

**Yemen Cases, 1970-2012**  
**Last Updated: 3 February 2018**

New problem: tribal militias → similar to SSD but even less organized

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T2048	ORGANIZATION OF DESCENDANTS OF COMPANIONS (OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD) IN THE LAND OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA		0	0
T1066	EAGLES OF NATIONAL UNITY		0	0
T481	TAKFIR WAL HIJRA		1966	2011
T28	AL QA'IDA		1989	2012
T536	YEMEN ISLAMIC JIHAD		1990	1998
T8	JAYSH ADAN (AAIA)		1994	2003
T1053	BANI JABER TRIBE		1998	1999
T2232	ABIDA TRIBE		1998	2012
T1475	WORLD ISLAMIC JIHAD GROUP		1998	0
T2247	AL-ZAIDI TRIBE - MAREB		2000	2000
T761	MOHAMMED'S ARMY		2000	0
T2440	SYMPATHIZERS OF AL-QA'IDA ORGANIZATION		2002	2002
T29	AL-QA'IDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP)	17-Dec-09	2003	2012
T2246	AL-SHABAAB AL-MUMININ	9-Apr-14	2004	2010
T2244	AL-QA'IDA IN YEMEN	17-Dec-09	2005	2009
T2182	HOUTHIS		2006	2010
T569	AL-JUB TRIBE		2009	2009

T1542	AL BAKAZIM		2010	2011
T658	AQMUR		2010	2010
T2518	SOUTHERN MOBILITY MOVEMENT (YEMEN)		2010	2012
T1816	JOINT MEETING PARTIES (JMP)		2011	2011
T9003	NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT		0	0
T9004	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN		0	0

I. ORGANIZATION OF DESCENDANTS OF COMPANIONS (OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD) IN THE LAND OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Torg ID: 2048

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

**Part 1. Bibliography**

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<https://search-proquest-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org/docview/458721372?accountid=14026>.
- "Plan of Car Bomb Attacks Against 3 Embassies Foiled: Baseless." 2003.Yemen Times, Oct 06.  
<https://search-proquest-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org/docview/429767302?accountid=14026>.

**Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: None

Group Formation: Unknown

Group End: 2003 (merger)

**Part 3. Narrative**

**Group Formation**

There is very little information available about this group. It first came to attention in 2003 when it merged with EIJ, Yemeni Jihad Organization, Aden Islamic Army, and Al-Dawa al Salifiyah to form Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (BBC 2003; Yemen Times 2003). It is unknown when the group forms, its aim, or whether it conducts a violent attack.

### **Geography**

There is no evidence the group ever conducted an attack prior to merging with these other organizations to form AQAP (BBC 2003).

### **Organizational Structure**

No information could be found about the group's organizational structure, size, membership, or leadership.

### **External Ties**

No information could be found about the group's external ties.

### **Group Outcome**

It last came to attention in 2003 when it merged with EIJ, Yemeni Jihad Organization, Aden Islamic Army, and Al-Dawa al Salifiyah to form Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (BBC 2003; Yemen Times 2003).

## **II. EAGLES OF NATIONAL UNITY**

Torg ID: 1066

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- "Eagles of National Unity." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4009, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-phNscm68pYs3oRFwAhGLvXtHnsvHGUZp15S\\_XaBDI/edit](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-phNscm68pYs3oRFwAhGLvXtHnsvHGUZp15S_XaBDI/edit)
- David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf. International Terrorism and World Security. Routledge 2015. <https://books.google.com/books?id=vXJKCAAQBAJ&pg=PA40&lpg=PA40&dq=%22EAGLES+OF+NATIONAL+UNITY%22&source=bl&ots=da1IjxvGG&sig=Zzt1wHGLPvMh>

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QjAl#v=onepage&q=%22EAGLES%20OF%20NATIONAL%20UNITY%22&f=false](https://search-proquest-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org/docview/169191041?accountid=14026)

- "Plane Flies to Cairo; 3 Hijackers in Libya." 1972. Chicago Tribune (1963-Current File), Aug 24, 2.  
<https://search-proquest-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org/docview/169191041?accountid=14026>.
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[https://books.google.com/books?id=9XrvCAAQBAJ&pg=PA352&lpg=PA352&dq=%22EAGLES+OF+NATIONAL+UNITY%22&source=bl&ots=dxDI6UsItW&sig=eNI9gPnseYIHcMEEuQiFW4amJhM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEWjj79iCtZ\\_ZAhWVw4MKHTPoAecQ6AEIPzAH#v=onepage&q=%22EAGLES%20OF%20NATIONAL%20UNITY%22&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=9XrvCAAQBAJ&pg=PA352&lpg=PA352&dq=%22EAGLES+OF+NATIONAL+UNITY%22&source=bl&ots=dxDI6UsItW&sig=eNI9gPnseYIHcMEEuQiFW4amJhM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEWjj79iCtZ_ZAhWVw4MKHTPoAecQ6AEIPzAH#v=onepage&q=%22EAGLES%20OF%20NATIONAL%20UNITY%22&f=false)

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Eagles of National Unity in South Yemen (Shubber)

Group Formation: 1972

Group End: 1972 (disappear)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

It is unknown when this group formed, but it first came to attention in 1972 when three people hijacked a Southern Yemen airplane and demanded it fly to Benghazi, Libya (Carlton and Schaerf 2015, 40). The group later said the attack's aim was to demonstrate "a resistance exists" against the South Yemen government (Chicago Tribune 1972).

### **Geography**

The hijacking occurred sometime between Cairo, Egypt and Beirut, Lebanon (Carlton and Scharef 2015, 40; Chicago Tribune 1972). The plane stopped in Cyprus for refueling (Los Angeles Times 1972).

### **Organizational Structure**

Three people carried out the hijacking (Chicago Tribune 1972; Shubber 2013, 352).

## External Ties

Yemen claimed the group was affiliated with Saudi Arabia, but there is no other evidence to corroborate this (MIPT 2008).

## Group Outcome

The plane diverted from its originally scheduled route between Beirut and Cairo to fly to Benghazi, Libya (Carlton and Schaerf 2015, 40). The hijackers surrendered to Libyan authorities when they arrived (Chicago Tribune 1972).

- III. TAKFIR WAL HIJRA  
Torg ID: 481  
Min. Group Date: 1966  
Max. Group Date: 2011  
Onset: NA

## Part 1. Bibliography

- TOPS ID 4477
- Anneli Botha, "Terrorism in the Magrheb," ISS Africa, 2008, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/103660/MONO144FULL.pdf>
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- Joshua Gleis, "National Security Implications of al-Takfir Wal-Hijra," al-Nakhlah, Spring 2005
- Chelsea Daymon, "The Egyptian Sinai: A New Front for Jihadist Activity," Small Wars Journal, 2013
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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: "late 1960s"

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

## **Group Formation**

The group was founded in Egypt by Shukri Mustafa either in the late 1960s, or sometime between the 1970's and 1980's, depending on the source; the group resurfaced in 2011 due to the death of Mubarak (Gleis 2005; MIPT 2008). The group was allegedly a splinter of the Muslim Brotherhood (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010; Godsell 1981). The group rose up again in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (CNN 2011).

Mustafa was heavily influenced by the teachings of Sheikh Ali Ismael; Ismael argued Muslims and Islam were being suppressed by Egyptian President Nasser (Mili 2006). The group does not follow a specific ideology, but rather follows the words of organizational leaders, and punished people by torture who did not follow the way of the group. The group is still theorized to follow a fundamentalist Sunni Islamist ideology, which was then branded as takfiri (Mili 2006; Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2004; Kimyungi N.d.; CNN 2011). Mustafa formed the group to punish apostates and wage jihad (Mili 2006; MIPT 2008). He was anti-modernity and Salafi jihadi. Mustafa and his followers moved to the desert in order to practice Islam and get around what they deemed "illegitimate" Egyptian law. The group's aim was to wage jihad, overthrow the existing governments, and create an Islamic state. The date of the group's first violent attack is unknown.

## **Geography**

Al-Takfir wa al-Hira is a transnational terrorist group which provides support to different cells across Europe and northern Africa (Mili 2006; MIPT 2008; Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010; GTD 2017). The group originally formed in Egypt. The group has been active in Egypt's Sinai as of 2011, and more specifically Sheikh Zuweid (TIMEP N.d.; Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2004; Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010)

The group conducted attacks in Benghazi, Libya; Rafah, Egypt; Mogadishu, Somalia; Kirkuk, Iraq; and Garaffa, Sudan (GTD 2017). The group re-emerged after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in the Rafah and Sheikh Zuwaïd regions of the Sinai Peninsula (Daymon 2013; CNN 2011).

