut (Guardian 1994).

Organizational Structure

There is no information available about the group's organizational structure.

External Ties

No information could be found about the group's external ties.

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happened to the group after the 1994 incident as it is not heard from again. There is no evidence about how the government responded shortly after the attack (New York Times 1994; Guardian 1994).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1994

Group End (Outcome): 1994 (unknown)

XXIV. AL-QA`IDA IN THE LANDS OF THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQLIM)

Min. Group Date: 1996

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qa`ida In The Lands Of The Islamic Maghreb (Aqlim), Al-Qaeda Committee In The Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaeda Committee In The Islamic Maghreb (Aqim), Al-Qaeda Organization In The Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, AQLIM

Part 1. Bibliography

- Filiu, Jean-Pierre. 2009. "The local and global jihad of Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghrib" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Spring).
- Thurston, Alexander and Andrew Lebovich. "A Handbook on Mali's 2012-2013 Crisis," *Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) Working Paper Series* no. 13-001. Sept. 2013.
<http://buffett.northwestern.edu/documents/working-papers/ISITA-13-001-Thurston-Lebovich.pdf>
- Harmon, Stephen. "From GSPC to AQIM: The Evolution of an Algerian Islamist Terrorist Group into an Al-Qa'ida Affiliate" in *Concerned African Scholars: US Militarization of the Sahara-Sahel: Security, Space and Imperialism*. 2010.
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.465.7833&rep=rep1&type=pdf#page=14>
- Gazdik, Gyula. "The Rise of Al-Qaida in North Africa: AQIM and its Role in the Region" in *Terrorist Threats in North Africa from a NATO Perspective*, 2015. Edited by J. Tomolya, L.D. White. IOS Press.
https://books.google.com/books?id=nQtRCwAAQBAJ&dq=AQIM&lr=&source=gbs_navlinks_s
- "Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)" National Counterterrorism Center. 2014. <https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqim.html>
- Arieff, Alexis. 2011. "Algeria: Current Issues," *Congressional Research Service*.
<http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a543373.pdf>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

GSPC formed in 1998 as a splinter of the GIA following the Algerian Civil War resolution. The group's original goal was to liberate the Algerian population from FLN rule and create an Islamic state, though now the goal seems to have shifted to be more about global jihad, in line with what al-Qaeda generally preaches. The group's ideology is solidly Salafi. Some notable violent attacks include: in June 2005 the GSPC (precursor to AQIM) fighters killed 15 soldiers in an attack on a Mauritanian army base, and in early 2003, the group kidnapped 32 German tourists. One Algeria-specific attack was the failed assassination attempt on President Bouteflika on September 6th, 2007.

Geography

The group primarily operates in Algeria, though it has troops in Mali and Mauritania and has expanded somewhat into Tunisia and Libya. Most of its attacks are in Algeria, though many of its bases are in northern Mali.

Organizational Structure

The leadership is complicated: when the group first split from the GIA in 1998, Hassan Hattab (a former GIA member) was the leader. In 2003, however, Nabil Sahraoui ousted him but died less than a year later in 2004. After that, the current leader Abdelmalek Droukdal took power, though he shares it somewhat in an al-Qaeda-like hierarchy, in which there are different divisions (like the Sahara division or branch), all of which have their own commanders. The group operates mostly through cells – like al-Qaeda – with many suicide bombings and smaller group attacks, though at the beginning of the group (before it allied with and became a part of al-Qaeda), the group was more concentrated in Algeria. Given that the group split from the GIA (a brutal radical Islamist organization in Algeria) specifically because of its brutality, the movement seems to have started as a political issue of a difference of opinions on how to go about realizing an Islamic state and turned into a much more militaristic movement afterwards. The group does not seem to have a formal political wing. Many of its supporters are Algerians, mostly men, who fought against the US in Afghanistan and, upon their return, joined AQIM. Apart from that, the group does not seem to recruit from a specific class or ethnic group.

External Ties

The group has no apparent external support from other countries, seeming to prefer making money through extortion and hostage-taking. However, the group does have a number of ties to other groups: as a splinter of the GIA, the GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in English) allegedly allied itself with a number of other Islamist groups in the region such as GICT, GICM and LIFG in order to share resources, though according to Harmon there's evidence that these ties deteriorated after 2008 as the group lost some power. Additionally, the group that was once the GSPC is now a part of al-Qaeda, announced in 2006 by bin Laden's deputy Zawahiri and by the name switch to AQIM. It's not clear exactly why the merger occurred, though Gazdik states that it's evidence that the GSPC wanted a more global approach, especially because even at the founding of the GSPC, bin Laden and the al-Qaeda ideologically supported the group.

Group Outcome

Governments have taken a number of different approaches to dealing with AQIM: the Algerian government has tried: offering the group amnesty if they'll put down arms, raiding and other military tactics often in conjunction with other governments, placing soldiers on Algeria's borders with Libya, Mali, Niger and Mauritania to try to apprehend AQIM fighters or officials, and even arresting suspected AQIM members. Other states affected by the AQIM have tried similar tactics, though few seemed to have an effect. As of 2012, the AQIM is still active, mostly in Algeria.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb; Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb; Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat; GSPC; Groupe salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat

Group Formation: 1998

Group End (Outcome): 2012 (active)

XXV. GREEN BRIGADE OF THE PROPHET

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Green Brigade Of The Prophet, Al Katibat Al Khadra, Al-Katibat Al-Khadra, Green Battalion, Green Brigade Of Islamic Resistance, Prophets Green Brigade, Prophet's Green Brigade

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4624, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- EXECUTED ; kidnappers shoot this italian hostage and warn: Get out of iraq or the killing goes on. (2004, Apr 15). Daily Mail Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/321468815?accountid=14026>
- Iraqi group sets demands for releasing four italians - al-jazeera. (2004, Apr 13). BBC Monitoring Newsfile Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/452457867?accountid=14026>
- Ellis, Mark. 2004. I'M READY TO KILL MYSELF ; iraq rebel cleric al-sadr's vow as US closes in. The Daily Mirror, Apr 14, 2004. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/339247727?accountid=14026> (accessed January 4, 2017).
- Security guards reject 'mercenary' tag ; up to 20,000 private "security contractors" are working in iraq, making them the second largest foreign force in the country after the US army, writes lara marlowe. (2004, Apr 16). Irish Times Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/309695408?accountid=14026>
- Barry Rubin and Judith Rubin. Chronologies of Modern Terrorism. Routledge 2015. p. 331 https://books.google.com/books?id=ynNsBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA331&lpg=PA331&dq=green+brigade+of+the+prophet+iraq&source=bl&ots=MCVYRGfka2&sig=ard1yhldh9YdnfvD-UlgTGEzFs0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi_29yHy6nRAhXByVQKHc_3DGcQ6AEIPTAF#v=onepage&q=green%20brigade%20of%20the%20prophet%20iraq&f=false

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in 2004 for a prominent kidnapping of four Italian security contractors (BBC 2004; MIPT 2008). The group fought to protest the US occupation and demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country (BBC 2004; Ellis 2004). It is an “extremist group” (Daily Mail 2004).

Geography

The group was active in Fallujah, Iraq (BBC 2004).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the organizational structure of the group.

External Ties

The group may be related or allied with the Mujahideen Brigades which was another sect of the Iraqi insurgency in 2003-2004 (MIPT 2004).

Group Outcome

Green Brigades were attacked by coalition forces in a raid “several months” after the Italian security contractors were kidnapped (MIPT 2008). The raid was successful and the group was not heard from again (Irish Times 2004; MIPT 2008).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Al-Mujahidin Brigade

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (military)

XXVI. ISLAMIC RESISTANCE BRIGADES
Min. Group Date: 1999
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4436, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- Aaron Karp. Chp. 4, Small Arms Survey 2010, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2010/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2010-Chapter-04-Annexe-1-active-insurgencies.pdf>
- Daniel Williams, "Despite Agreement, Insurgents Rule Fallujah." Washington Post. 2004. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A20761-2004Jun6.html>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the Islamic Resistance Brigades formed, but it first came to attention in 2004 for a series of kidnappings of several foreign security contractors (MIPT 2008). The group was Islamist (Karp 2010). It fought to expel foreign troops from Iraq following the US invasion (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group was active in Fallujah, Iraq (Williams 2004).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the group's organizational structure,

External Ties

In 2004, the group allied with the God Is Great Battalions, the Muhammad Messenger of God Forces, and the Jihad Battalion to reject the provisional government and reiterate their demand to expel US forces (Williams 2004). There is no evidence of external support from foreign governments. The group also later allied with other Sunni tribes as part of the Anbar Awakening (Karp 2010).

Group Outcome

The group later changed its goals and began to fight other insurgencies during the Anbar Awakening (Karp 2010).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2007 (merger? Change sides?)

XXVII. FREE FIGHTERS COMMAND

Min. Group Date: 2000

Max. Group Date: 2000

Onset: NA

Aliases: Free Fighters Command, Iraqi Free Fighters Command, Qiyadat Al-Muqatilin Al-Ahrar

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Intelligence Briefs: Region." Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. Vol 2. No. 6, 2000.
https://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0007_meb.htm
- Searched proquest:
 - "free fighters command" + iraq
 - Free fighters command iraq
 - Free fighters command 2000
- Searched gscholar: "free fighters command" + iraq

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group initially formed, but it first came to attention in 2000 for the alleged seizure of a chemical weapon in Iraq (Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 200). There is no evidence what the group's goals or ideology was.

Geography

It is unknown where the incident took place apart from a "fortified Iraqi military post" (Middle East Intelligence Bureau 2000).

Organizational Structure

The group had a public spokesman indicating some degree of organization, but no additional information could be found about the group's leadership, membership, command structure or anything else (Middle East Intelligence Bureau 2000).

External Ties

There is no evidence of external support for the group or ties with other actors.

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happens to the group; there is no evidence of additional incidents by the group or actions by the Iraqi military in response.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2000

Group End (Outcome): 2000 (unknown)

XXVIII. JUND-UL-ISLAM (SOLDIERS OF GOD)
Min. Group Date: 2001
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Jund-UI-Islam (Soldiers Of God), Jund Al Islam, Jund Al-Islam, Jund UI Islam, Jund UI-Islam, Soldiers Of God

Part 1. Bibliography

- Scott Peterson Staff writer of The Christian, Science Monitor. (2002, Nov 22). Islamists escalate fight in N. Iraq. The Christian Science Monitor (1908-Current File) Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1696300584?accountid=14026>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for Ansar al-Islam (Christian Science Monitor 2002).

Geography

This is an alias for Ansar al-Islam (Christian Science Monitor 2002).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for Ansar al-Islam (Christian Science Monitor 2002).

External Ties

This is an alias for Ansar al-Islam (Christian Science Monitor 2002).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for Ansar al-Islam (Christian Science Monitor 2002).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: This is an alias for Ansar al-Islam (Christian Science Monitor 2002).

Group Formation: This is an alias for Ansar al-Islam (Christian Science Monitor 2002).

Group End (Outcome): This is an alias for Ansar al-Islam (Christian Science Monitor 2002).

XXIX. ANSAR AL ISLAM
Min. Group Date: 2001
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: 2004

Aliases: Ansar Al-Islam, Ansar Al Islam, Ansar Ul Islam, Ansar Ul-Islam, Supporters Of Islam

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3501, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- Martha Crenshaw, "Ansar al-Islam," Mapping Militant Organizations, 2016, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/13>
- "Ansar al-Islam." Terrorism Profile. Mackenzie Institute. 2015. <http://mackenzieinstitute.com/ansar-al-islam-ai-2/>
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- Jonathan Schanzer. "Ansar al-Islam: Back in Iraq." Middle East Quarterly. 2004. P. 41-50. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/4224e31e5fa37.pdf>
- Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda*. The RAND Corporation, 2008. 153. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf

- “Ansar al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan.” Human Rights Watch. N.d. <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounders/mena/ansarbk020503.htm>
- “Ansar al-Islam.” Paramilitary Iraq. Global Security. n.d. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ansar_al_islam.htm
- “Ansar al-Islam.” Big Allied And Dangerous. Project on Violent Conflict. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. 2015. <http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/ansar-al-islam>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

Ansar al-Islam was formed in 2001 from a merger of different Kurdish groups, “including Kurdish Hamas, Tawhid, the Al-Tawhid Islamic Front, the Second Soran Unit, the Reformist group, and Jund al-Islam” (Crenshaw 2016). It was originally named Jund al-Islam, but changed its name in 2003 (Human Rights Watch n.d.). Its goal was to overthrow the Iraqi government and later resist the US occupation of Iraq (Crenshaw 2016). The group became more extremist in 2003 when al-Shafii replaced Krekar (Gregory 2008). At this time, its ideology was primary Salafi jihadist and Kurdish ethno-nationalist (Crenshaw 2016). It first came to attention in 2002 during an assassination attempt on the leader of the PUK (Crenshaw 2016).

Geography

The group was originally active in Biyara, Iraq; Tawela, Iraq, Halabjh, Iraq; and later Erbil, Kirkuk, Mosul, Aleppo, and Anbar province (Global Security n.d.; Crenshaw 2016).

Organizational Structure

The initial leader of AI was Mullah Krekar, who was later replaced by Abu Abdullah al-Shafii in 2003 (Gregory 2008). The group was primarily composed of Kurds and Sunni Arabs. Many of these members had extensive military experience from the Soviet-Afghanistan war (Crenshaw 2016).

The group had approximately 350 members when it originally formed in 2001 and as many as 1000 members during its peak in 2004, 2005, 2009 (BAAD 2015; Crenshaw 2016). It had a propaganda wing which issued a magazine and maintained a strong Twitter presence to publicize and recruit members (Crenshaw 2016). There is no evidence of a formal political wing and there is little information available about the command-and-control structure of the group.

The group may have received some funding from Al-Qaeda (Gregory 2008; Crenshaw 2016). It also funded itself through local crime activities and a Sunni-Kurdish diaspora in

Europe and the Middle East (Mackenzie Institute 2015). It also engaged in taxation in the areas it controlled (BAAD 2015).

External Ties

The group allegedly received training, weapons, and funding from Al-Qaeda (Crenshaw 2016). It also had strong support from Osama bin Laden (Gregory 2008). After the US invasion of Afghanistan, Al supposedly harbored members of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Crenshaw 2016). Although the US government claimed that Saddam Hussein supported Al, no evidence was ever found to corroborate this (Crenshaw 2016). Additional analysts speculate (although it is not confirmed) that Iran and Syria provide support for Al through external sanctuary bases and logistical support (Gregory 2008).

