

Malaysia Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 8 July 2012

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T2021	BATALLION ABU BAKAR (BAB)		0	0
T554	PULO ARMY COMMAND COUNCIL		0	0
T364	PULO		1968	2006
T241	JAPANESE RED ARMY (JRA)		1970	1988
T759	COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYSIA-MARXIST-LENINIST		1975	1975
T178	GERAKAN ACEH MERDEKA (GAM)		1976	2005
T1799	MALAYSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY		1980	1988
T28	AL QAEDA		1989	2012
T4	ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG)		1991	2012
T242	JEMAAH ISLAMIYA (JI)		1993	2012
T260	KUMPULAN MUJAHIDIN MALAYSIA (KMM)		1995	0
T980	AL-MAUNAH		1998	2000
T1187	MUJAHIDEEN DIVISION KHANDAQ		2000	0
T475	SRI NAKHARO		2001	0

I. **BATALLION ABU BAKAR (BAB)**

Torg ID: 2021

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Jemaah militants regrouping despite arrest of their leaders.” Gulf News Asia. 2004. <https://gulfnnews.com/news/asia/jemaah-militants-regrouping-despite-arrest-of-their-leaders-1.327991>

-

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2000

Group End: Unknown

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in 2000. The group reportedly originated from Indonesia when it splintered from DI (Gulf News Asia 2004). It is a militant group (Gulf News Asia 2004). In 2000, members of the group attempted to kill Matori Abdul Djalil, former Indonesian defence minister (Gulf News Asia 2004).

Geography

Members of the group attempted to kill Matori Abdul Djalil, former Indonesian defence minister in southern Jakarta (Gulf News Asia 2004).

Organizational Structure

The group was a splinter of Darul Islam (Gulf News Asia 2004). It was grouped as a dangerous threat by the Malaysian intelligence officer with Jemaah Islamiyya, but there is no evidence the two were connected (Gulf News Asia 2004).

External Ties

It was grouped as a dangerous threat by the Malaysian intelligence officer with Jemaah Islamiyya, but there is no evidence the two were connected (Gulf News Asia 2004).

Group Outcome

The group had no known attacks since its attempt to kill Indonesian defence minister in 2000 (Gulf News Asia 2004). In 2004, a Malaysian intelligence officer noted the group might be trying to reorganize, but no further attacks were reported (Gulf News Asia 2004).

II. PULO ARMY COMMAND COUNCIL

Torg ID: 554
Min. Group Date: 0
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- Rohan Gunaratna and Arabind Acharya. "The Terrorist Threat from Thailand: Jihad or Quest for Justice?" Potomac Books. 2013.
https://books.google.com/books?id=ODxnSwlbe84C&pg=PA1988&lpg=PA1988&dq=PULO+ARMY+COMMAND+COUNCIL&source=bl&ots=KfO6dZQY41&sig=wo-thl8ogB7IPNU-Y4ARVWnrDKo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiDz_COW5PcAhUIWq0KHe9xCYkQ6AEIVjAl#v=onepage&q=PULO%20ARMY%20COMMAND%20COUNCIL&f=false
- Bilveer Singh. "The Talibanization of Southeast Asia." Greenwood Publishing. 2007.
https://books.google.com/books?id=-J-jxpelsaUC&pg=PA39&lpg=PA39&dq=PULO+ARMY+COMMAND+COUNCIL&source=bl&ots=0F3Kr5zTGN&sig=w0A_qSdEGR2hmhRIDbjNL4cdgM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiDz_COW5PcAhUIWq0KHe9xCYkQ6AEIUzAH#v=onepage&q=PULO%20ARMY%20COMMAND%20COUNCIL&f=false
- "Pattani United Liberation Organization." Global Security. N.d.
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pulo.htm>
- Ed. Barry Rubin. "Guide to Islamic Movements, Vol. 2." ME Sharpe. 2010.
https://books.google.com/books?id=wEih57-GWQQC&pg=PA105&lpg=PA105&dq=%22PULO+ARMY+COMMAND+COUNCIL%22&source=bl&ots=14UK7bMxQ7&sig=mqdx9zFAM-SkCO0CJ3uCOGe_jeA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiCyyvQxJPcAhUh6oMKHV3vA1gQ6AEISDAE#v=onepage&q=%22PULO%20ARMY%20COMMAND%20COUNCIL%22&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1992

Group End: Unknown

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed in 1992 after PULO splintered (Gunaratna and Acharya 2013). The exact date of the group's first violent attack is unknown. PULO is a Thai separatist group that fights against the Thai government in areas that are predominately Malay (Global

Security n.d.). The group abides to an ethnonationalist ideology; it is part of the larger separatist movement in southern Thailand (Global Security n.d.). The group supports the original aims of PULO (Global Security n.d.). They also allegedly supported an individual named “Tuanku Abdul Kade” but it is unclear exactly who this is or if it is a misspelling of PULO’s founder Tuanku Biyo Kodoniyo (Global Security n.d.).

Geography

The group operates in the southern Thailand region (Gunaratna and Acharya 2013).

Organizational Structure

The group is headed by a man named Haji Sama-ae Thanam (Gunaratna and Acharya 2013; Singh 2007; Global Security n.d.). The group is also reportedly headed by a man named Hajji Sama-ae Thanam (Rubin 2010). The group formed when PULO split into two different factions (Gunaratna and Acharya 2013; Singh 2007; Global Security n.d.). The first faction became the PULO Leadership Council while the second became the PULO Army Command Council (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group formed when PULO split into two different factions (Gunaratna and Acharya 2013; Singh 2007; Global Security n.d.). The first faction became the PULO Leadership Council while the second became the PULO Army Command Council (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

It is unknown when the group launched its first or last attack, but it formed in 1992. The group’s current status is unknown.

Notes for Iris:

- there was no evidence that the group was ever actually violent despite splintering
- leaders were arrested which caused part of the original splinter

- III. PULO
Torg ID: 364
Min. Group Date: 1968
Max. Group Date: 2006
Onset: NA

Aliases: Pattani United Liberation Organization (Pulo), PULO, Pulo

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Pattani United Liberation Organization.” Global Security. N.D.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pulo.htm>
- Islam, Syed Serajul. "The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines." Asian Survey 38, no. 5 (1998): 441-56.
doi:10.2307/2645502.
- “Thailand/Malay Muslims.” DADM Project. University of Central Arkansas. N.D.
<http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/thailandmalay-muslims-1948-present/>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Thailand: Information on the status, history and activities of the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), 1 January 1994, THA15742.E, available at:
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ac7774.html>
- “Patani United Liberation Organization.” Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford Islamic Studies. N.D. <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1836>
- Seth Jones and Martin Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End. RAND Corporation. 2008. P. 173.http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- Fearon and Laitin. “Random Narratives: Thailand.” 2005.
<https://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/ThailandRN1.3.pdf>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1968

Group End: 1992 (split)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group was created in 1968 (Global Security n.d.). It was formed by exiled Patani leaders in Saudi Arabia and Malaysia; as a result, religion mixed in with the nationalist movement (Fearon and Laitin 2005). The group’s first violent attack was also in 1968 (UCA n.d.). It is part of the larger Thai separatist movement in the Pattani region (Global Security n.d.). It represents the Malay people and campaigns against Thai colonialism (Global Security n.d.). The group attempted to murder King Bhumibol and Queen Siriki (UCA n.d.). It campaigns for the autonomy of the Muslims living in the southern part of Thailand (Canada IRB 1994).

Geography

The group has an external base. The headquarters of the group is based in Malaysia (Global Security n.d.). The group launched an attack in Tambon Sateng, located in the Yala province (UCA n.d.). The group has also launched an attack in the Mayo district (UCA n.d.). The group wants autonomy for the following provinces: Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Satun (Canada IRB 1994).

