

Kuwait Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 19 June 2019

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T360	PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)		1964	1995
T378	AL-JABHA ASH-SHA'ABIYA LI-TAHRIR FALASTIN		1967	2012
T1924	SUPREME COUNCIL FOR ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ (SCIRI)*		1972	2005
T70	ARAB COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION (ACO)		1974	1975
T208	ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE		1982	2012
T910	UNITED ARAB REVOLUTION		1986	1986
T1746	ISLAMIC HOLY STAR		1987	1987
T895	GENERATION OF ARAB FURY		1989	1989
T2055	JAMIAT AL ISLAH AL IJTIMAI		2000	0

- I. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)
 Torg ID: 360
 Min. Group Date: 1964
 Max. Group Date: 1995
 Onset: NA

Aliases: Palestine Liberation Organization (Plo), Palestine Liberation Organization (Plo)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: PLO

Group Formation: 1964

Group End: 2004 (Arafat's death - Fatah replaces - dissolve)

*Umbrella

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PLO formed in 1964 as a Palestinian nationalist political organization, which sought to form an independent Palestinian state (FAS 1998; Al Jazeera 2009). In 1974, it changed its struggle from an independent state and called for a two-state solution instead (Robinson n.d.). The group's ideology was ethno-nationalist and it first came to attention as a violent group in 1969 following the group's decision to launch an armed struggle (Al Jazeera 2009). It is also primarily secular (FAS 1998). It was partially an umbrella group (FAS 1998).

Geography

The group is from the Palestine region (West Bank and Gaza Strip), but has conducted transnational attacks in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel (FAS 1998; Al Jazeera 2009; GTD 2017). The group had its base of operations in Jordan until 1974 before Jordan expelled it (Al Jazeera 2009). Its base of operations was in Beirut, Lebanon from 1974 until 1982 (Al Jazeera 2009). The PLO also operated in Tunisia after it left Lebanon (Zanotti 2011).

Organizational Structure

The PLO's leader was Yassir Arafat (Robinson n.d.; Al-Jazeera 2009). He was the leader of Fatah (Al-Jazeera 2008). The PLO leadership was young and middle class (Robinson n.d.). The main faction in the PLO was Fatah (Zanotti 2011, 17). The organization has an Executive Committee and National Council, which mimic the functions of executive and legislative branches of government (Zanotti 2011, 17).

External Ties

The group was heavily inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood (Robinson n.d.). It clashed with Amal in Lebanon during the "Camps War" in the 1980s due to enmity over Arafat's leadership (Al Jazeera 2009). It also splintered and lost several members during the early 1980s. Israel allegedly sponsored Christian militia groups in Lebanon to fight against the PLO (BBC 1998).

The PLO received "tacit support" from the Jordanian and Syrian governments (BBC 1998).

The PLO is an umbrella organization that is legally recognized by the UN as the representative of the Palestinian people (Zanotti 2011, 17).

Group Outcome

The group originally operated in Jordan, but was forced to leave in 1970 following a massive crackdown by Jordanian forces (BBC 1998). The group clashed with Israeli security forces on several occasions. In 1982, the PLO was forced to leave Lebanon following the Israeli invasion (Al Jazeera 2009). The PLO operated in Tunisia afterwards (Zanotti 2011).

In 1987, the first Intifada erupted when an Israeli driver killed Palestinian workers (Al Jazeera 2008). In 1988, Arafat renounced terrorism and violence to achieve the group's goals and tried to steer the PLO towards a diplomatic solution (FAS 1998). The Intifada also helped make the Palestinian issue salient and drive negotiations (Barhoum n.d.). In 1993, the PLO signed the Oslo Accords with Israel (Barhoum n.d.; Robinson n.d.). This helped lead to the creation of the Palestinian Authority, which is a de facto state (Zanotti 2011, 18). The group was particularly active during the Second Intifada from 2000-2004. In 2002, Israeli forces attacked Arafat's headquarters and forced him to flee to Paris where he eventually died in 2004 (Al Jazeera 2009; Robinson n.d.). Arafat's death led the group to partially disintegrate due to lack of strong leadership to replace it (Robinson n.d.). Today, Fatah remains a prominent organization and main face of the Palestinian Authority (Zanotti 2011, 25-26). The PLO umbrella organization has declined in prominence (Zanotti 2011, 25).