Al was a merger between several Kurdish groups including Tawhid, Al-Tawhid Islamic Front, Second Soran Unit, and Reformist Group (Schanzer 2004). It also had ties to the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK).

Al opposed the PUK and KDP groups active in northern Iraq and fought to undermine them (Crenshaw 2016). It tried to exploit political competition between these two factions by launching attacks against secular Kurds in the area (Schanzer 2004).

Group Outcome

In 2003, Al members suffered a huge blow when US troops launched a major offensive against them. PUK forces aided US troops in this attack (BAAD 2015). Their leader fled to Europe and “the majority of Al members were captured, killed, or fled to neighboring Iran” (Crenshaw 2016). Despite this, the group managed to rebuild and launched a series of devastating attacks in Erbil, Iraq and Mosul starting in 2004 (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Crenshaw 2016). US forces arrested al-Shafii in 2010 in Baghdad (BAAD 2015).

In 2013, the group suffered another setback as many members defected to the Islamic State which had similar goals as Al (Crenshaw 2016). In 2014, many members of Al’s leadership command publicly pledged their support to ISIS and merged with ISIS (Crenshaw 2016).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Ansar al-Sunna, Ansar al-Sunna Army, Devotees of Islam, Followers of Islam in Kurdistan, Helpers of Islam, Jaish Ansar al-Sunna, Jund al-Islam, Kurdish Taliban, Kurdistan Supporters of Islam, Partisans of Islam, Soldiers of God, Soldiers of Islam, Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan, *Ansar al-Islam fi Kurdistan*

Group Formation: 2001

Group End (Outcome): 2014 (merger)

XXX. ANSAR AL-SUNNA
Min. Group Date: 2001
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: Ansar Al-Sunna, Ansar Al-Sunna (As) Shariah, Ansar Al-Sunnah, Ansar Al-Sunnah Army, Army Of Ansar Al-Sunnah, Shari'ah Council Of The Ansar Al-Sunnah Group

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3921, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- "Ansar al-Sunna (AS)." Chp. 8 Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Country Reports on Terrorism 2005. US Department of State. 2006.
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/125/ansar-al-sunna-as>
- "Jaish Ansar al-Sunna." Middle East Ansar al-Islam. Global Security. n.d.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ansar-al-sunna.htm>
- Michael Rubin. "Ansar al-Sunna." American Enterprise Institute. 2004.
<https://www.aei.org/publication/ansar-al-sunna/>
- Abu Rumman, Muhammad, "Politics of Sunni Armed Groups in Iraq." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Arab Reform Bulletin. Retrieved on July 24, 2011 from
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2008/08/18/politics-of-sunni-armed-groups-in-iraq/cb6>
- Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda*. The RAND Corporation, 2008.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf

Part 2. Narrative

Note: Ansar al-Sunna is an alias for Al. This profile refers to AS Shariah which is a splinter group of Al.

Group Formation

Ansar al-Sunna Shariah splintered from Al in 2007 over disagreements about ties to AQ/ISI (Crenshaw 2015). It was primarily Kurdish and Salafi Jihadist like Al with a goal to fight foreign troops in Iraq and overthrow the Iraqi government (Crenshaw 2015).

Geography

The group was engaged in several prominent attacks in Baghdad and northern Iraq (Crenshaw 2015).

Organizational Structure

Its original leaders were Abu Sajjad and Shaykh Abu Hind (Crenshaw 2015). There are no good estimates about the size of AS Shariah (Crenshaw 2015). The group had a Science and Technology wing which was advanced enough to develop a missile by 2009 (Crenshaw 2015).

External Ties

The group was allied with the Jihad and Reform Front and the Political Council of Iraqi Resistance (Crenshaw 2015). There is no evidence of external support for the group (Crenshaw 2015). It opposed Al's close ties with AQI (Crenshaw 2015).

Group Outcome

The group was last heard from in 2009 when it developed a missile (Crenshaw 2015). No information could be found about any prominent responses by the US government or Iraqi security forces.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None - remove Ansar al-Sunna since this refers to a separate group

Group Formation: 2007

Group End (Outcome): A new proposed end date with the reason for ending in parentheses

XXXI. ISLAMIC ARMY OF IRAQ (IAI)

Min. Group Date: 2002

Max. Group Date: 2009

Onset: 2005

Aliases: Islamic Army In Iraq (Al-Jaish Al-Islami Fi Al-Iraq), Al-Jaish Al-Islami Fi Al-Iraq, Al-Jaysh Al-Islami Fi Iraq, Islamic Army In Iraq, Islamic Army In Iraq (IAI), Islamic Army Of Iraq, Islamic Army Of Iraq (IAI), Reformation And Jihad Front

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4375, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- “New Front Challenges in Baghdad.” Conflict Forum. 2007.
<http://www.conflictsforum.org/2007/new-front-challenges-al-qaeda-in-iraq/>
- Pascale Siegel. “Mergers and Acquisitions within the Iraqi Insurgency. Terrorism Focus 5(8). 2008.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4749&no_cache=1#.V2F58uYrlxE
- Eric Herring. “The Future of Iraq.” Beyond Iraq: The Future of World Order.
<https://ericherring.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/eh-future-of-iraq-ms-proofs-10-doc.pdf>
- Pascale Siegel. “Partner or Spoiler: The Case of the Islamic Army in Iraq.” 2008.
<https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/partner-or-spoiler-the-case-of-the-islamic-army-in-iraq>
- Martha Crenshaw. “Islamic Army in Iraq.” Mapping Militants Project. 2015.
<http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/5>
- “Islamic Army of Iraq.” Global Security. N.d.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/iai.htm>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The IAI formed in 2003 following the US invasion of Iraq in order to force foreign troops to leave Iraq (Crenshaw 2015). In 2005, the group changed its goals to fight for the creation of three separate states from the current borders of Iraq to better represent the ethnic makeup of Iraq (Crenshaw 2015). It is ethno-nationalist and adheres to a Sunni ideology (Crenshaw 2015). It does sometimes issues propaganda and media announcements which use Salafi jihadist rhetoric, indicating a more extremist tone as well (Siegel 2011).

Geography

The IAI has been active in Anbar, Diyala, and Saladin provinces of Iraq (Crenshaw 2015). The group first came to attention in 2004 for an incident near Najaf, but has also been tied to incidents in Baghdad, Mosul, and Ramadi (Crenshaw 2015).

Organizational Structure

IAI was led by Ahmed al-Dabash (Crenshaw 2015). The group is primarily composed of Iraqi Sunnis, but it also has some Shiite members. It also purportedly has some ex-Baathist members who joined after the dissolution of Hussein’s Baath party in 2003 (Crenshaw 2015).

The group allegedly had 10000 members as of 2007 (Crenshaw 2015).

External Ties

IAI initially worked very closely with AQI, but this relationship fell apart in 2006 due to concerns about civilian targeting (Crenshaw 2015). In 2013, the group re-formed to fight against IS (Crenshaw 2015).

IAI is allied with the Mujahideen Army and Ansar al-Sunni Shariah; it later merged with the latter two to form the Reform and Jihad Front (Crenshaw 2015). After it formed the RJF, it also allied itself with Hamas Iraq, Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance, and the Political Council of the Iraqi Resistance (Crenshaw 2015).

Group Outcome

“In May 2007, IAI merged with Ansar al-Sunni Shariah and the Mujahideen Army to form the Reformation and Jihad Front (RJF), an anti-AQI, anti-US umbrella organization” (Crenshaw 2015). The IAI formally dissolved in 2011 after US troops finished withdrawing, but restarted in 2013 in order to fight ISIS (Crenshaw 2015). After the group dissolved in 2011, many members joined local tribal militias (Crenshaw 2015).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2003

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

XXXII. ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ
Min. Group Date: 2002
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: 2004

Aliases: Islamic State Of Iraq (ISI), Islamic State Of Iraq

Part 1. Bibliography

- Martha Crenshaw. “The Islamic State.” Mapping Militant Organizations. 2016.
<http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1>
- Zachary Laub. “The Islamic State.” Council on Foreign Relations. 2016.
<http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811>
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<http://mackenzieinstitute.com/islamic-state-iraq-levant-isil-2/>

- Octavia Nasr. "How Zarqawi's terror network morphed into ISIS." Al-Arabiya. 2014. <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/07/01/How-Abu-Musab-al-Zarqawi-shaped-ISIS.html>
- Jessica Lewis. "Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent." Middle East Security Report 14. Institute for the Study of War. 2013. <http://www.understandingwar.org/report/al-qaeda-iraq-resurgent>
- Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011. http://csis.org/files/publication/110614_Kirdar_AlQaedIraq_Web.pdf
- Teslik, Lee. "Profile: Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi." Council on Foreign Relations. 8 June 2006. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/profile-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/p98666>.
- Hashim, Ahmed. "The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate." Middle East Policy 21.4 (2014): 70. DOI: 10.1111/mepo.12096. <http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/islamic-state-al-qaeda-affiliate-caliphate>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for AQL.

Geography

This is an alias for AQL.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for AQL.

External Ties

This is an alias for AQL.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for AQL.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: This is an alias for AQL.

Group Formation: This is an alias for AQL.

Group End (Outcome): This is an alias for AQL.

XXXIII. SALAFI ABU-BAKR AL-SIDDIQ ARMY

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 2010

Onset: NA

Aliases: Salafi Abu-Bakr Al-Siddiq Army, Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq Brigades, Abu Bakr, Al-Siddiq Fundamentalist Brigades, Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq Fundamentalist Brigades (Absb), Salafist Brigades Of Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4453, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- "THE AMIR OF THE ABU BAKR AL-SIDDIQ AL-SALAFI ARMY DESCRIBES THE STATE OF THE IRAQI RESISTANCE." Terrorism Focus. 5(31). Jamestown Foundation. 2008. <https://jamestown.org/brief/briefs-215/>
- Myriam Benraad. "Assessing AQL's Resilience after April's decapitations." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 2010. <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/assessing-aqi%E2%80%99s-resilience-after-april%E2%80%99s-leadership-decapitations>
- Andrew McGregor. "[The Amir of the Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq al-Salafi Army Describes the State of the Iraqi Resistance](http://www.berfoylesecurity.com/?cat=26&paged=2)" 2008. Aberfoyle International Security. <<http://www.berfoylesecurity.com/?cat=26&paged=2>>
- Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida*. The RAND Corporation, 2008. 143. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- GTD Perpetrator 20401. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20401>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Abu Bakr Army was founded in 2003, but first came to attention in 2004 with two kidnappings (Jamestown Foundation 2008). The group demanded foreign troops leave Iraq (MIPT 2008). They later changed their goal to include the creation of an Islamic State in Iraq (Jamestown Foundation 2008). It adheres to a Salafi jihadist ideology (Jamestown Foundation 2008)

Geography

The group had two incidents in Baghdad, Iraq (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The Abu Bakr Army is led by Abu Muhammed al-Iraqi (Jamestown Foundation 2008). The group claims to primarily have devout religious followers and “denies the participation of Ba’athists” (Jamestown Foundation 2008). Although there is no estimate on the group’s size, there are at least some members from the Iraqi Army with combat experience (Jamestown Foundation 2008).

External Ties

The group was allegedly inspired by AQI’s actions during the Iraqi insurgency (Benraad 2010). Some members defected from the Abu Bakr army to join ISI (Benraad 2010).

Group Outcome

The group carried out additional suicide bombings between 2004 and was active as recently as 2008 (Jamestown Foundation 2008). It had lost some members to ISI due to a similar ideology and goal (Benraad 2010). According to Jones and Libicki (2008, 143), the group disappears due to splintering, but it has the wrong date of ending. MIPT (2008) claims there is no evidence of additional arrests or actions taken against the group following the 2004 kidnappings (MIPT 2008).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Abu Bakr Army

Group Formation: 2003

Group End (Outcome): 2008 (splinter?)

XXXIV. ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF IRAQI MUJAHIDEEN

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Jessica Shepherd and, Neil Connor. 2004. "Former West Midlands Resident Executed by Gunmen in Iraq." Birmingham Post, Dec 17, 1.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/323981448?accountid=14026>.
- "Mystery 'Charity Worker' Executed in Iraq." 2004.BreakingNews.Ie, Dec 16.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/747603435?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Mujahideen formed, but it first came to attention in 2004 for the execution of an Italian charity worker who ran into a roadblock (Shepherd and Connor 2004). It is unknown what the group's goals or ideology are. When the group publicized the execution, they said it was "a present to Berlusconi's stupidity" because he had placed Italian troops in Iraq (Shepherd and Connor 2004). The group said it was a warning for countries which had sent foreign troops into Iraq (Breaking News 2004).

Geography

The incident happened outside Ramadi, Iraq (Shepherd and Connor 2004).

Organizational Structure

No evidence could be found about the group's organizational structure.

External Ties

No evidence could be found about the group's external ties.

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happens to the group after the incident. There is no evidence of a state response.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (unknown)

XXXV. AL-FARUQ BRIGADES

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Faruq Brigades, Jihadist Al-Faruq Brigades, Media Commission For The Mujahidin In Iraq

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4325, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- "Al-Faruq." Global Security, n.d.(a)
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-faruq.htm>
- "Assessing the Iraqi Resistance Movement." Research Staffs of Conflict Forum. 2005.
<http://www.conflictsforum.com/Briefs/Briefing1.pdf>
- Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda*. The RAND Corporation, 2008. 153.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf

Note: this group is distinct from the Syrian rebel group known as the Farouq Brigades

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The al-Faruq Brigades was formed in June 2003 to fight against the US occupation of Iraq (Research Conflict Forum 2005). The group was opposed to Saddam Hussein, but had no other set ideology (Research Conflict Forum 2005). It ascribes to Salafi jihadist ideology (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group operates primarily out of Fallujah, Mosul, Al-Bakr, and Ramadi, Iraq (Research Conflict Forum 2005; MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

The al-Faruq Brigades is the armed wing of the Iraqi Islamic Movement (Research Conflict Forum 2005). It was named after There are no estimates on group sizes, but members include Arab Sunnis and some ex-Baathist members (Research Conflict Forum 2005). It is unknown how the group funds itself. The group is organized in a set of cells including both intelligence and combat wings (Research Conflict Forum 2005).

