

Italy Cases Part 1, 1959-1986
Last Updated: 6 January 2021

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T2335	ITALIAN UNABOMBER		0	0
T336	NUCLEI ARMATI COMUNISTA		0	0
T337	NUCLEI COMMUNIST COMBATANTS		0	0
T577	COLLETTIVO POLITICO METROPOLITANO		0	0
T102	ETA		1959	2011
T161	ERITREAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT (ELM)		1960	1992
T481	MARTYRS FOR MOROCCO		1966	2011
T378	POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP)		1967	2012
T241	ANTI-IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE (AIIB)		1970	1988
T99	RED ARMY FACTION		1970	1977
T108	MUNAZZAMAT AYLUL AL-ASWAD		1971	1976
T1136	JEWISH ARMED RESISTANCE		1971	1982
T323	NATIONAL YOUTH RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION		1973	1973
T389	PROLETARIAN ACTION GROUP		1973	1985
T702495	NUCLEI ARMATI PROLETARI (NAP)		1973	1978
T1212	ORDINE NERO		1974	1983
T188	NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF CORSICA		1974	2012
T2032	JEWISH EXTREMISTS		1974	2012
T263	PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF KURDISTAN		1974	2012
T3	ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION (ANO)		1974	1998
T329	RED BRIGADE		1974	1990
T248	JUSTICE COMMANDOS FOR THE ARMENIAN		1975	1986

	GENOCIDE			
T277	LTTE		1975	2011
T87	ARMENIAN SECRET ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA		1975	1997
T1003	ARMED COMMUNIST FORMATIONS		1976	1978
T9085	COMMUNIST COMBAT FORMATION		1976	1978
T121	CHE GUEVARA BRIGADE		1976	1990
T1253	PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM		1976	1976
T702501	COMBAT TERRITORY GROUPS		1976	1976
T702519	ITALIAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT (MSI)		1976	1979
T702524	COMMUNIST COMBAT UNIT		1976	1977
T702535	COMMUNIST BRIGADE DANTE DIMANI		1976	1976
T1581	NEW ORDER		1977	1998
T327	NEW ARMENIAN RESISTANCE		1977	1983
T401	RED GUERRILLA		1977	1979
T9084	PRIMA LINEA		1976	1981
T1627	ARMED REVOLUTIONARY NUCLEI (NAR)		1978	1988
T292	ARAB ORGANIZATION OF MAY 15		1979	1984
T2039	ITALIANS ATTACKING POLICIES OF THE REGIONAL SVP		1980	1980
T1041	COMMUNIST GROUP OF PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM		1981	1981
T1489	BLACK LEBANON		1982	1982
T787	NEW RED BRIGADES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE FIGHTING COMMUNIST PARTY		1983	2003
T14	AL-BORKAN		1984	1984
T218	INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST GROUP		1984	1984
T1004	ARMED COMMUNIST FRONT		1986	1986
T578	RED BRIGADES FIGHTING COMMUNIST UNION		1986	2002

(BR-UCC)			
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torg	gname	onset	min	max
T2335	ITALIAN UNABOMBER		0	0
T336	NUCLEI ARMATI COMUNISTA		0	0
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T577	COLLETTIVO POLITICO METROPOLITANO		0	0
T102	ETA		1959	2011
T161	ERITREAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT (ELM)		1960	1992
T481	MARTYRS FOR MOROCCO		1966	2011
T378	POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP)		1967	2012

- I. ITALIAN UNABOMBER
Torg ID: 2335
Min. Group Date: 0
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Monabomber

Group Formation: 1994

Group End: 2006 (reason unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Italian Unabomber's first attack occurred in August of 1994, when a metal pipe exploded at a cultural bird hunting festival in Sacile, a town in northeastern Italy (la Repubblica, 1994; la Repubblica, 1998; la Repubblica, 2003; We Are History, 2012). Between 1994 and 2006, the Italian Unabomber is thought to be responsible for approximately 30 attacks (UPI News Track, 2007). The Italian Unabomber's motives are unknown, but investigators believed him to be a man between 30-40 years of age, who had extensive knowledge of explosive devices (We Are History 2012).

Geography

Most of the Italian Unabomber's attacks occurred within a 40 kilometer radius in Northeastern Italy, in the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region and along the coast of the Adriatic Sea (la Repubblica 1996; We Are History 2012; Independent 2005). Some of the attacks between 1994 and 1996 were at tourist resorts, where the Italian Unabomber placed bombs inside beach umbrellas (Independent 2005).

Organizational Structure

The identity of the Italian Unabomber is unknown. Investigators believed he was a 30-40 year old man with extensive knowledge of explosives and chemistry (We Are History 2012; Independent 2005). Between 1998 and 2000, there were no attacks attributed to the Italian Unabomber, and attacks between 2000-2006 were conducted differently (United Press International 2005; la Repubblica 1996). Almost all of the Italian Unabomber's attacks prior to 1998 involved a short metal pipe packed with explosives, but after 2000, the Italian Unabomber placed his explosives in supermarket products, including a tube of tomato paste, mayonnaise, and a candle (United Press International 2005; Independent 2005).

External Ties

No information could be found about any external ties the Italian Unabomber may have had.

Group Outcome

In 2003, a dedicated police force was assembled to catch the Italian Unabomber, and in 2006, the Italian police charged 49 year old engineer Elvio Zornitta with planting twenty of the bombs attributed to the Italian Unabomber (Times-Colonist 2006; Italy Magazine 2006; We Are History 2012). However, the case against Zornitta was dismissed in 2009, after it was revealed evidence used in his case was tampered with (United Press International 2007; la Repubblica 2009). The Italian Unabomber was never caught, and has not carried out any attacks since 2006, when a man lost his arm after picking up a glass bottle with an explosive inside on a beach (The Daily Telegraph 2006).

II. NUCLEI ARMATI COMUNISTA

Torg ID: 336

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

*Jones and Libicki often based off of MIPT, but there is no corresponding MIPT profile.

*1982 date suggests it's a one off group, but no Proquest

*checked and there is upcoming profile (T578) which will be BR-UCC

*we know this isn't NAP nor BR-UCC

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Searched on Proquest:
 - "Armed communist union"
 - "Nuclei armati comunista"

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Armed Communist Union

Group Formation: 1987

Group End: 1987

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

No information could be found about this group.

Geography

No information could be found about this group.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about this group.

External Ties

No information could be found about this group.

Group Outcome

No information could be found about this group.

III. NUCLEI COMMUNIST COMBATANTS

Torg ID: 337

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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nato-school-rome/docview/306478983/se-2?accountid=11243 (accessed February 20, 2021).

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 1994 (alleged)

Group End: 1994 (reason unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Nuclei Communist Combatants carried out their only attack on January 10, 1994, when the group placed a crude bomb outside NATO's training school in Rome (The Baltimore Sun, 1994; MIPT 2008). The timing of the attack coincides with a NATO summit scheduled to begin in Brussels on the same day (The Baltimore Sun 1994).

Geography

Nuclei Communist Combatant's sole attack targeted NATO's Defense College in Rome (The Baltimore Sun, 1994; GTD 2019).

Organizational Structure

The group allegedly had few members, and four men were spotted driving away from the site of the explosion shortly after the bomb detonated (The Baltimore Sun 1994; RAND 2008).

External Ties

No information could be found about any external ties the Nuclei Communist Combatants may have had.

Group Outcome

The 1994 attack was the only attack for which the Nuclei Communist Combatants claimed credit for, and the group is presumably inactive (MIPT 2008; GTD 2019). There is some ambiguity about whether the group even existed. The Baltimore Sun (1994) notes no group claimed responsibility for the attack after it occurred. MIPT (2008) also notes uncertainty about the group's existence.

Notes for Iris:

-one hit wonder with dubious claims of responsibility

IV. COLLETTIVO POLITICO METROPOLITANO

Torg ID: 577

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Metropolitan Political Collective, Collettivo Politico Metropolitan

*how to code this separately from BR?

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Metropolitan Political Collective, CPM

Group Formation: 1969

Group End: 1970 (possibly; unclear what CPM activities were after formation of Red Brigades)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Collettivo Politico Metropolitan (CPM) formed in September of 1969 by student and worker activists Renato Curcio, Mara Cagol, and Corrado Simioni (Orsini 2011, 119; Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 69; Pisano 1987, 38; Azzellini 2009, 2814). CPM operated as a legal activist group, and never claimed responsibility for any major violent attacks, but some members of the group burned cars and escalated violence at protests and demonstrations (Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 69). In 1970, the group splintered over disputes relating to the role of violence in activism, and the more militant faction formed the Red Brigades (Pisano 1987, 38; Sundquist 2010, 55).

CPM was a leftist group, but there are some disagreements as to CPM's objectives prior to its splintering in 1970. CPM was founded during the student and worker protests that swept across Northern Italy between 1968 and 1969, and before the December 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing that helped spark the left and right wing violence Italy saw during the 1970s and 1980s (Ferraresi 1996, 84; Edwards 2009, 18; Orsini 2011, 120). It is likely that the Piazza Fontana bombing pushed leaders of CPM further towards adopting "armed struggle" in their activism, which ultimately led to splintering of CPM and the formation of the Red Brigades (Orsini 2011, 120). However, it is unclear if the CPM itself was dedicated to generally nonviolent activism prior to the bombing (Orsini 2011, 120). In an interview from 19XX, Curcio stated that the CPM was focused on nonviolent leftist demonstrations before December of 1969; however, fellow CPM member (and Red Brigades founder) Alberto Franceschini claimed in a 2004 interview that "armed struggle was being planned before Piazza Fontana" (Orsini 2011, 120). In November 1969, members of CPM and other leftist groups met in Chiavari, Italy, where Curcio gave a speech titled *The Social Struggle and Organization in the Metropolis*, and discussed "moving to a new political stage" and reorganizing the group (Orsini 2011, 119). Regardless of its ideological intentions, CPM published a journal titled *Proletarian Left (Sinistra Proletaria)* (Pisano 1987; Pešta 2014, 71). Some sources assert that the CPM was simply renamed Proletarian left in July 1970 (Pisano 1987), while others claim that Proletarian Left was a different group than CPM, formed out of

the radical factions of CPM and other leftist groups and focused on escalating violence in factories (Pešta 2014, 71).

Geography

CPM formed in Milan, and several founders were former students at the University of Trento (Pisano 1987, 38). In November 1969, the CPM hosted a conference with other leftist groups in Chiavari, near Genoa (Pisano 1987, 38). Most of the CPM's activity was concentrated in Northern Italy, and in the factories of surrounding and in Milan (Pisano 1987, 39). There is no evidence of transnational activities. Since the group did not appear to conduct any violent attacks, there is no evidence of transnational attacks.

Organizational Structure

CPM was founded and led by Renato Curcio, Mara Cagol, and Corrado Simioni (Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 69). All three had been active in the student and worker protests of the late 1960s, and Curcio had been a militant member of the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Italy (Pisano 1987, 39). While Curcio oversaw the "discussions and manifestations" of the CPM, Simioni oversaw more radical, secret groups within the organization (Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 69). Simioni had contacts with other radical groups, including the USA's Black Panthers and France's Vive la Revolution and Gauche Proletarienne, and led CPM's more radical members, called the Zie Rosse (Red Aunts) in escalating violence at protests (Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 69). Simioni also oversaw the Superclan, a secret group within the CPM that bombed the US embassy in Athens on September 2nd, 1970 (Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 69). Curcio was unaware of Simioni's plan for the attack, and the event sparked tension within the CPM and among leaders of the group (Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 69). Simioni and other radicals eventually left the CPM and continued their revolutionary activity in secret (Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 70).

Membership in CPM was open to all, and included union representatives, student leaders, and leaders of the Catholic groups Young Laborers and Young Students (Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 69). Other prominent members of CPM included Mario Moretti, who would later go on to lead the Red Brigades, and Alberto Franceschini, a leader of the Group of the Apartment and founder of the Red Brigades (Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 69-71).

As an organization, the CPM officially operated legally, and even published a journal called *Proletarian Left* starting in 1970 (Pisano 1987, 38). However, members did escalate violence at demonstrations and protests, and prominent members, including Simioni, planned coordinated attacks in secret (Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 69).

External Ties

CPM had ties to other Italian left-wing organizations, including Continuous Struggle, Workers' Power, and the Group of the Apartment (Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 71).

The group also had contacts in the Pirelli, Sit-Siemens, and Mondadori unions in Milan (Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 69).

Group Outcome

In 1970, the CPM splintered due to debates over the role of violence in activism, and the more militant faction, led by Curcio, Cagol, and Franceschini, left the group and founded the Red Brigades (Pisano 1987, 38). An October 1970 issue of the *Proletarian Left* pamphlet announced the split in the CPM and the creation of the Red Brigades (Pisano 1987, 38).

Before its final splintering in 1970, the CPM may have formed a splinter group named the Proletarian Left, or simply may have renamed itself as such (Pisano 1987, 38; Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 71). One account states that at a conference hosted by the CPM in the summer of 1970, members of the CPM and other left-wing groups voted to create a new, separate legal political organization named Proletarian Left that also published a journal of the same name (Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 71). However, this group would secretly work in factories to escalate violence and intimidate factory leaders (Pešta and Stoleti 2014, 71). Another source states that the CPM simply renamed itself Proletarian Left in 1970 (Pisano 1987, 38). Yet another source states that the non-violent faction of CPM renamed the group Proletarian Left after the 1970 split (Buckingham 1982, 98).

It is also unclear what the CPM's activities were after the formation of the Red Brigades, and when the group ceased operations.

Notes for Iris:

- the CPM didn't engage in political violence
- CPM origins tied to student protests
- BR splintering might have been due to Curcio's wife? The group broke away from CPM due to ideological disagreements over the utility of violence. Some say the group broke away due to the Plaza Fontana bombing, which catalyzed the need for a far-left militancy. Other sources say the leadership decided later during this conference. Orsini book ("Anatomy of the Red Brigades") is really good on the origins of splintering.
- group's influence on BR: first real organized response to the Piazza Fontana bombing. Lots of union ties and labor.
- Simioni is an interesting character. He approached Mara Cagol (wife) about attempted murder, which created divisions/tensions between Siminioni and Curcio
- Curcio and Cagol's role in initial BR formation interesting relative to later organizational behavior of the group (interesting evolution in the group and the leadership role.)

- V. ETA
Torg ID: 102
Min. Group Date: 1959
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: Basque Fatherland And Freedom (Eta), Basque Fatherland And Liberty, Basque Homeland And Freedom, Eta, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: no other aliases

Group Formation: formed 1959, first attack 1968 (BBC 2017; MIPT 2008; CFR 2008; Mackenzie Institute 2015; Stewart 2009; Canada IRB 1992)

Group End: last violent attack 2008 (GTD 2017), 2017 disarmament (BBC 2017; Al Jazeera 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The ETA first appeared in 1959, during the rule of Franco, as a group of students from Bilbao's Deusto University protesting for Basque independence from Spain (BBC 2017; MIPT 2008; CFR 2008; Mackenzie Institute 2015; Stewart 2009; Canada IRB 1992). Franco prohibited the language and culture of the Basque Country (CFR 2008; Stewart 2009). The group was founded from some of the remaining members of another Basque nationalist group, the EKIN (MIPT 2008). The group formed because they claimed that the Basque National Party was too moderate (MIPT 2008; CFR 2008). The students were not originally a part of the Basque National Party, but were disgruntled by its actions.

The group's first violent attack was not until 1968 when a police torturer was shot outside of his home (Stewart 2009).

The ETA is a separatist, ethno-nationalist, leftist group and it seeks autonomy as its political aim (BBC 2017; MIPT 2008; CFR 2008; Mackenzie Institute 2015; Minder 2016).

Geography

The group has networks and bases in the different Basque parts of France and Spain (BBC 2017; MIPT 2008). It is also allegedly reported that members trained in various countries: Algeria, Czechoslovakia, Lebanon, South Yemen, Cuba, Uruguay, and Ireland (Canada IRB 1992). Group also allegedly has ties with the "Action Directe" in France (Canada IRB 1992). The group conducted an attack in Costa Rica (Canada IRB 1992). In 1984, they allegedly bombed the Palace of Justice in Antwerp, Belgium (Canada IRB 1992). Many members are allegedly hiding in Mexico, Cuba, Argentina, and Venezuela (Canada IRB 1992). The group operated in France during the Franco dictatorship.

The group is transnational - it conducts transnational attacks and has external bases.

Organizational Structure

The ETA first appeared in 1959, during the rule of Franco, as a group of students from Bilbao's Deusto University protesting for Basque independence from Spain (BBC 2017; MIPT 2008; CFR 2008; Mackenzie Institute 2015). The group primarily recruits youth and student individuals (Stewart 2009).

The group first operated in a hierarchical structure: leadership, military, logistics, and political (Mackenzie Institute 2015). There are three types of member in the ETA: “legal ones”, “liberated ones”, and supporters (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

The names of leaders are mostly unknown as the group interestingly is very secretive about their leadership wing (MIPT 2008). The group’s military wing leaders are allegedly Garikoitz Aspiazu Rubina and Juran Martitegi Lizaso and the group’s political wing leader is Javier Lopez Pena (BBC 2017; CFR 2008). The group has a political wing. A group leader was also Mikel Irastorza (Minder 2016). The political wing is known as Batasuna or HB.

The group uses several methods of funding including kidnapping and extortion, robbery, and charging a “revolution tax” from companies in the Basque Country (Canada IRB 1992; MIPT 2008).

The most common forms of attack by the ETA are assassinations and bombs (MIPT 2008). The group however, usually provides warning prior to attacks (MIPT 2008). The group is responsible for more than 800 deaths and thousands wounded (BBC 2017; CFR 2008; Al Jazeera 2017). The group has conducted nearly 2000 attacks (CFR 2008). The group had many high profile targets. They often attack Spanish police and government members and military members of the Spanish Guardia Civil (MIPT 2008; BBC 2017; Stewart 2009; CFR 2008). In 1973, they assassinated Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, the supposed successor to Franco in Spain (MIPT 2008). For example, in 1983 the group attacked the British ambassador in Costa Rica because an ETA member was arrested in that country (Canada IRB 1992). In 1984, they allegedly bombed the Palace of Justice in Antwerp, Belgium (Canada IRB 1992).

The group has also targeted journalists and media (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Stewart 2009). The group had about 200-300 members at an unknown date (Canada IRB 1992; MIPT 2008).

External Ties

Group has been an ally to the Red Flag in Venezuela and the Irish Republican Army (MIPT 2008; Canada IRB 1992). The group has also allegedly trained FARC members for money (Stewart 2009). The group despises the US as they did not help against Franco after WWII (Stewart 2009).

The group also allegedly received funding from various countries: Libya, China, and the USSR (Canada IRB 1992). It is also allegedly reported that members trained in various countries: Algeria, Czechoslovakia, Lebanon, South Yemen, Cuba, Uruguay, and Ireland (with the IRA) (Canada IRB 1992).

Group also allegedly has ties with the “Action Directe” in France and the “Uruguayan Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros” in Uruguay (Canada IRB 1992). Group also has ties in North Africa (Stewart 2009).

GRAPO has given “operational support” to ETA (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 661).

Group Outcome

Starting in 1968 through 1969, the government reacted to the group by making mass arrests, about 2000 in those two years (Stewart 2009).

Franco prohibited the language and culture of the Basque Country (CFR 2008; Stewart 2009; MIPT 2008). In 1980, the Basque Country was allowed its own parliament and taxes (MIPT 2008). In 1997, the group murdered the young leader of the Basque Popular Party because of his refusal to release 460 imprisoned ETA members (BBC 2017). This event made the ETA lose many supporters and protests began against the ETA (BBC 2017). The Popular Party continued to run with a strong policy of terminating the ETA (BBC 2017).

In 1992 the group called a 2 months truce because of the Olympics (Minorities at Risk Project 2004).

In 1998, the ETA called a cease-fire but that lasted for only 14 months until 1999 because the government of Spain did not allow Basque independence (MIPT 2008; BBC 2017). The Spanish police has been able to capture over 100 ETA members (MIPT 2008). In 1999, 700 people went on a hunger strike because of the ETA's poor prison conditions (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). In 2004, the group infamously set a bomb at a Madrid train station on the evening before elections; the bombs killed about 200 (BBC 2017; Stewart 2009).

In 2005, the government held a vote to have peace talks with the ETA in return for disarmament; about 250,000 voters voted against the talks, most likely due to distrust towards the ETA (CFR 2008).

Early in 2006 the group again proposed a ceasefire and peacefully joining politics but later that year the group bombed an airport garage (MIPT 2008). The Spanish government announced they would not allow peace talks and agreements until the group disarmed and ended its violence (BBC 2017).

The group's attacks up until 2003 had cost the Spanish government about 11 billion dollars in repair (CFR 2008).

The French and Spanish government banned the group's political wing that seeks Basque autonomy; the wing has been under the names Euzkako Herritarrok, Batasuna,

and Herri Batasuna (BBC 2017). The reason being that the political wing provides the group with government representation and allegedly funding as well (BBC 2017). In 2009, they were excluded from electing officials (BBC 2017).

In 2008, they arrested Garikoitz Aspiazu Rubina and Javier Lopez Pena, two suspected leaders of the group (BBC 2017; CFR 2008). The group's last recorded violent attack took place that year, 2008 (GTD 2017). In 2010, the group agreed to stop carrying out attacks (BBC 2017). In 2011, the group announced they had completely disarmed (BBC 2017; Al Jazeera 2017).

In April of 2017 the group said that they had dissolved, but the Spanish government said they would refuse to give them anything in return (BBC 2017). In April of 2017, the group announced they would disarm (Al Jazeera 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- unlike Colombia groups, ETA is not super corrupt and doesn't deviate or have to deal with rogue members or splinters
- ETA pursues different leadership strategy here covering their faces which makes it harder for government to track down and identify
- repeated history of ceasefire breakdown between ETA and the government. No one actually trusts that ETA has disarmed.

VI. ERITREAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT (ELM)

Torg ID: 161

Min. Group Date: 1960

Max. Group Date: 1992

Onset: NA

Aliases: Eritrean Liberation Front, Eritrean Liberation Front (Elf), Eritrean Liberation Movement (Elm)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Note: this is not the EPLF

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1960

Group End: 1992 (repressed by EPLF)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

ELF was created in July 1960 by students and scholars in Egypt (MIPT 2008). The group forms because of mounting resentment towards Selassie's government for ignoring Eritrean autonomy throughout the 1950s (Lobban 1972). Their first attacks began in 1961 (MIPT 2008; *ibid*). The organization aims to create an autonomous Eritrea free from Ethiopian control (*ibid*). ELF is mainly an ethno-nationalist group despite occasionally demonstrating traits of religious and Marxist movements (MIPT 2008)

Geography

ELF has a base of operations in Eritrea and Ethiopia (MIPT 2008). ELF was created in July 1960 by students and scholars in Egypt (MIPT 2008). It has also destroyed property in and near Djibouti and Addis Ababa (Lobban 1972; GTD 2016). Within Ethiopia the group has been active in Kerene, Asmara, Mekele, Massalva, Ghinda, and Bahar Dar (GTD 2016). Since 1969 ELF has participated in plane hijacking and bombings in Germany, Karachi, Khartoum, and Aden, and held an attack in Italy (Lobban 1972). In 1982 ELF was forced into Sudan (*ibid*). ELF is a transnational organization.

Organizational Structure

ELF is a group that was initially founded by students and scholars (MIPT 2008). Villages in ELF's area of control have elected representatives in the organization for civil-military decision-making, but no formal political wing existed (Lobban 1972). The group received military and financial support from Iraq and Syria (MIPT 2008).

Size estimates on the group vary as the Ethiopian government claimed the group began with 1,000 members and in 1969 had 8,000 members (Lobban 1972). However another source says that in its peak the group has 12,500-15,000 members (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan N.D. p.225).

No additional information could be found on specific ELF wings or leadership.

External Ties

ELF has received explicit military and financial support from Iraq and Syria (MIPT 2008). Isaias Afewerki who eventually became president of Nigeria was a member of ELF in 1966. He then went on to co-found the EPLF began, an ELF splinter which eventually pushed the organization into Sudan in 1982 (ibid; Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan N.D. p.226).

Group Outcome

In 1968 dead ELF members were displayed in Eritrean cities by Ethiopian authorities (Lobban 1972). The Ethiopian army in Eritrea is comprised of peasants thus counter-insurgency actions by them against ELF were very unsophisticated and uncoordinated. They employed indiscriminate violence (Lobban 1972). In 1970 the army shot 112 people in a mosque and their napalm killed 600 civilians (ibid). In 1970, the EPLF emerged as a splinter off of ELF because of ideological disagreements about the religious affiliation of the group (MIPT 2008). The group began fighting both this new rival group and the government (MIPT 2008). By 1982 ELF was pushed out of Eritrea into Sudan by the EPLF. Their last violent attack occurred in 1992 (GTD 2016).

