

Saudi Arabia Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 28 May 2019

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T208	HIZBALLAH		1982	2012
T28	AL-QA'IDA		1989	2012
T895	GENERATION OF ARAB FURY		1989	1989
T566	ISLAMIC MOVEMENT FOR CHANGE		1995	1996
T1494	AL-QA'IDA IN SAUDI ARABIA		2003	2004
T21	AL-HARAMAYN BRIGADES		2003	2004
T29	AL-QA'IDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP)		2003	2012
T1352	ABU MUS'AB AL-ZARQAWI BATTALION		2005	2005
T2182	HUTHIS		2006	2010
T9017	HEZBOLLAH AL-HEJAZ		1987	1996
T9029	JSM		1979	1979

I. HIZBALLAH

Torg ID: 208

Min. Group Date: 1982

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Hizbullah, Hizbollah, Hezbollah, Hezballah, Hizbullah, The Party of God, Islamic Jihad (Islamic Holy War), Islamic Jihad Organization, Islamic Resistance, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, Ansar al-Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansarollah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansar Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance), Organization of the Oppressed, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of Right Against Wrong and Followers of the Prophet Muhammed, Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad

Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Islamic Jihad Organization

Group Formation: 1982

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Hezbollah was formed in 1982, in the midst of the Lebanese civil war, as a splinter of the prominent Shiite political party Amal (Martin 2011, 254; Masters 2014; Christian Science Monitor 2012). It formed in reaction to Israel's invasion of Lebanon (NCTC n.d.; Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.). Hezbollah supported the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon and the Palestinian fight against Israel (Martin 2011, 254; BBC 2016). It ascribes to a Shiite ideology and believes the eventual Islamic state should also be Shiite (Mackenzie Institute 2016; Global Security n.d.; Al Jazeera English 2016; Christian Science Monitor 2012). The group is strongly opposed to the influence of western countries as well as Israel's involvement in the Middle East (Masters 2014; Al Jazeera English 2016). The group's first violent incident is generally considered to be the bombing of military barracks in Beirut in 1983 (GTD 2017; Martin 2011, 255; Global Security n.d.).

Today, the group is involved in the Syrian civil war; they support the Assad regime (Masters 2014; BBC 2016). The group is also involved in Lebanese politics as a result of the Taif agreement; they competed in the 1992 elections (Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.; BBC 2016). The group has reportedly moved from having deep Khomeinist roots to embodying a greater Islamic nationalist ideal (Masters 2014). The group removed Saad Hariri's government, which was backed by Saudi Arabia and rooted in Sunni ideals (Masters 2014). The group also aims to liberate Jerusalem (Global Security n.d.). The group also reportedly targets Jewish individuals (BBC 2016).

Geography

The group came to attention in 1983 with the bombing of US military barracks in Beirut (Martin 2011, 255; Global Security n.d.). The group operates out of Al Biqa' (Bekaa Valley), southern Beirut, and Ba'albek in Lebanon (Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.; Christian Science Monitor 2012). Hezbollah also maintains external bases and cells around the world including Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe (Global Security; Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.). The group has also carried out attacks in the Shebaa Farms zone which is disputed by the group and Israel (Masters 2014; BBC 2016). The group has also carried out attacks in Israel (Masters 2014).

Organizational Structure

The group was founded by a man named Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, as well as Imad Fayeز Mughniyeh, and Muhammad Hussein (Counter Extremism Project). The group reportedly consists of a seven member council called the Shura Council (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's initial leader was Sheikh Sobhi Tufeili; he was replaced by Abbas Musawi in 1992 (Martin 2011, 254; Mackenzie Institute 2016). After Musawi was assassinated, Hassan Nasrallah replaced him as the leader of the group (Masters 2014; Mackenzie Institute 2016; Al Jazeera English 2016; Christian Science Monitor 2012). Naim Qassem was second-in-command of the group, and a man named Hussein al-Khalil was a top advisor to the leader of the group politically (Masters 2014). Another official of the group was a man

named Imad Fayeز Mugniyah, who was killed in 2008 (Masters 2014).

The group has developed a strong political wing which has even engaged in Lebanese politics placing members in Parliament continuously since 1992 (Martin 2011, 254-255). It organized a series of cells across southern Lebanon, but consolidated into a political party organization in 1985 when it released a formal manifesto (CFR 2014). The group gained popular support in the 1980s by fighting against occupying IDF forces in southern Lebanon and other communist militias (Global Security n.d.). Hezbollah is led by the Shura Council including the group's leader, the Secretary General (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group estimates it had 5,000-10,000 different fighters and additional supporters as of 1993, but this has since dropped to about 500 (Global Security n.d.). The group also reportedly has ties with a group called Imam al-Mahdi, made up of youth that eventually join Hezbollah (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group coordinates with Tanzim, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the PFLP (Global Security n.d.). It may have also provided external support to Tanzim in the Palestinian territories to fund their actions. President Reagan publicly agreed to not negotiate with Hezbollah following the events, but privately set up a secure channel and secured an arms-for-hostages deal (Martin 2011, 256). It is well known that the IRGC supports Hezbollah with money, weapons, training, and other aid totaling up to \$200 million/year (CFR 2014; Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.; New York Times 2011). Syria and Iran also support Hezbollah (Global Security; Masters 2014). Syria is a key ally of Hezbollah, providing both a supply of arms into Lebanon and a safe haven for some of the group's leaders (Global Security n.d.). Hezbollah explicitly states their allegiance to Iran, especially to their supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini (until his death in 1989), and to the current leader, Khamenei (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). The group also has a charity and collects support through a Shi'a diaspora around the world (Global Security). The EU and the United States have accused the group of receiving support from the Qud Force of Iran (Masters 2014). The group is also reportedly allied with Iraq (Global Security n.d.). The group offers support for the Syrian president (Global Security n.d.; Masters 2014; New York Times 2011; Christian Science Monitor 2012). The group also reportedly has ties with Afghanistan (Global Security n.d.). The group also reportedly has ties with a group called Imam al-Mahdi, made up of youth that eventually join Hezbollah (Global Security n.d.). The group uses tactics such as hijacking, kidnapping, mortar or rocket attacks, tunneling, firearm attacks, suicide bombing, assassination, and explosive devices (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group has also exploited fundraising in Europe, the United States, and Arab Peninsula (Mackenzie Institute 2016; BBC 2016).

Group Outcome

The group's last known attack was reportedly in 2017 when Hezbollah assailants allegedly

kidnapped a Saudi citizen living in the Lebanese city Al-Aqiba (GTD 2017). Earlier that year, gunmen opened fire on the Wadi Hamid refugee camp in the town of Aarsal, Lebanon, killing three Syrian refugees (GTD 2017). No group has taken responsibility for either of these attacks, but sources agree that it was most likely conducted by Hezbollah (GTD 2017). These were the last reports of Hezbollah allegedly conducting violent attacks. Nevertheless, Hezbollah has allegedly planned numerous attacks since then. For example, it has set up vast networks of cells, who have allegedly planned attacks in places around the globe like the UAE, Venezuela, and New York (Gulf News 2019; FP 2019; Times of Israel 2019). Hezbollah is still active today, primarily by maintaining a strong presence in Lebanese politics (Global Security n.d.). Hezbollah's political wing is recognized as a political party, and it performed well in the 2018 Lebanese elections, with its Shiite bloc gaining a majority in the parliament (The Guardian 2018).

Recently, Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah has warned Israel and the United States that it has a stockpile of missiles capable of striking targets in Israel, perhaps indicating that Hezbollah still develops missiles and other arms (Haaretz 2019). Various state actors have taken measures to both militarily and diplomatically combat Hezbollah. Israel has conducted airstrikes on Hezbollah's arms supply chain in Syria and fights with them Syria in an attempt to prevent the group's ally Iran from asserting regional hegemony (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Global Security n.d.). Israel and Hezbollah have a long history of conflict, beginning in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, when the latter employed guerrilla tactics (The Tower 2016). Experts predict that another violent confrontation between Israel and Lebanon is looming and will be more destructive than ever (The Tower 2016). The United Nations passed UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in 2006, which presented a plan to end the war between Israel and Hezbollah, citing the violence and impact on civilians it caused; moreover, it required Hezbollah to disarm (United Nations 2006; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). The resolution had little effect as Hezbollah continued to stockpile weapons (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). The Lebanese government, tasked with the disarmament of Hezbollah, could not control the armed group as it was focused on improving the abysmal economic situation of the country (Global Security n.d.).