The group publicizes their attacks via the “Free Arab Voice” publication (Global Security n.d.a)

External Ties

The al-Farouq Brigades are allied with the General Command of the Armed Forces and the Resistance and Liberation in Iraq group (Research Conflict Forum 2005). It is named after al Qaeda leader Omar Bin Khattab.

Group Outcome

The group’s last prominent attack was in 2004 when they attacked an American military base near Mosul (MIPT 2008). MIPT says that, as of 2008, there had been no reports of any arrests or counterinsurgency operations taken against the group. There is no evidence of any continued actions afterwards.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Al-Farouq Brigades, Al Farouq Brigades

Group Formation: 2003

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (unknown)

XXXVI. JAISH AL-FURQAN
Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Jaish Al-Furqan, Jaish Al-Furgan

Part 1. Bibliography

- Bill Roggio. “US targets al-Qaeda’s al Furqan media wing in Iraq.” Long War Journal. 2007. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/us_targets_al_qaedas.php
- Ahmed Hashim. Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency. Routledge. 2013. p. 21. https://books.google.com/books?id=XIXOn_xk4-8C&pg=PA21&lpg=PA21&dq=%22JAISH+AL-FURQAN%22+iraq&source=bl&ots=5txCabGYOz&sig=3Z0PntU-O1nsb2xzBWBAHfXbzCk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjF-665harRAhXihFQKHytDCuMQ6AEISTAI#v=onepage&q=%22JAISH%20AL-FURQAN%22%20iraq&f=false
- Burak Agalday. “The Impact of 2003 US-Led Invasion on the Rise of Terrorism in Iraq.” 2016. Bilkent University. <http://repository.bilkent.edu.tr/bitstream/handle/11693/30123/10114139.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

Part 2. Narrative

Note: this is distinct from Al-Qaeda's media wing 'al Furqan' (Roggio 2007)

Group Formation

Jaish al-Furqan was formed in 2007 when it splintered from the IAI (Hashim 2009, 21). It is unknown what their goals or ideology are. No evidence could be found of specific violent attacks, but was considered to be part of the larger insurgency.

Geography

There is no evidence that the group engaged in any attacks so it is hard to discern where their base of operations was.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the group's organizational structure.

External Ties

Jaish al-Furqan splintered from the IAI in 2007 due to ideological differences (Hashim 2009). It is unknown if they received any external support or had ties to other actors.

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happens to Jaish al-Furqan after it forms. No evidence could be found and it is not associated with any violent attacks after it forms.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2007

Group End (Outcome): 2007 (disappear)

XXXVII. KURDISTAN FREE LIFE PARTY
Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Kurdistan Free Life Party, Parti Jiyani Azadi Kurdistan, Part" Jiyani" Azad" Kurdistan, Parti Jiyani Azadi Kurdistan (Pjak), Part" Jiyani" Azad" Kurdistan (Pjak), Party For A Free Life In Kurdistan, Party For A Free Life In Kurdistan (Pjak), PJAK, Pjak, The Free Life Party Of Kurdistan

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://alnakhlah.org/2013/05/01/terrorism-in-iran-an-analysis-of-non-state-militant-organizations-in-the-islamic-republic-by-micah-peckarsky/>
- "PJAK." Global Security.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pjak.htm>
- "Tehran faces growing opposition." Washington Times. 2006.
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/apr/3/20060403-125601-8453r/?page=all>
- Seymour Hersh. "Preparing the battlefield." New Yorker. 2008.
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/07/07/preparing-the-battlefield>
- Saban Kardas. "PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States" Terrorism Monitor. 7(7). 2009.
<https://jamestown.org/program/pjak-iran-and-the-united-states-kurdish-militants-designated-terrorists-by-the-united-states/>
- Kristian Gleditsch et al. "Non-State Actor Data." 2011.
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

PJAK was formed in 2004 when it splintered from the PKK (Kardas 2009). PJAK is an ethno-nationalist militant group fighting Iran for a separate state (Global Security n.d.). Violence escalated when the Iranian government reacted adversely to the killing of 10 Iranian Kurds during a peaceful demonstration in the city of Mahabad in 2004.

Geography

The group operates primarily out of the Qandil mountains on the Turkish-Iranian border (Global Security n.d.). They primarily target areas in Iran including Mahabad and the Meriwan region (Kardas 2009).

Organizational Structure

They were originally a peaceful student-based movement fighting to address civil rights. A government crackdown in 1999 led the student organization to move towards PKK where they were heavily influenced by political ideas and military strategies. It splintered from PKK around 2003 and gained the support of many PKK fighters who helped the group create a military wing and develop its military capabilities.

The group allegedly had about 1500 members when the conflict started (Gleditsch et al 2011). It had a separate political and military wing. "PJAK had a clear command structure that coordinated the efforts of the organization" (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 507).

External Ties

PJAK allegedly received support from the PKK and Turkey (Gleditsch et al 2011). There is one report that it also received broad support from Israel and the US in 2006, but this was never confirmed and the source may be suspect (Hersh 2008). They use Iraq as an external sanctuary base for raids into Iran.

Group Outcome

Violence escalated when the Iranian government reacted adversely to the killing of 10 Iranian Kurds during a peaceful demonstration in the city of Mahabad in 2004.

Iran attacks peaceful demonstrators, sparks riots, Iran increases crackdown and moves into the area; PJAK launches large offensives against Iran. Iran has launched cross-border raids or attacks into the Qandil mountains to attack PJAK forces (Kardas 2009).

The group remained active as late as 2013.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2013 (active)

XXXVIII. NATIONAL ISLAMIC RESISTANCE

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Iraqi National Islamic Resistance." Global Security. N.d.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/iraqi_natl_islamic_resist.htm
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26809-2004Jul4_2.html?sections=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for the 1920s Revolution Brigade.

Geography

This is an alias for the 1920s Revolution Brigade.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for the 1920s Revolution Brigade.

External Ties

This is an alias for the 1920s Revolution Brigade.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for the 1920s Revolution Brigade.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: This is an alias for the 1920s Revolution Brigade.

Group Formation: This is an alias for the 1920s Revolution Brigade.

Group End (Outcome): This is an alias for the 1920s Revolution Brigade.

XXXIX. ABU HAFS AL-MASRI BRIGADES
Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: Abu Hafs Al-Masri Brigades, Abu Hafs Al Masri Brigade, Abu Hafs Al-Masri Brigade

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3903, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
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- "Assessing the Iraqi Resistance Movement." Research Staffs of Conflict Forum. 2005. <http://www.conflictsforum.com/Briefs/Briefing1.pdf>
- Giles Foden. "Ace of Base." Guardian. 2003. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/nov/18/turkey.alqaida1>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Abu Hafsa al Masri Brigade formed in 2003 to expel foreign troops occupying Iraq after the US invasion (Research Conflict Forum 2005). The group was named after Abu Hafs, a relative of Osama bin Laden, who was killed in 2001 (Foden 2003).

Geography

The group primarily operates out of the Kerma village near Fallujah (Research Conflict Forum 2005). It later was based out of the UK (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

The group claims a lot of attacks in Egypt that some skeptics believe is incorrect; "some analysts believe they are only an internet propaganda front" (Jamestown Foundation 2005). There is no information available about the group's size, membership or funding capabilities (Jamestown Foundation 2005). Some analysts believe the group does not actually carry out any attacks, but only claims credit for other ones (Jamestown Foundation 2005).

External Ties

The group had ties to Al-Qaeda and was one of many proxy groups advancing Al-Qaeda's goals during the Iraqi insurgency (Research Conflict Forum 2005).

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happened to the group or if it ever actually existed. Its last known incident was in 2006 when it issued a communique denouncing a Danish newspaper for drawing cartoons of the prophet Muhammed (MIPT 2008).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Abu Hafsa al Masri Brigades, Abu Hafsa al-Masri Brigades

Group Formation: 2003

Group End (Outcome): 2006 (unknown)

XL. IRAQI HAMAS/ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Martha Crenshaw. " Hamas Iraq." Mapping Militant Organizations. 2015.
<http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/29>
- Abdul Hammeed Bakier. "Iraq's Islamic Mujahideen Profiled by Jihadi Websites." Jamestown Foundation. 2007.
<https://jamestown.org/brief/iraqs-islamic-mujahideen-profiled-by-jihadi-websites-part-two/>
- "Assessing the Iraqi Resistance Movement." Research Staffs of Conflict Forum. 2005.
<http://www.conflictsforum.com/Briefs/Briefing1.pdf>

Part 2. Narrative

Note: This group has no relation to the Palestinian Hamas.

Group Formation

Hamas Iraq was formed in 2007 when it splintered from the 1920s Revolution Brigades (Crenshaw 2015). It is a Sunni organization that fought to expel US troops from Iraq (Crenshaw 2015).

Geography

Hamas Iraq was tied to attacks in Diyala and Anbar province in Iraq including Baqouba and Anbar (Crenshaw 2015).

Organizational Structure

There is no information on Hamas Iraq's leadership, size, or membership. It is unknown how they fund themselves.

External Ties

Hamas Iraq initially splintered from the 1920s Revolution Brigade (Crenshaw 2015). The group allied with the Jihad and Reform Front and Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance to form the Political Council for Iraqi Resistance (Bakier 2008). This merger was a political umbrella organization and did not supplant the group's own activities (Crenshaw 2015).

Hamas Iraq might have coordinated some actions with the US during an offensive in 2007-2008 (Crenshaw 2015). Hamas Iraq claims to have rejected an offer of external support from Iran (Crenshaw 2015).

Group Outcome

The group's last known attack was in 2009 when it attacked US military forces (Crenshaw 2009). Afterwards, the group went quiet and it is believed that it lost many members to tribal militias fighting AQI (Crenshaw 2015).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Hamas Iraq

Group Formation: 2007

Group End (Outcome): 2009 (splinter/lose members)

XLI. AL-RASHIDIN ARMY

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Rashidin Army, Al-Rashideen, Al-Rashideen Army, Al-Rashideen Army (Ra), Al-Rashidin Army (Ra), Army Of The Rightly-Guided

Part 1. Bibliography

- IntelCenter. IntelCenter Terrorism Incident Reference (TIR): Iraq 2006. Tempest Publishing. 2008.
<https://books.google.com/books?id=eZ7NBz65CoAC&pg=PA371&lpg=PA371&dq=AL-R>

[ASHIDIN+ARMY&source=bl&ots=WW-eP89Hjl&sig=vF9Nd4V5nndx9XjsrGkYifUbgnyY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwinuaTqjarRAhULi1QKHSa6A8QQ6AEINDAG#v=onepage&q=AL-RASHIDIN%20ARMY&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=qZuXdUgb1gsC&pg=PA91&lpg=PA91&dq=Jaish+al-Ta%27ifa+al-Mansurah&source=bl&ots=gmoQXUO09B&sig=nj_qVaRh_n2x6zvsOESbZbORTKw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjM1sDUmqrRAhXKIIQKHQn-CIlg4ChDoAQgvMAQ#v=onepage&q=Jaish%20al-Ta'ifa%20al-Mansurah&f=false)

- Robert A. Pape and James Feldman. *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It*. University of Chicago Press. 2010.
https://books.google.com/books?id=qZuXdUgb1gsC&pg=PA91&lpg=PA91&dq=Jaish+al-Ta%27ifa+al-Mansurah&source=bl&ots=gmoQXUO09B&sig=nj_qVaRh_n2x6zvsOESbZbORTKw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjM1sDUmqrRAhXKIIQKHQn-CIlg4ChDoAQgvMAQ#v=onepage&q=Jaish%20al-Ta'ifa%20al-Mansurah&f=false
- United Kingdom: Home Office, Country of Origin Information Report - Iraq, 12 January 2009, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/496cad382.html> [accessed 5 January 2017]
- Radio Free Europe. "Iraq: Insurgent groups differ on talks with government." Relief Web. 2006. <http://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-insurgent-groups-differ-talks-government>
- "Insurgent Group Official Says Fight Not Confined to Iraq - UK Arabic Paper." 2007. BBC Monitoring Middle East, Jul 21, 1. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/459104867?accountid=14026>.
- "Militants Claim Downing US Drone North of Baghdad." 2005. BBC Monitoring Middle East, Oct 02, 1. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/459134645?accountid=14026>.
- "Iraq: Al-Rashidin Army, Ansar Al-Islam Videos Claim Attacks on US Forces." 2008. BBC Monitoring Middle East, Oct 30. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/459015161?accountid=14026>.
- "Islamic Groups Claim Responsibility for Attacks on US Troops in Iraq." 2009. BBC Monitoring Middle East, Feb 22. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/458810502?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The al-Rashidin Army was a Sunni, Iraqi-nationalist militant group which first came to attention in 2005 for downing a drone (BBC 2005; Pape and Feldman 2010, 91). The group fought to expel foreign troops from Iraq (Pape and Feldman 2010, 91).

Geography

The group conducted attacks north of Baghdad (BBC 2005, BBC 2008). It was also involved in attacks near al-Mushahidah, al-Mada'in, al-Huwayjah, and Abu Ghraib area (IntelCenter 2008).

Organizational Structure

Abu Muhammad al-Zubaydi was the leader of the political wing of the Rashidin Army, which he ran from his home in Baghdad (BBC 2007). Al-Zubaydi says the group was very well organized with a military wing, training wing, intelligence wing, and surveillance wing (BBC 2007). The group had approximately six brigades as of 2006 as well as an online presence (UK Iraq Report 2009). The group launched a suicide bombing campaign in 2006 (Pape and Feldman 2010). It is unknown how the group funded itself. A brigade is normally 1500-4000 soldiers, but it is unknown if the UK Iraq Report measured "brigade" the same way. Unlike many militant groups, the Rashidin Army refused to harm civilians (BBC 2007).

External Ties

The group claimed responsibility for the same attack alongside the al-Mujahidin Army and the Sa'd Bin Abi Waqqas Army (BBC 2009). It was affiliated with the Jihad and Reform Front (RJF) (BBC 2008). It also issued a joint communique along with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the Joint Leadership of the Mujahedin, Muhammad's Army, and the Al-Fatihin Brigade in 2006 (Relief Web/Radio Free Europe 2006).