VII. TAKFIR WAL HIJRA
Torg ID: 481
Min. Group Date: 1966
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: Takfir Wal-Hijra (Excommunication And Exodus), Anathema And Exile, Excommunication And Emigration, Excommunication And Exodus, Martyrs For Morocco, Rejection Of Sins And Exodus, Takfir Wa Hijara, Takfir Wa Hijra, Takfir Wal Hijra, Takfir Wa'l Hijra

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Aliases: Jama’at al-Muslimin

al-Takfir wa al-Hijra (Mili 2006)

Jama’at al-Muslimin, Takfeer wal-Hegra, Black Flags (TIMEP N.d.)

Repentance and Holy Flight (Godsel 1981)

Group Formation: “late 1960s”

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed in Egypt by Shukri Mustafa either in the late 1960s, or sometime between the 1970's and 1980's, depending on the source; the group resurfaced in 2011 due to the death of Mubarak (Gleis 2005; MIPT 2008). The group was allegedly a splinter of the Muslim Brotherhood (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010; Godsell 1981). The group rose up again in the aftermath of the Arab Springs (CNN 2011).

Mustafa was heavily influenced by the teachings of Sheikh Ali Ismael; Ismael argued Muslims and Islam was being suppressed by Egyptian President Nasser (Mili 2006). The group does not follow a specific ideology, but rather follow the words of the leaders of the group, and punished people by torture who did not follow the way of the group; the group is still theorized to follow a fundamentalist Sunni Islamist ideology, which was then branded as takfiri (Mili 2006; Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2004; Kimyungi N.d.; CNN 2011). Mustafa formed the group to punish apostates and wage jihad (Mili 2006; MIPT 2008). He was anti-modernity and Salafi jihadi. Mustafa and his followers moved to the desert in order to practice Islam and get around what they deemed "illegitimate" Egyptian law. The group's aim was to wage jihad, overthrow the existing governments, and create an Islamic state. The date of the group's first violent attack is unknown.

Geography

Al-Takfir wa al-Hira is a transnational terrorist group which provides support to different cells across Europe and northern Africa (Mili 2006; MIPT 2008; Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010; GTD 2017). The group originally formed in Egypt. The group has been active in Egypt's Sinai as of 2011, and more specifically Sheikh Zuweid (TIMEP N.d.; Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2004; Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010)

The group conducted attacks in Benghazi, Libya; Rafah, Egypt; Mogadishu, Somalia; Kirkuk, Iraq; and Garaffa, Sudan (GTD 2017). The group re-emerged after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in the Rafah and Sheikh Zuwaid regions of the Sinai Peninsula (Daymon 2013; CNN 2011).

Organizational Structure

The group was originally founded by Shukri Mustafa in Egypt (Gleis 2005; MIPT 2008; TIMEP N.d.; Kimyungi N.d.). Mustafa was heavily influenced by the teachings of sheikh Ali Ismael; Ismael argued Muslims and Islam was being suppressed by Egyptian President Nasser (Mili 2006). Mustafa formed the group to punish apostates, wage jihad, and create an Islamic caliphate (Mili 2006; CNN 2011). He was anti-modernity and Salafi jihadi.

During the 1980s and 1990s, Takfir cells emerged in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Kenya, and Morocco (Mili 2006). The group was ethnically Egyptians, Syrians, Palestinians, Lebanese and other Arabs (MIPT 2008). The group was led by Zakaria Miludi at an unknown time (Botha 2008). The group was more recently led by

Abdel-Fattah Hasan Hussein Salem (TIMEP N.d.). The group was allegedly an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010; Godsell 1981).

External Ties

The group may have influenced the ideology of GIA in Algeria as well as Takfiris in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco (Mili 2006). It may also have had a tacit alliance with the GIA (MIPT 2008). The group was allegedly also linked to as-Sirat al-Mustaqim and Salafia Jihadia (Botha 2008).

Group Outcome

In 1977, Mustafa was executed by Egyptian police after that the group went underground (Mili 2006). The group has periodically engaged in violence. It may have influenced the ideology of GIA in Algeria as well as Takfiris in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco (Mili 2006). The group was attacked by a Lebanese group in 2000 that led to the death of several of its members (MIPT 2008). The group was responsible for five attacks on worshippers that started in 1994 (Mili 2006). The group was also linked to the death of Theo van Gogh in 2004 (MIPT 2008). On December 31, 2000, several Takfir groups together attacked (Mili 2006). As late as 2012, the group operates as a set of decentralized cells with little coordinated oversight (Daymon 2013).

The Egyptian government has typically “turned its head the other way” about violent activities in the Sinai and done little to address the concerns of Bedouins living in the Peninsula about economic discrimination (Daymon 2013). The group re-emerged after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in the Rafah and Sheikh Zuwaid regions of the Sinai Peninsula (Daymon 2013). It came to attention through a set of prominent attacks around El Arish, Egypt (CNN 2011). Egyptian intelligence officials said the group had members from Palestinian factions

There is some confusion over whether Morocco’s Salafia Jihadia and Assirat al-Mustaqim are different from ATWAH because the ideology is so similar (Maroc Hebdo 2003; Mili 2008). It is also unclear whether Takfir refers to a single armed group or if it instead describes an ideology (Gleis 2005). Abdel-Fattah Hasan Hussein Salem was arrested in 2013 (TIMEP N.d.). The group was banned in Kazakhstan in 2014 (RFE/RL 2014). The group’s last violent attack was in 2013 in Libya (GTD 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- somewhat similar to Sunni Islam, but their own ideology
- attacks are typically in defense

VIII. POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP)
Torg ID: 378
Min. Group Date: 1967
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Popular Front For The Liberation Of Palestine (Pflp), Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades, Al-Jabha Ash-Sha'abiya Li-Tahrir Falastin, Al-Jabna Al-Shabiyya Li-Tahrir Filastin, Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades Popular Front For The Liberation Of Palestine, Red Eagles, PFLP

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Halhul Gang, Halhul Squad, Palestinian Popular Resistance Forces, PPRF (Mackenzie Institute)

Group Formation: 1967

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PFLP was formed in 1967 by George Habash to fight and destroy Israel after the latter began to occupy parts of the West Bank (BBC 2014). It formed as a merger between two unnamed left-wing faction (IB Times 2014). The group came to attention in 1968 with a series of prominent airplane hijackings and were the first group to employ this tactic (BBC 2014). It was primarily secular, but Habash argued the group was founded on Marxist-Leninist ideals (Global Security n.d., BBC 2014).

Geography

Today, the group primarily operates from the Gaza Strip attacking Israeli communities in the southern part of the country. It has also had prominent attacks in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Entebbe, Geva junction, Itamar, Ramallah, and Karnei Shomron (Global Security n.d., BBC 2014). Its headquarters were (are?) in Damascus (Global Security n.d.)

It's unclear exactly what the ties to Turkey are, but there is a bastion of support in Istanbul according to the PFLP official website (PFLP 2013).

Organizational Structure

The PFLP is a faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (BBC 2014). It was originally created by George Habash - a Christian doctor - and merged with the PLO in 1968 (Global Security n.d.) Habash stepped down in 2000 and was replaced by Abu Ali Mustafa. It has an armed wing known as the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades which was particularly active during the Second Intifada (BBC 2014). The armed wing was led - at some point - by Abu Ali Mustafa and later Ahmed Sadaa (BBC 2014).

The group has an estimated 800 members with potentially more support throughout the West Bank and Gaza (Global Security n.d.) It is currently led by Ahmed Jibril who was formerly head of the PFLP-General Command (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group funds itself from local supporters as well as external sources in Libya and Syria.

The representative of the PFLP in Turkey is Hassan Tahrawi (PFLP 2013).

External Ties

The PFLP has a vast network of alliances including the German Baader-Meinhor organization and Japanese Red Army (BBC 2014). It fought against Hamas early on (BBC 2014). The group received external support from Syria, Libya, USSR, and China in the form of financial support, training, and an external base of operations.

The Turkish branch of the PFLP claims to have an alliance with Kurdish forces and parties in the country (PFLP 2013).

Group Outcome

After the fall of the Soviet Union and fighting by more Islamist groups during the First Intifada (Hamas, PIJ), the PFLP was very weakened and lost nearly all of its power and influence in the West Bank by 2000 (ADL n.d., IB Times 2014).

The US designated the group a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1995 (Global Security n.d). The group became partially involved in politics in the 1990s when it sought to become a part of Arafat's government.

Israel killed Mustafa in 2001 and arrested Sadat in 2002 (Global Security n.d.). Today, the group continues to fight Israel and Saadat claims the group will not enter negotiations with the Israeli government (BBC 2014).

Italy Cases Part 2, 1970-1974

Last Updated: 6 January 2021

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T241	ANTI-IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE (AIIB)		1970	1988
T99	RED ARMY FACTION		1970	1977
T108	MUNAZZAMAT AYLUL AL-ASWAD		1971	1976
T1136	JEWISH ARMED RESISTANCE		1971	1982
T323	NATIONAL YOUTH RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION		1973	1973
T389	PROLETARIAN ACTION GROUP		1973	1985
T702495	NUCLEI ARMATI PROLETARI (NAP)		1973	1978
T1212	ORDINE NERO		1974	1983
T188	NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF CORSICA		1974	2012
T2032	JEWISH EXTREMISTS		1974	2012
T263	PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF KURDISTAN		1974	2012
T3	ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION (ANO)		1974	1998
T329	RED BRIGADE		1974	1990

- I. ANTI-IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE (AIIB)
Torg ID: 241
Min. Group Date: 1970
Max. Group Date: 1988
Onset: NA

Aliases: Japanese Red Army (Jra), Anti-Imperialist International Brigade, Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (Aiib)

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Part 2. Proposed Changes

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 1970

Group End (Outcome): 1988 (last attack), 2003 (dissolve)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The JRA formed in 1970 as a splinter from the Japanese Communist League - Red Army Faction (FAS 2003; Global Security N.d.). Its initial aim was to overthrow the Japanese government and launch a revolution although the goals were later modified to just demand political representation, as well as to oppose US presence in Japan after the Vietnam War (FAS 2003; Kushner N.d.). The group's first violent attack was in 1970 (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group was transnational. In 1981, the group attacked two airplanes at the Cairo airport (GTD 2017). The group primarily operated out of Lebanon and initially grew out of the anti-war movement and student protests (BBC 2000; FAS 2003; Global Security N.d.). The group was active in general in Italy, Egypt, India, Malays, the Netherlands, Singapore, Israel, and Japan (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group was a student-led movement (Kushner N.d.). The group's leader was Fusako Shigenbou who led the JRA from its formation until she was arrested in 2000 (BBC 2000). The group had six members, but may have had 30-40 members at one time; the group allegedly had seven hardcore members and the rest were perceived as sympathizers (FAS 2003; Global Security N.d.). Some members defected to join revolutionary movements in Peru and Colombia (Global Security N.d.). The group primarily operated as one cell, but may have tried to create cells in Manila and Singapore during the 1980s (Global Security N.d.).

External Ties

There is no evidence of external support although the JRA may have had ties to the Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB) and the Antiwar Democratic Front, and "Palestinian terrorists" (FAS 2003; Global Security N.d.). Other external ties are unknown (Global Security N.d.).

Group Outcome

The group was responsible for terrible bombings and hijackings through the 70's; JRA came to attention following an attack at Ben Gurion airport in Israel in 1972 which killed 26 people (BBC 2000). The group was primarily active in the 1970s and 1980s (GTD 2017). The group's last violent attack is in 1988 (GTD 2017; Global Security n.d.). The group's leader was Fusako Shigenbou who led the JRA from its formation until she was arrested in 2000 (BBC 2000). The group announced they would disband in 2003 (FAS 2003). The group allegedly had cells in Asian cities like Manila and Singapore (Global Security N.d.)

- II. RED ARMY FACTION
Torg ID: 99
Min. Group Date: 1970
Max. Group Date: 1977
Onset: NA

Aliases: Baader-Meinhof Group, Baader-Meinhof Bande, Baader-Meinhof Gang, Red Army Faction

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Baader-Meinhof Gang, Baader-Meinhof Bande, Red Army Faction, Rote Armee Fraktion

Group Formation: What is the earliest year the group was active?

The Baader-Meinhof group was founded in 1968. The very first act of violence, an arson attack, was carried out that same year.

Group End: What is the last year the group was active? Why did it stop using political violence?

The group formally ended in 1998. The group also issued a ceasefire in 1992, but its final, major act of violence occurred at a German prison in 1993. The group stopped using political violence, as radical leftist causes weakened following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, and various government countermeasures taken to decrease their influence.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

First Wave

The Baader-Meinhof Group, later-known as the Red Army Faction was founded in 1968 by Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof (Schmid and Jongman 1988; New York Times 1989). Their first violent incident was carried out by two figures, Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ennslin, who carried out an arson attack against a Frankfurt store in 1968, with the use of incendiary bombs (New York Times 1989; Weil 2017). The group originated as the result of growing student activist organizations and protests in Germany and Western Europe (BBC 2016; Schmid and Jongman 1988; New York Times 1989; Weil 2017).

Initially, the group possessed several aims. The Baader-Meinhof group protested against former Nazis who took up positions in government (New York Times 2009; BBC 2016). Others also felt that an oppressive capitalist system in West Germany resembled the Third Reich (BBC 2016). West German police shot and killed a young student protester, Benno Ohnesorg. This triggered demonstrations and protests against police brutality and authoritarianism as the violence was seen as an extension of Germany's Nazi past (New York Times, 2009). Finally, the Baader-Meinhof Gang drew inspiration from guerilla groups in South America, protesting against capitalist systems and imperialism, in addition to seeking to collapse the West German social structure (New York Times, 1989).

The group ascribed to a left-wing ideology, consisting of anti-imperialism, socialism, and a combination of Maoist and Marxist ideals (MIPT 2008; FAS 1998; The Guardian 2008; DW 2007; New York Times 1989).

The group had several waves of violence. When Ennslin and Baader carried out their first attack in 1968, they justified it as a sign of opposition to the bloodshed of the

Vietnam War (Weil 2017). Following their arrest, however, their defense lawyer, Horst Mahler reasoned that the attack was carried out as a "rebellion against a generation that had tolerated millions of crimes in the Nazi era." (Weil 2017). The Baader-Meinhof group experienced a spike in violence during 1972, targeting West German and American buildings of significance (Weil 2017). They conducted a string of several bomb attacks in 1972, targeting right-wing media, U.S. Army facilities, and police in West Germany, hoping to garner support for leftist and anti-imperialist causes (Weil 2017). The arrest of key members prompted another wave of violence between 1972-1977, which was solely devoted to freeing the imprisoned leaders (Weil 2017). Siegfried Haag became the leader of the group (Weil 2017).

Second Wave

By 1977, four leaders of the organization, Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof, Jan Carl Raspe, and Gudrun Ennslin were found dead in their cells at Stammheim Prison, due to suicide (Weil 2017; New York Times 1989). The group subsequently renamed itself to the Red Army Faction in 1977 (MIPT 2008; Sloan and Anderson 2009). In 1977, two new leaders, Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Christian Klar emerged, and after failing to release several prisoners from the group, they turned to targeting American and NATO symbols (Weil 2017). They attempted to murder American generals Alexander Haig and Frederick Kroesen, and they bombed an American airbase in Ramstein (Weil 2017; Sloan and Anderson 2009; CIA 2008). When Klar and Mohnhaupt were detained, leaders Wolfgang Grams and Birgit Hogefeld overtook the RAF (Weil 2017). They opposed a German and European-led economic world order, so they focused on targeting bankers, diplomats, and other figures of financial importance (Weil 2017). The group also sought to establish a coalition with other violent, leftist groups in Western Europe, often claiming responsibility for the actions of their international counterparts, until they eventually lost influence and disbanded (Weil 2017).

Geography

The group mainly operated in West Germany (CIA 2008; GTD 2019.; New York Times 2009; The Guardian 2008). They carried out many attacks throughout West Germany, in cities such as Cologne, Karlsruhe, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Hamburg, Essen, Darmstadt, West Berlin, Dusseldorf, and many others (GTD 2019). The group has also carried out acts of terror in other countries, such as Italy, France, and Switzerland (GTD 2019). RAF members also collaborated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), when they hijacked an Air France flight from Tel Aviv, Israel, to Paris, France (*Sloan and Anderson 2009, 574*). The plane was diverted to Entebbe, Uganda, and a hostage situation ensued until Israeli forces killed the hijackers (*Sloan and Anderson 2009, 574*). In 1977, the two groups collaborated once more to divert a Lufthansa flight intended for Mallorca, Spain, to Frankfurt, West Germany, which ended up in Mogadishu, Somalia (*Sloan and Anderson 2009, 574*). This was done to persuade the German government to release former RAF members who were imprisoned (*Sloan and Anderson 2009, 574*).

The Baader-Meinhof Group also received support from East Germany in the 1980's, who provided them with asylum which they used as an external base (MIPT 2008; Sloan and Anderson 2009).

Organizational Structure

Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof founded the group (New York Times 1989). Baader was born in 1943, whom he had lost his father to military service (The Guardian 2008). He relocated to West Berlin with the prospect of avoiding service in the military (The Guardian 2008). There, he met his girlfriend, Gudrun Ennslin, who was the daughter of a Lutheran preacher (The Guardian 2008). She was unhappy with the ruling party, the Social Democrats, and also espoused radical socialist principles (The Guardian 2008). With the help of Baader, they travelled to Frankfurt and committed an arson attack against a department store (The Guardian 2008; Kushner 2002). Following their detainment, Ennslin met Ulrike Meinhof in prison, a radical, left-wing journalist who later took part in the RAF's activities (The Guardian 2008). Ulrike Meinhof was born in 1934 in Oldenburg, Germany to a middle-class family (Rafinfo n.d.). She went to the University of Münster, in 1957 where she became an influential spokeswoman for the SDS, and subsequently became part of the Communist Party (KPD) in 1958 (Rafinfo n.d.). Ennslin and Meinhof devised a scheme to release Baader from prison, and in 1970, he successfully escaped (New York Times 1989; Weil 2017). The leaders were arrested once more in 1972, and were overtaken by Siegfried Haag, a lawyer (Weil 2017). Her arrest in 1976 signified her succession by Christian Klar and Brigitte Mohnhaupt (Weil 2017). Meanwhile, the original founders committed suicide in prison (Inquiries Journal 2017; New York Times 1989). Klar and Mohnhaupt were detained by authorities in 1982, and were thus replaced by Wolfgang Grams and Birgit Hogefeld until the group died down (Weil 2017). In 1970, the group was lacking funds, so they conducted a string of bank robberies in order to obtain them (Kushner 2002, 66).

The group was also split into multiple cadres which perpetrated various acts of violence (FAS 1998). The size of the group ranged between 10-20 active members at an unknown date, but also had hundreds of supporters in Germany (FAS 1998; MIPT 2008; Sloan and Anderson 2009). It was also estimated that between 16-20 RAF members roamed at large at an unknown date (CIA 2008).

External Ties

In 1970, the group received training in Jordan at a Palestine Liberation Organization camp, where members learned how to operate rifles (New York Times 2009; BBC 2016; New York Times 1989). Other members of the group went to Lebanon, where other Palestine-owned training camps assisted them with various guerilla warfare tactics and bomb-making techniques (Kushner 2002, 66).

The Baader-Meinhof Group also received support from East Germany in the 1980's, who provided them with asylum, training, and logistical aid (MIPT 2008; Sloan and Anderson 2009). The Group also sought to form an alliance with Direct Action, the Communist Combatant Cells, and the Red Brigades of Italy (Weil 2017). Evidence showed that the RAF worked with other organizations, such as the Communist Combatant Cells in Belgium and Direct Action in France, as well as the First of October Antifascist Resistance Group in Spain (GRAPO) (FAS 1998; MIPT 2008; Sloan and Anderson 2009; Schmid and Jongman 1988). They also worked together with the Palestinian PLFP to conduct aircraft two hijackings abroad (*Sloan and Anderson 2009, 574*).

Group Outcome

Many steps were taken to curb the threat of the RAF. Key members and leaders within the organization were repeatedly arrested by authorities (Weil 2017). In 1977, counterterrorism raids by the West German Grenzschutzgruppe (GSG-9) took place killing hijackers on a plane (Inquiries Journal 2017; Sloan and Anderson 2009; New York Times 2009). During their final days of violence, police officers clashed with RAF members, and Hogefeld was detained, while Grams was fatally shot by police (Sloan and Anderson 2009; Social History Portal n.d.). Investigative power to the German police was expanded in 1977 when the penal code was edited to permit checking personal communications, fortifying search procedures, and creating road checkpoints (Weil 2017). Interior ministers within Germany voted to form a counterterrorism police unit called the GSG-9 in 1972, whose members received extensive training (Weil 2017). Anti-terror laws in Germany were bolstered on numerous occasions. The West German government passed new statutes in 1971, which clearly defined what constituted acts of terrorism, such as stealing aircraft and taking hostages, and in 1976, the law was amended to punish membership in an extremist organization with prison sentences (Weil 2017). In 1977, lawyers who were sympathetic to extremist activity were prohibited from representing militants in court, as well as permitting the police to isolate inmates who were deemed a threat (Weil 2017).

In 1989, statutes were passed to decrease the sentences of terrorists who vowed to comply with police and other law enforcement (Weil 2017). Finally, in 1992, German Justice Minister Klaus Kinkel, with the approval of the government, was granted permission to gradually release RAF prisoners (Weil 2017).

The group's final known act of violence occurred in 1993, where the group bombed an newly-constructed prison in Weiterstadt (Sloan and Anderson 2009; Social History Portal n.d.). The RAF ordered a self-imposed ceasefire in 1992 (MIPT 2008; Sloan and Anderson 2009). The group's constantly changing aims failed to attract support from others, so they struggled to recruit new members (Weil 2017). The reunification of Germany, as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 also signaled the weakening of Communist causes, leaving the group with a diminished ideology (BBC 2016; Weil 2017). Their unpopular and often radical causes left the remaining members

of the RAF to formally announce their demise in 1998 (Sloan and Anderson 2009; MIPT 2008; BBC 2016; DW 2007).

Notes for Iris:

-Ennslin was a student, but Baader and Meinhof are not. Ennslin contributes ideology from university when group forms in 1970. Ennslin spent a year at an American college and brought her radical political views back to Germany. Baader did not attend univ. Meinhof was a former SDS member.

-state responses in the 1970s seemed to mostly be general anti-CT. In early 1970s, RAF attracted most of the state's attention and was the most prominent.

-interesting circular pattern in group's organization and evolution. arrests of original leaders → suicide in prison → new leadership taking over → Leadership turnover within the group several times, but this doesn't decimate the group immediately. (speak to leadership decapitation debates over whether removing leader hurts group or not). Further research -- State begun to take various countermeasures to decrease terror done by other groups. However, their most active period came as a result of a string of RAF violence, prompting them to take more drastic action.

III. MUNAZZAMAT AYLUL AL-ASWAD

Torg ID: 108

Min. Group Date: 1971

Max. Group Date: 1976

Onset: NA

Aliases: Black September, Black September Organization (Bso), Munazzamat Aylul Al-Aswad

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Fatah

Group Formation: 1970/1971

Group End (Outcome): 1973 (dissolve)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Black September is a transnational terrorist organization, a special secret armed wing of Fatah, named after events of September 1970 (Fruchter-Ronen 2008, 255). It was formed in either late 1970 or early 1971 (Wolf 1973, 37). The group came to attention for their attack during the Munich Olympics in 1972 (Wolf 1973, 5). The group came about after the Jordanian King initiated a massive crackdown against Fatah in September 1970 (Wolf 1973, 6).

Geography

The group's ties to Egypt came about when they assassinated Wasfi al-Tall, Prime Minister of Jordan, on November 27, 1971 in Cairo (Fruchter-Ronen 2008, 255; Global Security). Black September operated out of Lebanon and used this base as an external sanctuary to conduct guerrilla raids and operations into Israel (Wolf 1973, 7).

Organizational Structure

Members were primarily well-educated, from upper-middle class backgrounds, and were born in refugee camps around Europe (Wolf 1973, 8). The group's first leader was Mohammad Mustafa Syein, a former deputy chief of staff to Yasir Arafat (Wolf 1973, 8).

External Ties

The group received training in Jordan at terrorist camps where they may have also interacted with members of the Weather Underground, the IRA, Dev Genc, and Nicaragua's Sandinistas (Wolf 1973, 37)

Group Outcome

Fatah allegedly disbanded Black September in 1973 as it tried to pursue diplomatic negotiations and garner international recognition (Ciment and Hill 2013, 74).

