

Democratic Republic of Congo Cases, 1970-2012

Last Updated: 22 October 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T9009	FRONT FOR CONGOLESE NATIONAL LIBERATION		0	0
T224	IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (IRA)		1922	2011
T224	PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA)		1922	2011
T572	NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FNLA)		1962	0
T1446	POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (PRP)		1975	1975
T279	LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA)		1987	2012
T653	ALLIED DEFENSE FORCES (ADF)		1988	1999
T1679	CONGOLESE LIBERATION PARTY (PLC)		1988	1988
T1863	PARTY FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE HUTE PEOPLE (PALIPEHUTU)	27-Nov-91	1991	2008
T388	MAY-MAY		1993	2012
T65300	ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES	16-Nov-96	1993	2012
T88-A	ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA		1994	2012
T2418	RASTAS		1994	2007
T88-B	FORCES DEMOCRATIQUES DE LIBERATION DU RWANDA (FDLR)		1994	2012
T531	WEST NILE BANK FRONT (WNBF)		1995	1996
T2174	MOUVEMENT DE LIBERATION DU CONGO	1-Nov-98	1998	2002
T2274	BANYAMULENGE REBELS		1998	1998
T2008	CONGOLESE RALLY FOR	3-Aug-98	1998	2003

	DEMOCRACY/LIBERATION MOVEMENT			
T2620	RCD-WAMBA		1998	2003
T2059	RCD-ML		1998	2003
T2282	BUNDA DIA KONGO	1-Feb-07	2000	2008
T2041	PEOPLE'S REDEMPTION ARMY (PRA)		2001	0
T1546	CONGOLESE RALLY FOR DEMOCRACY-NATIONAL		2001	2003
T2186	UNION OF CONGOLESE PATRIOTS		2002	2012
T2403	ITURI PATRIOTIC RESISTANCE FRONT (FRPI)		2002	2005
T1478	FRONT FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION (FRP)		2002	2002
T1022	CONGOLESE RALLY FOR DEMOCRACY - PATRICK MASUNZU (RCD-PM)		2002	2002
T2394	NATIONALIST INTEGRATIONIST FRONT		2002	2005
T2187	CONGOLESE PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES (FAPC)		2003	2004
T2603	PARTY FOR UNITY AND SAFEGUARDING OF THE INTEGRITY OF CONGO		2003	2003
T2570	RCD-LN		2004	2004
T2598	CONGOLESE RALLY FOR DEMOCRACY - CHRISTIAN PAY PAY (RCD-CP)		2004	2004
T2306	NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE PEOPLE (CNDP)	28-Nov-06	2006	2008
T2590	PARECO		2007	2008
T2589	BANGADI MILITIA		2008	2008
T717	CONGOLESE PATRIOTIC RESISTENCE-PATRIOTIC ARMED FORCES (PARECO/FAP)		2009	2012
T2502	POPULAR FRONT FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONGO		2009	2009

T983	ENYELE MILITIA		2010	2010
T2615	MAYI MAYI COMPLET		2010	2010
T2688	ANGRY CITIZENS (SWAHILI)		2011	2012
T2496	FORCES DE DEFENSE CONGOLAISE		2011	2011
T2689	ALLIANCE OF THE PEOPLE FOR A FREE AND SOVEREIGN CONGO	27-Feb-13	2012	2012
T2653	MAI MAI SIMBA MILITIA		2012	2012
T2687	MAYI MAYI LUMUMBA		2012	2012
T2652	MARCH 23 MOVEMENT (M23)	6-Jun-12	2012	2012

Summary:

- Belgian Congo gained independence on June 30, 1960 -> became Republic of Congo -> series of rebellions -> July 1, 1964 becomes DRC
- Mobutu comes into power -> promises to rid DRC of polarizing ethnic political demands; uses fear and oppression; used secret police staffed by his ethnic group, the Ngbandi
- 1966 Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR) was launched and becomes sole legal party -> those who didn't accept the regime were exiled or imprisoned
- 1967 launched movement called "Authenticity" - basically an aim to get rid of all things European/colonial and replace them with "authentic" African things (ex. Rename Congo to Zaire) -> Constitution of 1974 centralizes gov in presidency and created a party-state
- Mobutu used co-optation and patronage to strengthen power
- 1977 - FLNC is first group to attack after Mobutu comes to power
- Mobutu loyal to pro-western stance
- 1984 Mobutu wins 99% of vote; this was understandably questioned, and there was some political dissidence (all were peaceful EXCEPT PLC)
- Late 1980s, many francophone african countries abandoned their military dictatorships bc of pressure from western donors -> Mobutu follows and allows multiple parties to run
- ADFL ultimately defeats Mobutu in 1998

Mid-1980s → 1998

- 1) Who's the leader/why is he a bad guy
- 2) Why are these groups forming

Big catalyst is start of the 1994 Rwandan genocide - RPF gets started//wants to pursue militias responsible for genocide, but can't so they decide to sponsor the AFDL to do this instead?

DRC Cases Part 1: 1970-1998

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T2008	CONGOLESE RALLY FOR DEMOCRACY/LIBERATION MOVEMENT	3-Aug-98	1998	2003
T2620	RCD-WAMBA		1998	2003

T2059	RCD-ML		1998	2003
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I. FRONT FOR CONGOLESE NATIONAL LIBERATION

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: 1977

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases:

Group Formation:

Group End:

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Geography

Organizational Structure

External Ties

Group Outcome

From wiki: “The invaders launched a three-pronged attack on March 8, 1977, crossing the Angola–Zaire border on bicycles.^[20]”

- II. IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (IRA)
Min. Group Date: 1922
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: Irish Republican Army (Ira), Provisional Irish Republican Army (Pira), Provos

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for the PIRA.

Group Formation: This is an alias for the PIRA.

Group End: This is an alias for the PIRA.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for the PIRA.

Geography

This is an alias for the PIRA.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for the PIRA.

External Ties

This is an alias for the PIRA.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for the PIRA.

- III. PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA)
Min. Group Date: 1922
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: Irish Republican Army (Ira), Provisional Irish Republican Army (Pira), Provos

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Sinn Fein, Oglagh na hEireann

Group Formation:
December of 1969

Group End:
On July 28, 2005 the IRA Army Council announced an end to its armed campaign.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PIRA is a splinter group, which formed out of the old IRA in December of 1969 (Global Security n.d.; Reuters 2008; Council on Foreign Relations 2010; Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's ideology can be identified as nationalist because it fights for

the geographical and political unity of Ireland (FAS 2005; CFR 2010; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Its political aim has been to both unify Ireland and force the removal of British forces from Northern Ireland (Reuters 2008; Council on Foreign Relations 2010). Their first documented attack occurred on June 26, 1970 (Council on Foreign Relations 2010; GTD 2017). Their political aim resembles one of an autonomy-seeking group.

Geography

The Provisional IRA focused the majority of its attacks in the boundaries of the United Kingdom, but did conduct attacks within Ireland (GTD 2017). Their bases were mainly stationed in Northern Ireland, but they operated throughout Ireland and Great Britain (GTD 2017). The PIRA can be identified as a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

There is no consensus as to who the leader(s) of PIRA were. Their nationalist political aims implies their label as a left-wing terrorist group. They are known to be affiliated as the wing of the politically driven group, Sinn Fein (FAS 2005). The group had a youth wing known as Fianna na h'Eireann (Schmid and Jongman 1988). No information could be found about the membership background. They were organized under an established Army Council made up of 12 members, which was recorded to have met semi-annually (Mackenzie Institute 2016). Notably, the group organized like a conventional army (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The leader of Sinn Fein's political party is Gerry Adams (Global Security n.d.). Additional leaders included John Stephenson, Rory O'brady, Leo Martin, Billy McKee, Seamus Twomey, and Francis Card (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The number of troops of the IRA in 1989 was 300 and in 1991 was 250 (Non-State Actor Dataset Narratives 2013). It has also been more generally reported to have several hundred members at an unknown date (FAS 2005; Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group received some partial funding through Irish diasporas in the US (Gleditsch et al 2013).

External Ties

The PIRA had many explicit splinters in their group, some that can be identified as the RIRA, Continuity IRA (CIRA), and the ONH (FAS 2005). The group received explicit weapons support from Libya as well as an endorsement from Ireland (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 410; Schmid and Jongman 1988). The group provided weapons specifically for training to the FARC (FAS 2004). These divisions shared the same motives as PIRA, but differed in a few beliefs, usually in attack. These groups helped further PIRA as a threat to English army troops based in Northern Ireland, and to even continue to pose as potential threats today (BBC 2013).

Group Outcome

A formal political agreement known as the Good Friday Agreement helped resolve the conflict in 1998 (BBC n.d.; BBC 2013). As part of this agreement, the IRA disarmed in July 2005 (CFR 2010). The group grew when British troops shot peaceful protesters in January of 1972 as part of an event that came to be known as Bloody Sunday (Reuters 2008; BBC n.d.; BBC 2013). Despite this confirmation, the IRA's last attack has been recorded to have occurred in May of 2011 in Londonderry, United Kingdom (Global Terrorism Database n.d.).

IV. NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FNLA)

Min. Group Date: 1962

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: National Front For The Liberation Of Angola (Fnla), Democratic Party Of Angola, Frente Nacional De Libertacao De Angola, Frente Nacional De Liberta_o De Angola, Frente Nacional De Libertacao De Angola (Fnla), Frente Nacional De Liberta_o De Angola (Fnla), Frente Nacional Para La Liberacion De Angola, Frente Nacional Para La Liberaci_n De Angola, Frente Nacional Para La Liberacion De Angola (Fnla), Frente Nacional Para La Liberaci_n De Angola (Fnla), Military Council Of Angolan Resistance (Comira), National Liberation Front Of Angola, Union Of The Populations Of Angola (Upa)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: founded 1961; First attack 1961

Group End: Ongoing as a political party

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In the 1960s, although most European countries removed their grip from their African colonies, Portugal held onto their possessions of Guinea-Bissau and Angola (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 179). Their failure to leave incited movements for Angolan independence, including the rise of groups FNLA and MPLA (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 179).