Group Outcome

The group was conducting attacks against US troops as late as 2009, but it is unknown what happened to the group afterwards (BBC 2009).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Jaysh al-Rashidin, First Four Caliphs Army, Jaysh al-Rashidin (The First Four Caliphs Army)

Group Formation: 2005

Group End (Outcome): 2009 (unknown)

XLI. ARMED VANGUARDS OF A SECOND MOHAMMED ARMY
Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 2003
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Assessing the Iraqi Resistance Movement." Research Staffs of Conflict Forum. 2005. <http://www.conflictsforum.com/Briefs/Briefing1.pdf>

- “Iraq’s Numerous Insurgent Groups.” NPR. 2006.
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5468486>
- “Jaysh Muhammed.” Global Security n.d.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/jaysh-muhammad.htm>
- GTD,
<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200308190001>
- Josh Landis. “Is Syria Aiding the Iraqi Resistance?” Syria Comment. 2005.
<http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/2005/01/is-syria-aiding-iraqi-resistance.htm> [taken from 2004 AP article ‘Iraqi militant admits ties with Iran, Syria’]

Part 2. Narrative

Note: This is the ex-baathist insurgency you have been looking for.

Group Formation

Mohammed’s Army was formed in either April 2003 by Saddam Hussein or September 2003 by residents in Diyala to expel foreign troops from occupying Iraq (Research Conflict Forum 2005). The group had one known attack in 2003 when it allegedly bombed UN headquarters in Baghdad, but this is later attributed to Al Qaeda in Iraq (GTD n.d.; Global Security n.d.).

Geography

The group had one known attack in 2003 when it allegedly bombed the UN headquarters in Baghdad, but this is later attributed to Al Qaeda in Iraq (GTD n.d.; Global Security n.d.). It has support and operates from Ramadi, Fallujah, Samaraa, and Baquba (NPR 2006).

Organizational Structure

Mohammed’s Army is the armed wing of the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party (ABSP). It was led by Moayad Ahmed Yasseen until his capture in Fallujah in 2005 (Landis 2005). Yasseen was a military colonel under Saddam’s army.

The group funds itself through party and member donations. Most members are ex-Ba’athists who joined after Hussein was overthrown (Research Conflict Forum 2005). It also has Sufi members who were a privileged minority under Hussein (Global Security n.d.). It may have also attracted some foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia to fight (Global Security n.d.). It may have also attracted Sunni farmers as well to join the fight (Global Security n.d.). The size of it means that the group operates primarily as a series of diffused cells or brigades across Iraq (NPR 2006).

External Ties

Yasseen claims the group sent members to Iran and Syria to ask for money and weapons. Iran allegedly provided these items, but it is unknown if Syria did. That said, the Ba'ath Party had Sunni ties while Iran and Syria are both Shi'ite so it is difficult to corroborate the plausibility of these claims.

It allegedly formed an alliance with 11 other militant groups in 2004 to seize control of Fallujah. The alliance included Mohammed's Army, the Iraqi Islamic Patriotic Resistance, the Salafi Movement for Propagation and Jihad, Tanzim al-Qariah, and Ansar al-Sunnah (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

Mohammed's Army was active through 2006. In 2004, security forces captured the leader of Mohammed's Army during the Battle for Fallujah (Landis 2005). After 2006, there are no more known attacks or incidents ascribed to it. It is unknown what happens to the group.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Jaysh Muhammad, Jaish Muhammed, Mohammed Army, Muhammed Army, Mohammed's Army, Jaish Mohammed, Jaysh Mohammed, Islamic Jihad Brigade of Muhammad's Army

Group Formation: 2003

Group End (Outcome): 2006 (unknown)

XLII. ISLAMIC JIHAD BRIGADES

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: NA

Aliases: Islamic Jihad Brigades, Islamic Jihad Brigade

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4467, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- "Kuwait Paper Reports Iraqi "Resistance", "Jihad" Groups' Merger." 2004. BBC Monitoring Middle East, Oct 14, 1.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/458699649?accountid=14026>.

- “GTD ID: 200501180001,” GTD, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20218>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Islamic Jihad Brigade formed in 2003 to expel foreign troops from Iraq following the initial US invasion (BBC 2004). According to an unnamed source, the group adheres to a Salafi jihadist ideology (BBC 2004; MIPT 2008). It came to attention in 2005 for an attack on a security force contractor (GTD n.d.).

Geography

The group operated primarily from Rawah northwest of Baghdad (BBC 2004).

Organizational Structure

According to an unnamed source, the group was composed of Iraqis and refused to let foreign fighters join. Some members were also ex-members of the military (BBC 2004). The organizational structure of the group was cell-based in order to make it more difficult for counterinsurgency efforts to target them (BBC 2004). Consequently, the group also had no well-defined leader (BBC 2004).

External Ties

There is no evidence of external support for the group and, furthermore, the group seems to reject foreign fighters (BBC 2004). No evidence could be found about any ties to other groups within Iraq.

Group Outcome

The group’s last known attack was in 2005 when they publicized a kidnapping of a foreign security contractor (GTD n.d.). It is unknown how the kidnapping got resolved or what happened with the group; it is not heard from again.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2003

Group End (Outcome): 2005 (unknown)

XLIII. JAISH AL-MAHDI
Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 2009
Onset: 2004

Aliases: Mahdi Army, Al-Mahdi Army, Al-Mehdi Army, Jaish Al-Mahdi, Jaish Al-Mehdi, Mehdi Army

Part 1. Bibliography

- Martha Crenshaw. "Mahdi Army." Mapping Militant Organizations. 2017.
<http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/57>
- "Profile: Moqtada Sadr." BBC. 2012.
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12135160>
- Gabriel Gatehouse. "Iraq's Moqtada al-Sadr warns Mehdi Army ready to fight." BBC. 2011. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13566102>
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<http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/iraqelection2010/2010/03/20103493048404203.html>
- Babak Rahimi. "The Return of Moqtada al-Sadr and the Revival of the Mahdi Army." Combating Terrorism Center. 2010.
<https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-return-of-moqtada-al-sadr-and-the-revival-of-the-mahdi-army>
- "Al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army: sectarianism and resistance in Iraq."
https://libcom.org/files/madhi%20army_final_0.pdf
- "Muqtada al-Sadr." Global Security. n.d.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/al-sadr.htm>
- "Al-Mahdi Army." Global Security. n.d.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-sadr.htm>
- Greg Bruno. "Muqtada al-Sadr." Council on Foreign Relations. 2008.
<http://www.cfr.org/iraq/muqtada-al-sadr/p7637>
- "Is Muqtada al-Sadr good for Iraq?" War on the Rocks. 2016.
<https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/is-muqtada-al-sadr-good-for-iraq/>
- "Iraq: The Reinvention of Muqtada al-Sadr." Al-Jazeera. 2016.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/iraq-reinvention-muqtada-al-sadr-160309061939234.html>
- "Iraq: Big Changes in the Mahdi Army?" Los Angeles Times. 2008.
<http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2008/08/big-changes-in.html>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Mahdi Army formed in 2003 to expel foreign troops from Iraq following the initial invasion (Crenshaw 2017). The group was Shiite and Iraqi nationalist (Crenshaw 2017). It came to attention for a massive coordinated attack in several cities on April 4, 2004 (Crenshaw 2017).

Geography

The Mahdi Army has a base in Baghdad, Sadr City, Najaf, and Basra. They are also active in Baghdad, southern Iraq, Diwaniya, Najaf, Kufa, Amara, Nasiriyah, Basra, and Amerli (Crenshaw 2017).

Organizational Structure

The Mahdi Army was led by Muqtada al-Sadr (Crenshaw 2017). Sadr was the son of a well-known Shiite cleric in Baghdad and de facto leader of 'Sadr City' - a poor neighborhood in Baghdad (Bruno 2008). Initially, the group had approximately 300 members, but soon grew to 6000-10000 by June 2004 (Crenshaw 2017; Global Security n.d.). At its peak in 2006-2007, the group supposedly had 60000 members throughout Iraq (Crenshaw 2017). When it began, it had no formal organizational structure and instead was just a focal point for unemployed, young men living in Sadr City to congregate (Bruno 2008). Most members are Shiite Iraqis who were recruited at local mosques and other community centers (Crenshaw 2017). Members wore uniforms and marched in military formation like a conventional army (Gatehouse 2011).

The group primarily funds itself through kidnapping, extortion, arms transfers, and Iranian sponsors (Crenshaw 2017). It tries to pay its fighters, but had trouble consistently doing so early on (Bruno 2008). It did not originally have a formal political wing when it formed, but later allied with other militant groups like SCIRI and Daawa in the 2005 elections (Crenshaw 2017). By 2004, Sadr was trying to model the Mahdi Army off the organizational structure of Hezbollah with both a functioning armed wing and a massive political component (Bruno 2008).

External Ties

The group had some foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait although not many (Crenshaw 2017). The Mahdi Army received some financial support from Iranian clerics who supported the Sadrist movement (Crenshaw 2017). There is also alleged support from the IRGC in the form of weapons, training, and funding (Rahimi 2008; Crenshaw 2017). By 2008, much of Iran's supposed assistance had fallen due to domestic turmoil within Iran as a result of Ahmadinejad's election (Rahimi 2008).

Hezbollah allegedly provided military training to the Mahdi Army in Lebanon early in the group's history (Crenshaw 2017).

The group clashed with the Badr Brigades and SCIRI in 2007 because they were rival Shi'ite militias (Rahimi 2008).

Group Outcome

The group became less active after 2007 for two reasons. First, the group experienced several military losses at the hands of coalition forces in a series of counterinsurgency operations (Rahimi 2008). Second, the group created and shifted its focus in 2008 to a new branch called Mumahidoon which provided social and economic services for members (Los Angeles Times 2008). Some members of the Mahdi Army became the Promised Day Brigades militia, but most disarmed (Crenshaw 2017). The group re-emerged in 2010 when Sadr had many members of the Mahdi Army back the Iraqi National Alliance party in elections. Sadr also supported Maliki in the 2010 elections, but later reneged on this support after Maliki took office (Crenshaw 2017).

Following the rise of ISIS in 2014, Sadr decided to restart the Mahdi Army in order to help fight IS (Crenshaw 2017).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Jaysh al-Mahdi, JAM

Group Formation: 2003

Group End (Outcome): 2017 (Active)

Note: interesting one year period 2003-2004 when members go to Lebanon to train in guerrilla tactics - this is very similar to communist training by Latin American groups during the 1970s

XLIV. USD ALLAH
Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Usd Allah, Lions Of God

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4511, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.

- A. Hunsicker. Understanding International Counterterrorism. Universal Publishers. 2006. https://books.google.com/books?id=K4XefrTISygC&pg=PA359&lpg=PA359&dq=usd+allah+lions+of+god&source=bl&ots=pZ_fEJKOVK&sig=GaW07qgD1DMRJA-l3C4mbCeAvZ0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjB7sPOIKrRAhXFbiYKHbbkDI4Q6AEIGjAA#v=onepage&q=usd%20allah%20lions%20of%20god&f=false
- John Esposito and Emad el-din Shahin. Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics. Oxford 2016. <https://books.google.com/books?id=wUcSDAAQBAJ&pg=PA623&lpg=PA623&dq=usd+allah+lions+of+god&source=bl&ots=r0kF4Pmm-b&sig=RBmqqA2vhTJJt1CVpZdB2uaZ9TQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjB7sPOIKrRAhXFbiYKHbbkDI4Q6AEIIDAC#v=onepage&q=usd%20allah%20lions%20of%20god&f=false>
- "Egyptian Hostage Released because of Religious Conduct, Iraqi Group Says." 2004. BBC Monitoring Middle East, Jul 26, 1. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/459225956?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when Usd Allah formed, but it first came to attention in July 2004 for the kidnapping of an Egyptian diplomat (Hunsicker 2006, 359). The group argued it opposed a statement by the Egyptian Prime Minister which indicated Egypt would provide the Iraqi government with "security experience" (MIPT 2008). MIPT (2008) says this is evidence that their goal was to expel foreign troops from Iraq, but this might be too large an inference.

Geography

It is unknown where the attack took place as available information only describes the event and not the location (BBC 2004; MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the group's organizational structure.

External Ties

There is no evidence of external ties by the group.

Group Outcome

The Egyptian diplomat was released by the group on July 26 “because he had a strong religious consciousness and good manners” (BBC 2004). There is no evidence of any police or military actions taken against the group and it was not heard from again.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (unknown/disappear)

Note: Esposito and al-Shahin have an interesting critique on Oxford Handbook about how MIPT overcounts the number of insurgencies in Iraq during this time and how many criminals actually masquerade as insurgencies to seem more menacing [interview idea?]

XLV. ABU AL-ABBAS

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Abu Al-Abbas, Abu Al Abbas

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4548, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida. The RAND Corporation, 2008.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf

Note: this is different from the Abu Al-Abbas Brigade fighting in the Syrian Civil War (see Anzalone CTC and Al-Tamimi)

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when Abu Al-Abbas formed, but it first came to attention in 2004 when it kidnapped a British journalist in Basra following (MIPT 2008). The incident arose after the group threatened to kill individuals assisting British and other foreign troops following a coalition attack in Najaf (MIPT 2008). Jones and Libicki claim the group’s goal is policy change, but there is not much evidence for that.

Geography

The one known incident took place in Basra, Iraq (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

It is unknown what the organizational structure of the group is.

External Ties

The group allegedly released the journalist under the orders of Moqtada al-Sadr which would imply the group either coordinates or is, in fact, part of the Mahdi Army (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

The Mahdi Army purportedly forced the group to give up the kidnapping, indicating they either had more clout than local security forces or in fact controlled the group (MIPT 2008). The group was not heard from again and it is strongly implied that they were not, in fact, a distinct organization.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (unknown)

XLVI. JAISH AL-TA'IFA AL-MANSURA

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: NA

Aliases: Jaish Al-Ta'ifa Al-Mansura, Army Of The Victorious Community, Jaiech Al-Taifa Al-Mansoura, Jaish Al-Taifa Al-Mansoura, Jaish Al-Taifa Al-Mansourah, Jaish Al-Taifa Al-Mansura, Victorious Army Group, Victorious Army Sect, Victorious Sect Army

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4630, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
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https://books.google.com/books?id=qZuXdUgb1gsC&pg=PA91&lpg=PA91&dq=Jaish+al-Ta%27ifa+al-Mansurah&source=bl&ots=gmoQXUO09B&sig=nj_qVaRh_n2x6zvsOESbZbORTKw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjM1sDUMqrRAhXKIIQKHQn-CI4ChDoAQgvMAQ#v=onepage&q=Jaish%20al-Ta'ifa%20al-Mansurah&f=false

Part 2. Narrative

Note: another baathist related group.

