

**Niger Cases, 1970-2012**  
**Last Updated: 30 January 2018**

According to ICG, missing entries for Revolutionary Army of North Niger (ARLNN), Temoust Liberation Front (FLT), and ARLNN splinter groups: Popular Liberation Army of the North (APLN), Liberation Forces Front (FFL), Revolutionary Action Front (FAR) and the North Niger Revolutionary Liberation Movement (MRLNN) -- no dataset records.

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T9001	COORDINATION DE LA RESISTANCE ARME (CRA)		0	0
T9002	UFRA		0	0
T208	HEZBOLLAH		1982	2012
T2072	ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS		1987	2011
T1598	AIR AND AZAWAK LIBERATION FRONT (FLAA)	1991	1992	1992
T446	SALAFIST GROUP FOR PREACHING AND FIGHTING (GSPC)		1996	2012
T2189	NIGER MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE	2007	2007	2008
T2656	MUJAO		2011	2012
T9053	POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE SAHARA		1994	1994
T9054	DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR RENEWAL (FDR)	1995	1995	1995
T9055	PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT OF NIGER		1985	1985
T9070	SAHARAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FRONT		1997	1997

- I. COORDINATION DE LA RESISTANCE ARME (CRA)  
Torg ID: 9001  
Min. Group Date: 0  
Max. Group Date: 0  
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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<http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38c2104.html>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Niger: Information on Tuareg rebels, whether they are still active and whether members of the Hausa ethnic group are likely to be suspected of supporting the Tuareg rebels, 1 August 1994, NER18052.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aae433.html>
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### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1993

Group End: 1995 (disarm)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

\*umbrella

#### **Group Formation**

In 1991, the Front de Libération de l'Ar et l'Azaouad (FLAA) formed to promote the development and self-determination of the Tuareg (Gleditsch 2013, 593). The Tuareg are a nomadic group concentrated in northern Niger (Gleditsch 2013, 593). In the 1980s, Niger experienced a severe drought, which inhibited the government from following

through on promises of development and humanitarian assistance to people of the Tuareg ethnicity (Gleditsch 2013, 593). In the 1990s, the government faced a series of armed Tuareg groups fighting against the government to promote Tuareg interests (Gleditsch 2013, 593). Overtime, the FLAA split into a number of groups (Gleditsch 2013, 593).

In September 1993, the Coordination de la Resistance Arme (CRA) formed as an umbrella organization to coordinate Tuareg groups, including the FLAA, FPLS, and FLT. The CRA sought to fight the Niger government for mistreatment of the Tuareg and to pursue greater autonomy and development (Gleditsch 2013, 593; DADM Project n.d.; Minorities at Risk Project 2004; IRB 1994). On February 23, 1994, the CRA presented a list of demands (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). The demands included “regional boundary changes, local autonomy, increased political and governmental participation, demilitarization of Tuareg areas, substantial economic investment in the area, and the teaching of the Tuareg language, Tamashek” in schools (Minorities at Risk Project 2004; Uppsala Annual Information n.d.). The CRA’s first recorded attack occurred on January 9, 1994, in the Manzou district (DADM Project n.d.; Uppsala Annual Information n.d.). The group killed seven individuals in this incident (DADM Project n.d.; Uppsala Annual Information n.d.).

## **Geography**

The group is not transnational (Gleditsch 2013, 594). The CRA sought autonomy for the Agadez region in northern Niger (Minorities at Risk Project 2004).

## **Organizational Structure**

Although the CRA’s size could not be determined, the CRA is believed to be weaker than Niger’s government forces (Gleditsch 2013, 594). The FLAA, FPLS, and FLT are all member factions under the CRA. Members of the CRA are of the Tuareg ethnicity (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). The group was founded and grouped by Mano Dayak (Idrissa, Decalo 2012, 145). Rhissa ag Boula, the head of the Organisation de la Résistance Armée, was the president of the CRA (Idrissa, Decalo 2012, 145).

## **External Ties**

The CRA rebels did not receive foreign aid (Gleditsch 2013, 594). However, the group had tacit approval from the Tuareg populations in Mali and diaspora support from Tuareg populations in Algeria and Libya (Gleditsch 2013, 594). The group sought support from within Niger (Gleditsch 2013, 594). The government received explicit military support from France, China, and Libya (Gleditsch 2013, 594).

