

Nigeria, Part 1 Cases: 1991-1999

Last Updated: 13 June 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T1426	MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT		1991	1995
T1776	KATSINA MUSLIM SOCIETY		1991	1991
T951	ODUA PEOPLE'S CONGRESS		1995	2011
T2114	FEDERATED NIGER DELTA IJAW COMMUNITIES (FNDIC)		1997	0
T2476	ITSEKIRI		1997	2004
T849	IJAW YOUTH MOVEMENT		1998	0
T1105	IJAW MILITANTS		1999	2005
T2297	EGBESU YOUTHS OF THE BAYELSA		1999	1999
T2266	ASSOCIATION OF MOBIL SPILL AFFECTED COMMUNITIES (AMSAC)		1999	1999
T2372	MOVEMENT FOR THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF BIAFRA		1999	2007
T2561	BAKASSI BOYS		2000	2005
T825	AL-SUNNA WAL JAMMA	2004	2001	2004
T211	HISBA		2001	0
T784	PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP)		2001	2006
T2296	EGBEMA NATIONAL FRONT		2003	2003
T1207	NIGER DELTA PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEER FORCE	2004	2003	2009
T2397	NIGER DELTA VIGILANTES		2003	2012
T2280	BINI-ORU		2003	2003
T2115	THE JOINT REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL		2004	2010

T2113	COALITION FOR MILITANT ACTION IN THE NIGER DELTA (COMA)		2005	0
T2127	NIGER DELTA FRONTIER FORCE		2006	0
T2120	WNDVF		2006	0
T2316	GUGAMA YOUTH FEDERATION		2006	2006
T1184	MOVEMENT FOR EMANCIPATION OF NIGER DELTA (MEND)		2006	2012
T2495	NIGER DELTA FREEDOM FIGHTERS (NDDF)		2008	2008
T2164	JAMAATU AHLIS SUNNAH LADDAAWATIH WAL-JIHAD (BOKO HARAM)	2009	2009	2012
T2538	URHOBO REVOLUTIONARY ARMY		2009	2009
T2488	NIGER DELTA LIBERATION FORCE		2010	2010
T1698	DELTA DEMOCRATIC MILITIA		2011	2011
T2693	NATIONAL UNION OF ROAD TRANSPORT WORKERS-TOKYO FACTION		2011	2011
T2626	ANSARU (JAMA'ATU ANSARUL MUSLIMINA FI BILADIS SUDAN)		2011	2012
T2692	NURTW-AUXILIARY		2011	2011

I. MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

Min. Group Date: 1991

Max. Group Date: 1995

Onset: NA

Aliases: Movement For Democracy And Development (Mdd), Mouvement Pour La Democratie Et Le Developpement, Movement For Development And Democracy

Part 1. Bibliography

- Canada IRB, "Chad: Information on factions within the Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD), including the faction led by Moussa Medella and the factions that supported the peace negotiations and signed the peace accord and those that did not," 1997, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aaf6ab.html>
- Canada IRB, "Chad: Movement for Development and Democracy, including a brief history, its founders and current leaders, various factions of MDD, profile of its

supporters, its political ideology, its organizational structure, its presence within and outside Chad and whether peace accords have been signed by MDD and if so, by which factions,” 1998, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6acf814.html>

- Canada IRB, 1999, “Any connection between the Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD), and Youssouf Togoimi and his Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT); date of the foundation of MDJT [TCD32956.E],” https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/196304/314980_de.html
- “Chad: Country Profile,” U.S. State Department, n.d., <http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/chad/101210.htm>
- “Chad: 1960-Present,” University of Central Arkansas DADM Project, <http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1991

Group End (Outcome): 1996 (peace agreement)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

MDD formed on October 15, 1991, seeking to overthrow the Idriss Deby regime. It operated out of the Lake Chad region in Chad and its leaders were Goukouni Guet, Hussein Habre, and Moussa Medella, who had previously been involved in the rebellion (Canada IRB 1998). It gained attention for its first violent attack against Chad in December 1991 (UCA DADM Project n.d.).

Geography

The group was transnational and operated in and around the Lake Chad area (UCA DADM Project n.d.; Canada IRB 1998). It had an international base of operations in Nigeria (UCA DADM Project n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The group purports to have a membership of several different ethnic groups and religions across regions in Chad (UCA DADM Project n.d.).

External Ties

The group maintains external bases and political representatives today to provide the group greater legitimacy in “Libya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Congo Brazzaville, Nigeria, Sudan, Cameroon, Paris, London and Amsterdam” (Canada IRB 1998). The group formed an alliance with the MDJT around 1998 (Canada IRB 1999).

Group Outcome

The group fragmented in 1992 into the MDD-FANT, which was led by Habre, and the MDD-FAO, led by Medella (Canada IRB 1998). The government signed a peace agreement with the group in 1992, though it ultimately failed, as government forces attacked the MDD-FAO in Lake Chad (Canada IRB 1998). Additional meetings led to a peace agreement between the government and the MDD in 1995 (UCA DADM Project n.d.). Peace talks in 1996 led to a second peace agreement between the government and Medella’s faction (MDD-FAO) (Canada IRB 1997).

II. KATSINA MUSLIM SOCIETY

Min. Group Date: 1991

Max. Group Date: 1991

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 1989, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1989>
- Searched proquest:
 - “Katsina muslim society”
 - Katsina muslim society nigeria
- Searched Lexis:
 - “Katsina muslim society”
 - Katsina muslim society nigeria
- Searched Google:
 - “Katsina muslim society”
 - Katsina muslim society nigeria
- Searched gScholar:
 - “Katsina muslim society”
 - Katsina muslim society nigeria

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1991

Group End: 1991 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Relatively little is known about the group. It first galvanized attention for one violent attack against a government newspaper in Katsina in 1991 (GTD 2016). There is no additional information available about the group's goal, organization, alliances, or outcome.

Geography

The group's attacks occur in Katsina, Nigeria (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

Relatively little is known about the group. It first galvanized attention for one violent attack against a government newspaper in Katsina in 1991 (GTD 2016). There is no additional information available about the group's goal, organization, alliances, or outcome.

External Ties

Relatively little is known about the group. It first galvanized attention for one violent attack against a government newspaper in Katsina in 1991 (GTD 2016). There is no additional information available about the group's goal, organization, alliances, or outcome.

Group Outcome

Relatively little is known about the group. It first galvanized attention for one violent attack against a government newspaper in Katsina in 1991 (GTD 2016). There is no additional information available about the group's goal, organization, alliances, or outcome.

- III. ODUWA PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
Min. Group Date: 1995
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: Odua Peoples' Congress (Opc), O odua Peoples Congress, Odua Peoples Congress, Odudua Peoples Congress, Oduduwa Peoples Congress, Oodua Peoples Congress, Yoruba O'odua Peoples' Congress, Yoruba Oodua Peoples Congress (Opc)

Part 1. Bibliography

- “The O’odua People’s Congress (OPC): Fighting Violence with Violence.” 2003. Human Rights Watch.
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/02/28/oodua-peoples-congress-opc/fighting-violence-violence>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nigeria: Oodua People's Congress (OPC); leadership, membership, activities, and treatment by authorities (January 2005 - February 2006), 16 February 2006, NGA101048.E, available at:
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/45f1478a2f.html>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nigeria: Information on the O'odua People's Congress (OPC), including the methods of recruitment and the selection of members; implications of being a member and the consequences of refusing to join (2003-May 2005), 9 June 2005, NGA100078.E, available at:
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/440ed7342.html>
- “Oodua People’s Congress.” Para-Military Groups Africa. Global Security. N.D.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/yoruba.htm>
- IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: The Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), including when formed, leaders, aims, ethnicity, treatment of members and when it first came into conflict with the government authorities [NGA32576.E], 26. August 1999 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
- http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/188556/306595_de.html
- Yusuf Abdulazeez. 2013. O'odua People's Congress and the Changes in Nigeria's Political and Security Structures, *Social Movement Studies*, 12:2, 235-243,
- Yvan Guichaoua. 2006. “The Making of an Ethnic Militia: The Oodua People’s Congress in Nigeria.” Working Paper No. 26. Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity.
- Ed. Nicolas Florquin and Eric Berman. “Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities.” *Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region*. 2005. Small Arms Survey. p. 330.
<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-01-Armed-and-Aimless/SAS-Armed-Aimless-1-Full-manuscript.pdf>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nigeria: Location of branches of the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) other than in the states of Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Kwara, Lagos, and Kogi; reports of violence involving the OPC in non-Yoruba areas, including the states of Abia and Cross Rivers (January - August 2001) , 24 August 2001, NGA37708.E , available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3df4be828.html>

- GTD Perpetrator 20342, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20342>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Oodua Liberation Movement (OLM); Revolutionary Council of Nigeria

Group Formation: 1994

Group End: 2017 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The OPC formed in August 1994 in response to the government's cancellation of a 1993 Nigerian election in which a Yoruba candidate was the likely winner (Human Rights Watch 2003; Florquin and Berman 2005, 330). The organization has an ethno-nationalist ideology, and claims that their motive is to safeguard the Yoruba culture and language. The OPC seeks autonomy for the Yoruba people, though it is not clear whether their political objective is the formation of a separate state or autonomy under the existing Nigerian government (Human Rights Watch 2003). The OPC's first attack is not officially recorded, though by 1999 they had engaged in several violent clashes with the police and other ethnic groups (Human Rights Watch 2003).

Geography

The OPC has bases in southwest Nigeria, which has a tropical savanna environment, including: Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Kwara, Lagos, and Kogi (Canada IRB 2001). A majority of attacks and clashes occur with the police in Yoruba areas like Ikorodu and Lagos (GTD 2016). Some records do suggest that the OPC was also active in Llorin, the capital of Kwara, around October and November 2000 (Canada IRB 2001). The OPC is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

The OPC has several leaders, one of which was Dr. Frederick Fasehun, a doctor with no prior political experience (Human Rights Watch 2003). In 1999, the OPC formed two distinct wings, the moderate wing, which was led by Fasehun and was willing to engage in politics. The more radical wing was led by Gani Adams, a previous carpenter, and frequently used violence (ibid.; Florquin and Berman 2005, 330). The leaders of the OPC tend to have a higher level of education and political experience, while the members have minimum education and are typically young, unemployed men (ibid.). A majority of

OPC members are Yoruba. While it is not clear if the OPC collects fees from regular members, Yoruba politicians that use their OPC membership as a platform to gain support have to pay the group (Florquin and Berman 2005, 330). The group is organized into a hierarchy composed of branches, zones, and wings. The Annual National Conference is at the forefront of all major group decisions, and the National Executive Council is its governing body (Human Rights Watch 2003). There are various estimates of the OPC's size, but most agree that each of the 20 battalions or zones has approximately 200 men (Florquin and Berman 2005, 330). It's unknown how many battalions there are.

External Ties

Many local governments in Yoruba majority areas hire the OPC as a vigilante justice organization (Canada IRB 2006). In addition, Yoruba politicians that want to use OPC membership as a platform to gain support have to pay the group (Florquin and Berman 2005, 330; Canada IRB 2006). The governor of Lagos allegedly hired the OPC to ensure his 2003 victory (Florquin and Berman 2005 p.330). In 1999, the OPC split into two opposing wings, a moderate wing led by its founder Fasehun, and a radical militant wing, which was led by Gani Adams (also known as the Oodua Liberation Movement, or the Revolutionary Council of Nigeria) (ibid; Global Security N.D).

