

Somalia Cases
Last Updated: 17 July 2017

| torg | gname | onset | min | max |
|-------|---|-----------|------|------|
| T1087 | FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE SOMALI COAST | | 1975 | 1976 |
| T354 | OROMO LIBERATION FRONT | | 1977 | 2012 |
| T1917 | SOMALI NATIONAL MOVEMENT | 5-Feb-83 | 1983 | 1991 |
| T1299 | SOMALI SALVATION DEMOCRATIC FRONT (SSDF) | 1983 | 1983 | 1983 |
| T549 | OGADEN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT | | 1984 | 2012 |
| T2072 | ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS | | 1987 | 2011 |
| T23 | AL-ITTIHAAD AL-ISLAMI (AIAI) | | 1988 | 2005 |
| T1918 | SOMALI PATRIOTIC MOVEMENT | 31-Jul-89 | 1989 | 2000 |
| T28 | AL-QA'IDA | | 1989 | 2012 |
| T1943 | UNITED SOMALI CONGRESS (USC) | 18-Nov-90 | 1990 | 2001 |
| T2557 | UNITED SOMALI CONGRESS/SOMALI NATIONAL ALLIANCE | 7-Sep-91 | 1991 | 1999 |
| T2571 | REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND | | 1992 | 2012 |
| T2596 | SOMALI NATIONAL FRONT | | 1992 | 1999 |
| T1916 | SOMALI NATIONAL ALLIANCE | | 1992 | 1994 |
| T2318 | HABR GEDIR CLAN | | 1994 | 2002 |
| T1268 | RAHANWEIN RESISTANCE ARMY | | 1995 | 2002 |
| T2383 | MUSA SUDI YALAHOW MILITIA | | 1998 | 2001 |
| T2213 | JUBBA VALLEY ALLIANCE | | 1999 | 2003 |
| T2369 | MATAN ABDULLE | | 1999 | 1999 |

| | | | | |
|-------|---|-----------|------|------|
| T2594 | SOMALI NATIONAL FRONT - MOHAMED SHEIKH ALI BURALEH FACTION | | 1999 | 1999 |
| T2595 | DIGIL SALVATION ARMY | | 1999 | 1999 |
| T2082 | ISLAMIC COURTS UNION | 24-Oct-06 | 2000 | 2008 |
| T726 | FORCES OF YUSSUF HAJJI NUR | | 2001 | 2001 |
| T2322 | SOMALI RECONCILIATION AND RESTORATION COUNCIL | 12-May-01 | 2001 | 2002 |
| T2572 | RAHANWEYN RESISTANCE ARMY - MADOBE AND HABSADÉ | | 2001 | 2002 |
| T2573 | USC/SSA - OMF | | 2001 | 2001 |
| T2367 | MARHAN CLAN | | 2001 | 2001 |
| T2576 | JUBBA VALLEY ALLIANCE FACTION | | 2002 | 2003 |
| T1130 | ISLAMIC TENDENCY | | 2006 | 2006 |
| T2147 | AL-SHABAAB | 17-Jan-08 | 2006 | 2012 |
| T2559 | ALLIANCE FOR THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND COUNTER-TERRORISM (ARPCT) | | 2006 | 2006 |
| T2380 | MUJAHIDEEN YOUTH MOVEMENT (MYM) | | 2007 | 2009 |
| T408 | AHLU SUNNA WAL JAMA'A (SOMALIA) | | 2008 | 2012 |
| T2517 | SOMALI ISLAMIC FRONT | | 2008 | 2009 |
| T2574 | HARAKAT RAS KAMBONI (HRK) | | 2008 | 2008 |
| T2412 | ISLAMIC PARTY (SOMALIA) | | 2009 | 2010 |
| T287 | 23 MAY DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (ALGERIA) | | 2009 | 2009 |
| T2389 | HIZBUL ISLAAMI (SOMALIA) | 21-May-09 | 2009 | 2010 |
| T2607 | FORCES OF SHAYK MUHAMMAD SAID ATOM | | 2010 | 2010 |
| T2619 | SHABELLE VALLEY ALLIANCE | | 2011 | 2011 |
| T2670 | SHABELLE VALLEY MILITIA | | 2012 | 2012 |

I. FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE SOMALI COAST

Min. Group Date: 1975

Max. Group Date: 1976

Onset: NA

Aliases: Front For The Liberation Of The French Somali Coast, Front De Liberation De La Cote Des Somalis, Front For The Liberation Of The Coast Of Somalia, Front For The Liberation Of The Somali Coast, Somali Coast Liberation Front

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: FLCS

Group Formation: 1964 (Raymond 1992, 183)

Group End: 1976 (political accommodation - GTD 2017; MIPT 2008)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Front for the Liberation of the Somali Coast (FLCS) formed in 1964 in French Somaliland (also known as the French Territory of the Afars and Issas) (Raymond 1992, 183; MIPT 2008). The organization, an ethno-nationalist revolutionary group, fought for the territory's independence from French colonial rule (Raymond 1992, 183; MIPT 2008). The group first came to attention as a violent organization in 1975 in Mogadishu, Somalia (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). The group seemed to oppose the French government and not the Somali government (Raymond 1992, 183; MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group was transnational. Its main attacks were transnational in Mogadishu, Somalia and Paris, France (GTD 2017). The group had an external base of operations in western Somalia (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

The group primarily recruited from the ethnic Issa in the French territory of Afars and Issa, as well as in Somalia (MIPT 2008). Information about the group's leadership and size could not be found. The group did not appear to have a political wing.

External Ties

The group had an external base of operations in western Somalia (MIPT 2008). There is no evidence of external support from any other state or non-state actors.

Group Outcome

The group's last violent incident occurred in 1976. The French police killed six FLCS members during a standoff in 1976 (MIPT 2008). In 1977, France granted the territory independence. The territory became an independent state known as Djibouti (MIPT 2008; Raymond 1992, 183). The group appears to have stopped using violence after the creation of Djibouti.

- II. OROMO LIBERATION FRONT
Min. Group Date: 1977
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Oromo Liberation Front, Oromo Liberation Front (Olf)

Aliases: Oromo Liberation Front, Oromo Liberation Front (Olf)

Part 1. Bibliography

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- GTD Perpetrator 1894, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2017, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=189>
- Paul Trevor William Baxter, Jan Hultin, Alessandro Triulzi. "Being and Becoming Ormo." p. 76-77. Nordic Africa Institute. 1996

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: OLA (armed wing)

Group Formation: 1973

Group End: 2014 active

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) formed in 1973 in response to aggressive persecution efforts taken by Abyssinian leaders in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia against Oromo separatists

(MIPT 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 536). The group's territorial claims include the capital of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. The group's first violent attack with casualties took place in 1974 (Gleditsch et al. n.d., 205). Members of the Bale Oromo Movement and the Ethiopian student movement founded the OLF (Desol, Girma, and Leterrier 2006). The Bale Oromo Movement staged a revolt in the early 1960s to overthrow a regional leader. The Movement yielded a lot of ex-militants to the OLF (Trevor et al. 1996, 76). The OLF aimed to create an independent Oromo state in southern Ethiopia (MIPT 2008; Gleditsch et al. n.d., 204). The OLF has an ethno-nationalistic ideology (MIPT 2008; Gleditsch et al. n.d., 204).

Geography

The OLF conducted attacks in Ethiopia, including in Addis Ababa, Bishoftu, Adi Quala, Dire Dawa, Mechatat, Kombolcha, and Mecera (GTD 2016). The OLF has operated in the provinces of northern Bale, Sidamo, Arsi, southern Shewa, and Hararghe (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 536). They claim to have offices in the US, London, and Eritrea (Desol et al. 2006). The OLF is a transnational group. The group has also conducted attacks in the Kenyan cities of Wajir and Isiolo (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

Members of the Bale Oromo Movement and the Ethiopian student movement founded the OLF (Desol, Girma, and Leterrier 2006). The Bale Oromo Movement staged a revolt in the early 1960s to overthrow a regional leader. The movement yielded a lot of ex-militants to the OLF (Trevor et al. 1996, 76).

In 2015, Daud Ibsa served as the group's chairperson, after the prior leader Gelasa Dilbo was exiled (Canada IRB 2015). The OLF's spokespersons have included Hassan Hussein, Shigat Geleta, and Beyan Aroba (Canada IRB 2015). The group has been divided into two main factions as of 2008: one led by Daud Ibsa and the other led by Kamal Galchu (ibid). Another faction led by Nuro Dedefo also exists (Canada IRB 2015). The Galchu faction no longer seeks to create a secessionist state, and has been renamed a splinter group by the Ibsa faction (Canada IRB 2015).

The OLF comprises a General Assembly, which makes group decisions, and the National Council, which comprises 4 members and enforces General Assembly decisions (Canada IRB 2015). The National Council also elects a chairman and 9 executive members (Canada IRB 2015). In 2014, two factions of the group, the National Council and Transitional Authority merged into one organization (Canada IRB 2015). The OLF's armed wing, known as the Oromo Liberation Army, is divided into companies, platoons, and squads (Jamestown Foundation 2011). In the 1990s, the OLF had 7,000-10,000 armed members (Gleditsch et al. n.d. 205). In 1987/1988, it had approximately 3,000 fighters and 10,000 supporters (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 536).

Most members are from the Oromo ethnic group (Canada IRB 2015). No information could be found on group funding.

External Ties

In 1991, the OLF was a part of a government led by the EPRDF coalition (Canada IRB 2015). Due to a tense relationship with the TPLF, the OLF left the government in 1992 (Canada IRB 2015; US BCI 2001). The Nigerian government accused the OPC and the OFDM of assisting the OLF (Canada IRB 2015; US BCI 2001). Somalia and Eritrea allegedly offered aid to the OLF; however, the type of aid could not be determined (MIPT 2008). The organizations the OLF acknowledges having close ties with include the ONLF, Sidama Liberation Front, Beni-Shangul Liberation Movement, and the Gambella People Liberation Movement (Desol et al. 2006).

Group Outcome

Beginning in 2000, the government began to crackdown on the OLF through mass arrests and the capture of major organization leaders (MIPT 2008). In 2006, the Nigerian government captured thousands of Oromos and put them in makeshift “concentration camps” (Desol et al. 2006). Although no official ceasefire was agreed upon, the OLF appeared to have halted earlier violent activities in 2002 (MIPT 2008). In 2011, the Ethiopian government classified the OLF as a terrorist organization (Canada IRB 2015). In February 2013, OLF leader Kamal Galchu was captured. The group dismissed Galchu in 2014 (Canada IRB 2015). Ethiopian and Kenyan government forces worked jointly to arrest OLF fighters in November 2014 (ibid)

III. SOMALI NATIONAL MOVEMENT

Min. Group Date: 1983

Max. Group Date: 1991

Onset: 1983

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: SNM

Group Formation: 1981 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655)

Group End: 1991 (creates Somaliland - Gleditsch et al. 2011, 491)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In 1981, a group of Issa elites living in exile in London formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655). The group sought to overthrow Siad Barre's government (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655). The group conducted its first violent attack on January 2, 1982, when it formally launched its guerrilla campaign (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655; DADM n.d.).

Geography

The group had an external base of operations in Dire-Dawa, Ethiopia (DADM n.d.). It conducted attacks in Hargeisa, Borama, Burco, and Tug Wajale (GTD 2017). It claimed land in northern Somalia, known as Somaliland (Lacey 2006). It did not conduct any transnational attacks.