In 2015, the United States passed the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act (HIFPA), which sanctioned organizations, businesses, and people that support or do business with Hezbollah or any of its affiliates (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Lebanon did not take similar actions because Hezbollah forms a key part of its economy; sanctioning the group would make the poor economic situation worse (Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

Notes for Iris:

--since 2017, there has been an organizational shift in Hezbollah's operations. It has adopted larger networks of cells -- whether these are ex ante cells or new cells -- is slightly unusual.

--the cells that are operational are not conducting violent attacks, but they do signal an increase in the transnational presence of the group

II. AL-QA`IDA
Torg ID: 28
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qa'ida, Al Qaeda, Al Qaida, Al-Qa`Ida, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qa'idat Al-Jihad, The Base

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active) (Crenshaw 2015)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Al-Qaida was founded by Osama Bin Laden in 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's initial goals were to completely remove Western influence and ideas and to abolish the United States and Israel (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida attempts to achieve a state governed by sharia law and a conservative interpretation of Islam (FP 2012). They conducted their first attacks against the US embassy in Africa in 1998 (BAAD 2015; Global Security N.D). Al-Qaida first came to global attention after 9/11 but was active prior to that in its region (FAS 2005). The group has a radical Sunni Muslim ideology and ascribes to Salafi jihadist ideas (CFR 2012; Global Security n.d.; Blanchard 2007, 6).

Geography

Al-Qaida operated mainly within Peshawar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (CFR 2012; PBS N.D). The group hid within cities and hills with particularly mountainous terrain in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan (as shepherd or farmers) (FAS 2005). The group's leader Osama bin Laden had a base of operations in Sudan from 1991 to 1998 (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Organizational Structure

Al-Qaida was headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was the group's sole leader until his assassination in 2011 (CFR 2012). He was originally from Saudi Arabia and had helped fight the Soviets in Afghanistan (Crenshaw 2015). His father, Mohammed bin Laden, moved from southern Yemen to Saudi Arabia, where he worked his way up from being a menial laborer to gaining favor with the royal family and constructing palaces and mosques for King Faisal (The Guardian 2015; PBS 2001). Osama bin Laden was born in Saudi Arabia as one of fifty children (The Guardian 2015). After returning from a trip to Peshawar, Pakistan, he vocally advocated for support for the mujahideen (PBS 2001).

After collecting monetary donations for the mujahideen in Afghanistan, bin Laden first went to Afghanistan in 1982 and eventually fought in battles and established camps, which eventually attracted more Saudis to the country (PBS 2001). Eventually, bin Laden established Al-Qa'edah, or "The Base" as the center of his mujahideen operations. After the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan, bin Laden again went to Afghanistan (PBS 2001). He was unable to leave the country as he had been banned from travel for trying to spread jihad to Yemen (PBS 2001). In response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1991, bin Laden argued that all Arab mujahideen should be brought to defend the country (PBS 2001). Then, bin Laden learned that the United States would enter the conflict in Kuwait (PBS 2001). This was a turning point for bin Laden. He gathered religious support and led 4000 people to receive jihadist training in Afghanistan (PBS 2001). He spent a short while in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but eventually escaped from Saudi and Pakistani authorities to Sudan where he received temporary refuge (PBS 2001). In 1996, he left Sudan and returned to Afghanistan, where he conducted attacks against civilians and American forces on the Arabian Peninsula (PBS 2001). After the Taliban took over the Afghan city of Jalalabad, bin Laden joined the group (PBS 2001). The Saudis and the U.S. tried unsuccessfully many times to kidnap bin Laden (PBS 2001). He was finally defeated when American Navy SEALs raided his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan (History 2018).

Following his death, he was replaced as leader by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2011 (Crenshaw 2015; CFR 2012). The group used a complex decentralized, or cell-based, organizational structure in which members reported to couriers who reported to other couriers eventually making their way up to the head (RAND 2008). Funding for the organization came from many places, including donations (FTO 2005). The group had different councils to deal with different aspects. For example, they had a "military committee" to deal with "military" matters, and a "consultation council" to plan out terrorist attacks and deal with financial matters (PBS 2001). They have no formal political wing (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida can be considered an umbrella group that consisted of many other terrorist groups within (ibid; Global Security n.d.). The organization had

an estimated 75 members when it was first formed and up to 18,000 at its peak in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015). As of 2015, it is thought to have less than 1000 members, but these estimates vary wildly by source (Crenshaw 2015; BAAD 2015).

External Ties

Both the government of Saudi Arabia and the US Central Intelligence Agency allegedly provided money and supplies to the mujahideen during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan before al-Qaida formally organized (Crenshaw 2015). Some reports claim that the CIA itself sent more than \$600 million to mujahideen associated with bin Laden (Crenshaw 2015). Some reports allege that Saudi Arabia funded Al-Qaida through drug trafficking and diamonds, though these claims are now considered to have been falsified and invalid (Crenshaw 2015). Bin Laden maintained ties with key members of the Saudi royal family; some, including Prince Faisal, allegedly provided Al-Qaida with large monetary donations (Crenshaw 2015; CNN 2015). Iran also allegedly trained and supported AQ members in the early 1990s (ibid; BAAD 2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan allow Al-Qaida to operate training camps within their borders (ibid). The group has ties to several other terrorist organizations including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Jemaah Islamiya (CFR 2012; PBS 2001).

Group Outcome

The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to find and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements operating in Afghanistan (BAAD 2015). The group's first leader Osama bin Laden was killed during a U.S. raid in 2011 (CFR 2012; BAAD 2015). The group is still active today.

III. GENERATION OF ARAB FURY

Torg ID: 895

Min. Group Date: 1989

Max. Group Date: 1989

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases found

Group Formation: 1989

Group End: 1989 (trial and execution)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when Generation of Arab Fury formed; nevertheless, it carried out its first and only known violent attacks in Mecca in 1989 (GTD 2018). On July 10, during the Hajj pilgrimage, the group carried out two bombings in Mecca: one on a street leading to the Grand Mosque and one on a nearby bridge (GTD 2018; Al Arabiya 2017; Deseret News 1989). The attacks killed one person, a Pakistani pilgrim, and injured sixteen others (Deseret News 1989). Saudi authorities also claimed that a third bombing was conducted six days later, but caused no fatalities (UPI 1989).

Generation of Arab Fury took responsibility for the July 10 attacks, berating Saudi leaders for recognizing the legitimacy of the nation of Israel (Deseret News 1989). Saudi authorities arrested and subsequently publicly beheaded sixteen Kuwaiti citizens, who were convicted for illegally smuggling weapons and explosives and carrying out the

attacks; four others were sentenced to prison for between fifteen and twenty years (UPI 1989; New York Times 1989). The leader's televised confession revealed that Iran ordered, trained, and supplied weapons to the assailants (New York Times 1989). Iran was quick to point out that the attacks demonstrated the Saudi government's lack of aptitude in overseeing the important religious shrine (Deseret News 1989). The group ascribes to Shia Islam (New York Times 1989).

Geography

It is unclear from where Generation of Arab Fury operated because it only conducted two attacks and then faded away. The sixteen individuals executed by the Saudi government for allegedly conducting the attacks in Mecca were all citizens of Kuwait, suggesting that the group was based in that country (New York Times 1989; UPI 1989). The Interior Ministry of Saudi Arabia alleged that the leader of the group disclosed to authorities that the Iranian government had ordered and supported the attacks (New York Times 1989). According to the Saudi record of his confession, the group was based in Kuwait, where members were trained by Iranian diplomats (New York Times). One article states that the group is from west Beirut, possibly indicating that Generation of Arab Fury also operated in Lebanon (Deseret News 1989). Both attacks conducted by the group were in the holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

There is scant evidence about the organizational structure of Generation of Arab Fury. The group was headed by a Shiite Muslim teacher, who was 22 years of age at the time of the 1989 attacks (New York Times 1989). He confessed to masterminding the attacks and was executed publicly (New York Times 1989). The leader's name was not divulged by Saudi authorities. It is unclear whether this person was only the leader of the 1989 attacks or whether he headed the group as a whole. The group's membership size was small, comprising of less than 100 members (MIPT 2008). The group allegedly received funding and arms from Iran (MIPT 2008; New York Times 1989).