II. AL-JABHA ASH-SHA'ABIYA LI-TAHRIR FALASTIN

Torg ID: 378

Min. Group Date: 1967

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Popular Front For The Liberation Of Palestine (Pflp), Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades, Al-Jabha Ash-Sha'abiya Li-Tahrir Falastin, Al-Jabna Al-Shabiyya Li-Tahrir Filastin, Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades, Popular Front For The Liberation Of Palestine, Red Eagles

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Halhul Gang, Halhul Squad, Palestinian Popular Resistance Forces, PPRF (Mackenzie Institute)

Group Formation: 1967

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PFLP formed in 1967 by George Habash to fight and destroy Israel after the latter began to occupy parts of the West Bank (BBC 2014). It formed as a merger between two unnamed left-wing faction (IB Times 2014). The group came to attention in 1968 with a series of prominent airplane hijackings and were the first group to employ this tactic (BBC 2014). It was primarily secular, but Habash argued the group was founded on Marxist-Leninist ideals (Global Security n.d., BBC 2014).

Geography

Today, the group primarily operates from the Gaza Strip attacking Israeli communities in the southern part of the country. It has also had prominent attacks in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Entebbe, Geha junction, Itamar, Ramallah, and Karnei Shomron (Global Security n.d., BBC 2014). Its headquarters were in Damascus, Syria as early as 1968(Global Security n.d.)

Organizational Structure

The PFLP is a faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (BBC 2014). It was originally created by George Habash - a Christian doctor - and merged with the PLO in 1968 (Global Security n.d.) Habash stepped down in 2000 and was replaced by Abu Ali Mustafa. It has an armed wing known as the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades which was particularly active during the Second Intifada (BBC 2014). The armed wing was led - at some point - by Abu Ali Mustafa and later Ahmed Sadaa (BBC 2014).

The group had an estimated 800 members at an unknown date with potentially more support throughout the West Bank and Gaza (Global Security n.d.) The group funds itself from local supporters as well as external sources in Libya and Syria.

The representative of the PFLP in Turkey is Hassan Tahrawi (PFLP 2013).

External Ties

The PFLP has a vast network of alliances including the German Baader-Meinhof organization and Japanese Red Army (BBC 2014). It fought against Hamas early on (BBC 2014). The group received external support from Syria, Libya, USSR, and China in the form of financial support, training, and an external base of operations.

The Turkish branch of the PFLP claims to have an alliance with Kurdish forces and parties in the country (PFLP 2013).

Group Outcome

The PFLP escalated during the First Intifada with Israel. After the fall of the Soviet Union and in-fighting between Palestinian groups during the First Intifada (Hamas, PIJ), the PFLP was very weakened and lost nearly all of its power and influence in the West Bank by 2000 (ADL n.d., IB Times 2014).

The US designated the group a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1995 (Global Security n.d). The group became partially involved in politics in the 1990s when it sought to become a part of Arafat's government.

Israel killed Mustafa in 2001 and arrested Sadat in 2002 (Global Security n.d.). As of 2017, the group was continuing to fight Israel and Saadat claims the group will not enter negotiations with the Israeli government (BBC 2014). The group's last violent attack was in 2016 (GTD 2017).

III. SUPREME COUNCIL FOR ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ (SCIRI)

Torg ID: 1924

Min. Group Date: 1972

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: NA

Aliases: Supreme Council For Islamic Revolution In Iraq (Sciri), Supreme Council For The Islamic Revolution In Iraq, Supreme Council Of The Islamic Revolution In Iraq (Sciri), SCIRI

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, ISCI, Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (ISCI)

Group Formation: 1982 (FAS 1998)

Group End (Outcome): The group is currently active as of 2015 (PVC 2015).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

SCIRI was formed in 1982 to overthrow Saddam Hussein in response to the Dujail Massacre and to oppose the Iraqi government’s hostility towards Shia-majority Iran (Crenshaw 2012; FAS 1998). The group is primarily Shiite and advocated for Hussein’s replacement with an autocratic state (Global Security n.d.). The group immediately began using violence against Iraq in 1982 following a massive government crackdown against the group. It continued fighting throughout the 1980s and the Gulf War when they attempted to destabilize the Saddam Hussein regime, which led to the Iraqi army destroying several of their holy sanctuaries and killing thousands (FAS 1998). It was also

seen as a threat and potentially violent during its initial formation because ex-Iraqi soldiers, various scholars, and Iraqi refugees began to join the movement (FAS 1998).