Organizational Structure

The group funded itself through diaspora donations from Issa living abroad (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655). The group had a political wing and a military wing (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655; Gleditsch et al. 2011, 491). Notably, the military wing operated independently of the political wing (Center of Military History 2003, 69). It had approximately 10,000 fighters in 1989 and between 5,000 and 10,000 fighters in 1991 (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 491). Members of the group were primarily Issaq (DADM n.d.). Sheikh Yusuf Ali Sheikh Madar led the group (DADM n.d.)

External Ties

The group had contacts from Saudi Arabia (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655). It received weaponry and sanctuary from Ethiopia beginning in 1982. Ethiopia ceased providing assistance on April 3, 1988 (DADM n.d.).

Group Outcome

The SNM conducted its first offensive in 1982. It conducted its second offensive in 1984 (DADM n.d.). In 1988, its offensive inspired other clans to revolt, which severely undermined Barre's rule (US Bureau of Citizenship 1999).

In May 1991, the rebel forces overthrew the leader of Somalia, Siad Barre (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 491). The SNM subsequently declared the creation of an independent state, which became known as Somaliland (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 491; Lacey 2006). The SNM has not conducted a violent attack since 1991, when it formed a new government.

IV. SOMALI SALVATION DEMOCRATIC FRONT (SSDF)

Min. Group Date: 1983

Max. Group Date: 1983

Onset: 1983

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: SSDF, Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia, DFSS

Group Formation: 1978

Group End: 1991 (gradually dissolves)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) formed in 1978 and conducted its first attack in 1979 (Canada IRB 1990). Three smaller armed groups merged to form the SSDF: the Somali Salvation Front, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia, and the Somali Workers’ Party (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655). Some accounts suggest

the group formed in 1979 as the Somali Salvation Front then later changed its name (Canada IRB 1990a).

The SSDF sought to overthrow the government (Center of Military History 2003; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655). It first came to attention as a violent organization in 1981 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655).

Geography

The group primarily operated in the northeastern region of Somalia (Center of Military History 2003). It operated and controlled territory in an area known today as "Puntland." The group formed at an external base of operations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Canada IRB 1990b; Center of Military History 2003).

Organizational Structure

The group once had approximately 8,000-10,000 fighters (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655). In 1989, the group had approximately 1,200 fighters (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 493). Members were ethnic Mijertein/Majertain (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655; Center of Military History 2003).

The group was organized around a central committee led by an ex-military officer, Col. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655; Gleditsch et al. 2011, 493). Yusuf had received training in Italy and Russia. Later, the group split into three different factions led by Abdullahi Yusuf, Mohamed Abshir, and a third unnamed Islamist leader (Center of Military History 2003).

External Ties

The group received external support from Ethiopia and Libya (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655). Specifically, this included weapons from Libya and sanctuary from Ethiopia at a base in Addis Ababa (Canada IRB 1990b; Center of Military History 2003). Marxist factions of the group splintered in 1983. One of these groups included the Somali Popular Liberation Front (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655).

Group Outcome

In 1984, the Barre government offered an amnesty program for fighters that many SSDF fighters accepted (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 655; Canada IRB 1990a). In 1985, the Ethiopian government reneged on its support of the SSDF and arrested Yusuf (Canada IRB 1990a). As of 1988, the government had still allowed the SSDF to have a base of operations. Between 1985 and 1990, the group did not engage in as much militant activity as earlier (Canada IRB 1990b). Yusuf was later released and returned to the

SSDF as a group commander (Canada IRB 1990a). The group remained active as late as 1991, when Barre fell from power.

Interesting quote from Canada IRB 1990b:

Since the early years of his dictatorship, General Siyaad Barre has limited the participation in government of members of the Majerteen clan, the predominant group during the civilian era. This has led to a confrontation, with Barre alluding to the Majerteen as his enemies, and ultimately identifying enemies to his regime according to clan membership. [[Ibid](#), p. 91.] **Barre is, according to a report, particularly paranoid of the Majerteen, mostly because of their past influence.** [[Ibid](#), p.156.]

V. OGADEN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

Min. Group Date: 1984

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Ogaden National Liberation Front (Onlf), Javhadda Waddaniga Xoreynta Ogaddeenya, Ogaden National Liberation Front

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: ONLA (Ogaden National Liberation Army)

Group Formation: 1984

Group End: 2014 (still active - GTD)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In 1984, members of different Somali liberation ethnic groups, including the Western Somali Liberation Front, formed the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) (Bloom and Kaplan CFR 2007; MIPT 2008). The group did not become violent until 1991, when the TPLF overthrew the Ethiopian regime (Abdullahi 2007). It is unclear whether the group sought to make Ogaden a separate state within Ethiopia or join Somalia as a state (Global Security N.D; IRIN 2012). The ONLF has an ethno-nationalistic ideology, as it fights on behalf of the Somali population living in Ethiopia (Bloom and Kaplan CFR 2007; Global Security N.D.).

Geography

The ONLF has conducted attacks in various Ethiopian areas like Kebri Dehar, Addis Ababa, Jijiga, Abole, and Gunagado (GTD 2017). The group has also conducted attacks in Somalia, including in Caato and Yeed (GTD 2017). The group mainly fights in the Dhagahbour, Fiiq, Godey, Qorahay, and Wardheer areas (Abdullahi 2007). Although the ONLF conducts transnational attacks, it is unclear if the group possesses bases in Somalia.

Organizational Structure

Abdullahi Mohamed Sacdi was one of the founding members of the ONLF (Abdullahi 2007). Hassan Jire Qalin initially led the ONLF; however, he predominantly exerted his leadership over the group's political presence (Abdullahi 2007). The ONLF had an active political wing (Gleditsch et al. n.d., 450). Later, the ONLF split into two factions: a more violent wing led by Sheik Ibrahim Abdalla, and an "accommodationist" wing led by Bashir Abdi Hassan (Abdullahi 2007; Gleditsch et al. n.d., 450). The accommodationist faction went on to support the EPRDF and eventually created the Somali People's Democratic Party (Abdullahi 2007; Gleditsch et al. n.d., 450). In 1998, the militant faction regrouped under Mohamed Omar Osman, a Somali ex-marine, who became the group's Chairman (Abdullahi 2007; Gleditsch et al. n.d., 450). The militant faction of the ONLF is called the ONLA. The ONLA operated as the same entity (MIPT 2008). The Vice Chairman is named Abdukadir Hassan Hiirmoge and the General Secretary is named Mohamed Ismail (Abdullahi 2007). The group's funding largely came from the Somali diaspora. The

Nigerian government claims Eritrea supported the ONLF (Bloom and Kaplan CFR 2007; Global Security N.D.).

In 2008, the ONLF had an estimated 8,000 militant members (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan n.d. 450). A majority of ONLF members belong to the Ogaden and Darood Somali ethnic groups (MIPT 2008). The WSLF, an organization to which several ONLF founders belonged, was an Ogaden separatist movement (Bloom and Kaplan CFR 2007; MIPT 2008).

External Ties

Members of the Western Somali Liberation Front founded the ONLF (Bloom and Kaplan CFR 2007). The group often works with the Oromo Liberation Front, and in 2000, joined with the OLF and four other organizations to form an alliance called the United Liberation Front of Oromiya (MIPT 2008). In 2006, the ONLF, OLF, and Coalition of Union of Democracy formed the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD), which was dedicated to peaceful resistance (Abdullahi 2007). The militant faction of the ONLF is called the ONLA (MIPT 2008). The initial political faction of the ONLF went on to support the EPRDF and eventually created the Somali People's Democratic Party (Abdullahi 2007).

The Eritrean government supplied weapons to the ONLF in 1999 and has continued to offer military support to the group (Abdullahi 2007). Al Qaeda reportedly has ties with the group but no further details could be found (MIPT 2008; Global Security n.d.). The ONLF has given explicit support to the Barre government in Somalia. In return, the group appears to have sent troops to help the group (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan n.d., 450).

Group Outcome

In 1994, the government created an opposition party to the ONLF's political faction called the Deri Dawa (Abdullahi 2007). In 2004 and 2005, peace talks between the ONLF and the Ethiopian government failed (MIPT 2008). In 2007, the Ethiopian army began to kill villagers and burn down homes in Abole in retaliation for an attack on private oil interests (Global Security N.D.). In 2008, Human Rights Watch claimed the Ethiopian government was forcing relocations, decimating villages, and enabling extrajudicial killings and violence (IRIN 2012). The group was officially designated as a terrorist organization in 2010 (ibid). In October 2010, the Ethiopian government claimed to have negotiated peace with a faction of the ONLF, but the agreement broke down and fighting resumed (ibid). The group's last recorded violent attack occurred in 2014 (GTD 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- The group starts being violent in 1991 which may be because the TPLF has just achieved relative victory by overthrowing the other regime
- Ethiopia is also unstable during this time and there is a 'window' to become more violent (start militancy!)
- Deri Dawa was a counter-political movement designed to suck support away from the ONLF. It was composed of elders and members of other clans that still participated in Ethiopian politics. It was designed to be seen as a legitimate counterweight to the ONLF. Comes at the same time the TPLF government is stressing unity and trying to consolidate power. They didn't have as many military resources in 1994.
- The government was trying to broker a peace, but after the ONLF touched oil then the army started reacting because it's such an important commodity. There's an international component involved as well with China because the ONLF took over a Chinese oil site.

VI. ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS

Min. Group Date: 1987

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Group Formation: This name is too vague for research.

Group End: This name is too vague for research.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This name is too vague for research.

Geography

This name is too vague for research.

Organizational Structure

This name is too vague for research.

External Ties

This name is too vague for research.

Group Outcome

This name is too vague for research.

VII. AL-ITTIHAAD AL-ISLAMI (AIAI)

Min. Group Date: 1988

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Ittihaad Al-Islami (Aiai), Aiai, Islamic Union, Islamic Unity

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1984

Group End: 1997 (splintering/political movement)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Al-Ittihaad Al-Islam (AIAI) formed in 1984 as a merger of two main Somali groups: al-Jama'a al-Islamiya and Wahdat al-Shabab al-Islam (MIPT 2008; Crenshaw 2016). The group's first violent incident took place in 1992, after the end of the Siad Barre regime (Crenshaw 2016; IPT 2006). In the late 1980s, the group primarily sought to overthrow the Siad Barre regime (MIPT 2008; Crenshaw 2016). After the regime ended in 1991, AIAI aimed to create an Islamic state in Somalia and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, which is mainly Somali and Muslim. The organization is a Salafi jihadist group (MIPT 2008; FAS 1999).

Geography

AIAI mainly operates in Somalia but has also conducted attacks in Kenya and Ethiopia (MIPT 2008; FAS 1999). The group had strategic facilities in Bosasso and a base in Qaw, west of Bosasso. The group relocated the base to Gedo in the 1990s (Crenshaw 2016). Al-Ittihaad Al-Islam has attacked the following Somali locations: Bardera, Hargeisa, Mogadishu, Bosasso, Marka, and Beledweyne (GTD 2016; Crenshaw 2016).

The AIAI is a transnational group. AIAI has actively operated in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and conducted attacks in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa (Crenshaw 2016; FAS 1999). The group has also attacked Djibouti (Crenshaw 2016).

Organizational Structure

AIAI formed in 1984 as a merger of two main Somali groups, namely al-Jama'a al-Islamiya and Wahdat al-Shabab al-Islam (MIPT 2008; Crenshaw 2016). Sources estimate the group had 2,000 members. No other information could be found in the group's membership base except that the group seems to come from religious Somali organizations (BBC 2002; MIPT 2008; Crenshaw 2016).

Hassan David Aweys led AIAI until it disbanded in 1997. He went on to become a leader in the Islamic Courts Union, Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia, and Hizbul Islam. Another of the group's initial leaders, known as Al Afghani, formerly fought as a soldier in Afghanistan. Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki also led a faction of the group until it disbanded. Turki went on to hold a leadership position in the ICU and later created a Somali group named the Ras Kamboni Brigade (Crenshaw 2016). In 1997, Aweys announced that AIAI would stop violent attacks and focus on political work. The group, however, mainly splintered into several cells (Crenshaw 2016; IPT 2006).