IV. JEWISH ARMED RESISTANCE

Torg ID: 1136
Min. Group Date: 1971
Max. Group Date: 1982
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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- "Jewish Defense League." Disorders and terrorism: Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism. United States. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism. US GPO. 1977. P. 518.
<https://books.google.com/books?id=jtVeR1boA1MC&pg=PA518&lpg=PA518&dq=%22JEWISH+ARMED+RESISTANCE%22+new+york+city+jdl&source=bl&ots=LhLJ7PeTMJ&sig=ACfU3U3yrUiQbgejqznPZ9IFx9GoBpFD0g&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKewiFyrKhoLXIAhWiMX0KHUnWAroQ6AEwBnoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22JEWISH%20ARMED%20RESISTANCE%22%20new%20york%20city%20jdl&f=false>
- "PLO Official in Rome Dies in a Car-Bomb Blast." New York Times. 1982.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/18/world/plo-official-in-rome-dies-in-a-car-bomb-blast.html>
- "USA Cases Part 2, 1866-1969." Armed Group Database. 2019.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1keW1Pno_J3LB1Gw9FFBtMouyjnMrLqvIJ3fCC5sYt8l/edit

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: JAR, Jewish Armed Resistance Strike Unit, Jewish Armed Resistance Strike Movement, The Jewish Armed Resistance of the Jewish Defense League, The Jewish Armed Resistance

Group Formation: 1971

Group End: 1982 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Jewish Armed Resistance was either a splinter group or affiliate of Jewish Defense League (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 686; Anti-Defamation League n.d.; National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism 1977, 518; New York Times 1982). JAR likely conducted its first attacks in December 1971 when it bombed two stores which were selling Russian merchandise (GTD 2019). The group conducted attacks throughout the 1970s, and its use of violence reached its peak in 1976 and 1977 during which JAR attacked the Soviet U.N. mission, the Iraqi U.N. mission, the Polish consulate, a residential complex where Soviet diplomats were residing, Soviet and Czechoslovak airlines, a Soviet trade agency, headquarters of the Communist Party USA, a cargo terminal at John F. Kennedy Airport, banks, and a Jewish temple (Anti-Defamation League n.d.; GTD 2019; United States House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State 1984, 1197; Magloff 2011, 316).

JAR was likely a conservative Jewish group and opposed liberalism and communism (Magloff 2011, 316; Armed Group Database 2019). It may have harbored similar political aims as the JDL to fight anti-semitism and promote the rights of the Jewish people in the US.

Geography

JAR conducted attacks in the United States and Italy (GTD 2019). The group conducted attacks in the following cities in the United States: New York City, New York; Shakopee, Minnesota; and Los Angeles, California (GTD 2019). The group conducted attacks in the following city in Italy: Rome (GTD 2019). The group conducted most of its attacks, likely all but four, in New York City (GTD 2019).

Organizational Structure

Nothing is known about the group's organizational structure, leadership, membership, or source of funding. Jewish Armed Resistance was either a splinter group or affiliate of Jewish Defense League so members were likely Jewish (Schmid and Jongman 1988,

686; Anti-Defamation League n.d.; National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism 1977, 518; New York Times 1982). Jewish Defense League, however, claimed that they had no connection to JAR, but commended JAR's efforts (National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism 1977, 518; New York Times 1982).

External Ties

Jewish Armed Resistance was either a splinter group or affiliate of Jewish Defense League (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 686; Anti-Defamation League n.d.; National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism 1977, 518; New York Times 1982). Jewish Defense League, however, claimed that they had no connection to JAR, but commended JAR's efforts (National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism 1977, 518; New York Times 1982). JAR may have had ties to other Jewish groups, especially those that were anti-Soviet (Magloff 2011, 316).

Group Outcome

JAR conducted its last attacks in June 1982 in Rome (GTD 2019; New York Times 1982). The group killed Nazeh Matat, a Palestinian medical student, news correspondent, and member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (New York Times 1982; GTD 2019). The next day, on June 17, JAR detonated a car bomb, killing the Deputy Director of the Rome office of the Palestine Liberation Organization (New York Times 1982; GTD 2019). The group has been inactive since 1982. It is unclear why the group stopped using violence.

Notes for Iris:

- unclear whether it was affiliate of the JDL as JDL denied association
- far right Jewish groups start to decline in 1980s
- unclear why the group disappears so suddenly

V. NATIONAL YOUTH RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION

Torg ID: 323

Min. Group Date: 1973

Max. Group Date: 1973

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- "National Youth Resistance Organization." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4159. MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses

to Terrorism.

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1nQpwYo2a_zq-Xpl65h4hYLxcYv90R70XEBuqEYn_uHaE/edit

- GTD Perpetrator 3802. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified September 2019.
<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3802>
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 - “National youth resistance organization”
 - National youth resistance organization bombing
 - vice counsel bombing italy athens from 1973-01-01 to 1973-12-31
 - bombing italy athens from 1973-01-01 to 1973-12-31
 - Bomb car athens 1973-01-01 to 1973-12-31
 -

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: unknown

Group Formation: 1973 (alleged)

Group End: 1973; unknown

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about the National Youth Resistance Organization. It is unknown when it formed, but it came to attention for its first -- and only -- violent attack on April 21, 1973, when the group placed a bomb under the Italian vice-consul's car (GTD 2019; MIPT 2008). The group's political aims and ideological motivation for the attack are unknown (MIPT 2008). Police discovered a leaflet near the car claiming credit for the attack (MIPT 2008).

Geography

National Youth Resistance Organization's sole attack targeted the Italian vice-consul in Athens, Greece (MIPT 2008; GTD 2019).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the organizational structure of this group.

External Ties

No information could be found about any external ties this group may have had.

Group Outcome

National Youth Resistance Organization has not claimed credit for any other attack since the 1973 bombing (MIPT 2008). It is unknown what happened to the group after this one attack.

VI. PROLETARIAN ACTION GROUP

Torg ID: 389

Min. Group Date: 1973

Max. Group Date: 1985

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Proletarian Action Group.” Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4215. MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1nQpwYo2a_zq-Xpl65h4hYLxcYv90R70XEBuqEYnuHaE/edit
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- Search ProQuest
 - “Proletarian action group”
 - “Proletarian action group” cologne

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: unknown

Group Formation: 1973 (alleged)

Group End: 1985; unknown

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but Proletarian Action Group first came to attention as a violent group on October 6, 1973, when it attempted to bomb the U.S. consulate in Genoa, Italy (Los Angeles Times 1973; MIPT 2008). Police found a leaflet near the attack “expressing solidarity with the Chilean people” (Los Angeles Times 1973). This might have been a reference to the 1973 overthrow of Salvador Allende which occurred the previous month. In May of 1985, the group also claimed responsibility for an attack on a French chemical firm’s facilities in Cologne (Los Angeles Times 1985). MIPT (2008) speculated the attack was in protest of President Ronald Regan’s trip to West Germany (MIPT 2008).

Geography

Proletarian Action Group’s attacks occurred in Germany and Italy, but targeted a French firm and the U.S. consul, respectively (GTD 2019). Both attacks were thought to have been related to U.S. politics (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about this group’s organizational structure.

External Ties

No information could be found about the group having ties with any other state or non-state actors.

Group Outcome

Proletarian Action Group has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since 1985 (MIPT 2008; GTD 2019). It is unknown what happened to the group after these two attacks.

VII. NUCLEI ARMATI PROLETARI (NAP)
Torg ID: 702495
Min. Group Date: 1973
Max. Group Date: 1978
Onset: NA

Aliases: Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP), Nuclei Armati Proletari (NAP)

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3361>
- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Armed Proletarian Nuclei." Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature. p. 587. Library of Congress. 1988. PDF.
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<https://www.nytimes.com/1975/05/12/archives/new-leftist-group-stirs-debate-in-italy.html>.
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https://web.archive.org/web/20071029185712/http://www.micciacorta.it/news_up/124.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Armed Proletarian Nuclei, NAP, Armed Proletarian Units. Different branches of NAP conducted attacks under different names, including: October 29 Nucleus, Sergio Romeo Nucleus, Without Cease for Communism, George Jackson Collective (Archvio 900)

Group Formation: 1973

Group End: 1978; absorbed by Red Brigades

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Nuclei Armati Proletari (NAP) carried out its first violent attack on July 25th, 1974, when the group kidnapped Antonio Gargiulo, the son of a prominent Neopolitan physician, for ransom (Pisano 1984, 75; Gnosis, 2006).

NAP originally formed out of the Italian prison riots of the late 1960s and early 1970s. (Gnosis, 2006). It is unclear exactly when NAP formed and carried out its first violent attack. One source lists 1973 as the year of the group's first attack (GTD 2019), but most sources list 1974 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 587; Mapping Militants 2012; Gnosis, 2006; Pisano 1984, 8). Membership in NAP included former members of the militant leftist groups Proletarian Left and Lotta Continua (LC), ex-convicts with contacts in prison, and other militant leftist workers and students (Pisano 1984, 8; Mapping Militants Project 2012; Gnosis, 2006). In 1970, during the height of the prison riots, LC established a commission to investigate prison conditions, and provided prisoners with financial and rhetorical support (Archivio '900, 2021; Mapping Militants 2012). In either 1973 (Archivio '900, 2021) or 1974 (Gnosis, 2006), LC's prison commission splintered due to internal ideological disputes over the role of violence in prison reform, the more militant, radical faction formed NAP (Gnosis, 2006; Archivio '900, 2021; Mapping Militants 2012). This group, along with members of other radical leftist groups including the Proletarian Left, joined with NAP, creating a "nuclei" in Naples (Gnosis, 2006). When LC splintered due to internal ideological disputes over the role of violence in activism, the more militant, radical faction joined with NAP, creating a "nuclei" in Naples (Gnosis, 2006). A second base formed in Florence, where its leaders were influenced by the writings of American Black Panther George Jackson (Archivio '900, 2021).

NAP was a leftist militant group that operated in the interests of Italy's poor and aimed to create a classless society (Archivio '900, 2021). The group had a unique focus on prisons, and attempted to function as the "operational revolutionary link" between inmates and free militants. It viewed prisons as the ultimate symbol of capitalist "repressive power" and as a breeding ground for revolutionary thought and action in the pursuit of communism (Gnosis, 2006; Mapping Militants 2012). NAP also aimed to abolish prisons (Pisano 1984, 13; Mapping Militants 2012). The group was influenced by Frantz Fanon's writings regarding the role of violence in decolonization, and the experiences and writings of the American Black Panther Party (Gnosis, 2006; Mapping Militants 2012). In particular, NAP was affected by the writings of imprisoned Black Panther Party member George Jackson, whose death during an attempted prison escape sparked prison riots in the U.S. (Mapping Militants 2012).

Geography

Most of NAP's attacks occurred in the Southern Italian cities of Naples and Rome, with additional attacks carried out in Florence, Milan, and Foggia, where the group had bases of support and established "nuclei" (GTD 2019).

Organizational Structure

NAP was composed of several decentralized and autonomous “nuclei” across Italy, and had no single leader (Gnosis, 2006). According to a manifesto from the group, the acronym NAP did not represent a centralized organization, but rather “summarized the characteristics” of members’ experiences (Gnosis, 2006). NAP’s “nuclei” in Florence included Luca Mantini, a former member of LC who formed the George Jackson collective, based on the writings of American militant George Jackson, while imprisoned. The Florence “nuclei” also included Guiseppe “Sergio” Romeo, who was killed alongside Mantini in an attempted robbery (Archivio ‘900, 2021; Gnosis, 2006). Other leaders included Pietro Sofia and Giorgio Panizzari, who helped stage NAP’s most high-profile attack, the kidnapping of high-ranking Italian judge Giuseppe Di Gennaro (Gnosis, 2006; Hoffman 1975).

In either 1973 (Archivio ‘900, 2021) or 1974 (Gnosis, 2006), LC’s prison commission splintered due to internal ideological disputes over the role of violence in prison reform, the more militant, radical faction formed NAP (Gnosis, 2006; Archivio ‘900, 2021; Mapping Militants 2012). This group, along with members of other radical leftist groups including the Proletarian Left, joined with NAP, creating a “nuclei” in Naples (Gnosis, 2006). NAP drew support from students, prisoners, and the poor (Gnosis, 2006). NAP also worked to radicalize and recruit prisoners (Pisano 1984, 13). The group likely had less than 100 members, 65 of which were investigated for the connection with the group (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 588; Archivio ‘900, 2021). Thirty-nine NAP bases had been destroyed as of 1983 (Pisano 1984, 20).

NAP funded itself through robberies and kidnappings for ransoms. In 1974, NAP used a \$1.5 million dollar ransom obtained through the kidnapping of industrialist Guiseppe Moccia to extend the group’s activities north of Naples and purchase additional weapons (Forest 2012, 14; Gnosis, 2006).

External Ties

Leaders of NAP had ties to fellow leftist group LC, as NAP emerged as a splinter of the group, and some members of NAP had joined after serving on LC’s prison commission (Schmid and Jongman, 1988; Mapping Militants 2012).

In 1976, NAP began to collaborate with fellow Italian leftist militant group the Red Brigades (BR), and the two launched a joint attack on military barracks and police vehicles across Italy (Schmid and Jongman, 1988; Gnosis, 2006). NAP and BR also allied together to attack the prison system’s administrative headquarters in Milan the same year (Archivio ‘900, 2021).

Group Outcome

NAP was investigated by the Italian police and subject to several “anti-terrorism” raids and attacks during its years active (Archivio ‘900, 2021). Police killed several members of NAP, including Luca Mantini, his sister Annamaria Mantini, and Guiseppe “Sergio” Romeo (Archivio ‘900, 2021). A trial for 26 members of NAP lasted from November 1976 to February 1977 and resulted in jail sentences for 23 individuals (Gnosis, 2006). In December of 1977 three imprisoned NAP members, after considering the group’s budget, decided autonomous NAP

operations should cease and the group should join with the Red Brigades (Archivio '900, 2021). No other sources could be found to back this story.

The group's last violent attack occurred in 1978, when it attacked the Christian Democratic Party Offices in Mestre (Mapping Militants 2012; GTD 2019).

Red Brigades absorbed the remainder of NAP's network of "nuclei" support bases (Gnosis, 2006). The Red Brigades also absorbed the group's focus on prisons, and an internal debate over the role of prisoners in a movement historically focused on the working class began, especially in the moderate, political wings of the group (Gnosis, 2006).

Notes for Iris:

- origin story based in prison politics
- NAP was a radical faction that focused entirely on prison politics under left-wing ideology
- group outcome is super bizarre - they decide they're bankrupt and can no longer fund their campaign. Also hurt by member arrests despite being highly decentralized organization (esp ties to prison)
- group merges with BR
- government seemed to crackdown more against far-left movements vs far-right? (interesting how partisan politics shaped influence)

VIII. ORDINE NERO
Torg ID: 1212
Min. Group Date: 1974
Max. Group Date: 1983
Onset: NA

Aliases: Ordine Nero (Black Order), Black Order, Ordine Nero

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Black Order, ON

Group Formation: 1974 (splinter/reorganization from New Order?)

Group End: 1983 (reason unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Ordine Nero (Black Order) formed in 1974 after fascist group Ordine Nuovo (New Order) was banned by the Italian government for its attempt to sabotage a rail line (Hoffman 1982, 3; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 588; della Porta 2013, 159). Ordine Nero operated during a period of Italian right and left wing violence that had been exacerbated by economic recession, an energy crisis, and social tension (Ferraresi 1996, 134). Italy had seen tremendous social and political changes during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Ferraresi 1996, 116). The country had continued to democratize, establishing autonomous regions and a procedure for a referendum by popular vote (Ferraresi 1996, 134). Divorce was legalized and workers' rights were greatly expanded (Ferraresi 1996, 134). However these changes were the result of protest, rather than debate by parliamentary elites; this contributed to a feeling by conservatives that the country was headed towards a communist takeover (Ferraresi 1996, 134). These feelings were exacerbated by the 1970 communist electoral victories in central Italy, and the 1973 energy crisis, which helped trigger high unemployment and inflation (Ferraresi 1996, 134). For radicals on the right, dissatisfaction with political, social, and economic conditions led to a rise violence aimed at eroding support and trust in Italy's parliamentary system and creating the conditions for a fascist takeover, similar to Mussolini's rise to power fifty years prior (Langford 1985, I-1).

After Ordine Nuovo's banning, a number of members splintered away and reorganized into a new group known as Ordine Nuovo. The group carried out its first attack under the new name in May of 1974 in Brescia, bombing an antifascist rally and killing eight and wounding 82-102 people (Hoffman 1982, 3; Langford 1985, 1-2; GTD 2019; Mapping Militants 2012).

Ordine Nuovo was one of Italy's main right-wing militant groups of the post-WWII years, and as its successor, Ordine Nero carried out at least six attacks between 1974 and 1983, killing 21 and wounding over 152 people (GTD 2019). Ordine Nero was a neo-fascist, neo-Nazi group, and espoused anti-Communist and anti-Semitic messages (Hoffman 1982, 3). The group continued Ordine Nuovo's "strategy of tension," and worked to incite violence and turmoil in Italy to increase the attractiveness of a fascist government's promise to uphold law and order (Drake 1984, 294).

Geography

Most of Ordine Nero's attacks occurred in the northern Italian cities of Brescia, Bologna, and Milan; one attack occurred in Palermo (GTD 2019). The group was originally based in Milan, and had an active base in Tuscany, with at least six other territorial bases across Italy (Ferraresi 1996, 128).

Organizational Structure

When Ordine Nuovo disbanded in 1973, many prominent members and leaders were arrested. Those who did not face imprisonment joined Ordine Nero after 1974, including Franco "Georgio" Freda, Gianluigi (Giancarlo) Espoti, Salvatore Franci, and Clemente Graziani (Pisano 1987, 52; Furlong 2011, 16; Ferraresi 1996, 130). Espoti had expressed support for the continuation of a "strategy of tension" and "indiscriminate massacres" to create terror among the people to make authoritarian, fascist control of the state seem desirable (Ferraresi 1996, 130). Espoti and Ordine Nero also attempted to make it appear as if Ordine Nero's attacks had been carried out by militant left-wing groups, to sow further confusion and terror into Italian society (Ferraresi 1996, 130). While camping at a paramilitary base outside of Rome, Espoti was killed by police (Ferraresi 1996, 134). Leaders of Ordine Nero also published a journal, Anno Zero (Year Zero) in 1974, edited by Salvatore Francia (Pisano 1987, 52).

Ordine Nero's bases across Italy were isolated from each other and organized hierarchically; they had little communication with each other, corresponding only with leadership (della Porta 2013, 159). Because the group was decentralized, size estimates are not exact. One account estimates 300 members at an unknown date (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 588). Estimates for Ordine Nuovo membership vary, with one account listing 600 members (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 561), and another account stating the group had approximately 2,500 members at the time it was banned (Pisano 1987, 52). Like other Italian fascist groups, Ordine Nero recruited across class lines, but membership was primarily made up of Italian middle and lower class men (Hoffman 1982, 16). Ordine Nero absorbed many other members of other

Italian right-wing militant groups, including members of National Vanguard (AN) and National Front (FN) (Mapping Militants 2012).

External Ties

Ordine Nero had ties to, or may have absorbed, other fascist groups, including Movimento Armato Rivoluzionario (MAR, or Armed Revolutionary Movement), Rosa dei Venti (Compass Card), Movimento Popolare Rivoluzionario (MPR, or Popular Revolutionary Movement), Terza Posizione (Third Position), and Squadre d'Azione Mussolini (SAM) (Hoffman 1982, 3; Ferraresi 1996, 128). Ordine Nero also had ties to Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (NAR, or Armed Revolutionary Nucleus). NAR was one of the most prolific right-wing militant groups of the 1970s in Italy, and carried out approximately 25 militant attacks (Hoffman 1982, 4).

Ordine Nero also had ties to militant group La Fenice, which may have been the name of Ordine Nuovo's base in Milan (Ferraresi 1996, 128). Ordine Nero had especially close ties to Movimento di Azione Rivoluzionaria (MAR), and some militants at the time thought that Ordine Nero was MAR's armed wing for a coup (Ferraresi 1996, 128). MAR and Ordine Nero may have jointly planned a "preliminary" coup for Spring of 1974 (Ferraresi 1996, 128).

Ordine Nuovo was founded by radicals of the Italian Social Movement (MSI), a post-WWII far-right Italian political party, who left the party to form a militant group (Ferraresi 1996, 52). While MSI and Ordine Nuovo were separate groups, they remained in "close touch" with each other, and as Ordine Nuovo's successor, Ordine Nero likely maintained contact, at least unofficially, with MSI (Ferraresi 1996, 52). Ordine Nero may have had contact with other European right-wing militant groups, especially groups in Germany, France, and Belgium (Hoffman 1982, 22).

The relationship between the Italian state, the U.S., and far-right militant groups, including Ordine Nero, is unclear. Italian lawmakers have alleged, starting in the 1990s, that a U.S. led NATO operation, Operation Gladio, provided various support to Italian far-right groups to keep the Italian Communist Party out of power (Willan, 2001; Pedrick 1990). There have also been allegations that Ordine Nuovo's founder was provided with regular funding from the American embassy, and that a leader of the Ordine Nero and MAR attempted coup had received funding from FIAT and the CIA (Willan 2000; Ferraresi 1996, 136). Ordine Nero may have benefited from state non-intervention, as Italian lawmakers have alleged that U.S. intelligence agents in Italy were informed of planned right-wing attacks, but did nothing to alert the Italian state (Willan 2000). Willian Colby, the CIA director from 1973 to 1976, admitted that he had run a covert "political-action programme" in Italy in the 1950s to prevent a communist takeover of the country (Agnew 1999).

Group Outcome

As Italian economic welfare and social conditions improved during the 1980s, extremist groups began to lose their appeal, and their attacks became less severe and frequent (Vettori 2007, 11). Italy's 1983 elections saw the Christian Democrats and the Communists, Italy's two largest parties lose seats, while the Socialists and MSI gained (New York Times 1983). The Socialist leader, Benito Craxi, became Prime Minister, after his party had distanced itself from the more radical Communists (Ferraresi 1996, 185). Public opinion shifted more conservative, a backlash to the progressive and democratic changes of the 1970s (Ferraresi 1996, 185). As the governing party, the Socialists adopted a more centrist platform (Donovan 1995, 50). Ordine Nero's last claimed attack was on August 10, 1983, when the group attempted, but failed, to blow up the Milan-Palermo Express train (GTD 2019; Pisano 1986, 14).

Notes for Iris:

-government successor to Mussolini government is fascist movement known as MSI. New order criticizes MSI as not radical enough. Post-WW2 establishes new constitution and government. See new liberal policies, lots of migration from south to the north, prompts lots of protests. 1960s/1970s saw economic growth stall. 1969 Piazza Fontaine is main catalyst for growth of militant attacks (catalyzes leftist violence like BR and then a few years later far-right groups form in reaction)

-who banned New Order? Why did the government ban New Order?

-ties between MSI and New Order are much more explicit. Ties seem to be more of a backlash to left-wing terrorism (good example of thermidorian reaction!). They had newspaper writings engaging with intellectual debates (look at Year Zero journal where most of these writings were published)

-are ON and Black Order distinct groups? 1974 seems an interesting turning point in far-right violence in Italy. Black Order may have had some members of the other groups beyond ON and both conducted some separately claimed attacks during 1974-1978 period

-in 83 election leftist groups had to back down a bit and things became more center-left. Public moved towards conservatism. Coincides with collapse of Red Brigades/leftist militant groups. Maybe removes violent incentives for far-right? (no longer have to compete with far-left groups? Government is a little less extremist leftist/more center-left?)

IX. NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF CORSICA

Torg ID: 188

Min. Group Date: 1974

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Corsican National Liberation Front (FInc), Front De Liberation Nationale De La Corse, Front De Liberation Nationale De La Corse (FInc), Fronte Di Liberazione Nazionale Di A Corsica, Fronte Di Liberazione Naziunale Di A Corsica (FInc), National Liberation Front Of Corsica

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: N/A

Group Formation: 1976

Group End: 2012 was the last year that the group was involved in an actual bombing, but small part of the group still exist today, deeply imbedded in the French government.
2014 (dissolve)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed in 1976 when two Corsican groups, Ghjustizia Paolina and the Fronte Paesanu Corsu di Liberazione merged together to create the FLNC (MIPT 2008; Schmid and Jognman 1988; Sloan and Anderson 2009; Kushner 2002; Minorities at Risk 2003; Minorities at Risk 2004; Minority Rights Group International 2018). They are a ethnonationalist separatist group fighting on behalf of the Corsican people (MIPT 2008; Sloan and Anderson 2009; CIA 1985; Minority Rights Group International 2018). It may have also had some Marxist tendencies (Global Security n.d.). Their initial goal was to fight “french colonialism” by seekings corsican autonomy (MIPT 2008; Schmid and Jognman 1988; Sloan and Anderson 2009; Kushner 2002; CIA 1985; Minority Rights Group International 2018). They also articulated secondary goals at some points, such as their demands for the release of FLNC members from prison (MIPT 2008). Support for Corsican separatism is rooted in the larger post-World War II anti-colonial fervor. At the same time other French colonies like Algeria were gaining independence, Corsicans tried to lobby for their own. The precipitating event for the FLNC formation was “in response to the dumping of toxic waste by an Italian multinational” (Global Security n.d.). Their first violent attack was in 1976, when the FLNC claimed responsibility for bombing government offices in France (Sloan and Anderson 2009; GTD 2019). The group also targeted French tourists who visited the island (Global Security n.d.).

Geography

The group mainly operated in France, specifically in Corsica (MIPT 2008; Sloan and Anderson 2009; Kushner 2002). Additionally, all attacks that were conducted took place in France (Sloan and Anderson 2009; GTD 2019).