## **Organizational Structure**

The group was originally founded by Shukri Mustafa in Egypt (Gleis 2005; MIPT 2008; TIMEP N.d.; Kimyungi N.d.). Mustafa was heavily influenced by the teachings of Sheikh Ali Ismael; Ismael argued Muslims and Islam was being suppressed by Egyptian President Nasser (Mili 2006). Mustafa formed the group to punish apostates, wage jihad, and create an Islamic caliphate (Mili 2006; CNN 2011). He was anti-modernity and Salafi jihadi.

During the 1980s and 1990s, Takfir cells emerged in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Kenya, and Morocco (Mili 2006). The group was composed of Egyptians, Syrians, Palestinians, Lebanese, and other Arabs (MIPT 2008). The group was led by

Zakaria Miludi at an unknown time (Botha 2008). The group was more recently led by Abdel-Fattah Hasan Hussein Salem (TIMEP N.d.). The group was allegedly an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010; Godsell 1981).

### **External Ties**

The group may have influenced the ideology of GIA in Algeria as well as Takfiris in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco (Mili 2006). It may also have had a tacit alliance with the GIA (MIPT 2008). The group was allegedly also linked to as-Sirat al-Mustaqim and Salafia Jihadia (Botha 2008).

### **Group Outcome**

In 1977, Mustafa was executed by Egyptian police after that the group went underground (Mili 2006). The group has periodically engaged in violence. It may have influenced the ideology of GIA in Algeria as well as Takfiris in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco (Mili 2006). The group was attacked by a Lebanese group in 2000 that led to the death of several of its members (MIPT 2008). The group was responsible for five attacks on worshippers that started in 1994 (Mili 2006). The group was also linked to the death of Theo van Gogh in 2004 (MIPT 2008). On December 31, 2000, several Takfiri groups coordinated an attack (Mili 2006). As late as 2012, the group operated as a set of decentralized cells with little coordinated oversight (Daymon 2013).

The Egyptian government has typically “turned its head the other way” about violent activities in the Sinai and done little to address the concerns of Bedouins living in the Peninsula about economic discrimination (Daymon 2013). The group re-emerged after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in the Rafah and Sheikh Zuwaid regions of the Sinai Peninsula (Daymon 2013). It came to attention through a set of prominent attacks around El Arish, Egypt (CNN 2011). Egyptian intelligence officials said the group had members from Palestinian factions.

There is some confusion over whether Morocco’s Salafia Jihadia and Assirat al-Mustaqim are different from ATWAH because the ideology is so similar (Maroc Hebdo 2003; Mili 2008). It is also unclear whether Takfir refers to a single armed group or if it instead describes an ideology (Gleis 2005). Abdel-Fattah Hasan Hussein Salem was arrested in 2013 (TIMEP N.d.). The group was banned in Kazakhstan in 2014 (RFE/RL 2014). The group’s last violent attack was in 2013 in Libya (GTD 2017).

- IV. AL QA’IDA  
Torg ID: 28  
Min. Group Date: 1989  
Max. Group Date: 2012  
Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qa’ida, Al Qaeda, Al Qaida, Al-Qa’ida, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qa’idat Al-Jihad, The Base

## Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm>
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[http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG741-1.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf)
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<http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/al-qaida>

## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active) (Crenshaw 2015)

### Group Formation

Osama Bin Laden founded al-Qaida in 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group’s initial goals were to completely remove Western influence/ideas and to abolish the United States and Israel (BAAD 2015). They conducted their first attacks against the US embassy in Africa in 1998 (BAAD 2015; Global Security N.D). Al-Qaida first came to global attention after 9/11 but was active prior to that in its region (FAS 2005). The group has a radical Sunni Muslim ideology (CFR 2012; Global Security N.D).

### Geography

Al-Qaida operated mainly within Peshawar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (CFR 2012; PBS N.D). The group hid within cities and hills with particularly mountainous terrain in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan (as shepherds or farmers) (FAS 2005). Bin Laden had a base of operations in Sudan from 1991-1998 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

### **Organizational Structure**

Al-Qaida was headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was their sole leader until his assassination in 2011 (although rumors exist that he died earlier or didn't die at all) (CFR 2012). He was from Saudi Arabia and had helped fight the Soviets in the Afghanistan war (Crenshaw 2015). He was replaced by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2011. (Crenshaw 2015; CFR 2012). The group used a complex system in which members reported to couriers who reported to other couriers eventually making their way up to the head who was initially Bin Laden (RAND 2008). This is what we call a decentralized or cell-based organizational structure. Funding for the organization came from many places, including donations (FTO 2005). The group had different councils to deal with different aspects. For example, they had a "military committee" to deal with "military" matters, and a "consultation council" to plan out terrorist attacks and deal with financial matters (PBS N.D). They have no formal political wing (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida can be considered an umbrella group that consisted of many other terrorist groups within (ibid; Global Security N.D). The organization had an estimated 75 members when it was first formed and up to 18,000 at its peak in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015). Today, it is thought to have less than 1000 members, but these estimates vary (Crenshaw 2015; BAAD 2015).

### **External Ties**

Saudi Arabia allegedly gave some funding to AQ through drug trafficking and diamonds, but these were never proven true (Crenshaw 2015). Iran also allegedly trained and supported AQ members in the early 1990s (ibid; BAAD 2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan allow Al-Qaeda to operate training camps within their borders (ibid). The group has ties to several other terrorist organizations including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Jemaah Islamiya (CFR 2012; PBS N.D).

### **Group Outcome**

The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to find and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements operating in Afghanistan (BAAD 2015). The group's first leader Osama bin Laden was killed during a raid in 2011 (CFR 2012; BAAD 2015). The group is still active today.

## V. YEMEN ISLAMIC JIHAD

Torg ID: 536

Min. Group Date: 1990

Max. Group Date: 1998

Onset: NA

Aliases: Islamic Jihad Organization (Yemen), Yemen Islamic Jihad

### Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20221. Global Terrorism Dataset. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.  
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20221>
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<https://search-proquest-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org/docview/451141067?accountid=14026>.

### Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases:

Group Formation: 1990

Group End: 1994

### Part 3. Narrative

#### Group Formation

Yemen Islamic Jihad formed in 1990. The organization relied on fighters who had traveled to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union.

## **Geography**

## **Organizational Structure**

The organization relied on fighters who had traveled to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union.

## **External Ties**

The organization had ties to al-Qaida and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. In 1994, AAIA formed as a splinter of the Islamic Jihad Movement after the end of the Yemen Civil War (ICG 2017, 3).

## **Group Outcome**

The group eventually merged with EIJ in 1994.

### VI. JAYSH ADAN

Torg ID: 8

Min. Group Date: 1994

Max. Group Date: 2003

Onset: NA

Aliases: Adan Abyan Islamic Army (Aaia), Aden Abyan Islamic Army, Aden Abyan Islamic Army (Aaia), Aden Islamic Army, Army Of Mohammed And The Jaish Adan Al Islami, Islamic Aden Army, Islamic Army Of Aden (Iaa), Islamic Army Of Aden-Abyan (Iaaa), Jaysh Adan, Jaysh Adan-Abiyan Al-Islami, Muhammed's Army

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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- GTD Perpetrator 20009. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20009>
- "Appendix F - Statement of Reasons - Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)." =Review of the re-listing of Ansar al-Sunna, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ), Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Islamic Army of Aden (IAA), Asbat al Ansar (AAA) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) as terrorist organisations under the Criminal Code Act 1995. Australian Parliament. 2007.

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[https://books.google.com/books?id=\\_PXpFxFxKRsHgC&pg=PA598&lpg=PA598&dq=jaish+adan&source=bl&ots=mE82ORpjTb&sig=OsNWjM0NPKuOtDxkQfSF9JrTBcQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj7tYqxpahZAhWlh1QKHT8NCnYQ6AEIPDAC#v=onepage&q=jaish%20adan&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=_PXpFxFxKRsHgC&pg=PA598&lpg=PA598&dq=jaish+adan&source=bl&ots=mE82ORpjTb&sig=OsNWjM0NPKuOtDxkQfSF9JrTBcQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj7tYqxpahZAhWlh1QKHT8NCnYQ6AEIPDAC#v=onepage&q=jaish%20adan&f=false)
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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1994 (According to only one source, it attacked a Yemeni political party) (Carapico 2000)

At some point in the 1990s, it splintered from Yemen Islamic Jihad (Australian Parliament 2007), first attack in 1998 (GTD 2017)

Group End: Disappeared in the mid-2000s. The last attack linked to AAIA occurred in 2006 (Australian Parliament 2007). CT operations are very effective. AQAP established a group called the Adan Abyan Army in 2010, which appears to be separate (Jamestown Foundation 2010 1-2).

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The group's origins are partially disputed. In 1994, AAIA formed as a splinter of the Islamic Jihad Movement after the end of the Yemen Civil War (ICG 2017, 3).