The group received financial, training, and logistical support from Al Qaeda and financial, training, and weapons from Sudan's government (Crenshaw 2016; FAS 1999). Much of AIAI's funding comes from overseas Islamic organizations and diaspora (Crenshaw 2016; IPT 2006). AIAI also imposes taxes on cities under its control and charges protection fees (Crenshaw 2016).

External Ties

The group has received explicit financial, training, and logistical support from Al Qaeda and financial, training, and weapons from Sudan's government (Crenshaw 2016; FAS 1999). The Eritrean government has also given the group weapons (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan N.D, 451). Osama Bin Laden has given AIAI direct financial support (BBC 2002). One of the group's leaders, Hassan David Aweys, went on to become a leader in the Islamic Courts Union, Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia, and Hizbul Islam. Another AIAI official, Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, also went on to hold a leadership position in the ICU and later created a Somali group named the Ras Kamboni Brigade (Crenshaw 2016). After 1991, the group allied itself with the ONLF. These two organizations worked together to separate the Ogaden region from Ethiopia (Crenshaw 2016; MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

After suspicion that AIAI had participated in the Ethiopian bombings during the 1990s, the Ethiopian led an attack against the organization (MIPT 2008; BBC 2002). When a new state (Puntland) formed in eastern Somalia, AIAI departed from the region due to its predominantly secular nature (MIPT 2008). Both of these factors led to a drop in AIAI membership, which made it difficult for AIAI to remain a cohesive, active group. In 1997, AIAI leader Aweys announced the group would cease violent activities (MIPT 2008; Crenshaw 2016). The last attack conducted in the group's name occurred in 2005. AIAI no longer conducts violent activities (GTD 2016; IPT 2006).

Notes for Iris:

- AIAI expanding their goals in Ethiopia through the Ogaden movement and helping ONLF.
- possibility that AIAI was trying to co-opt Ogaden movement?
- by the 1990s, the group is primarily in Ethiopia so Somalia is not really taking active counterinsurgency actions against it
- collaboration with the ONLF and increased violence saw the government step up its attack
- AIAI is much smaller than the ONLF
- the government doesn't rely on a peasant army here, but sends in its regular military

VIII. SOMALI PATRIOTIC MOVEMENT

Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 2000
Onset: 1989

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: SPM

Group Formation: 1989

Group End: 2006 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The SPM formed in 1989 to overthrow the Somali government (Kapteijns 2012, 280). Its first violent attack occurred in 1989 (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 1993).

SPM formed when military officers mutinied against the Barre government. The SPM sought the removal of Barre (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 1993).

Geography

The SPM primarily operated in southern Somalia (Center of Military History 2003). The SPM (GABIO) also operated in Kismayo (Center of Military History 2003). It was not transnational and did not have an external base.

Organizational Structure

Members were ethnic Ogaden (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 490). Specifically, members came from the Darod clan (Henry 1991; US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 1993).

Ex-military officers formed the SPM (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 490). It had an estimated 3,000 fighters in 1989 and, in 1991, between 5,000 and 10,000 fighters (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 490). It was primarily organized as a militia and had no formal political wing (Canada IRB 1999; Gleditsch et al. 2011, 490). SPM was a coalition of three different groups, including SPM (GABIO). Mohamed Siad Hersi led the SPM (Center of Military History 2003).

External Ties

The group opposed the United Somali Congress (USC) and fought against them on several occasions (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 1993). There is no evidence of external support for the group from other states or non-state actors.

Group Outcome

In 1991, the group participated in the Djibouti Accords but withdrew from political negotiations due to its rivalry with the USC (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 1993). The group continued to sporadically fight the USC as late as 2006 (BBC 2006).

- IX. AL-QAIDA
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qa'ida, Al Qaeda, Al Qaida, Al-Qa`Ida, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qa'idat Al-Jihad, The Base

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active) (Crenshaw 2015)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Osama Bin Laden founded al-Qaida in 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group’s initial goals were to completely remove Western influence/ideas and to abolish the United States and Israel (BAAD 2015). They conducted their first attacks against the US embassy in Africa in 1998 (BAAD 2015; Global Security N.D). Al-Qaida first came to global attention after 9/11 but was active prior to that in its region (FAS 2005). The group has a radical Sunni Muslim ideology (CFR 2012; Global Security N.D).

Geography

Al-Qaida operated mainly within Peshawar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (CFR 2012; PBS N.D). The group hid within cities and hills with particularly mountainous terrain in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan (as shepherds or farmers) (FAS 2005). Bin Laden had a base of operations in Sudan from 1991-1998 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Organizational Structure

Al-Qaida was headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was their sole leader until his assassination in 2011 (although rumors exist that he died earlier or didn't die at all) (CFR 2012). He was from Saudi Arabia and had helped fight the Soviets in the Afghanistan war (Crenshaw 2015). He was replaced by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2011. (Crenshaw 2015; CFR 2012). The group used a complex system in which members reported to couriers who reported to other couriers eventually making their way up to the head who was initially Bin Laden (RAND 2008). This is what we call a decentralized or cell-based organizational structure. Funding for the organization came from many places, including donations (FTO 2005). The group had different councils to deal with different aspects. For example, they had a "military committee" to deal with "military" matters, and a "consultation council" to plan out terrorist attacks and deal with financial matters (PBS N.D). They have no formal political wing (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida can be considered an umbrella group that consisted of many other terrorist groups within (ibid; Global Security N.D). The organization had an estimated 75 members when it was first formed and up to 18,000 at its peak in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015). Today, it is thought to have less than 1000 members, but these estimates vary (Crenshaw 2015; BAAD 2015).

External Ties

Saudi Arabia allegedly gave some funding to AQ through drug trafficking and diamonds, but these were never proven true (Crenshaw 2015). Iran also allegedly trained and supported AQ members in the early 1990s (ibid; BAAD 2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan allow Al-Qaeda to operate training camps within their borders (ibid). The group has ties to several other terrorist organizations including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Jemaah Islamiya (CFR 2012; PBS N.D).

Group Outcome

The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to find and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements operating in Afghanistan (BAAD 2015). The group's first leader Osama bin Laden was killed during a raid in 2011 (CFR 2012; BAAD 2015). The group is still active today.

- X. UNITED SOMALI CONGRESS (USC)
Min. Group Date: 1990
Max. Group Date: 2001
Onset: 1990

Aliases: United Somali Congress, United Somali Congress (Usc)

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: USC

Group Formation: 1989

Group End: 1991 (splinter)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Ali Mohamed Osoble Wardeegle formed the United Somali Congress (USC) in 1989 (Canada IRB 1990). Several individual groups merged to form the USC (Canada IRB 1990). The USC sought to overthrow the Barre government (San Francisco Chronicle 1991). Its first violent incident occurred as late as 1990 (Gleditsch et al. 2013).

Geography

The group primarily operated out of London, England, where the leaders lived in exile (Canada IRB 1989; Perlez 1991). In January 1991, it overran and took control of the capital in Mogadishu, Somalia (San Francisco Chronicle 1991; Edmonton Journal 1991).

Organizational Structure

The USC had a political wing (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 493). In 1990, the USC had approximately 1,000 fighters (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 493). Members are ethnic Hawiye from the Habr Gedir tribe (San Francisco Chronicle 1991; Canada IRB 1996).

External Ties

The USC fought against the SPM (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 1993). From August 1990 to January 1991, the group temporarily allied itself with the Somali Patriotic Movement and the Somali National Movement (San Francisco Chronicle 1991).

Group Outcome

In 1991, the USC took over Mogadishu and forced Siad Barre to flee (Edmonton Journal 1991). In 1992, the USC/SNA splintered from the USC (Center of Military History 2003).

XI. UNITED SOMALI CONGRESS/SOMALI NATIONAL ALLIANCE

Min. Group Date: 1991
Max. Group Date: 1999
Onset: 1991

Aliases: United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance, United Somali Congress - Somali National Alliance, United Somali Congress/Sna, United Somali Congress-Sna, Usc/Sna, Usc-Sna

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1991 or 1992

Group End: 2004 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) first came to attention as a violent group in 1991 (Center of Military History 2003; Global Security n.d.). In 1992, the group splintered from the USC (Center of Military History 2003; Tucker 2015, 806). The group sought to force UN troops to withdraw from Somalia and aimed to rule the country (Center of Military History 2003).

Geography

The group primarily operated in and around Mogadishu, Somalia (Center of Military History 2003). It also controlled territory in southern and central Somalia (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

At an unknown date, the USC/SNA had an estimated 5,000-10,000 active fighters (Center of Military History 2003). It has a political wing led by Mohammed Farrah Hassan Aideed (Center of Military History 2003). Members of the Haber Gedir clan formed the group (Tucker 2015, 806). Members were ethnic Hawiye (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The USC/SNA splintered from the USC (Mahdi), which is led by Ali Mahdi Mohammed (Center of Military History 2003). There is no evidence of external support for this group.

Group Outcome

After Barre fell in 1991, Somalia collapsed into anarchy and a complete state of civil war, as various factions fought against each other for control (Global Security n.d.). The USC/SNA represented one of these factions (Global Security n.d.). As late as 2004, the group violently fought other factions, after it failed to follow-through on an agreement to install a transitional government (Global Security n.d.).

- XII. REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Jamhuuriyadda Soomaaliland, Republic Of Somaliland

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is either an alias for SNM or not an armed group.

Group Formation: This is either an alias for SNM or not an armed group.

Group End: This is either an alias for SNM or not an armed group.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is either an alias for SNM or not an armed group.

Geography

This is either an alias for SNM or not an armed group.

Organizational Structure

This is either an alias for SNM or not an armed group.

External Ties

This is either an alias for SNM or not an armed group.

Group Outcome

This is either an alias for SNM or not an armed group.

- XIII. SOMALI NATIONAL FRONT
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 1999
Onset: NA

Aliases: Somali National Front (Snf), Somali National Front

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: SNF

Group Formation: 1991

Group End: 1997 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Somali National Front (SNF) formed in 1991 to help restore Siad Barre to power in Somalia and fight against the United Somali Congress (USC) (Europa Publications 2003, 1012; Kapteinjs 2012, 280; Center of Military History 2003). The group adhered to an ethno-nationalist ideology (Canada IRB 1997). The group first came to attention with its first known violent attack in 1991 (Europa Publications 2003, 1012; Kapteinjs 2012, 280; Center of Military History 2003).

Geography

The SNF primarily operated in central Somalia. The USC/SNA and SSDF operated on either side of the SNF. The SNF was also active in southwest Somalia (Kapteinjs 2012, 280). The group controlled territory around Gedo in 1997 (Canada IRB 1997).

Organizational Structure

Ahmed Warsame Mohamed Hashi, a military commander, led the SNF (Europa Publications 2003, 1012; Center of Military History 2003). Members primarily comprised ex-military fighters from Siad Barre's army (Center of Military History 2003). Members predominantly comprised of ethnic Marehan (Center of Military History 2003). Around 2003, the SNF had an estimated 2,000 members (Center of Military History 2003).

External Ties

While enlisted in the military, Hashi received military training in Egypt and the Soviet Union (Center of Military History 2003). The group fought against the USC/SNA and Al Ittihad Al Islami (Canada IRB 1997). In 1997, the group received external support, in the form of arms, from Ethiopia (Canada IRB 1997).

