

Kazakhstan Cases, 1970-2012

Last Updated: 25 June 2019

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T674	CENTRAL ASIAN UYGUR HEZBOLLAH (KAZAKHSTAN)		0	0
T2451	UYGHUR LIBERATION ORGANIZATION		2000	2000
T1984	JUND AL-KHILAFAH		2011	2011

I. CENTRAL ASIAN UYGUR HEZBOLLAH (KAZAKHSTAN)

Torg ID: 674

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Central Asian Uygur Hezbollah (Kazakhstan), Central Asian Uygur Hizbollah (Kazakhstan)

Part 1. Bibliography

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ub_info_r#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=EfNtPoN5ZGAC&printsec=copyright&source=gbs_p
ub_info_r#v=onepage&q&f=false)

*This is either a faction of ETIM (Wang 2003) or may not exist as real/independent organization (Chinese Mission to the UN) - do research and comment to get approval from me about how to proceed given findings

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is a faction of the ETIM (Wang 2003; Mohit 2012; Reveron, Murer 2006).

Group Formation: This is a faction of the ETIM (Wang 2003; Mohit 2012; Reveron, Murer 2006).

Group End: This is a faction of the ETIM (Wang 2003; Mohit 2012; Reveron, Murer 2006).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is a faction of the ETIM (Wang 2003; Mohit 2012; Reveron, Murer 2006).

Geography

This is a faction of the ETIM (Wang 2003; Mohit 2012; Reveron, Murer 2006).

Organizational Structure

This is a faction of the ETIM (Wang 2003; Mohit 2012; Reveron, Murer 2006).

External Ties

This is a faction of the ETIM (Wang 2003; Mohit 2012; Reveron, Murer 2006).

Group Outcome

This is a faction of the ETIM (Wang 2003; Mohit 2012; Reveron, Murer 2006).

- II. UYGHUR LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Torg ID: 2451
Min. Group Date: 2000

Max. Group Date: 2000

Onset: NA

Aliases: Uighur Liberation Organization, Uyghur Liberation Organization

Part 1. Bibliography

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***note this is not alias for ETLO according to Refworld**

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Uighur Liberation Organization (ULO), Uygur Liberation Organization, Xinjiang Liberation Organization, Uyghuristan Liberation Organization, Uighuristan Freedom Association, Uygurstan Azatlik Teskilat, Uyghur Azatliq Tashkilati

Group Formation: 1992 (Bovingdon 2010, 142)

Group End: 2000

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed in 1992 in Kazakhstan, shortly after the Kazakh government declared independence from the Soviet Union (Bovingdon 2010, 142). The group was an ethnonationalist separatist group fighting for an autonomous Xinjiang region of China and fighting against the oppression of the Uighur minority there (Soltobaev 2000). They were a separatist group trying to gain independence from China (Stratfor 2001). It was founded by a man named Hashir Wahidi (Ashir Wahidi), the former leader of the Eastern Turkistan Army, who later died in 1998 after being attacked (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2006; Wayne 2007, 46; WRITENET 2002). During this time the group mostly spread propaganda in support of the separation of Xinjiang from China (Bovingdon 2010, 143). After Wahidi's death, he was replaced by Sabit Abdurakhman (ibid). The group's first attack was the 2000 assassination of Nigmat Bazakov, an Uighur who had refused to cooperate with a plan to kill Chinese Security Ministry Officials visiting Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (Christoffersen 2002). In 2000, it also conducted a series of violent

attacks in Kyrgyzstan against a Chinese delegation and Chinese businessmen (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2006).

Geography

The group has committed its attacks in regions inside and outside of Kazakhstan. Its attacks were conducted in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan and Almaty, Kazakhstan (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN 2001). The group is also said to work in urban areas like Yining, Urumqi, Korla, and Kucha, all cities in Xinjiang (Human Rights Watch Backgrounder 2001). The organization is also allegedly active in Uzbekistan, where it is said to have assassinated Uighur officials who were "collaborators" with the Chinese government (Stratfor 2001). The group also has support across China, Uzbekistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and agencies in the first four aforementioned countries recruit members for the organization (Soltobaev 2000; Stratfor 2001)

Organizational Structure

Most of the members of the group were young Uighurs, aged approximately 20-35 years old (Soltobaev 2000). Most of the members of the ULO in Kazakhstan had moved there from Xinjiang (Bovingdon 2010, 142). The organization had a central committee of 30 members and was split into five subgroups, and the members knew only the others in their own subgroups (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2006; Soltobaev 2000; WRITENET 2002). The founder of the group, Hashir Wahidi, claimed to have 1 million supporters in Xinjiang, and 12,000 supporters in central Asian countries although there is no evidence to back up these numbers (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2006; Wayne 2007, 46). The group had a notable media and propaganda wing which distributed videos to advertise its cause and attract support (Bovingdon 2010, 142). Its propaganda wing also promoted a book about Chinese aggression in Central Asia (Bovingdon 2010, 142).

Wahidi died in 1998 after being attacked (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2006; Wayne 2007, 46; WRITENET 2002). After Wahidi's death, he was replaced by Sabit Abdurakhman (Bovingdon 2010, 143). Wealthy Uighurs, some of whom have moved to Saudi Arabia, allegedly fund the activities of some Uighur groups, but it is unclear whether the ULO is one of these organizations (WRITENET 2002).

External Ties

The ULO is connected to the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkistan, as it merged with this group in 2001 (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2006). The result of this merger was the Uyghuristan People's Party (ibid). The group is often conflated with the ETLO, but it is an independent organization (Australia Refugee Review Tribunal 2006).

Group Outcome

In 1996, the Kazakhstan government shut down the paper that the ULO had been publishing, called *Uyghurstan* (Bovingdon 2010 145). Ten Uighurs were arrested in connection to the group's attacks in Kyrgyzstan in 2000 (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2006). This was the date of the group's last violent attack.