Group Formation

Jaysh al-Taifa formed in 2003 to expel foreign troops from Iraq and establish an Islamic State (Tracking Terrorism n.d.; MIPT 2008) The group is Sunni Islamist and might also have Salafist ties (Tracking Terrorism n.d.; Pape and Feldman 2010, 91). It allegedly formed as a splinter of Ansar al-Sunna (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group was active in Baghdad and had a prominent attack at the Imam Kadhim Mosque (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

The leader of Jaysh al-Taifa is allegedly al-Haj Uthman al-Iraqi, but there is very little known about him (MIPT 2008). The group is composed of approximately three brigades and members are primarily ex-Ba’athists from the Hussein regime (Pape and Feldman 2010, 91). They purposely try to avoid harming non-combatants (Pape and Feldman 2010, 91).

External Ties

There is evidence the group has coordinated with AQI (Pape and Feldman 2010, 91; Tracking Terrorism n.d.; Brookings 2016).

It specifically targets attacks at the Iraqi Islamic Party which is a Sunni political party (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

The group merged with the Mujahideen Shura Council in 2006 in an effort to consolidate different militant groups across Iraq (Tracking Terrorism n.d.). This merger included AQI (Brookings Institute 2016).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Victorious Group's Army

Group Formation: 2003

Group End (Outcome): 2006 (merger)

XLVII. 1920 REVOLUTION BRIGADES

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 2007

Onset: NA

Aliases: 1920 Revolution Brigades, 1920 Revolution Brigade, 1920 Revolutionary Brigades, 20th Revolution Brigades, Brigades Of The 1920 Revolution, Revolution Of The 1920s Brigades, Twentieth Revolution Brigades

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4437, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
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- Lydia Khalil. "Leader of 1920 Revolution Brigades Killed by al-Qaeda." Jamestown Foundation. 2007. <https://jamestown.org/program/leader-of-1920-revolution-brigades-killed-by-al-qaeda/>
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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The 1920s Revolution Brigades was founded in 2003 to resist the U.S. occupation and overthrow the government (Crenshaw 2016). It primarily adhered to a Sunni Islamist ideology and first came to attention in June 2004 for kidnapping a Marine (Crenshaw 2016).

Geography

The Brigades operated out of Baghdad, Fallujah, Khan Dari, and Abu Ghraib. It also had members in and around Anbar, Diyali, Babil, Salahdin, and Ninwi provinces (Roggio 2007; Crenshaw 2016).

Organizational Structure

Several different leaders have been associated with the 1920s Revolution Brigade including Hatim al-Zawbai, Aswad Kamil al-Falahi, Ahmed Sabah, Harith al-Dari, and Sheikh Ahmed al-Tamer (Crenshaw 2016). Harith al-Dari was publicized as one of the main leaders (Khalil 2007). It had a formal political wing.

The group was largest in 2007, but after Hamas Iraq splintered the group lost several members (Crenshaw 2016). It had approximately thousands of members in 2007 (Crenshaw 2016). The group was primarily composed of members by ex-Baathist soldiers and Buhriz tribesmen (Roggio 2007). It is unknown how they funded themselves.

External Ties

The group partially splintered in 2007 when an ideological dispute arose over whether to ally with Al-Qaeda in Iraq or not (Crenshaw 2016). A splinter that did not want to cooperate with AQI formed in 2007 to become Hamas Iraq (Crenshaw 2016).

There is no evidence of external support from other actors. It tacitly cooperated with the U.S. Army in 2007 as part of the Anbar Awakening (Roggio 2007). It was also active in leading a coalition of Sunni insurgents in the Anbar Salvation Council to fight against Al Qaeda forces (Roggio 2007).

The group formed an umbrella organization, the Change and Reform Front, with six other Sunni groups in 2007. The group also cooperated with other, un-named Sunni insurgent groups in 2010 when they decided to disarm (Crenshaw 2016).

Group Outcome

The group has not been active since U.S. troops withdrew in 2010. In 2010, the 1920s Revolution Brigade met in Turkey with other Sunni insurgents groups and decided to lay down their arms after U.S. troops left (Crenshaw 2016). In 2012, the group published a communique encouraging followers to use violence if the Maliki government continued to renege on its power-sharing agreements with the Sunni population. However, the group was not tied to any additional attacks (Crenshaw 2016).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: 2003

Group End (Outcome): 2010 (win? Disarm when US troops leave (Crenshaw 2016))

XLVIII. ANSAR AL-DIN
Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 2004
Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3920, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- "Ansar Al-Din Organization Arrests Two "Israeli Agents" in Iraq." 2004. BBC Monitoring Newsfile, Apr 08, 1. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/452463543?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when Ansar al Din was founded, but it first came to attention in 2004 for kidnapping two Israelis and demanding the release of Iraqi prisoners in exchange. It had no more associated incidents (BBC 2004).

Geography

It is unknown where the kidnapping occurred (BBC 2004).

Organizational Structure

There is no known information about the organizational structure of the group. It sent a video to Al-Ansam TV channel to publicize its demand, but there is no information available about the size of the group, funding, or organizational structure (BBC 2004).

External Ties

There is no known information about the external ties.

Group Outcome

The group was not heard from again after this April 2004. The two Israeli hostages were released two weeks after the incident and the group was not heard from again (MIPT 2008).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (disappear)

XLIX. BRIGADES FOR THE DEFENSE OF HOLY SHRINES

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Brigades For The Defense Of Holy Shrines, Saraya Al-Difa An Al-Atabat Al-Muqaddasah, Squadrons Defending Holy Places

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4432, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- Searched proquest:
 - brigades for the defense of holy shrines
 - squadrons defending holy places

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for the Mahdi Army.

Geography

This is an alias for the Mahdi Army.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for the Mahdi Army.

External Ties

This is an alias for the Mahdi Army.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for the Mahdi Army.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: This is an alias for the Mahdi Army.

Group Formation: This is an alias for the Mahdi Army.

Group End (Outcome): This is an alias for the Mahdi Army.

L. MUJAHEDDEEN CORPS IN IRAQ

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2009

Onset: NA

Aliases: Death Squad Of Mujahideen Of Iraq, Mujahedeen Corps In Iraq, Mujahedeen Of Iraq, The Group Of Death

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4622, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- "Backgrounder: List of Foreign Hostages Killed Or Held in Iraq." 2004. Xinhua News Agency - CEIS, Aug 09, 1.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/452939932?accountid=14026>.
- MARK TURNER, IN BAGHDAD. 2004. "Post-Transition Violence Continues in Iraq." FT.Com: 1. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/228836023?accountid=14026>.
- John Robb. Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization. John Wiley and Sons. 2007.
<https://books.google.com/books?id=tn4VjNjr1oIC&pg=PA13&lpg=PA13&dq=MUJAHIDE>

[EN+CORPS+IN+IRAQ&source=bl&ots=tr3sVsQBli&sig=eNrDZVodWG670eKTo8Wu3sD6udl&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiZ2MedyKvRAhUiiVQKHf2ZCxcgQ6AEIQDAH#v=onepage&q=MUJAHIDEEN%20CORPS%20IN%20IRAQ&f=false](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=mujahedeen+corps&sa.x=0&sa.y=0&sa=Search)

- ID Data, Global Terrorism Database, START, Last Modified June 2016.
<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=mujahedeen+corps&sa.x=0&sa.y=0&sa=Search>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in 2004 for an attack on a Jordanian truck (Robb 2007, 13). It stated its goal was to expel the truck drivers' Jordanian parent company, Daoud and Partners, to leave Iraq. Daoud and Partners was a private military contractor for the US military (Robb 2007, 13).

Geography

The incident took place in Baghdad (Turner 2004; GTD n.d.)

Organizational Structure

It is unknown what the group's organizational structure, membership, funding sources, or leadership was. It is unknown how the group communicated its message.

External Ties

There is no evidence of any external ties to other groups or state entities. This violence emerges in the larger context of the beginning insurgency in Iraq.

Group Outcome

There is no recorded response by the U.S. or Iraqi government. A local tribal leader in Fallujah led a raid against the group to free the truck driver (MIPT 2008). The Jordanian company responded by pulling out of Iraq and satisfying the group's demands (Robb 2007, 13). The group is allegedly tied to a second incident in Baghdad in 2009 when it tries to attack the U.S. embassy during a Biden visit (GTD 2016).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Mujahedeen Army

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2009

Note: this may be an alias for the Mujahedeen Army listed below

LI. FALLUJAH MUJAHIDEEN

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4550, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- "JOURNO INVITE." 2004. The Courier - Mail, Nov 08, 15.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/354118926?accountid=14026>.
- Lee Gordon, "Iraqi insurgents turn against 'out of control' Saudi al-Qaeda fighters," Telegraph, 2004,
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1463223/Iraqi-insurgents-turn-against-out-of-control-Saudi-al-Qaeda-fighters.html>
- Nir Rosen, "Home Rule," New Yorker, July 5, 2004,
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/07/05/home-rule>
-

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group initially formed, but it came to attention in 2003 for a series of prominent kidnappings in and around Fallujah (MIPT 2008). The group's stated goal was to expel foreign troops from Iraq and resist the U.S. occupation (MIPT 2008). The group is Sunni (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group primarily operates around Fallujah (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

The group's leader is Abu Abdullah (MIPT 2008). The group primarily has foreign fighters numbering over 2,500 members (MIPT 2008). The leader is Saudi and its members are Wahabbi Muslims (Gordon 2004). It is organized like a conventional army,

with 5-6 brigades and companies within these brigades (MIPT 2008). It brought in anti-tank weaponry and other conventional arms from outside the country. Its members are primarily Saudi, but are also Syrian, Palestinian, and Tunisian (Gordon 2004; Rosen 2004).

In 2004, the group claimed it was created a political wing under the direction of the Hya'at Olama a Muslimin (Gordon 2004).

External Ties

The group has alleged ties with AQI (Gordon 2004; MIPT 2008). It is different from the Fallujah Mujahedeen Shura led by Abdallah al-Janiah, which invited journalists to embed with the insurgency at the time (MIPT 2008; Courier 2004).

The group said in a public interview that it was trying to mimic the IRA (Gordon 2004).

Group Outcome

US Marines initially began occupying Fallujah in April 2003 after the initial invasion. In May 2004, Marines withdrew from Fallujah following the failed First Battle of Fallujah (Rosen 2004). The US turned authority and policing to the Fallujah Brigade (Rosen 2004). The withdrawal did not ameliorate levels of violence - journalists continued to be taken (Rosen 2004). At the same time, it was rumored the US exit enabled Zarqawi and AQI to enter the city and set-up operations (Rosen 2004). It is unknown what happened to the group, but was considered active as of 2008 (MIPT 2008).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: 2003

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (unknown)

LII. IRAQI LEGITIMATE RESISTANCE

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4374, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- "Saudi Company to Leave Iraq to Save Kidnapped Driver." 2004. The Guelph Mercury, Jul 15, A12.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/355672277/43E5CF9B521F479APQ/1?accountid=14026>.
- AP, Wire Service. 2004. "Insurgents Kidnap Egyptian." Tulsa World, Jul 07, A4.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/399962451?accountid=14026>.
- "Egypt Says Making Contact to Secure Release of Hostage in Iraq." 2004. Xinhua News Agency - CEIS, Jul 22, 1.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/452948747?accountid=14026>.
- "Backgrounder: Kidnapping of Foreigners in Iraq." 2004. Xinhua News Agency - CEIS, Jul 20, 1. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/452950410?accountid=14026>.
- "Writethru: Kidnapped Egyptian Diplomat Freed in Iraq: Al-Jazeera." 2004. Xinhua News Agency - CEIS, Jul 26, 1.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/452942423?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention on July 6, 2004 when it kidnapped an Egyptian driver (Xinhua 2004). The group demanded military contractors who had been working for the US and coalition forces immediately withdraw from Iraq (Guelph Mercury 2004). The group had no known ideology associated with its goal, but also demanded a \$1 million ransom.

Geography

The incident took place somewhere between Saudi Arabia and "a US military base in Iraq" (Xinhua 2004).

Organizational Structure

The group demanded \$1 million in ransom money indicating it engaged in extortion (Guelph Mercury 2004). There is no known information about the group's leadership, membership, or organizational structure.

External Ties

There is no evidence of external ties to other non-state actors or states. The violence occurs at a time multiple Iraqi groups began engaging in systematic kidnappings and attacks to protest the US occupation in Iraq (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

The group released the Egyptian driver on July 19 after the Saudi Arabian company agreed to end its business in Iraq (Xinhua 2004). It is not evident that the US or Iraqi forces took any action in response to the kidnapping (Xinhua 2004; Guelph Mercury 2004; MIPT 2008). The group was not heard from again after the incident (MIPT 2008).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (win, receive concession)

LIII. ISLAMIC AL-WAQQAS BRIGADE

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Islamic Al-Waqqas Brigade, Katibat Al-Waqqas Al-Islamiya

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4628, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- "Saudi National Claims Escape After Kidnap by Arabs in Iraq." 2004b. BBC Monitoring Middle East, Jun 27, 1.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/459232001?accountid=14026>.
- "Iraqi Group Abducts Kuwaiti Driver Transporting US Army Supplies." 2004a. BBC Monitoring Newsfile, Jun 05, 1.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/452812823?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group first formed, but it came to attention in June 2004 when it kidnapped a Saudi driver transporting supplies to a US military base in Iraq (BBC 2004b). The group used the driver in a video urging other military contractors not to do business with occupying US forces (BBC 2004a). The group had no well-defined ideology (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The incident took place in Fallujah (BBC 2004a).

Organizational Structure

There is no known information about the group's size, organizational structure, funding, or leadership.

External Ties

The group had no clear ties to other states or non-state actors. The kidnapped Saudi national claimed the group was working with Al-Jazeera media to produce and publish its videos (BBC 2004b). The kidnapped Saudi's lawyer said his client planned to sue the BBC for collusion and airing the video (BBC 2004b).