AAIA was a salafist, sunni, radical, jihadist group that had close ties to Al-Qa'ida from its establishment and sought to depose Yemeni government in order to replace it with a hardline Islamist regime (Schmid 2011, 598; MIPT 2008; Australian Parliament 2007; Global Security n.d.).

In 1998, AAIA abducted 16 Westerners and demanded the release of several militants from Yemeni prison (Global Security n.d.; Australian Parliament 2007; UNSC 2015). This is considered to be the group's first incident. Thereafter, AAIA was involved in the attacks on the USS Sullivans and USS Cole in the Port of Aden in 2000 (Mackenzie Institute 2016; Global Security n.d.). They have also been linked to other attacks in the Port of Aden, attempted bombings of Western embassies, and attacks on military medical convoys (Australian Parliament 2007). These incidents all occurred before 2006 (Australian Parliament 2007).

#### **Geography**

AAIA's activities were confined to Yemen and the waters surrounding it. It carried out attacks in Sana'a, Habab, the Gulf of Aden (GTD 2017), Harat, Aden (Australian Parliament 2007), the Abyan Governorate, and Mudiya (Mackenzie Institute 2016). In 2006, individuals linked to AAIA were prevented from travelling to Iraq to join the civil war (Australian Parliament 2007).

#### **Organizational Structure**

Little is known about this group's internal structure. One estimate put the group's size at between 30 and 100 members (Australian parliament 2007). Zain al-Abidin al-Mihdar (Abu al-Hassan) was the group's founder and first military leader until he was executed in 1999 (Australian Parliament 2007; Global Security n.d.).

Al-Mihdar was replaced by Sheikh Khalid Abd al-Nabi, until he went into the custody of the Yemeni government in 2003 and was released the same year with a pardon (Australian Parliament 2007; US Department of State 2005). It should be noted that there is some debate over al-Nabi's fate. One source states he was killed in 2003 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). Another states that he was not pardoned until 2005 (Jamestown Foundation 2010, 1-2).

Members were allegedly veterans who had fought in the Soviet-Afghanistan war before returning to Yemen (US State Department 2006, 244; Mackenzie Institute 2015). The group funded itself, in part, through support from al Qaeda (Global Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2015). The group also may fund itself through ransom and kidnapping (Australian Parliament 2007).

### **External Ties**

AAIA subscribed to AQ's brand of Salafi Sunni Islam, as well as to its mission and tactics. AAIA has cooperated with al-Qa'ida on attacks such as the one that struck the USS Cole in 2000 (UNSC 2015). AAIA has received funding and other resources from al-Qa'ida since it was created in the 1990s (Global Security n.d.; UNSC 2015)

### **Group Outcome**

The Yemeni government cracked down on AAIA in 1999 and the early 2000s. These measures were effective, resulting in the execution of Abu al-Hassan in 1999 and the arrest of Abd al-Nabi in 2003 (Australian Parliament 2007). In 2003, the group's operating center in Harat was raided; this dealt a major blow to AAIA's effectiveness (Australian Parliament 2007). The group's activities were significantly curtailed after Abd al-Nabi was removed from the fight in 2003 (Jamestown Foundation 2010, 1-2). In 2010, AQAP declared that it would be forming a new Aden-Abyan Army, though this entity does not seem to be directly affiliated with AAIA (Jamestown Foundation 2010, 1-2). AAIA did have ties to Al-Qa'ida, so it is possible some of the same individuals fought for AQAP within the new group (Jamestown 2010, 1-2).

Notes for Iris:

- Saleh president of unified Yemen in 1990 - coincidental at the same time there is an influx of foreign fighters from Afghanistan. He allows it because Islamists are fighting his enemies, not just undermining him. ---> leads to formation of Yemen Islamic Jihad
- Yemen Islamic Jihad → AQY and AAIA (unclear exactly why they are 2 different organizations. AQY is more outward-looking and AAIA is more inward-looking.). They cooperate often (e.g. USS Cole attack)
- Saleh in 1993-1994 is very fearful of tribe and military forces. He hopes to play the groups off of one another.

-group falls apart quickly after leadership loss and government crackdown. AQY scoops up the rest of the members by co-opting the lower fighters and exploiting lack of senior leadership.

-the group is unable to carry out attacks after 2003

VII. BANI JABER TRIBE

Torg ID: 1053

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 1999

Onset: NA

**Aliases:** None

**\*doesn't appear to be an armed group**

**Part 1. Bibliography**

- GTD Incident ID 199910260005. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.  
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199910260005>
- "Three Americans Taken Hostage in Volatile Yemen." 1999. The Washington Post (1974-Current File), Oct 27, 1.  
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1707176331?accountid=14026>.
- "Yemen: U.S. Hostages Freed." 1999. Times - Colonist, Oct 29, C14.  
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/345756498?accountid=14026>.

**Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1999

Group End: 1999 (continues as tribe, but no longer carries out violent attacks)

**Part 3. Narrative**

**Group Formation**

This appears to be a tribe and not an organized militant group. It is unknown when the tribe first formed, but it came to attention for an attack in 1999 when it kidnapped three American citizens in Marib, Yemen (Times 1999; Washington Post 1999). The group did not issue a formal demand, but similar kidnappings occurred when tribes wanted to demand an improvement in conditions (Washington Post 1999). An alternative source

claimed the group demanded the release of tribal members who had blown up an oil pipeline (GTD 2017).

### **Geography**

The kidnapping took place around Marib in southern Yemen (Times 1999; Washington Post 1999).

### **Organizational Structure**

Members came from the Bani Jabar tribe in Habab Valley (Times 1999). It is unknown how many members there were, how the group organized, or whether it was even a real group.

### **External Ties**

No information could be found about external ties.

### **Group Outcome**

Authorities negotiated with the tribe and managed to secure the hostage release after three days (Times 1999). The kidnapping in 1999 is the only violent attack attributed to the tribe in the dataset, but it is unclear whether they are actually a militant organization.

VIII. ABIDA TRIBE  
Torg ID: 2232  
Min. Group Date: 1998  
Max. Group Date: 2012  
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

#### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- GTD Incident ID 200511210002. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2012.  
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200511210002>
- Jamestown Foundation, The Tribes of Yemen: An Asset or Impediment to Stability? Part Two, 20 January 2011, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 3, available at:  
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d3966562.html>
- Jamestown Foundation, Special Report from Yemen: The Looming Threat of Tribal War, 1 March 2011, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d6e1b362.html>
- International Crisis Group (ICG), Yemen: Coping with Terrorism and Violence in a Fragile State, 8 January 2003, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3efde6314.html>

- United States Congressional Research Service, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, 3 March 2011, RL34170, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d8069b5c.html>
- "Yemen Adds Troops in Battle to Capture Suspects." 2001. New York Times, Dec 20. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/431932436?accountid=14026>.
- Danna Harman. "Yemen fights own terror war." Christian Science Monitor. 2002. <https://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0205/p01s04-wome.html>
- Howard Schneider. "For Yemen, a Risk and an Opportunity." Washington Post. 2002. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/01/02/for-yemen-a-risk-and-an-opportunity/64b7f30b-5bb9-4193-a0a0-e0683e6625e1/?utm\\_term=.7bfa8772941a](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/01/02/for-yemen-a-risk-and-an-opportunity/64b7f30b-5bb9-4193-a0a0-e0683e6625e1/?utm_term=.7bfa8772941a) (mostly context)

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2001

Group End: 2005

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

This is a tribe and not an armed group. It first came to attention in 2001 for blowing up pipelines (ICG 2003, 19). The tribe generally had semi-autonomy over the Abida region and did not interact much with the government (Washington Post 2002). The group occasionally blew up oil pipelines, a common tribal attack, used to draw attention to squalid conditions in tribal areas (ICG 2003, 19; Bani Jaber profile).

### **Geography**

The tribe operated in southern Yemen around Marib (GTD 2017).

### **Organizational Structure**

The tribe had 5,000 members, but was not a militant organization (New York Times 2001). Members came from the Abida tribe (ICG 2003, 19-20; New York Times 2001). No additional information about leadership or funding was found.

### **External Ties**

The tribe protected Al Qaeda militants and provided them sanctuary (New York Times 2001).

## **Group Outcome**

After 9/11, the Yemen government launched a counterinsurgency operation in Abida territory to rout out Al Qaeda members receiving sanctuary in the area (ICG 2003, 20; Christian Science Monitor 2002). Tribesmen clashed with government forces resulting in high casualties and no arrests of Al Qaeda members (ICG 2003, 20). The government arrested a few dozen members, but released them on the condition they talk to their tribal members and stop providing support for Al Qaeda (Christian Science Monitor 2002).

In 2005, the group kidnapped two Swiss civilians, but released them two days later (GTD 2017). During this attack, the tribe demanded the release of other tribesmen in government detainment (GTD 2017).