The FNLA was founded in 1954 by Holden Roberto under the name Union of Peoples of Northern Angola (UPNA) to promote the interests of the Bakongo people, an ethnic group consisting of Congolese tribes (Global Security n.d.; Woodson 1945; Minorities at Risk Project 2004; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2000; New York Times 2007). Rather than decolonization, it sought to re-establish the Kongo Kingdom through guerrilla war, and in 1957, the UNPA petitioned the UN to do so (Global Security n.d.). However, these attempts proved futile, and in 1958, the UPNA became the Union of Angola Peoples (UPA), and shifted their goals to Angolan independence from the Portuguese (Global Security n.d.; Central Intelligence Agency 1961).

In 1961, as rebels became more militarily organized, the UPA merged with the Kongo Kingdom nationalist group, the Democratic Party of Angola to form the FNLA (Global Security n.d.). Sources conflict as to when the group formed, though the majority state either 1961 or 1962 (Jongman and Schmid 1988, 502; Minorities at Risk 2004).

The group's first attack occurred in March 1961 against the Portuguese, however it was quickly crushed (Minorities at Risk 2004). It is not stated where the attack occurred.

Geography

Due to the difficulties of operating in Angola and ties with the Congolese group the Alliance of Bokongo, the FNLA established an external base in Kinshasa, the capital of the DRC (Global Security n.d.). The Kongo Kingdom, which the group has sought to re-establish, held territory in Angola, Republic of Congo, and the DRC. The group is therefore transnational (University of Iowa Museum of Art n.d.). The group initially fought in northern Angola (US State Department n.d.).

In the late 1970s, after the FNLA formed an alliance with the UNITA, conflict in Angola shifted from Bakongo regions in the north to central and southern Angola (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). UNITA, a splinter group of the FNLA, is based in central and southern Ovimbundu (Jongman and Schmid 1988).

During the Angolan war for independence, an estimated 1,000-2,000 Congolese regulars crossed the border in Angola to aid the FNLA (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

Holden Roberto was the president of the UPA (Global Security n.d.). The UPA was a political organization and operated a 'government-in-exile' in the DRC (Minorities at Risk Project 2004; Global Security n.d.; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 502). As president, he declared complete authority of anti-Portuguese operations within Angola and refused to merge with any other organizations in an effort to build the FNLA into the main Angolan independence movement (Global Security n.d.). In September 1998, Roberto was removed as the head of the FNLA and replaced by Lucas Ngonda (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2000). Roberto was in direct opposition to Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos (New York Times 2007).

The group consisted of an estimated 4,000-7,000 fighters (Jongman and Schmid 1988, 502). Other sources suggest the group had an estimated 5,000 members at an unknown date (Global Security n.d.). In 1961 when the UPA formed the National Liberation Army of Angola, it consisted of 5,000 untrained and poorly armed troops (Global Security n.d.). By November 1975, the FNLA army size had grown to 22,000 fighters (Global Security

n.d.). The FNLA has received support from members of the ethnic groups Bakongo and Kimbundu (Global Security n.d.; Jongman and Schmid 1988, 502).

External Ties

The FNLA was a merger of the UPA and Alazo (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 502). The FNLA held strong ties with the Congolese group Mobutu Sese Seko, who were allied with the United States (Global Security n.d.). The Angolan War for Independence served as a front for a Cold War conflict, as the Soviet Union and the United States supported opposing groups in Angola (US State Department n.d.). While the United States supplied aid and military training to FNLA and UNITA troops, the Soviet Union and Cuba provided military training and equipment to the Marxist-Leninist MPLA, the opposing group to the FNLA (US State Department n.d.). The FNLA also received great amounts of military support from the Congolese army (Gleditsch 2013). Wholly, the FNLA has received explicit support from the US, Zaire, South Africa, China, and North Korea (Jongman and Schmid 1988, 503; US State Department n.d.). Sometime before 1974, 1000 to 2000 Zaire soldiers traveled to Angola to help the MPLA fight (Global Security n.d.).

The FNLA conducted attacks in Angola from their bases in Congo (Global Security n.d.). Their primary base was located in present day Kinshasa, the capital of the DRC (Global Security n.d.). After the MPLA defeated the FNLA in 1976, the FNLA retreated to its bases in the DRC and continued to launch small attacks into Angola (Global Security n.d.). However, despite previous support, in 1978, as part of the Angolan-Zairian accord, the DRC withdrew its support of the FNLA, ultimately eradicating the group's bases (Global Security n.d.; MIPT 2008).

The FNLA shared interests to restore the Kongo Kingdom with the Congolese group the Alliance of Bokongo (Global Security n.d.).

UNITA splintered from the FNLA in 1963 (US State Department n.d.). UNITA, FNLA, and MPLA worked together initially to fight the Portuguese, but began to fight each other in 1975 (US State Department n.d.). At its inception, the FNLA consisted of a few thousand poorly trained and armed fighters (Global Security n.d.). In 1961, FNLA fighters went to Morocco and Tunisia to train with and learn from Algerian forces (Global Security n.d.). After Algeria gained independence in 1962, it explicitly supplied the FNLA with arms and ammunition (Global Security n.d.). The group also received explicit funds from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

At the end of the Angolan War for Independence, in January 1975, the FNLA and two other groups signed the Alvor Agreement which established Angolan independence from the Portuguese (Global Security n.d.; New York Times 2007). However, despite promises

of peace, the three groups quickly split, as each sought individual power in Angola and conflict resumed (US State Department n.d.; Global Security n.d.). These arguments ultimately lead to the Angolan Civil War (Global Security n.d.).

In 1976, Cuba sent military forces to support the MPLA (New York Times 2007). The FNLA was soon defeated (New York Times 2007). The MPLA has consistently been the winning party in Angola's general elections (New York Times 2007).

Despite previous support, in 1978, as part of the Angolan-Zairian accord, the DRC withdrew its support of the FNLA, ultimately eradicating the group's bases (Global Security n.d.; MIPT 2008). This took a significant hit to the group, and in 1984, Roberto accepted the MPLA's amnesty agreement and shut down and disarmed the militant wing of the FNLA (MIPT 2008). The group's last known attack occurred in 1990, when the FNLA claimed they had planted a suitcase bomb in Luanda International Airport (MIPT 2008).

In May 1991, the opposition groups became legal political parties (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). Once parties legalized, FNLA leader Holden Roberto returned from exile and ran for president of Angola in 1992 (Minorities at Risk Project 2004).

Notes for iris:

- Gleditsch et al. narrative is poor in paraphrasing Global Security article then didn't even cite it in their bibliography.
- Interesting: Angola is Africa's 2nd largest oil producer. Pres Santos offered Roberto a position in a consultative group, however Roberto refused stating Pres Santos has done nothing to help the poor in Angola... fun fact: Luanda, Angola's capital is the MOST EXPENSIVE city in the world to live in. Literally beating Hong Kong, Zurich, Singapore, AND Geneva
- the UPA was originally a political organization, but quickly realized they couldn't accomplish anything
- classic proxy war between the US and the Soviet Union
- when does the MPLA become more Marxist?
- there is a classic power struggle between the 3 groups in 1975; MPLA wins and is still in power. The FNLA still participates in politics today.

- V. POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (PRP)
Min. Group Date: 1975
Max. Group Date: 1975
Onset: NA

Aliases: People's Revolutionary Party (Prp), Popular Revolutionary Party (Prp), Zaire?S People?S Revolutionary Party, Zaire's People's Revolutionary Party, PRP

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: no proposed change

Group Formation: 1965 (Kisangani 2016, 496) or 1967 (Encyclopedia Britannica 2001; Appiah and Gates 2010, 623)

Group End (Outcome): 1977 (military defeat) (Appiah 2010, 623)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Laurant-Désiré Kabila was born in the Katanga province and came from the Luba ethnic group (Panafrican News Agency 2001). Kabila opposed the Congolese government for three decades, before leading a coup in 1997 and becoming military leader and

president of Congo (Appiah 2010, 623). Kabila formed the PRP in 1965 on Marxist ideals (TORG dataset; Kisangani 2016, 496) or 1967 (Encyclopedia Britannica 2001; Appiah and Gates 2010, 623). Sources agree that, by 1967, PRP was an established group. According to Schmid and Jongman (1988, 699), by 1967 PRP controlled strongholds in the area of Fizi Baraka. The group's ideology was leftist (Panafrikan News Agency 2001) and they were willing to use violence to overthrow the then-dictator of Congo, Mobutu Sese Seko (Onwar).

Kabila directly governed Congo from 1997-2001 (Ibid.). The PRP gained international attention in 1975 when it held three American students and a Dutch citizen hostage for 67 days (Appiah 2010, 623; Kisangani 2016, 496).

Geography

In the 1970s, the PRP established a "liberated zone" in southeastern Kivu, specifically the mountainous Fizi (Appiah 2010, 623). The PRP ruled this "liberated zone" as a Socialist state for two years, though the group was ultimately forced to flee by Congolese government forces (Ibid.). PRP members then fled to Tanzania (Ibid.)