Group Outcome

In 1994, Hashi signed a peace treaty (Canada IRB 1995). The peace agreement, however, had no measurable effect. Some critics say Hashi represented the aims of the SPM, over the SNF, at the time of signing the deal (Canada IRB 1995). The SNF continued fighting as late as 1997 (Canada IRB 1997).

XIV. SOMALI NATIONAL ALLIANCE

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 1994

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: SNA

Group Formation: 1992

Group End: 1997 (solo) or 2004 (as part of the USC/SNA)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Somali National Alliance (SNA) first came to attention as a violent group in 1992 (GTD 2017). The group, an armed faction, fought for control of the Somali capital after Siad Barre left office (Lewis 1993).

Geography

Around 1994, the group controlled territory around Merca, Somalia (Canada IRB 1996). The group also conducted attacks in Bardera and Beledweyne, Somalia (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

General Aideed led the SNA. Members came from the Habr Gidir clan (Canada IRB 1996). Other information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

The group allied with the USC and formed the USC/SNA (Center of Military History 2003).

Group Outcome

The group's last known violent incident occurred in 1996 (Canada IRB 1996). The group merged with the USC to form the USC/SNA at an unknown date. The USC/SNA fought up until 2004 (Global Security n.d.).

- XV. HABR GEDIR CLAN
Min. Group Date: 1994
Max. Group Date: 2002
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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- IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Information on the status of relations between the Murusade (sub-clan of Hawiye) and the other Hawiye sub-clans, especially the Habr Gedir, in areas where the Murusade reside [SOM16717.E], 02. März 1994 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net) http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/195216/313846_de.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Habr Gedir, Somali National Alliance (SNA), SNA, USC/SNA

Group Formation: This is an alias for the SNA or USC/SNA (c.f. USC/SNA profile, Human Rights Watch n.d.)

Group End: This is an alias for the SNA or USC/SNA (c.f. USC/SNA profile, Human Rights Watch n.d.)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Habr Gedir clan formed around 1992. This tribal militia formed when the USC splintered into two different factions (Canada IRB 1993). The group fought for control of the capital in Somalia after Siad Barre fell (Canada IRB 1996). The Habr Gedir clan appears to be an alias for the Somali National Alliance (SNA) (Human Rights Watch n.d.).

Geography

The group fought around Mogadishu, Somalia (Canada IRB 1996).

Organizational Structure

General Aidid led the Habr Gedid clan (Canada IRB 1996). Members of the group came from the Hawiye ethnic group and Habr Gedid subclan (Canada IRB 1996).

External Ties

The group opposed the other faction that splintered from the USC/SNA: the Abgal splinter led by Ali Mahdi (Canada IRB 1996).

Group Outcome

The Habr Gedir clan appears to be an alias for the SNA or USC/SNA (c.f. USC/SNA profile, Human Rights Watch n.d.)

XVI. RAHANWEIN RESISTANCE ARMY

Min. Group Date: 1995

Max. Group Date: 2002

Onset: NA

Aliases: Rahanwein Resistance Army (Rra), Rahanwein Resistance Army, Rahanweyn Resistance Army, Rahanweyn Resistance Army (Rra), Reewin Resistance Army, Reewin Resistance Army (Rra)

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Somalia: Rahanweyn Resistance Army Takes Control of Baidoa.” IRIN News. 2002. AllAfrica. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200208010264.html>
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<https://books.google.com/books?id=WjsrDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT206&lpg=PT206&dq=RAHANWEYN+RESISTANCE+ARMY+-+MADOBE+AND+HABSADE&source=bl&ots=0N63E5Z3U3&sig=SNyM533A5PCQKszNbRkAT2GrSYA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwii0qK3mp7WAhXBrVQKHW-nAV8Q6AEIQDAE#v=onepage&q=RAHANWEYN%20RESISTANCE%20ARMY%20-%20MADOBE%20AND%20HABSADE&f=false>
- "RRA faction imposes condition for attending conference." IRIN News. 2002.
<http://www.irinnews.org/report/35126/somalia-rra-faction-imposes-condition-attending-conference>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: RRA

Group Formation: 1995

Group End: 2002 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) formed in 1995 to regain control of territory in southwest Somalia and to oppose the activities of the SNA (Canada IRB 1996). The RRA formed after Aideed's militia invaded Baidoa (Mukhtar 2003, 190). The RRA originally operated as a local militia faction. Early on, Mohamaed Nir Shari Dadud or Hasan Mohamad Nur Shatigadud led the group. The RRA sought to oppose the SNA and Aideed's forces (AllAfrica 2002; Mukhtar 2003, 190; Armed Conflicts Report 2009).

The group had ethno-nationalist aims and fought for the Rahanweyn clans (Canada IRB 1996). The group also sought to create a separate state for the Reewin clan (Mukhtar 2003, 190; IRIN News 2002). The group first came to attention as a violent group in 1995 (Canada IRB 1996).

Geography

The group formed in Jhaffey, Somalia (Mukhtar 2003, 190). The group's headquarters were in Baidoa, Somalia (AllAfrica 2002). The group conducted attacks and clashed with forces in Goob Gaduud Shabelow and Huddur, Somalia (AllAfrica 2002; Mukhtar 2003, 190). The RRA operated in the Bay and Bakool regions of southwest Somalia (Canada IRB 1996). The group controlled territory around Baidoa (Canada IRB 1996). The group was not transnational.

Organizational Structure

Mohamaed Nir Shari Dadud or Hasan Mohamad Nur Shatigadud led the RRA (AllAfrica 2002; Armed Conflicts Report 2009; IRIN News 2002). In 1997, the group was organized as a local militia with no formal political wing (Canada IRB 1997). By 2002, the group had created a formal political wing and organization (IRIN News 2002). The RRA recruited fighters from the Reewin tribe. The group funded itself through clan donations (Canada IRB 1996; Canada IRB 1997; Mukhtar 2003, 190). In 2002, Muhammed Ali Adan Qainle led the group in Baidoa (IRIN News 2002).

It is unknown how many members the group had (Mukhtar 2003, 190).

External Ties

The group opposed and fought against the USC/SNA (Canada IRB 1996). Fighting among the RRA and other militias mostly stemmed from inter-clan animosities. The group allegedly received unspecified external support from Ethiopia (Mudug 2006).

The group supported the TNG (Armed Conflict Reports 2009). The group merged or allied with the Middle Shabelle Administration, Puntland Administration, and Somali Patriotic Movement to form the SRRC (Armed Conflict Report 2009).

Group Outcome

Between 1997 and 1998, the SNA attempted negotiating with the RRA, but the RRA allegedly refused (Mukhtar 2003, 190). In 2000, the Arta Reconciliation Conference prohibited the RRA from fighting (Mukhtar 2003, 190). In 2001, the group merged or allied with other factions to form the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (Armed Conflict Reports 2009).

By 2002, the RRA had declared the establishment of a separate state called the South West State of Somalia (IRIN News 2002). The group's last known violent activity occurred in 2002, when two RRA factions split and temporarily fought each other

(AllAfrica 2002). Eventually, the leader of the RRA managed to regain control over the rebellious faction, ending the violence (AllAfrica 2002).

XVII. MUSA SUDI YALAHOW MILITIA

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 2001

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Somalia: Update to SOM25151.E of 10 October 1996 on the relationship between the Murusade and the Hawiye subclans, 19 May 2000, som34376.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad7d8.html>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2001

Group End: 2006

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Musa Sudi Yalahow militia first came to attention as a violent group in 2001 (Los Angeles Times 2001; GTD 2017). The group seeks to prevent Islamists from taking power in Mogadishu, Somalia (Mohamed 2006). The group is anti-Islamist but has no clear ethno-nationalist orientation or other ideological aim.

Geography

The group conducted attacks in Mogadishu (GTD 2017; Lacey 2006).

Organizational Structure

Muse Sudi Yalahow, a warlord, leads this group (Lacey 2006). He also held a position as trade minister in the provisional government under Abdullahi Yusuf in 2006 (Lacey 2006). Members of the militia are ethnic Hawiye (Canada IRB 2000).

External Ties

The group fought against Islamist militant groups in Mogadishu (Mohamed 2006).

Group Outcome

The group's last known violent attack occurred in 2006 (Lacey 2006; Mohamed 2006). The Somali government called for the arrest of Yalahow and other warlords, but it is unknown if this happened (Mohamed 2006).

XVIII. JUBBA VALLEY ALLIANCE
Min. Group Date: 1999
Max. Group Date: 2003
Onset: NA

Aliases: Isbahaysiga Dooxada Jubba, Jubba Valley Alliance (Jva)

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- "Report on political, security, human rights developments in southern and central Somalia, including South West State of Somalia and Puntland State of Somalia." 2002. The Danish Immigration Office and the British Home Office. <https://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/ronlyres/9A15FEA2-087B-44B2-A4E9-44D3AE7BF99A/0/SomaliarapportUK2002.pdf>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: JVA, Allied Somali Forces, ASF

Group Formation: 1999

Group End: 2006 (repression/coercion)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA) formed in 1999 as a merger of several different Somali National Front (SNF) factions (Mudug 2006; Global Security n.d.). The group’s first violent attack occurred in 1999, when the group drove back the SPM from Kismayo (Mudug 2006; Global Security n.d.). Originally called the Allied Somali Forces, the group later became known as the Juba Valley Alliance (Mudug 2006).

The JVA sought to overthrow the SPM (Global Security n.d.; Danish Immigration Services 2002). It also fought against the SRRC (Danish Immigration Services 2002). The JVA wished to establish a regional government in Lower Juba known as Jubaland (Global Security n.d.; Danish Immigration Services 2002).

Geography

The JVA controlled territory in the Lower Juba region of Somalia. The group also controlled Kismayo, a Somali port city in Lower Juba (Kalkata 2006).

Organizational Structure

In 1999, Ahmed Warsame led Jubaland after the JVA took control of Kismayo (DeRouen and Bellamy 2008, 686). By 2002, Col. Barre Hilale and Adan Shire led the JVA (Danish Immigration Services 2002; IRIN News 2002). In 2002, Barre Adan Shire was referred to as chairman of the JVA (IRIN 2002).

The JVA had an organized political wing and administrative service in Kismayo (IRIN 2002). The group's political wing formed around 2001 (DeRouen and Bellamy 2008, 686).

Members of the group came from the Digil and Rahanwein clans (DeRouen and Bellamy 2008, 686). The group also recruited members from both the Marhan, Ogaden, and Habr Gedir clans (Danish Immigration Services 2002, 20).

The group received funding from taxes on trade and charcoal industry operations (Danish Immigration Services 2002, 20).

External Ties

The group allied with the Transitional National Government (TNG). There is no evidence of external support for the group by other state or non-state actors. The group opposed the SPM (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

In 1999, the group proclaimed an independent state known as Jubaland (Global Security n.d.). In 2001, the group began to support the TNG government in Mogadishu and dissolved their state (DeRouen and Bellamy 2008, 686). In 2002, the group's leader, Barre Adan Shire, attended peace and reconciliation talks in Kenya (IRIN 2002). By 2002, the group no longer controlled territory in southwest Somalia and had ceded most of its control to the RRA (DeRouen and Bellamy 2008, 686).

In January 2006, the group proclaimed the re-establishment of Jubaland (Global Security n.d.). The Union of Islamic Courts assembled a coalition of Islamist militias and groups (Global Security n.d.). They forced it to peacefully disarm in September 2006 (Global Security n.d.).

In 2001, the group disarmed to support the TNG (Global Security n.d.). The group clashed with SPM forces in 2004 and 2006 (BBC 2004; News24 Archives 2006). In 2006, the group re-formed the Jubaland government amidst a deteriorating security situation (Global Security n.d.). The group did not last long, however, as the Union of Islamic Courts defeated the group in September 2006 (Global Security n.d.).