In 2001, the Chinese government labeled the group one of 40 Uighur terrorist organizations (Chinese Permanent Mission to the UN 2001). The United States followed-up on the decision by only labeling the ETIM a terrorist group (New York Times 2002).

In 2001, the ULO joined with the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkistan (URFET), to create the Uyghuristan People's Party, based in Kazakhstan (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2006). They have renounced violence for political goals, and want to be recognized as a real Central Asian regional party (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2006; Wayne 2007, 46-47).

Notes for Iris:

- area of operations. The group never conducts any attacks in China, but does target Chinese officials when they are outside the country.
- notable media presence; their original aim is to just spread the message about Uighurs and violence comes much later

III. JUND AL-KHILAFAH
Torg ID: 1984
Min. Group Date: 2011
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: Soldiers Of The Caliphate, Jund Al Khilafah, Jund Al Khilafah (Jak), Jund Al-Khilafah, Jund Al-Khilafah (Jak), Soldiers Of The Caliphate (Jak), Soldiers Of The Caliphate (Jund Al Khilafah), Soldiers Of The Caliphate (Jund Al-Khilafah)

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<https://www.memri.org/reports/kazakh-jihadi-group-jund-al-khilafa-soldiers-caliphate---w-hich-recently-claimed-have>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Jund al-Khilafa, Army of the Caliphate, Kateeba Jund al Khilafah, Brigade of the Soldiers of the Caliphate

Group Formation: 2011

Group End: 2012

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed in 2011 by Kazakh nationals Renat Khabibuly, Orynbasarov Unasov, and Damir Nabiyev who were detained and told by Kazakh officials that they could not travel to study Islam in Saudi Arabia (Global Security n.d.; CRS 2013). It announced its formation in a series of videos it posted online (Global Security n.d.).

It was formed with the intent of waging a jihad in Kazakhstan, but originally formed in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area (ibid). It is thought to be a splinter of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Yemelianova 2019, 6). The group also wanted to establish a global Islamic caliphate (Roggio 2011b). It threatened the Kazakh president at the time that his administration would be overthrown because of anti-muslim policies such as banning hijabs (Zenn 2013). The group maintained connections with Salafists in Kazakhstan who would attack in the country (Global Security n.d). The group's first attack was the alleged rocket attack on an American military base in Khost, Afghanistan on July 11, 2011 (Zarif 2011).

Geography

The group is transnational. The group's headquarters are near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border on the Pakistani side, but their attacks are mostly conducted in Kazakhstan (Global Security n.d.). The attacks in Kazakhstan were conducted in the cities of Atyrau, Taraz and Almaty, where the group attacked government officials and buildings (Zenn 2013). Its other attacks were of American military bases in Khost, Afghanistan and in Toulouse, France (Omelicheva, Markowitz 2019; Zarif 2011).

Organizational Structure

The group formed in 2011 by Kazakh nationals Renat Khabibuly, Orynbasarov Unasov, and Damir Nabiyeu who were told by Kazakh officials that they could not study Islam in Saudi Arabia (Global Security n.d.; CRS 2013). The group was based in Afghanistan-Pakistan, but had multiple cells across Kazakhstan that carried out attacks and had their own leaders and subleaders (Global Security n.d.; Zenn 2012). The JaK also had a wing called al Zahir Baibars Battalion (ZBB), also known as Al-Zaher Baibars Company, that is led by Rawil Kusaynov (Zarif 2011). The ZBB has mostly Kazakh fighters and remains operational only in Kazakhstan, but Kusaynov claims that the JaK was made to unite Muslims of different countries and different schools of thought for the common goal of ending the oppression of Muslims and reclaiming their rightful land (Zarif 2011, Roggio 2011b). Others argue that the majority of JaK members are from Kyrgyzstan (Jamestown Foundation 2012; Zenn 2013). Its source of funding is unclear. The group had an unusually large web presence and frequently posted on the Al Qaeda Ansar ul Mujahedeen message boards (Jamestown Foundation 2012).

External Ties

The group was allied with the Taliban and was also connected to al-Qaeda (Global Security n.d.). It is also allegedly connected to the Haqqani Network which is based in Khost, Afghanistan and has ties to al Qaeda (Roggio 2011a).

Group Outcome

In November 2011, the group was banned by the Kazakh government (Global Security n.d.) In December of the same year, Kazakh officials killed four fighters and a sub leader in JaK safehouse, but the leader of the Almaty cell, Yerik Ayazbayev, escaped (Zenn 2012). He was killed a few weeks later (Zenn 2012). In April 2012, 47 people thought to be members or allies of JaK were sentenced for two bombings that the group carried out in October of 2011 in the the city of Atyrau (CRS 2013). The group last claimed responsibility for a 2012 shooting in Toulouse, France (Omelicheva, Markowitz 2019).

Jamestown Foundation (2012) notes that police have discovered and arrested other Salafi militants in Kazakh funneling money and fighters to Afghanistan, but it is unclear whether these militants are tied to Jund al-Khilafah. The group is no longer active.

Interesting Quote from Jamestown Foundation 2012

“In the last three months of 2011, three Jund al-Khilafah (Army of the Caliphate) cells carried out the first terrorist attacks in Kazakhstan's history, targeting government buildings and personnel in Atyrau, Taraz and Almaty.”

Notes for Iris:

- jund al khilafah is the only group that opposes the Kazakh government
- what is the algeria story? There might be a separate group named Jund al Khilafah

Country-Level Trends:

- Uighur diaspora in Kazakhstan very large notable and might be because it's too dangerous to operate within China
- Jund al-Khilafa is an outlier/unusual Islamist group