## **Group Outcome**

On October 9, 1994, the CRA signed the Ouagadougou peace agreement with the government of Niger. The group agreed to disarm within the following 6 months (Gleditsch 2013, 593; Minorities at Risk Project 2004; Uppsala Annual Information n.d.). The two parties agreed to establish an international commission of inquiry to investigate human rights abuses perpetrated by the Niger army and Tuareg rebel groups (Amnesty International 1995). In January 1995, the ceasefire ended (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). On March 27, 1995, the Democratic Front for Renewal, a member of the CRA, attacked government soldiers in northeast Agadez (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). On April 24, 1995, Tuareg rebels and the government signed a formal peace agreement and agreed to disarm 3,000 militants (DADM Project n.d.). On March 18, 1996, the government officially recognized the CRA (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). On November 13, 1996, the CRA and ORA rebel factions split and formed the UFRA (Gleditsch 2013, 594; Minorities at Risk Project 2004). Sources provide conflicting evidence on whether the ORA merges with the CRA or becomes a separate faction (Minorities at Risk Project 2004; Uppsala Annual Information n.d.).

Notes for iris:

- what is the relationship between the FLAA and CRA? FLAA splinters and has some members become the FPLS and FLT
- this group is included as unique organization because no other FLT records could be found
- CRA formed because the FLAA had weakened and needed help (strategic splintering?? Splinter then rejoin an umbrella to get larger share of pie??)
- the peace agreement signed with this group is the basis for the MNJ's grievance in 2007
- the Niger government enforced part of the agreement, but not all of it -- long-term failures → violence

## II. UFRA

Torg ID: 9002

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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<https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/military-reform-agreement-between-republic-niger-government-and-ora>

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- Kisangani, Emizet F. 2012. THE TUAREGS' REBELLIONS IN MALI AND NIGER AND THE U.S. GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR. International Journal on World Peace 29, (1) (03): 59-97, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1014055312?accountid=14026> (accessed January 31, 2018). PDF. gDrive.

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1996

Group End: 1998 (disarm)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

UFRA first emerged on November 13, 1996 (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). The group formed as a merger of several small Tuareg factions of the CRA after the CRA signed a peace agreement with the government in 1994 (Gleditsch 2013, 593, 594). UFRA is a Tuareg organization and had similar objectives to the CRA organizations (Minorities at Risk Project 2004; Gleditsch 2013, 594). It was also an ethno-nationalist separatist movement fighting for increased Tuareg autonomy (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 594). It launched an armed movement in March 1997 (Gleditsch 2013, 593). The group originally agreed to the 1994 peace agreement; however, the group became violent after frustration with the slow implementation process (Gleditsch 2013, 593; Psychology Press 2003, 800). The date of the group’s first attack in 1997 could not be determined.

### **Geography**

There is no evidence the group was transnational or had an external base of operations. The group had an attack in Tahoua, Niger against the government (UCDP GED). Other geographical information could not be found.

### **Organizational Structure**

Sia Katou serves as the group's leader and commander in chief (University of Notre Dame n.d.). Some sources consider UFRA to be a political party (Gleditsch 2013, 594). UFRA forces were weaker than the government's (Gleditsch 2013, 594). Members of UFRA are of the Tuareg ethnicity (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). UFRA had at least 3,500 members (University of Notre Dame n.d.).

### **External Ties**

UFRA officially allied with the Saharan Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARS) on September 26, 1997 (Minorities at Risk Project n.d.; Minorities at Risk 2004). FARS is composed of Toubu rebels (Minorities at Risk Project 2004).

### **Group Outcome**

In November 1997, UFRA signed a peace agreement with the government (Gleditsch 2013, 593). UFRA was the last Tuareg group to disarm (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). On June 8, 1998, UFRA disarmed and handed all military equipment to government authorities (Minorities at Risk Project 2004; Psychology Press 2003, 800). The group agreed to integrate into the Saharan security units and the Niger Armed Forces (University of Notre Dame n.d.). In June 2000, UFRA commander in chief Sia Katou accused the government of not fully integrating 3,500 of the group's ex-militants (University of Notre Dame n.d.). The group's last attack could not be determined.