Interesting quote from Ireland Documentation Center 2010 report:

“Because it is composed of two different clans, it does not possess a consistent policy in national affairs – though close to the TNG in the past, it maintains a separate political identity, and in more recent times has been identified with the G-8.” (Ibid, p, 38)”

Min. Group Date: 1999
Max. Group Date: 1999
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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<https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/af/780.htm>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1999

Group End: 2000 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Matan Abdulle first came to attention as a violent group in 1999 for an attack in Mogadishu, where the group clashed with the Daoud clan (IRIN News 1999; GTD 2017). The group’s goals and ideology could not be determined.

Geography

The group’s attacks occurred in North Mogadishu (IRIN News 1999; GTD 2017; US State Department 2001).

Organizational Structure

Group members came from the Abgal sub-clan (US State Department 2001).

External Ties

No information could be found about the group's external ties to other state or non-state actors. It clashed with the Daoud clan in 1999 (IRIN News 1999).

Group Outcome

The group's last known attack occurred in January 2000 when it attacked a bus (US State Department 2001). Other information about the group's outcome could not be found.

XX. SOMALI NATIONAL FRONT - MOHAMED SHEIKH ALI BURALEH FACTION

Min. Group Date: 1999

Max. Group Date: 1999

Onset: NA

Aliases: Somali National Front - Mohamed Sheikh Ali Buraleh, Snf - Msab, Snf-Msab, Somali National Front - Mohamed Sheikh Ali Buraleh Faction

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://www.irinnews.org/fr/node/176404>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1999

Group End: 1999 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The SNF-Buraleh faction emerged in April 1999 (IRIN News 1999). It opposed the SNF faction led by Masale (IRIN News 1999). The two factions clashed several times in 1999 over support for Ethiopia, which had been providing weapons to the SNF since 1997 (IRIN News 1999). Fighting broke out as part of a power struggle following the death of Ali Nur in April 1999 (Xinhua News 1999a).

Geography

The group clashed in Luuq and Bur Dhubo near the Ethiopian border (IRIN News 1999; Xinhua 1999a). The group controlled some territory in the Gedo region (Xinhua 1999b).

Organizational Structure

Mohamed Sheik Ali Buraleh led the SNF-Buraleh faction (IRIN News 1999). Members were ex-fighters from the SNF faction (IRIN News 1999).

External Ties

The group supported Ethiopia and its continued support for the SNF during the Somali Civil War (IRIN News 1999).

Group Outcome

The group's last known violent incident occurred in May 1999, when it clashed with the Marehan SNF faction (Xinhua 1999b). More information about the group's outcome could not be found.

XXI. DIGIL SALVATION ARMY
Min. Group Date: 1999
Max. Group Date: 1999
Onset: NA

Aliases: Digil Salvation Army (Dsa), Digil Salvation Army

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1999 (Guardian)

Group End: 2000 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Digil Salvation Army (DSA) formed in 1999, as a local militia opposed to Hussan Aideed's force (Guardian 1999; UNHCR 1999). The group claimed Aideed unfairly taxed the Gerra population (Guardian 1999). The DSA's first attack occurred in July 1999, when the group clashed with Aideed's forces (IRIN News 1999; Guardian 1999).

Geography

The DSA perpetrated attacks 75 miles south of Mogadishu in Coriolei and Aw-Dhelegh (Guardian 1999; AllAfrica 1999). The group had a base of operations in Dinsoor, Somalia (IRIN News 1999). The DSA controlled territory in Qoryoley, Somalia (Irish Times 2000).

Organizational Structure

Col. Ali Sheikh Abdulakir led the group (Guardian 1999). Asad Mohamed Abdi served as the group's spokesman (Irish Times 2000). Members of the group came from the Garre tribe (Guardian 1999). Other information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

Ethiopia allegedly supported the group (AllAfrica 1999). The group clashed several times with Aideed's forces between 1999 and 2000 (UNHCR 1999; Irish Times 2000).

Group Outcome

Between 1999 and 2000, the group clashed several times with Aideed's forces (UNHCR 1999; Irish Times 2000). The group lost territory in August 1999 (UNHCR 1999). The DSA's last known violent attack occurred in 2000, when group members captured the town of Qoryoley, Somalia (Irish Times 2000). Group activity beyond this attack could not be found.

XXII. ISLAMIC COURTS UNION
Min. Group Date: 2000
Max. Group Date: 2008

Onset: NA

Aliases: Islamic Courts Union (Icu), Alliance For The Re-Liberation Of Somalia/Union Of Islamic Courts, Ars/Uic, Islamic Courts Union, Sics, Supreme Islamic Council Of Somalia

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Joint Islamic Courts Council

Group Formation: 2000

Group End: 2008 (repression)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) formed in 2000, after a merger of several Islamist groups (Global Security n.d.; Crenshaw 2016). As early as 1994, Islamic courts operated independently in Somalia. These courts had primarily administered justice and did not operate as a political or militant organization (Hassan and Barnes 2005, 2-3; Roggio

2007). The ICU originally organized as a proto-justice system to manage the chaos in Somalia but conducted its first violent attack in 2006 against a group of warlords (Crenshaw 2016).

The ICU ascribed to an Islamist ideology (Crenshaw 2016). The ICU sought to implement and enforce Sharia law in the country and establish an Islamic state (Crenshaw 2016).

Geography

The group controlled territory in Kismayo and Mogadishu, Somalia (Crenshaw 2016). Its primary base of operations was in Baidoa, Somalia (Crenshaw 2016). It did not appear to have an external base or to conduct transnational attacks.

Organizational Structure

Sheikh Ali Dheere originally led the ICU. Sheikh Sharif Ahmed later replaced Ali Dheere as the ICU leader (Global Security n.d.; Crenshaw 2016). Other high-ranking ICU members included Yusuf Mohammad Siad, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Adan Hashi Ayro (VOIA 2006; Global Security n.d.). Ayro had military experience from fighting in the Soviet-Afghan War (Global Security n.d.).

The group had approximately 80 fighters in 2004, 600 fighters in 2006, and 3,000 fighters by early 2007 (Crenshaw 2016). Most members had been former militants from AIAI (Global Security n.d.). Members came from the Habr Gedir ethnic group (Hassan and Barnes 2007, 3).

The group was organized as a set of 11 different judicial courts (BBC 2006).

The group's military wing was al-Shabaab, which later splintered to form its own independent movement (Crenshaw 2016). Some reports, however, indicate that al-Shabaab had already operated independently while the ICU was active (Hassan and Barnes 2007, 3). Aden Hashi Ayro led al-Shabaab until 2006 (Crenshaw 2016).

External Ties

The group allegedly received weapons from Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Syria, and Saudi Arabia (Crenshaw 2016). The AIAI and other Islamist groups merged to form the ICU (Global Security n.d.). Ahweys, the leader of the Courts, had ties to Al Qaeda (BBC 2006). The group fought against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which operated in exile (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

In 2006, soon after becoming violent, the group took control of Mogadishu and southern Somalia (Crenshaw 2016). The ICU's territorial control spurred the Somali Transitional National Government, operating out of exile in Kenya, to negotiate with the ICU to disarm (Crenshaw 2006). In December 2006, the TFG and Ethiopian military forces launched an offensive into Somalia to push the ICU out of Mogadishu (Roggio 2007; Crenshaw 2016). Efforts successfully repressed the ICU. By 2008, the ICU's military wing broke away to form an independent group (Crenshaw 2016). The ICU's last known violent incident occurred in 2008, after which it disarmed and formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) (Crenshaw 2016; GTD 2017).

XXIII. FORCES OF YUSSUF HAJJI NUR

Min. Group Date: 2001

Max. Group Date: 2001

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://allafrica.com/stories/200108070257.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2002

Group End: 2002

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The forces of Yussuf Hajji Nur first came to attention as a violent group in August 2001, when Nur declared himself the leader of Puntland and then-president Col. Abdullahi Yusuf refused to step down (All Africa 2001; Mwaura and Schmeidel 2002, 139; Seddon 2013). The militia's first violent attack in August 2001 resulted in a clash with Yusuf's forces several times (All Africa 2001; Seddon 2013). The group supported Nur's attempt to take power in Puntland (Seddon 2013).

Geography

The group was a local militia force for Puntland (Mwaura and Schmeidel 2002, 139).

Organizational Structure

Yusuf Haji Nur led Puntland in 2001 (DOJ 2003). The group was organized as a local militia.

External Ties

Nur denied reports that he allegedly allowed Al-Ittihad to have a base of operations in Puntland (DOJ 2003). The group fought against Col. Abdullahi Yusuf's militia (All Africa 2001; Seddon 2013).

Group Outcome

Col. Yusuf's security forces effectively routed Nur's militia from Puntland by May 2002, leading to its demise (Seddon 2013). The force's last known violent incident occurred in 2002 (Seddon 2013).

XXIV. SOMALI RECONCILIATION AND RESTORATION COUNCIL

Min. Group Date: 2001
Max. Group Date: 2002
Onset: 2001

Aliases: Somali Reconciliation And Restoration Council (Srrc), Somali Reconciliation And Restoration Council

Part 1. Bibliography

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http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: SRRC

Group Formation: 2001

Group End: 2003 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) formed in 2001 as a merger of different militia factions (All Africa 2001; Gleditsch et al. 2011, 490). The SRRC sought to establish a new government in Somalia (BBC 2001; All Africa 2001). The group opposed the provisional government operating from Ethiopia known as the Transitional National Government (TNG) (AMISOM n.d.; BBC 2001). The SRRC had no clear ideological leaning. The SRRC’s first violent incident occurred in 2001.

Geography

The group formed in exile in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (UK Home Office 2004).

Organizational Structure

The SRRC was initially organized under a presidential council led by Hussein Mahamed Aidid (AllAfrica 2001; BBC 2001). The SRRC organized as a political organization with a paramilitary wing (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 495). No other information about the group's organizational structure could be found.

External Ties

The SRRC had an external base of operations in Ethiopia (Elmi and Barise 2006, 42). The group received material and training support from Ethiopia (Elmi and Barise 2006, 42; Gleditsch et al. 2011, 495).

Group Outcome

In 2002, the group reached a cease-fire agreement. The group's last violent incident also occurred in 2002 (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 490). In 2003, the SRRC reached an agreement with the TNG at a conference in Kenya (Sitrep 2003).

XXV. RAHANWEYN RESISTANCE ARMY - MADOBE AND HABSADE
Min. Group Date: 2001
Max. Group Date: 2002
Onset: NA

Note: this should be merged with

Aliases: Rahanwein Resistance Army (Rra), Rahanwein Resistance Army, Rahanweyn Resistance Army, Rahanweyn Resistance Army (Rra), Reewin Resistance Army, Reewin Resistance Army (Rra)

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://allafrica.com/stories/200208010264.html>
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mp7WAhXBrVQKHW-nAV8Q6AEIQDAE#v=onepage&q=RAHANWEYN%20RESISTANCE%20ARMY%20-%20MADOBE%20AND%20HABSADE&f=false

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<http://www.irinnews.org/report/35126/somalia-rra-faction-imposes-condition-attending-conference>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: RRA, Reewin Resistance Army

Group Formation: 2002

Group End: 2002

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Rahanweyn Resistance Army - Madobe and Habsade (RRA-MH) formed as a splinter of the RRA in 2002 (AllAfrica 2002). After deputy commanders of the RRA tried to depose RRA Chairman Col. Hasan Muhammad Nur Shatigadud, the RRA split into the original group and a faction led by Sheikh Aden Madobe and Muhammad Ibrahim Habsade (AllAfrica 2002; IRIN News 2002). The RRA-MH sought to create a separate state for the Reewin clan (Mukhtar 2003, 190). Its first violent incident occurred in 2002 (IRIN 2002; AllAfrica 2002).