In 2010, AQAP called on the Abida Tribe to rise up and revolt against the government after a prominent Abida Sheikh died, but there is no evidence it happened (Jamestown Foundation 2010).

### **IX. WORLD ISLAMIC JIHAD GROUP**

Torg ID: 1475

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

#### **Part 1. Bibliography**

#### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: This is likely an alias for the World Islamic Front For The Jihad Against The Jews And The Crusaders (T728).

Group Formation: This is likely an alias for the World Islamic Front For The Jihad Against The Jews And The Crusaders (T728).

Group End: This is likely an alias for the World Islamic Front For The Jihad Against The Jews And The Crusaders (T728).

#### **Part 3. Narrative**

##### **Group Formation**

This is likely an alias for the World Islamic Front For The Jihad Against The Jews And The Crusaders (T728).

### **Geography**

This is likely an alias for the World Islamic Front For The Jihad Against The Jews And The Crusaders (T728).

### **Organizational Structure**

This is likely an alias for the World Islamic Front For The Jihad Against The Jews And The Crusaders (T728).

### **External Ties**

This is likely an alias for the World Islamic Front For The Jihad Against The Jews And The Crusaders (T728).

### **Group Outcome**

This is likely an alias for the World Islamic Front For The Jihad Against The Jews And The Crusaders (T728).

- X. AL-ZAIDI TRIBE - MAREB  
Torg ID: 2247  
Min. Group Date: 2000  
Max. Group Date: 2000  
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- GTD Incident ID 200011140007. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.  
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200011140007>
- United States Department of State, U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 - Yemen , 4 March 2002, available at:  
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3c84d9a38.html>
- “Who are the Houthis in Yemen?” Al Jazeera. 2014.  
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/yemen-houthis-hadi-protests-201482132719818986.html>

- “Yemen Crisis: Who is fighting whom?” BBC. 2018.  
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423>

\*this is a tribe, not an armed group

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: This name refers to the tribe of a journalist, Hassan al-Zaidi, located in Marib, but not the name of the tribe itself so it is hard to identify (US State Department 2002).

Group Formation: This name refers to the tribe of a journalist, Hassan al-Zaidi, located in Marib, but not the name of the tribe itself so it is hard to identify (US State Department 2002).

Group End: This name refers to the tribe of a journalist, Hassan al-Zaidi, located in Marib, but not the name of the tribe itself so it is hard to identify (US State Department 2002).

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

This name refers to the tribe of a journalist, Hassan al-Zaidi, located in Marib, but not the name of the tribe itself so it is hard to identify (US State Department 2002).

### **Geography**

This name refers to the tribe of a journalist, Hassan al-Zaidi, located in Marib, but not the name of the tribe itself so it is hard to identify (US State Department 2002).

### **Organizational Structure**

This name refers to the tribe of a journalist, Hassan al-Zaidi, located in Marib, but not the name of the tribe itself so it is hard to identify (US State Department 2002).

### **External Ties**

This name refers to the tribe of a journalist, Hassan al-Zaidi, located in Marib, but not the name of the tribe itself so it is hard to identify (US State Department 2002).

### **Group Outcome**

This name refers to the tribe of a journalist, Hassan al-Zaidi, located in Marib, but not the name of the tribe itself so it is hard to identify (US State Department 2002).

XI. MOHAMMED'S ARMY  
Torg ID: 761  
Min. Group Date: 2000  
Max. Group Date: 0  
Onset: NA

Aliases: Mohammed's Army (Yemen), Mohammed's Army

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: This is an alias for Islamic Army of Aden (T8)

Group Formation: This is an alias for Islamic Army of Aden (T8)

Group End: This is an alias for Islamic Army of Aden (T8)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

This is an alias for Islamic Army of Aden (T8)

#### **Geography**

This is an alias for Islamic Army of Aden (T8)

#### **Organizational Structure**

This is an alias for Islamic Army of Aden (T8)

#### **External Ties**

This is an alias for Islamic Army of Aden (T8)

#### **Group Outcome**

This is an alias for Islamic Army of Aden (T8)

## XII. SYMPATHIZERS OF AL-QA`IDA ORGANIZATION

Torg ID: 2440

Min. Group Date: 2002

Max. Group Date: 2002

Onset: NA

Aliases: Sympathizers Of Al-Qa'ida Organization, Sympathizers Of Al-Qa`Ida Organization

### Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20423. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.  
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20423>
- Search ProQuest
  - "Sympathizers Of Al-Qa'ida Organization"

**\*this doesn't appear to be an actual group.**

### Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This name is too vague for research; there is no evidence of an armed group by this name.

Group Formation: This name is too vague for research; there is no evidence of an armed group by this name.

Group End: This name is too vague for research; there is no evidence of an armed group by this name.

### Part 3. Narrative

#### Group Formation

This name is too vague for research; there is no evidence of an armed group by this name.

#### Geography

This name is too vague for research; there is no evidence of an armed group by this name.

#### Organizational Structure

This name is too vague for research; there is no evidence of an armed group by this name.

### **External Ties**

This name is too vague for research; there is no evidence of an armed group by this name.

### **Group Outcome**

This name is too vague for research; there is no evidence of an armed group by this name.

#### XIII. AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP)

Torg ID: 29

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 2009

Aliases: Al-Qa`ida In The Arabian Peninsula (Aqap), Al-Qaeda In The Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qaeda In The Arabian Peninsula (Aqap), Al-Qaeda In The Arabian Peninsula (Aqap), Al-Qaida In The Arabian Peninsula, Aqap

#### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- "AQAP." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4470, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-phNscm68pYs3oRFwAhGLvXtHnsvHGUZpl15S\\_XaBDI/edit](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-phNscm68pYs3oRFwAhGLvXtHnsvHGUZpl15S_XaBDI/edit)
- GTD Perpetrator 20032. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20032>
- Martha Crenshaw. "Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula." Mapping Militant Organizations. Last updated 2015. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/19>
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- "Profile: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula." BBC News. 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11483095>
- "Fighting the Long War: The Evolution of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula." The Sentinel. Vol. 10. Issue 1. 2017. Combating Terrorism Center. <https://ctc.usma.edu/fighting-the-long-war-the-evolution-of-al-qaida-in-the-arabian-peninsula/>

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- Katherine Zimmerman. "AQAP: A Resurgent Threat." Sentinel. Vol 8, Issue 9. Combating Terrorism Center. 2015. <https://ctc.usma.edu/aqap-a-resurgent-threat/>
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- "Yemen's al Qaeda: Expanding the Base." Report 174. International Crisis Group. 2017. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base>
- International Crisis Group (ICG), Yemen's al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base , 2 February 2017, Middle East Report N°174, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/58933e434.html>
- Michael Horton. "Guns for Hire: How al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is Securing its Future in Yemen." *Terrorism Monitor* Vol. 16, No. 2. Jamestown Foundation. 2018. <https://jamestown.org/program/guns-hire-al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-securing-future-yemen/>

## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2009. The group formed from the merger of Saudi and Yemeni AQ forces (Crenshaw 2015)

Group End: Active as of January 2018 (Horton 2018)

## Part 3. Narrative

### Group Formation

After a Saudi crackdown pushed al-Qa'ida operatives into Yemen, Al-Qa'ida in Yemen merged with its Saudi counterpart to form AQAP in 2009 (Crenshaw 2015; Zahriyeh 2015). Both groups had both local support and foreign fighters who had gained experience fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviets twenty years earlier (Crenshaw 2015; Zahriyeh 2015). AQAP has continued its precursor organizations' operations in Yemen and Saudi Arabia and has been linked to transnational attacks against the US and France (CFR 2015). Many of AQAP's early attacks targeted Western and other foreign presences in Yemen, including South Korean and Western tourists in 2009 (Crenshaw 2015). Since its creation, AQAP has grown far stronger in Yemen. With a failed state, lawlessness, and ever-more-intense sectarian violence, the environment is

perfect for AQAP to grow in size, engage in a full military campaign, and acquire better sources of funding and materiel (ICG 2017).

It was initially focused on fighting the West, but has reoriented to operations in Yemen since the revolt against the Yemeni government began in earnest in 2011 (ICG 2017). AQAP is a Sunni, jihadist, Salafi, organization that aims to fight the West and establish Islamic rule, hoping to unify the Arabian Peninsula and fight towards Palestine to destroy Israel (Crenshaw 2015, Horton 2018). It also wants to overthrow the Yemen and Saudi governments and replace them with an Islamic state (Crenshaw 2015).

