

Qatar Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 19 June 2019

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T28	AL QAEDA		1989	2012
T918	SOLDIERS OF GREATER SYRIA		1998	2005
T1424	MILITARY WING OF THE GREATER SYRIAN ARMY		2005	0
T9024	ORGANIZATION FOR THE RETURN OF LEGALITY		1996	1996

I. AL-QAEDA

Torg ID: 28

Min. Group Date: 1989

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qa'ida, Al Qaeda, Al Qaida, Al-Qa`Ida, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qa'idat Al-Jihad, The Base

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active) (Crenshaw 2015)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Al-Qaida was founded by Osama Bin Laden in 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's initial goals were to completely remove Western influence and ideas and to abolish the United States and Israel (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida attempts to achieve a state governed by sharia law and a conservative interpretation of Islam (FP 2012). They conducted their first attacks against the US embassy in Africa in 1998 (BAAD 2015; Global Security N.D). Al-Qaida first came to global attention after 9/11 but was active prior to that in its region (FAS 2005). The group has a radical Sunni Muslim ideology and ascribes to Salafi jihadist ideas (CFR 2012; Global Security n.d.; Blanchard 2007, 6).

Geography

Al-Qaida operated mainly within Peshawar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (CFR 2012; PBS N.D). The group hid within cities and hills with particularly mountainous terrain in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan (as shepherd or farmers) (FAS 2005). The group's leader Osama bin Laden had a base of operations in Sudan from 1991 to 1998 (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Organizational Structure

Al-Qaida was headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was the group's sole leader until his assassination in 2011 (CFR 2012). He was originally from Saudi Arabia and had helped fight the Soviets in Afghanistan (Crenshaw 2015). His father, Mohammed bin Laden, moved from southern Yemen to Saudi Arabia, where he worked his way up from being a menial laborer to gaining favor with the royal family and constructing palaces and mosques for King Faisal (The Guardian 2015; PBS 2001). Osama bin Laden was born in Saudi Arabia as one of fifty children (The Guardian 2015). After returning from a trip to Peshawar, Pakistan, he vocally advocated for support for the mujahideen (PBS 2001).

After collecting monetary donations for the mujahideen in Afghanistan, bin Laden first went to Afghanistan in 1982 and eventually fought in battles and established camps, which eventually attracted more Saudis to the country (PBS 2001). Eventually, bin Laden established Al-Qa'edah, or "The Base" as the center of his mujahideen operations. After the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan, bin Laden again went to Afghanistan (PBS 2001). He was unable to leave the country as he had been banned from travel for trying to spread jihad to Yemen (PBS 2001). In response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1991, bin Laden argued that all Arab mujahideen should be brought to defend the country (PBS 2001). Then, bin Laden learned that the United States would enter the conflict in Kuwait (PBS 2001). This was a turning point for bin Laden. He gathered religious support and led 4000 people to receive jihadist training in Afghanistan (PBS 2001). He spent a short while in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but eventually escaped from Saudi and Pakistani authorities to Sudan where he received temporary refuge (PBS 2001). In 1996, he left Sudan and returned to Afghanistan, where he conducted attacks against civilians and American forces on the Arabian Peninsula (PBS 2001). After the Taliban

took over the Afghan city of Jalalabad, bin Laden joined the group (PBS 2001). The Saudis and the U.S. tried unsuccessfully many times to kidnap bin Laden (PBS 2001). He was finally defeated when American Navy SEALs raided his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan (History 2018).

Following his death, he was replaced as leader by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2011 (Crenshaw 2015; CFR 2012). The group used a complex decentralized, or cell-based, organizational structure in which members reported to couriers who reported to other couriers eventually making their way up to the head (RAND 2008). Funding for the organization came from many places, including donations (FTO 2005). The group had different councils to deal with different aspects. For example, they had a “military committee” to deal with “military” matters, and a “consultation council” to plan out terrorist attacks and deal with financial matters (PBS 2001). They have no formal political wing (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida can be considered an umbrella group that consisted of many other terrorist groups within (ibid; Global Security n.d.). The organization had an estimated 75 members when it was first formed and up to 18,000 at its peak in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015). As of 2015, it is thought to have less than 1000 members, but these estimates vary wildly by source (Crenshaw 2015; BAAD 2015).

External Ties

Both the government of Saudi Arabia and the US Central Intelligence Agency allegedly provided money and supplies to the mujahideen during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan before al-Qaida formally organized (Crenshaw 2015). Some reports claim that the CIA itself sent more than \$600 million to mujahideen associated with bin Laden (Crenshaw 2015). Some reports allege that Saudi Arabia funded Al-Qaida through drug trafficking and diamonds, though these claims are now considered to have been falsified and invalid (Crenshaw 2015). Bin Laden maintained ties with key members of the Saudi royal family; some, including Prince Faisal, allegedly provided Al-Qaida with large monetary donations (Crenshaw 2015; CNN 2015). Iran also allegedly trained and supported AQ members in the early 1990s (ibid; BAAD 2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan allow Al-Qaida to operate training camps within their borders (ibid). The group has ties to several other terrorist organizations including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Jemaah Islamiya (CFR 2012; PBS 2001).