Organizational Structure

The group's founding leader was Laurent Kabila (Onwar n.d.). Other leaders included Gabriel Yumu, Kashimu, and Gaston Soumalot (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 698). The PRP's armed branch was formed in 1969 and named Forces Armées Populaires (FAP) (Ibid.). In 1980, the PRP joined an umbrella organization called the Council for the Liberation of the Congo-Kinshasa (Ibid.). The PRP's estimated group size was approximately 3,000 members at the time (Ibid.).

The PRP funded itself through gold mining and ivory trading (Global Security n.d.). The Zairian officers positioned in Kivu, who were supposed to drive the PRP out of power in the region, often smuggled out ivory, gold and other commodities which were used to enrich both themselves and the PRP (Onwar n.d.).

External Ties

The PRP regularly received funding from China (Appiah 2010, 623). Members fled to Tanzania after defeat in 1977 (Ibid.). Prior to founding the PRP, Laurent-Désiré Kabila had been educated in France and in 1965 had briefly collaborated with Che Guevara in connection with an insurrection in eastern Congo (Ibid.).

Group Outcome

In 1977 President Mobutu's troops forced the PRP to abandon their liberated Zone and the PRP members fled (Appiah 2010, 623). According to Kisangi (2016, 496) the PRP re-emerged in October 1996 as part of the umbrella organization Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), however the connections between PRP and the later AFDL are not entirely clear. The AFDL successfully conducted a coup in May 1997 and Kabila then became president of Congo until 2001 (Ibid.)

VI. LORDS RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA)

Min. Group Date: 1987

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Lord's Resistance Army (Lra), Lords Resistance Army, Lord's Resistance Army, Lords Resistance Army (Lra), Lord's Resistance Army Lra, Lord's Resistance Army/Movement (Lra/M), Lords Resistance Movement, Lord's Resistance Movement, Lord's Resistance Movement/Army (Lrm/A)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Uganda People's Democratic Christian Army, UPDCA

Group Formation: 1987

Group End (Outcome): 2012 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) formed in 1987 as a faction of the Holy Spirit Movement in Uganda (Zapata 2011; Arieff and Ploch 2011, 3). The group claims to want to fight the Museveni government in Kampala and promote the rights of the Acholi people (Zapata 2011). Its goals are not as concrete as other armed groups (Arieff and Ploch 2011, 3). It is ethno-nationalist and Christian fundamentalist in membership (Zapata 2011). The group was originally named the Uganda People's Democratic Christian Army and changed its name to the LRA in 1991 (Zapata 2011).

Geography

The group was active in Katine, Gulu, Kitgum, and other areas around northern Uganda (Rice 2007). Its base of operations in southern Sudan and later moved to Western Equatoria and DRC (Bevan 2006, 276).

Organizational Structure

Joseph Kony leads the LRA (Arieff and Ploch 2011, 3). Though the group claims to promote the rights of the Acholi people, it raids, abducts, and kills Acholi members frequently (Rice 2007). The group primarily acquires new fighters through abduction

(Bevan 2006, 275). Senior commanders were Acholi, and its fighters were from several groups in the CAR, DRC, and South Sudan (Bevan 2006; Arieff and Ploch 2011, 4). It had approximately 5,000 fighters by 1997 (Bevan 2006, 275), though by 2011, the group only had a few hundred members (Arieff and Ploch 2011, 4). In 2015, it had 200 combatants (Global Security n.d.). The group is organized along conventional lines, and its soldiers are 'indoctrinated' during training to obey their commanders at all times (Bevan 2006, 277).

External Ties

The Sudanese government provided sanctuary to the LRA (Rice 2007). Sudan also provided weapons, ammunition, and training in retaliation for Ugandan support of the SPLA (Bevan 2006, 275). In 2002, Sudan partially withdrew its support and allowed Ugandan forces to conduct cross-border raids in pursuit of the LRA (Arieff and Ploch 2011, 6). As of 2010, the group was believed to be operating out of the northeastern DRC (Arieff and Ploch 2011, 6).

The LRA also collaborates with the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) and the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) in the Congo (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

The Ugandan government launched a massive counter-offensive in 1991 known as Operation North, though it ultimately failed to quash the movement (Rice 2007). This involved separating Acholi residents from the LRA into different settlements, though it actually provoked LRA retaliation against the Acholi (Bevan 2006, 275). The government later launched a second counter-offensive in 2002 known as Operation Iron First, though it also failed (Rice 2007). The US aided Uganda, DRC, CAR, and Sudanese efforts to combat the LRA (Arieff and Ploch 2011, 5-8).

VII. ALLIED DEFENSE FORCES (ADF)

Min. Group Date: 1988

Max. Group Date: 1999

Onset: NA

Aliases: National Army For The Liberation Of Uganda (Nalu), Allied Defense Forces (Adf), Allied Defense Forces (Adf) (Uganda)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: ADF-NALU

Group Formation: "early 1990s" (merger)

Group End (Outcome): 2012 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There are conflicting dates about when the group formed. Some argue that it was formed in 1989 by Sheikh Jamil Mukulu when it was still NALU, and others argue that it formed in the early 1990s during a merger (Gaffey 2015; West 2015). There is no evidence of a 1993 start date in any of the listed sources. The group's goal was to overthrow the Museveni regime (West 2015; BAAD Narratives 2015). Due to its Islamic ideology, it also wanted to install Sharia law (IRIN 2014; Ireland Refugee Documentation 2013). It first gained attention in Uganda in 1995 for its attack in the Rwenzururu mountains (West 2015).

Geography

The group has an external base of operations in the Kivu region of the DRC, including training camps (IRIN 2014).

Organizational Structure

ADF's leader is Jamil Mukulu who originally led NALU (IRIN 2014). The group had approximately 800-1,400 fighters in 2014, many of which were foreign fighters coming from Uganda, Tanzania, and Somalia (IRIN 2014). It funds itself through logging, mining, and diaspora donations, though it is unknown how it is organized. It is reportedly a "tightly controlled organization" and hybrid group (IRIN 2014).

External Ties

The group allegedly received external support from Sudan and the DRC, although it is unclear what this support entailed (BAAD Narratives 2015; Global Security n.d.). The DRC's support may have been conditional until Kabila came to power, as it was sending FARDC (DRC armed forces) to combat the group in 2014 (IRIN 2014). Others speculate that the group received arms from Iran and the UAE, although this is disputed (Global Security n.d.).

The group may have ties to al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda as well, but this is heavily disputed (Global Security n.d.; IRIN 2014; Gaffey 2015).

Group Outcome

The group lost support in 1997 when Laurent Kabila came to power in the DRC and damaged their transnational base (Global Security n.d.). The group suffered further defeats in 1998 when the Ugandan army launched a massive offensive, nearly destroying the group (Global Security n.d.). The group retaliated with a 1999 offensive in the Kabarole and Bundibugyo districts (Global Security n.d.). In 2001, the group primarily moved to the DRC, where Ugandan troops were prohibited from entering following the

2001 DRC peace accords (Global Security n.d.). The group reorganized in the DRC and has been conducting attacks against civilian and army targets since.

VIII. CONGOLESE LIBERATION PARTY (PLC)

Min. Group Date: 1988

Max. Group Date: 1988

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1984 or 1986

Group End: 1996 (merger)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PLC is a politico-military organization founded by members of the Tembos, Hundes, and Nandes ethnic groups (Sadiki 2015, 147). It was created in 1984 or 1986 in Beni, Congo as a center-seeking ethno-nationalist group to overthrow Mobutu (Prunier 2004, 362; Banks et al. 2016, 215). Beginning in 1984, the group allegedly incited sporadic anti-government guerrilla warfare in eastern DRC (Banks et al. 2016, 215). The members founded the PLC in an effort to promote the rights of non-Banyarwanda minorities in the DRC and potentially replace Mobutu's government (Sadiki 2015, 147). The Banyarwanda is a Congolese cultural group consisting of around 57,000 Hutus and Tutsis (Minority Rights Group 2017). The Banyarwanda usurpation of land was backed by Mobutu, the dictator of Zaire (Prunier 2004, 368). This led the PLC to adopt low intensity, anti-government guerrilla warfare (Prunier 2004, 368). Sources did not include the group's political activities despite referring to it as a politico-military organization. The group is left-wing (Banks et al. 2016, 215).

Geography

The PLC was founded in Beni North-Kivu, in the eastern DRC (Sadiki 2015, 147). Beginning in 1984, the group incited sporadic anti-government guerrilla warfare in eastern DRC (Banks et al. 2016, 215). The PLC conducted raids of Ugandan border villages in the Ruwenzori Mountains and areas close to the Ugandan border (Sadiki 2015, 147). In 1988-9, the Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) launched attacks on the group and forced the PLC to relocate either further into the Beni Forest or north, into Garamba National Park (Prunier 2004, 369). The group operates in both the DRC and Uganda, and therefore is transnational (Prunier 2004, 369).

Organizational Structure

The PLC was led by deputy leader Julius Mikango until 1988, when he died from an alleged poisoning by Congolese operatives (Banks, Day, & Muller 2016, 215). Sources did not state the current leader, nor Julius Mikango's experience. The PLC was financed by Zairean coffee smuggling operations (Prunier 2004, 374). No wings were found. Size estimates were not stated, however a source describes the group's size as "limited" (Prunier 2004, 369). In 1987, the group controlled a political wing that operated a government in exile (Banks et al. 2016, 215). The PLC consists of members of the Tembos, Hundes, and Nandes ethnic groups (Sadiki 2015, 147).

External Ties

The group received military training and support from the Uganda government under the auspices of the ESO starting around 1994 (Prunier 2004, 369). The Ugandan External Service Service Organization (ESO) explicitly aimed to restructure the leadership of the PLC which helped transform the group from a micro-guerrilla to a serious, organized military force (Prunier 2004, 369). The ESO used the PLC to protect Uganda from

Zairean military offences (Prunier 2004, 369). In 1996, the PLC joined the first Congo War of 1996 under the umbrella organization, the AFDL (Prunier 2004, 361, 362).