External Ties

Crucial to its operation, Generation of Arab Fury had a strong external tie to Iran (New York Times 1989). The group conducted attacks in Mecca allegedly on the orders of the government of Iran (New York Times 1989). The government of Iran allegedly provided not only financial support to the group, but also trained members and provided a supply of arms (New York Times 1989). The leader of the 1989 attacks allegedly confessed that Iranian diplomats trained members in Kuwait (New York Times 1989). Moreover, the Iranian embassy allegedly supplied the group with weapons and explosives in Kuwait, which were illegally smuggled into Saudi Arabia (New York Times 1989). After the execution of the sixteen Kuwaitis who allegedly conducted the explosions in Mecca, Iranians, allegedly associated with Hezbollah, vowed to get revenge for what they believed was the unjust execution of Shiites (MIPT 2008). In the same year, Hezbollah

allegedly attacked Saudi diplomats as revenge for the executions, suggesting that there could be a tie between Generation of Arab Fury and other Shiite groups like Hezbollah (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

The group's last known attack was in 1989 (GTD 2018). An Islamic court tried and convicted twenty Kuwaiti citizens for their role in the attacks (UTI 1989). On September 21, 1989, Saudi authorities publicly beheaded by sword sixteen of those Kuwaitis for carrying out the bombings (MIPT 2008; New York Times 1989; UTI 1989). The group is no longer active and likely dissolved after the attacks and executions in 1989.

Notes for Iris:

-might be interesting to look up context of Iran support (think about ties to Bahrain)

IV. ISLAMIC MOVEMENT FOR CHANGE

Torg ID: 566

Min. Group Date: 1995

Max. Group Date: 1996

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: IMC, The Islamic Movement for Change

Group Formation: 1995

Group End: 1996 (stopped using violence), 2003 (last year of alleged group activity) (splinter)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group's first known attack was on November 13, 1995, when it carried out a car bombing in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia (MIPT 2008). At 11:40 a.m., the group detonated two explosives at a training center operated by the U.S. military (New York Times 1995). Four Americans, including three civilians, died as a result; between 35 and 40 others were injured according to the Pentagon's estimates (New York Times 1995). The group carried out the bombing for many reasons: to protest the imprisonment of Islamic leaders and to demonstrate that groups like them can conduct violent attacks freely (CIA 1995). IMC's primary goal was to expel all westerners, especially Americans and U.S. service members, from the Arabian Peninsula (MIPT 2008).

The group opposed the Saudi royal family and tried to stop the spread of western influence in the region (MIPT 2008). IMC described its goal as the elimination of all so-called "infidels," like non-Muslims and foreigners, to "purify" Saudi Arabia (CIA 1995). IMC continued using violence through 1996, carrying out another car bombing in Riyadh on June 25, 1996, which killed 19 Americans (MIPT 2008; New York Times 1996). The only attack IMC carried out without the assistance of other groups was on December 31, 1996 when the group carried out a bombing on a passenger bus in Aleppo, Syria to protest the execution of Jafaar bin al-Hajj Qassim Marzouk al-Shuwaykhat, a member of Hezbollah who had been arrested for involvement in the June 25 attacks (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017).

Geography

IMC primarily operated in Saudi Arabia, mainly in the capital, Riyadh, where it conducted its first two attacks (MIPT 2008). The group has stated that it would conduct more attacks in Saudi Arabia and shift its focus to civilian targets (CIA 1995). The group has also been known to operate in Syria as it carried out its last known attack in Aleppo (GTD 2017; MIPT 2008). Little about the specifics of IMC's operational environment is known.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the leadership or organizational structure of IMC. No official reports exist about the membership of the group. One estimate puts the number of members of IMC in the "10s" at its peak (RAND 2008). The members were likely Saudis as they carried out attacks in Riyadh to "purify" Saudi Arabia (CIA 1995). The members of the group were composed of members from other Middle Eastern armed groups including Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (MIPT 2008). Not much data exists about the group's sources of funding. Some sources allege that the government of Iran may have funded IMC (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

IMC was allegedly supported and funded by the government of Iran; however, these claims have not been substantiated (MIPT 2008). The group had ties to other armed groups. Firstly, the Tigers of the Gulf, a previously unknown group, had involvement and took responsibility for the November 13, 1995 bombings in Riyadh; as such, IMC likely coordinated with the Tigers of the Gulf to carry out the attacks (New York Times 1995).

The group has alleged connections to Hezbollah. Hezbollah masterminded the June 25, 1996 car bombing in Riyadh, indicating that IMC could have ties with Hezbollah (MIPT 2008). IMC took responsibility for an attack on a bus in Aleppo, claiming that it was an act of retaliation against the Syrian government's execution of Jafaar bin al-Hajj Qassim Marzouk al-Shuwaykhat, a member of Hezbollah who was arrested for being part of the June 25, 1996 bombing (MIPT 2008). IMC also claimed that al-Shuwaykhat was a member of IMC (MIPT 2008). Conducting a violent attack to respond to the execution of a member of Hezbollah could indicate that the two groups are tied and perhaps conducted operations together.

Though it was a Shia group, IMC may have had a tie to Sunni Al-Qaida as Al-Qaida was later considered to have been involved with the aforementioned 1995 Riyadh bombings (MIPT 2008). Moreover, IMC allegedly supported the overthrow of the then-leader of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, a stance steadfastly held by Al-Qaida (MIPT 2008). Because of suspected connections to these larger armed groups, IMC might have been simply a front for Hezbollah or Al-Qaida (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

King Fahd of Saudi Arabia was quick to denounce the group and the violence it caused; however, he took no concrete actions to respond or to control the group (New York Times 1995). In response to the 1995 attack, the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Raymond E. Mabus, Jr. stated that he would cooperate with the Saudi government to address the problem (New York Times 1995). The Federal Bureau of Investigation

promptly sent some of its agents to Saudi Arabia (New York Times 1995). After the 1996 bombing in Riyadh, the FBI again sent a large team of investigators to assess what happened and who was responsible (New York Times 1996). Following the 1996 attack, Saudi police took more security measures and increased increased patrol units, which had previously been insufficient (New York Times 1996). Despite this, no measures were taken to directly counter the group. IMC's last recognized attack was on a passenger bus in Aleppo on December 31, 1996 (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). Following this attack, the group stopped using violence. One source indicates that the group splintered, though it is unclear when or how (RAND 2008). In 2003, seven years after its last attack, IMC stated that they supported the overthrow of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi (MIPT 2008).

Notes for Iris:

- it's possible this group could be an alias
- this group just has less information available about it because of the group's history which makes it harder to confirm Iran support

V. AL-QA'IDA IN SAUDI ARABIA

Torg ID: 1494

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 2004

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: al-Qaeda Organization in Saudi Arabia

Group Formation: 2003

Group End: 2004 (repression)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia first came to prominence when it allegedly conducted four simultaneous attacks in Riyadh on May 12, 2003 (GTD 2018). Militants affiliated with Al-Qaida allegedly detonated explosives in the Al Hamra, Jedawai, and Vinnell residential complexes, which housed many foreigners who were temporarily working in Saudi Arabia, as well as at the Saudi Maintenance Company (RAND 2008). In total, the attacks killed 34 Americans and Saudis and injured approximately 60 others (RAND 2008). The group conducted similar attacks on foreigners on November 8, 2003 in the al-Muhaya residential complex in Riyadh, causing 17 deaths and injuring 122 people, including one American, and at a Swiss engineering and natural gas company in Yanbu (GTD 2018; CNN 2003). The group also carried out explosions at a hospital in Jizan and the Saudi Interior Ministry in Riyadh (GTD 2018). The al-Qaida offshoot in Saudi Arabia has not formally stated its goals; nevertheless, it likely had goals identical or similar to

that of its parent organization: the elimination of Western influence and ideas and the expulsion of foreigners from the region. The group ascribes to ideas Osama bin Laden learned in Saudi Arabia including conservative Salafi jihadism (Blanchard 2007, 6).