Organizational Structure

Members were Corsican. Not a lot is known about the organizational structure of the group, but there were approximately 30-300 activists and 200-1000 supporters (CIA 1985). The group had approximately 600 members at an unknown date (MIPT 2008). The group financed its operations through taxation, extortion, and robbery (CIA 1985; MIPT 2008).

External Ties

The group allegedly received weapons from Libya and other East European countries including Czechoslovakia (CIA 1985). The group also allegedly met with IRA, Basque, Catalanian, and Galician separatist groups during a 1982 meeting.

Group Outcome

FLNC was originally created from the merger of 2 Corsican Terrorist groups in 1976: the Ghjustizia Paolina, and the Fronte Paesanu Corsu di Liberazione (MIPT 2008). In 1980, the group split due to political rivalry (MIPT 2008). It split into 2 main groups (Canal Historique and Canal Habituel) as well as a few smaller groups like the Resistenza, Fronte ribellu, and the Front Arme Revolutionnaire Corse (MIPT 2008). The Canal Habituel ended in 1997, but the Canal Historique merged with a few other groups in 1989 to create the FLNC (MIPT 2008). In 1985, the group announced that it was going to suspend its violent campaign (CIA 1985; Schmid and Jognman 1988; Sloan and Anderson 2009). However, this temporary ceasefire didn't last long and in 1986 the group continued its bombing campaign on France (Schmid and Jongman 1988). A second truce in 1988 with the French government was also negotiated on the premise several FLNC members would be released from prison. However, "the FLNC appears to have used the truce to rebuild its clandestine military apparatus" and in 1993 returned to conducting violent attacks against French tourists visiting the island (Global Security n.d.). This followed a separate faction known as Resistenza splintering off and forming in 1990 (Minorities at Risk 2004).

Around the same time, the group split into two different factions: the Canal Historique faction and the Canal Habituel. These two factions continued fighting until a ceasefire in 1999 (Global Security n.d.). In 1999, Lionel Jospin, the French prime minister, attempted to negotiate a ceasefire with the Corsicans (MIPT 2008). In 2000, he proposed that the island would be allowed more autonomy, but in July of 2003, the Corsicans rejected this offer (MIPT 2008). The group never really had a specific end, but their last planned attack was in 2012 (Sloan and Anderson 2009; Minority Rights Group International 2018). A faction of the FLNC known as the Combattants Union announced it was unilaterally disarming in 2014 (Global Security n.d.) A splinter group known as the October 22 faction broke away and conducted attacks until 2016 (Global Security n.d.). The group may not be active today, but there are still FLNC supporters embedded deep in the French government (Minority Rights Group International 2018).

Notes for Iris:

- GTD records group's first incident in 1974 despite the group not existing until 1976
- in 1976, there was a merger of two existing groups and immediately transitioned to violence. Internal splits in the late 1980s → Canal Historique and Canal Habituel. But then there was a bunch of smaller splinters like Resistenza (they only exist for a small amount of time). Canal Habituel self-dissolves after a few years. Canal Historique keeps operating for awhile until 1989 and then it re-absorbs some other splinters and renames itself the FLNC
- they negotiated a lot with the French government, but in 1999 reneged on the claim Lionel Jospin really wanted to negotiate an end with the group's campaign by offering a referendum, but the vote failed
- there's not a lot of popular support for the cause
- most members of the group dissolved. Some small splinter groups may still exist but not active
- main periods of the group's history: 1976-1989, 1989-2005 → might be interesting to look at **evolution of the group** more detail
- group's decline occurred in part because it ostracized the population which was reliant on outside tourism. Group primarily targeted tourists.
- French government negotiated with this group a lot and seemed very willing to accommodate them. Unusual and not seen with other groups so far. Bargaining example. Negotiations. Lionel Jospin was interested in carrots over sticks with this group. Might be interesting to explore why (tourism? Local economy? distance?)
- their bombing campaign was very discriminate at first and didn't harm people

X. JEWISH EXTREMISTS

Torg ID: 2032

Min. Group Date: 1974

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Jewish Extremists, Jewish Terrorists

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Group Formation: This name is too vague for research.

Group End: This name is too vague for research.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This name is too vague for research.

Geography

This name is too vague for research.

Organizational Structure

This name is too vague for research.

External Ties

This name is too vague for research.

Group Outcome

This name is too vague for research.

XI. PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF KURDISTAN

Torg ID: 263

Min. Group Date: 1974

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Kurdistan Workers' Party (Pkk), Argk, Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan (Argk), Kadek, Kongra Gele Kurdistan, Kongra-Gel (Kgk), Kongreya Azadi U Demokrasiya Kurdistan, Kurdish Workers' Party (Pkk), Kurdistan Freedom And Defense Congress, Kurdistan Freedom And Democracy Congress, Kurdistan National Liberation Front (Ernk), Kurdistan National Liberty Army, Kurdistan People's Conference, Kurdistan Workers Party, Kurdistan Workers' Party, Kurdistan Worker's Party, Kurdistan Workers Party (Pkk), Kurdistan Worker's Party (Pkk), Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (Pkk), People' S Liberation Army Of Kurdistan (Argk), Peoples Congress Of Kurdistan, People's Congress Of Kurdistan, Peoples Defense Force, People's Defense Force, Peoples Liberation Army Of Kurdistan, People's Liberation Army Of Kurdistan, Peoples Liberation Army Of Kurdistan (Argk), People's Liberation Army Of Kurdistan (Argk), Pkk/Kongra-Gel, The Peoples Congress Of Kurdistan, The People's Congress Of Kurdistan

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: KADEK, Kurdistan Halk Kongresi (KHK)

Group Formation: 1974

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PKK began in 1974 in Diyarbakir by a group of Kurdish students organized as the National Liberation Army (UKO) (Karaca 2010, 38). The UKO was renamed to be the PKK in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan with a goal to fight for an independent Turkish state (Australian National Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Ocalan was inspired by Marxist ideology (Mackenzie Institute 2016). After the fall of the Soviet Union, the group began to emphasize Kurdish nationalism more than Marxism (Karaca 2010, 37). The group came to attention in 1984 when it launched an armed struggle against the Turkish state (Mackenzie Institute 2016; Australian National Security n.d.).

Geography

The group claims territory in southeastern Turkey as part of Kurdistan including Hakkari province, Siirt, Adiyaman, Sirnak, and Agriman (Australian National Security n.d.). The PKK bases are located in the “PUK and KDP-controlled regions of the KRG” (Karaca 2010, 76). The HPG operates out of the Qandil mountains (Karaca 2010, 35).

The group primarily operated out of southeastern Turkey until 1991 when it began to move into western Turkey (Karaca 2010, 39).

Organizational Structure

PKK was initially led by Abdullah Ocalan who decided to form the PKK while a university student in the 1970s (Mackenzie Institute 2016). After his arrest, he was replaced by Murat Karayilan (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The PKK has evolved into a very well-organized group. The armed wing is called the People's Defence Forces (HPG) (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The Central Executive Committee oversees everything including the Military Wing (ARGK), External Wing (ERNK), and other subcommittees (Karaca 2010, 33). The ERNK is in charge of propaganda, training, funding, contacts with other armed groups, and intelligence on Turkish security forces (Karaca 2010, 34). It has a women's wing called YAJK as well.

From 1984-1986, the PKK purposely targeted noncombatants that did not support their movement (Karaca 2010, 38).

It has approximately 7000 members (Mackenzie Institute 2016). It primarily funds itself through donations from supporters throughout Kurdistan as well as a Kurdish diaspora in Europe (Mackenzie Institute 2016). Members are primarily drawn from the Kurdish ethnic group and in rural areas often through personal connections (Australian National Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group primarily fought against other armed groups in the late 1970s (Karaca 2010). It had an alliance with DHKP/C from 1991 to 1998 (Karaca 2010, 39).

The group allegedly received external support from Greece, Syria, Russia, Iraq, Iran, and Armenia including diplomatic, political, and funding (Karaca 2010, 46-51).

Group Outcome

Until 1980, the PKK namely fought against other armed groups in Turkey and Kurdish tribal leaders (Karaca 2010, 38). After the 1980 military coup, the PKK reorganized to create a formal military wing and in 1984 launched its "people's revolution" against the government (Karaca 2010, 38). Turkish counter-terrorism was largely ineffective at destroying the PKK until 1991 when it launched a series of offensives which pushed the PKK out of villages and towards the Qandil mountains (Karaca 2010, 40-41).

Ocalan was arrested by Turkish police in 1999 and sentenced to death, but it was later commuted (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The arrest had little effect on the group's actions. In 2013, the PKK announced a ceasefire with Turkish forces (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

XII. ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION (ANO)

Torg ID: 3

Min. Group Date: 1974

Max. Group Date: 1998

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: What is the earliest year the group was active?

Group End: What is the last year the group was active? Why did it stop using political violence?

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This section is where you would include information about the group's founding date, its initial goals, ideology, and date when it first came to attention as a violent group.

Geography

This section is where you would include information about the group's operational environment including the names of areas where they operate from, the name of any external sanctuaries, the name of any cities, towns, or neighborhoods where they conduct attacks. You may also provide a generic descriptor if you cannot identify specifically where, but know what the geographic composition of the area was.

Organizational Structure

This section is where you would include information about the group's organizational structure including its leadership, membership, source of funding, and different wings.

External Ties

This section is where you would include information about the group's ties to other actors including both other armed groups as well as other countries. This includes information about external support, alliances, and splinters.

Group Outcome

This section is where you would include information about the state's response to the group, if any, and how this affects the group. You will also identify whether the group is still active, when it stopped using violence, and what happened to the group to cause it to stop using violence.

XIII. RED BRIGADE
Torg ID: 329
Min. Group Date: 1974
Max. Group Date: 1990
Onset: NA

Aliases: Red Brigades, Brigade Rosse (Br), Red Brigade

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-awesome new resources!

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Red Brigades, Brigade Rosse, BR

Group Formation: 1969

Group End: 1984

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Brigate Rosse, also referred to as the Red Brigades, formed in 1969 (FAS 1998; Martha Crenshaw 2012; Global Security. N.d.), while others more specifically mention the date October 20, 1970 (Sundquist 2010). It was a splinter of the Political Metropolitan Collective, a non-violent leftist organization (Global Security n.d.). Its purpose was to overthrow the Italian democratic government (Crenshaw 2012; Global Security. N.d.). The first recorded attack of the Red Brigades took place on September 17, 1970 in Milan (Crenshaw 2012). They were a Marxist-Leninist group (MIPT 2008; Sundquist 2010).

There is some dispute as to when the Red Brigades was founded. Some sources list 1969 as the group's origin (Global Security N.d.; UCA), while others list 1970 (Sundquist 2010, 5; Pisano 1987, 38). This confusion over the group's founding year seems to arise from the group's origin story. The group formed as a splinter of the Metropolitan Political Collective (Collettivo Politico Metropolitan/CPM). The CPM was a

leftist group which formed in 1969 and renamed itself the Proletarian Left in 1970. (Pisano 1987, 38). On November 1, 1969, left-wing extremists and high-ranking members of CPM met at a conference in Genoa, where Renato Curcio, one of the founders of the Red Brigades, voiced support for the use of violence in left-wing activism (Pisano 1987, 38). A second conference was held on October 20, 1970, where those who favored armed confrontation as necessary for communism broke away from Proletarian Left and formed the Red Brigades, led by Renato Curcio, Mara Cagol, and Alberto Franceschini (Pisano 1987, 38; Sundquist 2010, 55). The Red Brigades was a Marxist-Leninist group, and advocated for the use of violence in the communist overthrow of the Italian government (Langford 1985, I-8). The group was anti-U.S. and anti-imperialist, and aimed to separate Italy from other countries in NATO and the Western Alliance (Langford 1985, I-8; Sundquist 2010, 55; Pisano 1987, 40).

Initially, the Red Brigades actions remained largely non-violent (Pisano 1987, 40). Between its founding and 1974, the group began to make targeted attacks on factory and “establishment” leaders, vandalizing and damaging corporate property and burning the cars of business leaders, politicians, and unionists (Irrera 2014, 18; Sundquist 2010, 55). In 1972, the group claimed credit for the kidnapping of a factory foreman, and in 1974, the Red Brigades became increasingly violent (Sundquist 2010, 55; Langford 1985, I-9). In 1974, the Red Brigades shifted their attacks away from factories and towards the state (Pesta and Stoleti 2014, 72). The group claimed responsibility for its first political kidnapping on April 18th, 1974, when it kidnapped Mario Sossi, an Italian magistrate who had prosecuted other leftist groups (Archivio '900, 2021; GTD 2019).

Dubbed the “Years of Lead,” the 1970s in Italy saw high rates of left and right wing violence (Tarantelli 2010, 544). In particular, left-wing violence had been sparked by poor economic conditions, student and labor protests, and shifting political alliances (Langford 1985, I-6). In the late 1960s, the Italian economy began to stagnate, which sparked violent labor demonstrations, especially in northern factories (Langford 1985, I-7). These protests coincided with the end of Italy’s student movement in 1968, which left some dissatisfied students to turn towards more violent forms of activism (Langford 1985, I-7). Meanwhile, the center-left Italian government of the late 1960s had failed to pass the progressive reforms it had promised, leaving young leftist radicals who already felt that the Communist Party had shifted too far towards the center disillusioned and dissatisfied with the government (Langford 1985, I-7). The militant leftist groups that formed during this upheaval were also influenced by violent communist movements elsewhere, including the Tupamaros in Uruguay, and the past communist resistance movements in Germany and Italy of the 1930s and 40s. (Tanner 1978).

Geography

Almost all of the Red Brigade attacks took place in Italy, specifically in big cities like Rome, Florence, and Milan with exceptions in smaller cities like Novara and Lecce. RB’s bases were in Italy (GTD 2017). The group is transnational because it had one attack in London in 1980 and attack in France in 1976 (GTD 2017).

Most of the Red Brigades' attacks occurred in the northern and central Italian cities of Turin, Rome, Milan, Bologna, and Genoa (GTD 2019). The group may have conducted attacks abroad, bombing the Italian consulate in London (GTD 2019; Boston Globe 1980). The Red Brigades had several bases across Italy, including the cities of Milan, Turin, Genoa, Rome, Naples, and Sardinia, as well as the Veneto region (Pisano 1987, 40).

Organizational Structure

The Red Brigade was formed by Renato Curcio, a Catholic activist from the University of Trent, along with his other Catholic activist friends (Sundquist 2010; Global Security n.d.). The first members were Catholic students from the University of Trent, the PCI, and former members of the CPM (Global Security n.d.). The group had a hierarchical organization and was a politico-military organization (Global Security n.d.). The group shrunk to only 300 members by about 2004 (BBC 2004). The group had approximately 50 members when it formed (Crenshaw 2012; Global Security n.d.). Other sources claim the group had approximately 1,000 supporters around 1978-79 (Global Security n.d.; Crenshaw 2012). The group recruited from labor organizations (Crenshaw 2012).

The Red Brigades was founded by Renato Curcio, his wife Mara Cagol, and Alberto Franceschini (Sundquist 2010, 55). Renato Curcio was a student at the University of Trento, and was the illegitimate son of Renato Zampa, a prominent Italian man (Langford 1985, 1-7). Curcio and Cagol had been active in the student protests of the late 1960s, and after they married in 1969, the couple began organizing student-worker protests in Milan, which soon evolved into Red Brigade activities (Pepper 1979). In 1972, as the state intensified its actions against the Red Brigades, the organization shifted completely underground, but constituted to intensify their actions (Pepper 1979). However, in 1975, Cagol was killed by police, and by 1976, many other leaders of the group, including Curcio and Franceschini, had been arrested (Pepper 1979; Sundquist 2012, 58; Irrera 2014, 18). Leadership of the Red Brigades then shifted to Mario Moretti, who pushed the group farther towards violence (Pesta and Stoleti 2014, 72). Moretti oversaw the kidnapping and murder of Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978 (Sundquist 2010, 59).

The Red Brigades was organized in an incredibly hierarchical fashion. At the top was the Strategic Directorate, which defined the group's goals and objectives, and oversaw the rest of the organizational structure (Sundquist 2010, 57; Pisano 1984, 8). The Executive Committee reported directly to the Strategic Directorate, and the Committee had multiple divisions (or columns) reporting to it (Sundquist 2010, 57). Each division was composed of multiple brigade fronts (or cells), which were broken into even smaller squads (Sundquist 2010, 57; Pepper 1979). These divisions carried out attacks and collected intelligence (Pisano 1984, 8). Each cell was composed of three to five individuals and kept isolated from the other cells, and were tasked with specific duties, including propaganda, logistical planning, and recruitment (Sundquist 2010, 57; Irrera 2014, 17; Pepper 1979). The Red Brigades had bases in several cities, including Milan,

Turin, Genoa, Rome, Naples, Sardinia, and the Veneto region (Pepper 1979; Pisano 1984, 8; Pisano 1987, 40). The Red Brigades had members who worked completely underground, and members who lived “outwardly normal lives,” with total membership totaling around 400-500 activists and 10,000 supporters at an unknown time (Pisano 1984, 9; Schmid and Jongman, 593; Tanner 1978).

The Red Brigades financed itself largely through kidnappings for ransom and robberies (Freeman 2011, 466; Sundquist 2012, 65). They also received arms from Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi (Kaplan 2007). As a Marxist-Leninist group, the Red Brigades recruited mainly working-class individuals, but in the late 1970s, the group expanded its recruitment efforts to target intellectuals (Al-Khoury 2020; Sundquist 2010, 59). Most members were in their early twenties to mid-thirties, and male, although there were both female and male leaders of the group (Pisano 1987, 44).

External Ties

The Red Brigades allegedly received weaponry from the PFLP (Crenshaw 2012). The group had connections to other leftist groups in Europe like the Red Army Faction and Action Directe (FAS 1998; Crenshaw 2012).

The Red Brigades received support and arms from the Libyan leader Qaddafi in the early 1970s (Kaplan 2007; Freeman 2011, 465). The group also may have received support from Cuba, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria (Pisano 1984, 31). The Czechoslovakian connection is particularly note-worthy; some Red Brigade members were granted asylum in Czechoslovakia, and leaders of the Red Brigades were in contact with Czech intelligence and visited the country multiple times to obtain weapons (Pisano 1984, 33; Irrera 2014, 17).

The group also had ties to other European leftist militant groups, including the German Red Army Faction (RAF), the French Action Directe (AD), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Basque separatist group ETA, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) (Pisano 1984, 29; Gnosis 2005). The relationship between these groups was mutual; they provided each other with arms, training, sanctuary, and other forms of support (Pisano 1984, 29). The relationship between the Red Brigades and the PLO is particularly note-worthy; the PLO provided the Red Brigades with arms and access to trading camps in Lebanon, and in return, the Red Brigades stored PLO weapons and conducted attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets as directed by the PLO (Pisano 1985, 22).

Allegedly, the Israeli government approached the Red Brigades in 1974 with an offer to provide the group with arms in hopes of further destabilizing the Medeterranean region and increasing U.S. support for Israel; however, the red Brigades declined the offer, due to fear of being influenced by foreign powers (The Globe and Mail 1983).

The Red Brigade had a well-known rivalry with Prima Linea (Mapping Militants 2012). The group had an alliance with the NAP and Red Barbagia (Mapping Militants

2012). It also absorbed several smaller organizations including Partisan Action Group (Mapping Militants 2012).

After Moretti was arrested in 1981, the group split into factions: The Red Brigades-Communist Combatant Party (RB-CCP), the Red Brigades-Walter Alasia column, and the Red Brigades-Guerilla Party, which advocated for “clamour-inducing” violence and stressed the role of the unemployed (Pisano 1987, 45; Re 2020, 285).

The RB-CCP was the largest faction, and the offshoot with the closest ideology to the original Red Brigades (Re 2020, 285). The group kidnapped U.S. general and NATO official James Dozier in 1981, but the group suffered when the Italian state was able to rescue the general (Re 2020, 287). In 1984, a group of RB-CCP members who advocated for a legal element to revolution and spontaneous protests broke away and formed the Red Brigades-Union of Combatant Communists (Re 2020, 287). The RB-PCC claimed their last attack in 1988, and the Union of Combatant Communists dissolved in 1987 (Re 2020, 287).

Group Outcome

In 1984, the group suffered a serious splinter when it broke into two factions: the Communist Combatant Party (the New Red Brigades) and the Union of Combatant Communists (Global Security n.d.; MIPT 2008). Police arrested Renato Curcio and his partner Franceschini, in 1974 (Crenshaw 2012). French and Italian police worked together to arrest the group’s members in 1989 (FAS 1998). The group began to lose support when their attacks targeted popular Italian politicians (Sundquist 2010, 65). The last attack conducted by the Red Brigades took place on January 5, 1992 in Lecce, Italy (GTD 2017).

Following the murder of Mario Sossi at the hands of the Red Brigades in 1974, the Italian police formed a dedicated anti-terrorism unit and began to infiltrate the Red Brigade cells (Irrera 2014, 18). Police were able to arrest Curcio and Franceschini with the help of informants, and by 1976, the Italian police were able to weaken the group significantly. The government was so confident it had eradicated the threat of the BR that it dissolved its dedicated anti-terrorism unit (Irrera 2014, 19). They were gravely mistaken. Over the next few years, the actions of the Red Brigades became increasingly violent, and in 1978, the group murdered former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro (Langford 1985, I-9). After this prolific attack, the Red Brigades began to alienate supporters and its reputation in the eye of the working-class public began to tarnish (Langford 1985, I-12). The group’s number of recruits dropped as the police waged an “all-out war” against the Red Brigades, and by the early 1980s, the frequency and intensity of the group’s attacks began to decline (Sundquist 2010, 61). In 1981, Moretti was arrested, and the group split into factions: The Red Brigades-Communist Combatant Party (RB-PCC), the Red Brigades-Walter Alasia column, and the Red Brigades-Guerilla Party, which advocated for “clamour-inducing” violence and stressed the role of the unemployed (Pisano 1987, 45; Re 2020, 285).

The RB-PCC was the largest faction, and the offshoot with the closest ideology to the original Red Brigades (Re 2020, 285). The group kidnapped U.S. general and NATO official James Dozier in 1981, but the group suffered when the Italian state was able to rescue the general (Re 2020, 287). In 1984, a group of RB-PCC members who advocated for a legal element to revolution and spontaneous protests broke away and formed the Red Brigades-Union of Combatant Communists (Re 2020, 287). The RB-CCP claimed their last attack in 1988, and the Union of Combatant Communists dissolved in 1987 (Re 2020, 287).

Massimo D'Antona and Marco Biagi, two professors involved in the Italian government, were murdered in 1999 and 2002, respectively, by a group claiming to be the Red Brigades (Popham 2003). It is unclear what ties this group had to the Red Brigades of the 1970s and 80s.

Notes for Iris:

- MIPT 2008 source is way off and refers to a separate group.
- they had a lot of popular support for their goals, but this started to falter when they began to splinter in the late 1980s
- mainly aimed to foment chaos.
- violence direction is interesting because they formed in 1969, but they only turn to violence and launch a real armed struggle in 1974 (after Black Order and far-right violence has already begun). At this point, their target selection changes from labor to more political.
- when leader Mario Moretti took over the group, there was a big shift in militancy. Signifies huge role of leadership (COG) in some of these group's because his ascension to power and arrest (following former PM Moro's murder) changed the group's trajectory a lot
- funny anecdote: they kidnapped a guy who didn't speak Italian and the kidnapers didn't speak English
- they splintered over organizational disagreements and many of them went into the New Red Brigades
- no evidence that "political shock" of USSR matters - it's all about their internal politics and not lack of access to external support from state sponsors
- state's response was very swift and overwhelming. CT efforts increased in intensity after 78 Moro murder. Gave the state a lot of expanded powers
- lots of fragmentation after Moretti's arrest (again shows his importance in keeping the group)
- good example of splinters having ideological disagreements (more moderate and more extremist)

Italy Cases Part 3, 1975-1977 **Last Updated: 6 January 2021**

torg	gname	onset	min	max
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T248	JUSTICE COMMANDOS FOR THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE		1975	1986
T277	LTTE		1975	2011
T87	ARMENIAN SECRET ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA		1975	1997
T1003	ARMED COMMUNIST FORMATIONS		1976	1978
T9085	COMMUNIST COMBAT FORMATION		1976	1978
T121	CHE GUEVARA BRIGADE		1976	1990
T1253	PROLITARIAN INTERNATIONALISM		1976	1976
T702501	COMBAT TERRITORY GROUPS		1976	1976
T702519	ITALIAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT (MSI)		1976	1979
T702524	COMMUNIST COMBAT UNIT		1976	1977
T702535	COMMUNIST BRIGADE DANTE DIMANI		1976	1976
T1581	NEW ORDER		1977	1998
T327	NEW ARMENIAN RESISTANCE		1977	1983
T401	RED GUERRILLA		1977	1979
T9084	PRIMA LINEA		1976	1981

I. JUSTICE COMMANDOS FOR THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

Torg ID: 248

Min. Group Date: 1975

Max. Group Date: 1986

Onset: NA

Aliases: JCAG-ARA, Armenian Revolutionary Army

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: JCAG, Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide

Group Formation: 1975

Group End: 1985 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide was a right wing, Armenian nationalist and separatist group (MIPT 2008; Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 1; Gunter 2007, 110; Wilkinson 1983, 346; Chalk 2013, 383). JCAG was formed by the Dashnak Party, an Armenian political party that is more commonly known as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or ARF (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2013, 383). The group's main goal was to use violence to coerce the government of Turkey into accepting responsibility for the Armenian genocide of the early twentieth century, in which 1.5 million Armenians were killed (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, iii; Chalk 2013, 383). Moreover, JCAG reportedly attempted to make other countries around the world recognize the Armenian genocide (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, iii). The group strived for the formation of a separate and autonomous Armenian state (MIPT 2008). The group had profound enmity for Turkey, and accordingly, attacked Turkish interests and assassinated Turkish diplomats (MIPT 2008; Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 2; Gunter 2007, PAGE; Chalk 2013, 383). JCAG conducted its first attack on October 22, 1975, when three group operatives assassinated Danis Tinaligil, the Turkish ambassador to Austria (GTD 2018; Gunter 2007, 115; Chalk 2013, 383).