Group Outcome

The PLC was led by deputy leader Julius Mikango until 1988, when he died from an alleged poisoning by Congolese operatives (Banks, Day, Muller 2016, 215). The group participated in the First Congo War of 1996 under the umbrella organization, the AFDL (Prunier 2004, 361, 362). No data on what happened to the group was found. In 1988-9, the Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) launched a severe military offensive against the PLC and forced the group to withdraw north and/or deeper into the Garamba National Park and/or the Beni Forest (Prunier 2004, 368, 369). In 1996, the PLC joined the first Congo War of 1996 under the umbrella organization, the AFDL (Prunier 2004, 361, 362).

Notes for Iris:

- Mobutu favored the Banyarwanda and allowed them to participate in the politics at the expense of the other smaller militant groups
- why is Uganda messing around with this group?

IX. PALIPEHUTU
Min. Group Date: 1991
Max. Group Date: 2008
Onset: NA

Aliases: Party For The Liberation Of The Hutu People (Palipehutu), Palipehutu, Party For The Liberation Of The Hutu People

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu

Group Formation: 1980

Group End: 2008 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PALIPEHUTU, or Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu is an extremist Hutu group founded in Tanzania in 1980 (Canada IRB 2000; UK Home Office 2002; Global Security n.d.(b)). The group, which was founded by Rémy Gahutu and led by Etienne Karatasi,

sought to forward the interests of the Hutus, as well as undermine the Tutsi political and military dominance (UK Home Office 2002). In addition, the PALIPEHUTU wanted to raise awareness of the 1972 massacre of elite Hutus, in which the Tutsi minority murdered an estimated 150,000-300,000 Hutu citizens of Burundi (Bömmel and Sarwary 2015, 1; Lemarchand 2008, 2).

In November 1991, the PALIPEHUTU incited attacks in towns in northern Burundi to provoke a national Hutu uprising (Minorities at Risk 2010).

Geography

PALIPEHUTU was founded in Tanzania in 1980 in a refugee camp (Canada IRB 2000; UK Home Office 2002; Global Security n.d.(b)). PALIPEHUTU originated in central Burundi, known as the province of Muramvya, and obtained much of its support from this area (Global Security n.d.(b)). The group held strongholds in areas around the capital Bujumbura, notably in Citoboke and Bujumbura Rurale (Meike Bömmel, Hares Sarwary 2015, 3).

All attacks conducted by the PALIPEHUTU occurred in Burundi, with the exception of an attack against Congolese citizens on May 23, 2004, in Kiliba, Congo (Global Terrorism Database 2017). The PALIPEHUTU incited attacks throughout Burundi (Global Terrorism Database 2017). The group encouraged Hutu civilians in northern Burundi (Ntega and Marangara) to commit violence against the Tutsis (UK Home Office 2002). The majority of attacks conducted by the PALIPEHUTU, however, occurred in Bujumbura, in proximity to the Burundi-Congo border (Global Terrorism Database 2017). The group allegedly received arms, training, and sanctuary from Rwanda (Minorities at Risk 2010).

Organizational Structure

The FNL or Forces nationales de liberation is the armed wing of PALIPEHUTU (Global Security n.d.(b); Canada IRB 2000; UK Home Office 2002). The PALIPEHUTU-FNL, led by Agathon Rwaswa, is based in southern Rwanda (UK Home Office 2002). The faction has faced numerous accusations of human rights abuses including mutilation and torture (UK Home Office 2002). Members are primarily Hutu (MAR 2010; Global Security n.d.(b)). Estimates for the exact size of the armed PALIPEHUTU-FNL are unclear, as the PALIPEHUTU-FNL has claimed to have around 20,000 fighters, while sources report a size estimate of 3,000 (Bömmel and Sarwary 2015, 4).

In addition, FROLINA, or Front pour la libération nationale, is an inactive military splinter of PALIPEHUTU based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (UK Home Office 2002). It was formed in the 1970s and founded by Joseph Karumba for unclear reasons (UK Home Office 2002).

PALIPEHETU taxed citizens in areas in which the group held strongholds (primarily around the capital Bujumbura) (Bömmel and Sarwary 2015, 3). There are no estimates to how much revenue the group made from these taxes or if the taxes provided sole funding for the group.

External Ties

In December 1991, the government of Burundi accused Rwanda for allegedly supporting the PALIPEHETU (Minorities at Risk 2010). The group allegedly received arms, training, and sanctuary from Rwanda (Minorities at Risk 2010). The group fought against the CNDD in the south (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

The armed wing of PALIPEHETU, FNL, splintered in 1992, but never operated independently of the group so the group is sometimes referred to as PALIPEHETU-FNL (Canada IRB 2000). Prior to 2008, there was a series of peace agreements and ceasefires commissioned by the UN between Burundi and the FNL (International Crisis Group 2002; International Crisis Group 2008; Human Rights Watch 2009). However, tensions between the FNL and Burundi government remained, as a fraction of the FNL attacked government forces after a peace agreement in 2007 (International Crisis Group 2009).

On May 26, 2008 the Burundi government and PALIPEHUTU signed a ceasefire, promising to lay down all hostilities in return for immunity for FNL leaders who resided in exile in Tanzania (Mail & Guardian 2008; Human Rights Watch 2009). However, despite this agreement, violence continued from April 17th to May 14th in Bujumbura and Bujumbura Rural province, killing over 100 civilians and displacing thousands more (Armed Conflict Report 2009). Violence ended when returned FNL leaders joined to establish a peace deal in May (Human Rights Watch 2009). Though conflict between the government and FNL remained relatively stable, that fall, the Palipehutu-FNL refused to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate until they were assumed as an official political party (Human Rights Watch 2009). Due to the Palipehutu-FNL's foundation as an ethnic group, the government of Burundi refused their demands (Human Rights Watch 2009). In December, despite the government's refusal, the group and the government agreed to uphold peace (Human Rights Watch 2009).

The group's last known violent attack was in 2008 (GTD 2017).

- X. MAY-MAY
Min. Group Date: 1993
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Mayi Mayi, Forces D Auto-Defense Populaires, Forces D'auto-Defense Populaires, Mai Mai, Mai-Mai, May May, Mayi-Mayi, May-May, Popular Self-Defense Forces, Popular Self-Defense Forces (Fap)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1998

Group End: 2016 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Mayi-Mayi are a coalition of Congolese militias that politicized themselves in 1998 in response to the influx of Rwandan immigrants and the Rwandan-backed RCD, a rebel group trying to overthrow the Congolese government (Gettleman 2008; Global Security n.d.). It originated around 1993 as a series of militias and had their first attack that year (ICG 2003, 4; ICG 2006, 1; Vlassenroot, 63). The Mayi-Mayi partnered with the Congolese government in this effort and did not politically oppose them (Gettleman 2008). The groups continued to act as a band of ad-hoc, self-defense militias as part of an umbrella system (Buchanan 2015).

The group is notorious for their numerous human rights abuses including rape, torture, and recruitment of child soldiers (Buchanan 2015). They are formed by community leaders who arm young men from their villages (Buchanan 2015). The group does not have a clear objective, nor any permanent, lasting allegiances (Global Security n.d.; Acker and Vlassenroot 2011, 53). However, the groups are directly opposed to Tutsi domination and the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD) (Global Security n.d.). In 1999, Mayi-Mayi groups were used in North and South Kivu to confront Rwandan army offences (Global Security n.d.; FAS 1999). The groups carry and wear magic potions said to protect fighters from bullets (Buchanan 2015; Gettleman 2008). This most likely emboldens members to take greater risks when fighting.

Geography

The Mayi-Mayi are a series of rebel groups present throughout the DRC (Gettleman 2008; Buchanan 2015). They are primarily present within eastern Congo and Northern Katanga (Gettleman 2008; ICG 2003, 2). They operate in the Kivu region (ICG 2003; FAS n.d.; Global Security n.d.; Vlassenroot, 62).

Organizational Structure

Some of the largest Mayi-Mayi groups are the Congolese Resistance Patriots (PARECO) and Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) (Buchanan 2015). In 2009, these groups promised to become non-violent political parties (Buchanan 2015). The Mayi-Mayi groups are named after their leaders (Buchanan 2015).

Mayi-Mayi groups are often disorganized, untrained, and undisciplined (Global Security n.d.). The Mayi-Mayi militias often clash with each other (Global Security n.d.). They do not have a political wing, but operate as a militia. The group had 5,000 to 8,000 fighters organized around 19 commanders in the Kivu region (ICG 2006, 2).

Primary ethnic groups in Kivu/Katanga are Lubakat and Hemba (ICG 2006, 5). Members were often Tembo (Global Security n.d.).

Specific member size is vague, however sources state the presence of thousands of Mayi-Mayi fighters within dozens of poorly connected militias throughout Congo (Gettleman 2008).

Members of the Mayi-Mayi militias are young, marginalized school dropouts who use violence as a method to rebel against the Congolese political and social order (Vlassenroot and Acker 2001, 51, 52, 58). As a result, the militias seek to enforce egalitarianism within their own organizational structure (Vlassenroot and Acker 2001, 59).

The Mayi-Mayi militias grew in membership due to an agricultural labor surplus of young men, the notion of ethnic violence as a means to institute change (as demonstrated in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the violence that followed), and the development of militarized strategies to increase economic control (Vlassenroot and Acker 2001, 55).

(VICE: Many of the mines were controlled by militias until international pressure. In 2010, the US passed a law that made tech companies ensure they don't get their coltan and other metals from conflict mineral mines.)