Geography

As the offshoot of al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia, al-Qaida operated exclusively in Saudi Arabia. The group conducted most of their attacks in Riyadh, but they also conducted attacks in the coastal city of Yanbu (near Medina) and in the city of Jizan (near Yemen), suggesting that the group operated throughout the country (GTD 2018). Many of the group's attacks targeted Riyadh's residential areas, though some targeted government buildings near the city's center (GTD 2018; CATO 2008). Not much else is known about the operational environment of al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia.

Organizational Structure

Al-Qaida itself was led by Osama bin Laden until his death in a U.S. raid in 2011. He appointed Yusuf al-Ayeri as the chief of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 4). Other than bin Laden himself, al-Ayeri was al-Qaida's highest ranking official in Saudi Arabia (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 4). He oversaw five cells, each led by one of his lieutenants (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 4). The lieutenants of the first four cells were Turki al-Dandani, who led the most powerful cell and carried out the May 2003 attacks, Ali Abd-al Rahman al-Fagasi al-Ghamdi (or Abu Bakr al-Azdi), who masterminded the four attacks in Riyadh on May 12, 2003, Khalid al-Hajj, a Yemeni, and Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, who organized the bombing in a Riyadh housing complex on November 8, 2003 (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 4). Al-Hajj was the de facto leader of al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia until he was ambushed and killed in Riyadh by Saudi security forces (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 4). Al-Muqrin declared himself leader and effectively succeeded al-Hajj as director of operations for al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 4; New York Times 2004).

Due to the eventual release of hours of footage from Saudi security forces, journalists were able to assemble a ninety-minute film documenting how al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia ran camps in the Saudi desert to brainwash uneducated young men and children, to inculcate militancy skills, and to train them to conduct suicide attacks on various targets (Arab News 2018). No official records exist pertaining how the group attains funding; however, it is likely that the group receives funding from al-Qaida, its parent group.

External Ties

Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia is an affiliate of the main al-Qaida organization and network. Some would argue that Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia is nothing more than a front for al-Qaida which operated specifically in Saudi Arabia. However, due to the leadership

and organizational structure of the group, al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia can be considered an offshoot of al-Qaida (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 4). A man who had connections with the al-Haramayn Foundation was taken into custody by Saudi authorities for allegedly being involved in the November 8, 2003 bombing in Riyadh, suggesting that al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia could have connections with the group (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 15). Not much else is known about the ties al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia has to other armed groups or states.

Group Outcome

Saudi Arabia's government and security forces responded to al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia quite effectively. Saudi security forces took action immediately following the attacks in Riyadh on May 12, 2003 by infiltrating the group's first and most potent cell in Saudi Arabia (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 5). Saudi security forces used vast amounts of intelligence to uncover names of key leaders (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 5). Al-Ghamdi surrendered to authorities, and al-Dhandi was killed (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 5). Soon later, al-Ayeri, the most important al-Qaida member in Saudi Arabia, was shot, and less than a year later, al-Hajj, the then-leader of the group's operations in Saudi Arabia, was ambushed and killed (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 5). Following the deaths of the most important leaders of al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia, weak leadership allowed Saudi security to crack down on the group's violent activities (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 5). Prince Sultan, the Minister of Defence of Saudi Arabia, guaranteed amnesty for any individuals associated with the group (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 12, 14). The program was successful and resulted in the pardoning of 31 people who had been a part of al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 14). Using both religion and the media, the Saudi government was able to augment staunch opposition to the group's activities (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 13-15). By using Islam to denounce the group's violent attacks and rallying up Wahhabi support, the government incited widespread sentiment against al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia and other such groups (Riedel and Saab 2008, 37). The government set up reeducation camps for individuals who had been members of violent groups and to convert them "into peaceful citizens" (Riedel and Saab 2008, 37). Moreover, the government took financial measures to combat illicit practices to help curtail avenues of financing like money laundering and donations from charitable foundations to groups like al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 15-16; Riedel and Saab 2008, 38-39). Saudi Arabia also pursued international cooperation with the United States, the European Union, and Interpol to coordinate counterterrorism efforts (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 18). In 2007, the Saudi government issued a fatwa that banned youth from practicing jihad in an effort to prevent al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia from using youth to carry out attacks (Riedel and Saab 2008, 38). In 2014, a Saudi court ordered the execution of five people and the imprisonment of 37 others who were convicted for involvement in the attacks in Riyadh on May 12, 2003 (BBC 2014). The last known violent attack conducted by al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia was a car bombing near the Saudi Interior Ministry in Riyadh on December

29, 2004, which killed eight people (GTD 2018). The group ceased to exist after Saudi security forces successfully killed the group's important leaders and infiltrated its five cells in Saudi Arabia (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 5).

Notes for Iris:

-the group was dead long before the merger with AQY -- its possible there were clandestine elements of the group still operating which merged
-Cordesman claims the group is an alias for IMC, but then also says the group conducted the Khobar Tower bombings which were conducted by the Shia Hezbollah al-Hejaz so not sure

VI. AL-HARAMAYN BRIGADES

Torg ID: 21

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 2004

Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Haramayn Brigades, Special Death Brigades

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Khataib al-Haramain, Al-Haramain Brigades, Al Haramain Brigades, Two Mosques Brigades

Group Formation: 2003

Group End: 2004 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Al-Haramayn Brigades conducted its first violent attack on December 4, 2003 when it shot Saudi diplomat, Major General Abdelaziz al-Huweirini, the highest-ranking counterterrorism official in the Interior Ministry, and his brother (GTD 2018).

Al-Haramayn Brigades took responsibility for the attempted assassination (GTD 2018). Saudi authorities have not disclosed much information about the attack including the location of the attack or potential intelligence about the assailants (GTD 2018).

Al-Haramayn Brigades primarily targeted government officials, especially those who specialize in counterterrorism as a way to retaliate against those who commit “crimes against the friends of Allah” and have “vehement enmity against [their] religion” (MIPT 2008; GTD 2018). For example, on December 29, 2003, the group detonated an explosive in the car of an intelligence officer outside his house in a residential area of Riyadh (GTD 2018).

Geography

Not much is known about the operational environment of al-Haramayn Brigades. The group operated in Saudi Arabia, having conducted at least two of its three attacks in the capital city of Riyadh (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

Not much is known about the group’s organizational structure or leadership. No official membership size estimates exist (MIPT 2008). No official reports about the group’s financing are available (MIPT 2008). Nevertheless, it is likely that al-Haramayn Brigades received funding from al-Qaida and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, groups to which it was allegedly linked (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; New York Times 2003). After the group conducted an attack on April 23, 2004, Saudi officials were quick to blame al-Qaida for the attack, and by extent, they alleged a connection between the attackers and the al-Qaida network in Saudi Arabia (BBC 2004; New York Times 2003). It is unclear, however, of the nature of the group’s tie to al-Qaida and its affiliates.

External Ties

The group has alleged ties to al-Qaida and al-Qaida-based groups (New York Times 2003; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Al-Haramayn Brigades is allegedly a subgroup of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (Counter Extremism Project n.d). After the group conducted an attack on April 23, 2004, Saudi officials were quick to blame al-Qaida for the attack, and by extent, they alleged a connection between the attackers and the al-Qaida network in Saudi Arabia (BBC 2004; New York Times 2003). It is unclear, however, of the nature of the group's tie to al-Qaida and its affiliates. One source states that the group could possibly have an affiliate in Kuwait, but it has not been confirmed whether the al-Haramayn Brigades that operated in Saudi Arabia is affiliated to its namesake group which operates in Kuwait (MIPT 2008). Moreover, al-Haramayn Brigades allegedly has ties to the Peninsula Lions, a group which conducts jihadist attacks in Kuwait targeting American officials, the Kuwaiti government, and civilians (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). The group may have ties to the mujahideen, who they lauded for being "righteous" (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

Not much is known about Saudi Arabia's response to al-Haramayn Brigades, and it is unclear what became of the group. The group conducted its last violent attack, a suicide car bombing, on April 23, 2004 outside the headquarters of the Saudi Domestic Security Forces in Riyadh (GTD 2018). The attack killed four or five people, including two security guards, and injured between 145 and 148 others (GTD 2018; BBC 2004). It is unclear what prevented the group from conducting more attacks. Saudi security forces, in coordination with U.S. forces, effectively conducted counterterrorism operations in the region to curb political violence and infiltrate the networks of armed groups like al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Saudi Arabia (New York Times 2003; MIPT 2008). This could have affected other armed groups in the region and could potentially explain the end of the al-Haramayn Brigades's violent attacks. Besides broader counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaeda, not much is known about if and how the Saudi government dealt with al-Haramayn Brigades. All that is known for sure is that Saudi government and religious officials were quick to denounce the group, declaring that its actions were an "abomination" to Islam and would assuredly doom the perpetrators of the attacks to spend their afterlives in "hell" (Baltimore Sun 2004).