The group conducted its first attack in Portugal on June 7, 1982, when a group member fatally shot a Turkish administrative attache and his or her wife (GTD 2018).

Geography

JCAG conducted attacks throughout the world (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in Austria in the city of Vienna (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in France in the cities of Paris and Marseilles (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in Switzerland in the cities of Zurich and Bern (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in Italy in the city of Rome (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in Belgium in the city of Brussels (GTD 2018). The group conducted an attack in the United Kingdom in the city of London (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in Spain in the city of Madrid (GTD 2018). The group conducted an attack in the Netherlands in the city of Den Haag (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in the United States in the cities of Los Angeles, New York City, Cambridge, Somerville, and Philadelphia (GTD 2018; Central Intelligence Agency 1984, iii). In the United States, the group maintained a particularly large presence in Los Angeles and elsewhere in California (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, iii; New York Times 1982). The group conducted an attack in Australia in the city of Sydney (GTD 2018). The group conducted an attack in Denmark in the city of Copenhagen (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in Portugal in the cities of Linda-a-Velha and Lisbon (GTD 2018). The group conducted an attack in Canada in the city of Ottawa (GTD 2018; New York Times 1985). The group conducted an attack in Bulgaria in the city of Burgas (GTD 2018). The group conducted an attack in Turkey in the city of Istanbul (GTD 2018). The group allegedly conducted an attack in Lebanon in the city of Beirut (GTD 2018). The group allegedly conducted an attack in what was then Yugoslavia in the city of Belgrade (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

JCAG was a part of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or ARF; JCAG often functioned as an armed wing of ARF (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 2-4). The structure of ARF is hierarchical and pyramidal (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 2). ARF consisted of many regional chapters throughout the world (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 2-4). Each chapter was led by a central committee, which was generally responsible for that chapter's operations and members (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 4). Each chapter's central committee reported to a geographic bureau, which consisted of about five of the most important ARF members of that region (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 4). The geographic bureau made important decisions, received funding, and directed important facets of activities (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 4). The entire ARF was led by the world bureau (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 4). The world bureau was elected every four years by delegates from local chapters (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 4). Nothing is known about the organizational structure or leadership of JCAG itself. JCAG consists of members of the Armenian diaspora around the world (MIPT 2008; Gunter 2007, 111). JCAG was funded privately and not by states (MIPT 2008). The group is primarily funded by the Armenian diaspora around the world (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2013, 383).

External Ties

The Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide had ties to Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsuthium (MIPT 2008; Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 2-4; Gunter 2007, PAGE; Chalk 2013, 383). Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsuthium is more commonly known as the Dashnak Party, Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or ARF (Gunter 2007, 113). ARF, an Armenian political party, was the parent organization of JCAG (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, iii). JCAG was formed by the ARF in 1975 (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2013, 383). JCAG functioned as a military wing of ARF (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 4).

The Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide had a fierce rivalry with another Armenian group called Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, or ASALA (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 5). ASALA, like JCAG, used violence to increase recognition of the Armenian genocide and to achieve liberation for the Armenian people (MIPT 2008; CIA/FOIA 1984, 1). Nevertheless, ASALA posed a larger threat to American interests than JCAG did (MIPT 2008; CIA/FOIA 1984, 1). Unlike the right wing JCAG, ASALA was a Marxist and Leninist group, which had ties to the U.S.S.R. and Palestinian nationalist groups which attempted to form an independent Palestinian state (MIPT 2008; Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 6; CIA/FOIA 1984, 1; Chalk 2013, 383).

JCAG was succeeded by the Armenian Revolutionary Army, or ARA (MIPT 2008). Armenian Revolutionary Army was an alias that the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide adopted in July 1983 (MIPT 2008; Gunter 2007, 110).

JCAG likely did not have ties to any governments.

Group Outcome

In a technical sense, JCAG's violent activities ended in 1983 (MIPT 2008). In July of that year, the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide adopted the alias Armenian Revolutionary Army, or ARA (MIPT 2008; Gunter 2007, 110). The ARA used violence until 1985 (MIPT 2008; Gunter 2007, 110, 115-116; Chalk 2013, 383). For this reason, it can be determined that JCAG used violence after 1983, albeit under a different name. In March 1985, the group attacked the Turkish Embassy in the Canadian city of Ottawa (Gunter 2007, 115; Chalk 2013, 383). A security guard was killed (Gunter 2007, 115; Chalk 2013, 383). This was likely the group's last violent attack. The ARA reportedly has shifted its goals to campaigns in other places like Azerbaijan, where it is attempting to win Nagorno-Karabakh, a region in which many Armenians reside (MIPT 2008). It is unclear why the ARA ceased conducting attacks targeting Turkish diplomats and interests.

II. LTTE

Torg ID: 277

Min. Group Date: 1975

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: What is the earliest year the group was active?

Group End: What is the last year the group was active? Why did it stop using political violence?

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This section is where you would include information about the group's founding date, its initial goals, ideology, and date when it first came to attention as a violent group.

Geography

This section is where you would include information about the group's operational environment including the names of areas where they operate from, the name of any external sanctuaries, the name of any cities, towns, or neighborhoods where they conduct attacks. You may also provide a generic descriptor if you cannot identify specifically where, but know what the geographic composition of the area was.

Organizational Structure

This section is where you would include information about the group's organizational structure including its leadership, membership, source of funding, and different wings.

External Ties

This section is where you would include information about the group's ties to other actors including both other armed groups as well as other countries. This includes information about external support, alliances, and splinters.

Group Outcome

This section is where you would include information about the state's response to the group, if any, and how this affects the group. You will also identify whether the group is still active, when it stopped using violence, and what happened to the group to cause it to stop using violence.

- III. ARMENIAN SECRET ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA
Torg ID: 87
Min. Group Date: 1975
Max. Group Date: 1997
Onset: NA

Aliases: Armenian Secret Army For The Liberation Of Armenia, Armenian Liberation Army, Armenian Secret Army For The Liberation Of Armenia (Asala), Hayastani Azatagrutyán Hay Gaghtni Banak, Hayastani Azatagrut'yan Hay Gaghtni Banak

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Armenian Liberation Army, Armenian Secret Army For The Liberation Of Armenia (ASALA), Hayastani Azatagrutyan Hay Gaghtni Banak, Hayastani Azatagrut'yan Hay Gaghtni Banak, Popular Movements for the Armenian Secret Army For The Liberation Of Armenia (PMASALA), Orly Group, ASALA-RM

Group Formation: 1971 - 1975

Group End: 1997 (dissolved due to splintering and death of leader)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Hayastani Azatagrut'yan Hay Gaghtni Banak, commonly known as the Armenian Secret Army For The Liberation Of Armenia (ASALA), was founded between 1971 and January 1975 (Migliorino 2008, 154; Chalk 2013, 59; CIA n.d.). The group conducted its first attack in Beirut, Lebanon on January 20, 1975 (Gunter 2007). ASALA was the manifestation of a new wave of Armenian terrorism inspired by the 1973 killing of two Turkish attaches in Los Angeles by a 73-year old survivor of the Armenian genocide (Gunter 2007).

The primary goals of ASALA were to pressure the Turkish government into recognizing the Armenian genocide (Rubin and Colp Rubin 2015, 1376), enacting revenge on Turkey for their perpetration of the Armenian genocide, and establishing an independent Armenian state (Rubin and Colp Rubin 2015, 1376). The group ascribes to Marxism-Leninism as well as ethno-nationalism on behalf of the Armenian people (Sullivan 2011; Gunter 2007; Chalk 2013).

Geography

ASALA was founded in Beirut, Lebanon and maintained headquarters with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in Western Beirut (Wilkinson 1983) until 1982 when the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) invaded Lebanon in order to disrupt the PLO. ASALA's headquarters were then moved to Damascus, Syria (Migliorino 2008, 155). Additional reports state that ASALA has an additional base in Libya where it was allowed to train by Muammar Gaddafi's government (Lalevee 1983, 41). ASALA is a transnational organization, orchestrating attacks in almost two dozen countries across Europe, the Middle East, North America, and South America (GTD 2018). These attacks are generally conducted in metropolitan areas with dense populations.

Organizational Structure

ASALA was founded in 1975 by Hagop Hagopian and Hagop Tarakciyan in Beirut, Lebanon (GTD Perpetrator 305) with the support of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (Migliorino 2008, 154), a faction of the Palestinian Liberation

Organization (PLO), and Black September (Gunter 2007, 117), the secret service branch of Fatah. Prior to starting ASALA, Hagopian, an ethnic Armenian born in Lebanon (Sullivan 2011), was a member of the PFLP (Gunter 2007, 117). ASALA received funding and support from a wide range of states and organizations.

In addition to external support from both state and non-state actors, U.S. officials have stated that ASALA has acted as a mercenary group in order to finance their terrorist operations (Washington Post 1988). At its inception, ASALA had six or seven members (Sullivan 2011) and later estimates placed membership in the group anywhere from roughly 100 to 300 members (Sullivan 2011; FAS 1998). Membership of ASALA consists of ethnic Armenians. A CIA report from 1984 states that the CIA believed ASALA to be managed by a central leadership committee while most academic sources credit Hagopian as the group's leader (Central Intelligence Agency 2010). However, the CIA report references Hagopian as a group leader chief spokesman. Due to redactions in the document, it is not possible to determine additional information regarding Hagopian and the group's leadership.

External Ties

ASALA receives funding and support from multiple state and non-state actors. At ASALA's onset, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine heavily supported the group by giving them protection and training (Migliorino 2008, 154). The leader of another Palestinian terrorist leader, Abu Iyad, chief of Black September, the secret service branch of Fatah, also reportedly supported the group during its inception (Gunter 2007). Both Syria and Libya have provided aid and safehaven for ASALA (Lalevee 1983, 41; FAS 1998). ASALA maintained close connections with the terrorist groups the New Armenian Resistance (NAR) (GTD n.d.) and the Kurdish Workers' Party (KWP) (Central Intelligence Agency 2010), both of whom ASALA has conducted joint operations with in Europe.

Following the displacement of ASALA's headquarters following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the attack on Orly Airport in France in 1983, ASALA splintered into two groups. One would be known as ASALA Revolutionary Movement (ASALA-RM), and the other, lead by Hagopian, would continue on as ASALA.

Group Outcome

Following the splinter of 1983, ASALA-RM attempted to establish itself as a political movement rather than a terrorist organization. However, members of ASALA-RM claim to have been targeted by ASALA hindering the group's ability to function (source). In addition, the leader of ASALA-RM, Monte Melkonian, was arrested in France in 1985, essentially killing the movement (Gunter 2007). Due to the loss of resources as a result of splinter of 1983 combined with the troubles of establishing itself in Syria, ASALA was forced to rely heavily on the Syrian government to remain afloat. Eventually the Syrians

took control of ASALA and ousted its leader Hagopian at the end of 1987 (Gunter 2007). ASALA did not launch a single attack during 1987 and only conducted a single attack following the expulsion of Hagopian in 1988.

The last confirmed attack undertaken by the ASALA was on February 2, 1988. In two additional incidents, occurring in 1991 (Los Angeles Times 1991) and 1997 (GTD n.d.), individuals claiming to be connected to ASALA claimed responsibility for the attacks, but their claims can not be substantiated and were likely lone wolf actors.

Notes for Iris:

-they had 6 or 7 people in 1975 (likely) when they formed, but the 100-300 people estimates are unknown

-why were they able to grow so big? The group's ties to the PFLP gave them a lot of training and experience because of external support. The founder of ASALA was Armenian and the initial members were likely Armenian (Armenian refugees in Lebanon), but external support was primarily Palestinian.

-the group has a lot of external support, but most of it is alleged. The Libya support is super unclear

-one of the most interesting things about ASALA was the heroism associated with one of the group's leader

-why did ASALA splinter? They had gotten kicked out of Lebanon and there were reports of in-fighting. ASALA R-M *might* have wanted to be more of a political movement, but another faction might have tried to keep using violent activities post Orly-attack.

IV. ARMED COMMUNIST FORMATIONS

Torg ID: 1003

Min. Group Date: 1976

Max. Group Date: 1978

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Formazioni Comuniste Armate (FCA), Armed Struggle for Communism, Lotta Army for Worker Power, Armed Struggle for Proletarian Power, Proletarian Teams

Group Formation: 1975

Group End: 1976 (dissolved after most members joined the Red Brigades or the Combatant Communist Unit)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Formazioni Comuniste Armate (FCA) formed in Rome in 1975, out of the Communist Committee of Centocelle (CoCoCe) (Misteri d'Italia 2020). CoCoCe was one of several "communist committees" formed after the leftist group Worker Power (Potere Operaio) dissolved in 1975 (Pisano 1979, 67; Edwards 2009, 81; Misteri d'Italia 2020).

FCA carried out its first attack on April 14th, 1976, when the group set the Florence office of Texaco Oil Company on fire (The Atlanta Constitution 1976; GTD 2019). FCA was one of several leftist militant groups fighting against the central government during the 1970s (Edwards 2009, 81, 101). A majority of the group's attacks were targeted at multinational oil companies (GTD 2019).

Geography

FCA was founded in Rome, and its activity was concentrated in the central Italian cities of Rome and Florence (Edwards 2009, 81; GTD 2019; Misteri d'Italia 2020).

Organizational Structure

FCA likely had around two dozen members (Mapping Militants Project 2012). Members came from the Communist Committee of Centocelle (CoCoCe) (Misteri d'Italia 2020). Twenty-one individuals were allegedly investigated for their connection with FCA; it is unknown when these individuals were investigated (Misteri d'Italia 2020).

External Ties

FCA likely had contact with other leftist groups operating in central Italy at the time, including CoCoCe and Lotta Armata per il Comunismo (Armed Struggle for Communism, LAC) (Edwards 2009, 81). Former FCA members founded the Union of Communist Combatants (UCC) and the Communist Revolutionary Committees (CoCoRi) (Mapping Militants Project 2012). Once FCA leader, Valerio Morucci, eventually left the FCA to take on a leadership position in the Red Brigades (Mapping Militants 2012; Morucci 2004; Mazzochi 1994).

Group Outcome

FCA carried out most of its attacks over an eight day period in April of 1976, and attacked the Italian offices of Texaco Oil and the president of Chevron Oil Italiana (GTD 2019; Washington Post 1976). In 1976, members of FCA began to join the Red Brigades' Rome column, and other members formed the Unità Comuniste Combattenti (Fighting Communist Units) (Pisano 1979, 67; Misteri d'Italia 2020; Edwards 2009, 81). The FCA dissolved in 1976 as its members left the group and joined the Red Brigades (Misteri d'Italia 2020; Mapping Militants Project 2012). GTD (2019) claims the group's last attack was in 1978. However, this seems suspect given the group's dissolution two years earlier. It is unclear whether that attack is erroneously attributed to the group or if an ex-member claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of the group.

Notes for Iris:

-attacks were all concentrated around Easter weekend

-group ties to UCC? UCC doesn't really seem like a splinter because the group was so small and tied

V. COMMUNIST COMBAT FORMATIONS

Torg ID: 9085

Min. Group Date: 1976

Max. Group Date: 1978

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Communist Combat Formations, FCC, Communist Combat Formations (FCC), Formazioni comuniste combattenti, Communist Fighting Formations, Workers Armed for Communism, Armed Proletarian Teams

Group Formation: 1977

Group End: 1979

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Communist Combat Formations (FCC) formed in 1977, and carried out their first violent attack in 1978, when the group assassinated Carmine de Rosa, the head of security at the Fiat plant in Cassino, Italy (Misteri d'Italia n.d.). FCC was a violent left-wing group that aimed to overthrow the Italian government and replace it with a "dictatorship of the proletariat" (Mapping Militants Project 2012). The group formed around the magazine *Rosso*, which was first published in 1973 by members of various left-wing militant groups, including Potere Operaio and Lotta Continua (Misteri d'Italia n.d.; Mapping Militants Project 2012). In 1977, the FCC emerged from the interactions surrounding *Rosso*, and the group was "immediately characterized by a more marked choice of clandestinity" (Misteri d'Italia n.d.).

Geography

FCC activities were centered in the Italian cities of Milan, Varese, Bologna, Rome, and Avellino (Misteri d'Italia n.d.).

Organizational Structure

FCC was founded by Corrado Alunni, a former member of the Red Brigades (Pisano 1987, 47). Although exact membership numbers are unknown, some estimates place group membership at slightly over 100 members (Mapping Militants Project 2012), and 121 individuals were investigated in connection to the FCC (Misteri d'Italia n.d.). The group was considered one of the 4 largest far-left groups in the 1970s alongside the BR and PL (Mapping Militants 2012).

External Ties

FCC had ties to fellow leftist militant group Prima Linea, and the two groups likely carried out several joint attacks (Pisano 1987, 47, 46). In 1978, FCC members joined Prima Linea at a training camp hosted by the Basque ETA at the Spanish-French border (Pisano 1987, 135; Pisano 1984, 29).

Group Outcome

The FCC dissolved after many members were arrested in May of 1979 (Misteri d'Italia n.d.). Some former FCC members joined the Red Brigades, while others abandoned the armed struggle completely (Misteri d'Italia n.d.; Mapping Militants Project 2012).

Notes for Iris:

-origin story around magazine? Potere Operaio started the magazine in the late 1960s, which radicalized or somehow influenced the FCC members to start the group

VI. CHE GUEVARA BRIGADE

Torg ID: 121

Min. Group Date: 1976

Max. Group Date: 1990

Onset: NA

Aliases: Che Guevara Brigade, Che Guevara International Brigade, La Brigada Che Guevara

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: no proposed change

Group Formation: no proposed change

Group End (Outcome): no proposed change (splintering, S (Jones and Libicki 2008, 153))

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

La Brigada Che Guevara was a left-wing group active from 1976 until 1990 (TOPS 2008, ID 3982; GTD, START 2016; Jones and Libicki 2008, 153). The group's initial goal was to target officials allegedly involved in the death of transnational guerrilla Ernesto "Che" Guevara (TOPS 2008, ID 3982). The group also sought leftist social revolution and later attacks (circa 1990) targeted U.S.-based businesses in Buenos Aires (GTD, START 2016; Jones and Libicki 2008, 153; U.S. Department of State 1991, 4-5, 8).

La Brigada Che Guevara is allegedly responsible for several well-known attacks, however little is known about the group's organizational structure or external ties (TOPS 2008, ID 3982). La Brigada Che Guevara first came to international attention when a representative claimed responsibility for the assassination of former Bolivian President and leftist general Juan Jose Torres González in Paris in June 1976 (2008, ID 3982). According to TOPS, La Brigada Che Guevara targeted González in Buenos Aires because González allegedly led the military operation that killed Guevara in Bolivia (2008, ID 3982).

Geography

Within Argentina, the group conducted attacks in Buenos Aires (START 2016, GTD). The group allegedly conducted attacks in Paris, France, Bogota, Colombia, and the Italian cities of Brindisi and Rome, however many of these are disputed (START 2016, GTD).

Organizational Structure

La Brigade Che Guevara reportedly had less than 100 members (Jones and Libicki 2008, 153). The group's targets tended to be officials involved in the death of Che Guevara or sites linked to the Argentine government or United States (START 2016, GTD).

External Ties

In November 1999, the Argentine Government ruled González's killing part of Operation Condor, claimed partial responsibility, and awarded \$320,000 in compensation to González's widow (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 309). The Argentine Government's raised uncertainty about La Brigada Che Guevara's involvement: was the group tied to the Latin American governments participating in Operation Condor?

Some sources say La Brigada Che Guevara claimed credit for the assassination of General Joaquín Zenteno Anaya in Paris on May 11, 1976 (TOPS 2008, ID 3982; Greisman 1977, 306; Parry 1976, 253). However, GTD does not attribute La Brigada Che Guevara with Anaya's assassination (START 2016). Calloni claims that the state actors behind Operation Condor assassinated Anaya, but blamed La Brigada Che Guevara in order to avoid attribution (May 1999, 85). However, Calloni claims that La Brigada Che Guevara never existed at all, which contradicts the entries in GTD and TOPS (Calloni May 1999, 85; TOPS 2008, ID 3982; START 2016, GTD).

A 1991 C.I.A. report noted that some Argentine guerrillas, described as "possibly" La Brigada Che Guevara members, traveled to Peru in mid-July 1990 (NSA Archive 2002, MORI DocID 766907, 4). Once in Peru, the suspected Che Guevara Brigade members allegedly

contacted the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which had a similar Marxist-Leninist and anti-imperialist (anti-U.S.) ideology (Ibid.). However, the nature of the alleged communication is unknown. The C.I.A. report classifies the link between the La Brigada Che Guevara and the MRTA as “suspected” but unconfirmed (Ibid.).

Group Outcome

La Brigada Che Guevara is associated with a bomb explosion at U.S.-owned Parke-Davis Laboratories in Buenos Aires (START 2016, GTD 198803060001). The explosion caused property damage but the extent is unknown (START 2016, GTD 198803060001). *The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism for 1988* and TOPS claim that La Brigada Che Guevara claimed responsibility in a communiqué accusing the U.S. of supporting the British military in the Falkland Islands (TOPS 2008, ID 3982; Gardela and Hoffman 1988, 41). However, GTD says it is unknown if La Brigada Che Guevara claimed responsibility, contradicting the RAND report and TOPS (START 2016, GTD 198803060001).

La Brigada Che Guevara allegedly detonated a bomb at a branch of the state telephone company Entel in the Florencio Varela suburb of Buenos Aires on June 30, 1990, causing significant property damage and lightly injuring two employees (U.S. Department of State 1991, 8). According to a U.S. State Department report, La Brigada Che Guevara claimed responsibility for the bombing in a call to a local radio station (1991, 8). However, a 1991 report from the Canadian government’s Immigration and Refugee Board discounted the group’s claim of responsibility for bombing Entel and instead concluded “true identity of the terrorists has not been determined” (IRB 1991). The attack was reportedly protesting the Argentine government’s approval for the sale of Entel to two foreign firms including U.S. Bell Atlantic (U.S. Department of State 1991, 8; TOPS 2008, ID 3982). The U.S. State Department report lists two other 1990 incidents in which La Che Guevara bombed U.S.-owned businesses in Buenos Aires (a CitiBank and GTE-owned subsidiary) (U.S. Department of State 1991, 4-5). A purported representative of the group claimed responsibility in a telephone call to local media following both attacks (U.S. Department of State 1991, 4-5). The group splintered in 1990 and is not associated with any attack following 1990 (Jones and Libicki 2008, 153; START 2016, GTD).

The 1991 IRB report also noted that the same or other groups using a similar-sounding name were claiming responsibility for various terrorist acts “lacking a clear political purpose” around that time in Argentina (IRB 1991, ARG7522).

Following the 1989 La Tablada attack (cf. MTP), a military intelligence source named La Brigada Che Guevara as among a series of groups posing imminent threats (Schneider 1989, 9). However these predicted attacks never occurred (Ibid.). Contemporary Argentine journalist Joe Schneider claimed that competing liberal/leftist and nationalist factions of the military purported these warnings to fan public distrust of opposing political factions (1989, 9).

The name “Che Guevara Brigade” is also used by a pro-Castro regime group that organizes international trips to Cuba, volunteer work, and transnational communication with leftist activists (Alekseeva and Fitzpatrick 1990, 58; Pagliccia 2014, 87, 89-91, 237; ALBA Movimientos 2014). This pro-Castro group does not appear connected to the terrorist group Che Guevara Brigade in Argentina.

Min. Group Date: 1976
Max. Group Date: 1976
Onset: NA

Aliases: Proletarian Internationalism, Prolitarian Internationalism

Part 1. Bibliography

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 - “Proletarian Internationalism”
 - “Prolitarian Internationalism”
 - Proleterian Internationalism Italy
 - Rome south africa embassy attack from 1976-08-01 to 1976-09-30
 - Rome bombing south africa from 1976-08-01 to 1976-09-30
 - Rome internationalism from 1976-08-01 to 1976-09-30

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No information could be found about the group.