Geography

The group primarily operates from northern Iraq (Crenshaw 2012). During the Iran-Iraq war, the Badr Brigade fought in “southern Iraq” in the marshlands near Iran and Saudi Arabia (FAS 1998). Most of the groups central offices are located in Tehran, which is capital of Iran (Global Security n.d.). Due to its alliance with the Kurdish Democratic party, it has some main offices in Kurdistan (FAS 1998; Global Security n.d.). SCIRI has several international offices in locations such as London, Syria, and Vienna with agents in other countries (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

SCIRI was formed by a group of Shiite exiles (Crenshaw 2012). The first leader of SCIRI was Ayatollah Mohamad Baqir Al Hakim, and he was the son of the Shia’s spiritual leader (Global Security n.d.). After his death in 2003, Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim became the leader of the group until his death in 2009 (Crenshaw 2012; PVC 2015). Presently, the leader is Ammar al-Hakim, who inherited the leader role from his father, Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim (PVC 2015). SCIRI was very well-organized with a general assembly and military wing. It had a political wing, executive bureau, and central committee (Global Security n.d.). It also had a foreign relations unit, military unit, social services, propaganda, and financing wings (Global Security n.d.).

The group has a military wing called the Badr Brigade (Crenshaw 2012). The Badr Brigade had many experienced Iraqi military veterans who left in the 1960s/1970s (FAS 1998). The group allegedly had 10,000 members in 2003 (Crenshaw 2012). Another estimate argues the group had 4000-8000 members during the Iran-Iraq War during the late 1990s (FAS 1998). SCIRI also maintains a political presence within the country, and in 2014 it took 11 percent of Parliament seats, which is a decline from its prior years (PVC 2015). In terms of funding, SCIRI receives funds from Iran, who is their state sponsor (PVC 2015).

External Ties

The Badr Brigade received training and financial support from the IRGC (Crenshaw 2012). After the Iran-Iraq War, the group tried to distance itself from Iran due to allegations it was just an Iranian puppet (Crenshaw 2012). SCIRI was also allies with the United States during the Bush administration in opposition to Saddam Hussein’s regime (PVC 2015).

It had alliance agreements with the PUK and KDP (FAS 1998). It was a rival of the Mahdi Army until 2009 when it decided to ally with it (Crenshaw 2012).

Group Outcome

The group was active during the Iran-Iraq war and persisted during the 1990s. After Hussein fell in 2003, the group changed its goals to gaining political influence in the new government and reorganized as a political party (Crenshaw 2012). Hakim died in 2009, but was replaced with his son as the new leader (Crenshaw 2012). SCIRI still has influence within the country as it holds 11% of the Parliament seats, and there is no evidence of the group ending activities (PVC 2015).

IV. ARAB COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION (ACO)

Torg ID: 70

Min. Group Date: 1974

Max. Group Date: 1975

Onset: NA

Aliases: Arab Communist Organization (Aco), Arab Communist Organization

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: ACO

Group Formation: 1974

Group End: 1977 (arrests)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the ACO formed, but it first came to attention in mid-1974 when it robbed several banks and attacked a US pavilion (Cooley 1975). The group later attacked several military targets (GTD 2017). The group's goal initially was to oppose "establishments," but later said it wanted to protest a visit by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to the Middle East (MIPT 2008). The group's ideology is described as far-left, but does not appear to be communist (Cooley 1975; MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group conducted transnational attacks in Syria and Lebanon (GTD 2017). Its attack primarily occurred in Aleppo and Beirut (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

There is not much information available about the group's organizational structure. Some members are Palestinian, but it is not known how large the group is (Cooley 1975). Three members, Imad Shiha, Haytham Na'al and Faris Murad, were arrested in 1975 and detained until 2004 (BBC 2004; MIPT 2008).

External Ties

There are no clear external ties to other state or non-state actors. The PLO and Communist parties in Lebanon and Syria denied any association with the group (Cooley 1975).

Group Outcome

In 1975, the Syrian government arrested several members of the ACO and held them in prison for over 30 years (Cooley 1975; BBC 2004). The Syrian government released the prisoners in 2002 and 2004 after allegations arose that the Syrian government had tortured them (MIPT 2008). The group's last known incident was in 1977, but it is unknown what happens to the group after these attacks.

V. ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

Torg ID: 208

Min. Group Date: 1982

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Hizbullah, Hizbollah, Hezbollah, Hezballah, Hizbullah, The Party of God, Islamic Jihad (Islamic Holy War), Islamic Jihad Organization, Islamic Resistance, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, Ansar al-Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansarollah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansar Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance), Organization of the Oppressed, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of Right Against Wrong and Followers of the Prophet Muhammed, Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Islamic Jihad Organization

Group Formation: 1982

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Hezbollah was formed in 1982, in the midst of the Lebanese civil war, as a splinter of the prominent Shiite political party Amal (Martin 2011, 254; Masters 2014; Christian Science Monitor 2012). It formed in reaction to Israel's invasion of Lebanon (NCTC n.d.; Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.). Hezbollah supported the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon and the Palestinian fight against Israel (Martin 2011, 254; BBC 2016). It ascribes to a Shiite ideology and believes the eventual Islamic state should also be Shiite (Mackenzie Institute 2016; Global Security n.d.; Al Jazeera English 2016; Christian Science Monitor 2012). The group is strongly opposed to the influence of western countries as well as Israel's involvement in the Middle East (Masters 2014; Al Jazeera English 2016). The group's first violent incident is generally considered to be the bombing of military barracks in Beirut in 1983 (GTD 2017; Martin 2011, 255; Global Security n.d.).

Today, the group is involved in the Syrian civil war; they support the Assad regime (Masters 2014; BBC 2016). The group is also involved in Lebanese politics as a result of the Taif agreement; they competed in the 1992 elections (Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.; BBC 2016). The group has reportedly moved from having deep Khomeinist roots to embodying a greater Islamic nationalist ideal (Masters 2014). The group removed Saad Hariri's government, which was backed by Saudi Arabia and rooted in Sunni ideals (Masters 2014). The group also aims to liberate Jerusalem (Global Security n.d.). The group also reportedly targets Jewish individuals (BBC 2016).

Geography

The group came to attention in 1983 with the bombing of US military barracks in Beirut (Martin 2011, 255; Global Security n.d.). The group operates out of Al Biqa' (Bekaa Valley), southern Beirut, and Ba'albek in Lebanon (Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.; Christian Science Monitor 2012). Hezbollah also maintains external bases and cells around the world including Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe (Global Security; Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.). The group has also carried out attacks in the Shebaa Farms zone which is disputed by the group and Israel (Masters 2014; BBC 2016). The group has also carried out attacks in Israel (Masters 2014).

Organizational Structure

The group was founded by a man named Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, as well as Imad Fayez

Mughniyeh, and Muhammad Hussein (Counter Extremism Project). The group reportedly consists of a seven member council called the Shura Council (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's initial leader was Sheikh Sobhi Tufeili; he was replaced by Abbas Musawi in 1992 (Martin 2011, 254; Mackenzie Institute 2016). After Musawi was assassinated, Hassan Nasrallah replaced him as the leader of the group (Masters 2014; Mackenzie Institute 2016; Al Jazeera English 2016; Christian Science Monitor 2012). Naim Qassem was second-in-command of the group, and a man named Hussein al-Khalil was a top advisor to the leader of the group politically (Masters 2014). Another official of the group was a man named Imad Fayeز Mugniyah, who was killed in 2008 (Masters 2014).

The group has developed a strong political wing which has even engaged in Lebanese politics placing members in Parliament continuously since 1992 (Martin 2011, 254-255). It organized a series of cells across southern Lebanon, but consolidated into a political party organization in 1985 when it released a formal manifesto (CFR 2014). The group gained popular support in the 1980s by fighting against occupying IDF forces in southern Lebanon and other communist militias (Global Security n.d.). Hezbollah is led by the Shura Council including the group's leader, the Secretary General (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group estimates it had 5,000-10,000 different fighters and additional supporters as of 1993, but this has since dropped to about 500 (Global Security n.d.). The group also reportedly has ties with a group called Imam al-Mahdi, made up of youth that eventually join Hezbollah (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group coordinates with Tanzim, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the PFLP (Global Security n.d.). It may have also provided external support to Tanzim in the Palestinian territories to fund their actions. President Reagan publicly agreed to not negotiate with Hezbollah following the events, but privately set up a secure channel and secured an arms-for-hostages deal (Martin 2011, 256). It is well known that the IRGC supports Hezbollah with money, weapons, training, and other aid totaling up to \$200 million/year (CFR 2014; Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.; New York Times 2011). Syria and Iran also support Hezbollah (Global Security; Masters 2014). Syria is a key ally of Hezbollah, providing both a supply of arms into Lebanon and a safe haven for some of the group's leaders (Global Security n.d.). Hezbollah explicitly states their allegiance to Iran, especially to their supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini (until his death in 1989), and to the current leader, Khamenei (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). The group also has a charity and collects support through a Shi'a diaspora around the world (Global Security). The EU and the United States have accused the group of receiving support from the Qud Force of Iran (Masters 2014). The group is also reportedly allied with Iraq (Global Security n.d.). The group offers support for the Syrian president (Global Security n.d.; Masters 2014; New York Times 2011; Christian Science Monitor 2012). The group also reportedly has ties with Afghanistan (Global Security n.d.). The group also reportedly has ties with a group called Imam al-Mahdi, made up of youth that eventually join Hezbollah (Global Security n.d.). The