Notes for Iris:

-NYT notes that Saudi authorities first attributed the incident to AQ but then later evidence emerged that it might have been a secondary group -- hard to independently verify what's going on

Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qa`ida In The Arabian Peninsula (Aqap), Al-Qaeda In The Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qaeda In The Arabian Peninsula (Aqap), Al-Qaeda In The Arabian Penninsula (Aqap), Al-Qaida In The Arabian Peninsula, Aqap

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2009. The group formed from the merger of Saudi and Yemeni AQ forces (Crenshaw 2015)

Group End: Active as of January 2018 (Horton 2018)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

After a Saudi crackdown pushed al-Qa'ida operatives into Yemen, Al-Qa'ida in Yemen merged with its Saudi counterpart to form AQAP in 2009 (Crenshaw 2015; Zahriyeh 2015). Both groups had both local support and foreign fighters who had gained experience fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviets twenty years earlier (Crenshaw 2015; Zahriyeh 2015). AQAP has continued its precursor organizations' operations in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and has been linked to transnational attacks against the US and France (CFR 2015). Many of AQAP's early attacks targeted Western and other foreign presences in Yemen, including South Korean and Western tourists in 2009 (Crenshaw 2015). Since its creation, AQAP has grown far stronger in Yemen. With a failed state, lawlessness, and ever-more-intense sectarian violence, the environment is perfect for AQAP to grow in size, engage in a full military campaign, and acquire better sources of funding and materiel (ICG 2017).

It was initially focused on fighting the West, but has reoriented to operations in Yemen since the revolt against the Yemeni government began in earnest in 2011 (ICG 2017). AQAP is a Sunni, jihadist, Salafi, organization that aims to fight the West and establish Islamic rule wherever possible, hoping to unify the Arabian Peninsula and fight towards Palestine to destroy Israel (Crenshaw 2015, Horton 2018). It also wants to overthrow the Yemen and Saudi governments and replace them with an Islamic state (Crenshaw 2015).

Geography

AQAP has been active mostly in the southern and southeastern parts of Yemen (Crenshaw 2015). AQAP has also been linked to attacks in Saudi Arabia and

transnational operations against the United States and other Western powers, including France (Charlie Hebdo), through training and online propaganda (CFR 2015; Crenshaw 2015; Zahriyeh 2015). One notable attempted attack on the US was Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's failed attempt to conceal explosives in his underwear in 2009 (CFR 2015). As of 2018, AQAP is most active in Al-Bayda and in the disputed city of Taiz, where it opposes the Houthis and their allies, as well as the Hadramawt, where it has been fighting against UAE forces (Horton 2018). The group's base is in southern and southeastern Yemen (Crenshaw 2015).

Organizational Structure

AQAP's leader (emir) since its formation in 2009, Nasser al-Wuhayshi, was killed by an airstrike in 2015 (BBC 2015; Zimmerman 2015). He was replaced by Qassim al-Raimi (CFR 2015). While the group only had a few hundred fighters in 2009, its size increased drastically by 2014, when it had about 1,000 (CFR 2015; Crenshaw 2015). AQAP releases a Yemen-focused propaganda magazine called *Sada al-Malahim*, or "The Echo of Battles", as well as *Inspire*, which is propaganda in English meant for consumption by westerners (CFR 2015). American jihadists Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan were a key part of this effort, until they were killed in 2011 (CFR 2015). This has helped the group recruit foreign fighters (Counter Extremism n.d.). In 2014, the group shifted to engage locals more in an apparent mimicry of Houthi tactics, in order to acquire tribal support in Yemen (Horton 2018).

AQAP has been so resilient to losses in its fight against the US and other groups in Yemen because of its regimented, cellular structure (CFR 2015). It is also very hierarchical with a clear set of senior leadership and junior leadership (Counter Extremism n.d.; CFR 2015). The group has both a political wing and an armed wing (Counter Extremism n.d.)

The group funded itself through Islamic charities (Crenshaw 2015; CFR 2015). The group also funds itself through robberies, kidnapping, and control of a port in Yemen (Counter Extremism n.d.; CFR 2015).

External Ties

At a certain point, AQAP was receiving funding from Islamic charities, and still receives funds from individuals willing to donate directly to AQAP, though most of its money comes from ransoms, theft and drugs (CFR 2015; Crenshaw 2015). AQAP is affiliated with the main AQ organization based in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Crenshaw 2015). In the context of the 2011 uprising, AQAP renamed part of itself as "Ansar al-Shari'a", and attempted to market itself as a more locally-supported group (Crenshaw 2015; Horton 2017). While originally amenable to cooperating with the Islamic State, the relationship between the two groups has soured; the Islamic State in Yemen and AQAP now openly

criticize each other (Crenshaw 2015; Zimmerman 2015). AQAP has been fighting the advance of the Houthis eastward and southward in Yemen (CFR 2015). AQAP has interactions with local tribes that result in cooperation on some issues and violent clashes on others (Horton 2018)

Group Outcome

AQAP remains active, violent, and powerful in Yemen, but has needed to sacrifice ideological purity for the purpose of making alliances and securing funding (Horton 2018). The lack of governmental control in Yemen has allowed AQAP to expand and, in 2011, to begin to control territory (ICG 2017, 10). In 2011-2012, it attempted to hold Abyan but failed (ICG 2017; Horton 2018). In 2015-2016, it attempted to hold Mukalla but was unable to do so in the face of a UAE offensive (ICG 2017; Horton 2018). As of 2018, analysts anticipated that AQAP will remain an important part of the landscape of violence in Yemen, and but may reorient towards warding off challengers and expanding its presence within Yemen, as opposed to launching transnational attacks against the West (Horton 2018). It remains the most prominent Sunni counterweight to the Shi'i, Iran-backed Houthis (Crenshaw 2015). The United States has directed growing drone strikes against AQAP commanders to combat the problem (BBC 2015). The Yemen government also tried to launch offensives against the group in 2010 (BBC 2015). In 2015, the Saudi government launched "Operation Decisive Storm" to undermine the Houthis, but, in the process provided space for AQAP to expand (Horton 2017).

Interesting quote from Counter Extremism:

In recent years, AQAP has continued to exploit the opportunities for recruitment provided by social media sites. On Twitter, for example, as soon as an AQAP account is shut down, another emerges almost immediately, typically using a new name ("handle") with one character amended. In November 2014, AQAP even launched its own "AMA" (Ask Me Anything) Twitter account, providing official answers to questions such as "Why haven't there been further AQAP attacks inside the US? Why don't you move the war from Yemen to US soil?" The job of resolving such queries from prospective jihadists falls to Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi, the AQAP senior official who claimed responsibility for the *Charlie Hebdo* attack in January 2015.

Notes for Iris:

-AQAP seems to mark a transnational focus (more outward-looking). 2009 is a major turning point in AQ worldwide history (e.g. IRQ, AFG, YEM, PHL?)

-change in funding sources around this time forces them to switch tactics - they become more efficient at supply lines. Since Yemen Civil War, they have retrenched a lot. They have territory (sort of), but they're not governing, they're consolidating, they're exporting media → more a messaging/radicalization campaign.

-in 2018, there is still no consolidated CT operation against them and drone operations limited in scope.