Group Outcome

A government anti-crime force called "Operation Sweep" in December 1998 in Bariga, Lagos resulted in the death of four members of the OPC (Global Security N.D). In 1999, the Nigerian government banned the OPC, and ordered police officers to shoot on sight. This resulted in a series of violent confrontations in Yoruba territory (Canada IRB 2006). It was finally in November 2005 that both of the group's leaders were arrested by the Nigerian police (ibid.). The group is still active in Yoruba politics, though nonetheless is suspected of being involved in conflicts and corruption as recently as 2014 (GTD 2016).

IV. FEDERATED NIGER DELTA IJAW COMMUNITIES (FNDIC)

Min. Group Date: 1997

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (Fndic), Federated Niger-Delta Ijaw Communities (Fndic)

Part 1. Bibliography

- Human Rights Watch, Nigeria: The Warri Crisis: Fueling Violence, 17 December 2003, A1518, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/402f6e7d4.html>
- Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, Nigeria: 1. Please provide information on the Ijaw group - not necessarily the ethnic group, 8 January 2009, NGA34249, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b6fe2b80.html>

- International Crisis Group (ICG), The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria's Delta Unrest, 3 August 2006, Africa Report N°115, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/44e9a07a4.html>
- Ed. Nicolas Florquin and Eric Berman. "Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities." Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region. 2005. Small Arms Survey. p. 334. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-01-Armed-and-Aimless/SAS-Armed-Aimless-1-Full-manuscript.pdf>
- Tomas Malina. "Niger Delta." International Security. Ridgeway Research Center. 2010. <http://research.ridgeway.pitt.edu/blog/2010/03/15/niger-delta/>
- "Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)." Para-Military Groups Africa. Global Security. N.D. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mend.html>
- Reuben Kendrick Udo, J.F Ade Ajayi, Anthony Kirk-Greene, Toyin Falola "Nigeria: Climate." Encyclopedia Britannica. 2017. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria#toc55281>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Western MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta)

Group Formation: 1997

Group End: 2005 (merger with MEND)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The FNDIC formed in 1997 following constant conflicts between the Ijaw and other ethnic groups (Florquin and Berman 2005 p.334). Their first official violent confrontation occurred with government forces on March 12, 2003 (Human Rights Watch 2003). Politically the group wants the Ijaw people to regain control over the Warri area from the Nigerian government and the oil industry (Malina 2010). They have an ethno-nationalist ideology as they fight on behalf of the Ijaw people (Florquin and Berman 2005, 334).

Geography

The FNDIC has bases and attacks in the southern coastal regions of the Niger Delta area, specifically in: Oporoza, Eghoro, Oghoye, Ogidigben Ajudaibo Ugbogwugwu, Akpakpa, Ugogoro Ajakosogbo, Ugbogbodu, Deghole, Utonlila, Wakeno, Tobu, and Kolokolo (Florquin and Berman 2005 p.334). The Niger Delta Area has forest swamps and has a wetland environment in general (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2017). The FNDIC is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

The political face of the FNDIC is Oboko Bello, the Ijaw chief who called for the formation of the group in 1997 (Malina, 2010). The military leader of the group is Tom Polo, who was formerly an oil industry employee (ibid). In 2003, it was estimated that the FNDIC was composed of 3,000 young people (Florquin and Berman 2005 p. 334). A majority of the FNDIC comes from the Ijaw ethnic group (ibid; Malina, 2010). No information could be found about additional wings. The FNDIC draws its financial support from many Ijaw in the Delta state (Florquin and Berman 2005 p. 334).

External Ties

The FNDIC formed a coalition with several other militant groups like the Outlaws and the Niger Delta Strike Force, of which they are considered the western division (Malina, 2010). Much of the support for the group comes from Ijaw in Delta state (Florquin Burman 2005 p.334). Governor Emmanuel Udueghan has allegedly provided “political patronage” to the FDNIC, which possibly included financial support (Malina, 2010).

Group Outcome

Their first violent attack was conducted on March 12, 2003, against government forces, though it was also their last documented independent attack (Human Rights Watch 2003). When MEND formed in 2005, it merged with the FNDIC (Global Security N.D). Since the FNDIC now operates under the MEND umbrella, the outcome of the individual group is uncertain. In 2009, the Nigerian government created an amnesty program which cued MEND’s official ceasefire (ibid). However, during a time of political instability in 2010, MEND’s ceasefire ended. The MEND group has been active as of 2014 (Malina, 2010; GTD 2016).

- V. ITSEKIRI
Min. Group Date: 1997
Max. Group Date: 2004
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nigeria: The conflict between Itsekiri and Ijaw ethnic groups in Warri, Delta region (March 1997-September 1999), 14 September 1999, NGA32676.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad6864.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: NA

Group End: NA

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an ethnic group in Nigeria and not an armed group (Canada IRB 1999).

Geography

This is an ethnic group in Nigeria and not an armed group (Canada IRB 1999).

Organizational Structure

This is an ethnic group in Nigeria and not an armed group (Canada IRB 1999).

External Ties

This is an ethnic group in Nigeria and not an armed group (Canada IRB 1999).

Group Outcome

This is an ethnic group in Nigeria and not an armed group (Canada IRB 1999).

VI. IJAW YOUTH MOVEMENT

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Iduwini Youths, Ijaw Youth Movement,

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Ijaw Youth Movement" Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4490, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ojNFiiZwS-ITJ4QFt1I5qteYdZgQfochJ4ZkKaT7GyY/edit>

- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nigeria: The Ijaw Youth Movement (IYM); date founded, names of executive members, location of headquarters, description of membership cards and its relationship to the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and the Egbesu Boys; information on IYC membership cards (1999-2000) , 24 December 2003, NGA42304.E , available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/403dd20a14.html>
- "Background: Kaiama Declaration." Crackdown in the Niger Delta. Human Rights Watch. 1999. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria2/Ngria993-02.htm>
- "Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force/Egbesu Boys/Ijaw National Congress/Ijaw Youth Congress." Global Security. N.D. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ijaw.htm>
- "Nigeria: Ijaw Ethnic Youth Group Calls on Government to Withdraw Police." 2002.BBC Monitoring Africa - Political, Feb 06, 1. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/450361347?accountid=14026>.
- "Nigeria: Youth, Former Militants Discuss Rehabilitation Under Amnesty Programme." 2010.BBC Monitoring Africa, Jan 12. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/458479683?accountid=14026>.
- "Buhari Divides Ijaw Youth Council." AllAfrica.Com, Apr 05, 2015. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1669766737?accountid=14026>.
- Ed. Nicolas Florquin and Eric Berman. "Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities." Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region. 2005. Small Arms Survey. p. 334. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-01-Armed-and-Aimless/SAS-Armed-Aimless-1-Full-manuscript.pdf>
- Augustine Ikelegbe. "Beyond the Threshold of Civil Struggle: Youth Militancy and the Militia-ization of the resource conflicts in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria." African Study Monographs.2006. Departmental Bulletin Paper. p. 110, https://repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2433/68251/1/ASM_27_87.pdf
- Austin Obinna Ezejiofor. "The Option of Death, Egbesu and the Narrative of Protection: Empirical Evidence from Ijaw Armed Group Fighters in the Niger Delta of Nigeria." 2016. p. 3. [http://www.ijhssi.org/papers/v5\(9\)/version-3/D0593026032.pdf](http://www.ijhssi.org/papers/v5(9)/version-3/D0593026032.pdf)

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Ijaw Youth Congress, Ijaw Youth Council, Iduwini Youths, Iduwini National Movement for Peace and Development (INMPD)

Group Formation: 1998

Group End: 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The IYC formed on December 11, 1998, after a meeting of 5,000 youths from 25 different groups in Bayelsa state (Human Rights Watch 1999; Florquin and Berman 2005 p.335). It was established as an umbrella organization for youth groups fighting for the Ijaw people fighting for autonomy over their land and resources (ibid). The IYC has an ethno-nationalist ideology. Their first violent attack occurred after government attacks on the Ijaw region in January 1999 (Ikelegbe 2006 p.110).

Geography

The group has bases and operates in the region between Delta State and Bayelsa in Southern Nigeria (MIPT 2008). In January 1999 the Egbesu Boys, a group associated with the IYC, attacked police and military in Kaiama and Odi (Ikelegbe 2006 p.110). The IYC is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

The IYC was initially led by seven college students with non-violent aims until Alhaji Asari Dokubo, a failed politician turned activist, became its leader in 2001 (Ikelegbe 2006 p 24). Under the national executive, the group has three zonal executives for the East, Central, and Western areas (ibid). Since the IYC encompasses several different organizations, their number is unknown (MIPT 2008). A majority of their members are young Ijaw men. Some sources consider the group to be the armed or youth wing of the Iduwini National Movement for Peace and Development (INMPD) (MIPT 2008).

Some sources say that the Egbesu Boys are the militia wing of the IYC (Ikelegbe 2006 p. 110, Canada IRB 2003). Others argue the groups have no clear relationship, but fight for the same cause and have the same origin story (Florquin and Berman 2005 p. 335).

External Ties

The IYC openly voices its support for other organizations with ethno-nationalistic ideologies like the OPC and MOSOP (Global Security n.d). The group itself serves as an umbrella organization for a coalition of Ijaw youth groups (Ikelegbe 2006 p.110). Some say that the Egbesu Boys are the militia wing of the IYC (Ikelegbe 2006 p. 110, Canada IRB 2003). Others argue the groups have no clear relationship but fight for the same cause, and have the same origin story (Florquin and Berman 2005 p. 335).

Group Outcome

In reaction to the group's non-violent protests in 1988, the government struck down several Ijaw youths and communities like Umuechem in Rivers State and Odi in Bayelsa State (Ezejiolor 2016 p.3). In response to the government's action, the IYC initiated

Operation Warfare and in January 1999, the Egbesu Boys attacked military and police forces in Kaiama and Odi (Ikelegbe 2006 p.110). In 2000, the group began to mainly demonstrate through protests and rallies in Ijaw areas (ibid). On January 11, 2010, the government called a meeting with former IYC members in an attempt to establish an amnesty program (BBC 2010). Then, in the 2015 Nigerian election, Ijaw candidate Jonathan Goodluck lost to General Buhari, which sparked a faction of the IYC to retaliate (All Africa 2015). The group is active and visible as of 2016.

VII. IJAW MILITANTS
Min. Group Date: 1999
Max. Group Date: 2005
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: NA

Group End: NA

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is descriptive and not the name of an armed group.

Geography

This is descriptive and not the name of an armed group.

Organizational Structure

This is descriptive and not the name of an armed group.

External Ties

This is descriptive and not the name of an armed group.

Group Outcome

This is descriptive and not the name of an armed group.