Group Outcome

The Saudi national recounts a clash between U.S. forces in Fallujah and his kidnapers that enabled him to escape (BBC 2004b). The group is not heard from again after this incident and it is unclear if they achieved any of their goals.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Katibat al-Waqqas al-Islamiyah

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (disappear)

- LIV. ISLAMIC FRONT FOR IRAQI RESISTANCE - SALAH-AL-DIN AL-AYYUBI BRIGADES
Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 2007
Onset: NA

Aliases: AL-JABHAH AL-ISLAMIYAH AL-MUQAWAMAH AL-IRAQIYAH (JAMI)

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4602, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- Abdul Bakier, "Islamic Front for Iraq Resistance Brigadier Refutes al-Qaeda's Approach to Combating U.S. Occupation" Terrorism Focus. 5(28) Jamestown Foundation. 2008.

<https://jamestown.org/brief/islamic-front-for-iraq-resistance-brigadier-refutes-al-qaedas-approach-to-combating-u-s-occupation/>

- “Iraqi Resistance Islamic Front.” Global Security. N.d.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/iraqi-resistance-islamic-front.htm>
- Samir Haddad and Mazin Ghazi. “An Inventory of Iraqi Resistance Groups: Who Kills Hostages in Iraq?” Global Policy. 2004.
<https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/37307.html>
- Anthony Cordesman and Emma Davies, *Iraq’s Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict*, CSIS, 2008

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

Salah al-Din Brigade is a violent group, which formed in 2004 to protest the occupation of US troops in Iraq (Global Security n.d.; MIPT 2008). It is Sunni jihadist and targets both US forces and Shia Muslims (MIPT 2008; Bakier 2008). Its goal is to expel US forces from Iraq (Bakier 2008).

Geography

The group primarily operates in Diyala and Ninaveh provinces. Its most famous incidents occurred in Mosul, which is in Ninewa province (Global Security n.d.)

Organizational Structure

IFIR has a political wing and a military wing (Bakier 2008). It also has a sophisticated propaganda/media unit, which publicizes attacks by its armed wing on jaami.info (MIPT 2008). Salah al-Din brigades and Sayfullah al-Masluk Brigades is the armed wing of the Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance (IFIR) (Haddad and Ghazi 2004; MIPT 2008). It is unknown how the group funds itself. The group allegedly screens fighters for military experience and must “pass certain standards” (Bakier 2008). It also has several female fighters including a female battalion known as Nosayba al-Ansari (Bakier 2008). It is unknown how many fighters it has although several battalions would indicate a sizable operation. There is no information about how the group funded itself.

External Ties

The group is not the Salah al-Din Battalion from the Palestinian Popular Resistance Committee and has no relation to the group (MIPT 2008). It is allied and coordinates with the 1920s Revolution Brigades and the Islamic Army of Iraq (MIPT 2008; Bakier 2008). It also works with Army of the Men of al-Naqshabandia Way (Bakier 2008). It refuses to merge with these groups.

It is allegedly connected with the Mujahideen Shura Council in Fallujah and AQI although it is unclear what this relationship entails (MIPT 2008). There is conflicting evidence that it may not be involved with these groups at all due to ideological differences over how best to practice Salafi jihadism (Bakier 2008).

Group Outcome

It engaged in small-scale clashes with US forces. In 2006, it published a booklet advocating more guerrilla tactics and direct confrontation with U.S. forces due to the threat of suppression (Cordesman and Davies 2008, 576). In 2007, the group merged with Hamas-Iraq (Cordesman and Davies 2008 576). This contradicts MIPT's assertion that the group was active as of 2008 (MIPT 2008).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Salah-al Din Brigades, Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance, IFIR, Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance (IFIR), Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi Brigades

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2007 (merger)

Note: this is a good example - I think - of how 2004 produced a 'window' for many different groups to step-up their attacks against coalition forces including IED and kidnappings. They do not, however, escalate or turn into full-blown insurgencies like the Mahdi Army, AQI, etc.

LV. ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF HOLY WARRIORS

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Note: not HuM

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4455, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- Filkins, Dexter. 2008. "U.S. Cedes Control of Anbar to Iraq Forces Province's Sunnis Rebelled Against Foreign Militants." International Herald Tribune, Sep 02, 1. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/318950594?accountid=14026>.

- Filkins, Dexter. 2008. "U.S. Hands Off Pacified Anbar, Once Heart of Iraq Insurgency." New York Times, Sep 02.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/433942401?accountid=14026>.
- Nicholas Blandford, Thank God I'm alive, says captive forced to watch hostage beheaded, Bekaa Valley, 2004,
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/319187816/902C31D28F8A4DB0PQ/7?accountid=14026>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Islamic Movement of Holy Warriors came to attention in August 2004 when it was involved in the kidnapping of a Lebanese military contractor (Bekaa Valley 2004; MIPT 2008). The group's goal was to resist the U.S. occupation in Iraq by punishing military contractors and U.S. forces involved with it (MIPT 2008; Filkins 2008).

Geography

The group's first attack occurred in Ramadi (Bekaa Valley 2004). They operated out of Anbar Province (Filkins 2008).

Organizational Structure

It is unknown what the group's organizational structure is although it claimed to have a 'brigade' involved in the Lebanese kidnapping (Bekaa Valley 2004). It is also unknown how many members the group had or its financing mechanisms.

External Ties

Originally, the group may have had ties with AQI and praised Zarqawi (Bekaa Valley 2004). In 2006, AQI tried to take over the group, which led them to turn against it (Filkins 2008). Instead, the Islamic Movement allied with other Sunni groups as part of the Anbar Awakening (Filkins 2008).

Group Outcome

In 2006, AQI tried to take over the group, which led them to turn against it (Filkins 2008). Instead, the Islamic Movement allied with other Sunni groups as part of the Anbar Awakening (Filkins 2008). By 2008, it appeared to have completely disbanded and many members had joined local police forces (Filkins 2008).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Islamic Movement of the Holy Warriors in Iraq

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2006 (merger)

LVI. ISLAMIC RAGE BRIGADE

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4629, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- Langbein, Sarah. 2004. "HOSTAGE'S FAMILY PRAYS, AWAITS WORD ON HIS FATE." Rocky Mountain News, May 08, 16A.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/413636451?accountid=14026>.
- Florio, Gwen. 2004. "SISTER PLEADS FOR RELEASE OF HOSTAGE IN IRAQ." Rocky Mountain News, May 10, 10A.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/413480249?accountid=14026>.
- David Olinger Denver Post, Staff Writer. 2004. "Terror Groups Baffle Experts Obscure Units' Threat Growing some of these Militants Focus on Taking Hostages and may be Linked to Al- Qaeda Or Elements of Hussein's Former Regime." Denver Post, May 07.
[http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.stanford.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sr&csi=144565&sr=HEADLINE\(Terror+groups+baffle+experts+Obscure+units%27+threat+growing+Some+of+these+militants+focus+on+taking+hostages+and+may+be+linked+to+al+Qaeda+or+elements+of+Hussein%27s+former+regime.\)%2BAND%2BDATE%2BIS%2B2004](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.stanford.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sr&csi=144565&sr=HEADLINE(Terror+groups+baffle+experts+Obscure+units%27+threat+growing+Some+of+these+militants+focus+on+taking+hostages+and+may+be+linked+to+al+Qaeda+or+elements+of+Hussein%27s+former+regime.)%2BAND%2BDATE%2BIS%2B2004)
- THE, ASSOCIATED PRESS. 2005. "One Year Later, Kidnapping a Mystery." Charleston Daily Mail, May 06, 4C.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/332089226?accountid=14026>.
- "THE WAR IN IRAQ / 13 Americans Still Listed as Missing." 2006. Houston Chronicle, Jun 21, 13. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/396305965?accountid=14026>.
- Jon Sarche The, Associated Press. 2004. "DENVER MAN SHOWN AS CAPTIVE ON TAPE." The Commercial Appeal, May 07, A13.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/394057267?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the Islamic Rage Brigade formed, but it first came to attention in 2004 for the kidnapping of an American military contractor (Associated Press 2005). The group's goal was never clearly articulated in a video it released following the kidnapping (Sarche 2004; Associated Press 2005).

Geography

The kidnapping took place near Fallujah, Iraq (Associated Press 2005).

Organizational Structure

There is no evidence about the group's organizational structure, membership, funding, etc.

External Ties

It is unclear whether the group had any formal external ties. CT officials speculated it could be related to AQI, ex-Baathist, or Sunni insurgent elements (so anyone) (Olinger 2005).

Group Outcome

The State Department refused to comment on the incident (Associated Press 2005). In 2006, the kidnapped individual was still listed as missing (Houston Chronicle 2006). The Islamic Rage Brigade never issued a ransom for Elias (Associated Press 2005).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Islamic Anger Brigade

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (disappear)

LVII. MUJAHEDDEEN ARMY
Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 2006
Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4464, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
- Alexandra Zavis, Associated Press. 2005. "Investigators Visit Site of Helicopter Crash." Deseret News, Apr 22.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/351388697?accountid=14026>.
- Davis, Joyce M. 2008. "ALL EYES ARE ON OBAMA." The Sunday Patriot - News, Nov 16. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/306752388?accountid=14026>.
- Sly, Liz. 2006. "Some Rebels Ready to Deal, Iraqi Says ; no U.S. Confirmation on Talabani Remarks." Chicago Tribune, May 01, 1-1.1.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/420426960?accountid=14026>.
- "REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS CALLS FOR RI JOURNALISTS' RELEASE." 2005. Antara, Feb 21, 1.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/446547137?accountid=14026>.
- PAUL GARWOOD, in Baghdad. 2004. "10 Die in Karbala Suicide Bombing." The Advertiser, Dec 20, 32.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/355462775?accountid=14026>.
- "Iraqi Police Arrest Suspected Leader of Insurgent Group." 2006. BreakingNews.Ie, Aug 24. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/744279556?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the Mujahedeen Army formed, but it first came to attention in November 2004 for a prominent kidnapping (MIPT 2008). The Sunni group's goal was to resist US occupation in Iraq (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group was implicated in one attack in Mandali near the Iran-Iraq border (Garwood 2004). Its leader was captured in Tal Afar (BreakingNews 2006).

Organizational Structure

The group has a clear propaganda wing and a military wing to manage its operations (MIPT 2008). The head of propaganda was Ahmad Ni'mah Khudayyir Abbas (MIPT 2008). The group financed itself by posing as a children's charity and soliciting donations (MIPT 2008). Its members were primarily Sunni (MIPT 2008). It is unknown how many members, but had "more members" than AQI (Sly 2006).

External Ties

The group was implicated in a December 2004 kidnapping along with the Black Banner Brigade and the Mutassim Bellah Brigade (Garwood 2004). It and the Islamic Army in Iraq both claimed credit for a missile attack on a US helicopter in 2005 which may have been a collaboration or credit-taking (Zavis 2005; MIPT 2008). It traveled to Baghdad to lobby Talabani along with the Islamic Army in Iraq, the 1920 Revolution Brigade, and the Iraqi Resistance Islamic Front (Sly 2006).

In 2006, AQI pressured the Mujahedeen Army to join the Mujahedeen Shura Council in Fallujah, but they declined to join (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

In 2005 or 2006, the group lobbied Iraqi President Talabani to allow Islamist militia groups participate in politics (Sly 2006; MIPT 2008). In 2006, Iraqi police arrested the group's leader in Tal Afar (Breaking News 2006). The group's last known attack was in 2006 (MIPT 2008). In 2008, the group threatened Obama to withdraw troops from Iraq (Davis 2008). The group had previously indicated its willingness to disband and disarm if US troops left so it may have gone dormant in 2011.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2009 (unknown)

If this is an alias of the Mujahedeen Corps in Iraq, then the group's last attack is in 2009 (c.f. T1382).

LVIII. SARAYA USUD AL-TAWHID

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4415, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
- "Jordan Truck Driver Freed in Iraq After Firm Bows to Kidnappers' Demands." 2004b. BBC Monitoring Newsfile, Sep 16, 1.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/452457656?accountid=14026>.

- "Group Threatens to Kill Jordanian Driver in Iraq." 2004a. BBC Monitoring Newsfile, Sep 14, 1. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/452813531?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when Saraya Usud al-Tawhid initially formed, but it first came to attention in 2004 for kidnapping a Jordanian truck driver (BBC 2004a). Its goal was to resist US military occupation in Iraq and convince military contractors to cease and desist business with the contractors (BBC 2004a).

Geography

It is unknown where the kidnapping took place.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the group's organizational structure, financing, or membership.

External Ties

There is no evidence of external ties between this group and other state or non-state actors.

Group Outcome

The group was not heard from again after it released the one hostage (BBC 2004b). There is no evidence of US military or Iraqi security force involvement. The Jordanian Embassy and Council of the Al-Fallujah Mujahidin were involved in negotiating a release of the kidnapped driver (BBC 2004b).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Lions of Monotheism Brigades, Brigades of the Lions of Monotheism

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (disappear)

LIX. OMAR BIN KHATTAB GROUP
Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4636, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
- "Religious Scholars Appeal for Release of Pakistani Hostage in Iraq." 2005. BBC Monitoring South Asia, Apr 19, 1.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/459919403?accountid=14026>.
- "Pakistani Worker Kidnapped." 2005. Tallahassee Democrat, Apr 11.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/992981733?accountid=14026>.
- Faraj, Murtada. 2005. "Baghdad Car Bombs Leave 18 Dead, 36 Injured." Kingston Whig - Standard, Apr 15, 10.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/352710429?accountid=14026>.
- MURTADA FARAJ, ASSOCIATED PRESS. 2005. "Al-Qaida Takes Responsibility for Car Bombings that Kill 18 ; Video shows Kidnapped Pakistani Diplomat Appealing for Help." The Record, Apr 15, A16.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/425895024?accountid=14026>.

Note: MIPT profile refers to the WRONG group.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when this group formed, but it first came to attention in 2005 for kidnappings in Iraq (Tallahassee Democrat 2005). When the group called the Pakistani Embassy in Iraq to report the kidnapping, it had no clear political goal associated with the incident (Tallahassee Democrat 2005). It demanded a ransom (Faraj 2005). The group also has no clear ideology associated with it.

Geography

The kidnapping took place in Baghdad, Iraq (Tallahassee Democrat 2005).

Organizational Structure

No information is available about the group; it was unknown before it carried out this kidnapping (Tallahassee Democrat 2005).