### III. HEZBOLLAH

Torg ID: 208

Min. Group Date: 1982

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Hizbullah, Hizbollah, Hezbollah, Hezballah, Hizbullah, The Party of God, Islamic Jihad (Islamic Holy War), Islamic Jihad Organization, Islamic Resistance, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, Ansar al-Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansarollah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansar Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance), Organization of the Oppressed, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of Right Against Wrong and

Followers of the Prophet Muhammed, Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed

## **Part 1. Bibliography**

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- “Hizballah (Party of God),” Global Security, n.d. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hizballah.htm>
- “Hizballah,” Mackenzie Institute, 2016, <http://mackenzieinstitute.com/hizballah/>
- “Hezbollah,” Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Ed. Gus Martin, Sage 2011, 5-6\*

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1982

Group End (Outcome): Still active (Hezbollah still is active in Lebanon and around the World, (NCTC; Mackenzie Institute 2016; Masters 2014))

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

Hezbollah was formed in 1982 as a splinter of a prominent Shiite political party Amal (Martin 2011, 254). It formed in reaction to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, and it supported both the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon and the Palestinian fight against Israel (NCTC; Martin 2011, 254). It ascribes to a Shiite ideology, and believes the eventual Islamic state should also be Shiite (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Hezbollah carried out a series of bombings against Israeli targets in Argentina (Embassy) in 1992. Argentina has the largest Jewish population in Latin America, and many believe the attacks were triggered by President Menem’s decision to bolster relations with the US and Israel while withdrawing support for Iran’s nuclear technology program (Times of Israel).

### **Geography**

Hezbollah carried out a series of bombings against Israeli targets in Argentina (Embassy) in 1992. Hezbollah and Iran were responsible for the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center that killed 85 people in the worst terrorist attack on the nation (Atlantic).

### **Organizational Structure**

The group's initial leader was Sheikh Sobhi Tufeili, though he was replaced by Abbas Musawi in 1992 (Martin 2011, 254). The group developed a strong political wing, which even engaged in Lebanese politics, placing members in Parliament continuously since 1992 (Martin 2011, 254-255). It was organized as a series of cells across southern Lebanon, but consolidated into a political party organization in 1985 when it released a formal manifesto (CFR 2014). The group gained popular support in the 1980s by fighting against occupying IDF forces in southern Lebanon and other communist militias (Global Security). Hezbollah is led by the Shura Council including the group's leader, the Secretary General (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group estimates it had 5,000-10,000 different fighters and additional supporters as of 1993, but this has since dropped to about 500 (Global Security).

### **External Ties**

The group coordinates with Tanzim, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the PFLP (Global Security). It may also provide external support to Tanzim in the Palestinian territories. President Reagan publicly agreed to not negotiate with Hezbollah following the events, but privately set up a secure channel and secured an arms-for-hostages deal (Martin 2011, 256). It is well known that the IRGC supports Hezbollah with money, weapons, training, and other aid totaling up to \$200 million/year (CFR 2014). Syria also supports Hezbollah (Global Security). The group also has a charity and collects support through a Shi'a diaspora around the world (Global Security).

### **Group Outcome**

Hezbollah is still active today and has a strong presence in Lebanese politics (Global Security). It also now operates as a political party in southern Lebanon with massive support in its area of control (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

In 2012, they detonated a bomb in a bus in Bulgaria killing 5 Israelis. In 2014, members were arrested in Peru and Thailand. In 2015, an operative with explosives and weapons was discovered in Cyprus (NCTC). They also support Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria and send soldiers to support him (National Counterterrorism Center). In 2004, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1559 which called for all armed militias in Lebanon to disarm (NCTC). However, Hezbollah has resisted fully disarming and continues engaging in clashes with Israel in southern Lebanon as well as conducting terrorist



attacks against Western targets internationally (Ibid.). After Hezbollah military leader Imad Mughniyah was killed by a vehicle bomb in Damascus in 2008, Hezbollah publicly blamed Israeli and has since increased its rate of attacks against Israeli targets outside the Middle East to a level not seen since the 1990s (Ibid.). Hezbollah gained veto power in the Lebanese government during negotiations in 2008 (Ibid.).

#### IV. ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS

Torg ID: 2072

Min. Group Date: 1987

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: NA

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

##### **Part 1. Bibliography**

##### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Group Formation: This name is too vague for research.

Group End: This name is too vague for research.

##### **Part 3. Narrative**

##### **Group Formation**

This name is too vague for research.

##### **Geography**

This name is too vague for research.

##### **Organizational Structure**

This name is too vague for research.

##### **External Ties**

This name is too vague for research.

##### **Group Outcome**

This name is too vague for research.

V. AIR AND AZAWAK LIBERATION FRONT (FLAA)

Torg ID: 1598

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 1998

Onset: 1991

Aliases: None

**Part 1. Bibliography**

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- "Threat of force against Tuaregs." Keesing's Record of World Events (Formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1931-2014). Volume 38 (1992), Issue No. 1 (January), Page 38708. PDF. gDrive.