group uses tactics such as hijacking, kidnapping, mortar or rocket attacks, tunneling, firearm attacks, suicide bombing, assassination, and explosive devices (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group has also exploited fundraising in Europe, the United States, and Arab Peninsula (Mackenzie Institute 2016; BBC 2016).

Group Outcome

The group's last known attack was reportedly in 2017 when Hezbollah assailants allegedly kidnapped a Saudi citizen living in the Lebanese city Al-Aqiba (GTD 2017). Earlier that year, gunmen opened fire on the Wadi Hamid refugee camp in the town of Aarsal, Lebanon, killing three Syrian refugees (GTD 2017). No group has taken responsibility for either of these attacks, but sources agree that it was most likely conducted by Hezbollah (GTD 2017). These were the last reports of Hezbollah allegedly conducting violent attacks. Nevertheless, Hezbollah has allegedly planned numerous attacks since then. For example, it has set up vast networks of cells, who have allegedly planned attacks in places around the globe like the UAE, Venezuela, and New York (Gulf News 2019; FP 2019; Times of Israel 2019). Hezbollah is still active today, primarily by maintaining a strong presence in Lebanese politics (Global Security n.d.). Hezbollah's political wing is recognized as a political party, and it performed well in the 2018 Lebanese elections, with its Shiite bloc gaining a majority in the parliament (The Guardian 2018).

Recently, Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah has warned Israel and the United States that it has a stockpile of missiles capable of striking targets in Israel, perhaps indicating that Hezbollah still develops missiles and other arms (Haaretz 2019). Various state actors have taken measures to both militarily and diplomatically combat Hezbollah. Israel has conducted airstrikes on Hezbollah's arms supply chain in Syria and fights with them Syria in an attempt to prevent the group's ally Iran from asserting regional hegemony (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Global Security n.d.). Israel and Hezbollah have a long history of conflict, beginning in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, when the latter employed guerrilla tactics (The Tower 2016). Experts predict that another violent confrontation between Israel and Lebanon is looming and will be more destructive than ever (The Tower 2016). The United Nations passed UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in 2006, which presented a plan to end the war between Israel and Hezbollah, citing the violence and impact on civilians it caused; moreover, it required Hezbollah to disarm (United Nations 2006; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). The resolution had little effect as Hezbollah continued to stockpile weapons (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). The Lebanese government, tasked with the disarmament of Hezbollah, could not control the armed group as it was focused on improving the abysmal economic situation of the country (Global Security n.d.).

In 2015, the United States passed the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act (HIFPA), which sanctioned organizations, businesses, and people that support or do business with Hezbollah or any of its affiliates (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Lebanon did not take similar actions because Hezbollah forms a key part of its economy; sanctioning

the group would make the poor economic situation worse (Counter Extremism Project n.d).

VI. UNITED ARAB REVOLUTION

Torg ID: 910

Min. Group Date: 1986

Max. Group Date: 1986

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: no change - 1986 (GTD 2018, MIPT 2008).

Group End: 1986 (GTD 2018, MIPT 2008, Boghardt 2006). The United Arab Revolution was most likely not a real militant organization, but instead a cover up for the real

perpetrators of the oil bombings in Kuwait (MIPT 2008). This is perhaps why the group ceased to exist shortly after the real culprits of the bombing were discovered.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In July 1986, several bombings occurred on four national oil institutions in Kuwait: two on the Ahmadi oil collection centers, one on an oil well in Maqwa, and one on a connecting pipe (Boghardt 2006). Shortly after the incident, a group called the United Arab Revolution claimed responsibility for the attacks, arguing they were in the pursuit of Arab unity and to oppose the United States (Boghardt 2006; MIPT 2008). Later it was revealed that the true perpetrators of the attack were Iranian-backed Shia Muslims who had planned the attack because Kuwait was not decreasing oil production and were very friendly with their enemy, Iraq; it had nothing to do with Arab unity (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The attacks occurred against the Ahmadi oil collection centers and in Maqwa, Kuwait (Boghardt 2006). There is no evidence of transnational operations or additional attacks outside the country.