External Ties

There is no evidence of external ties between this group and any other actors.

Group Outcome

The group's last known incident is the kidnapping in 2005 (Faraj 2005; BBC 2005). There is no evidence of US or Iraqi involvement against the group (Tallahassee Democrat 2005; Faraj 2005; BBC 2005). Independent religious leaders pleaded for the kidnapped Pakistani to be released, but no evidence could be found whether this happened and, if so, why (BBC 2005).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2005

Group End (Outcome): 2005 (disappear)

LX. DIVINE WRATH BRIGADES

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4435, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
- "Militants Kidnap Minister's Brother-in-Law, Demand End to Najaf Raids." 2004. Standard - Freeholder, Aug 26, 7. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/353879618?accountid=14026>.
- "Group Releases Iraqi Defense Ministry Official Salah Al-Lami." 2004. BBC Monitoring Newsfile, Aug 27, 1. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/452806512?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is not known when the Divine Wrath Brigade formed, but it first came to attention in August 2004 when it kidnapped an Iraqi general (Standard Freeholder 2004). The group demanded that military operations end in Najaf as well as the release of a Sadr deputy (Standard Freeholder 2004). The group is Shia (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The incident took place in Baghdad (Standard Freeholder 2004).

Organizational Structure

No information is available about the group's organizational structure or funding. It was Shia and so likely had Shia members (MIPT 2008). It is unknown how many members it had.

External Ties

The group pledged support to Moqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army although it did not appear to get any assistance from the group (BBC 2004; MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

The group released the Major General two days after kidnapping him (BBC 2004). This is the only incident associated with the group and it is not heard from again afterwards (BBC 2004; MIPT 2008).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (disappear)

LXI. BLACK BANNER BRIGADE

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2004

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- Samir Haddad and Mazin Ghazi. "An Inventory of Iraqi Resistance Groups: Who Kills Hostages in Iraq?" Global Policy. 2004.
<https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/37307.html>
- Paul Reynolds. "Iraq Strategy tough to enforce." BBC. 2004.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3713614.stm

- Claude Salhani. "Analysis: Iraq's 'changing' war" UPI. 2004.
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2004/07/23/Analysis-Iraqs-changing-war/12951090608453/
- Eric Schmitt. "Military Assault in Falluja is Likely, US Officers Say." New York Times. 2004.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/27/world/middleeast/military-assault-in-falluja-is-likely-us-officers-say.html>
- PAUL GARWOOD, in Baghdad. 2004. "10 Die in Karbala Suicide Bombing." The Advertiser, Dec 20, 32.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/355462775?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the Black Banners group formed, but it first came to attention in 2004 for kidnapping and a string of violence (BBC 2004). The group wanted to resist the US occupation in Iraq and compel military contractors to cease business with the coalition forces (Haddad and Ghazi 2004). When it kidnapped several military contractors, it demanded the kidnapper's host countries - Kenya, Egypt, and India - stop doing business with the US in Iraq (UPI 2004).

Geography

The group was active in Fallujah (BBC 2004).

Organizational Structure

The Black Banners is a battalion and armed wing of the Secret Islamic Army (Haddad and Ghazi 2004). It is unknown how many members it had or who the leader of the Secret Islamic Army was. The group had a reputation for being one of the most-feared, lethal, and organized militant groups operating in Fallujah (BBC 2004; Schmitt 2004; Haddad and Ghazi 2004).

External Ties

The group was rumored to have ties with AQI and Zarqawi and possibly just been a cover for the group (BBC 2004; UPI 2004). The group was implicated in a December 2004 kidnapping along with the Mujahedeen Army and the Mutassim Bellah Brigade (Garwood 2004).

The group is an armed wing of the Secret Islamic Army although no other information could be found about it (Haddad and Ghazi 2004).

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happens to the group and it is only tied to this one prominent kidnapping (UPI 2004). The violent activities by this group coupled with other militant activities prompts increased U.S. presence and assaults in Fallujah (Schmitt 2004).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (disappear)

LXII. MUTASSIM BELLAH BRIGADE

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2004

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Militants claim to kidnap 10 Iraqis." USA Today. 2004.
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-12-19-iraq-videos_x.htm
- PAUL GARWOOD, in Baghdad. 2004. "10 Die in Karbala Suicide Bombing." The Advertiser, Dec 20, 32.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/355462775?accountid=14026>.
- Stojanovic, Dusan. 2004. "Insurgents Kill 25 in Sunni Triangle ; 12 Iraqi Policemen Slain at Station before it's Blown Up." Chicago Sun - Times, Dec 29, 22.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/259009162?accountid=14026>.
- "Leave Iraq Or 10 Hostages Die, Insurgents Warn U.S. Firm." 2004. Chicago Sun - Times, Dec 19, 29. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/259027713?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the Mutassim Bella Brigade formed, but it first came to attention in December 2004 for a joint attack on several military contractors in Baghdad (USA Today 2004). The group demanded the Sandi Group military contractors stop doing business with the Americans and "warn the director of (Sandi Group)...to close the company completely and all its branches and to leave Iraq" (USA Today 2004).

Geography

The attack took place at Mandali near the Iran-Iraq border (Garwood 2004).

Organizational Structure

There is not much information about the group's organizational structure or capabilities. The video it released demanding US contractors leave had "machine guns, bullet-proof jackets, Iraqi and company identity documents, and communications equipment" in the background of the tape. It is unknown how many members this group had, how it funded itself (it did not ask for a ransom with the kidnapping), or its leadership.

External Ties

The group carried out the attack alongside the Mujahedeen Army and the Black Banner Brigade (USA Today 2004).

Group Outcome

The group announced a week after it kidnapped the individuals that it had executed the military contractors "because it was proven they were supporting the occupational army" (Stojanovic 2004). There is no evidence that the group took any additional actions and disappeared after this incident. There is no evidence of a police or security force raid/counteraction in response to the kidnapping.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (disappear?)

LXIII. SALAFIAH AL-MUJAHIDIAH
Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Profile: Tawhid and Jihad Group." 2004. BBC Monitoring Middle East, Sep 22, 1. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/459218427?accountid=14026>.
- Muazzam Gill. UPI. "Outside View: Holy Terror in Iraq." <http://www.upi.com/Outside-View-Holy-Terror-in-Iraq/23941096047653/>
- Google:
 - "Salafiah" al Qaeda Iraq
 - "Salafiah" Zarqawi Iraq 2003

Part 2. Narrative

Note: this group should be deleted. There is no evidence it ever engages in political violence.

Group Formation

It is unknown when this group forms or how it first comes to attention. There are no violent incidents ascribed to it in GTD nor TOPS nor UCDP...

Geography

It is unknown where the group operates.

Organizational Structure

There is no information about the group's strength, membership, funding, or capabilities.

External Ties

The group merged with Al Qaeda in Iraq also known as Tawhid and Jihad at the time (BBC 2004; Gill 2004).

Group Outcome

The group merged with AQI in May 2004 (BBC 2004; Gill 2004).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: unknown

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (merger)

LXIV. AL ZAWAHIRI LOYALISTS

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2004

Onset: 0

Aliases: Al Zawahiri Loyalists, Al-Zawahiri Loyalists

Part 1. Bibliography

- Profile: Two female Italian aid workers have become the latest hostages in Iraq (2004). Washington, D.C.: NPR. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/189883567?accountid=14026>
- U.S. jets pound Fallujah in bid for control of city. (2004, Sep 11). The Globe and Mail Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/383827100?accountid=14026>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in September 2004 when it kidnapped two female Italian aid workers (Globe and Mail 2004). The group argues their goal is to punish Italy for “killing Muslims in Iraq” and wanted Berlusconi to withdraw Italian troops from Iraq (NPR 2004).

Geography

It is unclear where the kidnapping took place in Iraq. (NPR 2004; Globe and Mail 2004).

Organizational Structure

The kidnapping involved “15 heavily armed men” who kidnapped the two aid workers (NPR 2004). The group publicized the kidnapping and their goal on a website (NPR 2004). It is unknown whether the group had more members, their funding (they did not demand a ransom), or other strength.

External Ties

The group’s name refers to an Al-Qaeda deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in 2004 (NPR 2004). In 2011, al-Zawahiri was in charge of al-Qaeda.

Group Outcome

There is no evidence over whether the hostages are released. The Office of the Prime Minister in Italy rejected demands for Italy to do something saying the group's demands were not credible (Globe and Mail 2004). There is no other evidence of security action in response to the group.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (disappear)

LXV. JIHAD MARTYR'S COMPANIES IN IRAQ

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2004

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Reid, Robert H. 2004. "Iraq Head: Fallujah Entering 'Final Phase'." Ocala Star - Banner, Nov 01. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/390481504?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in 2004 for a car bombing in Baghdad. The group opposed the US occupation in Iraq and sought to punish a TV station it claimed was "siding with America" (Ocala Star 2004).

This is an alias for Saraya Al-Shuhuada Al-Jihadiyah Fi Al-Iraq (profile below).

Geography

The incident took place in Baghdad (Ocala Star 2004).

Organizational Structure

There is no information available about the group's organizational structure. It posted its announcement "on an Islamic web site known for carrying announcements by militant groups" (Ocala Star 2004).

External Ties

The attack was also claimed by the 1920s Revolution Brigades, but it is unknown whether they were working together or if the Jihad Martyrs Companies is an alias (Ocala Star 2004).

Group Outcome

The group is not heard from again after this one incident. There is no evidence of a security response by Iraqi or US security forces against the group although U.S. military officials issue a statement blaming the attack on "anti-Iraqi forces" (Ocala Star 2004).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Jihadist Martyr's Brigades in Iraq, Saraya Al-Shuhuada Al-Jihadiyah Fi Al-Iraq

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (disappear)

Note: this should be merged with the profile below. **This is an alias for Saraya Al-Shuhuada Al-Jihadiyah Fi Al-Iraq (profile below).**

LXVI. MUJAHEDDEEN BRIGADES

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2004

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Dangers Mount Along with Iraq's Need for Help." 2004. South China Morning Post, Apr 12, 10. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/266333878?accountid=14026>.
- "Iraqi Group Claims Responsibility for Abducting Brazilian Engineer." 2005. BBC Monitoring Americas, Jan 23, 1. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/460233268?accountid=14026>.
- Rushdi, Abu Alouf and Ashraf Khalil. 2008. "Attack Spurs Gaza Incursion." Chicago Tribune, Apr 10, 10. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/420666133?accountid=14026>.
- Reid, Robert H. 2005. "Is Kidnap Photo a Hoax? ; Web Posting Triggers Vast Doubts." The Grand Rapids Press, Feb 02, A6. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/285800800?accountid=14026>.

- Mark Simkin. 2004. "Japan Makes Little Progress Winning Hostages' Release; Three Japanese have been Taken Hostage in Iraq." ABC Premium News, Apr 10, 1. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/458096636?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in April 2004 for kidnapping several Japanese workers from the Self-Defense Forces helping with reconstruction (South China Morning Post 2004). The group demands Japan withdraw from Iraq and resists the US occupation in the country (South China Morning Post 2004).

Geography

The group is primarily active in Iraq, but it is unknown where the 2004 or 2005 incidents take place (ABC 2004; BBC 2005).

Organizational Structure

It is unknown how many members the group had, its funding, leadership, or organizational structure.

External Ties

The group kidnapped an engineer in 2005 with Al-Sunnah (BBC 2005). The group may have also been implicated in an attack in Gaza in 2009 with Islamic Jihad and the Popular Resistance Committees (Alouf 2008).

Group Outcome

The Japanese government said it would not negotiate with the group although it formed a special task force to handle the situation (ABC 2004). It is unknown what happens to the Japanese hostages. The group is later implicated in a kidnapping in 2005, but there is no follow-up. In 2008, a similarly named group was operating in Gaza and trying to push the Israelis out of Gaza (Alouf 2008). It is unknown if this is the same group, but if so, then Israeli officials attacked and shelled the group (Alouf 2008).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2005 (disappear) or 2008 (police activity)

LXVII. MUJAHEDDEEN GROUP

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2004

Onset:

Aliases: None

This name is too vague for research.

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

This name is too vague for research.

Geography

This name is too vague for research.

Organizational Structure

This name is too vague for research.

External Ties

This name is too vague for research.

Group Outcome

This name is too vague for research.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: A new proposed formation date if different than above

Group End (Outcome): A new proposed end date with the reason for ending in parentheses

LXVIII. KURDISTAN FREEDOM HAWKS (TAK)

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (Tak), Kurdish Vengeance Brigade, Kurdistan Freedom Falcons, Kurdistan Freedom Falcons Organization, Kurdistan Freedom Hawks, Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan (Tak)

Part 1. Bibliography

- Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda*. The RAND Corporation, 2008. 153.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- “Teyre Azadiye Kurdistan (TAK),” Terrorism Profiles, Mackenzie Institute,
<http://mackenzieinstitute.com/teyre-azadiye-kurdistan-tak/>
- Tim Arango and Semini Sengupta, “Obscure Kurdish Group Claims Hand in Bombing Turks,” New York Times, 2016,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/20/world/europe/obscure-kurdish-group-claims-hand-in-bombing-turks.html>
- Tim Arango and Ceylan Yeginsu, “Turkey Blames Kurdish Militia for Ankara Attack, Challenging U.S.” New York Times, Feb. 18, 2016.,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/20/world/europe/obscure-kurdish-group-claims-hand-in-bombing-turks.html>
- Global Post -
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110206091908/http://www.globalpost.com/webblog/turkey/terrorist-organization-profilekurdistan-freedom-hawks>
- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4381, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
- James Brandon, “The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons Emerges as a Rival to the PKK,” Terrorism Focus Vol. 3, Issue 40, Jamestown Foundation,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=936#.V0lzs5MrLkl
- Garrett Krivicich, “Turkey is blind to its most dangerous foe,” National Interest, 2016,
<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkey-blind-its-most-dangerous-foe-15943>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

TAK was formed in 2004 by Bahoz Erdal when it splintered from the PKK (Mackenzie Institute 2016). Its goal is to create a Kurdish state from parts of Iraq and Turkey and believes the complete destruction of the Turkish state is a necessary part of that (Mackenzie Institute 2016; National Interest 2016). It differs from the PKK in that it primarily focuses on urban environments. The government tends to underestimate it believing it is part of the PKK so ignores urban operations to contain it. It ascribes to a Kurdish ethno-nationalism (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Geography

Urban environments

TAK has carried out specific attacks in Ankara, Istanbul, Marmaris, and Antalya (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Organizational Structure

There is very little known about the group's organizational structure. It is allegedly led by Bahoz Erdal who was a former leader of the PKK (Mackenzie Institute 2016). Its members are primarily Kurdish; in 2006 they had a "few dozen active members" but that number has probably grown (Jamestown Foundation 2006). It is believed its members live in Kurdish diasporas in western Turkey and Istanbul (Jamestown Foundation 2006).