The development of Congolese militias is a result of the extreme social and political deprivation of young, poor, and uneducated individuals (Vlassenroot and Acker 2001, 51, 52). These young members used the militias as a form of survival and self defence against this deprivation (Vlassenroot and Acker 2001, 52). Violence is used as a method for some members to achieve status (Vlassenroot and Acker 2001, 53, 54). These militias' objectives are constantly shifting and often vague - at first, the Kabila-led AFDL rebellion incentivized militias to protect the Congolese against foreign (especially Tutsi) invasion (Vlassenroot and Acker 2001, 52). The AFDL is a Tutsi umbrella organization whose primary goal was to overthrow Zairean president Mobutu (Global Security n.d.).

The Mayi-Mayi militias are an example of these young individuals' rebellion against the Congolese social hierarchy for a more egalitarian social order (Vlassenroot and Acker 2001, 58).

The objectives of the May-May militias widely differ from structured groups with clear political objectives and from bandits and loose gangs who use the name Mayi-Mayi to mask their wide abuses and violence towards the Congolese people (Vlassenroot and Acker 2001, 60).

External Ties

Due to the groups' mass human rights violations and absence of allegiances, they most likely receive no external aid. As the Mayi-Mayi began to emerge, local businessmen

immediately mobilised these militias to eliminate the competition of Tutsi businesses and protect their economic holdings in North Kivu (Vlassenroot and Acker 2001, 59).

The Mayi-Mayi are allegedly tied with the FDLR due to their mutual enemy - the Rwandan Tutsi led government. Many members of the Mayi-Mayi and FDLR are Hutus who participated in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 escaping prosecution from the Tutsi led Rwandan government. (Vice). The group fought against the RCD (ICG 2003; Global Security n.d.). The May-May also clashed with each other.

Group Outcome

After the First Congo War, many Mayi-Mayi militias agreed to disarm (Gettleman 2008). However, Mayi-Mayi militias in eastern Congo continued to launch violent attacks (Gettleman 2008).

In May 2009, fifteen Mayi-Mayi groups formed to become a political party called the Union of Democratic Congolese Resistance (URDC) (Global Security n.d.). Another group of 9 Mayi-Mayi groups formed a party called the Alliance of Popular and Patriotic Forces of Congo (Global Security n.d.). There was also a secondary proliferation of Mayi-Mayi militias following the CNDP disarmament agreement.

The violence between Mayi-Mayi militias have caused the displacement of thousands civilians (Global Security n.d.). Due to their mass human rights violations, the UN supplied 20,000 peacekeeping and police officers to the DRC to combat the violence incited by Mayi-Mayi militias (Gettleman 2008). Various Mayi-Mayi militias were still violent as of 2012.

Notes for Iris:

-these are originally local militia groups to repel Rwandan invasion

XI. ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES

Min. Group Date: 1993

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 1996

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire, AFDL, ADFL

Group Formation: 1996

Group End: 1997 (become state force), 1999 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The ADFL was formed and organized in 1995 or 1996 by Uganda and the RPF (Global Security n.d.). The group's goal was to overthrow Zairean president Mobutu (Global Security n.d.). The ADF's first recorded attack was in October 1996 when it raided several refugee camps (Global Security n.d.).

The ADF was involved in both the First and Second Congolese Wars (World Peace Foundation 2015). During the First Congolese War, the ADF and Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) partnered in a conflict against the former Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR), the Rwandan Interahamwe militia, and former President Mobutu Sese Seko's Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) (World Peace Foundation 2015). The ADF and RPA murdered thousands of Hutu civilian refugees (World Peace Foundation 2015). Recorded attacks incited by the ADF occur throughout the DRC and Uganda, because as Hutu refugees fled the camps, the ADF chased and killed the civilians to multiple areas throughout the DRC (World Peace Foundation 2015). The ADF blocked humanitarian assistance for the Hutu refugees (World Peace Foundation 2015). In addition, during this time, the FAZ deported Tutsi civilians (World Peace Foundation 2015).

During the Second Congolese War of 1998, the ADF led government targeted Tutsi, Rwandan, and Banyamulenge groups (World Peace Foundation 2015). These groups are of Rwandan descent, however they had lived in the DRC for multiple generations (World Peace Foundation 2015).

Geography

The ADF has incited numerous attacks throughout the DRC and Uganda (GTD 2017). Some rebels claim they started training in Rwanda in 1995. Kabila was also living in exile around Lake Tanganyika and returned to lead the DRC when the ADF invaded Zaire (Thom 1999).

Initially, the group attacked refugee camps along the DRC-Rwanda border (World Peace Foundation 2015). These refugee camps consisted primarily of Hutu civilians (World Peace Foundation 2015).

Organizational Structure

The ADF was considered relatively weak (World Peace Foundation 2015). Sources debate as to which members the ADF is composed of (IRB 2008). Some state the group is primarily composed of Tutsis (Global Security n.d.; IRB 2008). However, others state

some members were of the Luba and Shaba ethnic origins and Rwandan descent (IRB 2008). The Secretary General of the ADF was Rwandan (IRB 2008). The ADF is led by Laurent-Desiré Kabila (World Peace Foundation 2015; IRB 1998). When Kabila seized the DRC presidency from Mobutu, the Rwandan and Ugandan government deemed him unfit and too erratic, incompetent, and independent (Global Security n.d.). Despite promises of democracy and a change from the dictatorship of Mobutu, during his presidency, these promises failed and Kabila proved no better than Mobutu (Global Security n.d.). The ADF had an estimated 20,000 troops in 1997 (Gleditsch 2013, 242).

External Ties

During the initial rebellion in 1996, the ADF was supported by Rwandan and Ugandan forces (World Peace Foundation 2015). The ADF was formed and organized in 1996 by Uganda and the RPF (Global Security n.d.). The two countries provided military assistance to the ADF; Rwanda may have provided training (IRB 1998). The group was also allied with Burundi, Angola, and other bordering countries (World Peace Foundation 2015). However, as Kabila seized the presidency of the DRC, tensions grew between him and his supporters (World Peace Foundation 2015). In 1998, the Rwandan and Ugandan government incited a rebellion against Kabila's leadership (World Peace Foundation 2015). Uganda funded self-defence militias to protect local communities in the DRC (BBC 2014). Rwanda and Uganda also utilized and supported a rebel group called the Rassemblement Congolais Democratique (RCD) (World Peace Foundation 2015). This group consisted of many former members of the ADF (World Peace Foundation 2015). Although the RCD failed to overturn Kabila's government, conflict between the two groups continued to escalate and ultimately led to the Second Congo War (World Peace Foundation 2015).

In 2010, the United Nations accused Rwanda for war crimes and genocide against the Hutus in the DRC (BBC 2014). Rwanda rejected these accusations (BBC 2014).

Group Outcome

In 1996, the ADF seized most of the territory of the DRC (World Peace Foundation 2015). In 1997, the ADF replaced president Mobutu Sese Seko with their own leader, Laurent-Desiré Kabila (World Peace Foundation 2015; IRB 1998). With the establishment of a new leader, the ADF renamed Zaire the DRC (World Peace Foundation 2015). Once in power, the ADF denied and prohibited the participation of other political parties within the DRC (IRB 1998). However, President Kabila promised to hold elections in 1999 (IRB 1998).

In 1999, Kabila demobilized the ADF although they had not really been opposed to the government since 1997 (Canada IRB 2008). Some members of the group disarmed

while other members became the foundation for RCD-Goma, MLC, and PPRD (Canada IRB 2008).

In 2001, president Kabila was assassinated and succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila (World Peace Foundation 2015; Jeune Afrique 2017). Under Joseph Kabila, conflict began to decline due to the increasing presence of UN peacekeeping operations and decreasing involvement of major regional actors (World Peace Foundation 2015). In 2001, along with the other members of the conflict, Kabila established the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) (World Peace Foundation 2015).

On September 6, 2002, the DRC's external supporters, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia agreed to withdraw from the conflict after international pressure to do so (World Peace Foundation 2015). After their withdrawal, the DRC prepared for democratic elections (World Peace Foundation 2015). However, despite the decrease in foreign conflict, local conflict continued in North Kivu, South Kivu, and North Katanga amongst the RCD-G, MLC, and Kabila led government (World Peace Foundation 2015). The fighting was an effort to stall the DRC government transition (World Peace Foundation 2015).

Notes for Iris:

- aliases are wrong here
- how do they get from trying to get revenge for the genocide → center-seeking?
- group has no ideology when they're formed
- first and second congo war are both center-seeking: main difference is the ADF switches from being the armed group to the government?

XII. ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA

Min. Group Date: 1994

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Armed People For The Liberation Of Rwanda, Armie Pour La Libiration Du Rwanda (Alir), Army For The Liberation Of Rwanda, Army For The Liberation Of Rwanda (Alir)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1994 (FAS) or 1998 (ICG)

Group End: 2001

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

ALIR was formed by a merger of the Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR) and the Interahamwe sometime between 1994 and 1998 (Carey and Mitchell 2013; FAS 2004). The FAR and Interahamwe are responsible for the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (BBC 2006; Carey and Mitchell 2013; FAR 2004). The two groups had fled from Rwanda to the DRC in fear of prosecution by Rwanda's new government (BBC 2006; Carey and Mitchell 2013; FAR 2004).

The group's first violent incident came during the Congolese War as late as 1998. ALIR was first used by then rebel leader Laurent Kabila during the Congolese War of 1998-2002 to protect against Rwandan invaders (Carey and Mitchell 2013; ICG 2005, 2). ALIR's primary objective was to overturn Rwanda's Tutsi dominated government into one dominated by Hutus (Carey and Mitchell 2013; FAS 2004). The group is therefore center-seeking (Carey and Mitchell 2013). In addition, one source infers that the group sought to complete the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (Carey and Mitchell 2013).