Organizational Structure

Members were Kuwaiti Shia Muslims who acted on behalf of the Iranian government (MIPT 2008). The Kuwaiti government arrested 27 perpetrators potentially associated with the attack (Rabinovich and Shaked 1988). The perpetrators admitted that they had no relation with the United Arab Revolution, but were hung by the Kuwaiti government (MIPT 2008).

The fake group proclaimed to be committed to Arab unity (Boghardt 2006; MIPT 2008). There were 27 perpetrators of different nationalities who were initially thought to be part of the United Arab Revolution, but they were not actually connected (Rabinovich and Shaked 1988; MIPT 2008). Therefore, there are no real members of the group.

External Ties

The United Arab Revolution does not have any real ties. The real perpetrators were a group of Shia Muslims that had allegedly been acting on behalf of the Iranian government.

Group Outcome

The group ceased to exist after it was uncovered that they were not the real culprits of the oil bombings in Kuwait because they were a cover up group for the Iranian security services who had planned the attack (MIPT 2008). The Kuwaiti government arrested 27 perpetrators potentially associated with the attack (Rabinovich and Shaked 1988). The perpetrators admitted that they had no relation with the United Arab Revolution and were hung by the Kuwaiti government (MIPT 2008).

VII. ISLAMIC HOLY STAR
Torg ID: 1746
Min. Group Date: 1987
Max. Group Date: 1987
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Search Proquest
 - Islamic holy star kuwait
 - Police bomb kuwait - date restricted
 - Police bomb Kuwait January 1987
- Search Google
 - Islamic holy star kuwait
 - Police bomb kuwait january 1987

Couldn't find any additional evidence of the bomb. Best evidence is that there were a series of bombings in and around Kuwait on January 24-25 due to the concurrent opening of peace talks on the Iran-Iraq War (Boston Globe 1987; Observer 1987).

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1987

Group End: 1987. There is no evidence explaining why the group stopped using violence after 1987.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the Islamic Holy Star formed, but it first came to attention as a violent group in 1987 when it was suspected of bombing a police station in Kuwait (GTD 2018). The reason for the bombings are most likely due to the opening of peace talks on the Iran-Iraq War (Boston Globe 1987; Observer 1987). Following the bombings, there were kidnappings of United States citizens by men dressed as police officers, suggesting potential hostility towards the United States (Observer 1987).

Geography

The group most likely operated from Kuwait or in a nearby region, since that was where the bombings occurred (Boston Globe 1987; Observer 1987).

Organizational Structure

There is not much information available about the group's organizational structure, leadership, or size. However, we can infer that the group was not extremely large because there were no incidents beyond the bombings in 1987. The group is an Islamic extremist and anti United States organization.

External Ties

There is not much information about the group's external ties.

Group Outcome

There is no evidence of group activity following the suspected police bombing in 1987 (GTD 2018).

VIII. GENERATION OF ARAB FURY
Torg ID: 895
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 1989
Onset: NA

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases found

Group Formation: 1989

Group End: 1989 (trial and execution)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when Generation of Arab Fury formed; nevertheless, it carried out its first and only known violent attacks in Mecca in 1989 (GTD 2018). On July 10, during the Hajj pilgrimage, the group carried out two bombings in Mecca: one on a street leading to the Grand Mosque and one on a nearby bridge (GTD 2018; Al Arabiya 2017; Deseret News 1989). The attacks killed one person, a Pakistani pilgrim, and injured sixteen others (Deseret News 1989). Saudi authorities also claimed that a third bombing was conducted six days later, but caused no fatalities (UPI 1989).

Generation of Arab Fury took responsibility for the July 10 attacks, berating Saudi leaders for recognizing the legitimacy of the nation of Israel (Deseret News 1989). Saudi authorities arrested and subsequently publicly beheaded sixteen Kuwaiti citizens, who were convicted for illegally smuggling weapons and explosives and carrying out the attacks; four others were sentenced to prison for between fifteen and twenty years (UPI 1989; New York Times 1989). The leader's televised confession revealed that Iran ordered, trained, and supplied weapons to the assailants (New York Times 1989). Iran was quick to point out that the attacks demonstrated the Saudi government's lack of aptitude in overseeing the important religious shrine (Deseret News 1989). The group ascribes to Shia Islam (New York Times 1989).