## **Geography**

AQAP has been active mostly in the southern and southeastern parts of Yemen (Crenshaw 2015). AQAP has also been linked to attacks in Saudi Arabia and transnational operations against the United States and other Western powers, including France (Charlie Hebdo) through training and online propaganda (CFR 2015; Crenshaw 2015; Zahriyeh 2015). One notable attempted attack on the US was Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's failed attempt to conceal explosives in his underwear in 2009 (CFR 2015). As of 2018, AQAP is most active in Al-Bayda and in the disputed city of Taiz, where it opposes the Houthis and their allies, as well as the Hadramawt, where it has been fighting against UAE forces (Horton 2018). The group's base is in southern and southeastern Yemen (Crenshaw 2015).

## **Organizational Structure**

AQAP's leader (emir) since its formation in 2009, Nasser al-Wuhayshi, was killed by an airstrike in 2015 (BBC 2015; Zimmerman 2015). He was replaced by Qassim al-Raimi (CFR 2015). While the group only had a few hundred fighters in 2009, its size increased drastically by 2014, when it had about 1,000 (CFR 2015; Crenshaw 2015). AQAP releases a Yemen-focused propaganda magazine called *Sada al-Malahim*, or "The Echo of Battles", as well as *Inspire*, which is propaganda in English meant for consumption by westerners (CFR 2015). American jihadists Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan were a key part of this effort until they were killed in 2011 (CFR 2015). This propaganda helped the group recruit foreign fighters (Counter Extremism n.d.). In 2014, the group shifted to engage locals more in an apparent mimicry of Houthi tactics, in order to acquire tribal support in Yemen (Horton 2018).

AQAP has been so resilient to losses in its fight against the US and other groups in Yemen because of its regimented, cellular structure (CFR 2015). It is also very hierarchical with a clear set of senior leadership and junior leadership (Counter Extremism n.d.; CFR 2015). The group has both a political wing and an armed wing (Counter Extremism n.d.)

The group funded itself through Islamic charities (Crenshaw 2015; CFR 2015). The group also funds itself through robberies, kidnapping, and control of a port in Yemen (Counter Extremism n.d.; CFR 2015).

### **External Ties**

At a certain point, AQAP was receiving funding from Islamic charities, and still receives funds from individuals willing to donate directly to AQAP, though most of its money comes from ransoms, theft, and drugs (CFR 2015; Crenshaw 2015). AQAP is affiliated with the main AQ organization based in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Crenshaw 2015). In the context of the 2011 uprising, AQAP renamed part of itself as “Ansar al-Shari’a”, and attempted to market itself as a more locally-supported group (Crenshaw 2015; Horton 2017). While originally amenable to cooperating with the Islamic State, the relationship between the two groups has soured; the Islamic State in Yemen and AQAP now openly criticize each other (Crenshaw 2015; Zimmerman 2015). AQAP has been fighting the advance of the Houthis eastward and southward in Yemen (CFR 2015). AQAP has interactions with local tribes that result in cooperation on some issues and violent clashes on others (Horton 2018)

### **Group Outcome**

AQAP remains active, violent, and powerful in Yemen, but has needed to sacrifice ideological purity for the purpose of making alliances and securing funding (Horton 2018). The lack of governmental control in Yemen has allowed AQAP to expand and, in 2011, to begin to control territory (ICG 2017, 10). In 2011-2012, it attempted to hold Abyan but failed (ICG 2017; Horton 2018). In 2015-2016, it attempted to hold Mukalla but was unable to do so in the face of a UAE offensive (ICG 2017; Horton 2018). As of 2018, analysts anticipated that AQAP will remain an important part of the landscape of violence in Yemen, and but may reorient towards warding off challengers and expanding its presence within Yemen, as opposed to launching transnational attacks against the West (Horton 2018). It remains the most prominent Sunni counterweight to the Shi'i, Iran-backed Houthis (Crenshaw 2015). The United States has directed growing drone strikes against AQAP commanders to combat the problem (BBC 2015). The Yemen government also tried to launch offensives against the group in 2010 (BBC 2015). In 2015, the Saudi government launched “Operation Decisive Storm” to undermine the Houthis, but, in the process provided space for AQAP to expand (Horton 2017).

Interesting quote from Counter Extremism:

In recent years, AQAP has continued to exploit the opportunities for recruitment provided by social media sites. On Twitter, for example, as soon as an AQAP account is shut down, another emerges almost immediately, typically using a new name (“handle”) with one character amended. In November 2014, AQAP even launched its own “AMA” (Ask

Me Anything) Twitter account, providing official answers to questions such as “Why haven’t there been further AQAP attacks inside the US? Why don’t you move the war from Yemen to US soil?” The job of resolving such queries from prospective jihadists falls to [Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi](#), the AQAP senior official who claimed responsibility for the *Charlie Hebdo* attack in January 2015.

Notes for Iris:

-AQAP seems to mark a transnational focus (more outward-looking). 2009 is a major turning point in AQ worldwide history (e.g. IRQ, AFG, YEM, PHL?)

-change in funding sources around this time forces them to switch tactics - they become more efficient at supply lines. Since the Yemen Civil War, they have retrenched a lot. They have territory (sort of), but they’re not governing, they’re consolidating, they’re exporting media → more a messaging/radicalization campaign.

-in 2018, there is still no consolidated CT operation against them and drone operations are limited in scope.

-Ansar al Sharia wants to be seen as the local faction (Remains to be seen whether they’re perceived as domestically legitimate)

-IS-Yemen is pretty small; AQAP has more support. They don’t have ties to the locals the same way other militant groups in the country do (SMM and Houthis).

-this is a terrorist group, not an insurgent group. They don’t have the organizational planning. Their goals are so abstract that they don’t know what they stand for or how to implement what they should achieve. This is in stark contrast to Houthis. (key features - aims and organizational structure)

-interesting divergence between preferences and capabilities

#### XIV. AL-SHABAAB AL-MUMININ

Torg ID: 2246

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2010

Onset: 2014

Aliases: Al-Shabaab Al-Mu'minin, Al-Shabaab Al-Muminin, Al-Shabaab Al-Muminin (Houthis), Al-Shabaab Al-Mu'minin (Houthis), The Believing Youth

#### Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://ucdp.uu.se/#/actor/1091>
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<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/who-are-yemen-houthis/390111/>
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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), Ansarullah, the Houthis, al-Houthiyin, Shabaab al-Sumud

Group Formation: Mid-1990s (Uppsala Actor Conflict Encyclopedia 2017)

Group End: Active as of February 2018 (O'Connor 2018)

## Part 3. Narrative

### Group Formation

Al-Shabaab al-Mu'minin is the first name given to the military wing of a movement formed at an unknown date in the 1990s by Husein Badr al Din al-Houthi (Uppsala Actor

Conflict Encyclopedia 2017). Since 2004, it has been known as “Ansar Allah”, or simply “the Houthis”, even though the Houthi name refers to the political part of the movement as well (Counter Extremism Report n.d.; Global Security n.d.; Uppsala Actor Conflict Encyclopedia 2017). Ansar Allah are Zaidi Shi’i Muslims and have demanded regional autonomy for the Zaidi population of northern Yemen (Saada Governorate) (Counter Extremism Report n.d.; ICG 2014, 6). The following slogan, directed at President Saleh’s policies more than the United States or Israel, has followed the movement since its inception: “God is great! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse the Jews! Victory to Islam!” (Schmitz Feb. 28, 2015; Counter Extremism Report n.d.).

Until around 2003, the movement was largely a social one that sought to promote Zaidi culture among young people, and to protect it against Salafi and Wahabi Sunni Islam from Saudi Arabia, using cultural programs in the Saada Governorate (Counter Extremism Report n.d.). In 2004, Husein al-Houthi was killed by the Saleh government in a crackdown that targeted al-Shabaab al-Muminin because of its increasingly powerful protest movement (Basu 2015; HRW 2010, 13). The fighting has grown more severe since his death. Periods of intermittent fighting and ceasefires lasted through 2010, and Saudi Arabia joined in to help the Saleh government fight the Houthis (HRW 2010, 10). Following the protests that began in 2011 and a subsequent armed campaign, the Houthis helped overthrow the Yemeni government (Al Batati 2015).

## **Geography**

The Houthis’ political uprising began in the Sadaa governorate in northern Yemen, but they have since expanded, beginning with the neighboring ‘Amran Governorate (Counter Extremism Report n.d.). In 2014, they took control of Sana’a (Schmitz Feb. 14, 2015). They also took the port at Hodeidah in 2015 (Al Batati 2015). The Houthis have been unable to exert control over all of Yemen, largely due to resistance from tribes in the east that are backed by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf powers, along with the Sunni Islah Party, which still has considerable power in the East (Schmitz Feb. 14, 2015).

## **Organizational Structure**

The Houthis routinely receive both cash and material support (both weapons and personnel) from Iran (Counter Extremism Report n.d.; Schmitz Feb. 14, 2015; ). Some of this is routed through Hizbullah, whereas the rest arrives directly in Yemen from Iran (Counter Extremism Report n.d.). Its founder and first leader, Husein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, was killed in 2004, and replaced by his father, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, then Husein’s younger brother, Abd al-Malik al-Houthi (Counter Extremism Report n.d.; Taylor 2015). The group primarily recruits fighters from tribal areas in Northern Yemen (Counter Extremism n.d.). It has a political wing and a military wing.