Organizational Structure

At its peak, the group had approximately 300 soldiers (Global Security n.d.). The group was created by a man named Tuanku Biyo Kodoniyo (Global Security n.d.). The group is mainly made up of Muslims (Canada IRB 1994). The group mainly receives the support of young Muslims living in the Patani region of Thailand (Canada IRB 1994). The group also received support, including moral and financial support, from Malaysians and Malaysian organizations (Oxford Islamic Studies n.d.). Those associated with the Islamic Party of Malaysia have also offered support for the group (Oxford Islamic Studies n.d.).

External Ties

In 1992, the group split into two separate groups: the first group (PULO 88) was led by a man named Dr. A-rong Muleng and the second group (Caddan Army) was led by a man named Hayihadi Mindosali (Global Security n.d.). The group has received support from the Islamic Party of Malaysia and ambiguous support from individuals in the Middle East (Canada IRB 1994). The group is supported by young Muslims living in the Patani region of Thailand (Canada IRB 1994). The group also received support, including moral and financial support, from Malaysians and Malaysian organizations (Oxford Islamic Studies n.d.).

Group Outcome

In 1992, the group split into two separate groups: the first group was led by a man named Dr. A-rong Muleng and the second group was led by a man named Hayihadi Mindosali (Global Security n.d.). In 1998, several leaders belonging to the two new PULO groups along with the leaders from the original PULO group were arrested, significantly lowering the overall morale of the group (Global Security n.d.). Afterwards, PULO 88 and Caddan Army tried to reunite and carry out joint operations (Global Security n.d.). There has been consistent violence in the Pattani province as a result of Islamic militants (UCA n.d.).

IV. JAPANESE RED ARMY (JRA)

Torg ID: 241

Min. Group Date: 1970

Max. Group Date: 1988

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Japanese Red Army.” FAS. 2003. <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/jra.htm>
- “Japanese Red Army (JRA).” Global Security. n.d. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/jra.htm>
- “Japanese Red Army leader arrested.” BBC. 2000. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1012780.stm>
- “Japanese Red Army.” Encyclopedia of Terrorism. ed. Harvey Kushner. SAGE Publications. 2003. <http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/terrorism/n217.xml>
- GTD Perpetrator 3020. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3020>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1970

Group End: 2001

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed after breaking away from the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction in 1970 (Global security n.d.; FAS 2003; SAGE Publications 2003). The group’s first attack was in 1970 (GTD 2017). The group’s goals are reportedly to overthrow the Japanese government and to bring about a world revolution (Global security n.d.; FAS 2003). The group carried out plane hijackings, hostage taking, and homicide (BBC 2000). The group reportedly originated from student protests in Japan (SAGE Publications 2003).

Geography

The group was reportedly hiding outside Japan (Global security n.d.). The group has reportedly organized cells in Manila and Singapore (Global security n.d.). The group no longer operates in Japan, but members of the group are stationed in places such as Lebanese camps, Peru, and Colombia (Global security n.d.). The group is formally based in parts of Lebanon that are controlled by Syria (Global security n.d.; FAS 2003). The group has launched attacks in Italy, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Netherlands, Singapore, Israel, and Japan (FAS 2003).

Organizational Structure

The group was led by a woman named Fusako Shigenobu (Global security n.d.). The group consists of about six core members, and at its peak, it had around 30 to 40 members (FAS 2003). Many members of the group came from JCL, which is possibly the Japanese wing of the Red Army group (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group reportedly has ties with another group called the Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (Global Security n.d.; FAS 2003). The group also reportedly has links with Palestinian terrorist groups (Global security n.d.; SAGE Publications 2003). The group also reportedly has ties with another group called the Antiwar Democratic Front (FAS 2003).

Group Outcome

Shigenobu was arrested in 2000; after her arrest, she declared that she was going to carry out her goals in the form of a political party instead of as a violent group (FAS 2003). The group disbanded in 2001 (FAS 2003). The group's last violent attack was in 1988 (GTD 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- super rare that it had a female leader
- the group was only violent through the 80s
- conflicting information about the group's origins. We think student protests led to the creation of the Japanese Communist League and then this group splintered from them
- transnational activity is hindrance? Help? Allows them to survive longer, but less likely to obtain goals?

V. COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYSIA- MARXIST-LENINIST

Torg ID: 759

Min. Group Date: 1975

Max. Group Date: 1975

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- Murray Heibert. "From Guns to Rubber: Malay leftist insurgents accept Thai amnesty." Christian Science Monitor. 1987. <https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0702/othai.html>
- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Malaysia." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988.

<https://books.google.com/books?id=Up4uDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA615&lpg=PA615&dq=COMMUNIST+PARTY+OF+MALAYSIA-+MARXIST-LENINIST&source=bl&ots=RwMuLyFjke&sig=Ac1DocC7qMbIpJOVqyrGdJpYwSs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjbi8bTxJPcAhVm64MKHaTNAEQ4ChDoAQg4MAI#v=onepage&q=COMMUNIST%20PARTY%20OF%20MALAYSIA-%20MARXIST-LENINIST&f=false>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1970

Group End: Unknown

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed in 1970 when it splintered from the Communist Party of Malaysia (Schmid and Jongman 1988). At the time, the Communist Party of Malaysia had begun to falter in strength as its long-running insurgency against the British and then Malaysian governments began to lose support. It formed when the 8th regiment and the 2nd district of the 12th regiment joined together (Schmid and Jongman 1988). It had similar aims as the Communist Party of Malaysia to create a communist state, but notably differed from the CPN-M in that it focused on urban, rather than jungle, warfare to achieve its aims (Schmid and Jongman 1988).

It is unclear when its first violent attack occurred as Malaysian forces did not identify it as a credible threat until 1974 (Schmid and Jongman 1988).

Geography

The group had an external base around Betong, Thailand (Schmid and Jongman 1988).

Organizational Structure

In the early 1980s, the group had approximately 500 members (Schmid and Jongman 1988). 644 members of the group later turned themselves in to the Thai army in 1987 (Heibert 1987). Since members came from the original CPM, it is likely they were ethnic Chinese.

External Ties

The group was a splinter of the Communist Party of Malaysia (Schmid and Jongman 1988). It formed when the 8th regiment and the 2nd district of the 12th regiment joined

together (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The group funded itself through growing rubber, producing light bulbs, and extorting tax money from citizens living in the region (Heibert 1987).

Group Outcome

The group began to fall apart after police successfully infiltrated the group around Betong and gained valuable intelligence from key informers (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The group turned themselves into the Thai army in 1987 and agreed to disband under an amnesty agreement (Heibert 1987). The group's last violent attack was also in 1987 (Heibert 1987).

Notes for Iris:

- the CPM was falling apart by 1970 and the CPM-ML splintered around the same time
- unclear if it was any different in terms of ideology or political aims

VI. GERAKAN ACEH MERDEKA (GAM)

Torg ID: 178

Min. Group Date: 1976

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: NA

Aliases: Free Aceh Movement (Gam), Aceh Security Disturbance Movement, Free Aceh Movement, Free Aceh Movement Government Council (Mp-Gam), Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Gam), Gerakin Aceh Merdeka (Gam)

Part 1. Bibliography

- "GAM." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3600, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-gP05IM7aH41bHYL4ffcS-M8YqOHaFI4seuTSCvGAvs/edit>
- "Indonesia (Aceh), 1976-2000." Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan. Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies. 2013. RAND.
- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Indonesia." Political Terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature. Transaction Publishers. 1988. P. 575. Attached.
- "Free Aceh (Aceh Merdeka)." FAS. 1999. <https://fas.org/irp/world/para/aceh.htm>
- "Free Aceh Movement." Global Security. N.D. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/aceh.htm>
- "Profile: Aceh's separatists." BBC. 2002. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2558165.stm>
- "Aceh's Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)." International Crisis Group. 2006.