Geography

It is unclear from where Generation of Arab Fury operated because it only conducted two attacks and then faded away. The sixteen individuals executed by the Saudi government for allegedly conducting the attacks in Mecca were all citizens of Kuwait, suggesting that the group was based in that country (New York Times 1989; UPI 1989). The Interior Ministry of Saudi Arabia alleged that the leader of the group disclosed to authorities that the Iranian government had ordered and supported the attacks (New York Times 1989). According to the Saudi record of his confession, the group was based in Kuwait, where members were trained by Iranian diplomats (New York Times). One article states that the group is from west Beirut, possibly indicating that Generation of Arab Fury also operated in Lebanon (Deseret News 1989). Both attacks conducted by the group were in the holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

There is scant evidence about the organizational structure of Generation of Arab Fury. The group was headed by a Shiite Muslim teacher, who was 22 years of age at the time of the 1989 attacks (New York Times 1989). He confessed to masterminding the attacks and was executed publicly (New York Times 1989). The leader's name was not divulged by Saudi authorities. It is unclear whether this person was only the leader of the 1989 attacks or whether he headed the group as a whole. The group's membership size was small, comprising of less than 100 members (MIPT 2008). The group allegedly received funding and arms from Iran (MIPT 2008; New York Times 1989)

External Ties

Crucial to its operation, Generation of Arab Fury had a strong external tie to Iran (New York Times 1989). The group conducted attacks in Mecca allegedly on the orders of the government of Iran (New York Times 1989). The government of Iran allegedly provided not only financial support to the group, but also trained members and provided a supply of arms (New York Times 1989). The leader of the 1989 attacks allegedly confessed that Iranian diplomats trained members in Kuwait (New York Times 1989). Moreover, the Iranian embassy allegedly supplied the group with weapons and explosives in Kuwait,

which were illegally smuggled into Saudi Arabia (New York Times 1989). After the execution of the sixteen Kuwaitis who allegedly conducted the explosions in Mecca, Iranians, allegedly associated with Hezbollah, vowed to get revenge for what they believed was the unjust execution of Shiites (MIPT 2008). In the same year, Hezbollah allegedly attacked Saudi diplomats as revenge for the executions, suggesting that there could be a tie between Generation of Arab Fury and other Shiite groups like Hezbollah (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

The group's last known attack was in 1989 (GTD 2018). An Islamic court tried and convicted twenty Kuwaiti citizens for their role in the attacks (UTI 1989). On September 21, 1989, Saudi authorities publicly beheaded by sword sixteen of those Kuwaitis for carrying out the bombings (MIPT 2008; New York Times 1989; UTI 1989). The group is no longer active and likely dissolved after the attacks and executions in 1989.

IX. JAMIAT AL ISLAH AL IJTIMAI

Torg ID: 2055

Min. Group Date: 2000

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Society For Social Reform, Jamiat Al Islah Al Ijtimai, Jamiat Al-Islah Al-Ijtimai, Society Of Social Reforms, Hadas

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Muslim Brothers in Kuwait, Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, Islamic Constitutional Movement, ICM, Al-Haraka Al-Dusturi Al-Islamiyya, Jamaat al-Islah al-Ijtimai – the Social Reform Society

Group Formation: 1952 (Foreign Policy 2013)

Group End: It is currently an active political party in Kuwait (Foreign Policy 2013).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait formed in 1952 by Abdul Aziz Al-Ali Al-Mutawa to spread its Islamic ideology of strong brotherhood and Islamic nationalism (Foreign Policy 2013). In its formative decades, the group focused on social and charitable activities such as funding education and sports (POMEPS n.d.). In order to gain membership, it focused on indoctrinating the youth — some members were unaware of the group's radical ideology (POMEPS n.d.). During the educational classes, the group would teach Islamic propaganda and their political visions (POMEPS n.d.). It aims to implement Sharia law and protect the original Kuwaiti values, essentially meaning that it wants to minimize Westernization through constitutional amendments (Brown 2007).

ICM, which is the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, formed in 1991 (POMEPS n.d.). It entered the political realm and aimed to amend Article 2 of the Constitution to make Sharia law the form of legislation, and at one point, it wanted to restrict citizenship in Kuwait for only Muslims (Foreign Policy 2013). However, the group has modernized since then and has let go of such radical views because it replaced its older leaders, who were more conservative, with younger leaders, who are more moderate (Foreign Policy 2013; Global Security n.d.). The ICM considers now considers itself a democratic political party (Global Security n.d.).