- “Government of Niger vs FLAA.” Uppsala Armed Conflict Database. N.d.  
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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: FLAA

Group Formation: 1991

Group End: 1995 (disarm)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The FLAA is an ethno-nationalist Tuareg armed group that formed in October 1991 (Demir 2015; UCDP n.d.). The group sought autonomy and more government policy advancing the Tuareg ethnicity (Demir 2015). The FLAA also advocated for the withdrawal of government forces within the Tuareg region and the wider distribution of the area’s uranium ores (Banks 1998, 683). There is some disagreement over whether the group is better characterized as autonomy-seeking (e.g. Demir) or center-seeking (e.g. UCDP). Its first recorded attack was in 1991 when it launched a rebellion against the Nigerien government, following the concurrent onslaught of other Tuareg rebellions in the area.

### **Geography**

The Tuareg region consists of parts of western Niger, eastern Mali, southeastern Algeria, and western Libya (Global Security n.d.). Information on bases could not be found. The group conducted attacks in Arlit district, Iferouane, and Agadez, Niger (GTD 2017).

### **Organizational Structure**

Rhissa Ag Boula led the group until its end in 1995 (News24 2005; Keesings 1993). Boula became a government minister prior to his arrest for alleged complicity in the murder of a ruling party activist (News24 2005). Another source claims Mohammed Ewangai led the group (Minorities at Risk 2010).

The FLAA consisted of 3,160 members at an unknown date (All Africa 2005). It is alleged that Tuareg members had recently returned from the Islamic Legion in Libya (UCDP n.d.). Members were of the Tuareg ethnicity -- a group of nomads in the Sahara desert (News24 2005). The Tuaregs share a common language, Tamashek (News24 2005).

The FLAA has a military and political wing (Minorities at Risk 2010). The military wing consisted of 400-1,000 members (Banks 1998, 680).

### **External Ties**

On May 12, 1992, Algeria and France served as mediators for a ceasefire agreement between the FLAA and the Niger government (Minorities at Risk 2010). The FLAA is allied with the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Sahara (FPLS), Front for the Liberation of Tamoust (FLT), and Revolutionary Army of the Liberation of Northern Niger (ARLN) (Minorities at Risk 2010). In November 1993, the FLAA and ARLN agreed to suspend contact with the Niger government in mutual retaliation for the government's failure to attend peace talks (Minorities at Risk 2010).

The FLAA was part of the CRA -- a Tuareg umbrella organization that consists of the FPLS, FLAA, and FLT (Minorities at Risk 2010).

### **Group Outcome**

On May 12, 1992, the FLAA and government signed a 15-day ceasefire agreement (Minorities at Risk 2010). Delegations from Algeria and France served as mediators (Minorities at Risk 2010). The group's last recorded attack occurred on September 19, 1992 in Agadez, Niger (GTD 2017). There were no fatalities (GTD 2017).

In March 1993, the FLAA and government agreed to a truce in return for an exchange of all prisoners (Minorities at Risk 2010; Global Security n.d.). It lasted for 6 months (Minorities at Risk 2010). In July 1993, various leaders from the FLAA left and formed the Front for the Liberation of Tamoust (FLT) (Minorities at Risk 2010). The FLAA signed a peace agreement in 1995 (News24 2005).

The group's last recorded attack occurred in 2005, in which rebels kidnapped four soldiers (Minorities at Risk 2010). The soldiers were later released with help from a Libyan NGO (Minorities at Risk 2010). The same year, ex-combatants received economic assistance in the form of micro-loans to further their reintegration (All Africa 2005). On July 17, 2005, the FLAA handed over arms to the Libyan government (Minorities at Risk 2010).

Notes for Iris:

- drought hurt the Tuaregs by undermining feed for cows
- tons of uranium in Niger? Uranium exports constitutes ~70% of Niger's GDP - payoffs not equally distributed to the community
- unclear why there is a 10 year gap in activity between 1995 and 2005

VI. SALAFIST GROUP FOR PREACHING AND FIGHTING (GSPC)

Torg ID: 446

Min. Group Date: 1996

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases:

**Part 1. Bibliography**

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## **Group Formation**

The group formed in 1998 as a splinter group of the GIA. As of 2012, AQIM is still active, mostly in Algeria. The group's original goal was to liberate the Algerian population from FLN rule and create an Islamic state, though now the goal seems to have shifted to global jihad in line with what al-Qaeda generally preaches. The group's ideology is Salafi jihadist. In June 2005, the then-GSPC (precursor to AQIM) killed 15 soldiers in an attack on a Mauritanian army base and, in early 2003, the group kidnapped 32 European tourists.