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/aceh-s-local-elections-role-free-aceh-movement-gam>

- “Aceh Redux: the tsunami that helped stop a war.” IRIN News. 2014.
<http://www.irinnews.org/report/100960/aceh-redux-tsunami-helped-stop-war>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1976

Group End: 2005

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group reportedly formed in the mid-1970s and issued a declaration of independence in 1976 (MIPT 2008; Global Security n.d.; BBC 2002; Schmid and Jongman 1988). It seeks to form an independent Islamic kingdom in Aceh, a province located in Sumatra, an Indonesian island (MIPT 2008; FAS 1999; Global Security n.d.; Schmid and Jongman 1988). It is considered one of Indonesia’s three most troubled areas (FAS 1999). Aceh, despite being independent throughout history, was incorporated into Indonesia in 1943 (MIPT 2008; BBC 2002). Resentment rose among the citizens of Aceh after its political autonomy was diminished (MIPT 2008; IRIN News 2014; BBC 2002). Citizens of Aceh also opposed the Indonesian government’s exploitation of its natural resources and brutal killings of Aceh citizens (MIPT 2008; IRIN News 2014; FAS 1999). The group has launched attacks on the Indonesian military and Exxon-Mobil (natural gas facility) (MIPT 2008). The group has taken part in negotiations with the Indonesian government; however, the Indonesian government stressed special autonomy for the region as the goal of the negotiations while the group desired independence (MIPT 2008; Global Security n.d.). The group’s attacks were centered around Indonesian security personnel, police, and civilians (MIPT 2008). The group’s attacks against the government have resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis (IRIN News 2014). Thousands have been displaced due to violence (IRIN News 2014). The group reportedly takes part in extortion and intimidation (BBC 2002).

Geography

The group is based in the Aceh province of Indonesia (IRIN News 2014; FAS 1999; Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The group was founded by a man named Hasan di Tiro, who was exiled to Sweden (MIPT 2008; BBC 2002). Another leader of the group was man named Irwandi Yusuf,

who was then arrested (IRIN News 2014). After Hasan di Tiro's exile, he formed a splinter group called the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (MIPT 2008). Its rival faction is known as the Free Aceh Movement Government Council, led by a man named Teungku Don Zulfari based in Malaysia (MIPT 2008). The group started out with approximately 150 fighters and grew to about 2,000-3,000 fighters (BBC 2002).

External Ties

The group has received support from Iran and Libya (MIPT 2008). It, however, claims to not have any anti-U.S. sentiments and even supports its war on terrorism (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

Internal complications arose in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta on how to react to the group (MIPT 2008). Some favored imposing intense military force onto the region (MIPT 2008). The U.S. Government pressured the group to accept the political settlement of autonomy within the country (MIPT 2008). In 2004, after a tsunami hit the region, the group resumed its negotiations with the government after it lifted military emergency law from the region (MIPT 2008; IRIN News 2014; Global Security n.d.). In 2005, a peace treaty was signed, granting Aceh local self-governance (MIPT 2008; IRIN News 2014; Global Security n.d.). The group then disarmed and its members were granted amnesty (MIPT 2008; IRIN News 2014). Since then the group has been inactive (MIPT 2008; IRIN News 2014). The group has reportedly tried to exploit tsunami and war funds to allocate jobs for its former fighters (IRIN News 2014). The peace treaty is fragile and discontent is still present among citizens of Aceh (IRIN News 2014). In 2006, the first elections were held in Aceh, with former guerillas running for office (BBC 2002). Old guard leadership and younger fighters that took part in the conflict presented conflicting opinions during the elections when it came to policies and choosing candidates (BBC 2002). Hasan di Tiro, the leader of the group, was reportedly killed in 1980 (Schmid and Jongman 1988).

VII. MALAYSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Torg ID: 1799

Min. Group Date: 1980

Max. Group Date: 1988

Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, Malaysia: 1. What is the attitude of the Malaysian authorities to Communism/communists? 2. Do the authorities charge, detain in prison and/or restrain the movement of communists? 3. Could the authorities institute other actions such as "instigating violence", "creating public unrest", and "anti-national activities" to mask action against communists? 4. Is Malaysia branding the human rights movement as communists? 5. What is the ISA Act, (Internal Security Act) in Malaysia? 6.

Is it generally accepted that the ethnic Chinese have spread the Communist ideology in Malaysia? 7. What rights of association, freedom of movement, workers' rights (the right to organize and bargain collectively) and anti-discrimination rights are held by Malaysian citizens?, 16 December 2005, MYS17707, available at:

<http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b6fe2ab0.html>

- Fujio Hara. "The Malayan Communist Parties as Recorded in the Comintern Files." Yusof Ishak Institute. 2016. No. 1. <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/WP2016-01.pdf>
- Rizal Yaakop. "Malaysian Communist Party (MCP): Explaining Its Early Political Orientation." Research Gate. N.D. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mohd_Yaakop/publication/228197619_Malaysian_Communist_Party_MCP_Explaining_its_Early_Political_Orientation/links/5670f77008ae0d8b0cc105f6/Malaysian-Communist-Party-MCP-Explaining-its-Early-Political-Orientation.pdf
- GTD Perpetrator 2538, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2538>
- Karl Hack. "The Long March of Peace of the Malayan Communist Party in Southern Thailand." Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula. Ed. Michael John Montesano, Patrick Jory. NUS Press. 2008. <https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=B-wIX4SSp1MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA173&dq=malayan+communist+party&ots=MsDhjuNiqy&sig=ZfJQkCpe4PEuKp3pLjMpcfdsztE#v=onepage&q=malayan%20communist%20party&f=false>
- Albert Jongman and Schmid. Political Terrorism. "Thailand" p. 671. 1988. https://books.google.com/books?id=NgDks1hUjhMC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=thailand&f=false
- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Malaysia." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. <https://books.google.com/books?id=Up4uDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA615&lpg=PA615&dq=COMMUNIST+PARTY+OF+MALAYSIA-+MARXIST-LENINIST&source=bl&ots=RwMuLyFjke&sig=Ac1DocC7qMblpJOVqyrGdJpYwSs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjb8bTxJPcAhVm64MKHaTNAEQ4ChDoAQg4MAI#v=onepage&q=COMMUNIST%20PARTY%20OF%20MALAYSIA-%20MARXIST-LENINIST&f=false>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Communist Party of Malaysia

Group Formation: 1930

Group End: 1989

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The politico-military group formed in 1930 as a political organization. It was banned in 1948 after it launched a rebellion against the British government (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Yaakop n.d.; Hara 2016; Australia RRT 2005). It was reportedly inspired by the Indonesian communist party and the Chinese communist party (Yaakop n.d.).

Australian, New Zealand, and British forces helped suppress the insurrection that killed more than 11,000 people (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The group was formed as an outgrowth of Communist International (Hack 2008; Hara 2016). It organized anti-Japanese activities with support from the British during the Japanese occupation of the state (Hack 2008). The group's goals were to create a Chinese community inside Malaysia, gain independence from British colonization, establish a communist socialist state in Malaysia, and lastly to gain political power (Yaakop n.d.).

Geography

The Malayan National Liberation Army was organized by the group to carry out guerilla activities at Malaysia's border with Thailand (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The group launched attacks in the city of Ban Yarom in Malaysia and Sadao in Thailand (Schmid and Jongman 1988).

Organizational Structure

The group was formed as an outgrowth of Communist International (Hack 2008; Hara 2016). The party was led by a man named Chin Peng (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The head of propaganda was reportedly a man named Fu Tai-Keng and the head of organization is a man named Wu Ching (Hara 2016). They were both arrested (Hara 2016). The group consisted of approximately 15,000 ethnic Chinese men from rural villages (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Hack 2008; Hara 2016; Australia RRT 2005). Other size estimates suggest that the group had 3500 guerillas in 1975, and the number fell to 2,500 in 1978 and 1,300 in 1987 (Schmid and Jongman 1988).

External Ties

The group was supported by China but the type of support is unspecified (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The Malayan National Liberation Army was organized by the group to carry out guerilla activities at Malaysia's border with Thailand (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The group was formed as an outgrowth of Communist International (Hack 2008; Hara 2016).

Group Outcome

Forces from Malaysia and Thailand organized operations against the group; the headquarters for the group was reportedly captured in 1987 (Schmid and Jongman

1988; Australia RRT 2005). The group accepted an amnesty issued by the Thai government in 1987(Schmid and Jongman 1988). In 1989, the group formally disarmed as part of the Peace Accord of Hat Yai.