VIII. EGBESU YOUTHS OF THE BAYELSA

Min. Group Date: 1999

Max. Group Date: 1999

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Nigeria: Information on the "Egbesu Boys of Africa" and the "Niger Delta Volunteer Force", 14 January 2000, NGA00002.ZSF, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6a424.html>
- IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Egbesu "Boys" or "cult" including membership requirements; whether forced recruitment is practiced and, if so, whether a person can move within Nigeria to avoid this group [NGA34309.E], 25. Mai 2000 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
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- Rory Carroll, Africa correspondent. 2004. "Rebels Threaten Nigeria's Oil Wells." The Guardian, Sep 25, 17. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/246220239?accountid=14026>.
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Egbeseu Boys, Egbesu Boys of Africa

Group Formation: 1998

Group End: 2005 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The specifics of how the group formed is unknown, but it was established around December 1998 when the IYC was created (Florquin Berman 2005 335). It was known as a splinter or branch of the IYC and its first violent attack occurred in January 1999 in response to aggressive government presence in the region (Ikelegbe 2006 p. 24). It's political agenda and ideological beliefs align with the IYC's which calls for the Ijaw peoples to have control over their native territory and resources. It has an ethno-nationalistic ideology. (Florquin and Berman 2005 p. 335). However, the EBA specifically teaches that its support comes from Egbesu, a traditional Ijaw war god (ibid).

Geography

The EBA operates in the Niger Delta Region in the following southeastern states: Ondo, Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, and Akwa Ibom (Canada IRB 2006). Their main base is in Amabulou in Bayelsa State and they usually work in a swamp environment (ibid). They are not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

The EBA leader Alex Preye died in 2001, and no one ever officially took his place thereafter (ibid). In 2003, the chief priest at the Egbesu shrine gave guidance to the group, and his assistants were the group's executives (Canada IRB 2006). The majority of the members are unemployed Ijaw youth (Florquin and Berman 2005, 336). Some sources say that the Egbesu Boys are the militia wing of the IYC (Ikelegbe 2006 p. 110, Canada IRB 2003). Others argue the groups have no clear relationship, but fight for the same cause and have the same origin story (Florquin and Berman 2005 p. 335). It is difficult to find accurate estimates of their size, since members could come and go and like several other Ijaw youth groups the EBA lacks organization (Canada IRB 2006; US BCIS 2000).

External Ties

Some sources say that the Egbesu Boys are the militia wing of the IYC (Ikelegbe 2006 p. 110, Canada IRB 2003). Others argue the groups have no clear relationship but fight for the same cause and have the same origin story (Florquin and Berman 2005 p. 335). While no explicit connections could be found, sources claim that the EBA was often allegedly hired by “political leaders” for assassinations and various acts of violence (Canada IRB 2006). In return, they received weapons and monetary support (ibid). They also gained funds from selling oil siphoned from other organization’s pipes (ibid).

Group Outcome

Their last attack could not be found because the group’s members tend to act with other militant organizations and lacked organization after the death of their official leader in 2001 (Canada IRB 2006). The group disappeared for several reasons, one being their leader’s death, the other being members leaving to join more powerful organizations and members joining organized crime groups (Florquin Berman 2005 336).

- IX. ASSOCIATION OF MOBIL SPILL AFFECTED COMMUNITIES (AMSAC)
Min. Group Date: 1999
Max. Group Date: 1999
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1999

Group End: 1999 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In April 1999, AMSAC formed in response to the Mobil Oil Spill (BBC 1999). Their first attack occurred on April 5, 1999, when they took control of oil company facilities (GTD 2016). They have no specific political or ideological goals, but they want compensation from Mobil for the environmental effects of the spill (BBC 1999). There is no politicized opposition.

Geography

The members of the group come from the coast of Akwa Ibom state in the Niger delta region (BBC 1999). The location of their first attack on April 5, 1999 is unknown (GTD 2016). There is no evidence that this group is transnational.

Organizational Structure

The AMSAC says it represents 61 communities, though it is mainly comprised of fishermen (IRIN 1999)

External Ties

No information could be found on external support or ties to other groups.

Group Outcome

No information could be found on the group or actions taken against them after their first attack. Their only known attack was in 1999 (GTD 2016).

X. MOVEMENT FOR THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF BIAFRA

Min. Group Date: 1999

Max. Group Date: 2007

Onset: NA

Aliases: Movement For The Actualization Of The Sovereign State Of Biafra (Massob), Massob, Movement For Actualization Of The Sovereign State Of Biafra, Movement For Actualization Of The Sovereign State Of Biafra (Massob), Movement For The Actualization Of The Sovereign State Of Biafra

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: no recommended changes

Group Formation: 1999

Group End: 2014 (Stopped Using Violence)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The MASSOB was created in 1999 as an attempt to reinstate the previous Igbo state of Biafra after its loss in the Biafra War (Ireland RDC 2011). The group has an

ethno-nationalist ideology with separatist goals for southeastern Nigeria (Ireland RDC 2011). It claims to be a nonviolent organization, but its first violent attack happened against the police in December 17, 2001 (GTD 2016)

Geography

The main base of MASSOB can be found in Imo State. They are suspected of violent activity mainly in areas of southern Nigeria, such as Abia and Enugu (Canada IRB 2005; GTD 2016). The group is also suspected of attacks in Onitsha, Port Harcourt, and Enugu (GTD 2016). MASSOB claims to have members in other nations, but has no records of violence or bases outside of Nigeria, and is thus not considered transnational (Canada IRB 2005; *ibid*).

Organizational Structure

The leader of MASSOB is Ralph Uwazuruike, who was a lawyer prior to starting the group (Ireland RDC 2011). Uwazuruike says the group is organized into a hierarchy and only operates on a political level (*ibid*). The exact number of members is unknown but according to the number arrested it seems to have more than 1,000 members (Canada IRB 2002; Ireland RDC 2009). Even though the group claims to have 7.5 million members both inside and outside of Nigeria's borders, this number references the Igbo population (Ireland RDC 2011; Canada IRB 2005). Though all MASSOB members are Igbo, not all Igbo groups associate themselves with MASSOB (Canada IRB 2000). The group is reported to have a women's wing (*ibid*).

External Ties

MASSOB claims to have support from several pro-Biafra groups outside of Nigeria, but there is no evidence of explicit financial support (Canada IRB 2005). Many Igbo organizations choose to disassociate themselves from MASSOB, such as the umbrella group Ohanize Ndigbo, because they do not want a separate state (Canada IRB 2000).

Group Outcome

The state has repeatedly taken aggressive actions toward MASSOB leaders and some outspoken members. The state has arrested and killed group members, as being associated with the Biafra cause is considered treasonous (Ireland RDC 2009). Police activity against the group happened between 1999 and 2002 (Canada IRB 2000; Canada IRB 2002).

In early 2004, MASSOB sympathizers were arrested, and a manhunt for MASSOB affiliates was called for by the Nigerian government (Ireland RDC 2009). The last violent incident the group is suspected of being involved with occurred in 2014 (GTD 2016).

MASSOB is still an active political group but insists that it is and has always been non-violent contrary to the Nigerian government's claim (Canada IRB 2005).

Nigeria Part 2 Cases: 2000-2005
Last Updated: 30 June 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T2561	BAKASSI BOYS		2000	2005
T825	AL-SUNNA WAL JAMMA	2004	2001	2004
T211	HISBA		2001	0
T784	PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP)		2001	2006
T2296	EGBEMA NATIONAL FRONT		2003	2003
T1207	NIGER DELTA PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEER FORCE	2004	2003	2009
T2397	NIGER DELTA VIGILANTES		2003	2012
T2280	BINI-ORU		2003	2003
T2115	THE JOINT REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL		2004	2010
T2113	COALITION FOR MILITANT ACTION IN THE NIGER DELTA (COMA)		2005	0

- I. BAKASSI BOYS
 Min. Group Date: 2000
 Max. Group Date: 2005
 Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-01-Armed-and-Aimless/SAS-Armed-Aimless-1-Full-manuscript.pdf>

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Anambra State Vigilante Service (AVS) Abia State Vigilante Service (AVS) Imo State Vigilante Service (IVS) ASMATA Boys

Group Formation: 1999 (Economist 2001; Canada IRB 2002)

Group End: 2005 (Disappearance)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In 1999, Uzbor Kalu, the governor of Abia, established the Bakassi Boys as an official task force against crime in the area (Economist 2001; Canada IRB 2002). Prior to this, they worked as a loose knit youth vigilante group formed by traders in 1998 within the city of Aba (Florquin and Berman 2005, 332; Canada IRB 2006). Prior to 1999, the youth group had no centralized organization. In November 2000, the group came to public attention for the assassination of prophet Eddie Okeke, who they believed to be a high profile criminal (HRW 2002). They have no specific ideology, but seem to operate on

cult-like beliefs (Canada IRB 2006). The group acts as a paramilitary force against organized crime in the Abia areas on the government's behalf (Canada IRB 2002).

Geography

The base of the Bakassi Boys was initially in Aba, Abia State but as of 2005 the group was active in Abia, Imo, and Anambra provinces (Florquin and Berman 2005, 332; Canada IRB 2006). In 2002, members of the group were ambushed by armed robbers in Onitsha, Anambra State (All Africa 2002). The Bakassi Boys are not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

The first leader of the Bakassi Boys was chairman Gilbert Okoye (Florquin and Berman 2005, 332). His background is unknown, but he was most likely a youth who led the organization when it formed (Florquin and Berman 2005, 332). Information about the individual wings of the Bakassi Boys is unknown, and there is no evidence of a formal political wing. The group is organized as a clear hierarchy with an explicit chain of command governing individual factions (Canada IRB 2006). Groups in various areas of southeastern Nigeria adopt the organization's name, which makes it difficult to track its size (ibid). At one point, funding for the Bakassi Boys came from the governments of Abia, Imo, and Anambra, which gave the group offices, uniforms, transportation, and individual salaries (Florquin and Berman 2005, 332; Canada IRB 2006). Traders in the area and other institutions also pay a tax which funds the Bakassi Boys (ibid).

External Ties

The Anambra state government has demonstrated explicit support to the Bakassi Boys and has sanctioned them as a state vigilante service in August 2000 (Florquin and Berman 2005, 332). The governor of Anambra Chinwoke Mbadinuju allegedly hired the group to murder not just criminals but even an opposing politician (The Economist 2001; Canada IRB 2002). At one point funding for the Bakassi Boys came from the governments of Abia, Imo, and Anambra, which gave the group offices, uniforms, transportation, and individual salaries (Florquin and Berman 2005, 332; Canada IRB 2006).

Group Outcome

From 2001-2002, public opinion began to turn against the group due to its brutal tactics and operations (HRW 2002). In 2002, the Nigerian government supposedly repressed the Bakassi Boys, which were also known as the Anambra State Vigilante Service (Canada IRB 2006). However the group persisted with the local Anambra governor's support until 2003 following his failed re-election (Florquin and Berman 2005, 332). In

August 2005, the police arrested seventeen supposed Bakassi Boys members in connection to deaths in Abia State (Canada IRB 2006). Then, in December of the same year, fourteen members were brought to federal high court (ibid). After 2005, the group has been inactive (Florquin and Berman 2005, 332).

- II. AL-SUNNA WAL JAMMA
Min. Group Date: 2001
Max. Group Date: 2004
Onset: 2004

Aliases: Al-Sunna Wal Jamma, Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa, Followers Of The Prophet

Note: The relationship between this group and Boko Haram looks murky. Please pay careful attention to external ties, leadership, and group outcome measures.

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: (Nigerian) Taleban

Group Formation: 1995

Group End: 2017 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Al-Sunna Wal Jamma was created in 2002 by Maiduguri University students (Florquin and Berman 2005, 339; Global Security, N.D). The group may have existed in an earlier form beginning in 1995 when it was led by Abubakah Lawan under the name Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah Hijra (Connell 2012).