Group Outcome

The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to find and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements operating in Afghanistan (BAAD 2015). The group's first leader Osama bin Laden was killed during a U.S. raid in 2011 (CFR 2012; BAAD 2015). The group is still active today.

II. SOLDIERS OF GREATER SYRIA

Torg ID: 91800

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: NA

Aliases: Organization Of Soldiers Of The Levant, Army Of The Levant, Jund Al-Sham, Soldiers Of Greater Syria, Military Wing of the Greater Syrian Army, Tanzim Jund al-Sham lil-Jihad wal-Tawhid

Part 1. Bibliography

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Note: lots of groups called Jund al Sham.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Soldiers of Syria, Jund al-Sham for Tawhid and Jihad

Group Formation: 1999

Group End: 2005 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This seems to be an alias for TWTJ.

Geography

This seems to be an alias for TWTJ.

Organizational Structure

This seems to be an alias for TWTJ.

External Ties

This seems to be an alias for TWTJ.

Group Outcome

This seems to be an alias for TWTJ.

Note: this needs a separate torg id. It is different than the jund al sham in Lebanon

III. MILITARY WING OF THE GREATER SYRIAN ARMY

Torg ID: 1424

Min. Group Date: 2005

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Soldiers of Greater Syria, Jund al-Sham, Organization Of Soldiers Of The Levant, Army Of The Levant, Tanzim Jund al-Sham lil-Jihad wal-Tawhid

Group Formation: 1989/1990 - This is an alias for Jund al-Sham or the Greater Syrian Soldiers aka AQI (BBC, 21 March 2005).

Group End: 2015 (active) - This is an alias for Jund al-Sham or the Greater Syrian Soldiers (BBC, 21 March 2005).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for Jund al-Sham or the Greater Syrian Soldiers aka AQI (BBC, 21 March 2005).

Geography

This is an alias for Jund al-Sham or the Greater Syrian Soldiers aka AQI(BBC, 21 March 2005).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for Jund al-Sham or the Greater Syrian Soldiers aka AQI(BBC, 21 March 2005).

External Ties

This is an alias for Jund al-Sham or the Greater Syrian Soldiers aka AQI (BBC, 21 March 2005).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for Jund al-Sham or the Greater Syrian Soldiers aka AQI (BBC, 21 March 2005).

IV. ORGANIZATION FOR THE RETURN OF LEGALITY

Torg ID: 9024

Min. Group Date: 1996
Max. Group Date: 1996
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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 - "Organization for the return of legality" qatar
 - Organization for the return of legality passport office
 - Doha passport office qatar bombing
 - Qatar bombing (date: 10/1/1996-10/31/1996)

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 1996

Group End: 1996 (GTD 2018). During a trial, seven people were charged with planting a bomb at the passport office in Doha, the capital of Qatar (Amnesty International 1999). Five of them were sentenced to ten years of imprisonment, one was sentenced to three years of imprisonment, and one was acquitted (Amnesty International 1999).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is no information on when the group formed, but it first came to attention for a violent attack when it planted a bomb at the government's passport office in Doha in October 1996 (GTD 2018; Amnesty International 1999). The bomb did not detonate and authorities were able to locate and identify the explosive (The New Arab 2018).

In February of 1996, there was a failed coup attempt aimed at overthrowing Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (The New Arab 2018). Later, in October of 1996, Sheikh Hamad allegedly financed plans to conduct bombings in the capital of city of Doha, including the failed attempt at the passport office, and attribute it to a previously unknown rebel group (The New Arab 2018). Sheikh Hamad probably resorted to this tactic to show the dangers of the rebel groups, maintain his power, and decrease the popularity of the rebel groups.

Geography

The group most likely operated from Qatar as they were supposed political opponents of the government (Amnesty International 1999).

Organizational Structure

There is no information about the group's organization structure. Former Qatari intelligence officer stated that he received \$265,000 from Sheikh Hamad to carry out the bombings against government institutions (The New Arab 2018).

External Ties

There is no information about the group's external ties. There are allegations the group was funded by the Qatar government.

Group Outcome

After the government found that the Organization for the Return of Legality had planted a bomb at the passport office in Doha, there was a trial finding six of the seven initially charged people guilty (Amnesty International 1999). However, there is scrutiny surrounding this trial because there is evidence suggesting that torture methods, both physical and psychological were used, in order to gain confessions (Amnesty International 1999). This suggests that the supposed rebels responsible for the attack may not have really been associated with the plan but were instead part of Sheikh Hamad's cover up plan for the bombings of Doha he had financed. After the group members were sentenced to imprisonment, there was no evidence of any attacks (GTD 2018).