Notes for Iris:

- they are a political movement that turns violent
- in 1948 they turn violent although there is no clear catalyst
- Communist International was a global communist movement of which CPM was a member. ChiCom and IndoCom were also part of the Communist International.
- they originally fought against the British. They mainly operated along the Thai-Malay border and only stopped operations after the Thai government initiated a major amnesty program in the late 1980s. Note for Iris - the amnesty program is dated around 1987 so it is probably part of the CPT amnesty program as well.
- surprise launch of insurrection in 1948 seems unusual
- ethnic networks might have provided an advantage
- they also received extensive support from China which could help explain

VIII. AL QAEDA

Torg ID: 28

Min. Group Date: 1989

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qa'ida, Al Qaeda, Al Qaida, Al-Qa`Ida, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qa'idat Al-Jihad, The Base

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Al-Qaida (The Core)." Terrorism Profiles. Mackenzie Institute. 2015.
<http://mackenzieinstitute.com/al-qaida-2/>
- "Al Qaeda: Inside the Terror Network." Frontline. PBS.
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/network/alqaeda/indictment.html>
- Jayshree Bajoria, and Greg Bruno. "al-Qaeda Backgrounder." Council on Foreign Relations. 2012.
<http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaeda-k-al-qaida-al-qaida/p9126>
- Martha Crenshaw. "Al Qaeda" Mapping Militant Organizations. 2015.
<https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/21>
- "Al-Qaida." US State Department FTO Profiles. 2005.
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65479.pdf>
- Ken Katzman. "Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment." Congressional Research Services. FAS. 2005. <https://www.fas.org/sqp/crs/terror/RL33038.pdf>

- Ty McCormick. "Al Qaeda: A Short History." Foreign Policy. 2014.
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/17/al-qaeda-core-a-short-history/>
- "Al-Qaida / Al-Qaeda (The Base)." Global Security.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm>
- Seth Jones and Martin Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End* RAND. 2008.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- "Al-Qa'ida." BAAD Database. Project on Violent Conflict. 2015.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/al-qaida>
- "Evidence of Financial Links between Saudi Royal Family and Al Qaeda." New York Times. N.d.
<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/documents/evidence-of-financial-links-between-saudi-royal-family-and-al-qaeda>
- Andrew Wander. "A history of terror: Al Qaeda 1988-2008." Guardian (UK). 2008.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/13/history.alqaida>
- "Timeline of al Qaida." The Guardian. N.d.
<https://www.theguardian.com/alqaida/page/0,12643,852377>
- Jason Burke. "Rags to riches story of the bin Laden family is woven with tragedy." Guardian. 2015.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/01/rags-to-riches-story-of-the-bin-laden-family-is-woven-with-tragedy>
- "A biography of Osama bin Laden." from "Hunting bin Laden." 2001. Frontline Investigations. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/bio.html>
- "The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are aiding terrorists in Yemen." Washington Post. 2018.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/08/29/the-united-arab-emirates-and-saudi-arabia-are-aiding-terrorists-in-yemen/?utm_term=.ebf9b28f987c

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active) (Crenshaw 2015)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Al-Qaida was founded by Osama Bin Laden in 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's initial goals were to completely remove Western influence/ideas and to abolish the United States and Israel (BAAD 2015). They conducted their first attacks against the US embassy in Africa in 1998 (BAAD 2015; Global Security N.D). Al-Qaida first came to global attention after 9/11 but

was active prior to that in its region (FAS 2005). The group has a radical sunni muslim ideology (CFR 2012; Global Security N.D).

Geography

Al-Qaida operated mainly within Peshawar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (CFR 2012; PBS N.D). The group hid within cities and hills with particularly mountainous terrain in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan (as shepherd or farmers) (FAS 2005). The group's leader Bin Laden has had a base of operations in Sudan from 1991-1998 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Organizational Structure

Al-Qaida was headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was their sole leader and called all the shots until his assassination in 2011 (although rumors exist that he died earlier or didn't die at all) (CFR 2012). He was originally from Saudi Arabia and had helped fight the Soviets in the Afghanistan war (Crenshaw 2015) He was later replaced by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2011 after bin Laden was killed by an American raid (Crenshaw 2015; CFR 2012) The group used a complex system in which members reported to couriers who reported to other couriers eventually making their way up to the head who was initially Bin Laden (RAND 2008). This is what we call a decentralized or cell-based organizational structure. Funding for the organization came from many places, including donations (FTO 2005). The group had different councils to deal with different aspects. For example, they had a "military committee" to deal with "military" matters, and a "consultation council" to plan out terrorist attacks and deal with financial matters (PBS N.D). They have no formal political wing (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida can be considered an umbrella group that consisted of many other terrorist groups within (ibid; Global Security N.D). The organization had an estimated 75 members when it was first formed and up to 18,000 at its peak in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015). Today, it is thought to have less than 1000 members, but these estimates vary (Crenshaw 2015; BAAD 2015).

External Ties

Saudi Arabia allegedly gave some funding to AQ through drug trafficking and diamonds, but these were never proven true (Crenshaw 2015). Iran also allegedly trained and supported AQ members in the early 1990s (ibid; BAAD 2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan allow Al-Qaeda to operate training camps within their borders (ibid). The group has ties to several other terrorist organizations including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Jemaah Islamiya (CFR 2012; PBS N.D).

Group Outcome

The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to find and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements operating in Afghanistan (BAAD 2015). The group's first leader

Osama bin Laden was killed during a raid in 2011 (CFR 2012; BAAD 2015). The group is still active today.

IX. ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG)

Torg ID: 4

Min. Group Date: 1991

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Abu Sayyaf Group (Asg), Abu Sayyaf Group, Al-Harakat Al-Islamiyah, Bearer Of The Sword

Part 1. Bibliography

- Abu Sayyaf Group (Asg), Terrorist Organization Profile No. 204, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MBsjzdJ74dLv_SbHEa6mRxBdxV99Sf6LMrOJibOMyEY/edit
- “Philippines unrest: Who are the Abu Sayyaf group?,” BBC, Last Modified 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36138554>
- “Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),” National Counterterrorism Center, Last Modified 2014, https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/abu_sayyaf.html
- “Abu Sayyaf Groups (Philippines, Islamist Separatists),” Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, Last Modified May 27, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/philippines/abu-sayyaf-group-philippines-islamist-separatists/p9235>
- “Abu Sayyaf Group,” Terrorism Profiles, Mackenzie Institute, 2015, <http://mackenzieinstitute.com/abu-sayyaf-group-asg-2/>
- Martha Crenshaw. “Abu Sayyaf Group,” Mapping Militants Project. Last Modified 2015. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/152>
- “Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),” Australian National Security, <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/AbuSayyafGroup.aspx>
- “Who are the Abu Sayyaf Group?” CNN, 2016, <http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/04/08/Abu-Sayyaf-terrorist-organization.html>
- Fellman, Zack. Abu Sayyaf Group. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011.

Part 2. Basic Coding Changes

Aliases: Mujahedeen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF) (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015), Al Harakat Al Islamiyya (AHAI) , Al-Harakatul-Islamia, Al Harakat Al Aslamiya, Abou Sayaf Armed Band (ASAB), Abu Sayyef Group (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

Group Formation: No proposed changes

Group End (Outcome): Still Active as of 2019

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, a former MNLF member, formed the Abu Sayyaf Group in 1991 (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Mackenzie Institute 2015; CNN 2016; Fellman 2011). Janjalani became dissatisfied with the MNLF's strategy and developed ASG as a more radical alternative to establishing a Muslim Moro State (Crenshaw 2015; Fellman 2011). The splinter group is separatist and Islamist (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

ASG's first recorded use of violence was a grenade attack in Zamboanga City, on April 4, 1991, that left two Christian Americans dead (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015). ASG specifically targets Christians and foreigners in their attacks, though most of their victims are Filipino (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009).

Geography

Originally, ASG aimed to establish an independent Muslim state in Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, Borneo, and Southern Thailand (MIPT Knowledge Base 2008).