## **External Ties**

The Houthis routinely receive both cash and material support (both weapons and personnel) from Iran (Counter Extremism Report n.d.; Schmitz Feb. 14, 2015). Some of this is routed through Hizbullah, whereas the rest arrives directly in Yemen from Iran (Counter Extremism Report n.d.). The Houthis have also received support from former President Saleh and tribes loyal to him; the consensus appears to be that Saleh views Ansar Allah as a method of eliminating his other opponents (Al Batati 2015; ICG 2014, 7; Schmitz Feb. 14, 2015). Ansar Allah has also been fighting AQAP, the Islah party, forces from Taiz in the South, and Sunni tribes in eastern Yemen (Schmitz Feb. 14, 2015).

### **Group Outcome**

Having joined in peaceful protests (though acts of violence still occurred) against the Yemeni government in 2011, and having seen the government's reform process (the National Dialogue) stall, Ansar Allah took up violence again and gained control of Sana'a in 2014 (Schmitz Feb. 14, 2015; Schmitz Feb. 28, 2015). In their campaign, Ansar Allah fought against General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, the Hashid tribal group, and the Islah party, who had all fought against President Saleh (Schmitz Feb. 28, 2015). By 2015, the interim government led by Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi had resigned (Taylor 2015). The Houthis have since attempted to become a nationally recognized government (Schmitz Feb. 28, 2015). However, they have been met with fierce resistance from AQAP, the Islah party, Taiz, and tribes in the east (Schmitz Feb. 14, 2015).

Notes for Iris:

- Zaidi becomes even more of a minority after reunification; local leader sets up social programs to preserve and protect (sounds like BH)
- government crackdowns because they don't like the minority (there used to be a Zaidi monarchy for centuries). This crackdown backfires immensely and the group is able to amass a bunch of support quickly.
- crackdown happens in 2003; Houthi leaders dies in 2004 -> they step up their attacks in this wake
- low-level conflict until 2011 and when the Arab Spring happens, they take up arms further. Saleh steps down in 2011, provisional government promises reforms, but they don't materialize. → 2014 deposal
- they have a history of grievances and interactions with the government
- interesting comparison between Zintan militias and this group. It's much more organized
- they are religious, but it's not that important. Their organizational structure and local support and history is really important.
- this is a huge commitment problem.
- their identity is hugely important to their resolve?

Torg ID: 2244  
Min. Group Date: 2005  
Max. Group Date: 2009  
Onset: 2009

Aliases: Al-Qa'ida In Yemen, Al-Qaêida In Yemen, Al-Qaeda In Yemen, Al-Qaida In Yemen

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-qaedas-base-in-yemen>
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<http://www.refworld.org/docid/58933e434.html>

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: AQY, Al-Qa'ida Organization in the South of the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaeda Organization of Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula: The Soldiers' Brigades of Yemen (Crenshaw 2015)

Group Formation: 1990s, potentially 1993 (Khan 2012). AQY's first high-profile, confirmed attack was in 2000 (Crenshaw 2015)

Group End: Merged with AQAP in 2009 (Specifically December 17, 2009) (Novak 2009).

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

AQY formed from mostly foreign fighters coming to Yemen from the war in Afghanistan (Khan 2012). The group originated out of the “Islamic Jihad Movement” which formed in 1992 and conducted their first attack against U.S. Marines in December 1992 (ICG 2017, 2-3). They built up an operational structure in the 1990s, recruiting Yemenis to fight alongside foreign AQ members who had settled in Yemen under the shelter of President Saleh’s administration (Khan 2012). After the Yemen Civil War, the group broke into three main factions: (1) IJM members who integrated into the government, (2) AAIA, and (3) “AQ” members (ICG 2017).

The group became Al Qaeda sometime in the mid-1990s (Khan 2012). It was reportedly active in Yemen as early as 1998 or 1999 (Khan 2012). In 2000, the group attacked the USS Cole in the Port of Aden (Crenshaw 2015). While it is not clear when AQY became an active fighting force, the pace of its attacks increased significantly after 2000 as it increased in stature (Crenshaw 2015). AQY faced challenges early on when Yemeni and US operations that ramped up in 2001 succeeded in eliminating or capturing several of its leaders (Crenshaw 2015; Khan 2012). From 2003 to 2006, AQ was more active in Saudi Arabia than in Yemen (Crenshaw 2015).

## **Geography**

AQ in Yemen was active throughout the country before its merger with AQAP in 2009. It has been linked to attacks in Sana’a, Aden, Marib, Seiyun Shibam, Sadah, and elsewhere (GTD 2017). Most of its operations were coordinated from Sana’a, where it may have been based (Crenshaw 2015).

## **Organizational Structure**

AQY’s leader from 2000 to 2002 was Abu Ali al-Harithi, a Yemeni who fought in Afghanistan with bin Laden (Crenshaw 2015). Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal was an important AQY figure, as well as its financial head, was active between 2000 and 2003, when he was captured by the Yemeni government (Crenshaw 2015). After his escape from Yemeni prison in 2006, Nassir al-Wuhayshi took control of AQY (Crenshaw 2015). It is not clear how cohesive AQY was after 2006, when two different, similar-sounding names (“AQ Organization of Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula: The Soldiers’ Brigades of Yemen” and “AQ Organization in the South of the Arabian Peninsula”) were used for what appears to have been two groups with a very porous barrier between the two (Crenshaw 2015). AQY was funded through the same channels used by other AQ groups and affiliates (Crenshaw 2015). Estimates place the size of AQY in 2009 at a few hundred individuals (Crenshaw 2015).

AQY formed from mostly Afghan veterans returning to Yemen (Khan 2012).

## External Ties

As a subset of the larger AQ movement, AQY had close ties to Osama bin Laden and AQ operations in other countries, particularly in Saudi Arabia (Crenshaw 2015). In 2009, AQ in Saudi Arabia and AQY merged under the AQAP title; Nassir al Wuhayshi, who was once close to Osama bin Laden, became head of the group (Novak 2009). AQY also attempted, somewhat unsuccessfully, to cultivate ties with rural Yemeni tribes through gifts and marriages (Crenshaw 2015).

## Group Outcome

During the 1994 Yemen Civil War, the Saleh regime recruited IJM (later AQY) members to fight on its behalf (ICG 2017, 3). In return, some AQY members received government positions (ICG 2017, 3). Those who did not join the government formed the AAIA in 1994 (ICG 2017, 3).

After 23 AQY members (including Nassir al -Wuhayshi and Qassim al-Raymi) were freed from prison in 2006, AQY was able to grow again beginning in 2005-2006 (Khan 2012; Crenshaw 2015). The pace of its attacks increased until 2009 (Khan 2012; Crenshaw 2015). In 2009, AQ in Saudi Arabia and AQY merged under the AQAP title, but with leadership from al-Wuhayshi, who was once close to Osama bin Laden (Novak 2009; Crenshaw 2015).

AQAP would go on to control a significant amount of territory and wage a large military campaign in Yemen during the civil war in the 2010s (Farrukh 2017; Schmitt and Al-Batati 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- why AQY over AAIA? Leadership not captured, external support from UBL, removing competition for Islamist fighters allows AQY to grow rather quickly and grow more
- unclear why AQY survives government crackdown better than AAIA (hard to say if it's ideology, latent support, evolution/adaptation)
- they try to control territory a couple times, but fail
- they are much smaller than Houthis
- AQY/AQAP fights against Houthis so somewhat helpful to keep them around
- both AQY and AAIA suffer leadership loss in 2003, but Wuhayshi escapes and then takes over the group (in contrast to AAIA)
- government crackdowns increase in SAU against AQ affiliates in 05-06. US incr COIN in mid-2000s → push Saudi AQ fighters to Yemen for sanctuary. All recognize duplicate resources and common ideology so merge together in 2009 - adopt AQY leadership

XVI. HOUTHIS  
Torg ID: 2182

Min. Group Date: 2006  
Max. Group Date: 2010  
Onset: NA

Aliases: Huthis, Houthis

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

Group Formation: This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

Group End: This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

#### **Geography**

This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

#### **Organizational Structure**

This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

#### **External Ties**

This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

#### **Group Outcome**

This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

- XVII. AL-JUB TRIBE  
Torg ID: 569  
Min. Group Date: 2009  
Max. Group Date: 2009  
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- GTD Perpetrator 30086. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.  
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30086>
- "2nd LD: Kidnaped Japanese Engineer Released in Yemen." 2009.Xinhua News Agency - CEIS, Nov 17. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/451624581?accountid=14026>.