In December 2003, the group had its first violent incident in response to government attempts to disband the organization (Florquin and Berman 2005, 339). Al-Sunna Wal Jamma is center-seeking, because it wants to turn Nigeria into an Islamic state that follows Islamic fundamentalist principles. It has a Salafi jihadist ideology (Global Security N.D).

Geography

In 2003, the group attacked Geidam, Kannamma, and Damaturu in Yobe (Florquin and Berman 2005, 339; Global Security N.D). They also fought just outside Maiduguri's borders which is around 135 kilometers east of Damaturu (ibid). Al-Sunna Wal Jamma is suspected of being involved in an attack on the police in Kala-Balge as well (GTD 2016). Sources claim a September 2004 attack by the group can be traced to Niger, suggesting that the group might be transnational (Global Security N.D).

Organizational Structure

In 2002, two hundred students of Mohammed Yusuf, who would later form Boko Haram, moved to the Yobe countryside and formed Al-Sunna Wal Jamma (Afoaku N.D; HRW 2012).

A majority of its members are Muslim Maiduguri University students (Florquin and Berman 2005, 339). It is estimated to have two hundred or more members (Global Security N.D). No information could be found about specific wings. Funding for the groups is suspected to come from wealthy Saudis and organizations rather than smaller groups (Florquin and Berman 2005, 339).

External Ties

The group was established by students of the Boko Haram founder (Afoaku N.D; HRW 2012). The name Al Sunna Wal Jamma is also used by an unrelated group in Somalia (Global Security N.D). Allegedly the leader of the Almundata Al-Islam Foundation gave financial help to the group (Florquin and Berman 2005, 339). The quality of weapons and transportation also suggests assistance from wealthy Saudis (ibid).

Group Outcome

In 2003, the Nigerian government claimed to have successfully repressed the group by killing 18 members and capturing several others in response to Al-Sunna Wal Jamma's attempt to siege the capital of Yobe (Florquin and Berman 2005, 339; Global Security, N.D). In September 2004, the group launched it's most recent attack against a Borno state police station which seems to be the date of their last official violent attack (ibid; IRIN News 2004). A government crackdown led a majority of members to flee back to Maiduguri to join Mohammed Yusuf's nascent Boko Haram organization (Afoaku N.D). In March 2005, Al Sunna Wal Jamma threatened to harm Christian locations, but did not follow through with action (Florquin and Berman 2005, 339).

Note: CTC (West Point) says it does not know if this is the same group as BH.
<https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-rise-of-boko-haram-in-nigeria>

III. HISBA
Min. Group Date: 2001
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1999 (new)

Group End: Active 2017

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In 1999, several Muslim majority states began to promote Sharia law after Nigeria began holding democratic elections again (NSRP 2017). Hisbah describes the type of group which emerged in response to the state’s desire for the enforcement of Sharia law (MIPT 2000; Florquin and Berman 2005, 338). Even though the groups work on behalf of the state, most begin as a local volunteer-based organization and later solicit state support (NSRP 2017). Since there are several different Hisbah groups, no specific first violent attack date could be found. Further, their political aims vary by group, because each group implements Sharia law to different standards (MIPT 2000; NSRP 2017).

Geography

Hisbah groups have had attacks in Kaduna, Katsina, Zamfara, and Kano, specifically the Christian majority areas of Kano (Florquin and Berman 2005, 338; MIPT 2008). The groups have bases in most majority Muslim states in northern Nigeria (NSRP 2017). Hisbah groups are not transnational.

Organizational Structure

Since several groups in various areas are referred to as Hisbah groups, there is no one Hisbah leader (NSRP 2017). In fact most groups lack specific organization and strong leadership (Florquin and Berman 2005, 338). A majority of Hisbah members seem to be young local men that are either unemployed or received a low level of education (HRW 2004; Florquin and Berman 2005, 338). No information could be found about any secondary wings in the Hisbah groups (HRW 2004). Most groups are provided explicit financial support by their local or state government, though some are even given salaries, uniforms, offices, and transportation (ibid). However in some locations like Katuna, Hisbah members are considered unpaid volunteers (ibid).

External Ties

Most Hisbah groups are provided explicit financial support from their respective local or state government, with some even given salaries, uniforms, offices, and transportation (HRW 2004). The Nigerian federal government claims that Kano State has sought foreign aid in order to train their Hisbah groups, but the Kano state government denies this (BBC 2006).

Group Outcome

Throughout his presidency Olusegun Obasanjo decided to ignore extrajudicial violence from Hisbah groups for fear of inciting aggression from northern Nigeria (MIPT 2008). On May 30, 2003, in Hoto, Kano State the local police force and Hisbah group clashed and 30 Hisbah members were arrested. They were released the following day without charges (HRW 2004). Starting in 2003, Hisbah groups began to work more like a general security force and less a vigilante band of Sharia law enforcers (HRW 2004). In some northern Nigerian states like Kaduna, which emphasize Sharia law to a lesser extent. By 2003, most Hisbah groups barely functioned (ibid). Hisbah groups are still active in some northern Nigerian states (Florquin and Berman 2005, 338; NSRP 2017).

IV. PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP)

Min. Group Date: 2001

Max. Group Date: 2006

Onset: NA

Aliases: People's Democratic Party (Pdp), People's Democratic Party

Note: violent political party

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1998 (political party)

Group End: Last Known Use of Violence in 2014

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The People's Democratic Party is a political party that was created on July 28, 1998, by the leaders of various pre-existing political groups, such as G-34 and the People's Democratic Movement (Osumah and Ikelegbe 2009, 190). The PDP'S first violent attack occurred on December 23, 2001, in Ibadan against government officials or buildings (GTD 2016). Its initial political aim was to implement liberal political reforms and establish a strong democracy following an era of constant military leadership in Nigeria (Osumah and Ikelegbe 2009, 190).

Geography

The PDP has been suspected of attacks in Ibadan and Bassa, and was directly connected to attacks in Ede, Ezza, and Umuezekoha (GTD 2016). The PDP also clashed with the UNPP in Bassambiri and with the ANPP in Oporoma (HRW 2004). The group has bases in several states such as Edo, Delta, Oyo, Imo, Anambra, Ekiti, Kwara, and Plateau (Osumah and Ikelegbe 2009, 190). In the 2007 elections, the PDP allegedly used violence to commit voter fraud in Ondo state to gain victory over the opposing Labor Party (Canada IRB 2008). The PDP is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

Since the PDP is mainly a political party, it consists of an organized hierarchy and operates at a local, state, zone, and national level (Osumah and Ikelegbe 2009, 190). The original leaders and founders of the group were previously involved with other pre-existing political groups like G-34 and the People's Democratic Movement (ibid). The PDP's armed wing has been used to coerce voters and tamper with elections (HRW 2004; Canada IRB 2008). Leaders of the group are described as the "political elite" and include several prior military officers (Osumah and Ikelegbe 2009, 190). The PDP describes itself as the largest political party in Africa, but no specific membership sizes could be found (ibid). Unlike some violent political parties, the party does seem to sanction violence during election cycles (Canada IRB 2004).

External Ties

Since the PDP is a political party several of its members take on positions of power in the government at various levels. For example, Member Olunsegun Agagu was elected governor of Ondo State in 2003 (Canada IRB 2008). This is an inference not explicitly stated in the text but the funding for the armed wing seems to be sourced from the main political wing (Osumah and Ikelegbe 2009, 190). The PDP allegedly employs a group named Defenders of Democracy to operate as a security service during election periods (Canada IRB 2008). It is also tied to G-34 and the People's Democratic Movement since its original founders were the leaders of the aforementioned groups (Osumah and Ikelegbe 2009, 190).

Group Outcome

The group was involved in polling and election violence in 2003 and 2007 (Canada IRB 2004; Canada IRB 2008). Their last known violent attack happened on August 8, 2014, in Ede against a government structure or organization (GTD 2016). The reason the group stopped using violence is unknown but it seems the PDP is mainly active only around election cycles (Osumah and Ikelegbe 2009, 190). Even though they once held a

large amount of political power in Nigeria, the PDP has become an unpopular organization due to widespread corruption within the party (ibid). The group's ineffectiveness has led to the rise of several militant groups that are frustrated with the disconnect between the Nigerian people and the PDP government (ibid). However the organization does still exist as a political party (Canada IRB 2008; GTD 2016).

- V. EGBEMA NATIONAL FRONT
Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 2003
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20150>
- "Pipeline sabotage causes no pain in petroleum markets." Reuters (Taipei Times). 2003.
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2003/08/03/2003062147>
- Mike Oduniyi. 2003. "Nigeria: Warri: Chevron Staff Kidnapped." All Africa.
<http://allafrica.com/stories/200307290487.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2003

Group End: 2003 (disappearance)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Egbema National Front's first violent attack occurred on July 25, 2003, when they allegedly kidnapped a Chevron employee (Reuters 2003; GTD 2016). The group calls for Chevron to side with it and the Ijaw in the Niger Delta oil conflict (Oduniyi All Africa, 2003). Since the group seems to be an Ijaw youth group it can be inferred the organization has an ethno-nationalist ideology; however, its specific political goals are unclear (ibid). The group's origin date remains unknown.

Geography

The Egbema National Front is allegedly responsible for one case of kidnapping in the Warri area (Reuters 2003; Oduniyi All Africa, 2003). The group operates in the Niger Delta region (Reuters 2003). This is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

Members seem to be young Ijaw men (Oduniyi All Africa 2003). No information could be found on leaders, wings, or size estimates.

External Ties

No information could be found on any external ties.

Group Outcome

Local leaders and state officials responded to the Egbema National Front's kidnapping and managed to free the captured employee (Reuters 2003). The group's last known violent attack was in 2003 (Reuters 2003; Oduniyi 2003). No more information could be found on government response to the group or how the group became inactive.

VI. NIGER DELTA PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEER FORCE

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 2009

Onset: 2004

Aliases: Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (Ndpvf), Ndpvf, Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (Ndpvf), Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Group, Niger Delta People's Volunteer Group

Note: relation between NDPVF and MEND is slightly unclear. Pay careful attention to external ties and group outcome.