The majority of ASG's attacks occurred in the Mindanao and Sulu regions (Crenshaw 2015). In 1991, ASG attacked American Christians in Zamboanga City (Crenshaw 2015). In 2016, ASG perpetrated an attack in Basilan (Crenshaw 2015). There have also been numerous ASG attacks in Manila (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015).

In 2000, ASG conducted a kidnapping in Sidapan, Malaysia (Mackenzie Institute 2015). In 2014, ASG killed 21 Muslims on the island of Jolo in the southwest Philippines. (Crenshaw 2015).

Organizational Structure

Abdujarak Janjalani initially led ASG (Crenshaw 2015). Janjalani radicalized after studying with the Islamic Tabligh and travelling around the Middle East, specifically Libya, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (Crenshaw 2015). The newest ASG leader is Isnilon Hapilon (CNN 2016).

ASG uses traditional clan and familial structures to organize its factions (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

ASG primarily recruited members young Muslim men in and around Mindanao (Australian National Security n.d.). Recruited members typically had few other career options due to the struggling Philippine economy (Crenshaw 2015).

ASG has an estimated 200-500 core members, and up to 2000 supporters (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; Council on Foreign Relations 2009). Other estimates suggest that ASG has approximately 400 members (BBC 2016; Mackenzie Institute 2015; Australian National Security).

Al Qaeda funded ASG and trained their members (Crenshaw 2015). Mohammad Jamal Khalifa provided financial support, and Ramzi Yousef provided tactical support for ASG (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Fellman 2011).

After the loss of Al Qaeda support, ASG relied on ransom and extortion to fund its activities (Crenshaw 2015; MITP Knowledge Base 2008; Australian National Security; Mackenzie Institute 2015). Along with ransom, ASG procures funding through blackmail, extortion, smuggling, and marijuana sales (Crenshaw 2015).

External Ties

ASG has an informal connection with Al Qaeda because Janjalani met Bin Laden while studying in the Middle East (Crenshaw 2015; Fellman 2011). ASG may have been secretly funded by Libya (Crenshaw 2015). After Janjalani's death in 1998, ASG split into two factions: one led by Abubakar's brother Khadaffy Janjalani, and the other led by Galib Andang (also known as Commander Robot) (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2016; MITP Knowledge Base 2008; Fellman 2011). The two factions merged when Galib Andang was captured in 2003, but ASG has since operated as a collection of independent groups linked by a common purpose (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2016; Council on Foreign Relations 2009).

ASG has ties to Jemaah Islamiya (JI), the MILF, and Mujahidin Indonesia Timu (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; CNN 2016; BBC 2016). The extent of these ties is unclear. A professional bomb maker, Mohammad Khattab, was found deceased after fighting alongside ASG in the Philippines (BBC 2016).

In 2014, Isnilon Hapilon, as ASG leader, pledged his allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State in a YouTube video (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015; Australian National Security; CNN 2016).

ASG is unwilling to negotiate with the Philippine Government (Crenshaw 2015).

Group Outcome

As of 2015, ASG has been active (Crenshaw 2015). The Philippine government has killed key ASG leaders such as Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, Khadafy Janjalani, Albader Parad, Abu Sulaima, and Alhamser Limbong, as well as arresting Galib Andang and Abdul Basir Lati (Crenshaw 2015; Fellman 2011). ASG has deteriorated from its religious roots and now engages in more criminal activity to disrupt the Philippine government and fund itself (MITP Knowledge Base 2008).

ASG suffered a major leadership blow when a 2006 US-led operation known “Oplan Ultimatum” killed Janjali. Consequentially, ASG lost its last centralized leader (Fellman 2011; Mackenzie Institute 2015). His successor, Sulaiman, was killed in 2007 (Mackenzie Institute 2015). Leadership fell apart until Isnail Hapilon took over the group again and pledged allegiance to ISIS (Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Mackenzie Institute 2015; CNN 2016).

Recently, the Philippine Army and Police Force has targeted ASG (BBC 2016).

The U.S. military assisted the Philippine government in ending a nearly three week siege in the southern city of Marawi (Pitman 2017). The ASG and Maute militant groups had carried out the siege (Pitman 2017). On May 20, 2017, President Duterte declared martial law on the island of Mindanao (Branigin 2017).

- X. JEMAAH ISLAMIYA (JI)
Torg ID: 242
Min. Group Date: 1993
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Jemaah Islamiya (Ji), Jemaah Islamiah

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Profile: Jemaah Islamiah.” 2012. BBC. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16850706>
- “Jemaah Islamiyah.” Last Updated 2009. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/jemaah-islamiah-aka-jemaah-islamiah>
- “Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).” N.D. Australian National Security. Australian Government. <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/JemaahIslamiyahJI.aspx>
- “Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).” N.D. Counter Extremism Project. <https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/jemaah-islamiah-ji>
- Martha Crenshaw. “Jemaah Islamiyah.” Last Updated 2015. Mapping Militant Organizations. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/251>
- “Jemaah Islamiyah.” N.D. Para-Military Groups Southeast Asia. Global Security. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ji.htm>

- David Gordon and Samuel Lindo. "Jemaah Islamiya." 2011. Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Transnational Threats Project. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Case Study Number 6.
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/111101_Gordon_JemaahIslamiyah_WEB.pdf
- "Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)." 2016. Mackenzie Institute.
<http://mackenzieinstitute.com/jemaah-islamiyyah-ji/>
- International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Current Status, 3 May 2007, Asia Briefing N°63, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/46481a532.html>
- United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 - Philippines, 2 June 2016, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/57518d91a.html>
- Sidney Jones (2005) The changing nature of Jemaah Islamiyah, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59:2, 169-178
- "Jemaah Islamiya." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3613, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Jema'a Islamiyya, Jema'a Islamiyyah, Jema'ah Islamiyah, Jema'ah Islamiyyah, Jemaa Islamiya, Jemaa Islamiyya, Jemaah Islamiyya, Jemaa Islamiyyah, Jemaah Islamiyyah, Jemaah Islamiya, Jemaah Islamiyah, Jamaa Islamiya, Jemaah Islam, Jemahh Islamiyah, Jama'ah Islamiyah, Al-Jama'ah Al Islamiyyah, Islamic Group and Islamic Community (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Group Formation: JI was formed in 1993, but the first recorded attack was in December of 2000 (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Crenshaw 2015).

Group End: JI is still active. Their last successful attack was in 2009 (Crenshaw 2015; Counter Extremism Project n.d.)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There are reports of groups calling themselves Jemaah Islamiyah as early as the 1970's, but these groups were informal gatherings of Indonesian Muslims with similar beliefs (Global Security n.d.). JI was founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in the late 1980s when they fled from Indonesia to Malaysia (Crenshaw 2015; Australian National Security n.d.; Gordon 2011 pg 3), to escape prison sentences for their affiliation with Darul Islam (DI), a former Indonesian insurgency (Crenshaw 2015).

In 1992 Sungkar had an ideological dispute with fellow DI leader Ajengan Masduki, which led him to leave DI and form JI (Gordon 2011 pg 3). JI became an official group in 1993 (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

JI's goal was to overthrow the Indonesian government and establish an Islamic State encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and the southern Philippines (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Global Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). In Malaysia they began to gather a group of Southeast Asian Muslims to send to Afghanistan for military training and for fighting the Soviet Red Army (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Gordon 2011 pg 3; Mackenzie Institute 2016). While training in Afghanistan JI members made lasting connections with Afghan militant leaders including Osama Bin Laden (Gordon 2011 pg 3). Al Qaeda influenced JI leaders to use violent "Holy War" tactics to achieve their goals (BBC 2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2009).

JI relocated several training camps to the Philippines by the mid-1990's (Crenshaw 2015). The first verifiable attack by JI was a string of attacks on Christian Churches and clergy members throughout Southeast Asia in December of 2000 (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Refworld 2016 pg 3). In the early 2000s Abu Bakar Ba'asyir announced the focus of JI attacks would shift from Southeast Asian Christians to Western and specifically American targets (Crenshaw 2015). The attacks then began to occur in public places and JI became more willing to have Muslim lives become collateral damage in their attacks (Crenshaw 2015; Gordon 2011 pg 4). JI has also been recorded to have opposed Jewish interests (Australian National Security n.d.).