- Ansar al Sharia wants to be seen as the local faction (Remains to be seen whether they're perceived as domestically legitimate)
- IS-Yemen is pretty small; AQAP has more support. They don't have ties to the locals the same way other militant groups in the country do (SMM and Houthis).
- this is a terrorist group, not an insurgent group. They don't have the organizational planning. Their goals are so abstract that they don't know what they stand for or how to implement should they achieve. This is in stark contrast to Houthis. (key features - aims and organizational structure)
- interesting divergence between preferences and capabilities

VIII. ABU MUS'AB AL-ZARQAWI BATTALION

Torg ID: 1352

Min. Group Date: 2005

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases found

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2006 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi Battalion conducted its only known violent attack on September 12, 2006 in Damascus, Syria (MIPT 2008; CNN 2006; New York Times 2006). Four operatives, equipped with explosives, grenades, and automatic weapons, attempted to attack the U.S. Embassy (MIPT 2008; CNN 2006; New York Times 2006). Upon reaching the gates to the building, one operative allegedly told the guard that he wanted to give a bouquet of flowers to someone in the Embassy to show his solidarity for victims of terrorist violence and 9/11 victims (New York Times 2006). Officials refused the man entry to the Embassy, and the attack began (New York Times 2006). The assailants were shot at by Syrian guards, beginning a fierce shootout (MIPT 2008; CNN 2006; New York Times 2006). The guards successfully killed three of the operatives, and wounded the fourth one (New York Times 2006). Before attempting to enter the building, the attackers detonated a car bomb (CNN 2006). Concurrently, a second vehicle arrived at a separate checkpoint, but its driver was shot thereby foiling a second explosion (MIPT 2008). Many other explosives were placed around the Embassy; however, they were not detonated due to the failure of the attack (CNN 2006). One guard was killed (MIPT 2008; CNN 2006). One other security worker as well as eleven civilians were wounded (MIPT 2008; CNN 2006; New York Times 2006). No individual who was working in the U.S. Embassy was seriously injured; however, two officials from the Iraqi Embassy and one of the Chinese Embassy were wounded (CNN 2006; New York Times 2006). American officials, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, commended Syria and the guards for rapidly responding and "secur[ing] our people" (CNN 2006; New York Times 2006).

Not much is known about the group's ideology. The group may be a religious or nationalist-oriented group (MIPT 2008). The group was inspired by its namesake, the Jordanian jihadist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who led AQI (MIPT 2008). As such, the group likely ascribes to Sunni Islam. As its only attack was on the U.S. Embassy, the main goal of the group's political aim seems to be the elimination of foreigners, namely Americans, from the region (MIPT 2008; CNN 2006; New York Times 2006).

Geography

Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi Battalion was allegedly based in Saudi Arabia (MIPT 2008). The group also organized in Lebanon, where members of Abdul-Raouf Saleh's family purchased weapons with the money he had sent them from Saudi Arabia (MIPT 2008). Finally, the group operated in Syria, where it conducted its only attack on the US Embassy in Damascus with the weapons smuggled into the country from Saleh's family in Lebanon (MIPT 2008; CNN 2006; New York Times 2006).

Organizational Structure

The group was led by Abdul-Raouf Saleh (MIPT 2008). Initially, some authorities allegedly claimed that the group was led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (MIPT 2008).

However, upon further investigation, authorities realized that the group was only inspired by the aforementioned Sunni jihadist, and not affiliated to him (MIPT 2008). Moreover, authorities further investigated the attack by interrogating suspects and discovered that Abdul-Raouf Saleh was involved in the attacks (MIPT 2008). He himself funded the group by sending money to Lebanon where family members purchased weapons for use in the upcoming attack on the U.S. Embassy (MIPT 2008). The group had less than 100 members as its peak (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

Syrian officials initially suspected that the four people responsible for the attack on the U.S. Embassy were directly linked to either al-Qaida or an al-Qaida offshoot (CNN 2006). For example, Imad Moustapha, Syria's ambassador to the United States, stated that a group called Jund al-Sham, or Soldiers of the Levant, could have been responsible (CNN 2006; New York Times 2006). However, this group does not have a reputation for conducting attacks like this (c.f. Lebanon Profiles). Initially, authorities alleged that Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi Battalion had an external tie to al-Qaida, especially because it was named for a jihadist who pledged support to al-Qaida and led the al-Qaida offshoot in the Land of Two Rivers (MIPT 2008). However, now authorities consider the group to have merely been inspired by al-Zarqawi and not affiliated to him or al-Qaida. No evidence has been found to substantiate any claim that the group was linked to other armed groups (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

The group's attack on the U.S. Embassy was largely unsuccessful. Only one person, barring the three attackers who were killed, died (MIPT 2008; CNN 2006). No individual who was working in the U.S. Embassy was seriously injured, and only fourteen others were wounded (CNN 2006; New York Times 2006). American officials, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, commended Syria and the guards for rapidly responding and "secur[ing] our people" (CNN 2006; New York Times 2006). No additional security measures were taken as Syrian officials deemed that the thirty guards stationed around the U.S. Embassy were sufficient to repel the attackers (CNN 2006).

The group disappeared after it conducted its only attack (MIPT 2008). The group likely dissolved after its failed attack on the U.S. Embassy in 2006, although the specifics of the group's dissolution are unknown.

- IX. HUTHIS
Torg ID: 2182
Min. Group Date: 2006
Max. Group Date: 2010
Onset: NA

Aliases: Huthis, Houthis

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

Group Formation: This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

Group End: This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

Geography

This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

External Ties

This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for Ansar Allah (T2246).

- X. HEZBOLLAH AL-HEJAZ
Torg ID: 9017
Min. Group Date: 1987
Max. Group Date: 1996
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Hizballah in the Hijaz, Saudi Hizballah, Hezbollah al Hejaz, Hezbollah al-Hijaz, Hezbollah of the Hijaz, Hizballah al-Hijaz, Ansar Khat al-Imam (Followers of Imam Khomeini)

Group Formation: 1987

Group End: 1996 (arrests and rapprochement)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Hezbollah al-Hijaz is a Shiite group that formed in the second half of the 1980s in Saudi Arabia (Al Arabiya 2015; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Hegghammer 2009; 398). The group first emerged in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia in 1987 following violent confrontations between Shiites and Saudi security forces in Mecca during the Hajj pilgrimage, in which more than 400 Iranian pilgrims died (Al Arabiya 2015; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Hegghammer 2009, 398).

The group dedicated itself to using acts of violence to advocate for regime change (Al Arabiya 2005). Hezbollah al-Hijaz ascribes to Shia Islam and largely arose as a violent group in response to tensions and violence between Sunnis, who form the overwhelming majority of Saudi Arabia, and Shiites (Hegghammer 2009; 398). The group has pledged loyalty to the supreme leader of Iran and was inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini (Al Arabiya 2015; Teitelbaum n.d., 77; Hegghammer 2009, 398). The group follows the Shiite doctrine of velayat-e faqih, which gives authority to an Islamic jurist to have guardianship over others (Al Arabiya 2015). The group is center-seeking; its political aim is to use violence to bring about the demise of the Saudi regime and to replace it with an Islamic republic similar to that of Iran (Matthiesen 2009; 185). One of the group’s primary objectives is to conduct violent attacks against Americans and U.S. property in Saudi Arabia (United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, 2). The group opposes the Islamic Revolution Organization, or the Organization of the Islamic Revolution, a less radical pro-Shirazi group (Hegghammer 2009, 398; Matthiesen 2010, 179).

The group allegedly was responsible for numerous attacks in the late 1980s, including a bombing at a petrochemical plant in Jubayl, bombings of oil refineries in Ras Tanura, and

attacks in Riyadh (Hegghammer 2009, 398; Matthiesen 2010, 185). Hezbollah al-Hijaz is most well-known for its 1996 attack on a tower in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, which was housing American soldiers (Al Arabiya 2015; Combatting Terrorism Center 2009; Levitt 2016, 11; Stratfor 2007; Teitelbaum n.d., 78; Brookings 2015; Newsweek 2018; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Hegghammer 2009, 398; Mattheisen 2010, 191). The attack killed 19 U.S. soldiers and injured between 400 and 500 others (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Newsweek 2018).

Geography

Hezbollah al-Hijaz primarily operates in Saudi Arabia (Al Arabiya 2015; Combatting Terrorism Center 2009; Levitt 2016, 11; Stratfor 2007; Teitelbaum n.d., 77; Brookings 2015; Newsweek 2018; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Hegghammer 2009, 398; Mattheisen 2010, 179). It has conducted attacks in cities throughout the country, but seems to have conducted most of its attacks in eastern Saudi Arabia, near Bahrain and Kuwait, especially in Eastern Province cities such as Khobar, Dhahran, Ras Tanura, Jubayl, and Qatif (Hegghammer 2009, 398; Brookings 2015; Asharq al-Aswat 2017). It has also conducted attacks in Riyadh and Mecca (Hegghammer 2009, 398). The group has also operated in Bahrain and Kuwait, where it set up cells, planned attacks, and conducted bombings (Levitt 2016, 11-13; Newsweek 2018). The group operated in Lebanon, where the group's leader Ahmed al-Mughassil received sanctuary from the Lebanese Hezbollah after the Khobar bombings (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Brookings 2015). Moreover, the truck bomb used in the Khobar attacks was manufactured in Lebanon (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015).