## **Geography**

The group primarily operates in Algeria, though it has troops in Mali and Mauritania and has expanded somewhat into Tunisia and Libya. Most of its attacks are in Algeria, though many of its bases are in northern Mali. It had prominent attacks in Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal.

## **Organizational Structure**

The leadership of the organization has changed over time. When the group first split from the GIA in 1998, Hassan Hattab (a former GIA member) was the leader. In 2003, however, Nabil Sahraoui ousted him but died less than a year later in 2004. After that, Abdelmalek Droukdal took power, sharing it in an al-Qaeda-like hierarchy, in which there are different divisions (like the Sahara division or branch), all of which have their own commanders. The group operates mostly through cells – like al-Qaeda – with many suicide bombings and smaller group attacks, though at the beginning of the group (before it allied with and became a part of al-Qaeda), the group was more concentrated in Algeria. Given that the group split from the GIA (a brutal radical Islamist organization in Algeria) specifically because of its brutality, the movement seems to have started as a political issue of a difference of opinions on how to go about realizing an Islamic state and turned into a much more militaristic movement afterwards. The group does not seem to have a formal political wing. Many of its supporters are Algerians, mostly men, who fought against the US in Afghanistan and, upon their return, joined AQIM. Apart from that, the group does not seem to recruit from a specific class or ethnic group.

Additionally, the group that was once the GSPC is now a part of al-Qaeda, announced in 2006 by bin Laden's deputy al-Zawahiri. It changed its name to AQIM in January 2007. It's not clear exactly why the merger occurred, though Gazdik states that it's evidence that the GSPC wanted a more global approach, especially because even at the founding of the GSPC, bin Laden and al-Qaeda ideologically supported the group.

## **External Ties**

The group has no apparent external support from other countries, seeming to prefer making money through extortion and hostage-taking. However, the group does have a number of ties to other groups: as a splinter of the GIA, the GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in English) allegedly allied itself with a number of other Islamist groups in the region such as GICT, GICM, and LIFG in order to share resources. However, according to Harmon, there's evidence that these ties deteriorated after 2008 as the group lost some power.

### **Group Outcome**

Governments have taken a number of different approaches to dealing with AQIM. The Algerian government has tried offering the group amnesty if they lay down their arms, raiding, and other military tactics often in conjunction with other governments, and even arresting suspected AQIM members. Other states affected by the AQIM have tried similar tactics, though few seemed to have an effect. The group suffered a major splinter in 2012 when a faction broke away to form the "Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade" (Crenshaw 2016).

## VII. NIGER MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE

Torg ID: 2189

Min. Group Date: 2007

Max. Group Date: 2008

Onset: 2007

Aliases: Movement Of Niger People For Justice (Mnj), Mouvement Des Nig\_riens Pour La Justice, Niger Movement For Justice, Niger Movement For Justice (Mnj)

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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: NMJ

Group Formation: 2007

Group End: 2010

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

In 2007, ex-rebels Amoumane Kalakoua and Aboubacar Alambo formed the Niger Movement for Justice (NMJ). The group formed in response to the failure of the 1995 peace agreement to establish a decentralized governing plan between the government and Tuareg groups (Al Jazeera 2008a; Gleditsch 2013, 596; IFRI 2007). NMJ sought a greater distribution of Niger’s uranium wealth and increased political representation (Al Jazeera 2008a; NYT 2008; Stratfor 2008).

The NMJ’s first attack occurred on June 22, 2007, in Agadez and was targeted against the military (GTD 2017). The incident resulted in 15 fatalities and 43 injured (GTD 2017).



The government discounted the NMJ as a group of bandits and drug traffickers (NYT 2008; Al Jazeera 2008).

## **Geography**

The NMJ operated in northern Niger (Al Jazeera 2008a). The group held territory in eastern Niger (Gleditsch 2013, 733). In an effort to quell Tuareg rebellions, the government cut off the northern Niger region and ruined the region's economy (NYT 2008).

## **Organizational Structure**

Members of the NMJ primarily consisted of the Tuareg ethnicity (Al Jazeera 2008a). However, members of other ethnic groups like the Fulani nomads and Toubou joined as well ((A) Al Jazeera 2008).

Members also include ex-rebels of the FLAA, PCPAA, and rebels previously integrated within Niger's Armed Forces (IFRI 2007). Nomads join the NMJ to protect their land from sedentary farming (Al Jazeera 2008a).

Aghaly ag Alambo led the group (Reuters 2009; MRGI 2008). In 2009, however, the MNJ ousted Alambo for "tricking" the group to conform to agreements with the government (Reuters 2009).