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: n/a

Group Formation: 2009

Group End: 2009 (never took responsibility for another attack)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

There is not much information available about this group and they might better be described as a tribe. The group's only attack occurred in 2009, in which they kidnapped a Japanese engineer for unknown reasons (GTD 2017). No information could be found about the group's ideological or political aims.

#### **Geography**

Their only attack occurred in Sanaa in the Arhab district (GTD 2017; Xinhua 2009).

#### **Organizational Structure**

The kidnappers belonged to the Zindan clan of the Arhab Tribe (Xinhua News Agency 2009). No other information could be found about the group's organizational structure.

#### **External Ties**

One of the members of the Zindan clan had ties to al-Qaeda, which this group, by extension, might have been connected to (Xinhua News Agency 2009).

#### **Group Outcome**

The group's only attack occurred in 2009, in which they kidnapped a Japanese engineer for unknown reasons (GTD 2017). They released the engineer after one day following negotiations between "tribal mediators" and authorities (Xinhua 2009).

XVIII. AL BAKAZIM  
Torg ID: 1542  
Min. Group Date: 2010  
Max. Group Date: 2011  
Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Bakazim, Al Bakazim

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- GTD Perpetrator 30219. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.  
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30219>
- "2 Foreigners Kidnapped by Armed Tribesmen in S. Yemen." 2010.Xinhua News Agency - CEIS, Aug 27. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/748069122?accountid=14026>.

This seems to be a tribe and may not be an armed group

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: n/a

Group Formation: 2010

Group End: 2011 (never took responsibility for another kidnapping)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The group's first attack occurred in 2010, where they kidnapped two foreigners (Xinhua News Agency 2010). It is customary for tribal groups such as this one to kidnap random foreigners to help ensure that their demands are met by the government (Xinhua News Agency 2010). The kidnappers demanded a prisoner exchange so they could secure a tribal member suspected of having ties with Al Qaeda (GTD 2017). However, the primary source article only speculates this and there is no firm evidence to corroborate this claim.

#### **Geography**

The two kidnappings that the group carried out occurred in Mafad and the Ahwar District (GTD 2017).

### **Organizational Structure**

No information could be found about the group's organizational structure. It seemed to be members from a local tribe (Xinhua 2010).

### **External Ties**

No information could be found about the group's external ties.

### **Group Outcome**

The group carried out another kidnapping in 2011, but disappeared from the spotlight soon after, never taking responsibility for another attack after (GTD 2017).

XIX. AQMUR  
Torg ID: 658  
Min. Group Date: 2010  
Max. Group Date: 2010  
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- GTD Perpetrator 30090. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.  
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30090>
- "Armed Tribemen Kidnap 3 Chinese Engineers E. Yemen." 2010. Kuwait News Agency, May 16. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/288197866?accountid=14026>.

This seems to be a tribe and may not be an armed group

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: n/a

Group Formation: 2010

Group End: 2010 (never took responsibility for another kidnapping/attack)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The group's only attack occurred in 2010, in which they kidnapped three Chinese engineers and the four Yemeni soldiers accompanying them (GTD 2017; Kuwait News Agency 2010). This kidnapping might have occurred due to a tribesman being killed by personnel at a checkpoint (Kuwait News Agency 2010). The group's political aims and ideological goals are unknown.

### **Geography**

The group's only attack took place in Habban (GTD 2017).

### **Organizational Structure**

No information could be found about the group's organizational structure. There is some uncertainty over whether the kidnappers came from the Aqmur or Laqmush tribes (GTD 2017).

### **External Ties**

No information could be found about the group's external ties.

### **Group Outcome**

The group's only attack occurred in 2010, in which they kidnapped three Chinese engineers and the four Yemeni soldiers accompanying them (GTD 2017; Kuwait News Agency 2010). This kidnapping might have occurred due to a tribesman being killed by personnel at a checkpoint (Kuwait News Agency 2010). This was the group's only known attack and they never took responsibility for another.

## XX. SOUTHERN MOBILITY MOVEMENT (YEMEN)

Torg ID: 2518

Min. Group Date: 2010

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

\*umbrella

Aliases: None

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- GTD Perpetrator 30168. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.  
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30168>
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<https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/yemen-president-hadi-southern-mobility-movement-secession.html>
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<https://books.google.com/books?id=rOpWMr4sUMMC&pg=PR20&lpg=PR20&dq=SOUTHERN+MOBILITY+MOVEMENT&source=bl&ots=vBsRaXoyeC&sig=2moynb0xGIAEm2VMtFyRxyqllas&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwik2YHb3qHZAhUn4YMKHWp-Dw84ChDoAQg3MAM#v=onepage&q=SOUTHERN%20MOBILITY%20MOVEMENT&f=false>
- Gamal Gasin. "What is going on in southern Yemen?" Al Jazeera. 2018.  
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/south-yemen-secession-aden-180129095311293.html>

## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Southern Oppositionists, al-Harakat al-Janubiyaa, Al-Hirak Al-Janoubi, Southern Movement, al-Hirak al-Janubi, Al-Herak Al-Janoubi, Al Harakat al Janubi, al-Harakat al-Janubiyaa, South Yemen Movement, the Peaceful Southern Movement, Southern Separatist Movement, al-Hirak, al-Harak, Hirak, Hiraak

Group Formation: 2007

Group End: 2015 (active)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The Southern Mobility Movement is an umbrella organization demanding fairer political representation and economic development for citizens in the south (Knights 2011). The group first formed around 2007 when retired army officers demanded pensions, but were rejected (Knights 2011; Canada IRB 2013; Brehony 2013, xx). Other reports claim the group formed around 2008 (Jamestown Foundation 2010; Jamestown Foundation 2011). The movement grew and attracted support among citizens in the south who felt Southern Yemen became much poorer after reunification (Brehony 2013, xx; Jamestown Foundation 2011). The movement also claimed that military officers in the south were disenfranchised after the first Yemen Civil War (Canada IRB 2013). It later changed to just demand a separate state in 2009 (Jamestown Foundation 2011; Knights 2011; Brehony 2013). The group's violence escalated in 2009 and 2010 (Critical Threats 2009; Knights 2011).

#### **Geography**

The group first began organizing and taking territory around Jaar and Zinjibar in Abyan, Southern Yemen (Knights 2011). The group controlled territory in an area they called al-Janub al-Hur (literally the liberated south). The group may have raided arms depots and attacked police stations in Shabwa (Jamestown Foundation 2011). It is particularly strong around Aden in south Yemen (Canada IRB 2013).

#### **Organizational Structure**

The group first formed with retired army officers (Jamestown Foundation 2010; Knights 2011; Jamestown Foundation 2011). The officers had served in the 1994 civil war and wanted adequate compensation (Brehony 2013, xx).

As an umbrella organization, the SMM has numerous factions and leaders under its banner. One of the SMM's leaders was Hassan Ba'um around 2012-2013 (Canada IRB 2013; Brehony 2013, 219). The principal leader and founder of the group was General Nasser al-Nuba (Jamestown Foundation 2011; Canada IRB 2013). The group stresses it is primarily a political organization, but also has armed wings (Jamestown Foundation 2011). A third leader is Ali Salim al-Beidh (Ali Salim al Bid) (Canada IRB 2013; Sharp 2014, 8). Al Beidh lives in Germany having fled Yemen after the 1994 civil war (Critical Threats 2009).

The group is an umbrella organization and its organization is not well-defined (Jamestown Foundation 2011). Some individual groups are the Armies of Liberation Movement and the Thawra (Revolution) Brigades (Knights 2011). Other individual groups are “Higher National Forum for the Independence of the South; Higher National Council for the Liberation of the South, led by Hasan Baoum and Mohammed Salih Tammah; Movement of the Southern Peaceful Struggle, led by Salah al-Shanfara and Nasser al-Khubbaji (both members of Yemen's House of Representatives and the [Yemeni Socialist Party]); Union of the Southern Youth, led by Fadi Hasan Baoum (son of Hasan Baoum); National Forum for the Southern Peaceful Struggle, led by Salih Yahya Said; Council for Leading the Peaceful Revolution, led by Tariq al-Fadhli; Council of the Peaceful Movement to Liberate the South” (Canada IRB 2013).

It is thought to be organized into three large movements based on their varying aims (Canada IRB 2013). One faction demands complete secession, one faction just wants grievances addressed, and one faction wants to establish a federation with Northern Yemen (Canada IRB 2013).

The group heavily relied on funding from the Yemen diaspora (Jamestown Foundation 2010).

### **External Ties**

The group fought against the Houthi-Ali Abdullah Saleh alliance (Al Jazeera 2018). The group began receiving support from the UAE around 2015 (Al Jazeera 2018).