Part 1. Bibliography

- Ed. Nicolas Florquin and Eric Berman. "Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF)." *Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region*. 2005. Small Arms Survey. p. 337.
<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-01-Armed-and-Aimless/SAS-Armed-Aimless-1-Full-manuscript.pdf>
- "Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force/Egbesu Boys/Ijaw National Congress/Ijaw Youth Congress." *Global Security*. N.D. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ijaw.htm>
- Dafe Oputu. "Is Nigeria's Other Insurgency Making a Comeback?" 2015. All Africa.
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201507101214.html>

- Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, Nigeria: 1. Please provide information on the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and its related organisation, the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF) including the dates when they were founded, their leaders and their activities. 2. Could either organisation be regarded as "Peaceful and non-violent"?, 4 February 2008, NGA32922 , available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b6fe2b6d.html>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nigeria: Leadership structure of the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF); whether a certain individual is a leader of the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF); his alleged arrest in 2006 and his current whereabouts, 24 June 2008, NGA102884.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/49b92b2ec.html>
- Eric Marquardt. "Mujahid Dokubo-Asari: The Niger Delta's Ijaw Leader." 2007. Terrorism Monitor Vol. 5 Issue 15. Jamestown Foundation. <https://jamestown.org/program/mujahid-dokubo-asari-the-niger-deltas-ijaw-leader-2/>
- Ludovica Iaccino. "Nigeria's oil war: Who are the Niger Delta militants?" IB Times. 2015. <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigerias-oil-war-who-are-niger-delta-militants-1520580>
- "Background: Kaiama Declaration." Crackdown in the Niger Delta. Human Rights Watch. 1999. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria2/Nigeria993-02.htm>
- GTD Perpetrator 20338, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20338>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2003 (Marquardt 2007)

Group End: 2007 (Government Amnesty Programs + Ceasefire)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The NDPVF was formed in 2003 by Mujahid Abubakar Asari Dokubo, who was the former president of the Ijaw Youth Council and a member of MOSEIN (Florquin and Berman 2005 p.338; Australia RRT 2008). The group garnered attention in 2004 for Operation Locus Feast (Australia RRT 2008; Global Security n.d.). Asari created the group in order to violently achieve the goals set in the Kaiama Declaration, which called for control over the Niger Delta and its resources to be given to the Ijaw peoples (Marquardt 2007; HRW 1999). It seems the NDPVF may have at one point adopted a separatist goal as in 2005 Asari was arrested for separatist propaganda (Australia RRT 2008). The group has an ethno-nationalistic ideology (Marquardt 2007; Iaccino 2015).

Geography

The NDPVF conducted attacks in Port Harcourt, the Nembe District, Utorogu, and is suspected of being involved in the Akututuru district (GTD 2016). The group's main area of control extended to the parts of the Rivers state near Buguma (Florquin and Berman 2005 p.338). The NDPVF is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

The NDPVF was formed in 2003 by Mujahid Abubakar Asari Dokubo, who was the former president of the Ijaw Youth Council and a member of MOSEIN (Florquin and Berman 2005 p.338; Australia RRT 2008). The General Commander of the group, British Columbus Epebada, was allegedly once a serviceman in the Nigerian army (Florquin and Berman 2005 p.23). The NDPVF has loose organizational structure, and is allegedly tied to other groups in Bayelsa and Delta State, which have their own leaders and hierarchy (Canada IRB 2008). Several smaller coalitions also operate under the NDPVF umbrella and retain their own organization while still following the NDPVF's command (Marquardt 2007; Australia RRT 2008). Since the NDPVF is considered an umbrella organization, it's difficult to find an exact size estimate.

A majority of its members are disenfranchised Ijaw youth (Australia RRT 2008).

Funding for the NDPVF is collected from the Kalabari ethnic group and supposedly from members of the Ijaw ethnic group living in Port Harcourt (Florquin and Berman 2005 p.338). The group also makes a majority of their finances from stealing and reselling gas and oil from privately owned pipes (Florquin and Berman 2005 p.338; Australia RRT 2008).

External Ties

The NDPVF is associated with several different militant organizations. Several smaller groups like Dey Gbam and Esenasawo from Bayelsa state align themselves with the NDPVF (Florquin and Berman 2005 p.26; Marquardt 2007). The NDPVF also claims to operate under the umbrella of the JRC and MEND (Canada IRB 2008). The NDPVF and MEND are closely linked. The leader of the NDPVF got arrested in 2005 and the group splintered, and a few of its members went on to create MEND (Australia RRT 2008). Asari, the leader and founder of the NDPVF, was also president of the IYC at one point (Florquin and Berman 2005 p.338; Australia RRT 2008). The NDPVF and the NDV are rival organizations despite having similar goals, and clashed fiercely in 2003 through 2004 in Rivers State (Australia RRT 2008). Funding for the NDPVF is collected from the Kalabari ethnic group and from members of the Ijaw ethnic group living in Port Harcourt (Florquin and Berman 2005 p.338).

Group Outcome

In 2004 following a series of clashes between the NDPVF and its rival the NDV, Asari Dokubo claimed he would launch an “all out war” against the federal government unless the Ijaw people were given greater control of the Niger Delta land (Florquin and Berman 2005 p.19; Australia RRT 2008). The government's response was Operation Hakusi which attempted to negotiate between the NDPVF and the NDV, and resulted in an October 2004 ceasefire agreement (ibid). Then, in September 2005, Asari was arrested by the federal government for publicizing separatist ideas. Violence in the area increased as the NDPVF splintered into several decentralized groups without a leader (Australia RRT 2008). When Asari was released in 2007 he discussed peace with president Jonathan Goodluck and instated a ceasefire for the NDPVF (ibid). Later, President Goodluck established an amnesty program for Niger Delta militants in 2009 which brought a decrease to violence in the south (Ibid; All Africa 2015). Consequently, the NDPVF's last violent attack occurred in 2009 (GTD 2016). However, as of 2015, Asari claimed that if Goodluck was not re-elected, the NDPVF would not remobilize the amnesty program that ended as scheduled in December (All Africa 2015).

What separates NDPVF in 2004?

- more of an umbrella organization so there are more opportunities for violence
- NDPVF gets to command a bunch of minor groups which enables it to carry out more violence → more members/factions
- NDPVF also has a better financial system. Tanya says that Asari bragged about their diaspora financial support in Harcourt and their weapons caches. They controlled more oil sites.

VII. NIGER DELTA VIGILANTES

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Niger Delta Vigilante (Ndv), Niger Delta Vigilantes, Niger Delta Vigilantes (Ndv), NDV

Part 1. Bibliography

- Ed. Nicolas Florquin and Eric Berman. “Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV).” *Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region*. 2005. Small Arms Survey. p. 337.
<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-01-Armed-and-Aimless/SAS-Armed-Aimless-1-Full-manuscript.pdf>
- Ludovica Iaccino. “Nigeria’s oil war: Who are the Niger Delta militants?” *IB Times*. 2015.
<http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigerias-oil-war-who-are-niger-delta-militants-1520580>

- “Niger Delta Vigilante.” N.D. On War. <https://www.onwar.com/actors/type43/ndv.htm>
- International Crisis Group (ICG), Nigeria: Ending Unrest in the Niger Delta, 5 December 2007, Africa Report N°135, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4756aeae2.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Germans, German 2000, Icelanders, and Okrika Vigilante (Florquin and Berman 2005, 337)

Group Formation: 1998

Group End: 2009 (surrender to government amnesty program)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The NDV was originally known as the Okrika Vigilante during its successful run as a vigilante task force against the local mafia in the community of Okrika (Florquin and Berman 2005, 40). It initially formed around 1998 (Florquin and Berman 2005, 40). In 2003, the leader of the group, Ateke Tom, changed the name to create the NDV (ibid). The group is composed mainly of Ijaws and has an ethno-nationalistic ideology (IB Times 2015). Their political goal is to take control of the oil in the Niger Delta Area (On War N.D.; IB Times 2015).

Geography

The NDV has had several clashes with police and rival groups in the Rivers State, specifically in Port Harcourt (ICG 2007; Florquin and Berman 2005, 40). Their main base of operations was originally in the town of Okrika (Florquin and Berman 2005, 40). The NDV is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

The leader of the group is Ateke Tom, who led the group when it was just a vigilante force in the town of Okrika (Florquin and Berman 2005, 40). No information could be found on wings or size estimates. Most members of the group are from the Ijaw ethnic group (IB Times 2015). A large source of financial support for the group is stealing oil from privately owned pipes (Florquin and Berman 2005, 337).

External Ties

Allegedly a local Okrika chief bought and supplied the NDV with weapons early into its formation (Florquin and Berman 2005, 45). There are also reports of Abiye Sekibo, the federal transport minister, supporting the NDV leader as early as 2001 in exchange for the group's services in the 2003 election period (ibid). The group has also received logistical support from political figures in the People's Democratic Party (Florquin and Berman 2005, 337). In return, the NDV interfered with the PDP's opposition, the All Nigeria People's Party, in the 2003 elections (ibid). In 2003 and 2004 the NDPVF and the NDV became rivals and fought (IB Times 2015). This created a conflict which the Nigerian government eventually ended by providing explicit support for the NDV (ibid).

Group Outcome

The date of their last violent attack could not be found, although it was not associated with any new attacks as recently as 2015 (IB Times 2015). In 2004, the Nigerian government provided explicit support for the NDV when it clashed against the NDPVF (IB Times 2015). This could be because the NDV offered its assistance to the PDP in the 2003 elections prior (Florquin and Berman 2005, 45). In 2009, NDV leader Ateke Tom surrendered to Nigerian president Musa Yar'adua in response to the government's creation of an amnesty program for Niger Delta militants in that same year (ibid). He claimed at that time that the group would no longer commit violent actions, but it is unclear if the NDV remains active or inactive without him (ibid).

Note for future Iris:

- **Look into when PDP was in power and if that could affect why the Nigerian government backs the NDV over NDPVF in 2004 - NDPVF leadership is also more controversial**
- **Note: very different from northern fighting during this period - lots of competition and in-fighting between them. Leadership of Ateke Tom versus Asari**

VIII. BINI-ORU
Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 2003
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20109, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20109>
- "14 held hostage off Nigeria coast." Associated Press (Topeka Capital-Journal). 2003. http://cjonline.com/stories/112103/pag_hostages.shtml#.WSy3fhMrKkY

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Bini Oru Security

Group Formation: 2003

Group End: 2003

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

On November 19, 2003, Bini-Oru committed their first violent attack when they took 14 Texaco employees hostage (Associated Press 2003; GTD 2016). No information could be found regarding the group's formation. The group aimed to collect monetary compensation for an alleged oil spill in their area and wanted to be offered jobs (Associated Press 2003).

Geography

The group originates from the Foropa municipality in Bayelsa State (Associated Press 2003). The kidnapping took place in southeastern Nigeria on the Pennington and Middleton ocean platforms (ibid). This is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

Members seem to be Ijaw men (Associated Press 2003). No information could be found on leaders, wings, or size estimates.

External Ties

No information could be found on any external ties.

Group Outcome

On November 19, 2003, Bini-Oru committed their last violent attack when they took 14 Texaco employees hostage (Associated Press 2003; GTD 2016). No information could be found on government response to the group or how the group became inactive.

IX. THE JOINT REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2010

Onset: NA

Aliases: The Joint Revolutionary Council, Joint Revolutionary Council (Jrc)

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Brief: Information about Nigeria’s JRC.” Stratfor Enterprise. 2010.
<https://www.stratfor.com/situation-report/brief-information-about-nigerias-jrc>
- Searched Proquest
 - “Joint revolutionary council” nigeria
- Searched Lexis
 - “Joint revolutionary council” nigeria

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: NA

Group End: NA

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

No information could be found on the JRC’s founding, although it first came to attention for claiming several 2010 attacks in the Niger Delta (Stratfor Enterprise 2010). It is unclear if the JRC is actually directly responsible for any violent attacks (Stratfor Enterprise 2010). The group seems to be a tool that individual Delta militants use to relay their successful operations against oil company infrastructures (ibid). No information could be found on specific political or ideological goals for the JRC.