The group had an estimated 700 rebels (Gleditsch 2013, 733). The group did not have a political wing (Gleditsch 2013, 733).

## **External Ties**

Libya worked with the NMJ to produce peace agreements (Reuters 2009). MNJ allegedly received financial and material support from Tuareg diasporas in Libya and Algeria (Gleditsch 2013, 733; IFRI 2007). Niger accused the Libyan government of providing safe haven, but this was denied (McConnell 2020' Gleditsch 2013, 733).

## **Group Outcome**

The group's last recorded attack occurred on June 22, 2008 in Arlit (GTD 2017). There were no fatalities (GTD 2017).

In May 2007, the Niger government earmarked 60 million dollars towards initiatives to fight the NMJ (Al Jazeera 2008). Amnesty International accused the Niger army of inciting human rights abuses in attacks against civilians in retaliation against the NMJ (Al Jazeera 2008). In an effort to quell Tuareg rebellions, the government cut off northern

Niger and ruined the region's economy (NYT 2008). The group disarmed between 2009 and 2010, after peace negotiations (Gleditsch 2013, 596).

Notes for Iris:

-how did the Niger government "ruin" the economy? Government declared northern Niger a war zone which cut off transit to the region and cut off the Tuaregs from the rest of the region → loss in trade opportunity and trade flows

-MNJ rebels thought the leader was agreeing to deals that were really bad for them so they overthrow him (internal coup risk!) -- they coup him (see Comoros)

#### VIII. MUJAO

Torg ID: 2656

Min. Group Date: 2011

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique Occidentale; Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest; MUJWA; Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa; MOJWA; Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa; Movement for Tawheed and Jihad in West Africa; Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa; Jama'at Tawhid Wal Jihad fi Garbi Afriqqiya

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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2011

Group End (Outcome): 2013 (merger)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

MUJWA was a splinter group of AQIM that aimed to overthrow Mali's government and fight against its army forces. The reason the group splintered from AQIM is debated, but generally thought to have stemmed from either a lack of representation in the Malian government or difference in expansionist aims that AQIM could not accommodate (Crenshaw 2016).

MUJWA originally formed in October of 2011 as an offshoot of AQIM for jihadis to cross West Africa (START 2015). Like AQIM, their goal was to spread jihad to places AQIM failed to influence, as well as establish their own Shariah law (Crenshaw 2016; Al Jazeera 2013). The group's first attack took place on October 22, 2011 in Tindouf, Algeria (GTD 2017). The group ascribed to a Salafist jihadist ideology (START 2015).

### **Geography**

The group's first attack took place in Tindouf, Algeria (GTD 2017). After the Malian coup in 2012, the group moved into Mali (Crenshaw 2016). The majority of MUJWA's attacks occur in Mali, but some significant attacks take place in Niger and Algeria (GTD 2017). Their bases are located in Mali (START 2015). The group is transnational.

### **Organizational Structure**

The two founders of the group, Hamad al-Khairi and Ahmed el-Tilemsi, were both former members of AQIM. Another significant leader included Oumar Hamaha, who served as a spokesperson and a military commander before he was shot by French army (Crenshaw 2016; Mackenzie Institute 2016). In 2013, MUJWA merged with a similar wing, the Masked Men Brigade and formed the group: Al-Mourabitoun which was acknowledged as an alleged terrorist organization in 2014 (Northwestern 2013). The group was composed of former Arab fighters of AQIM (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The number of members ranged from 1,000-3,000 fighters (Crenshaw 2016). Members were mostly Tuareg (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

## External Ties

The group received financing from AQIM.

## Group Outcome

In 2013, the group merged with Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade to form al-Murabitoun which ended MUJWA's activity. However, the media continued to attribute the merged group's attacks to MUJWA (Refworld 2012; START 2015; UN Security Council 2012).

### IX. POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE SAHARA

Torg ID: 9053

Min. Group Date: 1994

Max. Group Date: 1994

Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

#### Part 1. Bibliography

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#### Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Front Populaire Pour la Liberation de la Sahara

Group Formation: 1994

Group End: 1994 (last attack), 1995 (disarm)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Sahara (FPLS) formed on January 28, 1994, as one of the four main Tuareg groups fighting against the Nigerien government (Minorities at Risk 2004; Lansford 2015, 1082). There is speculation that it formed when members splintered from the FLAA, but the circumstances surrounding the splinter are unknown (ICG 2013, 50). It formed the same month as the Coordination of Armed Resistance (Lansford 2015, 1082). The group -- along with other Tuareg groups -- fought for increased autonomy and policy reforms including "increased political and governmental participation, demilitarization of Tuareg areas, substantial economic investment in the area, and the teaching of the Tuareg language, Tamashek." (Minorities at Risk 2004).