Geography

The group's headquarters were located in Baidoa, Somalia (AllAfrica 2002). The group conducted attacks and clashed with forces in Goob Gaduud Shabelow and Huddur, Somalia (AllAfrica 2002).

Organizational Structure

Sheikh Aden Madobe and Muhammad Ibrahim Habsade led the RRA-MH. Both had been deputies in the RRA (IRIN News 2002). RRA-MH members were ex-militants from the RRA.

External Ties

The RRA-MH splintered from the RRA. Other information about the group's external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

The group's last known violent incident occurred in 2002 (IRIN News 2002; AllAfrica 2002). Other information about the group's outcome could not be found.

XXVI. USC/SSA - OMF
Min. Group Date: 2001
Max. Group Date: 2001
Onset: NA

Aliases: Usc/Ssa - Omar Mohamed Mohamud Finish, United Somalia Congress/Somali Salvation Alliance - Omar Mohamed Mohamud "Finish" Faction, United Somalia Congress/Somali Salvation Alliance - Omar Mohamed Mohamud Finish, United Somalia Congress/Somali Salvation Alliance - Omar Mohamed Mohamud Finish Faction, Usc/Ssa - Omf, United Somalia Congress/Somali Salvation Alliance - Omar Mohamed Mohamud "Finish" Faction

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is a faction of USC/SSA.

Group Formation: This is a faction of USC/SSA.

Group End: This is a faction of USC/SSA.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is a faction of USC/SSA.

Geography

This is a faction of USC/SSA.

Organizational Structure

This is a faction of USC/SSA.

External Ties

This is a faction of USC/SSA.

Group Outcome

This is a faction of USC/SSA.

XXVII. MARHAN CLAN
Min. Group Date: 2001
Max. Group Date: 2001
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Marehan Clan

Group Formation: 1997

Group End: 1998 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Marhan clan militia first came to attention as a violent group in 1997 for attacks against civilians and members of the Majertein clan militia (Canada IRB 1997). The Marhan clan supported former Somalia President Siad Barre and fought against militias like the SNF, Al-Ittihad, and Somali Patriotic Movement after Barre's rule (Canada IRB 1997; Canada IRB 1999).

Geography

The group was primarily active in the Gedo region and, specifically, the Abduk Wak area of Galgaduud in Somalia (Canada IRB 1999).

Organizational Structure

The group organized as a local militia with members from the Marehan clan (Canada IRB 1997; Ireland Refugee Documentation Center 2010). In 1998, it had at least 200 members (Canada IRB 1999).

External Ties

The group clashed repeatedly with Al-Ittihad and the SNM (Canada IRB 1997; Canada IRB 1999). There is no evidence of external support by other state or non-state actors.

Group Outcome

The group's last known violent attack occurred in 1998, when the clan attacked a Majertan militia in Kismayo, Somalia (Canada IRB 1999). More information about the group's outcome could not be found.

XXVIII. JUBBA VALLEY ALLIANCE FACTION

Min. Group Date: 2002

Max. Group Date: 2003

Onset: NA

Aliases: Jubba Valley Alliance Faction, Jva Faction

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://www.irinnews.org/report/35277/somalia-interview-barre-adan-shire-chairman-juba-valley-alliance-jva>
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<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/jubaland.htm>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1999

Group End: 2006 (defeat)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA) formed in 1999 to overthrow the SPM (Global Security n.d.; Danish Immigration Services 2002). The JVA sought to fight against the SRRC and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (Danish Immigration Services 2002). Its first violent incident occurred in 2009, when it clashed with SPM forces (Global Security n.d.). It also aimed to establish a regional government in Lower Juba known as Jubaland (Global Security n.d.; Danish Immigration Services 2002).

Geography

The JVA's headquarters were in Kismayo, Somalia (Danish Immigration Services 2002). It also clashed with SPM forces in Kismayo (BBC 2004; News24 Archives 2006).

Organizational Structure

Col. Barre Hilale and Aden Serrar led the JVA (Adam Shire) (Danish Immigration Services 2002; IRIN News 2002). The group recruited members from both the Marhan and Habr Gedir clans, both of which are members of the Darod and Hawiye ethnic

groups respectively (Danish Immigration Services 2002). The group funded itself through extortion and control over the charcoal industry (Danish Immigration Services 2002). The JVA allegedly had an organized political wing and administrative service in Kismayo (IRIN 2002).

External Ties

The JVA allied with the Transitional National Government (TNG) (Danish Immigration Services 2002).

Group Outcome

In 2001, the group disarmed to support the TNG (Global Security n.d.). The group clashed with SPM forces in 2004 and 2006 (BBC 2004; News24 Archives 2006). In 2006 the group re-formed the Jubaland government amidst a deteriorating security situation (Global Security n.d.). The group did not last long, however, as the Union of Islamic Courts defeated the group in September 2006 (Global Security n.d.).

Interesting quote from Ireland Documentation Center 2010 report:

“Because it is composed of two different clans, it does not possess a consistent policy in national affairs – though close to the TNG in the past, it maintains a separate political identity, and in more recent times has been identified with the G-8.” (Ibid, p, 38)”

Alias for the JVA

XXIX. ISLAMIC TENDENCY
Min. Group Date: 2006
Max. Group Date: 2006
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20227, Global Terrorism Database, Last Updated June 2017, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20227>
- Search PQ
- Search gScholar
 - “Islamic tendency” somalia
 - Islamic tendency somalia

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2006

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Islamic Tendency first came to attention as a violent group in 2006, when the group attacked a movie theater in Dhusamareb, Somalia (GTD 2017). The group's goals, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties could not be found.

Geography

The Islamic Tendency's sole known attack occurred in Dhusamareb, Somalia (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

No information about this group's organizational structure could be found.

External Ties

No information about this group's external ties could be found.

Group Outcome

Islamic Tendency first came to attention as a violent group in 2006, when the group attacked a movie theater in Dhusamareb, Somalia (GTD 2017). No other information could be found about this group's outcome.

XXX. AL-SHABAAB
Min. Group Date: 2006
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: 2008

Aliases: Al-Shabaab, Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen

Part 1. Bibliography

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- “Al Shabaab Profile. A History of Somalia’s Insurgent Movement.” Telegraph. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/11513886/Al-Shabaab-profile-A-history-of-Somalias-insurgent-movement.html>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Al-Shabaab al-Islaam, Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya, Al-Shabaab al-Jihaad al Shabaab, As-Saḥāb, Ash-Shabaab, Hizbul Shabaab, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM), Harakat Shabaab Al Mujahidin, Mujahideen Youth Movement (MYM), Hezb al-Shabaab, Hisb'ul Shabaab, Hizbul Shabaab, Movement of Warrior Youth, Mujahidin Al-Shabaab Movement, Shabaab, The Party of Youth, The Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRM), The Youth, Unity of Islamic Youth, Youth Wing, Muhajiroon brigade (division made up of foreign fighters)

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2017 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Al Shabaab formed in 2006, when it splintered from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The group originally functioned as the paramilitary youth wing of the ICU (Masters and Sergie 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2016; Crenshaw 2016). Some sources indicate the group actually started in 1997 as an extremist faction of the AIAI (Yan 2015). Its first violent incident was in 2007 (Crenshaw 2012; GTD 2017). Al Shabaab desires to overthrow the Somali government and establish an Islamic state (Counter Extremism n.d.; Masters and Sergie 2015; Crenshaw 2016; BBC 2016). It also wishes to expel foreign troops and the AMISOM mission (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group ascribes to a Wahhabi Islamist ideology (Wise 2011; BBC 2016; Counter Extremism n.d.).

Geography

Al Shabaab is transnational. The group controls most of the territory in southern Somalia. The organization lost control over Kismayo, Baidoa, and Mogadishu in 2011-2012 (BBC 2016; Crenshaw 2016). Al Shabaab conducted attacks in Nairobi, Kenya; Kampala, Uganda; and Djibouti (Yan 2015; Crenshaw 2016).

Organizational Structure

Aden Hashi Ayro, who previously fought for the AIAI in the 1990s, originally led al Shabaab (Crenshaw 2016). A US drone strike killed him in 2008 (Crenshaw 2016). In 2017, Ahmed Umar Abu Ubaidah took over as leader of the group (Counter Extremism n.d.).

The group has a central hierarchical organization (Counter Extremism n.d.). It has several different branches, including two different armed wings, a religious law enforcement wing, an intelligence wing, and a media wing (Counter Extremism n.d.; Yan 2015; Crenshaw 2016)

The group funds itself through diaspora support, extortion, and control over the charcoal industry (Yan 2015; Counter Extremism n.d.). Additionally, the group allegedly receives financial support from Eritrea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Yemen (Counter Extremism n.d.; Crenshaw 2016).

The group originally started as the youth wing of the ICU and continues to primarily recruit children and young men into its ranks (Counter Extremism n.d.). It also attracts members through online information operations (Yan 2015; Counter Extremism n.d.). The group had approximately 400 fighters in 2006 and 6,000-7,000 in 2008 (Masters and Sergie 2015; Crenshaw 2016). In 2015, the group had an estimated 7,000-9,000 fighters (Crenshaw 2016).

External Ties

Al Shabaab's original members belonged to an extremist faction of the AIAI (Yan 2015). Due to ideological disagreements, they splintered from the IAIA around 2003 and joined the ICU (Yan 2015). Al Shabaab splintered from the ICU in 2006 (Yan 2015). Ayro allegedly received training in Afghanistan at an unknown date (Mackenzie Institute 2016). In 2008, al Shabaab began to establish ties with al Qaeda (Crenshaw 2016). The group established a formal alliance with al Qaeda in 2012. Al Qaeda provided funding and training for the group (Counter Extremism n.d.; International Crisis Group 2014; Crenshaw 2016). In 2010, al Shabaab forcefully merged with Hizbul Islam (International Crisis Group 2014, 9). Al Shabaab rejects ISIS (BBC 2016). The group allegedly receives financial support, weaponry, and training from Eritrea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Yemen, and Hezbollah (Counter Extremism n.d.; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 499; Masters and Sergie 2015; Crenshaw 2016).

Group Outcome

The group originally splintered from ICU when Ethiopian troops pushed the ICU out of Mogadishu, Somalia (Crenshaw 2016). In 2007, Uganda began sending forces to Somalia under AMISOM to fight al Shabaab (Masters and Sergie 2015). In 2008, the United States designated the group an FTO (Yan 2015). In 2010, the group forcefully merged with Hizbul Islam (International Crisis Group 2014, 9). In 2011, an African Union coalition launched a new offensive against al Shabaab, which resulted in the recovery of Mogadishu, Somalia (BBC 2016). In 2014, a faction of al Shabaab splintered after the group refused to switch allegiance to ISIS. In 2014, AMISOM launched a new offensive known as Operation Eagle against al Shabaab forces which successfully liberated several towns around the Ethiopia-Somalia border (International Crisis Group 2014). In 2016, the group began a resurgent campaign in and around Mogadishu against AMISOM forces (Jamestown Foundation 2017). In 2016, Ethiopia withdrew some troops from the area ostensibly for cost control although al Shabaab claimed it a victory (BBC 2016).