The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait came to attention as a violent group at the moment of its creation because the organization was initially formed in Egypt and the Kuwait organization was a branch of it (Brown 2007). The group claims to eschew the use of violence (Brown 2007). There is no clear record of violence by the group or other Sunni Islamist groups in the country (CRS 2019). The governments of Russia and Kazakhstan have characterized the group as a terrorist organization, alleging without evidence that they finance terrorist operations for groups such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates and practice armed jihad (Counter Extremism n.d.). In 2012 and 2013, the Kuwaiti government accused Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait of taking commands from the parent organization in Egypt and condemned their participation in terrorism affiliated activities such as financing and money laundering (Counter Extremism n.d.). The ICM protested d the Kuwaiti government's condemnation of Egypt's President Morsi, who was affiliated with Muslim Brotherhood (Counter Extremism n.d.).

Geography

The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait operates throughout the country as it tries to gain support from several people by building schools and conducting charitable activities at different locations (Foreign Policy 2013).

Organizational Structure

Many of ICM's current leaders came from the Islamic student movement, which basically called for the liberation of Islamist countries from Westernization (Brown 2007). The

main recruiting ground for members is at mosques, schools, and outreach activities (mainly charitable) at communities (Brown 2007).

The group had a charitable wing known as the Society for Social Reform (Canada IRB 2003). The charitable wing has been designated a terrorist organization by Russia and Kazakhstan (Counter Extremism n.d.). The group's political wing was known as the Islamic Constitutional Movement (Global Security n.d.). The group received funding through running charities and using parts of the money for political purposes (Brown 2007).

External Ties

The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait was inspired by the parent organization in Egypt (Brown 2007). There are several other branches of Muslim Brotherhood in countries such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and other Middle eastern countries which the Kuwait organization is allied with (POMEPS n.d.; Brown 2007). Although it is evidenced that the Kuwait organization is less radical and violent, they have strong ties and similar ideologies with those groups such as an advocacy for strict Sharia law (Brown 2007). During the 1960s, the Muslim Brotherhood allegedly helped Qutb's radical Islam movement with fundraising and messaging (van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012).

The Qatar government is suspected to have supported Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait by hosting several of the organization's leaders because the government's leaders believed it was necessary to maintain a strategic alliance with the group to protect themselves from larger countries in the region such as Saudi Arabia (Zain 2017).

Group Outcome

The group has transitioned from being extremely radical in the 1950s to more moderate now due to new leadership and changing values, although the core ideology remains the same (Brown 2007). The charitable wing has been designated a terrorist organization by Russia and Kazakhstan for allegedly financing militant groups (Sova 2008; Counter Extremism n.d.). The group is currently active as a political party and holds a sizable presence in the Parliament who judge legislation based on Sharia law (Global Security n.d.). In 2012 and 2013, the Kuwaiti government accused Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait for taking commands from the parent organization in Egypt. The government condemned their participation in terrorism affiliated activities such as financing and money laundering (Counter Extremism n.d.). However, there was still no clear connection of violence on behalf of the group.

Notes:

-what are the ties between the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the MB in Kuwait? MB Egypt was much more violent, but less so with MB Kuwait. Originally had strong ties, but MB Kuwait

evolved a lot over the years. For example, the ICM was more “democratic” and tried to participate in elections.

- ICM/MB in Kuwait wanted to amend the Constitution to implement Sharia Law in the central government

- ICM was more of a political party while the MB was considered a larger overarching organization. ICM had more specific political aims to change the government of Kuwait, but MB was broader social and political aims within the community.

- policy aims, not regime change

- No evidence of violence activities -- the group doesn't consider violence as legitimate political tactic

- the group is considered a terrorist group by association due to relationship with other MB organizations (MB is very bad name in other countries!)

- the social wing/charity wing is linked to funding other militant groups and enabling other groups to carry out attacks, but does not do itself

General Country-Level Trends:

- two one-hit wonders

- lot of variation in the group -- either large pseudo-political organization or small one-hit wonder groups

- SCIRI and MB both had social wings/charitable giving (zakat?)

- lots of evolution going on with these organizations

- slightly more Shia groups with pro-Iran and receiving assistance from Iran, but mixed population of Arabs