It is unknown precisely when the group's first violent attack occurred, but was no later than May 16, 1994 (GTD 2019).

#### **Geography**

The group conducted an attack in Tiawa, Niger (GTD 2019). There is no evidence of an external base or transnational attacks in other countries.

#### **Organizational Structure**

Members of the group were Tuareg (Minorities at Risk 2004; Lansford 2015, 1082). The group's original leaders were Mohamed Anako and Issad Kato (Lansford 2015, 1082).

#### **External Ties**

The group worked closely with other Tuareg militant groups including the Air and Azawad Liberation Front (FLAA) and Front for the Liberation of Tamoust (FLT). The group coordinated its efforts with other Tuareg militant groups under the umbrella organization the Coordination of Armed Resistance (CRA) (Minorities at Risk 2004).

#### **Group Outcome**

The group was part of the CRA-led negotiations with the Niger government in 1995 that culminated in the Treaty of the Ouagadougou. The group's last known recorded attack

was in 1994, but it is unclear whether it continued fighting as part of the CRA longer (GTD 2019).

Members of the group later gained political positions within the government. Anako was appointed a special advisor to the president in 1999 and later headed the Nigerien Commission for Peace to help mediate talks with the MNJ during the 2007 uprising (Lansford 2015, 1082).

X. DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR RENEWAL (FDR)

Torg ID: 9054

Min. Group Date: 1995

Max. Group Date: 1995

Onset: 1995

Aliases: NA

**Part 1. Bibliography**

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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Democratic Renewal Front, Front Democratique pour le Renouveau (FDR), Front démocratique pour le renouveau

Group Formation: 1994

Group End: 1997 (last attack), 1998 (disarm after peace agreement)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The Democratic Renewal Front (FDR) formed in May 1994 to fight against the Nigerien government (Lansford 2015, 1082). Others claim the group formed in October 1994 (UCDP n.d.). The group formed in response to a large influx of Chadian Toubou refugees entering Niger during the Chadian Civil War (UCDP n.d.). The FDR was center-seeking and aimed to overthrow the Nigerien government. They proposed replacing it with a federal system that would have “boundaries conforming to ‘geographic and social reality’” (Lansford 2015, 1082). Later, the group’s goals changed and they began to claim increased autonomy for the Toubou regions in eastern Niger (UCDP n.d.).

### **Geography**

The group originally formed in the Lake Chad region near the Nigerian-Chad border (Lansford 2015, 282). The group was active in the Manga and Kawar areas of Niger (UCDP n.d.). A secondary source says the group also operated close to the Libyan border (ICG 2013, 10). This source also claims the group is Tuareg so might not be reliable. There is no evidence of an external base of operations or transnational attacks in other countries.

### **Organizational Structure**

The group’s leader was Ahmed Mohammed, a military officer who had previously served in the Libyan armed forces (Lansford 2015, 1082). Other known leaders of the group included Mamane Kodelami Ali, Goukouni Zene, and Issa Lamine (Lansford 2015, 1082). Other sources cite Lamine Mai Abdouramane and Barka Ouardougou as central leaders of the group (UCDP n.d.). Lamine later went on to head the group and

eventually become a member of the Nigerien government in 2000 (UCDP n.d.; Lansford 2015, 1082). The group's first known violent attack was in 1995 (GTD 2019; UCDP n.d.).

Members of the group were ethnically diverse, including Arab Choa, Toubou, and Kanouri (Lansford 2015, 1082). However, the primary ethnic group was Toubou (Kisangani 2012; UCDP n.d.).

### **External Ties**

The group clashed with Tuareg forces, resulting in at least 40 deaths in early 1995 (Lansford 2015, 1082). The Nigerien government accused Chad of endorsing the FDR rebellion due to inter-Toubou ethnic ties, but there is limited evidence to support this claim (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 694). San-Akca (2016) claims Mali and Nigeria provided safe haven to group members in 1995.

There is some speculation the group was part of the CRA alliance group (Minorities at Risk 2004). There was also a separate Toubou group known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Sahara which might have coordinated efforts with the group.

### **Group Outcome**

In 1995, the group rejected the Treaty of the Ouagadougou as a "facade" and chose to keep fighting. The group fought against the Nigerien government from 1995 to 1997. In May 1996, the group formally withdrew from the peace talks between the government and Tuareg forces following a counterterrorism operation against the group (Minorities at Risk 2004). On August 22, 1998, the FDR signed a ceasefire agreement and demobilized (UCDP n.d.; Peace Agreements 1998; Lansford 2015, 1082).