Geography

JI was founded in Malaysia by Indonesians (Crenshaw 2015; Gordon 2011 pg 3). JI recruits originally trained in Afghanistan (Crenshaw 2015; Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

JI had training camps in the southern Philippines by the mid 1990's (Crenshaw 2015; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Gordon 2011 pg 3). One such camp was within the MILF's Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao (Gordon 2011 pg 3). JI members also trained in Pakistan (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Gordon 2011 pg 3). JI relocated to Indonesia in 1998 in response to an economic and political crisis caused by the death of the undemocratic Indonesian President (Crenshaw 2015; Gordon 2011 pg 3). JI has branches in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia and the Philippines (BBC 2012; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Global Security n.d.).

Jl members attacked Christian churches and clergy members in West Java, Sumatra and Lombok (Crenshaw 2015; Gordon 2000 pg 4), as well as in Maluku and Sulawesi (Australian National Security n.d.). The majority of Jl's members are concentrated in Java (Australian National Security n.d.). Jl bombed Christian churches in Indonesia and the Philippines in December 2000 (Crenshaw 2015; Australian National Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016). In 2002 Jl bombed nightclubs in Bali (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Australian National Security n.d.; Global Security n.d.; Gordon 2011 pg 1; Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Jl unsuccessfully planned to attack the American, Australian, Israeli and British embassies in Singapore (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Australian National Security n.d.; Global Security n.d.). Jl bombed hotels and the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Australian National Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016). In 2005 there was a suicide bomber attacked attributed to Jl in Bali (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Gordon 2011 pg 1; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Jl has sent members to fight in the Islamic resistance in Syria (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Jl had a cell in Australia (Australian National Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir founded Jl (Crenshaw 2015; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Abdullah Sungkar died from natural causes in 1998 in Indonesia (Crenshaw 2015; Gordon 2011 pg 3; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Noordin Top was the leader of the cell that perpetrated the 2004 Jakarta and 2005 Bali violent attacks (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Gordon 2011 pg 4). Noordin Top was a prominent Jl leader until he was killed by Indonesian police in 2009 (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Jl was estimated to have more than 900 members in Indonesia alone in 2007 (Refworld 2016 pg 1; Crenshaw 2015), and around 3,000 total members in 2012 (Crenshaw 2015). Jl recruits members from a network of Islamic boarding schools that teach an extremist interpretation of Islam (Crenshaw 2015; Australian National Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Jl also recruits from prisons and religious study groups (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Jl recruits from social outreach programs, such as providing relief after natural disasters or providing opportunities for the poor (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Global Security n.d.).

Al Qaeda provided funding for Jl during its formation (Crenshaw 2015). Since then Jl has acquired funding through charities, legal and illegal business, member contributions, and financiers from the Middle East specifically Yemen and Saudi Arabia (Crenshaw 2015). Jl split into two factions; bombers who wanted to use violence to achieve their

goals, and proselytizers who wanted to spread JI ideology through preaching (BBC 2012; Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

JI has a charter and operational guide known as “General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah” (PUPJI) which describes JI’s governing religious principles and objectives (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Gordon 2011 pg 3). This charter describes the operational organization of JI; JI is divided into regional units referred to as Mantiqi (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Gordon 2011 pg 3). Each Mantiqi serves a different administrative purpose; Mantiqi I in Singapore and Malaysia finances JI operations, Mantiqi II in Indonesia is where most of JI’s attacks occur, Mantiqi III includes training camps in Mindanao, Borneo and Sulawesi, Mantiqi IV in Australia and West Papua provides fundraising (Ibid.). Each Mantiqi is divided into smaller cells known as Wakalah (Ibid.). The decentralized and spread out organization of JI allows it to continue its activities even when important leadership is arrested or killed (Ibid.).

External Ties

Al Qaeda provided tactical advice and funding for JI during its formation (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Australian National Security n.d.; Global Security n.d.), some refer to JI as Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian wing (Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Gordon 2011 pg 3).

JI members continue to train with the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Gordon 2011 pg 3). Iraq, Libya and Syria (before 1987) all financed and supported JI (Global Security n.d.).

JI once had an Australian cell called Mantiqi IV that opposed Jewish interests in Australia but never committed a violent attack against them (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). JI regional leaders were involved with a second plane attack on the United States that was meant to follow the 9/11 bombings (Australian National Security n.d.).

JI and the MILF had strong ties (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012; Australian National Security n.d.; Gordon 2011 pg 3). JI also has ties to ASG (Australian National Security n.d.; Gordon 2011 pg 3). After the Bali bombings, radical splinter groups and associates continued to perpetrate violent attacks in the name of JI (Crenshaw 2015), these are collectively known as non-structural JI (Gordon 2011 pg 4). JI members have worked with the Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI) (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Global Security n.d.).

Jl has sent members to fight in the Islamic resistance in Syria (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). In 2014 Abu Bakar Ba'asyir declared Jl's allegiance to ISIS from prison, while active leadership of Jl is firmly anti-ISIS (Crenshaw 2015). Jl has ties to many other Southeast Asian groups also inspired by DI including Jamaah Anshurat Tauhid, Front Pembela Islam, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, KOMPAK, Lashkar Jundullah and Majelis Dakwah Umat Indonesia (Crenshaw 2015; Australian National Security n.d.). Jl has extensive ties with the Nursa Front (Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

Group Outcome

The Singaporean, Philippine, and Malaysian governments have all actively opposed Jl operations within their own country (Crenshaw 2015).

Indonesia resisted foreign pressure, especially from the United States, to take action against Jl until the Bali bombing of 2002 (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009). After the government persecution following the Bali bombings, Jl leaders wanted to shift the group's purpose to religious outreach rather than violent public attacks (Crenshaw 2015; Global Security n.d.; Gordon 2011 pg 2). The bombings and ensuing violence in Bali in 2005 shifted the public's view of Jl and made it acceptable for politicians to persecute Jl (Gordon 2011 pg 6). By the mid 2000s, Jl was crippled by the national security efforts of several countries (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012). The Indonesian Government has targeted and disabled the Mantiqi system (Gordon 2011 pg 6). Jl has been downsized to the territory of Mantiqi II, and is likely not growing in size (Refworld 2016 pg 1).

Southeast Asian governments have arrested over 400 members and essential leaders of Jl since 2002, they have also killed much of Jl's leadership (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012). Jl splinter groups and other extremist groups in Indonesia have been more active than Jl lately (Crenshaw 2015). In 2007 a suspected Jl member, Wiwin Kalahe, turned himself in and informed the Indonesian authorities about a number of Jl safe houses in Java (Refworld 2016 pg 1-2). The Indonesian government then put the safe houses under surveillance (Ibid.). They followed two men from the safe house and were led to a home with a weapon stockpile (Ibid.). There the police arrested four men and killed one, one of the arrested men lead them to a weapon and explosives cache (Ibid.). The last recorded attack by Jl is in 2009 (Crenshaw 2015; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). In 2015 Philippine armed forces raided a Jl camp in Mamapasano and forty three Philippine police officers were killed (Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

- XI. KUMPULAN MUJAHIDIN MALAYSIA (KMM)
Torg ID: 260
Min. Group Date: 1995

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (Kmm), KMM, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia." N.D. Global Security.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kmm.htm>
- "Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM)." 2003. Federation of American Scientists.
<https://fas.org/irp/world/para/kmm.htm>
- United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 - Malaysia, 30 April 2003, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4681079e1e.html>
- Sidney Jones (2005) The changing nature of Jemaah Islamiyah, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59:2, 169-178
- Aida Arosoaie. 2016. "From KMM to IS: A transnational Islamist extremism movement." Today Online.
<http://www.todayonline.com/commentary/kmm-transnational-islamist-extremism-movement>
- Kamarulnizam Abdullah. Last Updated 2015. "Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI): The Links." Working Paper.
<http://www.platformpk.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/mujahidin1.pdf>
- Mohd Mizam Mohammed Aslan. 2009. "A CRITICAL STUDY OF KUMPULAN MILITANT MALAYSIA, ITS WIDER CONNECTIONS IN THE REGION AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF RADICAL ISLAM FOR THE STABILITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA." Ph.D. Dissertation for Victoria University of Wellington. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/41339479.pdf>
- "Kumpulan Mujahedin Malaysia (KMM)." 2006. Chapter 8; Other Groups of Concern," Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, US Department of State.
<https://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/156/kumpulan-mujahedin-malaysia-kmm>
- "KMM." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4401, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism,
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Malaysian Mujahideen Movement, Malaysian Mujahideen Group (Global Security n.d.) MASSA-Pakindo, Halaqoh-Pakindo (Aslan 2009 pg 119 & 121)

Group Formation: KMM was formed in 1995 (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; Abdullah 2016; Aslan 2009 pg 114). KMM was first discovered by the Malaysian government in 2001, KMM perpetrated attacks beforehand, but not all were recorded.