Notes for Iris:

- the group has a very sophisticated and intense training camp system for new recruits
- interesting note in ICG report about how forceful merger with Hizbul Islam tested cohesion of Shabaab

XXXI. ALLIANCE FOR THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND COUNTER-TERRORISM (ARPCT)

Min. Group Date: 2006

Max. Group Date: 2006

Onset: NA

Aliases: Alliance For The Restoration Of Peace And Counter-Terrorism, Alliance For The Restoration Of Peace And Counter-Terrorism (Arpct), Arpct, Isbaheysiga Ladagaalanka Argagaxisada, Isbaheysiga Ladagaalanka Argagaxisadda, Isbaheysiga La-Dagaalanka Argagaxisada, Isbaheysiga Ladagaalanka Argagaxisadda

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- United Kingdom: Home Office, Country of Origin Information Report - Somalia, 12 October 2007, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/47207f7d2.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: ARPCT

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2006

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) formed in February 2006 to combat terrorism in and around Mogadishu, Somalia (Hoehne 2009; Dagne 2011). The ARPCT conducted attacks against al Qaeda members operating in Somalia (Mazzetti 2006). The ARPCT's first violent attack occurred around March 2006 (UK Home Office 2007; Hoehne 2009). The group was secular and opposed other Islamist militias operating in the capital (Roggio 2007; Hoehne 2009).

Geography

The group operated in Mogadishu, Somalia (UK Home Office 2007; Hoehne 2009; Dagne 2011).

Organizational Structure

ARPCT members were warlords (Hoehne 2009; Dagne 2011). Famous warlords in the group included Bashir Rage, Mohammed Qanyare Afrah, Muse Sudi Yalahow, Omar Finnish, and Abdirashid Shire Ilqyete (Dagne 2011). The group allegedly received financing from the Ethiopian and US governments (Hoehne 2009). No information could be found about the group size. It did not appear to have a political wing.

External Ties

The group allegedly received financing from the Ethiopian and US governments (Mazzetti 2006; UK Home Office 2007; Roggio 2007; Hoehne 2009).

Group Outcome

The group faced stiff resistance from the Islamic Courts in Mogadishu and were quickly defeated in June 2006 (UK Home Office 2007; Roggio 2007; Hoehne 2009; Hegne 2011). Some speculate the ARPCT's formation enabled the Islamic militias to regroup and reorganize (Mazzetti 2006). In June 2006, the Transitional National Government fired four cabinet ministers who belonged to the ARPCT (Hegne 2011). The group's last violent incident occurred in 2006 when it clashed with local Islamic militias (Hoehne

2009). The Islamic Courts forcibly integrated group members into its organization after June 2006 (UK Home Office 2007).

note: ARPCT seems like local militia/vigilante force for TNG

XXXII. MUJAHIDEEN YOUTH MOVEMENT (MYM)

Min. Group Date: 2007

Max. Group Date: 2009

Onset: NA

Aliases: Mujahideen Youth Movement (Mym), Mujahideen Youth Movement

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Al-Shabaab (Black 2007; Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Group Formation: This is an alias for al Shabaab (Black 2007; Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Group End: This is an alias for al Shabaab (Black 2007; Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for al Shabaab (Black 2007; Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Geography

This is an alias for al Shabaab (Black 2007; Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for al Shabaab (Black 2007; Mackenzie Institute 2016).

External Ties

This is an alias for al Shabaab (Black 2007; Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for al Shabaab (Black 2007; Mackenzie Institute 2016).

XXXIII. AHLU SUNNA WAL JAMA'A (SOMALIA)

Min. Group Date: 2008

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Ahlu-Sunah Wal-Jamea (Somalia), Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a (Aswj), Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a (Somalia), Ahlu-Sunah Wal-Jamea, Ahlu-Sunah Wal-Jamea (Aswj)

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<https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=eYSA2uew3CUC&pg=PA292&lpg=PA292&dq=Hizbul+Islam&source=bl&ots=vSAtrXEF9f&sig=ynQ87xA30J7658B8MNiLH7poBqU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj8hY-Atb7WAhVJOhQKHVfLCG4Q6AEIcDAN#v=onepage&q=Hizbul%20Islam&f=false>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: ASWJ

Group Formation: 1991

Group End: 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a (ASWJ) formed in 1991 to counter the influence of extremist groups like AIAI and protect local populations (US State Department n.d., 292; Hoehne n.d.; Crenshaw 2016). It was a splinter of Majuma, a local militia created after the fall of Siad Barre (Hoehne n.d.). Its goal later evolved to fight against Al Shabaab (Crenshaw 2016). The group ascribed to a moderate Sufi Islamist ideology and wanted to unify Sufi Muslims in Somalia (Global Security n.d.; Hassan 2009; Crenshaw 2016). The group's first violent attack occurred in 2008 (Hassan 2009; Crenshaw 2016).

Geography

ASWJ primarily operates in Galgadud, Gedo, Mudug, Dollo, Yeed, and Mogadishu in Somalia (UK Home Office 2010; UK Home Office 2011; Crenshaw 2016). Its headquarters are in Galgadud (Crenshaw 2016). ASWJ has conducted attacks in Guriel, Dusamareb, Webho, Tulo Barqaqo, and Dhirimaadie, Somalia (Crenshaw 2016). The group has controlled territory and has set up checkpoints in these areas (UK Home Office 2010; UK Home Office 2011). The group does not appear to be transnational.

Organizational Structure

Members are primarily Sufi Muslims (Crenshaw 2016). It is unknown if the group has one leader and operates as a highly decentralized group or even umbrella for local militias (Hoehne n.d.; Crenshaw 2016; US State Department n.d., 292). Members come from local clan militias and local clerics (US State Department n.d., 292; Global Security n.d.; UK Home Office 2010) They also reportedly recruited child fighters (UK Home Office 2011). The group had approximately 4,500 members in 2011 (Crenshaw 2016).

External Ties

The group had an alliance with the TNG starting in the early 2000s (Global Security n.d.; International Institute for Counterterrorism 2010; Crenshaw 2016). The group received weapons and political positions in exchange for fighting al Shabaab (Crenshaw 2016). It may have also received financial support from the Somali government (Hassan 2009).

The group also allegedly received training and weapons from the Ethiopian government (Global Security n.d.; UK Home Office 2010; Crenshaw 2016). The group opposed AIAI and currently opposes al Shabaab (Hassan 2009; International Institute for Counterterrorism 2010; Crenshaw 2016).

Group Outcome

In 2008 or 2009, ASWJ signed a military agreement with the TFG to formally integrate into the transitional government's military (US State Department n.d., 292). From 2008 to 2010, the group clashed repeatedly with al Shabaab and Hizb al-Islam over territory (Hassan 2009; International Institute for Counterterrorism 2010). In 2011, the group refused to attend peace negotiations (Crenshaw 2011). In 2015, the group attacked government bases in Guriel (Crenshaw 2016). The group's last violent incident occurred as late as 2015, but the group is considered to remain active (Crenshaw 2016).

XXXIV. SOMALI ISLAMIC FRONT
Min. Group Date: 2008
Max. Group Date: 2009
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Jabhatul Islamiya, Jabhatul Islam, Jabhatul Islamiya, Jabatulla Islamiya, Jabathul Islamiya, JABISO

Group Formation: 2007/2008

Group End: 2009 (merger)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Somali Islamic Front first came to attention as a violent group as early as 2007 or 2008, when the group fought against occupying Ethiopian troops (Norway LandInfo 2009). The group comes to attention again in 2009, when it clashed with security forces and merged with three other groups to form Hizbul Islam (Shabelle Media Network 2009; AllAfrica 2009). The Somali Islamic Front opposed the TFG and fought to overthrow it with the assistance of Hizbul Islam (Shabelle Media Network 2009). The group ascribed to an Islamist ideology (AllAfrica 2009).

Geography

The group was generally active in south and central Somalia, in the same areas as al Shabaab. It was also active in Mogadishu (AllAfrica 2009; Canada IRB 2016).

Organizational Structure

The group's leader, Sheikh Mohamed Ibrahim Hayle, came from the Arjuan clan (AllAfrica 2009; Canada IRB 2016). Group members originated from the Hawiye ethnic group (Norway Land Info 2009; Canada IRB 2016). No information could be found about group size. It is unclear if the group had a political wing.

External Ties

The group had ties to Hizbul Islam and Al Shabaab (Canada IRB 2016). It allied with Ras Kamboni, Al Muqawama Islamiya, Jabathul Islam, and Anole Camp, whom it merged with to form Hizbul Islam (New Zealand Refugee Status 2010).

Group Outcome

In 2009, the group clashed with security forces outside Mogadishu (AllAfrica 2009). That year, it merged with three other groups to form Hizbul Islam (Norway Land Info 2009).

XXXV. HAKAKAT RAS KAMBONI (HRK)
Min. Group Date: 2008
Max. Group Date: 2008
Onset: NA

Aliases: Harakat Ras Kamboni, Harakat Ras Kamboni (Hrk)

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2009 (merger)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Harakat Ras Kamboni (HRK) emerged between 2006 to 2008 to fight against occupying Ethiopian troops and overthrow the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (Jamestown Foundation 2012; Crenshaw 2015). HRK formed after the ICU formally disbanded (Crenshaw 2015). It ascribed to an Islamist ideology (Crenshaw 2015). HRK's first violent incident occurred in 2008, when it attacked local militias in Kismayo, Somalia (Crenshaw 2015).

Geography

The group conducted attacks in Kismayo, Ras Kamboni, Jilib Afmadow, and Dhoobley, Somalia (Crenshaw 2015). The group was active along the Somalia-Kenya border. It is unclear if the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki led HRK (Crenshaw 2015). Turki was a senior leader in AIAI and later a southern military commander of the ICU (Roggio 2010; CTC 2009). HRK members hailed from the Ogaden/Darod clan (Crenshaw 2015; Canada IRB 2016). HRK had approximately 500-1,000 fighters in 2011, when it left Hizbul Islam (Roggio 2010). One source reports that the organization had a political wing (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 499).

External Ties

The group conducted attacks with al Shabaab in 2008 (Crenshaw 2015). It operated training camps in southern Somalia (Roggio 2010). The group allegedly received financial support from the Eritrean government (Crenshaw 2015).

Group Outcome

The group's last known violent incident occurred in 2008 (Crenshaw 2015). In 2009, the group merged with several other groups to form Hizbul Islam (Norway Lando Info 2009; Jamestown Foundation 2012; Crenshaw 2015). The merger occurred because Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia (Crenshaw 2015). In 2010, a faction of Hizbul Islam splintered away and named itself the Ras Kamboni Brigade - Madobe, but quickly merged with al Shabaab and, by extension, al Qaeda (AllAfrica 2010; Roggio 2010; Jamestown Foundation 2010; Crenshaw 2015).

Note: there is no ucdp dyad coding for HRK so I'm not sure why Gleditsch et al have a profile on it. Gleditsch et al also do not corroborate Eritrean support (Gleditsch et al 2013, 499)

XXXVI. ISLAMIC PARTY (SOMALIA)
Min. Group Date: 2009
Max. Group Date: 2010
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for Hizbul Islam.

Group Formation: This is an alias for Hizbul Islam.

Group End: This is an alias for Hizbul Islam.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for Hizbul Islam.

Geography

This is an alias for Hizbul Islam.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for Hizbul Islam.

External Ties

This is an alias for Hizbul Islam.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for Hizbul Islam.

XXXVII. 23 MAY DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (ALGERIA)

Min. Group Date: 2009

Max. Group Date: 2009

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

See Mali Profile.

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: ADC, Democratic Alliance for Change

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2006

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Democratic Alliance for Change formed in May 2006 (Westerfield 2012; ecocq and Klute 2013, 429). The group formed in response to the government's perceived failure to uphold the 1992 National Pact peace agreement which had ended the previous uprising. Specifically, the group argued the Mali government had failed to invest in appropriate development funds for the Tuareg population in Northern Mali resulting in disproportionate development across the country (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). The group's demands included increased autonomy and additional resources for the Tuareg population (BBC 2008).

The group's first violent attack was on May 23, 2006, when it launched coordinated attacks against military bases in Kidal and Menaka (Thurston and Lebovich 2013).