Members of the group were trained in Lebanon and Iran by members of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC (Brookings 2015). The group operated in Damascus, Syria, where al-Mughassil resided for some time while he planned the attacks in Khobar and Dhahran (Brookings 2015; United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, 2-3). The group may have also operated in Iran, where members were offered external sanctuary (DeVore 2012, 91).

Organizational Structure

Hezbollah al-Hijaz consisted of two wings: a religious and political wing and a military wing (Matthiesen 2010, 185). The clerical wing, Tajamu' 'Ulama' al-Hijaz, was formed in the 1980s when a group of Saudi Shia clerics, who supported the ideas of Khomeini, moved Qom (Matthiesen 2010, 180). Some of the leaders of Tajamu' 'Ulama' al-Hijaz, including Shaykh Hashim al-Shakhs, Shaykh 'Abd al-Karim al-Hubayl, and 'Abd al-Jalil al-Maa, founded Hezbollah al-Hijaz (Matthiesen 2010, 184-185). Hezbollah al-Hijaz consisted of both members of Tajamu' 'Ulama' al-Hijaz and the Movement for Vanguard Missionaries, or MVM, which wanted to conduct violent attacks against the Saudi regime

(Matthiesen 2010, 185). The leader of the military wing of Hezbollah al-Hijaz was Ahmed al-Mughassil (Matthiesen 2010, 185).

Al-Mughassil, a Saudi Shiite born in the Eastern Province, was a former member of the MVM (Brookings 2015; Matthiesen 2010, 185). He allegedly masterminded the attacks in Khobar and was apprehended by authorities in Beirut in 2015 (Brookings 2015; Levitt 2016, 13; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015). The leader of the group allegedly was Abdel Karim al-Nasser, who al-Mughassil and leaders of the clerical wing reported to (United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, 3).

Hezbollah al-Hijaz recruited youth from the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and set up camps where they received military training (United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, 2-4). Many young men went on religious pilgrimages to the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine in Damascus, Syria, where Hezbollah al-Hijaz operated (United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, 2). There, some of the children who were considered to have potential for militancy, were recruited by Hezbollah al-Hijaz and taken to camps in Lebanon for further indoctrination and training (United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, 2-3). Some people joined Hezbollah al-Hijaz after defecting from the IRO, a rival Shia organization (Al Arabiya 2015). It is difficult to find specific numbers on membership size, but it initially had approximately 14 core members (United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001).

External Ties

Hezbollah al-Hijaz had an external tie to Iran, which indirectly and directly sponsored the group (DeVore 2012, 85-107). Iran financed the group and ensured that it had sufficient funds to function (DeVore 2012, 91). Iran's financing allowed Hezbollah al-Hijaz set up "a sophisticated infrastructure of training camps and administrative facilities," something it would not be able to do on its own (DeVore 2012, 91). For example, Iran signed deals with Syria, which enabled Hezbollah and Hezbollah al-Hijaz to operate more freely in regions of Lebanon like Beka'a Valley (DeVore 2012, 91). Iran also provided safe haven to group members should have needed it (DeVore 2012, 91). For example, Iran allegedly harbored Ahmed al-Mughassil in Tehran for nearly twenty years before he was apprehended in Beirut in 2015 (Asharq al-Awsat 2017). Members of Hezbollah al-Hijaz were trained in Iran and Lebanon by operatives of the Lebanese Hezbollah and by members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC (Brookings 2015; DeVore 2012, 92).

In exchange for funding and promises of safe haven for the group's members, Hezbollah al-Hijaz conducted attacks on behalf of Iran such as jihad against Israel and attacks on American and French targets of the Multinational Force, a peacekeeping organization (DeVore 2012, 96-99). The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency stated that Iranian officials

approved previous attacks in Saudi Arabia (Levitt 2016, 11). Iran was involved in the 1996 Khobar attacks. A U.S. federal judge ruled in favor of the victims' families and ordered the government to Iran to pay \$254.4 million in compensation (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Newsweek 2018). In that judge's report, he stated that the bomb used in the attack was manufactured and assembled at the Hezbollah base in Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, which was operated by Iran's government and the IRGC (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015). In 2018, another judge also demanded that Iran pay \$104.7 million to the victims' families (Newsweek 2018). Saudi authorities alleged that Iran attempted to revive Hezbollah al-Hijaz by supporting camps that trained youth in the Qatif region in eastern Saudi Arabia to incite a revolution (Asharq al-Awsat 2017).

Saudi Hezbollah, or Hezbollah al-Hijaz, had ties to the Lebanese Hezbollah. Members were known to have operated in Lebanon and maintained close ties with Lebanon's Hezbollah (Brookings 2015). Moreover, operatives were trained in Lebanon both by the IRGC and by Lebanon's Hezbollah (Brookings 2015). Lebanon's Hezbollah operated a base in Bekaa Valley, which was often used by Hezbollah al-Hijaz (Newsweek 2018; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015). In fact, the truck bomb used in the 1996 Khobar attacks was assembled at the base (Newsweek 2018; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015). According to the U.S. Department of Justice 46-count indictment of Ahmed al-Mughassil and thirteen others who allegedly participated in the plotting of the attack, the bomb was built by a member of Lebanon's Hezbollah (United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, 5-6; Brookings 2015).

Group Outcome

Authorities responded effectively to Hezbollah al-Hijaz's violent activities. In the late 1980s, the group carried out attacks on targets in eastern Saudi Arabia, including a bombing at a petrochemical plant in Jubayl and bombings of oil refineries in Ras Tanura (Hegghammer 2009, 398; Matthiesen 2010, 185).

Shortly after these attacks, group operatives were apprehended by authorities in nearby cities like Qatif and Dammam (Al Arabiya 2015). Some of the suspected attackers were executed, and others were taken into custody by Saudi authorities (Al Arabiya 2015). Some of the detained operatives received a pardon from King Fahd bin Abudlaziz and were released in 1994 (Al Arabiya 2015). Many of the group members ceased using violence and focused on religious and social work (Al Arabiya 2015). In 1993, the Saudi government initiated a general amnesty program with the Islamic Revolution Organization in the Arabian Peninsula, which negotiated on behalf of all Shia groups (Matthiesen 2010, 190). Some members were released from prison as part of this program (Matthiesen 2010, 191).

Others, however, continued using violence, and in 1996, attacked a tower in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. soldiers and injuring between 400-500 others (Al Arabiya

2015; Combatting Terrorism Center 2009; Levitt 2016, 11; Stratfor 2007; Teitelbaum n.d., 78; Brookings 2015; Newsweek 2018; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Hegghammer 2009, 398; Mattheisen 2010, 191). The Saudi government was quick to accuse Hezbollah al-Hijaz and arrested individuals they suspected of being directly involved in the attacks as well as those it suspected of having indirect ties to the group (Mattheisen 2010, 191). Due to tensions between the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, the official indictment of the attackers by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation only occurred in 2001 (Mattheisen 2010, 192; United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, Brookings 2015; Newsweek 2018).

Hezbollah al-Hijaz ceased its violent attacks and largely disappeared in 1996 after the Khobar bombings due to the arrests of most of its members (Mattheisen 2010, 194). Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to a reproachment, which prohibited Saudi Arabia from allowing the United States to operate in Saudi Arabia to conduct attacks against Iran and prohibited Iran from continuing to support violent Shiite groups in Saudi Arabia like Hezbollah al-Hijaz (Mattheisen 2010, 194). Some Saudi officials have emphasized the importance of permitting members of Hezbollah al-Hijaz to conduct religious activities and to seek public office; Saudi Arabia and Hezbollah al-Hijaz have begun cooperating in a peaceful way (Mattheisen 2010, 195-196).