External Ties

It formed in 2004 after the PKK called off a 2004 truce. Although it started off bombing soft targets in 2004, TAK has begun to conduct increasingly lethal attacks. TAK pushes for pro-Kurdish policies including the creation of an independent Kurdish state, but does not coordinate nor cooperate with the PKK and has been a rival of it since 2006. In contrast to the PKK, the TAK targets foreign and civilian targets (Jamestown Foundation 2006).

Group Outcome

The group is still active and has had many attacks in Turkey in 2016. Turkey treats the TAK as part of the PKK, but this means that TAK largely goes ignored because PKK counterterrorism operations in the southeast do not affect TAK which seems to operate out of Ankara underground. (note urban/rural guerrilla warfare?) Even when US intelligence believes the TAK has perpetrated an attack, Turkish officials tend to blame alternate groups (Arango and Yeginsu 2016).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: 2004 (splinter)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

LXIX. SARAYA AL-SHUHUADA AL-JIHADIYAH FI AL-IRAQ

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Saraya Al-Shuhuada Al-Jihadiyah Fi Al-Iraq, Jihadist Martyrs Brigades In Iraq

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4439, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
- "Group Claims Attack on Al-Arabiya Office in Baghdad, Threatens further Attacks." 2004. BBC Monitoring Middle East, Nov 01, 1.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/458706121?accountid=14026>.
- "Seraya Al-Jihad." Conflict Forum Briefing Paper. 2005.
<http://www.conflictsforum.com/Briefs/Briefing1.pdf>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it came to attention in 2004 for an attack on a TV station as part of their general resistance to the U.S. occupation (BBC 2004; MIPT 2008). The group is Sunni and may be partially extremist due to reports they "regard Osama bin Laden as their role model" (Conflict Forum Briefing Paper 2005, 4). Other reports say it is unclear whether they are Sunni or Shia (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The TV station attack is in Baghdad (BBC 2004). The group otherwise operates out of Fallujah (Conflict Forum Briefing Paper 2005).

Organizational Structure

The group's leadership is composed of local religious leaders from Fallujah (Conflict Forum Briefing Paper 2005). They may recruit Arabs and foreign fighters in order to

boost their numbers (Conflict Forum Briefing Paper 2005). It is unknown how they fund themselves or how many total fighters they have.

External Ties

The group may have ties to Al Qaeda in Iraq and Zarqawi, who was also working out of Fallujah during this time (Conflict Forum Briefing Paper 2005). They recruit foreign fighters, which primarily come from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Region, to help them with their resistance (Conflict Forum Briefing Paper 2005).

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happens to the group. It may have been affected during the battle to retake Fallujah in late 2004 or joined AQI depending on the strength of those ties (MIPT 2008). The group allegedly negotiates with a Shia organization in order to release a hostage, American journalist Micah Garen (MIPT 2008). MIPT (2008) says the group is still active as of 2008, but there are no additional incident reports to corroborate this claim. There is no clear interaction or response with either US security forces or Iraqi security forces in the region.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Jihad Martyr Company in Iraq

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (disappear) or 2008 (active?)

LXX. HOLDERS OF THE BLACK BANNERS

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2004

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4396, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
- Khalil, Ashraf. 2004. "THE WORLD; Six More Foreigners are Kidnapped in Iraq." Los Angeles Times, Jul 22.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/421893418?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but they first came to attention in July 2004 for a kidnapping of Kenyan, Egyptian, and Indian drivers. If this sounds like the same incident attributed to the Black Banner Brigade, then give yourself a gold star! This is an alias for the Black Banner Brigade.

Geography

This is an alias for the Black Banner Brigade.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for the Black Banner Brigade.

External Ties

This is an alias for the Black Banner Brigade.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for the Black Banner Brigade.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Black Banner Brigade

Group Formation: This is an alias for the Black Banner Brigade.

Group End (Outcome): This is an alias for the Black Banner Brigade.

LXXI. ANSAR AL-JIHAD
Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 2004
Onset: NA

Aliases: Ansar Al-Jihad, Supporters Of Jihad

Note: this is different from the Egyptian Ansar al-Jihad

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4452, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

- Sawyer, Patrick. 2004. "Iraq PM's Hostage Women Relatives Freed." Evening Standard, Nov 15, 4. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/329755768?accountid=14026>.
- "Iraq PMs Family Members Abducted." 2004. The Statesman, Nov 11, 1. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/284194996?accountid=14026>.
- EDWARD WONG and, JAMES GLANZ and Dexter Filkins contributed reporting from Falluja for this article, Eric Schmitt from Washington and an Iraqi employee of The New York Times, from Mosul. 2004. "Rebels Attack in Central Iraq and the North." New York Times, Nov 16. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/432913638?accountid=14026>.
- Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida. The RAND Corporation, 2008. 153. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when Ansar Jihad formed, but it first came to attention in November 2004 when it kidnapped two relatives of the Iraqi Prime Minister in Baghdad, Iraq (Sawer 2004; MIPT 2008). Ansar al-Jihad claimed their goal was to force US troops to end their siege/battle for Fallujah (Sawer 2004; Statesmen 2004). Jones and Libicki claim the group's goal is regime change, but there is no additional evidence to corroborate this (Jones and Libicki 2008, 147). MIPT (2008) claims the group is Islamist, but there is no additional evidence to corroborate this other than the group's name (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The attack took place in Baghdad, Iraq (Sawer 2004).

Organizational Structure

There is not much information available about the group. It claimed the attack through an Internet message (Wong and Glanz 2004). Jones and Libicki claim the group had tens of members, but there is no additional evidence to corroborate this (Jones and Libicki 2008, 147).

External Ties

There is no evidence of external ties to other states or non-state actors (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

In February 2005, the group announced it would escalate its attacks, but there is no additional evidence of future activity (MIPT 2008). There is no evidence of arrests, raids, or other counterinsurgency operations by Iraqi or US security forces. MIPT (2008) says it is unknown whether the government negotiated with the group as the relatives were successfully released a few days after the initial kidnapping (Wong and Glanz 2004; MIPT 2008).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2005 (disappear)

LXXII. BRIGADES OF THE VICTORIOUS LION OF GOD

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4434, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
- Dwight Hamilton and Kostas Rimsa. *Terror Threat: International and Homegrown Terrorists and Their Threat to Canada*. Dundum 2007.
https://books.google.com/books?id=4F_laomcrUEC&pg=PA107&lpg=PA107&dq=BRIGADES+OF+THE+VICTORIOUS+LION+OF+GOD&source=bl&ots=7n-gL9_5mR&sig=C2j07oapYLD_ozcUSLdLnIYm7lw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjK69_bnazRAhUQ2WMKH_WzJBxYQ6AEIMTAE#v=onepage&q=BRIGADES%20OF%20THE%20VICTORIOUS%20LION%20OF%20GOD&f=false
- Jackie Spinner. "US Planes Strike Sadr City." Washington Post. 2004.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2004/09/24/AR2005040209298.html>
-

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in September 2004 when it kidnapped Fairuz Yamulky (Hamilton and Rimsa 2007, 106). The group demanded "GSS Cement build 150 homes in Iraq to replace those destroyed by

American bombs during the initial start of the war, arrange the release of 50 female Iraqi prisoners, leave Iraq, and pay US \$2.5 million in ransom” (Hamilton and Rimsa 2007, 106).

Geography

The kidnapping took place in Baghdad, Iraq (Spinner 2004).

Organizational Structure

There is no information available about the group’s organizational structure, membership, leadership, funding, or size.

External Ties

There is no information available about the group’s external ties. There is another group, the Usd Allah (Lions of God), that may be separate (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happens to the group. In December 2004, a group by the same name fired rockets and mortars at a US army base in al-Habbaniyah (MIPT 2008). There is no evidence of police action, arrests, or raids by either US or Iraqi security forces against the group. Yamulky was able to escape by tricking her prison guards to let her go (Hamilton and Rimsa 2007, 106; Spinner 2004).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004

LXXIII. BRIGADES OF MARTYR AHMED YASSIN

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4504, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
- Khalaf, Roula. 2004. "US Handling of Israel and Iraq Stokes Anger in Arab World: FOREIGN POLICY: Two Critical Issues for the Bush Administration are Merging in the Eyes of Many in the Region, Writes Roula Khalaf." Financial Times, Apr 22, 10. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/249484221?accountid=14026>.
- Allam, Hannah. 2004. "Many in Middle East View Deaths of U.S. Contractors with Indifference." Knight Ridder Tribune News Service, Apr 03, 1. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/456617853?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in March 2004 for a violent attack on US private military contractors in Fallujah, Iraq (Allam 2004; Khalaf 2004). The group claims the incident was revenge for the murder of Palestinian Ahmed Yassin, the leader of Hamas (Allam 2004). According to MIPT (2008), "the group also called for an end to the U.S. occupation of Iraq." There is no proscribed ideology.

Geography

The incident took place in Fallujah, Iraq (Allam 2004; Khalaf 2004).

Organizational Structure

There is no information available about the group's organizational structure including its members, funding, leadership, or size.

External Ties

There is no information about the group's external ties although it seemed to tacitly support Hamas and Ahmed Yassin (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

The group is not heard from again after this one incident. There is no evidence of a securitized response by US or Iraqi security forces (MIPT 2008; Allam 2004). The group's claim for the attack "received little attention" in Iraq (Allam 2004).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (disappear)

LXXIV. KARBALA BRIGADES

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Kata'ib al-Karbala

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4380, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
- "Iraq: New Armed Group Claims Responsibility for Hotel Attack." 2004. BBC Monitoring Middle East, Jul 02, 1.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/459227868?accountid=14026>.
- "Al-Manar TV shows Scenes of Attacks on US, British Troops in Iraq." 2007. BBC Monitoring Middle East, Jul 06, 1.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/458739860?accountid=14026>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it came to attention in July 2004 for an attack on a Sheraton Hotel in Baghdad, Iraq (BBC 2004). The group claims its goal is to resist the US occupation and force American troops to leave (BBC 2004). It had no ascribed ideology although MIPT (2008) says the group is Shia due to their name (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The attack took place in Baghdad, Iraq (BBC 2004). In 2007, it had an attack in Basra (BBC 2007).

Organizational Structure

There is no information available about the group's organizational structure including its members, funding, leadership, or size.

External Ties

There is no information available about the group's external ties.

Group Outcome

The group was last active in 2007, continuing to attack US and UK troops in Iraq (BBC 2007). It is unknown what happened to the group after that. The group purposely claimed it would not attack Iraqi security forces and there was no other evidence of interaction with ISF (BBC 2004).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Holy Karbala Brigades

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2007 (unknown)

LXXV. ARMY OF THE FOLLOWERS OF SUNNI ISLAM

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Army Of The Followers Of Sunni Islam, Jaish Ansar Al Sunnah, Jaish Ansar Al-Sunnah

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4431, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
- Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda*. The RAND Corporation, 2008. 153.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- Searched proquest:
 - Army of the followers of sunni islam
 - "Army of the followers of sunni islam"
 - "Followers of sunni islam"

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in September 2004 for kidnapping three Iraqi truck drivers working with the U.S. military (MIPT 2008). The group claims it opposes the US occupation and seeks to deter other Iraqi and military contractors from working with the U.S. government (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The attack took place in Basra near al-Taji (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

It is unknown how the group funded itself, its leadership, organizational structure, etc. Jones and Libicki claim the group had tens of members, but there is no additional evidence to support this (Jones and Libicki 2008, 150).

External Ties

The group has no known external ties to other state or non-state actors.

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happens to the group. It does not claim responsibility for another attack after 2004 (MIPT 2008). Jones and Libicki claim the group is still active as of 2008, but there are no other attacks or news articles to corroborate this (Jones and Libicki 2008, 150).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (disappear)

LXXVI. KHALID IBN WALID BRIGADE
Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 2004
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Robert Windrem, “US, Iraqi forces hunt alleged insurgency leader,” NBC News. 2005. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7466117/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/us-iraqi-forces-hunt-alleged-insurgency-leader/#.WNnPwxlrLkl
- Mohammed Hafez. “Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom.” 2007. US Institute of Peace Press. 245. <https://books.google.com/books?id=0I8m2CnuVooC&pg=PA246&lpg=PA246&dq=KHALID+IBN+WALID+BRIGADE+iraq&source=bl&ots=-wXQioi-w1&sig=1JWGLQI2kvCA4nfZp9iVMOiDI8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjRrZrNmPjSAhUBJCYKHThKAbEQ6AEIRTAk#v=onepage&q=KHALID%20IBN%20WALID%20BRIGADE%20iraq&f=false>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The group was founded by Ahmed Ibrahim al-Dabbash in 2003 to oppose the U.S. occupation (Windrem 2005). The group’s primary tactic was to use IEDs against US convoys and was “Sunni fundamentalist” (Windrem 2005).

Geography

The group was originally active in Baghdad, Iraq in 2003 (Windrem 2005).

Organizational Structure

The group is led by Ahmed Ibrahim al-Dabbash, who was originally an imam in Baghdad and formed a militia to protect medical supplies from looters (Windrem 2005). In December 2003, the group turned violent after it was attacked by two Shia militias (Windrem 2005). It grew rapidly due to Dabbash’s massive popularity and support from the Sunni community (Windrem 2005). The group finances terrorism in Iraq, but it is not known how it funds itself although potentially from AQI (Windrem 2005). The group has Sunni members, but there is no count size (Windrem 2005).

External Ties

The group allegedly has ties to Zarqawi and AQI (Windrem 2005). The group later merged with other groups to form the Ansar al-Sunnah Group/Army, which was separate from AQI in 2006 (Hafez 2007, 245).

Group Outcome

The group merged into the Ansar al-Sunnah Army in 2006 (Hafez 2007, 245).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2003

Group End (Outcome): 2006 (merger)