Al Bid announced his group was seeking foreign assistance “from any regional actor” around 2012, which might be interpreted as a move to attract support from the Shias (Sharp 2014, 8).

### **Group Outcome**

The government initially dismissed the group as factions of al Qaeda (Jamestown Foundation 2010; Knights 2011). In response, they cracked down on the militants with mass arrests (Knights 2011; Canada IRB 2013). In 2009, the group sent troops to the south and closed seven newspapers in southern Yemen (Critical Threats 2009). The group exploited rising protests around the start of the Arab Spring to recruit more support for its cause (Jamestown Foundation 2011). It clashed with Yemen armed forces in 2012 and 2013 in Lahij, Abyan, al-Dali, Shabwah, and Hadramawt (Canada IRB 2013).

The group's aim shifted to possibly support a new unity government in 2011 (Jamestown Foundation 2011). In 2017, al-Zubaidi created the Southern Transition Council to better unify the separatist movement in southern Yemen (Al Jazeera 2018).

Interesting quote from Critical Threats:

“Currently, the majority of the country’s security resources are involved in suppressing the Houthi Movement, the most direct security threat to the government. If the Southern Movement, which fights for secession, opened a second front, the Yemeni government would probably not be able to respond adequately to both the northern and southern security challenges, potentially leading to the failure of the state. State failure in Yemen could create an environment conducive for al Qaeda to establish a base of operations, building on the organization’s current presence in the country.”

XXI. JOINT MEETING PARTIES (JMP)

Torg ID: 1816

Min. Group Date: 2011

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: NA

Aliases: Joint Meeting Parties (Jmp), Joint Meeting Parties

**Part 1. Bibliography**

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[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/22/how-war-is-changing-yemens-largest-islamist-coalition/?utm\\_term=.65a50b336b4a](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/22/how-war-is-changing-yemens-largest-islamist-coalition/?utm_term=.65a50b336b4a)
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<http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/07/14/opposition-to-yemens-opposition/>

**Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: JMP

Group Formation: 2002

Group End: 2011 (last attack), 2017 (active)

**Part 3. Narrative**

## **Group Formation**

The JMP is an umbrella organization of five opposition political parties in Yemen (Durac 2011). The umbrella formed in 2002 to oppose Yemen president Ali Abdullah al-Salih (Al Jazeera 2011; Durac 2011). The group was primarily a political organization protesting Salih's power and fighting for greater political representation (Durac 2011, 343-344). It contains Islamist parties, including Islah (Durac 2011). Islah is akin to a Yemen Muslim Brotherhood that formed in 1990 as a tribal-socialist-Salafist political organization (Washington Post 2017). Member parties that merged also included the Yemeni Socialist Party and four smaller groups -- the Popular Nasserist Unity Organization, Union of Popular Forces, Baath National Party, and Zaydi Hizb al-Haqq (Durac 2011). It came to attention for its first - and only - violent attack in 2011 when state-run media claimed it attacked a member of the Presidential Republican Guard (GTD 2017).

## **Geography**

It is unknown where the group's one attack took place (GTD 2017).

## **Organizational Structure**

Members of the JMP political umbrella include Islah (Yemen Congregation for Reform) and the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) (Durac 2011). Islah had an estimated 900,000 members (Durac 2011, 344). It was a political organization that seemingly only engaged in electoral violence (Durac 2011; GTD 2017).

The organization suffered from internal divisions and in-fighting among various factions (Al Jazeera 2011).

## **External Ties**

No information could be found about external ties to other state or non-state actors.

## **Group Outcome**

The group's one alleged attack occurred in 2011, but it is unclear whether that event actually transpired (GTD 2017). The group remains a political organization in Yemen (Yadav 2017).

Notes for Iris: the optics on this attack are uncertain and I think the attack is unlikely to be real.

XXII. NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT  
Torg ID: 9003

Min. Group Date: 0  
Max. Group Date: 0  
Onset: 1979

Aliases: None

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: NDF, National Democratic Front (NDF)

Group Formation: 1976

Group End: 1990 (fully disarm)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

In 1968, the Sanaa Mutiny led the North Yemen government to ban most left-wing political parties from participating in politics (Schmitz and Burrowes 2017). The NDF formed in 1976 as a left-wing Marxist political umbrella organization in the YAR (North Yemen) to lobby for political representation (CIA 1982; Schmitz and Burrowes 2017; "National Democratic Front" 2012). The group aimed to overthrow President Ali Abdallah

Saleh because of his refusal to allow opposition parties participate in politics (Schmitz and Burrowes 2017). The group's goals later included unifying South Yemen and North Yemen, combatting tribal warlords, and expanding political participation (Schmitz and Burrowes 2017). Its first violent attack occurred in 1978 after two successive YAR leaders - al Hamdi and al-Gashimi - were assassinated (Schmitz and Burrowes 2017).

## **Geography**

The group attacked areas around Sanaa (CIA 1982). The group also operated along the southern coast and in the mountains near Ibb and Ta'izz (CIA 1982). Conflict escalated in 1979 when the NDF seized Harib, Baydha, and Qatabah ("National Democratic Front" 2012). There is no evidence of an external base or transnational attacks.

## **Organizational Structure**

The NDF was an umbrella of six different political organizations: the Revolutionary Democratic Party, the Organization of Yemeni Resisters, the Labor Party, the Popular Democratic Union, the pro-Syrian wing of the Baath Party, and the pro-Iraqi wing of the Baath Party (CIA 1982; Schmitz and Burrowes 2017). A key leader of the group was Sayyid al-Shami (Schmitz and Burrowes 2017). The group had a political wing that operated a government-in-exile outside the country (CIA 1982). Members were primarily Shafais ("National Democratic Front" 2012).

The group had approximately 1,500 militants at their undated peak ("National Democratic Front" 2012).

## **External Ties**

The group received "active support" from South Yemen (Schmitz and Burrowes 2017; CIA 1982; New York Times 1982). The group received Soviet support via South Yemen (CIA 1982; New York Times 1982). The group also received unspecified support from Syria (CIA 1982). The group may have also received weapons from Libya ("National Democratic Front" 2012).

## **Group Outcome**

The group was at first very successful in its campaign and pushing back against the Saleh regime in North Yemen (Schmitz and Burrowes 2017). However, the Saleh regime recruited tribal militias (the Islamic Front) to help it combat the NDF (Schmitz and Burrowes 2017). Simultaneously, a 1979 war between North and South Yemen led to a new government in South Yemen that was less willing to support the NDF (Schmitz and Burrowes 2017). The group reached a ceasefire with the government in March 1979, but it fell down and violence restarted in 1980 ("National Democratic Front" 2012). In

December 1981, South Yemen and North Yemen agreed to stop supporting each other's militants ("National Democratic Front" 2012). In 1982, the government offered reconciliation, which most members accepted (Schmitz and Burrowes 2017). Al-Shami did not disarm until 1990 (Schmitz and Burrowes 2017). Some parts of the NDF supported the General People's Congress after unification in 1990 (Schmitz and Burrowes 2017).

### XXIII. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Torg ID: 9004

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: 1994

Aliases: None

#### Part 1. Bibliography

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#### Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: DRY

Group Formation: 1994

Group End: 1994 (defeat)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

When North Yemen and South Yemen unified in 1990, the power-sharing agreement was expected to yield equal power between the two governments (Global Security n.d.). In 1993, an election gave most of the power to a coalition from Northern Yemen and disenfranchised the south (Global Security n.d.). In response, a separatist movement began to foment in southern Yemen, which culminated in the formation of the Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1994 (Global Security n.d.). The first violent attack was in February 1994 (HRW 1994, 10).

The DRY wanted to secede from Yemen and re-create southern Yemen (Global Security n.d.). The group tried to negotiate a settlement with northern Yemen in February 1994, but violence broke out in May 1994 after and quickly escalated (Global Security n.d.; HRW 1994).

#### **Geography**

The DRY controlled Aden and fought heavily to defend it in July 1994 (New York Times 1994). The group also controlled Mukalla (New York Times 1994).

#### **Organizational Structure**

The leader of the DRY was Abd al-Rahman Ali al-Jifri (Canada IRB 1996). The group had a political wing (Canada IRB 1996). The group allegedly had 27,500 troops (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 690). Members were from southern Yemen.

#### **External Ties**

The DRY received external military support from Saudi Arabia (Global Security n.d.).

#### **Group Outcome**

Yemen military forces mobilized quickly and took back the DRY's areas of control by July 1994 (New York Times 1994; Global Security n.d.). Most DRY supporters fled to Saudi Arabia, where they promised to continue the fight (Global Security n.d.). Abroad, they created the "National Opposition Front" and appointed al-Jifri their leader (Canada IRB 1996). However, they were unable to mount another fight. They later inspired the SMM.

Notes: DRY is reminiscent of Macedonia and UCK groups - very short quick conflicts.