In 1999, members of the group attacked English speaking tourists due to the U.S. and U.K. support of Rwanda's Tutsi president, Paul Kagame (BBC 2006). In 1996, ALIR threatened to kill US citizens and the U.S. ambassador to Rwanda (FAS 2004).

Geography

ALIR is present throughout eastern DRC and is the most active group in that region (Carey and Mitchell 2013). It has an external base in the DRC even though it does not conduct many attacks inside Rwanda. In 1999, the group incited an attack against English speaking tourists in a Ugandan national park (BBC 2006). The group is transnational.

Organizational Structure

ALIR is composed of members of the Interahamwe (Hutu extremists), former members of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), and members of the Mayi-Mayi militias (Carey and Mitchell 2013). Members are Hutu. Group size is vague, however one source measured membership in the thousands (ICG 2005, 2). ALIR is the armed branch of the Party for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALIR) (FAS 2004). The group has a political wing.

ALIR has two branches - one that is integrated in the Congolese army and the other fighting a guerilla war in eastern DRC against both the Rwandan army and the ANC (ICG 2005, 2). The ANC is the armed wing of the RCD-G (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma), which is allied with Rwanda (ICG 2005, 2).

External Ties

During the Congolese War of 1998-2002, ALIR/FDLA allied with the Kinshasa government to protect against Rwandan invaders (Carey and Mitchell 2013; ICG 2005, 2). The government provided arms, training, and supplies for the group (Carey and Mitchell 2013).

The US has prosecuted members of ALIR responsible for the murder of US tourists in 1999 (Carey and Mitchell 2013).

The government of Rwanda has accused President Kabila's government of supporting ALIR and other militias (Carey and Mitchell 2013). After the violation of the Lusaka Agreement, in 2001, President Kabila used the ALIR to incite an attack against Rwanda (Carey and Mitchell 2013). The Lusaka Agreement of 1999 was a ceasefire agreement signed by Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Uganda, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe (United Nations A, n.d.). The peace agreement sought to deploy UN peacekeeping troops to end the violence in the DRC (United Nations A, n.d.). ALIR was not mentioned in the Lusaka Agreement and was not a party in peace negotiations (Carey and Mitchell 2013).

After the establishment of the Pretoria agreement of 2002, Kabila's government withdrew support of the Alir and declared personae non grata against the group's leaders (Carey and Mitchell 2013). After the failure of the Lusaka Agreement, the Pretoria agreement was established specifically to ease conflict between the DRC and Rwanda (United Nations B, n.d.). The agreement called for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops in the DRC and dismantling of Alir (United Nations B, n.d.). However, Kabila's government is still accused of supporting multiple Congolese militias, including the Mai Mai (Carey and Mitchell 2013).

Group Outcome

In an effort to combat terrorism, the Rwandan government increased border security and control against terrorist financing (US Department of State 2006). Dates when this began are not stated. The last attack occurred in 2001, when President Kabila used ALIR to incite an attack against Rwanda (Carey and Mitchell 2013). In 2001, the two branches of the ALIR - the branch originally integrated in the Armed Forces and the militant wing - merged to form the FDLR (US Department of State 2006; FAS 2004).

After the establishment of the Pretoria agreement of 2002, Kabila's government withdrew support of the Alir and declared personae non grata against the group's leaders (Carey and Mitchell 2013). The agreement called for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops in the DRC and dismantling of ALIR (United Nations B, n.d.).

Notes for Iris:

- the group's formation date is a little unclear. Between 1994 and 1998 is when they fled to DRC, but weren't officially organized until 1998
- Kabila partially used the group to protect against a Rwandan invasion
- multiple political aims? ALIR partially used to protect DRC

XIII. RASTAS
Min. Group Date: 1994
Max. Group Date: 2007
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2005

Group End: 2007 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Rastas are a militant group primarily composed of Rwandan Hutus - many of whom allegedly participated in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and had fled prosecution as part of the FDLR (IRIN 2005; NYT 2007; HRW n.d.). It is notorious for its numerous human rights violations and has been singled out by the United Nations mission in the DRC, MONUC (IRIN 2005). These violations include summary execution, rape, beating, and hostage taking (IRIN 2005). The Rastas have committed these violations along with the FDLR (IRIN 2005). The group has no objective besides a pursuit of money and the mental and physical destruction of women and civilians (IRIN 2005; NYT 2007; HRW n.d.). Attacks are sporadic and not recorded. The group was first mentioned in 2005, however this date is only an approximation (IRB 2007; IRIN 2005). The group has no politicized opposition to the government. The Rastas are a splinter of the FDLR (ABC 2005; HRW n.d.).

Geography

The Rastas are present throughout eastern DRC (IRIN 2005). They operate in FDLR-held regions (IRB 2007). No sources stated attacks outside of the DRC, so the group is most likely not transnational.

Organizational Structure

The Rastas fund their operations by raiding villages and kidnapping women for ransom (NYT 2007; IRB 2007). The group consists of fewer than one hundred members (HRW n.d.). Most of the members are Rwandan Hutus and ex-FDLR members - many of whom allegedly participated in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (IRIN 2005; NYT 2007; HRW n.d.; ABC News 2005). Members were notable for wearing Lakers jerseys and dreadlocks (New York Times 2007).

External Ties

The Rastas have incited numerous operations and human rights violations along with the FDLR, however the FDLR denies this connection (IRIN 2005; IRB 2007). Both groups are Rwandan Hutu rebel groups (IRB 2007). In fact, the Rastas consist of many ex-FDLR members (ABC 2005). The FDLR claims it is protecting DRC civilians from the Rastas, however the FDLR has incited countless attacks on the same civilians it states it protects (BBC 2005). Conflict between the two groups has displaced thousands of Congolese civilians (ABC 2005; HRW n.d.). Despite this conflict and the FDLR's supposed distancing from the Rastas, the FDLR does not interfere with the Rastas and some Rastas members reportedly pass FDLR positions (ABC 2005).

Group Outcome

The DRC army has planned operations to prosecute the Rastas responsible for the mass human rights violations against DRC citizens (IRIN 2005). The DRC army, however, has also been accused of crimes against women (NYT 2007). The United Nations has launched peacekeeping missions in the DRC to protect its women (NYT n.d.). Conflict between the Rastas and FDLR is ongoing (ABC 2005). The group was last mentioned in 2007 and seems to have disappeared since then (NYT 2007; Canada IRB 2007).

- XIV. FORCES DEMOCRATIQUES DE LIBERATION DU RWANDA (FDLR)
Min. Group Date: 1994
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: FDLR, Front for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda

Group Formation: 2000

Group End: active - last incident in 2016 (GTD 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The FDLR is a notably violent Hutu rebel group that formed in 2000 in opposition to Rwandan President Paul Kagamé's government (UN 2004; Boisselet 2015; Canada IRB 2007). The group is a merger between ALIR and other Hutu rebel groups. Président Paul Kagamé represented the RPF, a Rwandan political party responsible for ending the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 (BBC 2011; History 2009). The group seeks to overthrow the current Rwandan government (Buchanan 2015). The group incited its first attack in 2005 in the DRC, but was likely violent earlier (Global Terrorism Database 2017).

Geography

The FDLR is based in eastern DRC (Canada IRB 2007). According to the Agence France-Presse (AFP), the group controls an estimated 50 percent of the North and South Kivu provinces of the DRC (Canada IRB 2007).

Attacks incited by the FDLR occurred throughout the DRC and Rwanda (Global Terrorism Database 2017). A steep majority of attacks occurred within the DRC (Global Terrorism Database 2017).

Organizational Structure

The FDLR is led by Ignace Murwanashyaka and military leader Sylvestre Mudacumura, a Rwandan wanted by the International Criminal Court for inciting war crimes in eastern Congo (Canada IRB 2007; Buchanan 2015). Members of the group primarily consist of exiled people responsible for the Rwandan Genocide and ex-militants from the ALIR (Canada IRB 2007). These individuals include former members of the Rwandan Armed Forces and ex-fighters of the *interahamwe* - a Hutu militia that incited the mass murder of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in the Rwandan Genocide (Canada IRB 2007, Lister 2011). Sources widely differ on estimates of FDLR membership; however, estimates converge at around several thousand (Canada IRB 2007). Membership has declined to around 1,000-1,500 since 2009 (Buchanan 2015). As of 2004, the group consisted of an estimated 3,000 members (Global Security n.d.).

The FDLR has an armed wing known as FOCA (Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi) operating in South Kivu (Buchanan 2015).

The Rastas is a splinter group of the FDLR known for its allegations of kidnapping and demanding ransom (Canada IRB 2007). The group operates in FDLR-held areas (Canada IRB 2007). The FDLR denies any ties to this group (Canada IRB 2007).

External Ties

The FDLR is a shared enemy of Rwanda and Congo (Boisselet 2015). No sources stating external support were found.

The Rastas is a splinter group of the FDLR known for its allegations of kidnapping and demanding ransom (Canada IRB 2007). The group operates in FDLR-held areas (Canada IRB 2007). The FDLR denies any ties to this group (Canada IRB 2007).

Group Outcome

In 2005, the Congolese government launched an offensive against the FDLR (Canada IRB 2007). However, the offensive was halted in 2007 due to a fear of increasing ethnic

tensions in eastern Congo and an inability to distinguish between the Congolese Army and FDLR soldiers (Canada IRB 2007).