## **XI. PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT OF NIGER**

Torg ID: 9055

Min. Group Date: 1985

Max. Group Date: 1985

Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=539>
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  - "People's Liberation Front of Niger"
  - Liberation front of Niger



- Liberation Front Tchín Tabaraden

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1985 (first attack)

Group End: 1985 (disappear)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

There is not much information available about this group. The People's Liberation Front of Niger first came to attention as a violent group on May 29, 1985, when it attacked local government offices in Tchín Tabaraden, Niger (GTD 2019). The attack resulted in 3 fatalities. It is unknown what the group's political aims or ideological goals were.

### **Geography**

The group's only known attack occurred in Tchín Tabaraden, Niger (GTD 2019).

### **Organizational Structure**

The attack was carried out by 14 perpetrators, suggesting the group had at least 14 members (GTD 2019). No other information is available about the group's leadership, membership background, organizational structure, or source of funding.

### **External Ties**

There is not much information available about this group and so it is unclear whether the group had any ties to other state or non-state actors.

### **Group Outcome**

The group's last -- and only -- known violent attack was on May 29, 1985, when it attacked local government offices in Tchín Tabaraden, Niger (GTD 2019). The group did not conduct any more attacks after this incident and disappeared.

- XII. SAHARAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FRONT  
Torg ID: 9070

Min. Group Date: 1997  
Max. Group Date: 1997  
Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: FARS, Armed Revolutionary Forces of the Sahara, Forces armées révolutionnaires du Sahara, ARFS

Group Formation: 1997 (first attack)

Group End: 2008 (unknown but eventually disarm)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

It is unclear when FARS forms. Some speculate the group was active in the early Tuareg rebellion of the 1990s and came to attention as a violent group because they refused to accept the terms of the 1995 peace agreement (Massalatchi 2008). The group first came to attention as a violent group in 1997 when it announced an alliance with the UFRA on September 26, 1997, following a joint military attack on the Libya-Niger border (Minorities at Risk 2004).

The group was a Toubou autonomy-seeking group which demanded better economic deals and increased autonomy for the Toubou population (Massalatchi 2008).

### **Geography**

The group -- and the Toubou ethnic minority it represented -- primarily operated around the Lake Chad region in eastern Niger as well as the Kawar and Manga regions (Kisangi 2012; ICG 2013). The group conducted an attack in 1997 with UFRA at the Madam Military base near the Libya border (Minorities at Risk 2004). In 2008, the group clashed with Nigerien forces in Diffa (Massalatchi 2008).

### **Organizational Structure**

Before 2001, the group's leader was Chahayi Barkaye (Lansford 2015, 1082). He died in a counterterrorism operation in 2001 and was later replaced by Barka Ouardougou and Boubacar Mohammed Sogoma (Lansford 2015, 1082). The primary ethnic group was Toubou (Kisangani 2012). It is unclear where members were recruited from.

In 2001, the group had at least 250 members (Lansford 2015, 1082).

### **External Ties**

The group formed an early alliance with UFRA in 1997 and conducted joint military attacks with them (Minorities at Risk 2004). The group later formed an alliance with the MNJ and conducted attacks alongside them (Massalatchi 2008; Lansford 2015, 1082). The group also posted statements under the direction of Bocar Sougoma on the MNJ website (Massalatchi 2008).

### **Group Outcome**

In January 1997, 14 members of the group died in a clash with government forces following a retributive attack against a Canadian aid worker and Nigerien security officers. The attack prompted a ceasefire agreement in June 1997, but this failed to hold as the group chose to ally with UFRA (Lansford 2015, 1082; Minorities at Risk 2004).

In 2001, the Nigerien government launched a massive military crackdown against the group which resulted in the group leader's death. The crackdown caused at least 250 FARS members to demobilize with the assistance of French financial assistance (Lansford 2015, 1082).

Other members remained active and kept fighting. In 2006, the group kidnapped several Italians in the Lake Chad region and reiterated their territorial demands for Toubou people (BBC 2006; Lansford 2015, 1082). In 2008, the group conducted attacks alongside MNJ (Massalatchi 2008).

At an unknown date, additional members of the group disarmed for unknown reasons and integrated into the Nigerien military (ICG 2013, 35). The leader, Barka Wardougou formed a new Toubou militia group in Mourzouk (ICG 2013, 35).