Group Formation: No information could be found about the group.

Group End: No information could be found about the group.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

No information could be found about the group.

Geography

No information could be found about the group.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the group.

External Ties

No information could be found about the group.

Group Outcome

No information could be found about the group.

VIII. COMBAT TERRITORY GROUPS

Torg ID: 702501

Min. Group Date: 1976

Max. Group Date: 1976

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Nuclei of Territorial Communists, Cellule Comuniste Territorial, Communist Territorial Cells, Nuclei Comunisti Territorial, NCT

Group Formation: 1979

Group End: 1980

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Territorial Communist Nuclei (NCT) was founded in 1979 in Turin (Misteri d'Italia nd). The group carried out its first violent attack the same year, attacking the homes of several employees of the Fiat plant in Turin (Misteri d'Italia nd). Much of the group's activities were centered around the Fiat plant. In October of 1979, NCT set the cars of two Fiat foremen on fire in response to the dismissal of 61 employees for "inciting industrial unrest," and in January of 1980, NCT members killed a factory guard and wounded another (New York Times 1979; Misteri d'Italia 2020; Italian Association of Victims of Terrorism 2003). NCT was a communist-inspired, leftist organization (New York Times 1979; Mapping Militants 2012). It aimed to construct a "proletarian army" and "control the territory" ostensibly around its area of operations in Turin (Misteri d'Italia nd). It is unclear if NCT wanted Turin to "secede" from Italy in the traditional sense (Mapping Militants 2012).

Geography

NCT operated around the northern Italian city of Turin, and most of the group's attacks occurred at the city's Fiat factory (Misteri d'Italia nd; Mapping Militants 2012).

Organizational Structure

NCT likely had no more than a few dozen members (Mapping Militants 2012). In 1982, Italian police arrested 25 members (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 592). Additional information about their leadership, source of funding, or organization could not be found.

External Ties

NCT operated at the same time as fellow leftist militant group Prima Linea, and likely was connected to other smaller leftist groups in the region (Misteri d'Italia 2020). Remaining members joined with other unnamed militant leftist organizations (Misteri d'Italia 2020).

Group Outcome

In June of 1980, several members of NCT were arrested which decimated the group's capacity (Misteri d'Italia 2020). Remaining members joined with other unnamed

militant leftist organizations (Mapping Militants 2012; Misteri d'Italia nd). Some speculate the group's last attack was on January 31, 1980 when they killed a janitor at a Fiat plant (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 592). Others speculate the group allegedly carried out its last attack in July of 1980, when members attacked the office of a Turin-based real estate agency "against rents and real estate speculations" (Misteri d'Italia nd). However, this choice of target doesn't really match with their previous attacks, which focused on the Fiat factory in Turin. In 1982, twenty-five NCT members were arrested for their connection with the 1980 killing of the Fiat guard (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 592).

IX. ITALIAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT (MSI)

Torg ID: 702519

Min. Group Date: 1976

Max. Group Date: 1979

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

***electoral violence?**

Aliases: MSI, Movimento Sociale Italiano

Group Formation: 1946

Group End: 1995 (??--this is when the party became AN)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

After the Italian Republic formed in 1946 following the end of World War II, Italian politics was dominated by two parties: the moderate anti-communist Christian Democratic (DC) party and Italy's Communist Party (CSI) (Ferraresi 1996, 22). During this time, several small, neo-fascist political groups emerged, unencumbered by the government due to their anticommunist views (Ferraresi 1996, 22). The Italian Social Movement (MSI) was founded in December of 1946, when several of these small neo-fascist groups and parties united under a new name (Ferraresi 1996, 23). The MSI became Italy's fourth largest political party for much of the last half of the 20th century (Tassani 1990, 126).

It is unclear when MSI carried out its first violent attack. Atkins (2004) notes that clashes between MSI supporters and protesters became commonplace by the "early 1960s." Italian police seized a cache of weapons in 1965, which seemed indicative of preparations for violent attacks (Atkins 2004). Schmid and Jongman (1988, 590) suggest the group's violent activities escalated in 1969 following the death of a member, but it is unclear whether they had previously initiated violence before that date.

As a neo-fascist group, MSI aimed to reinstate a Musolini-style fascist government, combat communism and the CSI, and attack and undermine the democratic system (Atkins 2004, 151). Officially, the party's platform outlined typical conservative policies, stressing opposition to communism, abortion, divorce, and emphasizing the importance of "family, church, and nationalist values" (Hoffman 1982, 1). However, the MSI was routinely accused of working to undermine Italian democracy and supporting various far-right militant organizations (Hoffman 1982, 2). The party's lifespan was characterised by internal tension between its moderate and revolutionary factions (Ferraresi 1996, 23). MSI was founded by individuals belonging to the faction of revolutionaries, but as the party gained support in central and southern Italy, the moderates within the party began to gain control and attempted to reinvent MSI as a more modern, typical conservative party (Ferraresi 1996, 23; Tassani 1990, 126).

Geography

MSI was headquartered in Rome, and had offices across Italy (source). Most of the party's support came from Central and Southern Italy (von Beyme 1988, 21). MSI's university organization, University Front of National Action, was especially active at Sapienza University in Rome in the late 1960s (Mammone 2008, 215).

Organizational Structure

MSI was founded by Giorgio Almirante, who had been a low-ranking official in Mussolini's government (Tassani 1990, 126; Langford 1985, I-5). Almirante belonged to the more radical faction of the party, and his beliefs were reflected in MSI's 1948 platform, in which democracy was regarded as a "pollution," and a "national state of labor" was advocated for "within the framework of a national socialism" (Ferraresi 1996, 24). However, in 1950, Almirante was replaced by the more moderate August De Marsinich, who came to power as the support for MSI increased in Italy's central and southern regions (Tassani 1990, 126; Ferraresi 1996, 24). Supporters from Central and Southern Italy had a high degree of control over MSI's finances and positions, and in 1954, Arturo Michelini assumed leadership of the party, backed by the Vatican and "Roman financial circles" (Ferraresi 1996, 24). The party's platform became less radical, which angered extremist revolutionaries (Ferraresi 1996, 24).

From the 1950s to the mid-1960s, there was sometimes violent infighting between the moderates and the extremists (Ferraresi 1996, 24). Youth groups seemed to be the primary recruiting grounds for MSI materials as Schmid and Jongman (1988, 590) argue "MSI party offices served as 'base camps' for groups of young fascist thugs" during the 1960s.

In addition to its main political structure, MSI had several youth organizations called Youth Front (FDG), Students and Workers' Youth Group, and the Student Association of National Action--Young Italy, and an organization present on university campuses called University Front of National Action (FAUN) (Mammone 2008, 215; Tassani 1990, 124). MSI also had contact with other European, South America, and Middle Eastern neo-fascist groups, and published an international journal titled *Europa Unita* under its' European Study Center (Tauber 1959, 568).

These youth groups and other attacks placed leadership in a difficult political position. While they could not condone any of the violence perpetrated by the extremists, they also could not condemn them and risk losing their support; as a result, leaders often publicly decried the violence, but did not take any actions to expel or discipline the perpetrators (Ferraresi 1996, 24). After Michelini's death in 1969, however, MSI underwent several changes as Almirante regained control of the party (Tassani 1990, 126).

In 1972, MSI officially renamed itself MSI-DN, after it absorbed the Democratic Party of Monarchical Unity, a conservative, monarchist party with a southern stronghold (Tassani 1990, 126). The MSI was accused of attempting to reestablish the Fascist Party in 1972 (Mammone 2008, 224). Almirante attempted to purge the party of far-right extremists between 1973 and 1974, and although this, and the increasing inclusion of more moderate and conservative messages “watered down the original Fascist component” of MSI, the party remained solidly extreme and neo-fascist (Langford 1985, 1-5; Tassani 1990, 126). Under Almirante, Rauti’s extremist group Ordine Nuovo was welcomed back into the party folds, and some moderates left MSI to form the National Democratic Party (Ferraresi 1996, 53; Tassani 1990, 126). Almirante led the party until 1987, when his protege Gianfranco Fini was elected Party Secretary (Gallego 1999, 11). Fini was a skilled politician, and kept the MSI intact through the collapse of Italy’s first republic and the creation of the second, and adapted party messaging to reflect the declining political influence of anticommunist sentiments (Gallego 1999, 12).

As an established political party, MSI endeavors were officially regulated to legal political activity. However, the party certainly had ties to militant individuals and groups. In 1965, the Italian police found a hidden stockpile of weaponry belonging to a prominent MSI supporter (Atkins 2004, 151). During Almirante’s attempted “softening” of the party’s parliamentary image in the 1970s, he simultaneously encouraged unofficial “street activism” (Mammone 2008, 223).

The party received its highest percentage of the vote--8.7%--in 1972 (Baldini 2). MSI reported 400,000 members in 1975, and in the 1980s, MSI membership ranged from 100,000 to 150,000 members (Hoffman 1982, 2; Tassani 1990, 126). Forty-nine percent of MSI’s membership came from southern Italy, and 25.9% and 24.7% of members were from the central regions and the north, respectively. (Tassani 1990, 124). Portions of MSI’s financial support came from those fearful of a communist takeover, including businesses, landowners, and the Vatican (Atkins 2004, 151).

External Ties

Membership in far-right militant groups, including Ordine Nuovo, Ordine Nero, National Vanguard, Armed Revolutionary Movement, Compass Card, Popular Revolutionary Movement, Third Position, Armed Revolutionary Nucleus, People’s Struggle, Phoenix, and Mussolini Action Squads, often overlapped with membership in MSI (Pisano 1984, 36; Hoffman 1982, 3-4). These groups also shared similar and extreme versions of the right-wing ideology that guided MSI (Hoffman 1982, 2).

MSI also had contact with other right-wing and neo-fascist political parties across Europe, including France’s National Front, Greece’s Ethniki Politiki Enosis, Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party, and Germany’s Die Republikaner (Liang 2007, 96). In the 1950s, the MSI helped to form the European Social Movement (Europäische Soziale Bewegung), which aimed to gain representation in the European Parliament (Tauber 1959, 570). In the 1984 European elections, MSI formed the Group of the European Right with the National Front, Ethniki Politiki Enosis, and the Democratic

Unionist Party, but MSI broke away from the group after the 1989 European elections due to a dispute with Die Republikaner over the territory of South Tyrol (Liang 2007, 96).

At its founding, the MSI enjoyed the support of the Vatican and the Ministry of the Interior, controlled by the Christian Democrats, both of which were glad to see the formation of an anticommunist party that would also curb the influence of Southern Italy's The Common Man's Front, a moderate-conservative party that threatened to gain Catholics votes that the DC wanted (Ferraresi 1996, 23).

Group Outcome

After the 1992 collapse of the first Italian republic, a 1993 referendum changed the Italian voting system, and the proportional representation system was replaced with a plurality system in three-fourths of the seats in Parliament (Newell 2000, 476). This change could have harmed MSI, were it not for the decline of the three other major parties, particularly the Christian Democrats (Newell 2000, 477). In 1993, MSI candidates Fini and Alessandra Mussolini (Benito Mussolini's granddaughter) ran for mayor of Rome and Naples, respectively, and received over 40% of the vote (Gallego 1999, 13). Fini recognized that in order to increase support for MSI, the party needed to overcome voters' hesitation over the party's history (Newell 2000, 478). In the 1994 general elections, MSI ran candidates under a new name--National Alliance--and received 14% of the vote (Gallego 1999, 13). In 1995, under Fini's leadership, the MSI officially dissolved and was replaced with the National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale/AN) (Ferraresi 1996, 3; Gallego 1999, 13). Although membership between the two groups remained the same, the AN platform abandoned MSI's calls for a fascist dictatorship and fully accepted Italy's liberal democratic government (Gallego 1999, 13). Some MSI members, including Pino Rauti, declined to join the new AN and attempted, unsuccessfully, to re-establish the MSI (Atkins 2004, 152).

Schmid and Jongman report that the bulk of the group's violence ended around 1974 as the groups lost security protections and became vulnerable to arrests (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 590). GTD reports the group's last attack occurred in 1979 when it attacked the headquarters of the Christian Democratic Party in Rome (GTD 2019).

Notes for Iris:

- this seems to operate more like a violent political party
- there's no real evidence of sanctioned violence by the group. Rather see followers of the movement engaging in violent attacks/clashes
- targets leftist political parties or left-wing group
- it's also hard to attribute violent attacks because of large overlapping membership between MSI and New Order
- in 92 Italy changed its voting system from proportional representation to plurality system. Reorg in 1995 coincided with a drastic change in the ideological platform of the group.
- most of the violence occurred between 69-75 which might have been attributable to changes in leadership

-youth followers seemed to be responsible for violence? (seems like alt-right youth groups which showed up at charlottesville). A lot of these followers “aged” out of the group

X. COMMUNIST COMBAT UNIT

Torg ID: 702524

Min. Group Date: 1976

Max. Group Date: 1977

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: UCC

Group Formation: 1976

Group End: 1977 (splintered)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Communist Combat Units (UCC) formed in 1976 when it splintered from the leftist militant organization Armed Communist Formations (Mapping Militants Project 2012). It carried out its first attack on June 15, 1976, when the group kidnapped meat importer Guiseppe Ambrosio and demanded that the price of meat be lowered (New York Times 1976; GTD 2019). UCC was a leftist group, and blamed small and medium sized businesses for exploiting workers and for the “daily robbery of the proletariat” (Mapping Militants Project 2012; New York Times 1976).

Geography

The UCC conducted two attacks, both of which occurred in Rome (GTD 2019). The group was also active in Northern and Central Italy (Mapping Militants Project 2012).

Organizational Structure

Members of the group splintered from the leftist militant Armed Communist Formations (Mapping Militants Project 2012). The Armed Communist Formations was a relatively small left-wing group that later fragmented with some members joining the Red Brigades and some members forming the UCC (Mapping Militants Project 2012).

External Ties

Members of the group splintered from the leftist militant Armed Communist Formations (Mapping Militants Project 2012). As UCC began to dissolve, several members joined fellow militant leftist organization Prima Linea (Front Line) (Mapping Militants Project 2012).

Group Outcome

UCC conducted its last violent attack in February 1977, and dissolved in the same year (GTD 2019; Mapping Militants Project 2012). Some former members of UCC joined Prima Linea (Mapping Militants Project 2012).

Notes for Iris:

- GTD attacks are very sparse
- odd political policy aim: group ransomed him for meat, very hyper-specific aims
- similar to volcano kidnapping group
- only evidence of communist ties is in the statement

- XI. COMMUNIST BRIGADE DANTE DIMANI
Torg ID: 702535
Min. Group Date: 1976

Max. Group Date: 1976

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Search Proquest
 - Communist brigade dante dimani
 - "Dante dimani"
 - rome attack msi from 1976-12-01 to 1976-12-15
 - Dante dimani from 1976-12-01 to 1976-12-15

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 1976

Group End: 1976 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Communist Brigade Dante Dimani carried out its sole attack on December 8th, 1976, when it bombed a center for the Italian Social Movement, Italy's leading far-right party at the time (GTD 2019). It is unclear what the group is named after.

Geography

Communist Brigade Dante Dimani's only attack occurred in Rome (GTD 2019).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about Communist Brigade Dante Dimani's organizational structure.

External Ties

No information could be found about any external ties Communist Brigade Dante Dimani may have had.

Group Outcome

No information could be found about the outcome of Communist Brigade Dante Dimani. The group's last -- and only known violent attack -- was in 1976 when it bombed an MSI target (GTD 2019).

Notes for Iris:

-who is Dante Dimani? Could not find any evidence

XII. NEW ORDER

Torg ID: 1581

Min. Group Date: 1977

Max. Group Date: 1998

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

*note MIPT error here: MIPT TOPS Profile refers to USA "New Order" and not Italian "New Order"

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Ordine Nuovo, ON

Group Formation: 1954

Group End: 1973 (banned by the Italian government), reorganizes/splinters into Black Order (T1212)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In 1954, Pino Rauti, a deputy in the Italian Social Movement (MSI) founded a “center” within the MSI that brought together the party’s most radical members (Feraresi 1996, 28; Bale 2017). In 1956, Rauti’s center broke away from the MSI and adopted the name “Centro Studi Ordine Nuovo” (New Order Study Center), which was commonly referred to as Ordine Nuovo (New Order) (Feraresi 1996, 28; Bale 2017). Inspired by the writings of Italian neo-fascist philosopher Julius Evola, New Order operated as both a far-right intellectual and militant organization that aimed to facilitate a fascist takeover of the Italian state (Bale 2017; Furlong 2011, 16). In 1969, in the midst of a wave of student and worker protests, Rauti decided to bring New Order back into the MSI (Bale 2017). Violent extremists within the group, led by Celemele Graziani, rejected this move back into the established party and formed the Movimento Politico Ordine Nuovo (New Order Political Movement/MPON), which conducted militant activity until it was banned by the Italian government in 1973 (Feraresi 1996, 53; Bale 2017).

Throughout all of its various forms and names, New Order was concerned with two goals: creating an “order” in defense of “the principles of tradition,” and conducting militant attacks with the ultimate goal of carrying out a successful coup d’etat against the Italian government (Feraresi 1996, 54). The first goal is remarkably vague. Unlike other European far-right groups, New Order did not make clear distinctions between social groups (Feraresi 1996, 55). Instead, New Order members admired historical and often mythical examples of Italian, European, and Fascist heroism, and rejected the modern world and society for their lack of “traditional values” (Feraresi 1996, 55).

During its militant activity in the 1960s and 70s, New Order deployed a “strategy of tension,” in which it used non-discriminate attacks on the public to destabilize the Italian government and increase the attractiveness of a fascist takeover (Kushner 2003, 278). Unlike its left-wing counterparts, New Order rarely claimed credit for its attacks (Mapping Militants 2012). The group’s first attack may have been the 1969 Piazza

Fontana bombing (Hoffman 1982, 3; Langford 1985, 1-2). This attack occurred at the start of Italy's "Years of Lead," and the end of the student and worker protests of the late 1960s. The ruling party, the Christian Democrats, were shifting farther left, forming governments and alliances with the Socialists and Communists. Right-wing extremists were fearful of an increase of support for the Communist party and a more general political shift to the left, which they believed could be prevented with an authoritarian takeover of the state (Ferraresi 1996, 86). For right-wing extremists, including those in New Order, public support for a fascist coup and a return to "law and order" could be garnered by escalating the tension within Italy through violent attacks, blamed on leftist militant groups and anarchists (Ferraresi 1996, 86).

Geography

New Order operated across Italy. Its 1956 break from the MSI occurred at the party's congress in Milan (Ferraresi 1996, 53). The group's directorate was headquartered in Rome (Ferraresi 1996, 53). The group had eight regional bases, representing the regions of Latium, Campania, Sicily and Calabria, Lombardy and Piedmont, Venetia, Emilia, Tuscany, and Umbria (Ferraresi 1996, 54). New Order's violent attacks were concentrated in the cities of Milan and Rome, where members would engage in violence with left-wing students and militant groups (Weinburg and Eubank 1988, 536)

Organizational Structure

New Order was founded by Pino Rauti, who had previously served in Italy's National Republican Guard during Mussolini's rule (Bale 2017). Rauti was captured and spent time in various Allied internment camps, and when he was released in 1946, he joined the newly-formed MSI, and became a member of the Central Committee and the "national youth leader" (Bale 2017). Rauti then became a leader of the right-wing paramilitary group Revolutionary Action Fasci (FAR) that carried out several attacks in the 1950s, for which he was arrested for trying to "reconstitute the fascist party" (Bale 2017). When he was released from prison, he rejoined the MSI and eventually founded the New Order Study Center (Bale 2017). After Rauti's departure and subsequent reunification with the MSI, Clemente Graziani assumed leadership of New Order (Ferraresi 1996, 53). The relationship Rauti had with the militants of New Order after he rejoined the MSI is unclear. Although he formally broke with New Order, he was investigated in connection to the Piazza Fontana bombing, and maintained a close relationship with Graziani (Ferraresi 1996, 101, 53; Bale 2017). Graziani had previously been an Italian member of the fascist French Secret Armed Organization and FAR, and had published an essay in 1963 that argued that "devious and indirect means" were necessary to combat communism, and outlined the use of "propaganda, infiltration, subversion, and terrorism" to stop communism from taking hold (Ferraresi 1996, 69; Mammone 2015, 114).

New Order had a high degree of centralization in both its political and militant levels of organization (della Porta 2013, 158; Ferraresi 1996, 58). Its' political wing consisted of different "sectors," which dealt with "organization, propaganda, financial initiatives, high school scholars, university students, workers, parallel organizations, press relations, external affairs, activism, and ideology" (della Porta 2013, 158). The group published a journal titled *Ordine Nuovo* that outlined ideology and "symbolic codes" for members (Ferraresi 1996, 55). New Order also had provincial bases, run by "regents," and regional bases called "inspectories" (Ferraresi 1996, 53). Militant activity was structured through cells, which were made up of a few militants and only contacted other cells through leadership (della Porta 2013, 158). Membership in New Order was available at three levels: "sympathizers," "adherents," and "militants," only the last group conducted clandestine attacks (Bale 2017).

Italian police stated that New Order had approximately 600 members (della Porta 2013, 158; Bale 2017; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 591), but other accounts estimated ten thousand in the 1960s (Ferraresi 1996, 53; Mapping Militants Project 2012) and 2500 at the time of its 1973 dissolution (Pisano 1987, 52). Membership in New Order, like other neo-fascist groups at the time, was overwhelmingly male, and most members were natural-born Italians from the Northern cities and Rome (Weinberg and Eubank 1988, 538). Most members were young, and many were either students, employed in a business related field, or were a white-collar professional, and a sizable portion had police or military backgrounds (Weinberg and Eubank 1988, 539; Schmid and Jongman 1988). It is unclear how New Order funded itself; Italian investigations revealed that the group received "occasional gifts from supporters" (Ferraresi 1996, 63). The group may have had ties with business groups and various state entities that provided financial support (Ferraresi 1996, 63).

External Ties

New Order had well-established ties to other Italian far-right groups, and membership was often fluid between groups. Of course, New Order maintained a close relationship to MSI, even when the group operated autonomously (Ferraresi 1996, 53). In 1959, New Order members founded Avanguardia Nazionale (AN), which remained in close contact with New Order during its years of operation (Ferrerasi 1996, 63). New Order was in contact with militant groups including National Front, Mussolini Action Squads, Revolutionary Action Movement, and People' Struggle (Weinberg and Eubank 1988, 536). After its dissolution in 1973, many New Order members would create a Black Order (Ordine Nero).

New Order was a core node of the larger European fascist movement, and had relationships with a plethora of militant groups (Ferraresi 1996, 62). One of the tenants of European neo-fascist ideology post WWII was the idea of a "nation Europe"--a strong and autonomous Europe, unrestrained by democracy, that did not need NATO's (mainly the United States') protection (Ferraresi 1996, 59). This goal united New Order with other groups across Europe, including New European Order, a German-run collection of

far-right extremists who exchanged ideas and weapons; the French OAS; Jeune Europe, a Belgian group with branches across Europe and the US; Aginter Press, a Portuguese-based counterinsurgency group with the support of the Portuguese police and the CIA that was an frequent contact with Rauti (Ferraresi 1996, 59-63). Aginter Press may have been a front for the CIA (Ganser 2005, 120). The *Ordine Nuovo Europeo* journal had articles written in a variety of languages and was distributed across European nations to other neo-fascist groups (Mammone 2015, 72). New Order also had ties to a French group of the same name, "Ordre Nouveau" (Mammone 2008, 226). New Order, and the greater European neo-fascist network, had ties to the foreign secret service in several countries, including Spain, Greece, South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia (Mammone 2015, 72). Spanish dictator Francisco Franco provided several New Order members with asylum (Sguerri 2015, 27). Often, weapons used by Italian neo-fascist groups originated from places beyond Italy (Pisano 1984, 38).

An unsubstantiated link exists between the Italian state, the United States, and Italian far-right militant groups, including New Order. Starting in the 1990s, Italian lawmakers began to accuse the White House and the CIA of "inspiring a strategy of tension" in the 1960s and 70s (Willan 2000). The lawmakers also argued that the United States was aware of the plans for the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing, but failed to intervene or alert Italian authorities (Willan 2000). Italian officials also alleged that the U.S. embassy in Rome provided Rauti with "regular funding" (Willan 2000). NATO's secret stay-behind mission in Italy--led by the U.S.-- Operation Gladio, likely provided various support to Italian far-right groups, and New Order likely collaborated with the Italian Military Secret Service (Ganser 2005, 4).