Group End: KMM stopped using violence in 2003. Arrests made by the Malaysian government crippled KMM and it is no longer active.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

KMM's goal is to establish an Islamic state (Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara) that includes Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Southern Philippines (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; Arosoaie 2016; MITP Knowledge Base 2008; US Department of State 2005). KMM wants to overthrow the Mahathir government (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). KMM also wants to kill Muslims who converted to another religion or denounced Islam (Abdullah 2016 pg 16; Aslan 2009 pg 120). The Malaysian police suspect that three Indonesian extremists inspired KMM to use militant strategies to achieve their goals (Federation of American Scientists 2003). KMM is influenced by the Salafi-Wahhabi tenets (Arosoaie 2016). KMM's first attack was a robbery in Selangor (Arosoaie 2016).

KMM was established by Zainon Ismail in 1995 (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; Abdullah 2016 pg; Aslan 2009 pg 114). Other sources say the group was founded in 1996 (Arosoaie 2016). KMM was originally known as MASSA-Pakindo (Aslan 2009 pg 119). KMM was originally a secret organization within the PAS (Aslan 2009 pg 119). Zainon Ismail founded KMM by gathering members of Halaqah Pakindo, a group of Malaysian ex-Mujahidin who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets (Abdullah 2015 pgs 2 & 13). MASSA-Pakindo became KMM when Zainon Ismail handed over leadership to Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz in 1999 (Aslan 2009 pg 121).

Geography

The group is transnational, but primarily operates in Malaysia with secondary operations in the Philippines and Indonesia.

KMM is reported to have branches in the Malaysian States of Perak, Johor, Kedah, Selangor, Terengganu, Kelantan, and the territory of Wilayah Persukutuan that includes Kuala Lumpur (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; US Department of State 2005). KMM had a meeting in Kampung Seri Aman, Puchong to appoint a leader (Global Security n.d.). KMM has sent members to fight Christians in Ambon, Indonesia (Global Security n.d.; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). KMM bombed the port city of Klang in 2000 (Global Security n.d.). KMM bombed a Hindu temple in Kuala Lumpur in 2000 (Global Security n.d.; Abdullah 2016 pg 16; Aslan 2009 pg 148). KMM killed a provincial assembly legislator and raided a police arsenal in Kedah in November of 2000 (Global Security n.d.; Aslan 2009 pg 147; Jones 2005 pg 175). KMM

members train in the Southern Philippines at the Abu Bakar and Hudaibiyah camps (Arosoaie 2016).

KMM members from the Selangor cell trained in the Indonesian Mujahidin in Pulau Moti Halmahera, North Maluku and then Pulau Ngele-ngele Maluku (Abdullah 2016 pg 16)

Organizational Structure

Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz became the leader of KMM in 1999 (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz is suspected to be a puppet leader appointed because of his father's reputation (Aslan 2009 pg 124). Abu Bakar Bashir and Hambali were suspected to have the real power (Aslan 2009 pg 124; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz studied in Pakistan, and visited Afghanistan even after the Russians were defeated (Global Security n.d.). KMM is estimated to have 70-80 members (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). KMM is suspected to be self funded (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; US Department of State 2005). KMM bought weapons from arms dealers in Southern Thailand and Batam island, Indonesia (Aslan 2009 pg 126).

KMM members were recruited through the Halaqa Pakindon to avoid government detection (Abdullah 2016 pg 13). Many KMM members went to Islamic schools in Pakistan, Egypt and India (Arosoaie 2016). The majority of KMM members originated from the Malaysian states of Selangor, Kedah, Terengganu, Perak, Kelantan and Johor (Arosoaie 2016). KMM members train in the Southern Philippines at the Abu Bakar and Hudaibiyah camps (Arosoaie 2016). In April 2000, the Selangor cell sent two groups to train in Indonesia (Abdullah 2016 pg 16). To gain proficiency in military strategy KMM members enlisted in the askar wataniya, a reserve of the Malaysian Army (Arosoaie 2016; Abdullah 2016 pg 23).

KMM became more organized with Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz as the leader (Abdullah 2016 pgs 14-17; Aslan 2009 pg 125-135). He established committees known as "lujnah" (Ibid.). Zainuri Kamarudin headed the Economic Committee (Ibid.). The Economic Committee generated funds from donations and membership funds; each member was expected to contribute between nine and seventeen Australian dollars a month (Ibid.). Nik Adli himself was in charge of the Training Committee (Tarbiyyah) (Ibid.). The Training Committee increased membership, poaching University students, and recruiting talented student leaders (Ibid.). Solehan Abd Ghafar was the head of the Communications Committee (Ibid.). The Communications Committee transported members to and from Pakistan for military training (Ibid.). The two committees permitted to use violence were the Operational committee led by Zulkifli Abd Hir, and the Mu'askar Committee (Military) led by Tajudin Abu Bakar (Ibid.). The Operational committee's job was to kill Muslims who converted to another religion or denounced Islam, use violence against non-Muslims and be prepared to launch Jihad against the Mahathir government (Ibid.).

The Mu'askar Committee's purpose was to assist the Operational Committee by obtaining weapons (Ibid.). There were KMM cells in the Malaysian states of Perak, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, Selangor and Johore that were led by a leader with no committee members (Ibid.).

NOTE: (LT) There is a super informative chart on the organizational structure on page 15 of the Abdullah source

External Ties

KMM is reported to have connections with Laskar Jihad and the Thai separatist group PULO (Global Security n.d.; MITP Knowledge Base 2008.). KMM has sent members to fight Christians in Indonesia (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). Arrested members of KMM reported to have fought with the Afghan Mujahidin against the Soviets (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; Arosoaie 2016; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). Other arrested members reported having ties to Muslim separatist groups in Indonesia and the Philippines (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). The Malaysian government suspects smaller and more violent groups with the same ideology have splintered off KMM (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003) KMM members became Malay IS members (Arosoaie 2016). KMM has ties with the KMK and the KPIP (Aslan 2009 pg 116). The Selangor cell of KMM, known as K3M, had close ties with JI and Al Qaeda (Arosoaie 2016). K3M became a more radical splinter of KMM (Aslan 2009 pg 141). KMM had close ties with JI and Al Qaeda (Abdullah 2016 pg 24; Aslan 2009 pg 114; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). DI and JI members assisted KMM members with transportation to a training camps (Abdullah 2016 pg 16). Relations between JI and KMM evolved through personal relationships of group members (Abdullah 2016 pg 23). JI then helped KMM meet with MILF leaders to work out a deal where KMM members could train at MILF camps, but the deal did not work out because KMM could not afford the payment the MILF requested (Abdullah 2016 pgs 23-24). KMM has ties with Laskar Jihad (MITP Knowledge Base 2008).