Geography

The JRC asserts that they are responsible for attacks in the Niger Delta area but these claims have not been refuted (Stratfor Enterprise 2010). The group seems to have no physical base of operations in Nigeria but operates mainly online (ibid). This is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found on membership, size, leadership, or funding for the JRC. The group’s spokesperson, who goes by Cynthia White, seems to be a Nigerian man called George Kerley (Stratfor Enterprise 2010). The group does not directly organize

attacks but seems to be a tool that individual Delta militants use to relay their successful operations against oil company infrastructures and exists mainly online (ibid).

External Ties

No information could be found linking the JRC to any other organizations or leaders in the area. The JRC and MEND are two separate unrelated groups (Stratfor Enterprise 2010).

Group Outcome

No information could be found on the JRC's ending date, though it last came to attention for claiming several attacks in 2010 in the Niger Delta (Stratfor Enterprise 2010). No information could be found on the group's outcome or government action taken against them.

- X. COALITION FOR MILITANT ACTION IN THE NIGER DELTA (COMA)
Min. Group Date: 2005
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Coalition For Militant Action In The Niger Delta, Coalition For Militant Action In The Niger Delta (Coma), COMA

Part 1. Bibliography

- International Crisis Group (ICG), Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis, 28 September 2006(a), Africa Report N°118, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538900c4.html>
- International Crisis Group (ICG), Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment, 25 October 2006(b), Report N°119, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4565e60b4.html>
- Stephanie Hanson. "MEND: The Niger Delta's Umbrella Militant Group." 2007. Council on Foreign Relations.
<https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/mend-niger-deltas-umbrella-militant-group>
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<https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria#toc55281>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2005

Group End: 2006

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

No information could be found on how or when COMA was founded. The earliest the group has been documented is in 2005 when they were reportedly approached by al-Qaeda-related groups from the Middle East (ICG 2006a p.7). COMA seems to have a similar motivation as other groups under the MEND umbrella, which calls for the Nigerian people to have control over the Niger Delta area instead of oil companies (Hanson 2007).

Geography

COMA operates in the Niger Delta Area which has forest swamps and a wetland environment (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2017; Hanson 2007). COMA is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found on the leader of COMA or its members, wings, and size. The group seems to adopt the MEND name according to convenience, which might imply Ijaw membership (Hanson 2007).

External Ties

COMA claims to have participated alongside MEND in several attacks but the main MEND spokesperson denied any connection (ICG 2006a p.6). In 2005, the group was reportedly approached by al-Qaeda-related organizations from the Middle East and offered training, weapons, and logistical support (ICG 2006a p.7). COMA claims to have denied the offer (ibid). In July 2006, the group ended its alliance with the Joint Revolutionary Council (ICG 2006b p.7).

Group Outcome

No information could be found of government reaction to the group or whether the group remains operational. In fact, the main MEND spokesperson denied any connection or knowledge of the group's existence (ICG 2006a p.6). It's last public action was in July 2006 when the group ended its alliance with the Joint Revolutionary Council (ICG 2006b p.7).

Nigeria, Part 3 Cases: 2006-2012
Last Updated: 26 May 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T2127	NIGER DELTA FRONTIER FORCE		2006	0
T2120	WNDVF		2006	0
T2316	GUGAMA YOUTH FEDERATION		2006	2006
T1184	MOVEMENT FOR EMANCIPATION OF NIGER DELTA (MEND)		2006	2012
T2495	NIGER DELTA FREEDOM FIGHTERS (NDDF)		2008	2008
T2164	JAMAATU AHLIS SUNNAH LADDAAWATIH WAL-JIHAD (BOKO HARAM)	2009	2009	2012
T2538	URHOB0 REVOLUTIONARY ARMY		2009	2009
T2488	NIGER DELTA LIBERATION FORCE		2010	2010
T1698	DELTA DEMOCRATIC MILITIA		2011	2011
T2693	NATIONAL UNION OF ROAD TRANSPORT WORKERS-TOKYO FACTION		2011	2011
T2626	ANSARU (JAMA'ATU ANSARUL MUSLIMINA FI BILADIS SUDAN)		2011	2012
T2692	NURTW-AUXILIARY		2011	2011

I. NIGER DELTA FRONTIER FORCE

Min. Group Date: 2006

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Severin Carrell. "Hungry, soaking, desperate: freed British oil workers tell of ideal." Guardian. 2006. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/oct/24/oil.scotland>

- “Joy as oil worker ‘comes back from the dead.’” Scotsman. 2006.
<http://www.scotsman.com/news/joy-as-oil-worker-comes-back-from-the-dead-1-1416205i>
- Matthew Moore. “British oil worker ‘threatened with sacrifice.’” Telegraph (UK). 2006.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1532180/British-oil-worker-threatened-with-sacrifice.html>
- Youngson, Billy. 2006. "Ransom of Pounds 21m for Kidnapped Oilworkers." Daily Mail, Oct 06, 39. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/320173051?accountid=14026>.
- Searched gScholar
 - “Niger delta frontier force”

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: Last Activity in 2006 (unknown why the group disappeared)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group's first notable action occurred on October 3, 2006, when they kidnapped seven oil workers and demanded ransom (Carrell 2006; Scotsman 2006). Their political aim is to keep and distribute the profits gained from the Niger Delta oil industry to the Nigerians in the area (Carrell 2006). Information on the formation or ideology of the group is unknown.

Geography

They performed a kidnapping operation in Akwa Ibom state and released the man in Port Harcourt (Scotsman 2006). They operated and created a makeshift base in the swampy Niger Delta region (Carrell 2006). This is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found on the NDFF leadership, membership, source of funding, or different wings.

External Ties

No information could be found on the NDFF external ties.

Group Outcome

The group's last notable action was when they kidnapped oil workers on October 3, 2006 (Carrell 2006; Scotsman 2006). The NDFF demanded £21min ransom, and the worker's companies paid despite the Nigerian government banning such payments (Carrell 2006). The workers were released to the Nigerian State Service on October 21, 2006 (Carrell 2006; Telegraph 2006). No information could be found on the government response to the group after the attack.

II. WNDVF

Min. Group Date: 2006

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Western Niger Delta Volunteer Force (Wndvf), Western Niger Delta Volunteer Force, WNDVF, Wndvf

Part 1. Bibliography

- Searched Google
 - "Western niger delta volunteer force"
 - western niger delta volunteer force nigeria 2006
- Searched gScholar
 - "Western niger delta volunteer force"
 - western niger delta volunteer force nigeria 2006
- Searched Proquest
 - "Western niger delta volunteer force"
 - western niger delta volunteer force nigeria 2006

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No information could be found about this group.

Group Formation: No information could be found about this group.

Group End: No information could be found about this group.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

No information could be found about this group.

Geography

No information could be found about this group.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about this group.

External Ties

No information could be found about this group.

Group Outcome

No information could be found about this group.

III. GUGAMA YOUTH FEDERATION

Min. Group Date: 2006

Max. Group Date: 2006

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Ikenna Emeka Okpani. "Nigeria: Foreign Workers Kidnapped in Port Harcourt." AllAfrica. 2006. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200605120182.html>
- GTD Perpetrator 20186. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2016. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20186>
- Searched proquest
 - "Gugama youth federation"
 - Gugama youth federation
 - Gugama youth federation nigeria

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: Last Activity in 2006

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Gugama Youth Federation's first attack occurred on May 11, 2006, when they kidnapped workers from the oil company SAIPEM (GTD 2016; Okpani All Africa 2006). No information could be found on the group's formation or politics, despite their demanding a ransom (Okpani All Africa 2006).

Geography

The Gugama Youth Federation works in the Niger Delta area and their only recorded kidnapping took place specifically in the Port Harcourt area (Okpani All Africa 2006). This group is not transnational.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found on the Gugama Youth Federation's leadership, organizational structure, or size. The group seems to consist of youths from the Niger Delta region (Okpani All Africa 2006).

External Ties

No information could be found on the Gugama Youth Federation's external ties.

Group Outcome

The Gugama Youth Federation's May 11, 2006, kidnapping was also its last recorded activity (GTD 2016; Okpani All Africa 2006). No information could be found on the outcome of the kidnapping or the government's response.

IV. MOVEMENT FOR EMANCIPATION OF NIGER DELTA (MEND)

Min. Group Date: 2006

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: MEND, Movement For The Emancipation Of The Niger Delta (Mend), Movement For Emancipation Of Niger Delta (Mend)

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4692, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ojNFiiZwS-ITJ4QFt1I5qteYdZgQfochJ4ZkKaT7GyY/edit>

- “Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta.” Global Security. N.D.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mend.htm>
- Stephanie Hanson. “MEND: The Niger Delta’s Umbrella Militant Group.” Council on Foreign Relations. 2007.
<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mend-niger-deltas-umbrella-militant-group>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2005

Group End: 2017 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

MEND seems to have formed somewhere between late 2005 and early 2006 as a splinter of the NDPVF following the arrest of its leader, Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, in September 2005 (Global Security N.D; Canada IRB 2009). The group's first notable action was the kidnapping of four oil workers in January 2006 (ibid). MEND's initial political aims were to free Asari from prison, increase the profit Nigerians received from the oil industry, and to prevent government troops from occupying the Delta territory (Hanson 2007). This later evolved into the larger goal of expelling foreign private interests and nonnative Nigerians from the area, in addition to demanding the government provide better infrastructure to Delta citizens (MIPT 2008).

Even though some of the organizations under the MEND umbrella have an ethnic-nationalist ideology, MEND itself claims to focus more on the financial and political conflict with the Nigerian government rather than ethnic grievances (Global Security N.D).

Geography

Since MEND is the largest umbrella organization in the region, it has bases all over the Niger Delta area (Hanson 2007). Attacks carried under the MEND name have occurred in Batan, Ngo, Okrika, Kiagbodo, Forcados, Peremabiri, Nembe district, Port Harcourt, Ogbia, Warri, Abaji, Logbia, Clough Creek, and Brass (GTD 2016). MEND groups are familiar operating in the wetland environment, including mangrove swamps and creeks (Hanson 2007). It is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

The group was initially formed in 2005 by former NDPVF members (Hanson 2007; Australia RRT 2008). Not much is known about the group's organizational structure, and despite its importance in the area, there is no clear hierarchy (Malina 2010; Australia RRT 2008). However, the group has conducted increasingly sophisticated and coordinated attacks since 2005, indicating some coherence (Australia RRT 2008). Jobo Gbomo, a name many thought was an alias for oil bunkerer and MEND leader Henry Okah, claims to be MEND's main spokesperson (Hanson 2007; BBC 2010).

MEND boasts the membership of several influential organizations in the Niger area, such as the FNDIC, General "Boyloaf", Outlaws, NDSF, NDPVF, NDV, PLF, and NDSM (Malina 2010).

Even though a majority of MEND members are Ijaw, it has recently gained Ogoni, Urhobo, Itsekiri, and even supposedly Yoruba members (Global Security N.D; Canada IRB 2009). It is formed primarily of unemployed youths in the Niger Delta region, but has successful and educated leaders (MIPT 2008; Hanson 2007). Its size has been estimated to be anywhere from hundreds to low thousands (Hanson 2007). It seems to gain its finances from oil bunkering (Global Security N.D). As the group grew, it began to conduct more complicated attacks as a unit (Australia RRT 2008)

External Ties

MEND is an umbrella group which boasts the membership of several influential organizations in the Niger area such as the FNDIC, General "Boyloaf," Outlaws, NDSF, NDPVF, NDV, PLF, and NDSM (Malina 2010). It also formed an alliance with COMA, Martyrs Bridge, and the NDPVF, groups which alternate between acting individually and identifying as MEND (MIPT 2008). The group began as a splinter of the NDPVF, but eventually became more influential than the initial organization (Hanson 2007). MEND seems to share some leaders with the NDPVF and the IYC (ibid). The group has threatened the JTF, and accused it of being responsible for several civilian casualties (Canada IRB 2009).