The investigation into the Piazza Fontana bombing sheds some light on the possible links between the U.S, New Order, and the Italian state. Suspiciously, one of the bombs at Piazza Fontana did not explode with the others because its timer failed, but when the Italian police and secret service arrived at the site, "compromising evidence" was destroyed and the bomb went off, after it had been discovered (Ganser 2005, 119). After the attack, the Italian police placed the blame on left-wing extremists and arrested several known communists and anarchists, although a classified secret service report from four days after the attack alleged that the attacks had been conducted "by the political right with the support of the CIA" (Ganser 2005, 119; Ferraresi 1996, 91). One of the arrested leftists, Giuseppe Pinelli, mysteriously fell to his death from the third-floor window of the police station where he was being questioned, and the police claimed he committed suicide after his alibi fell apart, which created a scandal that helped to undermine public trust in the police (Ferraresi 1996, 91). During the 2001 trial for the Piazza Fontana bombing, the former leader of the Italian counter-intelligence agency alleged that the CIA and U.S. President Nixon had been involved in Italian right-wing terrorism to combat Italy's perceived shift towards communism (Ganser 2005, 120).

Group Outcome

The links between New Order and the Italian state may have helped to protect the far-right militants from prosecution (Ganser 2005, 5). For example, the thirty-six year long investigation into the Piazza Fontana bombing was seemingly made unnecessarily cumbersome by the Italian state. Immediately after the attack, investigations were taken over by Rome, and not conducted by the local magistrate, who had not been entirely sure of the communists and anarchists' guilt (Ferraresi 1996, 91). Police work aimed at proving the guilt of the anarchists was marked with irregularities, and the trial was moved from the progressive city of Milan to the small city of Catanzaro, which was ill-equipped for a trial of such large size (Ferraresi 1996, 94). The investigation into the possibility that the attack had been conducted by right-wing groups, including New Order, was initially discredited, and evidence from the attack was withheld from magistrates for years (Ferraresi 1996, 98). For all of their blunders, no police officers were disciplined or investigated by the state (Ferraresi 1996, 99). In the 1980s, the right-wing conspirators were acquitted for their role in the Piazza Fontana bombing, but arrested for their role in other attacks (La Stampa 1981). In total, eight trials were held between the year of the attack and 2005; no group of individuals were ever found guilty of planting the bombs (Foot 2009, 183). However, Ordine Nuovo and associated individuals were accused by the Italian state of carrying out the attack, and many believe that the bombing was the work of neofascist militants (Bull and Cooke 2013, xii; Foot 2009, 183).

In November of 1973, after an attempted attack on the Rome-Turin rail line in April of the same year, New Order was banned by the government for violation of the Scelba law, which forbade the "reconstitution of the fascist party" (Hoffman 1982, 3; Bale 2017; Schmid and Jongman 1988). After the group was banned, many members broke off and reorganized a new group known as Ordine Nero (Black Order) (Hoffman 1982, 3; Drake 1984, 294). Ordine Nero maintained many of the same contacts and goals as its predecessor.

Notes for Iris:

-lots of overlap between members of MSI and New Order; splinters from MSI and then part of it is reabsorbed

-Evolva seems like a unique personality in the far-right movements here.

-American support for anti-communist groups

-Note: Attacks that have been attributed to New Order that occurred past 1973 are not listed, as we consider the reorganization in 1973 to constitute the formation of a new group

-New Order and Black Order differences: political environment differences, not all members join Black Order, Black Order members are slightly less political than New Order, New Order wanted more regime change, and Black Order wanted to create more chaos (less organized), Black Order leadership was slightly different than New Order (younger?)

XIII. NEW ARMENIAN RESISTANCE

Torg ID: 327

Min. Group Date: 1977

Max. Group Date: 1983

Onset: NA

Aliases: New Armenian Resistance (Nar), New Armenian Resistance

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No Proposed Changes

Group Formation: 1977 (MIPT Knowledge Base 2008)

Group End: 1983 (Either disbanded or combined with ASALA) (MIPT Knowledge Base 2008; GTD 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group first formed but the first violent incident of the NAR was in 1977 when they bombed a Turkish tourism office in Paris (MIPT Knowledge Base 2008). This was followed with more attacks on Turkish banks and counters within Brussels, London, and Rome (MIPT Knowledge Base 2008). This group is allegedly a faction of ASALA within Europe and, in relation to that, is also hypothesized to be communist leaning as well (MIPT Knowledge Base 2008). Its goals and aims were to seek justice and retribution at Turkey for the Armenian genocide and to fight for the establishment of an independent Armenian state. They specifically targeted these Turkish foreign offices as they believed the diplomats deserved to be attacked as well (Armenian Reporter

International 1967-1988). It also targeted foreign travel agencies (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 676). This group's ideology is ethno-nationalist because they promote the rights of Armenians (MIPT Knowledge Base 2008).

Geography

This group is known and responsible for bombing travel agencies within Belgium, France, Italy, and Switzerland (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 676). The group aimed specifically for Soviet, British, and Israeli travel agencies (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 676). There is no reliable source on the group's bases.

Organizational Structure

There is no known leader of the NAR nor any information on its group structure, funding, or size. Although not explicitly stated, the ethnic group is most likely comprised of Armenians (MIPT Knowledge Base 2008).

External Ties

The only information on external ties is that this group is alleged to be a faction of ASALA within Europe (MIPT Knowledge Base 2008).

Group Outcome

There is no known counterterrorism efforts by the state. The last known violent attack was in 1983 when they bombed a Turkish airlines office within Brussels (MIPT Knowledge Base 2008). It either combined with ASALA (MIPT Knowledge Base 2008) or became inactive after an ASALA power struggle (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 676). As of 2012 the group's status is assumed to be inactive.

XIV. RED GUERRILLA
Torg ID: 401
Min. Group Date: 1977
Max. Group Date: 1979
Onset: NA

Aliases: Red Guerrilla, Red Guerrilla - Italy

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Search ProQuest
 - Red guerrilla spain 1978
 - "Red guerrilla" spain 1978

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: n/a

Group Formation: 1977

Group End: 1979 (never took responsibility for another attack)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown precisely when the group formed, but the group's first attack occurred in 1977 (GTD 2017). The group mostly targeted the cars of French tourists in cities north of Barcelona (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 663). The group later demanded the release of a militant Basque imprisoned in France during its attacks in 1979 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 663).

Geography

All of their attacks in 1977 occurred in Spain (GTD 2017). The group also conducted an attack in 1979 in Barcelona, Spain (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 663). The group also had an attack in Italy so may have been transnational (GTD 2017)

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the group's organizational structure.

External Ties

The group might have ties to the Bereziak wing of ETA (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 663). No information could be found about the group's external ties.

Group Outcome

The group disappeared in mid-1977, not reemerging until nearly two years later in Milan, where it had its final attack (GTD 2017). The group also had attacks in 1979 in Spain (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 663).

Notes for Iris:

-alias for ETA? The only thing that raises doubt is the transnational nature of the group

XV. PRIMA LINEA
Torg ID: 9084
Min. Group Date: 1976
Max. Group Date: 1981
Onset: NA

Aliases: Front Line

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: PL, Front Line, Communist Combatant Nuclei, Combatant Workers' Teams, Communist Fighting Committees, Ronde Proletarian Vintages, Tiburtino Proletarian Patrols, Collective Students Workers of the Castelli Romani, Fighting Units for the Counterpower of the Territory, Combat Communist Departments, Proletarian Units for the Communist Liberation Army, Organized Proletarians for Communism, Communist Combat Brigades, Armed Struggle for Communism

Group Formation: 1976 (merger)

Group End: 1981 (last attack) 1983 (officially announced dissolution due to internal fragmentation)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In the fall of 1976, extremists from several Italian leftist organizations, including Lotta Continua, Potere Operaio, Communist Brigades, Revolutionary Communist Committees, Combatant Communist Units, and Communist Committees for Workers' Power, joined together to form Prima Linea (PL) (Pisano 1987, 46; Agasso 2013, 18). PL described itself as an "aggregation of various guerilla units that until now acted using individual acronyms" that aimed to facilitate a communist overthrow of the Italian government (Pisano 1987, 46). PL aimed to create stronger ties between the working classes and the group's members by having members keep "normal" lives for as long as possible, and did not have many members living in hiding, unlike the Red Brigades (del Vecchio 2018). Unlike the Red Brigades, however, PL was not strictly a militant Marxist-Leninist revolutionary group, and was also dedicated to political action (Pisano 1984, 11).

The first violent attack claimed by PL was a raid on the Fiat headquarters in Turin in November of 1976 (GTD 2019; Gnosis 2005). This attack, and PL's other operations, occurred towards the last half of Italy's "Years of Lead," which had been characterized by high rates of left and right wing violence (Tarantelli 2010, 544). The student and labor protest movements of the late 1960s had bled into the early 1970s, and were exacerbated by declining economic conditions for workers and a change in the political landscape (del Vecchio 2018). After Italy's 1976 general election, in which the Communist Party gained significantly, a power-sharing agreement between the Communists and the Christian Democrats was adopted, which left many left-wing radicals frustrated (del Vecchio 2018). For these radicals, the Communist Party had compromised too much in order to gain power, and several leftist organizations, including Prima Linea, emerged advocating violence to achieve a communist takeover of the Italian state.

Geography

PL was active in the northern Italian cities of Milan, Florence, Naples, and Turin (Gnosis 2005; Agasso 2013, 18). The group also carried out attacks in Rome (GTD 2019). There is no evidence the group was transnational or had an external base.

Organizational Structure

PL was one of the largest leftist militant groups in Italy in the 1970s and 80s, second only to the Red Brigades (Pisano 1987, 46). Unlike the Red Brigades, however, PL was not strictly a militant Marxist-Leninist revolutionary group, and was also dedicated to political action (Pisano 1984, 11). PL was headed by central political and territorial structures (Pisano 1984, 11). The political structure operated non-clandestinely and was composed of several groups that handled intelligence collection, recruitment, communication, and logistics (Pisano 1984, 11). The territorial structure operated illegally, and was composed of multiple fire groups, each with squads and patrols. (Pisano 1984, 11). Fire groups oversaw squads, which usually operated under unique names and had their own internal structure (Pisano 1984, 11). Patrols were similar to

squads, but were usually less violent and aimed to intimidate rather than harm targets (Pisano 1984, 11). The group funded itself mainly through robberies and theft (Pisano 1984, 14; Mapping Militants 2012).

PL had approximately three thousand individuals associated with its actions, at an unknown time, and 923 PL members were arrested at various points (Janke 1992, 136; Micca Corta). In 1976, PL had 20 militant members and approximately 1,500-2,000 “potential supporters” (Mapping Militants Project 2012). In 1979, PL had 2,500 associated individuals, including those in “satellite groups” (Mapping Militants 2012). By 1983, PL had 100 members, although it is unclear if these individuals were supporters or involved militants (Mapping Militants 2012).

Central to PL’s goal was the “semi-clandestinity” of its members (del Vecchio 2018). Unlike the Red Brigades, where many members lived in hiding, the PL aimed to keep members living their “normal” lives for as long as possible, so PL actions were in line with the desires of the working class (del Vecchio 2018). PL did not aim to be the “vanguard” of the communist party, but rather “represent the vanguard component in immediate contact with the masses,” and its operations were less coordinated and systematic than those of the Red Brigades (Gnosis 2005).

Notable PL leaders included Marco Donat-Cattin, Sergio Segio, and Roberto Sandalo (Clark 2018, 65; Agasso 2013, 20). Donat-Cattin was the son of prominent anti-communist Christian Democrat leader Carlo Donat-Cattin, who protected Marco from the police and helped him escape to exile in France (Drake 2021, 111; Clark 2018, 64). After Donat-Cattin escaped to France, Segio took over PL’s leadership until he and other leaders including Sandalo were arrested (Mapping Militants 2012; Clark 2018, 65).

External Ties

PL had ties to other Italian left-wing groups, including the Red Brigades, Autonomia Operaia, the Communist Combat Formations (which may have been an alias for PL), Lotta Continua, Potere Operaio (Clark 2018, 109; Pisano 1987, 46) PL’s structure meant that squads and patrols associated with the PL may have conducted attacks under different names, including: Communist Combatant Nuclei, “Combatant Workers’ Teams, Communist Fighting Committees, Ronde Proletarian Vintages, Tiburtino Proletarian Patrols, Collective Students Workers of the Castelli Romani, Fighting Units for the Counterpower of the Territory, Combat Communist Departments, Proletarian Units for the Communist Liberation Army, Organized Proletarians for Communism, Communist Combat Brigades, and Armed Struggle for Communism” (Micca Corta; Pisano 1984, 11).

PL also had ties to French leftist groups, including Action Directe (Drake 2021, 109). A French leftist collective called the International Center of Popular Culture also maintained ties with PL, and may have facilitated contact between PL and other French and European leftist militant groups (Gnosis 2005; Pisano 1984, 24). When PL leader Donat-Cattin was extradited from France to Italy, he was found in the company of Gloria

Cesari Grunbaum, who may have been facilitating talks between Italian militants located in Italy and France (Pisano 1984, 24).

PL also may have had ties to the ETA. In the summer of 1978, members of Prima Linea attended a military training camp in the Basque region led by the ETA, where weapons were distributed (Agasso 2013, 112).

Group Outcome

Beginning in 1978, the Italian police began to increase their arrests of PL members, and in 1979, PL assassinated a judge named Emilio Alessandri (Drake 2021, 111). Unlike most targets of the PL, Alessandri was progressive; he had been the first to investigate the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing as a neo-Fascist act of terror instead of anarchism, and had reformist positions (del Vecchio 2018; Agasso 2013, 23). The PL targeted Alessandri for reasons that remain unclear, but in doing so, PL had helped fascist groups evade prosecution (Agasso 2013, 23). This act caused deep divisions within PL, and by autumn of the same year, some of PL's leaders proposed a retreat from the armed struggle (Drake 2021, 111). PL began to internally fall apart, and over the next two years, the Italian police arrested many PL members and leaders, effectively ending the group's operations (Clark 2018, 65; Drake 2021, 111).

PL carried out its last violent attack in 1981, when the group assassinated Eleno Viscardi, a police officer on an anti-terrorist squad in Milan (GTD 2019). During their trial in April of 1983, several PL leaders announced that the group had officially dissolved (Pisano 1986, 7; Pisano 1987, 46). Many of the remaining groups affiliated with PL were absorbed by the Red Brigades (Pisano 1987, 46).

The Organized Comrades for Proletaria Liberation (COLP) was founded by PL members Segio and Susanna Ronconi in 1980 (possibly under a different name), with the goal of freeing prison inmates (Pisano 1987, 46). Seven former members of PL, under the name of COLP, were involved in a shootout with the police in Siena in 1982. The incident resulted in the death of two police officers and one militant (Mapping Militants 2012). By 1983, COLP had emerged as the de facto successor to PL, and aimed to organize the group and develop "new social guerilla models" (Pisano 1987, 46).

Notes for Iris:

- the group would claim attacks under lots of different names
- this is similar phenomenon to group in Kashmir which claims responsibility under lots of different names
- group disagreed with the BR approach to operating in clandestine cells and secrecy. PL thought by operating more openly they would be able to gain more supporters.
- there may be an interesting relationship between the merger nature and the openness tactic work. Openness might have actually been fairly effective given that it was the second largest group in Italy

-cause of schism? They assassinate a very progressive judge (for reasons that remain unclear), but this provokes a backlash within the group. This marks the beginning of the end for the group. This coupled with increased arrests causes the group to fall apart.

Italy Cases Part 4, 1977-1986 Last Updated: 4 March 2021

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T1627	ARMED REVOLUTIONARY NUCLEI (NAR)		1978	1988
T292	ARAB ORGANIZATION OF MAY 15		1979	1984
T2039	ITALIANS ATTACKING POLICIES OF THE REGIONAL SVP		1980	1980
T1041	COMMUNIST GROUP OF PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM		1981	1981
T1489	BLACK LEBANON		1982	1982
T787	NEW RED BRIGADES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE FIGHTING COMMUNIST PARTY		1983	2003
T14	AL-BORKAN		1984	1984
T218	INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST GROUP		1984	1984
T1004	ARMED COMMUNIST FRONT		1986	1986
T578	RED BRIGADES FIGHTING COMMUNIST UNION (BR-UCC)		1986	2002

I. ARMED REVOLUTIONARY NUCLEI (NAR)

Torg ID: 1627

Min. Group Date: 1978

Max. Group Date: 1988

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NAR, Nuclei Armati Revoluzionari, Black Autonomy, Popular Revolutionary Movement

Group Formation: 1977

Group End: unclear; likely ended in 1982 when leaders were arrested (Pisano; Ferraresi), but may have conducted attacks until 1988 (Mapping Militants 2012; GTD 2019)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR) was likely founded in 1977 in Rome by a group of students affiliated with the MSI section "Monteverde" (della Porta 2013, 87). The group carried out its first violent attack in December of the same year, wounding Massimo Di Pilla, a leftist student in Rome (Pisano 1984, 83). Other accounts list 1979 as the group's official founding, when individual fascist "activists" with a history of committing acts violence began to meet at University Front of National Action's (FAUN; a student organization affiliated with MSI) branch in Rome (Ferraresi 1996, 163). NAR formed during the second half of Italy's Years of Lead, a period in which the country saw high levels of right and left wing violence (need source).

NAR was part of the wave of fascist groups that emerged during the second half of the 1970s that also included Costruiamo L'Azione and Third Position (Terza Posizione) (Weinberg and Eubank, 1988, 539). These groups were generally less centralized, more 'spontaneous,' and less ideological than their predecessors, and operated during the more violent part of the decade (della Porta 2013, 159-160). The fascist groups of the early 1970s had focused on overthrowing Italy's democratic regime and reinstating a fascist one, and had generally admired the idea of the state; the groups of the later years saw the Italian state "as a hopelessly corrupt institution" that could only be destroyed, and carried out attacks against law enforcement and state personnel (Weinberg and Eubank 1988, 537).

NAR's goals and ideology were particularly ambiguous. Like members of other right-wing militant groups, members of NAR had a fascination with historical and mythical instances of political violence and heroism, and NAR had a particular fixation on the celebration of members of radical right groups who had died "heros" (Weinberg and Eubank 1988, 537; della Porta 2013, 258). Schmid and Jongman (1988) describe it as neo-fascist. NAR was a radical right group, and emerged from student groups

associated with the Italian Social Movement (MSI), Italy's leading neofascist party at the time (della Porta 2013, 131). NAR may have also been an offshoot of contemporary fascist groups Ordine Nero or Terza Posizione (Hoffman 1982, 4). However, MSI leaders separated themselves from NAR, and decried the groups talk of "authoritarianism and free love, alienation of labour and ecology, even of women's liberation," and labelling their "spontaneity" to be "stupid and dangerous" (della Porta 2013, 131). Members of NAR were more concerned with partaking in violent activities, including street fighting, than any ideological components to that violence (Ferraresi 1996, 164-165). NAR was loosely guided by the idea of "spontaneismo," in which militants would commit escalating violent acts, which would highlight the presence and "power" of right wing groups to attract members, while simultaneously confusing the police with the volume and nature of the attacks (Ferraresi 1996, 165). The only ideological texts NAR produced during its active years were their statements claiming credit for their attacks (Ferraresi 1996, 164).

Geography

NAR was founded in the central Italian city of Rome, and most of its violent activities occurred there as well (della Porta 2013, 87; GTD 2019). NAR also carried out attacks in the northern Italian cities of Bologna, Turin, and Milan (GTD 2019).

Organizational Structure

NAR was founded by a group of students associated with MSI's student groups in Rome (della Porta 2013, 87). These individuals were described by prosecutors as "street fighters and in some cases robbers" who all had "an extraordinary propensity for violence" (Ferraresi 1996, 163). Leaders included brothers Giuseppe (Giusva) and Cristiano Fioravanti, Francesca Mambro, and Gilberto Cavallini (Ferraresi 1996, 179; Bull 2012, 145; Mapping Militants Projects 2012). Giuseppe Fioravanti had been a popular child actor, and became involved in the MSI youth groups and street violence against left-wing militants in the early 1970s (Raso 2021). Mambro had also been involved in right-wing violence and the MSI youth group FAUN (Raso 2021). She led the group's "women nucleus" that committed a series of robberies and arsons, and is credited with giving the organization its name (Mapping Militants Project 2012; Ferraresi 1996, 167). Fioravanti and Mambro married in 1985 (la Repubblica 1985). Cristiano Fioravanti became a police informant in 1981 (Mapping Militants Project 2012).

NAR did not have hierarchical structure, and members were free to choose what actions to partake in (Pisano 1987, 53; Ferraresi 1996, 165). Leaders asserted that the acronym NAR did not represent a single group, but could be used by any violent fascist group that had an "antisystem revolutionary" goals (Ferraresi 1996, 166; della Porta 2013, 160). Multiple groups may have used the acronym when claiming responsibility for violent acts (Pisano 1987, 53). NAR trained members by having them commit small crimes, which also served as a public rejection of the "bourgeois state" (Pisano 1987, 53).

Like many other militant groups at the time, NAR financed itself through armed robberies and thefts (Pisano 1987, 53; Mapping Militants 2012). The group also had ties to organized crime, and likely profited from money laundering and the creation of false documents (Pisano 1987, 54). Most of NAR's members were Italian-born men from the large cities, who were either students, or were employed in the business and white-collar sectors (Weinberg and Eubank 1988, 540). However, NAR's membership was younger, more Roman, and included more women than the membership of earlier fascist groups (Weinberg and Eubank 1988, 540).

NAR was loosely guided by the idea of "spontaneismo," in which militants would commit escalating violent acts, which would highlight the presence and "power" of right wing groups to attract members, while simultaneously confusing the police with the volume and nature of the attacks (Ferraresi 1996, 165).

External Ties

Due to its founding, NAR had ties with the MSI and its associated student organizations (Ferraresi 1996, 163). Although the party officially distanced itself from the violent group, MSI used the violence that NAR and other groups supplied to supplement their political messages (della Porta 2013, 131; Ferraresi 1996, 166). For example, on the anniversary of the killing of four MSI members by militant leftist groups, two MSI leaders planned a violent attack against local Christian Democratic offices, and relied on the young members of NAR and other groups to carry out the attack, loot shops, and destroy public transportation (Ferraresi 1996, 166). NAR likely had ties to other militant right-wing groups, and may have been a splinter of Terza Posizione or Ordine Nero (Hoffman 1982, 4).

Three members of NAR participated in training and anti-Palestinian activities at Christian Phalangist camps in Lebanon (Karmon 2005, 207). NAR also had ties with organized crime rings in Italy, and worked with them to store and acquire weapons and other goods (Pisano 1987, 53).

Group Outcome

In the 1980s, members of various fascist groups became increasingly suspicious of each other, and Fioravanti and other NAR leaders began to "purify" the movement (Ferraresi 1996, 183). NAR targeted Francesco Mangiameli, the leader of Terza Posizione, who Giuseppe Fioravanti believed had promised young recruits a role in a violent revolution, failed to deliver one, and then exploited their skills for his own gain and left members to face the police and left-wing groups alone (Ferraresi 1996, 183). In 1980, in a "hallucinated collective death ritual," Giuseppe and Cristiano Fioravanti murdered Mangiameli (Ferraresi 1996, 183). Murders like these claimed the life of approximately a dozen right-wing militants in the early 1980s (Ferraresi 1996, 183). In 1981, Cristiano Fioravanti was arrested and became an informant, which accelerated the police investigation into NAR's activities (Ferraresi 1996, 184). Members of NAR,

including the Fioravanti brothers, Mambro, and Cavallini were being investigated for their role in the 1980 Bologna train massacre, Italy's deadliest terror attack (Langford 1985, I-20; Hanley 1997). In 1981, Giuseppe Fioravanti was arrested. Two other leaders, Mambro and Cavallini, were arrested in 1982 (Ferraresi 1996, 184).

NAR carried out its last attack in October of 1982, when it bombed a bank in Rome (Pisano 1987, 84; GTD 2019). However, starting in 1985, NAR may have committed more attacks, including an arson attack at a movie theatre, the murder of a police officer, and a bombing at police headquarters (Pisano 1985, 14; Schmid and Jongman 1988; GTD 2019). However, it is unclear if NAR was a part of these attacks, or if it carried them out with other groups given that its leadership had been jailed 3 years earlier. Various left-wing militant groups, including the Red Brigades and the Anti-Fascist Territorial Groups also claimed credit for these attacks (Pisano 1985, 14).

Notes for Iris:

- Kushner says this is an alias for New Order. NAR targeted a judge. The judge suspected the group splintered off of Third Position or New Order. Other research (here) says the group was a splinter from the MSI.
- FAUN is distinct from Monteverde. FAUN is affiliated with MSI. MSI' youth wings were not called Monteverde
- this group's origins are conflicting. Della Porta and Ferraso seem to suggest students splinter from MSI
- spontaneismo was odd and highly unorganized. Members became paranoid and started turning on each other (any precedent with left-wing groups doing this?)
- goal of spontaneismo was principally to create chaos?
- really unusual transnational network ties. Link to Christian camps in Lebanon. Unclear if linked to specific group, but also in early stages of Lebanon Civil War
- group outcome is a little unclear. Attack in 82 followed by disappearance then attack in 85 followed by disappearance then final potential attack in 1988. It's unclear if group in 85 is actually the original NAR because the group encouraged people to take on the group's name to keep it alive. Most confident estimates are around 1982

II. ARAB ORGANIZATION OF MAY 15

Torg ID: 292

Min. Group Date: 1979

Max. Group Date: 1984

Onset: NA

Aliases: MAY 15 ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, ARAB ORGANIZATION OF MAY 15

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1979

Group End (Outcome): “mid-1980s”/1984 (GTD)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

15 May Organization was formed in 1979 as a splinter of the PFLP Special Operations Group (FAS 1998). It is unknown what its goals are although the PFLP supported the destruction of Israel and the creation of a separate Palestinian state (BBC 2014).