Geography

The group's first violent attack was on May 23, 2006, when it launched a set of coordinated attacks against military bases in Kidal and Menaka (Global Security n.d.; Thurston and Lebovich 2013). Its main headquarters were in Kidal (AfDevInfo 2008). Between 2006 and 2007, Bahanga moved with several fighters to Libya (El Watan

2008). In Libya, he claimed he would only re-start negotiations with the Mali government if Libya would mediate.

Organizational Structure

Iyad ag Ghali, who had originally led the MPA during the 1990 uprising, reorganized the ADC in 2006 (Thurston and Lebovich 2013). Others allege that ag Ghali did not initially organize the group, but quickly usurped control after its founding (Thurston and Lebovich 2013). Members of the group had originally fought as part of the MPLA and ARLA during the 1990s Tuareg uprising (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). MPLA leadership had served in the Malian Army in between the 1990 uprising and the 2006 uprising.

External Ties

The group conducted attacks against AQIM during its short-lived 2006 uprising (Global Security n.d; Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). The decision to attack AQIM led to internal divisions within the ADC who felt the attack severely weakened the group's ability to effectively fight against the Malian government (Global Security n.d.).

A faction of the group broke off in June 2006 following the signing of the Algiers Accord. The group opposed the government's military presence in Tinzawaten (El Watan 2008). This group, led by Ibrahim Bahanga, renamed their group the Northern Tuareg Alliance for Change (ATNMC) and began fighting in September 2007 (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429).

Group Outcome

The group began negotiations with the Mali government shortly after the May 23 attacks. Negotiations between the two actors resulted in the Algiers Agreement of 2006; the Malian government agreed to new concessions by the rebel groups. After the agreement was negotiated, the ADC disarmed in early 2007 (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). As part of the agreement, the Tuaregs had to disarm and stop demanding increased autonomy for northern Mali (El Watan 2008). In exchange, the Mali government had to expedite economic and political development in the north.

Some members of the group might have continued to fight as part of the ADC until 2009, but it is unclear whether these are rogue members or parts of the ATNMC faction (Global Security n.d.).

Some argue the decision to attack AQIM led to internal divisions within the ADC who felt the attack severely weakened the group's ability to effectively fight against the Malian government (Global Security n.d.). Iyad ag Ghali left the country and traveled to Pakistan

and Saudi Arabia where he became radicalized, setting the scene for his eventual return to Mali in 2011 (Thurston and Lebovich 2013).

Interesting quote from Global Security;

Mali found itself as a crossroads in 2010. One of Mali's great mistakes, according to Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT), was to agree to demilitarize the north following peace agreements with the Tuareg rebellion in 1992 and to reinforce this move to demilitarize following the Algiers Accords in 2006. As things stood, the Malian army was confined to bases in the cities of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. The Government had failed to set up the special mixed units which were to have incorporated former Tuareg and Arab rebels.

XXXVIII. HIZBUL ISLAAMI (SOMALIA)
Min. Group Date: 2009
Max. Group Date: 2010
Onset: 2009

Aliases: Hizbul Al Islam (Somalia), Hezb-UI Islam (Somalia), Hisbi Islam (Somalia), Hizbul Islaami (Somalia), Hizbul Islam (Somalia), Islamic Party (Somalia)

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=eYSA2uew3CUC&pg=PA292&lpg=PA292&dq=Hizbul+Islam&source=bl&ots=vSAtrXEF9f&sig=ynQ87xA30J7658B8MNIh7poBqU&hl=en>

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 2009

Group End: 2013 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Hizbul Islam formed in 2009 as the merger of four independent groups, including ARS, Ras Kamboni, Islamic Front, and Anole Camp (Roggio 2010; Horadam 2010; Crenshaw 2016). Hizbul Islam’s political aim was to overthrow the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and establish an Islamic state (Crenshaw 2016). The group formed in the midst of two important political events: (1) the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from the country and (2) a disarmament agreement between the TFG and other Islamist militant groups (Horadam 2010; Crenshaw 2016). Hizbul Islam ascribed to a Salafi Islamist ideology (Reuters 2010; Haradam 2010; Crenshaw 2016). Some sources report that the group is also nationalist (US State Department n.d., 292). Its first violent incident occurred in February 2009 when it attacked AU forces with al Shabaab (Crenshaw 2016).

Geography

The group conducted attacks in Mogadishu, Haradhere, and Afgooye (Afgoi), Somalia (Roggio 2010; Crenshaw 2016). It controlled territory in southern and central Somalia between 2009 and 2010 (Crenshaw 2016).

Organizational Structure

Omar Iman Abu Bakar founded Hizbul Islam. Hassan Dahir Aweys, the former leader of the AIAI, originally led the group (Roggio 2010; Haradam 2010; Crenshaw 2016; c.f. AIAI profile).

Hizbul Islam did not initially have a political wing. By 2013, when Hizbul Islam re-splintered from al Shabaab, the group had a political wing (Crenshaw 2016). There are disputed reports about whether Hizbul Islam was organized an umbrella or a new organization (US State Department n.d., 292; Reuters 2010). Hizbul Islam lacked a strong central command and had difficulty maintaining control over territory (Horadam 2010; US State Department n.d., 292;

No information could be found about the group's size.

External Ties

The group allegedly received sanctuary, financial, and material support from Eritrea (US State Department n.d., 292; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 502). The group conducted some joint attacks with al Shabaab early on but later came to oppose and fight the organization due to disagreements about al Qaeda's role in Somalia (Reuters 2010; Crenshaw 2016). Nevertheless, the group formally merged with al Shabaab in 2010 (BBC 2010; Roggio 2010; Crenshaw 2016). It later broke away again in 2012 (Crenshaw 2016).

Group Outcome

Hizbul Islam refused to negotiate with the TFG when it formed (Reuters 2010; Crenshaw 2016). The group suffered a string of military defeats and mass defections, which severely hurt the group's capabilities (Horadam 2010; Roggio 2010). In 2010, a faction splintered from the group and re-established the Ras Kamboni Movement (Voice of America 2010; Roggio 2010). The group's last known violent incident was in 2010 (Crenshaw 2016; GTD 2017). The group merged with al Shabaab from 2010 to 2012 (BBC 2010; Roggio 2010; Crenshaw 2016). In 2013, the group splintered from al Shabaab, denounced violence, and announced its intention to participate in Somali politics as a legitimate political party (Crenshaw 2016). Aweys surrendered to Somali state forces.

Gleditsch et al. is very generous on size estimates here:

Rebel estimate: 2,500 Rebel estimate (low): 1,000 Rebel estimate (high): 4,000 The UCDP gives no specific rebel estimate for Hizbul Islam. However, it reports that a 2009 estimate for the total strength of the Somali opposition was 5,000-10,000. Since Al-Shabab was the stronger insurgent organization in this period, we have estimated a lower number for Hizbul Islam of that total.

XXXIX. FORCES OF SHAYK MUHAMMAD SAID ATOM
Min. Group Date: 2010
Max. Group Date: 2010

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Why al-Shaab ally ‘Atom’ surrendered to the Somali government.” Somalia Newsroom. 2014.
<https://somalianewsroom.com/2014/06/09/why-al-shabaab-ally-atom-surrendered-to-the-somali-government/>
- Robert Young Pelton, Succad Mire, or Mohammed Nuxurkey. “Atom militia declares allegiance to Shabaab.” Somalia Report. 2012.
http://piracyreport.com/index.php/post/2915/Atom_Militia_Declares_Allegiance_to_Shabaab
- “Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea Issues List of Individuals Identified Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of Resolution 1844 (2008).” UN Security Council. 2010.
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9904.doc.htm>
- United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2010 - Somalia, 18 August 2011, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e524815c.html> [accessed 24 September 2017]
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Golis Mountains Mujahideen, Galgala Hills militia, Atom militia

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2012 (merger)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Mohamad Said Atom formed the Atom militia in 2006 (UN Security Council 2010). The group’s first violent incident occurred in 2008, when it bombed Ethiopian migrants in Bossaso (UN Security Council 2010). The group ascribed to an Islamist ideology (UK Home Office 2012). The group opposed Puntland regional forces and the Somali government (TFG) (UK Home Office 2012).

Geography

The group operated in northern Somalia around Puntland (UN Security Council 2010; Somalia Report 2012). It had a base of operations in Galgala and Badhan, Somalia (UN Security Council 2010; UK Home Office 2012). The area was mountainous (US State Department 2011).

Organizational Structure

Mohamed Said `Atom` led the Atom militia (UN Security Council 2010; US State Department 2011; UK Home Office 2011). In 2012, following the merger with al Shabaab, al Shabaab replaced Atom with Yasin Kilwe (Somalia News Room 2014). The group had approximately 250 members in 2010 (UN Security Council 2010). The group funded itself through kidnapping, piracy, and trafficking (UN Security Council 2010).

External Ties

The group provided arms and material assistance to al Shabaab (UN Security Council 2010). In 2012, the group formally pledged allegiance to al Shabaab and al Qaeda (Somalia Report 2012). The group may have also allegedly received support from former AIAI members (Somalia News Room 2014).

Group Outcome

In 2010, the Puntland government launched regional military operations against Atom's militia (US State Department 2011). In 2012, the group pledged allegiance to and merged with al Shabaab (Somalia Report 2012). In 2014, Mohamed Said independently surrendered to Somali government forces (Somalia News Room 2014).

XL. SHABELLE VALLEY ALLIANCE
Min. Group Date: 2011
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: Shabelle Valley Alliance (Sva), Shabelle Valley Alliance

Part 1. Bibliography

- Rashid Abdi. "Is Somalia's al Shabaab on the back foot?" BBC. 2012.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16510716>
- "2012 Country Report on Human Rights Practices." US State Department. 2013.
<https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012/af/204165.htm>
- "Pillars of Peace: Somali Programme." InterPeace. Center for Research and Dialogue. 2012.
http://3n589z370e6o2eata9wahfl4.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2012_08_28_SomSC_Pillars_Of_Peace_ENG.pdf

- GTD Perpetrator 40000, Global Terrorism Dataset, Study for Terrorism and Response to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=40000>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Doha Shabelle, Shabelle Valley militia

Group Formation: 2011

Group End: 2012 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Shabelle Valley Alliance (SVA) first came to attention as a militia in 2011 (BBC 2012). The militia sought to fight against al Shabaab (BBC 2012). SVA's first violent incident occurred in 2011, when it attacked al Shabaab fighters in Hiiraan (Critical Threats 2011). The SVA may have been a paramilitary force of a local government (US State Department 2011).

Geography

The SVA operated in the Shabelle Valley, Hiiraan region of Somalia (BBC 2012). The group conducted attacks in Beledweyne and Buuno Weyne, Somalia (GTD 2017). There is no evidence the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

The SVA may have been a paramilitary wing of the Hiiraan governor (US State Department 2011). Other information about this group's organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

In 2012, the group received an unspecified type of support from the Ethiopian government (BBC 2012). Simultaneously, the Ethiopian military began operating and conducting military patrols in the Shabelle Valley region (BBC 2012). The Ethiopian

government also opposed al Shabaab (BBC 2012). The SVA also fought against ASWJ in Hiiran (Center for Research and Dialogue 2012, 129).

Group Outcome

The group's last known violent incident occurred in 2012 (US State Department 2013; GTD 2017). Other information about the group's outcome could not be found.

XLI. SHABELLE VALLEY MILITIA
Min. Group Date: 2012
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for the SVA.

Group Formation: This is an alias for the SVA.

Group End: This is an alias for the SVA.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for the SVA.

Geography

This is an alias for the SVA.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for the SVA.

External Ties

This is an alias for the SVA.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for the SVA.