Group Outcome

Initially, in 2006, the government responded to the formation of MEND by attempting to create new jobs and fine Shell oil (MIPT 2008). However, after those initial attempts, the federal government refused to communicate with the group, and instead sent armed forces into the area (Hanson 2007). In 2007, MEND agreed to halt attacks until the arrest of Henry Okah as a result of negotiations with President Yar'Adua (Australia RRT 2008). Then, in June 2009, Nigerian President Umaru Yar'Adua established an amnesty program for Niger Delta militants which MEND leader Henry Okah took, initiating a 60 day ceasefire (Canada IRB 2011). Eventually, a majority of MEND joined the program as well. On October 25, 2009 the ceasefire was extended indefinitely (ibid).

Despite this, in 2010, a faction of the group ended the ceasefire and resumed violent action in the region. It was marked by a bombing in Abuja for which former MEND leader Henry Okah was arrested in connection (ibid). MEND's last attack recorded occurred on November 2, 2016 (GTD 2016). It remains an active group as of 2016 (ibid).

For Iris notes re: MEND

- **Contradictory evidence in the literature about whether it's an independent group or an umbrella, e.g. MEND-NDPVF alliance**
- **Sometimes subsidiary groups identify as part**
- **The MEND umbrella seems similar to the ISIS-wilayat relationship**

- **At the beginning of the amnesty program, there were major splits in which organizations took hold of it versus others**
- **Most of MEND has been defunct due to huge membership defections from the amnesty program starting in 2009-2010. The last remaining attack seems perpetrated by a small faction of sources.**
- **Goodluck Jonathan has more cultural ties/relationship to the Niger Delta (he is more connected - see Lisa work - to the southern region). The program ended in 2013 when the leadership program changed.**

V. NIGER DELTA FREEDOM FIGHTERS (NDDF)

Min. Group Date: 2008

Max. Group Date: 2008

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Egbema One

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2009 (amnesty program?)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Information on the group's formation date could not be found. The group's first notable action was a kidnapping conducted on October 3, 2006 (BBC 2006). A representative of the NDDF stated that the group's political goals were to allow the Ijaw in Egbema to have their own local government (BBC 2008). The group has an ethno-nationalistic ideology (ibid).

Geography

The NDDF is based in Warri and has conducted bombing on oil facilities in Edo State (BBC 2006; BBC 2008). It has kidnapped foreigners in Eket, Akwa Ibom State as well (BBC 2006). The NDDF is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found on the leadership of the NDDF when it was an active militant group. No information could be found on wings or size estimates. Most NDDF members belong to the Ijaw ethnic group (BBC 2008). It seems their finances come from ransom payments (BBC 2006; Youngson 2006). In 2013, members of the NDDF were unhappy with their exclusion from the amnesty program, gathering under General Para Ekiyes in protest (BBC 2013). Later, some members regrouped once more to monitor the 2015 election cycle under their new president Reuben Wilson (All Africa 2015).

External Ties

On May 8, 2007, members of the NDDF were kidnapped after a clash with MEND militants (All Africa 2007). The group has protested actions taken by the Joint Task Force against several Egbema communities (BBC 2008). No information could be found on any specific support providers.

Group Outcome

The last recorded NDDF attack was a bombing in 2008 on oil infrastructure (GTD 2016; BBC 2008). The specific reason the group disbanded is unknown but it seems that many members attempted to join the government amnesty program in following years (BBC 2013; All Africa 2015). In 2013, members of the group that didn't qualify for the amnesty program threatened to resume violence unless they were incorporated into it (BBC 2013). In 2015, a faction of the group led by Reuben Wilson claimed they would monitor the March 28th elections to prevent ballot box tampering, and were in support of candidate Jonathan Goodluck (All Africa 2015).

Min. Group Date: 2009
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: 2009

Aliases: Boko Haram, Group Committed To Propagating The Prophet's Teachings And Jihad, Jam?'Atu Ahlis Sunnah L?Dda'awatih Wal-Jihad, Jamaatu Ahlis Sunnah Laddaawatih Wal-Jihad, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Ladda'awatih Wal-Jihad, People Committed To The Propagation Of The Prophet's Teachings And Jihad, Western Education Is Sinful

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: ISWAP, Islamic State - West African Province, al-Wilāyat al-Islāmiyya Gharb Afrīqiyyah

Group Formation: 2002

Group End: 2017 active

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Boko Haram was founded in 2002 in an Islamic school set up by the group's founder, Mohammed Yusuf (BBC 2016). Even though many believe the group's first violent action was a series of clashes with the police in July 2009, it was discovered that as early as 2007, Yusuf had ordered attacks such as the assassination of preacher Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmoud Adam (USIP 2012). The turn to violence was fueled by conflict between Christian and Muslims in the state, harsh government crackdowns, and abuses by the police (Sergie and Johnson CFR 2015). Politically, the initial goal of Boko Haram under Yusuf seemed to be to create an Islamic state within Nigeria (ibid; Crenshaw 2016). However, under the Shekau leadership, the group became center-seeking and aimed to abolish the Nigerian government and replace it with an Islamic caliphate (Crenshaw 2016). The group has a Salafi jihadist ideology (Crenshaw 2016; BBC 2016).

Geography

The group was initially based in Maiduguri but was driven into the Sambisa forest and Manandra Mountains near the Cameroon-Nigeria border in 2013 (BBC 2016). Boko Haram is most active in the northeastern Nigerian states of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Jara, Bauchi, and Kaduna (Crenshaw 2016; ibid). It has conducted attacks in the following Nigerian areas: Maiduguri, Dogongona, Dan Mayan, Rann, Kesawa, Ngadaya, Kukawa district, Madagali, Kangarwa, and Bama (GTD 2016). The group has also attacked locations in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (GTD 2016; Sergie and Johnson CFR 2015). In 2012, it is believed Boko Haram began training in northern Mali with AQIM, and that the group is assisting IS in Libya (Crenshaw 2016). Boko Haram is a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

The initial founder of Boko Haram was Mohammed Yusuf who was a Muslim cleric prior to creating the group (BBC 2016; Forest 2012). When the organization began in Maiduguri as a religious complex in 2002, Boko Haram had its own cabinet, police, housing, and agricultural area (USIP 2012). No information could be found on any wings. Before Boko Haram turned violent in 2007, some of Yusuf's students splintered to form their own organization, which became known as the Nigerian Taliban (USIP 2012). When the student-run group eventually dissolved, many of its members re-joined Boko Haram (ibid). A majority of Boko Haram militants come from the Kanuri ethnic group, and are either unemployed youths or refugees from Chad (BBC 2016; USIP 2012). Members of Boko Haram have to pay a tax of 100 naira to support the group. Bank robberies and donations made by various organizations and individuals also finance the group

(Onuoha 2010; Forest 2012). As of 2014, it is estimated that the group has between fifteen thousand and twenty thousand members (Crenshaw 2016).

External Ties

Before Boko Haram turned violent in 2007, some of Yusuf's students splintered to form their own organization, which became known as the Nigerian Taliban (USIP 2012). When the student run group eventually dissolved many of its members rejoined Boko Haram (ibid). After Yusuf's death Boko Haram split into several different factions (Sergie and Johnson CFR 2015). Then Shekau, his successor, clashed with his own second in command Mamman Nur, which led Nur to form a separate group called Ansaru in 2012 (ibid; Crenshaw 2016).

In May 2013, a state of emergency was called in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa when an organization called the Joint Task Force (JTF) was created in response to Boko Haram (Sergie and Johnson CFR 2015). AQIM has allegedly provided financial support, given arms, and offered training to Boko Haram around or before 2012 (Crenshaw 2016). A few members including Shekau have sworn solidarity with Al Qaeda (ibid).

Later Shekau turned his back on Al Qaeda and pledged the group to IS in March 2015 (BBC 2016). Boko Haram also claims to have been trained in Somalia, presumably by Al-Shabaab (Forest 2012). On July 31, 2009, Alhaji Buji Foi, the previous Borno State Commissioner for Religious Affairs, was executed for allegedly supporting Yusuf (ibid). More men suspected of ties to Boko Haram were Alhaji Bunu Wakil, Alhaji Salisu Damaturu, and Mohammed Goni (ibid). Ali Ndume, a senator that belongs to the PDP, was arrested for allegedly financing Boko Haram (ibid).

Group Outcome

In 2008, Yusuf and some of his followers were arrested and tried by the police inspector general, but were then released on bail in 2009 (USIP 2012). On July 28, 2009, the Borno state task force conducted Operation Flush, in which they captured Yusuf and executed him (Onuoha 2010). After a series of clashes between Boko Haram and the police in that same year, the police arrested and executed anyone suspected of having involvement with the group (ibid). The group went underground after Yusuf was killed in the fighting (Onuoha 2010).

In September 2011, Boko Haram sent representatives to request the government remove troops from Maiduguri, rebuild mosques, and provide reparations to the families affected by the 2009 violence (Bavier 2012). A video was released on January 15, 2012, which reiterated that Boko Haram's main motivation was still retaliation for the government's violent actions (ibid). After Boko Haram gained international recognition for kidnapping schoolgirls, the United States sent military advisors to help find the girls in

May 2014 (Sergie and Johnson CFR 2015). France also assisted by sending soldiers to Niger to combat Boko Haram (ibid). In October 2014, the government claimed a ceasefire had been negotiated with Boko Haram, but that the group later denied one ever happened (Crenshaw 2016). The national 2015 elections were delayed by six weeks so forces could take back territory stolen by Boko Haram (ibid).

The African Union created a force of 7,500 fighters from Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to combat the group, which eventually became known as the Joint Task Force (ibid; Crenshaw 2016). In response to the 2015 attacks, the group killed 70 civilians from a town in Cameroon and village in Chad (Crenshaw 2016). In October 2016, after talks with the Red Cross, the Nigerian government, and the Swiss government, the Nigerian military chased Boko Haram into the Sambisa forest and several captives including several kidnapped girls were freed (BBC 2016).

Notes for Iris:

-Nigerian politics saw the president's religious background rotates between Christians and Muslims until this period when there wasn't a Muslim president anymore and their ability to be protected was declining.

-Yusuf's death motivates group to transform violently between 2009-2011. Not initially interested in overthrowing the government, but after the 2009 attack they changed their mind and became an offensive movement, grabbing territory, and seizing. Transnational attacks are guerrilla tactics, hit-and-run tactics. Cameroon attacks are prior to ISIS bayat and Niger/Chad attacks are after.

VII. URHOBOS REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

Min. Group Date: 2009

Max. Group Date: 2009

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://search.proquest.com/docview/315590216?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2009

Group End: 2009 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed in August 2009 in response to a high youth unemployment rate in the Niger Delta area (Connor 2009). The group claimed responsibility for a bombing of a Shell oil facility in the same month it formed (ibid). Politically, the group wanted more development assistance in Urhobo communities, including infrastructure, public goods, and jobs. They demand the government address underlying ethnic grievances against the Urhobo population (Izundu 2009; All Africa 2009). They also want the government to monitor and increase Urhobo representation in the Delta State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission group (All Africa 2009). The URA has an ethno-nationalistic ideology (ibid).