The group is criticized by Amnesty International and the United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks for inciting human rights violations including pillaging, rape, ethnicity based mass murder, kidnapping, and the mobilization of child soldiers and continues to be a driving force in the instability and violence against the Congolese people (Canada IRB 2007; Buchanan 2015). The group continued to incite attacks on citizens and the media as late as 2016 (Global Terrorism Database 2017; Buchanan 2015).

XV. WEST NILE BANK FRONT (WNBFB)

Min. Group Date: 1995

Max. Group Date: 1996

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: WNBFB, WNBFLF, West Nile Bank Liberation Front

Group Formation: 1993

Group End (Outcome): 2000

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The WNBF formed in 1993 to overthrow Museveni (CNN 1997), and it had goals to also create a separate West Nile state and restore Amin to power (Day 2011, 452). It may have had an ethno-nationalist ideology, although it never clearly preferred one ethnic group over another.

Geography

The group operated in the West Nile region of Uganda as well as the Sudanese towns of Kaya and Oraba-Miju (Day 2011, 451). It also had a base in the DRC (Day 2011, 451; Uganda Radio Network 2007).

Organizational Structure

The leader of the WNBF was Col. Juma Oris who had previously served in the Amin regime (CNN 1997). The Ugandan Army killed Oris in 1997, who was replaced by Moses Chaku (CNN 1997), a former Army captain (UK Home Assessment 2001, 42). The group was an amalgamation of separate ethnic groups in the West Nile region, including Kakwa, Aringa, Muslims, and non-Muslims (Day 2011, 452). Its number of fighters and sources of funding remain unknown.

External Ties

The group received external support from Sudan including a transnational base of operations (Day 2011, 451). It was extremely dependent on support, and was forced to fight the SPLA on Sudan's command instead of directing their efforts against Museveni (Day 2011, 451).

It coordinated campaigns with anti-RCD rebels and Interahamwe rebels (FAS 1999).

Group Outcome

A faction of the WNBF known as the Uganda National Rescue Front II formed in 1997 (Day 2011, 451-452). In 1998, the group left its bases in the DRC and Sudan (Uganda Radio Network 2007). The group stopped conducting attacks by 2000 (UK Home Assessment 2001, 42).

- XVI. MOUVEMENT DE LIBERATION DU CONGO
Min. Group Date: 1998
Max. Group Date: 2002
Onset: 1998

Aliases: Movement For The Liberation Of Congo (Mlc), Mouvement De Lib_ration Congolais, Mouvement De Lib_ration Congolais (Mlc), Mouvement De Lib_ration Du Congo, Mouvement De Lib_ration Du Congo (Mlc), Mouvement Pour La Liberation Du Congo, Mouvement Pour La Lib_ration Du Congo, Mouvement Pour La Liberation Du Congo (Mlc), Movement For The Liberation Of Congo

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1998

Group End: 2003 (disarm and transition to politics → violent political party), 2007 (last violent incident)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The MLC formed in 1998 as a rebel group seeking to overthrow Kabila's government (Gleditsch et al. 244, 2013; RRT 2009). They deemed his presidency a dictatorship (Gleditsch et al. 244, 2013). The group was founded by Bemba (Gleditsch et al. 244, 2013). The group is center-seeking (Global Security n.d.). Its main objective was to overthrow Kabila's government (Global Security n.d.). In 2003, it became a socialist political party and advocated social justice and nationalism (RRT 2009). The MLC's first attack occurred approximately when the group formed in 1998 (IRB 2004).

Geography

The MLC is transnational and operates bases in Uganda (Gleditsch et al. 245, 2013). It is unknown when they set-up bases in Uganda. The group allegedly committed war crimes in the Central African Republic (RDC 2012). In 2008 the group's leader, Bemba, was arrested in Belgium and handed to the ICC for prosecution (RDC 2012; IRB 2012; BBC 2006). These crimes included the mass rape of women and murder of civilians (BBC 2006).

The MLC controlled and emerged in Gbadolite, the capital of the Equateur province in northwest DRC (HRW 2001; Washington Post 2001; Global Security n.d.). In 1998, after the increase in aid from Uganda, the MLC captured northern DRC (BBC 2006). The group is transnational.

Organizational Structure

The MLC was founded and led by Jean-Pierre Bemba (Gleditsch et al. 244, 245, 2013; RRT 2009; IRB 2004). As the president of the MLC and commander-in-chief of its armed wing, the ALC, Bemba has a wide range of power within the group (Global Security n.d.). He is responsible for the group's goals and aims (Global Security n.d.). Jean-Pierre Bemba comes from a wealthy family and holds familial ties to President Mobutu (RRT 2009). In 2003, Bemba became the vice president of the DRC under the Pretoria peace deal (BBC 2016; RRT 2009). The MLC is the second largest rebel group in the DRC (Global Security n.d.). The MLC established a quasi-government in the Equateur

Province and received its funding by taxation (Gleditsch et al. 245, 2013). The group's leader, Bemba, also had access to timber, gold, diamond, and precious stones (Global Security n.d.). Bemba is the major source of the group's funding (Global Security n.d.). The group had a political wing and an armed wing. Uganda trained thousands of young Congolese to establish an armed wing of the MLC (HRW 2001). Membership size grew overtime; in 1999 and 2000 the group had an estimated 10,000 troops and an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 in 2001 (Gleditsch et al. 245, 2013).

Its members and founders consist of former members of the Zairean Armed Forces (FAZ), the Special Presidential Unit (DSP) of the Mobutu Sese Seko regime, and soldiers from the Republic of Congo (RRT 2009). The MLC is deemed the most militarily organized group that participated during the Second Congo War (Global Security n.d.). The group's military branch is the Armée de Libération du Congo (ALC) (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group received explicit military support from Uganda (Gleditsch et al. 245, 2013; IRB 2004; HRW 2001; BBC 2006). Uganda trained thousands of young Congolese to establish an armed wing of the MLC (HRW 2001). Many of the MLC members trained by Uganda were children (HRW 2001). In 1999, the MLC was affiliated with a Rwandan faction of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) but the alliance was broken after a conflict between Rwanda and Uganda (RRT 2009).

In 2002, President Patasse of the Central African Republic used the MLC and its military branch, the ALC to suppress a coup attempt (Global Security n.d.). However, once the MLC successfully quenched the coup, it remained in the CAR and committed countless war crimes (Global Security n.d.). The group's leader, Bemba, was later tried and prosecuted by the ICC (RDC 2012).

Group Outcome

The Pretoria peace accord of 2002 integrated the MLC into the DRC's transitional government (RRT 2009). On April 7, 2003, the MLC became a legalized socialist political party (RRT 2009). Prior to the 2006 elections, members and supporters of the MLC have been subject to arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detention, torture, and other forms of political intimidation and suppression (RDC 2012; IRB 2012). These misconducts were incited by local and national authorities (RDC 2012; IRB 2012). The obstruction of democracy incited by the DRC government caused armed conflict between the government and the MLC (RDC 2012). In 2006-2007, violence between these groups killed hundreds, and a coexistence between opposition and governing political parties in the Parliament began to evolve (RDC 2012). This was the group's last recorded violent

incident (RDC 2012). During the years of 2006-2011, the MLC was the primary opposition party in the DRC (IRB 2012).

Notes for Iris:

-why are they in CAF?

-the group is first an insurgency and then later a violent political party after 2003

-violence peaked in 2006-2007 - they may be violent later, but there's not good evidence to support this

-the leader self-finances the insurgency

XVII. BANYAMULENGE REBELS

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 1998

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Note: not the m23 group

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1996

Group End: 1998 (Formed into the RCD)

*umbrella for larger Banyamulenge/Tutsi movement in north Kivu

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Individuals of the Banyamulenge ethnicity are primarily Tutsis of Rwandan origin (Rukundwa 2004). In 1996, members of the group formed a loose local militia force after the DRC government attempted to expel the Banyamulenge from the country (Independent 1996). Fearing prosecution from the Tutsi led government, Hutu militants fled Rwanda and crossed into the DRC to continue the massacre of Tutsi, Banyamulenge civilians in mass numbers (RRT 2010, 3; Guardian 2012). Due to the lack of international intervention, the Banyamulenge militias formed to protect against these Hutu rebels (Guardian 2012). The Banyamulenge people were exiled by their Congolese counterparts and deemed Rwandan rather than Congolese (Reid 2014). During the First Congo War of 1966-7, the Zairean army killed hundreds of Banyamulenge civilians (Reid 2014). It is unknown when the group's first violent attack occurred.

The objectives of the Banyamulenge insurgencies have changed over time (RVI 2013, 45). Originally, the militias formed to protect against violent Hutu rebels (RVI 2013, 45; Guardian 2012).

Geography

The Banyamulenge people are concentrated in the South Kivu province of eastern DRC (Rukundwa 2004). No bases were found.

Organizational Structure

Sources on the group's leadership were not found. In 2003, there were an estimated 60,000 to 100,000 Banyamulenge living in the DRC (RRT 2010). Members are ethnic Banyamulenge, which means they are Rwandan or Burundi Tutsis (Independent 1996; Rukundwa 2004). The group primarily organized as a militia and did not have any political wing (Guardian 2012; RVI 2013, 45).

External Ties

In 1996, the Rwandan government sent troops into the DRC to protect Banyamulenge civilians from violence incited by Hutu rebels and persecution from the Congolese government and authorities (HRW 2002). The Banyamulenge militias were allegedly trained and armed in Rwanda (RRT 2010, 3). During this period, many Banyamulenge militants joined the AFDL (RRT 2010, 3).

Due to strong support from the Rwandan government, many Banyamulenge leaders have risen in power within the Congolese government (RVI 2013, 45). The community's close ties with the Rwandan government have caused the Congolese to claim the Banyamulenge people are Rwandan proxies - further undermining their Congolese citizenship (RVI 2013, 45).