Geography

The group was active in London, Rome, Istanbul, Athens, Vienna, Rio de Janeiro, Honolulu, and Aleppo (FAS 1998; GTD 2017). It had a base of operations in Baghdad (FAS 1998).

Organizational Structure

The group was led by Muhammed al-Umari who was a known bomb expert in the Palestinian Territories. The group had approximately 50-60 members in the early 1980s. Its members were Palestinian, but there is not much evidence about the organizational structure of the group beyond that (FAS 1998).

External Ties

The group allegedly received financial support and training from Iraq until 1984 (FAS 1998). It was never affiliated with the PLO (Global Security n.d.)

Group Outcome

The group fell apart in the mid-1980s after the defection of several members to Colonel Hawari's Special Operations Group of Fatah (FAS 1998).

III. ITALIANS ATTACKING POLICIES OF THE REGIONAL SVP

Torg ID: 2039

Min. Group Date: 1980

Max. Group Date: 1980

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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https://www.google.com/books/edition/Minority_Rules/Av-KBAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1980

Group End: 1980 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unclear when Italians Attacking Policies of the Regional SVP formed, but the group may have been responsible for the bombing of a car registered in West Germany in December of 1980 (GTD 2020).

The group's purported target -- the South Tyrolean People's Party (SVP) -- was an ethnonationalist political party that drew support from the South Tyrol region's German-speaking natives (Lublin 2014, 229). The group may have opposed the SVP's ethnonationalist parties, but it is unclear.

Geography

Italians Attacking Policies of the Regional SVP carried out its sole suspected attack in the German-speaking autonomous Italian region of South Tyrol (GTD 2020).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the organizational structure of Italians Attacking Policies of the Regional SVP.

External Ties

No information could be found about any external ties Italians Attacking Policies of the Regional SVP may have had.

Group Outcome

Italians Attacking Policies of the Regional SVP's sole suspected attack was the car bombing in 1980 (GTD 2020). It is unclear why the group only carried out one attack, and why they stopped using violence.

IV. COMMUNIST GROUP OF PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM

Torg ID: 1041

Min. Group Date: 1981

Max. Group Date: 1981

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1981

Group End: 1981

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the Communist Groups for Proletarian Internationalism formed, but it first came to attention in 1981. The Communist Groups for Proletarian Internationalism was a leftist group that carried out an attack against American business offices and three Latin American embassies, Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala, in Rome over a two-day period in October of 1981 (GTD 2019; Chicago Tribune 1981).

Geography

All of the Communist Groups for Proletarian Internationalism's attacks occurred in Rome (GTD 2019; Chicago Tribune 1981). Some of the attacks targeted American business (Chicago Tribune 1981; Boston Globe 1981; GTD 2019). Other bombs exploded at an Argentine government office, and at the Chilean and Guatemalan embassies to the Vatican (GTD 2019; New York Times 1981).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found regarding this group's organizational structure.

External Ties

No information could be found regarding any external ties this group may have had.

Group Outcome

The attacks in October 1981 were Communist Groups for Proletarian Internationalism's only known attacks (GTD 2019; New York Times 1981).

Notes for Iris:

-one hit wonder

-unclear context based on targeting (very diverse)

-North South Summit going on at the time in Mexico (Reagan attended) but unclear why Italy or Italian-based groups would be evolved

- V. BLACK LEBANON
Torg ID: 1489
Min. Group Date: 1982
Max. Group Date: 1982
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Zwart Libanon, Abu Nidal Organization, Black September, Black June

Group Formation: 1982

Group End: 1982

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Black Lebanon is a Palestinian nationalist group that conducted one confirmed and one suspected attack in front of synagogues across Europe in 1982 (GTD 2019; Christian Science Monitor 1982). It is unknown when the group formed. The group's suspected first appearance was a machine-gun attack in front of a synagogue in Brussels on September 18, 1982 (GTD 2019; Washington Post 1982). On October 9, 1982, the group may have conducted a similar attack at a synagogue in Rome (Christian Science Monitor 1982; Globe and Mail 1982). The group was likely affiliated with a violent dissident faction to the PLO headed by Abu Nidal, whose specific ideologies are unclear (Christian Science Monitor 1982).

Geography

The group conducted attacks throughout Europe, but nothing is known about its specific geographical location. Its possible ties to Abu Nidal could also place it in external bases in Palestine, Lebanon, or Syria (Christian Science Monitor 1982).

Organizational Structure

Nothing is known about the group's organizational structure or membership. The group's suspected leader, Abu Nidal, was a former representative of the PLO to Baghdad, who was sentenced to death by the leader of the PLO on criminal charges of murder, embezzlement, and armed sedition. (Christian Science Monitor 1982). He formed his own Palestinian faction in opposition to the PLO and is suspected to be responsible for

numerous violent attacks against Jewish institutions and the PLO (Christian Science Monitor 1982). Nothing is known about the group's funding.

External Ties

Nothing is known about the group's external relationships. Abu Nidal has been given diplomatic protection by Syria and Iraq alternately (Christian Science Monitor 1982). The group is possibly tied to the other Palestinian nationalist groups under Abu Nidal such as Black June and Black September (Globe and Mail 1982; ICT 2003).

Group Outcome

Nothing is known about the state's investigation response to the attacks. The PLO condemned both attacks (Washington Post 1982; Globe and Mail 1982; Christian Science Monitor 1982). The group has not conducted an attack since 1982 (GTD 2019). It is unknown why the group stopped using violence.

Notes for Iris:

- is this an independent organization or the Abu Nidal Organization? ICT claims the group are synonymous which would make it the same
- there seems to much clearer evidence this group is a subsidiary of ANO and not an independent organization

VI. NEW RED BRIGADES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE FIGHTING COMMUNIST PARTY
Torg ID: 787
Min. Group Date: 1983
Max. Group Date: 2003
Onset: NA

Aliases: Red Brigades Fighting Communist Party (Br-Pcc), Brigade Rosse/Partito Comunista Combattente (Br/Pcc), New Red Brigades For The Construction Of The Fighting Communist Party, New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Red Brigades Communist Combatant Party, Red Brigades-PCC, The New Red Brigade, BR/PCC, Red Brigades Fighting Communist Party

Group Formation: unclear; likely early 1980s

Group End: 2003 (police actions effectively dismantled the group)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The origins of the Red Brigades Communist Combatant Party (Red Brigades-PCC) are unclear. Some sources list 1984 as the year of the group's founding (CDI 2005; Sundquist 2010, 61; MIPT 2008; Gnosis 2005), while others list 1981 (Re 2020, 285), before 1981 (Pisano 1987, 45), and the early 1990s (Irrera 2014, 20). The year of the group's first violent attack is also unclear. It is unclear when the Red Brigades-PCC carried out their first attack, although it may have been the 1981 kidnapping of Dozier (). Several sources list the 1999 assassination of Italian Ministry of Labour consultant Massimo D'Antona as the Red Brigade-PCC's first known attack (Irrera 2014, 20; Sundquist 2010, 62; Sullivan 2011, 502; CDI 2005; FAS 1993), but other sources list the 1981 kidnapping of NATO commander James Lee Dozier (Re 2020, 286), or the 1983 assassination of law professor Gino Girigni (GTD 2019; Pisano 1985, 2).

The group's exact relationship with the original Red Brigades group is also unclear. The Red Brigades-PCC was likely a splinter group of the original Red Brigades, but the group may have existed as the "militarist faction" of, or a party within, the Red Brigades (Pisano 1985, 2; Re 2020 285). In 1980, a "resolution on strategic direction" put out by the Red Brigades described the creation of the Communist Combatant Party, which was intended to serve as a transitory body through which the group's aims would shift from armed

struggle towards “anti-imperialism civil war” (Re 2020, 285). In 1977, Red Brigades leader Mario Moretti expressed a desire to set up a Communist Combatant Party, which would “guide the working class to the next political level,” after declaring that the “working class advanced guard was effectively in place” (Sundquist 2020, 59).

While there is no consensus as to the exact year the Red Brigades-PCC was founded, the group began its operations after the decline of the original Red Brigades. After the prominent 1978 kidnapping of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro, the Red Brigades began to alienate supporters, and the police became increasingly successful at weakening the group by arresting members (Langford 1985, I-12; Sundquist 2010, 61). By the early 1980s, the frequency and intensity of the Red Brigades’ attacks started to decline, and in 1981 Moretti, who had led the Red Brigades through their most violent years, was arrested (Re 2020, 285; Pisano 1987, 45). The group likely splintered at this point, into the Red Brigades-Walter Alasia column, the Red Brigades-Guerilla Party, and the Red Brigades-PCC, which maintained much of the same ideology and goals as its predecessor (Re 2020, 285).

Like the original Red Brigades, the Red Brigades-PCC was a violent Marxist-Leninist group that aimed to overthrow the Italian government and replace it with a communist regime (Re 2020, 285; CDI 2005; Irrera 2014, 20). The Red Brigades-PCC was likely more ideologically “militarist” than its predecessor, and was focused on the “destruction of democracy and the creation of a new society through armed militant action” (Pisano 1987, 45; Sundquist 2020, 61). The group mainly carried out assassinations and bombings to generate chaos to “demonstrate a lack of security by the government” (Sundquist 2010, 62). It appears that the Red Brigades-PCC was especially concerned with imperialism, Italian foreign policy, and NATO, and may have considered the Italian government a puppet state for other western powers--namely, the United States (Sundquist 2020, 61; CDI 2005). The group expressed interest in forming alliances with “anti-imperialist and revolutionary forces” in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and elsewhere in Europe, and published a statement in 2002 in support of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States (CDI 2005).

Geography

The Red Brigades-PCC carried out most of its attacks in the central Italian city of Rome (GTD 2019). Most of the Red Brigades-PCC support bases were the columns of the Red Brigades in central and northern Italy (Gnosis 2005). The group was not transnational nor did it have an external base.

Organizational Structure

Mario Moretti had been the leader of the Red Brigades during the groups’ most violent years, and had orchestrated the kidnapping and murder of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro (Sundquist 2010, 59). Moretti had advocated for increasingly violent Red Brigade actions, so when the Red Brigades began to splinter in the early 1980s, he

assumed leadership of the Red Brigades-PCC, which was the most “militarist” of the new splinter groups (Re 2020, 285). Although he was arrested in 1981, Moretti likely led the Red Brigades-PCC from prison (Mapping Militants Project 2012).

Other leaders included Barbara Balzerani and Antonio Savasta (Corriere della Sera 2006; Mapping Militants Project 2012; Kamm 1982). Balzerani had been a member of the executive leadership of the Red Brigades in the 1970s, and assumed leadership of Moretti’s faction of the Red Brigades, which may have been considered the Red Brigades-PCC, after Moretti’s arrest. Balzerani and Moretti had had a personal relationship with each other for several years before 1985 (Associated Press 1985). Both Balzerani and Savasta helped orchestrate the 1981 kidnapping of NATO general James Dozier (Corriere della Sera 2006; Kamm 1982). Balzerani was arrested in connection with the kidnapping in 1985, and Savasta in 1982 (Corriere della Sera 2006; Boston Globe 1982). In the 1990s and early 2000s, leaders of the Red Brigades-PCC included Nadia Desdemona Lioce, Mario Galesi, Roberto Morandi, and Cinzia Banelli (Irrera 2014, 20; Sundquist 2010, 62; CDI 2005).

The Red Brigades-PCC was likely organized similarly to the Red Brigades of the 1970s, with columns, brigades, and cells (Irrera 2014, 20). The Red Brigades-PCC primarily funded itself through armed robberies (CDI 2005).

In the 1990s, the Red Brigades-PCC likely had around 50 members, which was reduced to less than 20 after the Italian government arrested key leaders and members of the group in 2003 (CDI 2005). Mapping Militants (2012) notes the group had 93 members at an unknown date. The Red Brigades-PCC likely had higher membership levels in the 1980s, but these fell once police began to arrest members (Sundquist 2010, 61). As the closest ideological successor to the Red Brigades of the 1970s, the Red Brigades-PCC’s recruits were likely similar to those of the original group, meaning students or youth with no criminal history (Pisano 1987, 45).

External Ties

The Red Brigades in the 1970s had a loose alliance with left-wing groups aimed at attacking Western democracies and destabilizing NATO (Gnosis 2005). Moretti was the Red Brigades’ sole contact with the French-based left-wing collective alliance, and when he was arrested, the group’s involvement with others was interrupted (Gnosis 2005). While other splinters of the Red Brigades were able to maintain contact with other groups across Europe, it appears that the Red Brigades-PCC was not as successful in maintaining and establishing international connections (Gnosis 2005). Groups that had been affiliated with the original Red Brigades met with other European left-wing militant groups in the mid-1980s, but it is unclear if the Red Brigades-PCC was one of those groups (Pisano 1985, 25).

The Red Brigades of the 1970s had ties to other groups, including the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque separatist group ETA, the German Red Army Faction (RAF),

and the French Armed Nuclei for Popular Autonomy (NAPAP) (Gnosis 2005). The Red Brigades also had connections with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which provided the Red Brigades with weapons and access to training camps in Lebanon in exchange for access to Italian storage facilities for arms and attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets (Pisano 1985, 22; Gnosis 2005).

The Red Brigades-PCC possessed weapons from the PLO, but it is unclear if the Red Brigades-PCC obtained the weapons when it was a separate group (CDI 2005).

Despite carrying out all known attacks within Italy, and a possible lack of ties with other European groups, the Red Brigades-PCC was especially concerned with targeting NATO and Western democratic alliance (Pisano 1985, 24). Most published documents by the Red Brigades after 1983—which was likely the Red Brigades-PCC—mentioned NATO, imperialism, or the Middle East (Pisano 1985, 25). After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, the Red Brigades-PCC published a document expressing support for the attacks, which placed the group on the U.S. 2002 and 2003 terrorist watch lists (Sundquist 2010, 61).

The Red Brigades-PCC had ties to other left-wing groups within Italy, including the Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei and the Nuclei of the Proletarian Revolution (CDI 2005).

Group Outcome

It is unclear when the Red Brigades-PCC ceased operations. After the Dozier kidnapping, and subsequent arrests of several prominent group members, some members of the Red Brigades-PCC proposed a “strategic retreat” in order to build an “armed proletarian power system” from within the ranks of the “masses” (Re 2020, 287). However, the Red Brigades-PCC did not pause their attacks, and continued their operations throughout the mid to late 1980s (Re 2020, 287). Nor did the group’s internal disagreements pause, and in 1984, the group splintered into the “first position” and the “second position” (Re 2020, 287). Members of the “first position” constituted the more violent “militant” wing of the Red Brigades-PCC, which pushed for armed struggle centered around the working class that gradually radicalized the masses (Gnosis 2005; Sundquist 2020, 59). The “first position” continued to use the name Red Brigades-PCC (Gnosis 2005). The “second position” was the less extremist faction of the group, which advocated for revolution that included a legal part and spontaneous protests (Sundquist 2020, 59). Members of the “second position” formed the Union of Combatant Communists (Gnosis 2005).

The Red Brigades-PCC carried out attacks throughout, and after, the end of the Cold War, assassinating advisors to the Italian government in 1999 and 2002 (GTD 2019). While the group did not have the same social following as the original Red Brigades had, there was still a high level of concern among the public and the Italian police over the attacks (Sundquist 2020, 62; Irrera 2014, 20). Police actions against the

group became increasingly effective as authorities received increased funding for rewards for information about the group, which helped the police arrest members and dismantle cells (Sundquist 2020, 62). The group claimed its last attack in 2002, when it murdered Marco Biagi, a consultant to the Italian Ministry of Labour. In 2002, 2003, and 2004, nine Red Brigades-PCC members were arrested, two of whom were arrested in Cairo, Egypt (Sullivan 2011, 502). 2003 was a particularly successful year for the Italian police targeting the Red Brigades-PCC, and membership in the group was reduced to twenty members, and while some of the remaining members attempted to continue their attacks by working with other left-wing groups, ideological divisions prevented a successful unified movement from emerging (Sundquist 2020, 63).

Notes for Iris:

- origins story for the splinter group is very murky. BR starts to fall apart after the death of the PM. Moretti captured in early 80s
- unclear whether the splintering started after Moretti or whether it splintered much later (1984) post-Dozier. There is a gap between attacks in the late 80s and the 1990s, which leads some to speculate a new group forms after the Cold War
- might be able to track the group based on leadership. Those arrested in the 1990s are members associated with the groups in the early 80s
- BR ending in early 80s and this group's formation is a little ambiguous because there aren't a lot of major organizational trends. BR splinters into a few factions -- this is the most prominent faction which takes up most of the mantle.
- first position assumes 'vanguard' position and second position assumes more militant/guerrilla position (difference in preferences). Some groups break off to form the UCC and others do not.
- organizational structure likely very similar to BR
- this group is super unusual because it receives an offer of support from Israel and turns it down
- French front (Hyperion?) was an alliance of non-state actors

VII. AL-BORKAN

Torg ID: 14

Min. Group Date: 1984

Max. Group Date: 1984

Onset: NA

Aliases: Al Borkan Liberation Organization, Al-Borkan, Al-Borkan Liberation Organization, Al-Borkan Organization, The Volcano Organization

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: n/a

Group Formation: 1984

Group End: 1985 (never took responsibility for another attack)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Al-Borkan was an anti-Libyan group that mostly targeted Libyan diplomats in Europe (MIPT 2008). It is unknown when the group formed, but came to attention for its first attack was in 1984 (GTD 2017).

Geography

Their attacks occurred both in Spain and Italy, making this group transnational (Philadelphia Daily News 1984; GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

One of the suspected sponsors of the group was the the PLO (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

The group might have been have received funding from the PLO (MIPT 2008). It might have also just been an alias for the PLO (Philadelphia Daily News 1984). The group also might have had ties to the Shia Amal militia, a Lebanese group, and the Muslim Brotherhood (Keesing's 1985, 33432).

Group Outcome

After the two attacks on Libyan diplomats in 1984 and 1985, the group disappeared and never had another confirmed or suspected attack (Philadelphia Daily News 1984; Globe and Mail 1985; Keesing's 1985, 33432).

Notes for Iris:

- they claim responsibility for the attacks, but they never articulate a political aim
- some speculation the PLO is involved, but it's hard to confirm

VIII. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST GROUP

Torg ID: 218

Min. Group Date: 1984

Max. Group Date: 1984

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Communist Group for Internationalism

Group Formation: 1984

Group End: 1984

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unclear when the International Communist Group formed, but the group carried out their first and only known attacks in May of 1984, bombing the Honduran embassy and an Italian-US cultural exchange center in Rome (GTD 2020; Atlanta Constitution 1984; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 589). While the group claimed responsibility for the attack, news reporting did not articulate a political goal or justification for the attack.

Geography

International Communist Group's sole attack occurred in the central Italian city of Rome (GTD 2020; Atlanta Constitution 1984).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about International Communist Group's organizational structure.

External Ties

No information could be found about any external ties International Communist Group may have had.

Group Outcome

International Communist Group's only attacks were the 1984 bombings in Rome (GTD 2020; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 589). It is unclear why and when the group stopped using violence.

IX. ARMED COMMUNIST FRONT

Torg ID: 1004

Min. Group Date: 1986

Max. Group Date: 1986

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 1986

Group End: 1986

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the Armed Communist Front formed, but it carried out its first and only known attack on April 16, 1986. On that day, the group set fire to buildings belonging to the British-Italian Friendship Association’s buildings in Bologna, Italy (Seattle Times 1986; GTD 2019). Italian police stated that the attack was in protest of the American actions against Libya (Seattle Times 1986). Beginning April 14th of 1986, the United States conducted airstrikes in Libya targeting Muammar Qadhafi’s regime (Endicott n.d.; Christian Science Monitor 1986). The UK had supported the attacks, and had allowed the United States to launch the attack from Royal Air Force bases (Endicott n.d.).

Geography

The Armed Communist Front’s sole attack targeted the British-Italian Friendship Association in the northern Italian city of Bologna (Seattle Times 1986). (It is worth noting that Italy had ruled Libya as a colony until World War II, and Britain and France had occupied parts of Libya until the nation gained independence in 1951).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the Armed Communist Front's organizational structure.

External Ties

There is no explicit evidence of ties between the Armed Communist Front and external actors. However, the group cited airstrikes against the Qaddafi regime as justification for their attack.

Group Outcome

The arson at the British-Italian Friendship Association in 1986 was the Armed Communist Front's only known attack (GTD 2019). It is unknown when and why the group stopped operating.

X. RED BRIGADES FIGHTING COMMUNIST UNION (BR-UCC)

Torg ID: 578

Min. Group Date: 1986

Max. Group Date: 2002

Onset: NA

Aliases: Red Brigades Fighting Communist Union (Br-Ucc), Combatant Communist Union Red Brigades, Red Brigades - Union Of Combatant Communists, Red Brigades - Union Of Combatant Communists (Rb-Ucc)

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Red Brigades Union of Combatant Communists; Red Brigades-UCC; Red Brigades Combatant Communists Union, Union of Fighting Communists

Group Formation: 1984

Group End: 1987

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Red Brigades Union of Combatant Communists (Red Brigades-UCC) formed in 1984, as a splinter of the Red Brigades Combatant Communist Party (Red Brigades-PCC). The BR-PCC was one of the three successor groups to the original Red Brigades that emerged when the group broke apart in the early 1980s (Re 2020, 285). The Red Brigades-PCC had suffered internal ideological disputes after the kidnapping of NATO general James Dozier in 1981, and in 1984, the group splintered into two factions: the “first position” and the “second position” (Re 2020, 287). The “second position” was composed of those who pushed for armed struggle and spontaneous protests with a legal component, while the “first position” was primarily concerned with organizing a clandestine, working-class centered revolutionary movement (Gnosis 2005; Re 2020, 287). Some individuals in the “second position” broke away to form the Red Brigades-UCC that same year (Re 2020, 287; Gnosis 2005).

The exact goals and ideology of the Red Brigades-UCC are unclear. Like its predecessors, the Red Brigades-UCC was a left-wing organization that aimed to overthrow the Italian government and replace it with a communist regime (Pisano 1985, 6). The group was a splinter of the Red Brigades-PCC, which could imply it continued to have extremist and more “militarist” preferences over the use of force.

Other sources suggest that the Red Brigades-UCC was a “post-Senzanian” organization, after Giovanni Senzani, who led the Red Brigades-Guerilla Party, another one of the three original splinter groups of the Red Brigades (Re 2020, 286; Gnosis 2005). Senzani’s group was also considered the “movementist” faction of the Red Brigades, which advocated for “revolutionary spontaneity” and “immediate mass participation” in the armed struggle for communism (Pisano 1985, 6). The members of the “second position” inherited Senzani’s ideological views, and pushed for low-level militant activities aimed at radicalizing the masses and demonstrating that the Red Brigades were “a party that makes politics with arms” (Gnosis 2005).

The Red Brigades-UCC carried out its first attack in 1986, when the group attempted to assassinate Antonio da Empoli, a senior cabinet official in the Socialist Prime Minister Benito Craxi’s government (GTD 2019; Schmid and Jongman 1988; Azzellini 2009, 2818).

Geography

Both of the Red Brigades-UCC’s attacks occurred in the central Italian city of Rome (GTD 2019; Azzellini 2009, 2818).

Organizational Structure

The leaders and organizational structure of the Red Brigades-UCC are unknown. Schmid and Jongman (1988, 594) note “Antonio Campesi, the group’s leader and seven other militants were arrested in Milan on Feb. 18, 1980.” However, this pre-dates the group’s formation by four years. Campesi may have been arrested as part of a larger round-up of Red Brigades members surrounding the Moro murder. However, it is unclear whether he was released, came back to the group, or played a role in the BR-UCC after 1980. Exact membership statistics for the group are also unknown, although seventy-three members of the group faced charges between 1986 and 1988 (Azzellini 2009, 2818). Schmid and Jongman (1988, 594) note the group was considered much smaller than other Red Brigade groups and “believed to have less firepower.”

External Ties

Any relationships the Red Brigades-UCC had to other left-wing militant groups are unclear. The group was a splinter of the Red Brigades-PCC (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Re 2020).

Group Outcome

The Red Brigades-UCC carried out its second, and last, attack in March of 1987, when the group assassinated Italian air force General Licio Giorgieri (GTD 2019; Azzellini 2009, 2818; The Ottawa Citizen 1987). Between May and June of 1987, Italian police arrested several members of the Red Brigades-UCC, which effectively dismantled the group (Azzellini 2009, 2818).

Notes for Iris:

- the group splintered from the BR-PCC because of likely preference over violent strategy
- Giovanni Senzani arrested soon after Moretti-much more violent
- smaller and smaller dedicated set of force