Geography

The Urhobo Revolutionary Army has bombed facilities in Lagos and the Warri area (Connor 2009; Izundu 2009). The group is also suspected of being involved in an attack in Iwhrekan (GTD 2016). It is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found on URA leadership, sources of funding, or different wings. Most URA members are youths from the Urhobo ethnic group (Connor 2009; All Africa 2009).

External Ties

No information could be found on any explicit external ties, but the URA has voiced its interest in working with other groups in the area, including ethno-nationalist groups like the OPC and MASSOB (All Africa 2009)

Group Outcome

Almost all URA activity consisted of a series of bombings in August 2009 (Izundu 2009; Connors 2009). No information could be found on why the group stopped conducting attacks, or governmental response to the organization.

VIII. NIGER DELTA LIBERATION FORCE

Min. Group Date: 2010

Max. Group Date: 2010

Onset: NA

Aliases: Niger Delta Liberation Force, Niger Delta Liberation Force (Ndlf) - Nigeria, Niger Delta Liberation Force (Ndlf)-Nigeria

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1151077259?accountid=14026>.
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Note: this is separate than the Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2010

Group End: 2017 Active (Nonviolent)

Disarmament 2011 (Nathaniel 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group was founded by John Togo in 2005 when it splintered from the NDPVF (IB Times 2015). It launched its first confirmed set of violent attacks against the government in 2010 in response to grievances with the amnesty program (BBC 2016; All Africa 2011). However, it is possible the group had been violent even earlier. It is unknown if the group was a splinter, or if it adhered to an ethno-nationalist ideology. The NDLF's first recorded violent attack occurred on December 17, 2010 (GTD 2016). The group wants more states to be created in the Nigerian Delta area, to block military land use, more governmental profit-sharing, and to increase development in the Niger Delta Area (All Africa 2011). After the group stopped using violence, they began to advocate for creating a death penalty for kidnappers and terrorists (BBC 2012b)

Geography

The NDLF operates in the Niger Delta area, though further details could not be found (All Africa 2011; BBC 2012b). This is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

The leader of the NDLF was General John Togo, though this title seems unrelated to his prior occupation, as he served as the general commander of the group (All Africa 2011). After the NDLF stopped using violence, the group used a spokesperson named Mark Anthony (BBC 2012a; BBC 2012b). It had previously splintered from the NDPVF.

External Ties

In 2012, after the group laid down their weapons, the NDLF warned Boko Haram against taking any action against President Jonathan Goodluck's life (BBC 2012a). The group also has views opposing a group named the Forum for Justice and Human Rights Defence (BBC 2012b). The NDLF is not associated with the Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force, and has openly voiced its disapproval on its association with their name (BBC 2016). No information could be found on any external support.

Group Outcome

NDLF leader John Togo was killed in a shootout with the JTF on May 12, 2011, and this is the group's last known violent interaction (All Africa 2011). The group became nonviolent after they disarmed during President Jonathan Goodluck's tenure (Nathaniel 2016). After the group stopped using violence, they advocated for establishing a death penalty for kidnappers and terrorists to Delta State governor Emmanuel Uduaghan (BBC 2012b). The group remains active as a non-violent organization (BBC 2016). There is no evidence that any members joined the JNDLF.

IX. DELTA DEMOCRATIC MILITIA

Min. Group Date: 2011

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2011

Group End: NA

Part 3. Narrative

- GTD Perpetrator 30227. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2016.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30227>
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<https://search.proquest.com/docview/822491636?accountid=14026>

Group Formation

No information could be found on the group's formation. The Delta Democratic Militia's first violent attack occurred on January 3, 2011 (GTD 2016). The group aimed to deter any corruption in the 2011 elections (BBC 2011; All Africa 2011).

Geography

The group operates in Delta state (BBC 2011; All Africa 2011). They planted a bomb in a government office in Ughelli (GTD 2016). This is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found on a group leader although an email the group sent claiming responsibility was signed by “Lt.” Tamuno Labutua (All Africa 2011; BBC 2011). No information could be found on group membership, wings, or source of funding.

External Ties

No information could be found on external support, alliances, or splinters.

Group Outcome

The group's first recorded violent attack in 2011 is their last violent confrontation (GTD 2016). No further information could be found on the group outcome or government response beyond police investigating the bombing (All Africa 2011).

- X. NATIONAL UNION OF ROAD TRANSPORT WORKERS-TOKYO FACTION
Min. Group Date: 2011
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: Nurtw-Tokyo, National Union Of Road Transport Workers-Tokyo, National Union Of Road Transport Workers-Tokyo Faction, Nurtw-Tokyo Faction

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1999 (NURTW under Tokyo leadership)

Group End: NA

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the Transport Union formed, but the Tokyo faction first came to attention as a violent group in 2011, when it clashed with another NURTW faction (Adeseri and Alayi 2011). The National Union of Road Transport Workers operates like a normal union in most parts of Nigeria except in Oyo State (Adeyemo All Africa 2009). This is largely due to the leadership of Alhaji Lateef Akinsola also known as Tokyo (ibid). The group evolved to become an organization used by politicians against their opponents at Tokyo's command (ibid). The group has no clear political aims or ideology.

Geography

The Tokyo faction is active in Oyo State and has been involved in clashes on the Iwo road end of Ibadan and the Agbeni area of Ibadan (Adeseri and Ajayi All Africa 2011; Ogunsola All Africa 2014). This is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

Alhaji Lateef Akinsola, the leader of the Tokyo faction of the NURTW, was brought to power by Oyo State governor Adesina in 1999 (Adeyemo All Africa 2009). They met in prison but it is unclear what Tokyo's occupation was before becoming the union leader (ibid). No other information could be found on the Tokyo faction's organization or membership.

External Ties

The NURTW Tokyo faction leader was brought into power by Oyo State governor Akinsola and initially worked for the Alliance for Democracy party (Adeyemo All Africa 2009). Later he was brought into the PDP by Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu and led the PDP militant faction (ibid). After Tokyo's arrest in 2011, the PDP distanced itself from Tokyo (ibid/date is correct). An auxiliary faction of the NURTW emerged and began to clash violently with the Tokyo faction (Adeseri and Ajayi All Africa 2011).

Group Outcome

In 2004, the leader of the Tokyo faction of the NURTW was arrested and held for two years until governor Adedibu got him freed (Adeyemo All Africa 2009). After he showed signs of disobeying the governing body and party, Tokyo was arrested and replaced with

Alhaji Lateef Salako (ibid). It is unknown when Tokyo was reinstated as President of the Oyo State NURTW (Adeseri and Ajayi All Africa 2011). It is unclear if the Tokyo faction of the NURTW is still active.

- XI. ANSARU (JAMA'ATU ANSARUL MUSLIMINA FI BILADIS SUDAN)
Min. Group Date: 2011
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Ansaru (Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan), Ansaru, Vanguard For The Protection Of Muslims In Black Lands

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2012

Group End: 2014 (merger)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Ansaru formed in January 2012 as a splinter off of Boko Haram by al-Ansary (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Global Security N.D). The group formed in response to a Boko Haram attack, which targeted Muslim civilians in Kano (ibid). Their first recorded notable action occurred in May 2012, when they kidnapped and executed two Nigerian citizens of European descent (Mackenzie Institute 2015). The group has a Salafi jihadist ideology, and aims to establish a Muslim state as well as expel Western influence in their region (Mackenzie Institute 2015). However, unlike Boko Haram, they claim to disapprove of killing innocents, even non-Muslims, except in self-defence (Onuoha 2013; USDS 2016).

Geography

Ansaru was formed in Kano State (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Global Security N.D). The group has been active in the following northern Nigerian cities and states: Birnin Kebbi, Kano, Katsina, Bauchi, Abuja, Jamaare, Rimi, and Kogi (Global Security N.D; GTD 2016). Ansaru is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

The leader and founder of the group calls himself Abu Ussamata Al-Ansary, but is suspected of actually being Khalid al-Barnawi, a former Boko Haram leader who trained with AQIM in the 2000s (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Onuoha 2013). The group seems to perform unsophisticated operations like kidnappings, suggesting it has a relatively small number of members compared to Boko Haram (Mackenzie Institute 2015; USDS 2016). No other information could be found on the organizational structure or the group's funding source (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Onuoha 2013). Members seem to be former Boko Haram militants (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

External Ties

The group is a splinter off of Boko Haram and their founder is a former leader of Boko Haram (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Onuoha 2013). They still work with Boko Haram and many sources claim the group has alleged unclear connections to AQIM as well (Mackenzie Institute 2015; BBC 2013). No information could be found on any other potential sources of external support.

Group Outcome

Ansaru's last recorded violent attack occurred in 2013 (Mackenzie Institute 2015; GTD 2016). It is suspected that they re-joined Boko Haram in 2014 (USDS 2016). The British labels Ansaru an FTO (BBC 2013). No information could be found on specific measures

taken by the government against the group although it is likely military operations against Boko Haram had spillover effects due to working in the same geographic area.

Notes for Iris:

- Group has minor attacks
- Group can't gain the same momentum or notoriety as Boko Haram
- Some of the actions the government takes against Boko Haram have spillover effects against the group.
- Similar to Pakistan groups that splinter then rejoin (see TTP)

XII. NURTW-AUXILIARY
Min. Group Date: 2011
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: Nurtw-Auxiliary, National Union Of Road Transport Workers-Auxiliary, National Union Of Road Transport Workers-Auxiliary Faction, Nurtw-Auxiliary Faction

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2011

Group End: NA

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The National Union of Road Transport Workers operates like a normal union in most parts of Nigeria, except in Oyo State (Adeyemo All Africa 2009). No information could be

found on the formation or ideology of the Auxiliary faction of the NURTW in Oyo State. It is unknown if it is a splinter off of the Tokyo faction. Their first big violent confrontation occurred in 2011 when it clashed with the Tokyo faction (Adeseri and Ajayi All Africa 2011). It does not appear to have any politicized opposition to the Nigerian state government.

Geography

The Auxiliary faction is active in Oyo state and has clashed with the Tokyo faction in several motor parks and on the Iwo road end of Ibadan (Adeseri and Ajayi All Africa 2011). It is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

The leader of the Auxiliary faction of the NURTW is Mukaila Lamidi. His previous occupation is unknown (Adeseri and Ajayi All Africa 2011). Information could not be found of faction membership, wings, or sources of funding.

External Ties

The Auxiliary faction often clashes with the Tokyo faction of the NURTW in Oyo State (Adeseri and Ajayi All Africa 2011). They were given motor parks that were previously under Tokyo faction control by governor Otunba Adebayo Alao Akala (ibid). Tokyo also claims that the State Commissioner of Police, Baba Adisa Bolanta, gave protection to the auxiliary faction (ibid).

Group Outcome

It is unknown when the group's last violent attack was. The leader of the auxiliary faction, Alhaji Lamidi Makaila, was arrested for his involvement in an Ibadan incident in March 2014, which resulted in civilian deaths (Ogunesan Tribune N.D). It is unclear if the auxiliary faction is still in operation.