Group Outcome

KMM was first discovered by the Malaysian government after a botched robbery on May 18th, 2001 (Aslan 2009 pg 114). In 2000 the Malaysian Government arrested 10 KMM members under the International security Act (ISA) (Global Security n.d.). 9 of the 10 members arrested in 2000 under the ISA had their detainments extended for two more years (Global Security n.d.). Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz was held by the Malaysian government under the ISA (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; Aslan 2009 pg 114; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). In 2002 the Malaysian government investigated over 200 suspected members of KMM (Global Security n.d.; Federation of

American Scientists 2003). In 2003 the Malaysian government held 48 members of KMM under the ISA (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). The Malaysian government held KMM sympathizers as well as members under the ISA (Arosoaie 2016). When the Royal Malaysian Police began arresting “terrorists” they did not know the difference between JI and KMM members (Aslan 2009 pg 124). The Malaysian government’s constant monitoring and 2001-2002 arrests of the KMM members and sympathizers crippled the group’s ability to carry out violent acts (Arosoaie 2016; Aslan 2009 pg 162). No information could be found about Indonesian counterinsurgency operations against the group.

Notes for Iris:

- Flag Malay IS → future research
- Selangor cell → favors Indonesia over Philippines → look up status of K3M in 2017
- 2002 context (9/11) key

XII. AL-MAUNAH
Torg ID: 980
Min. Group Date: 1998
Max. Group Date: 2000
Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Malaysian arms raid cult charged.” BBC. 2000a.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/870776.stm>
- “Malaysian gunmen surrender.” BBC. 2000b.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/821695.stm>
- Raphael Wong. “Death for Al-Ma’uanah man.” Star. 2003.
https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2003/06/27/death-for-almaunah-man_1/
- “Seven Al-Maunah members plead guilty to alternative charge.” Utusan. 2000.
https://web.archive.org/web/20170223043920/http://ww1.utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=2000&dt=1205&pub=utusan_express&sec=front_page&pg=fp_01.htm&arc=hive
- United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 - Malaysia, 30 April 2001, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4681075e20.html>
- United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 - Malaysia, 21 May 2002, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4681077923.html>
-

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Al-Ma'unah (BBC 2000b)

Group Formation: 2000 (BBC 2000a)

Group End: 2000 (confirmed last violent incident), 2003 (convictions - Wong 2003)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Al-Ma'unah is a religious group whose intent was to overthrow the government and create an Islamic state in Malaysia. Its first violent activity dates back to 2000 (BBC 2000a; BBC 2000b; Wong 2003; United States Department of State 2002; Utusan 2000). Al-Ma'unah is often described as Muslim cult (BBC 2000a; BBC 2000b). The group has also been described as a brotherhood that promotes martial arts (BBC 2000b).

Geography

The group had a base in Bukit Jenalek, and a rented house in Kati which served as a transit point to their main base (Utusan 2000). The group is known to have a jungle hideout in the northern state of Perak (BBC 2000b). Members allegedly committed treasonous acts in Kuala Rui, Hulu Perak, and Kuala Kangsar (Wong 2003).

Organizational Structure

Al-Ma'unah was allegedly led by a resentful police chief (BBC 2000b). The group is known to have at least 27-29 gunmen (BBC 2000a; BBC 2000b; United States Department of State 2001; Utusan 2000). The group started from an Indonesian martial arts group but this connection quickly dissipated (BBC 2000a). The group was estimated to have 1000-1800 members at some point in time (BBC 2000a; BBC 2000b). The group's leader was Mohd Amin Mohd Razali, his deputy was Zahit Muslim and another known member of the group was Jamaludin Darus - all were sentenced to death for treason (Wong 2003). Seven other members, Megat Mohamed Hanafi Ilias, Muhamad Nukhshah Bandi Che Mansor, Abu Bakar Ismail, Riduan Berahim, Azlan Abdul Ghani, Shahidi Ali, and Khairul Anuar Mohamed Ariffin, were convicted in planning to wage war against the Yang di-Pertuan (Utusan 2000).

External Ties

The group started from an Indonesian martial arts group but this connection quickly dissipated (BBC 2000a). A lot of members of the group were also members of a larger opposition party known as Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) (BBC 2000a).

Group Outcome

The largest known incident related to the group occurred when they stole 100 arms and took hostages including policemen in July 2000 (BBC 2000a; BBC 2000b; Utusan 2000). Two disillusioned members surrendered and provided the state information about hostages before the police went in to take down the group (BBC 2000b; United States Department of State 2001). After the raid, the group went into hiding near the border of Thailand, and a standoff ensued throughout June-July 2000 (BBC 2000b). Eventually, the members of the group surrendered and appeared in court in Perak (BBC 2000a). Most of the members were convicted in 2002-2003 with life imprisonments or the death sentence (Wong 2003). Members may also have been involved in an attack on a Hindu temple, brewery, and electric power tower (United States Department of State 2001). A majority of the members were imprisoned or detained in 2000 and activity has not been detected since (United States Department of State 2002). The only known incident after related to the group was a minor undated incident iwhen a member shot and tortured a man to instill fear and spread message (Wong 2003).

Notes for Iris:

- the original member was a resentful police officer who then recruited additional members from a martial arts group (so unclear connection between the police officer and the martial arts group)
- why are they a cult? BBC language is explicit (and maybe a reference to their organization because they were close-knit, secretive, small, etc._

XIII. MUJAHIDEEN DIVISION KHANDAQ

Torg ID: 1187

Min. Group Date: 2000

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- "MUJAHIDEEN DIVISION KHANDAQ." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4145, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-gP05IM7aH41bHYL4ffcS-M8YqOHaFI4seuTSCvGAVs/edit>
- Searched Proquest
 - Mujahideen Division Khandaq
 - "Mujahideen Division Khandaq"
 - Mujahideen Division Khandaq Indonesia
- Searched gScholar
 - "MUJAHIDEEN DIVISION KHANDAQ"
 - MUJAHIDEEN DIVISION KHANDAQ indonesia

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: 2000 (MIPT 2008)

Group End: 2000 (MIPT 2008)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Mujahideen Division Khandaq first recorded attack was bombing the Philippine Ambassador's headquarters in Jakarta in August 2000 (MIPT 2008). Mujahideen Division Khandaq claims to be an MILF splinter (MIPT 2008).

Geography

Mujahideen Division Khandaq had an attack in Jakarta (MIPT 2008). Mujahideen Division Khandaq was headquartered in Kuala Lumpur (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

Mujahideen Division Khandaq claims to be an MILF splinter (MIPT 2008). MILF denies that Mujahideen Division Khandaq was ever involved with the MILF (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

Mujahideen Division Khandaq's attack was their attempt to "show solidarity" with the Muslim rebels in Mindanao (MIPT 2008). Mujahideen Division Khandaq claims to be an MILF splinter (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

Mujahideen Division Khandaq has had no recorded violent attack since their first and only recorded violent attack

XIV. SRI NAKHARO
Torg ID: 475
Min. Group Date: 2001
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Seth Jones and Martin Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End. RAND Corporation. 2008. P. 151. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- "Terrorist Group Kills Two Hostages in Southern Thailand." 2001.Xinhua News Agency - CEIS, Jun 06, 1. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/453730059?accountid=14026>.
- "Relatives Urge Police to Intensify Search for Headless Bodies." 2001.The Bangkok Post, Jun 11, 1. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/308860815?accountid=14026>.
- "Four Suspects in Yala Beheading Case." 2001.The Bangkok Post, Jun 08, 1. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/308864542?accountid=14026>.
- "Sri Nakharo." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 2680. MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2001

Group End: 2001 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group forms, but it first comes to attention in 2001 when it kidnaps then murders several hostages after the Thai government refused to pay a ransom (Xinhua 2012). The group cites no political goal for the act nor any ideology (Xinhua 2012).

Geography

The incident occurred in Muang district, Yala in Thailand (Bangkok Post 2001).

Organizational Structure

Thai police said the group had up to 20 members (MIPT 2008). It issued a demand in Yawi which is the language of southern Thailand, but there is no evidence about group membership, leadership, or organizational structure. The group demanded a ransom which may be how they planned to fund themselves (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

There is no evidence of ties to other groups or even other separatist groups.

Group Outcome

The police identified and arrested four suspects involved in the murder in June 2001 (Bangkok Post 2001). There is no additional information about the group afterwards and it is not heard from again.