Notes for Iris:

- the Hajj incident seemed to be particularly important in formation --
- there were underlying sectarian tensions, but this seemed particularly important
- the Hajj incident didn't seem to have a diffuse effect on the other groups
- the MVM was a group of Shia Islamists that wanted to take greater effort against the Saudi government by advocating for political violence (there is no evidence it ever did take these events)
- the oil attacks take place before the group travels to Iran and these other countries. The Khobar towers attack takes place after the group travels around
- the group was affiliated with Lebanese Hezbollah, but maintained operational independence in planning and conducting its attacks
- member size is missing but relative effectiveness of arrests suggests group is small

XI. JSM
Torg ID: 9029
Min. Group Date: 1979
Max. Group Date: 1979
Onset: 1979 [but really?]

Aliases: **al-Jamaa al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba**

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Muslim Revolutionary Movement in the Arabian Peninsula, Union of the Peoples of the Arabian Peninsula, the Salafi Group that Commands Right and Forbids Wrong

Group Formation: 1965 (form), 1979 (first attack)

Group End: 1979 (arrests, executions, imprisonments, and repression)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

JSM allegedly formed in the mid-1960s (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 106). The group formed in 1965 during an event called “the breaking of the pictures,” in which conservative Islamists destroyed photographs and objects they deemed to not have been in accordance with their traditional view of Islam (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 106). JSM conducted its first and only recognized attack in November 1979, when it seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca (GTD 2018; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 509; American Foreign Policy Council n.d.; Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 112; New York Times 1979; NPR 2009; Vox 2015; Arab News 2018). In the early morning of November 20, 1979, between 200 and 300 armed JSM members entered the Grand Mosque and took approximately 100,000 people hostage (NPR 2009; GTD 2018; Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 112). Five people died, and ten were injured (GTD 2018). The Imam of Mecca was reportedly shot to death (New York Times 1979).

JSM was a Salafi and Wahhabi group (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 104; Vox 2015). The group wanted to further purify Wahhabism (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 106). The group’s ideology can be classified as a form of “rejectionist Islam”, which emphasizes ritual and rejects government and politics (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 104). The group wanted a return to traditional Islamic practices and a literal interpretation of the Quran (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 108). The group’s ideology can be described as a form of conservative Islam (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 108). The group opposed the Saudi regime, who they called “hypocritical ‘drunkards’” and denounced for betraying Islam (Vox 2015). JSM also opposed the increasing westernization in the country (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 509). The group regarded 'Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, a religious scholar, as their shaykh and also regarded another religious scholar, Abu Bakr al-Jaza'iri, as influential (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 106).

Geography

JSM conducted its only known attack in the city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia (GTD 2018). The group formed in Medina, primarily in poor neighborhoods like al-Hara al-Sharqiyya (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 106-107). The group had smaller branches in many cities throughout Saudi Arabia like Riyadh, Dammam, Taif, Jidda, Ha'il, Abha, and Buraydah (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107). The group had a branch in Kuwait (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 113). Group members received weapons training in Mecca (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 112).

An early report by U.S. intelligence agents indicated that the group was from Iran; however, this claim was likely mistaken as the report also claimed that the group ascribed to Shia Islam, which is incorrect (New York Times 1979).

Organizational Structure

Soon after “the breaking of the pictures” in 1965, individuals who were arrested for their involvement in the aforementioned event formed an organization called al-Jama'a al-Salafiyya (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107). At the recommendation of 'Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, the name al-Muhtasiba was amended onto the group's name (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107). 'Abd al-Aziz bin Baz became the group's murshid, or spiritual guide (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107). He gave Abu Bakr al-Jaza'iri the position of his deputy (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107). The group had no official leader (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107). Instead, it was lead by a shura council of five or six people, including al-Jaza'iri (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107). By the early 1970s, the group had expanded (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107). The group purchased a building in Medina's destitute al-Hara al-Sharqiyya neighborhood and used it as the center of operations and a place for assemblies and meetings (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107). In the early to mid 1970s, JSM's organizational structure expanded (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107). More administrative groups were set up to address specific facets of the group's operations (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107). Group members set up branches throughout Saudi Arabia in cities like Riyadh, Dammam, Taif, Jidda, Ha'il, Abha, and Buraydah (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107).

Juhayman bin Muhammad bin Sayf al-'Utaybi was the leader of JSM during its attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 112; American Foreign Policy Council n.d.). Juhayman was born in the Ikhwan settlement of Sajir in the 1930s (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 109). He was part of a bedouin family, and as such, had a traditional bedouin upbringing (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 109). Juhayman completed fourth grade before leaving school (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 109). He spent about eighteen years working in the national guard (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 109). Juhayman took classes at Dar al-Hadith, where he learned about the teaching of hadith (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 109). During this time, Juhayman joined JSM (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 109). He quickly rose in the ranks and became an important and respected member of the group (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 109).

The group's membership probably consisted entirely of males (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107). Most members were young and unmarried (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107). Many were from marginalized communities; for example, many came from impoverished socioeconomic backgrounds (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107). Many were manual laborers (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 509).

Many of the group's members were not originally from Saudi Arabia; many were from Yemen and Egypt, and some others were from Kuwait, Pakistan, Iraq, and Sudan (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107, 113; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 509; American Foreign

Policy Council n.d.). Some had been estranged from their families (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 107). Other members were students (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 108).

Not much is known about the group's source of funding. It is likely that the group was self-sufficient as it is unlikely that the group received external support from other actors (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 509).

External Ties

JSM had ties to many religious scholars including 'Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, Abu Bakr al-Jaza'iri, and Nasr al-Din al-Albani (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 106; American Foreign Policy Council n.d.). The group regarded 'Abd al-Aziz bin Baz as their shaykh (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 106).

It is unlikely that the group had external ties to larger groups (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 509).

An early report by U.S. intelligence agents indicated that the group was affiliated to Iran; however, this claim was likely mistaken as the report also claimed that the group ascribed to Shia Islam, which is incorrect (New York Times 1979).

Group Outcome

After JSM members attacked the Grand Mosque and took the people inside hostage in the early morning of November 20, 1979, Saudi forces attempted to regain control of the Grand Mosque despite their reservations about using violence in such a holy place (American Foreign Policy Council n.d.). Due to the group's fierce resistance, the Saudis enlisted assistance from French commando units, and eventually regained control of the Grand Mosque on December 4 (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 113; Vox 2015). Saudi authorities executed some JSM members and imprisoned others depending on the suspects' suspected degree of involvement in the attack (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 113). JSM members who were not convicted for involvement in the attack fled to places like Kuwait and Yemen (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 113; American Foreign Policy Council n.d.). Others reintegrated themselves into normal civilian life in Saudi Arabia in cities like Riyadh, al-Zulfi, and al-Rass (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 113).

The group is no longer active. Due to the arrests and executions, the Saudi Arabian branch of JSM quickly dissolved (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 113). The JSM branch in Kuwait is believed to have operated until the 1980s (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 113).

The Saudi Arabian regime was shocked by the seizing of the Grand Mosque (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 113). The government interpreted the attack as the beginning of a dangerous center-seeking Wahhabi movement (Vox 2015). The government reasoned that the best course of action would be to crack down on all dissent, aggrandize the religious and political power of the regime, and to implement more conservative policies (Hegghammer and Lecroix 2007, 113; Vox 2015).

Notes for Iris:

- this is a one hit wonder of a larger insurgency
- the group's violent activities are rather ephemeral. After the Saudi and French seize the Mosque back, they arrest and execute people which quickly destroys the group.
- this group is really concentrated.
- this is one of the first Wahhabism Sunni groups.
- what is "rejectionist Islam?" group upset at less literal interpretation of the Koran and monarchy's less theocratic approach to handling day to day live
- what was the catalyst for becoming violent in 1979? Perception that socio-economic conditions changing too rapidly (maybe inspirational effect of 79 Revolution?)
- what is significance of November 79 in Islamic calendar? It was the New Year of the Islamic Calendar
- a lot of the group's members came from other countries but no evidence of fighting force
- primary membership comes from lower-income/impoverished communities
- the Saudi government initially blamed the Iranian government, but this was quickly discounted as they learned about the group's ideological and organizational history
- lots of Saudi media and so a number of CT/repression implemented in response to prevent any future instability ---> key for consolidating the monarchy's power