Group Outcome

In 1998, the Banyamulenge rebels attacked government forces in eastern DRC (RRT 2010, 4). Soon after, the rebels formed the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) (RRT 2010, 4).

Notes for Iris:

- Is this just like an alias for AFDL? Or a local militia movement?
- a series of smaller communal militias under umbrella term
- seems like an umbrella
- lot of shared membership
- group political aims: response to grievances from the DRC and then violence escalates

XVIII. CONGOLESE RALLY FOR DEMOCRACY/LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 2003

Onset: 1998

Aliases: Congolese Rally For Democracy (Rcd), Congolese Rally For Democracy, Congolese Rally For Democracy (Rcd)/Rcd-Goma, Congolese Rally For Democracy/Liberation Movement, Congolese Rally For Democracy/Rcd-Kisangani, Rcd-Kisangani

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Armée Populaire Congolaise (APC) (HRW 2001)

Group Formation: 1998

Group End (Outcome): 2003 (politics/ceasefire)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

RCD/Goma was founded in August 1998 and the splinter group RCD/Kisangani originated out of RCD Goma (Global Security n.d.). The RCD (Congolese Rally for Democracy) was initially a front made up of three factions that had different political ideologies: one faction was politically conservative and loyal to the deceased Congolese dictator Mobutu Sese Soko; another faction was the umbrella group AFDL, composed of opposition groups to then-President Joseph Kabila; and finally, a third faction was dedicated to “democratic resistance” (Global Security n.d.). RCD had the initial goal of regime change, including the overthrow of then-President Kabila (Global Security). The RCD was connected to military operations from its founding, although its first leader Wamba dia Wamba’s official statements supported non-violence (HRW 2001).

Geography

From 1998-2003, the RCD governed North Kivu as a proxy for the Rwandan Government (Global Security n.d.). The RCD was active in northeastern and eastern Congo, specifically in the towns of Beni and Bunia (HRW 2001; Podur 2012). In August 1999, Rwandan government forces defeated Ugandan forces in Kisangani (Ibid.). Due to the instability in Kisangani, Wamba relocated the RCD-Kisangani's capital to first Kampala and then Bunia; he also renamed the Kisangani faction to Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML) (Ibid.). The Rwandan army provided military support to the RCD-Goma throughout South and North Kivu (Human Rights Watch 2002). The Burundian army also backed RCD-Goma in South Kivu near the border with Burundi, such as Ruzizi plain and Lake Tanganyika (Ibid.).

Organizational Structure

Ernest Wamba dia Wamba was the group's leader until 1999, when in-fighting resulted in his being ousted (Global Security n.d.). Emile Ilunga became the leader of RCD-Goma (Ibid.). Also over a period from 1998-1999, RCD further split into two factions: RCD-Kisangani (led by Wamba) and RCD-Goma (Global Security n.d.). The RCD-ML faction had a military wing named Armée Populaire Congolaise (APC) (HRW 2001). The majority of the RCD-ML army recruits included the ethnic groups Lendu, Hema, Nande, and Alur ethnic groups (Ibid.).

Wamba's background was as professor of history and he had long been involved in Congolese politics as an opponent of the former president Mobutu (HRW 2001). Prior to becoming the RCD's first leader, Wamba had lived in Tanzania for many years (HRW 2001).

The RCD constantly experienced in-fighting (HRW 2001). The three top officials at the group's founding, Wamba, Mbusa Nyamwisi, and Tibasima Ateenyi, created parallel political administrations in areas of Bunia and Beni that the RCD controlled (Ibid.). The group's military wings were also divided based on personal or ethnic ties, and each military unit tended to be primarily loyal to one of the RCD's leaders (Ibid.). In 1998, the group had approximately 60,000 fighters; in 1999, the group had approximately 50,000 fighters; in 2000, the group had approximately 15,000-20,000 fighters (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 244).

External Ties

The RCD split into two factions between 1998 and 1999 (Global Security n.d.). The mainstream faction was RCD-Goma, which was established first, in August 1998 (Ibid.). Later, the faction RCD-Kisangani splintered from RCD-Goma (Ibid.). Reportedly, the

RCD-ML was funded by Uganda and the RCD-Goma was funded by Rwanda (Global Security n.d.). Burundian forces also provided the RCD-Goma with military support (Human Rights Watch 2002).

Group Outcome

In July 1999, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was offered to all actors in Congo's second civil war (Global Security n.d.). The RCD's first leader, Wamba dia Wamba, was prevented from signing it although the source does not clarify if this opposition came from within RCD or the Congolese government (Ibid.). Eventually, on 31 August 1999, RCD-Goma and RCD-Kisangani signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (Ibid.). In 2003, RCD-Goma chairman signed an additional ceasefire in Sun City, South Africa (Ibid.).

Eventually, RCD forces joined the Congolese Army through power-sharing processes known as "brassage" and "mixage" (Podur 2012).

Notes -

Are these factions operating independently or still part of the same faction?

XIX. RCD-WAMBA
Min. Group Date: 1998
Max. Group Date: 2003
Onset: NA

Aliases: Congolese Rally For Democracy - Liberation Movement/Kisangani (Rcd-K-MI), Congolese Rally For Democracy - Liberation Movement/Kisangani, Congolese Rally For Democracy/Rcd-Kisangani-Movement For Liberation, Rcd-Kisangani-Movement For Liberation, Rcd-Wamba

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for the RCD.

Group Formation: This is an alias for the RCD.

Group End: This is an alias for the RCD.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for the RCD.

Geography

This is an alias for the RCD.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for the RCD.

External Ties

This is an alias for the RCD.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for the RCD.

- XX. RCD-ML
Min. Group Date: 1998
Max. Group Date: 2003
Onset: NA

Aliases: Rally For Congolese Democracy - Liberation Movement (Rcd-MI), Rally For Congolese Democracy - Liberation Movement, Rcd-MI

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for the RCD.

Group Formation: This is an alias for the RCD.

Group End: This is an alias for the RCD.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for the RCD.

Geography

This is an alias for the RCD.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for the RCD.

External Ties

This is an alias for the RCD.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for the RCD.

DRC Cases Part 2: 1999-2004 Last Updated: 17 December 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T2282	BUNDA DIA KONGO	1-Feb-07	2000	2008
T2041	PEOPLE'S REDEMPTION ARMY (PRA)		2001	0
T1546	CONGOLESE RALLY FOR DEMOCRACY-NATIONAL		2001	2003
T2186	UNION OF CONGOLESE PATRIOTS		2002	2012
T2403	ITURI PATRIOTIC RESISTANCE FRONT (FRPI)		2002	2005
T1478	FRONT FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION (FRP)		2002	2002
T1022	CONGOLESE RALLY FOR DEMOCRACY - PATRICK MASUNZU (RCD-PM)		2002	2002
T2394	NATIONALIST INTEGRATIONIST FRONT		2002	2005
T2187	CONGOLESE PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES (FAPC)		2003	2004

T2603	PARTY FOR UNITY AND SAFEGUARDING OF THE INTEGRITY OF CONGO		2003	2003
T2570	RCD-LN		2004	2004
T2598	CONGOLESE RALLY FOR DEMOCRACY - CHRISTIAN PAY PAY (RCD-CP)		2004	2004

- I. BUNDA DIA KONGO
Torg ID: 2282
Min. Group Date: 2000
Max. Group Date: 2008
Onset: 2007

Aliases: Bunda Dia Kongo (Bdk), Bunda Dia Kongo, Kingdom Of Kongo, Kingdom Of Kongo (Bdk)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Bundu dia Mayala (BDM)

Group Formation: 1986

Group End: 2017 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The BDK is a Kongolesse ethnically based fundamentalist political and animist religious movement (IRB 2002; RDC 2013; IRB 2003). It was founded in 1986 by Bernard Mizele Nsemi (IRB 2003; BBC 2017). Despite most sources stating the group was founded in 1986, the UN reports the BDK was founded in 1969 (Global Security n.d.; IRB 2011). Many of their religious beliefs are mixed versions of traditional Christian practices and beliefs (BBC 2017). Congolese officials however, have denied the group's ties to Christianity and state the BDK uses a political and religious front to conduct violent attacks and control the DRC's oil resources (Global Security n.d.). Members of the group protest the injustice, discrimination, and tribal segregation they claim to face under the DRC government (IRB 2003).

The BDK is separatist. It rejects central authority over the Bas-Congo province and seeks to re-establish the pre-colonial Kongo Kingdom (RDC 2013; IRB 2003). The Kongo Kingdom includes portions of western and southwestern Congo, northwestern Angola, and Gabon (IRB 2003; BBC 2017). The group is one of the Churches of Blacks (RDC 2013). The group advocates ethnic-based federalism (IRB 2003). The Congolese government and police consistently abuse members of the BDK because of their outspoken, anti-government views (IRB 2003). In 2008, the BDK faced significant persecution and changed its purpose and name to Bundu dia Mayala (BDM) (RDC 2013).

It is unknown when the group's first violent attack occurred, but it occurred as late as January 31, 2007, in Matadi, DRC (GTD 2017). The attack targeted citizens, property, and police and killed 12 (GTD 2017). However, the DRC government claims the group incited attacks throughout western DRC (Independent 2017).

Geography

The BDK is centered in Bas-Congo province (RDC 2013). Members primarily come from Bas-Congo and Kinshasa (IRB 2003). The group seeks to restore the Kongo Kingdom which includes portions of western and southwestern Congo, northwestern Angola, and Gabon (IRB 2003; BBC 2017). There is no direct evidence the group operated or conducted attacks in other countries despite this claim.

Organizational Structure

The BDK is led, founded, and governed by Bernard Mizele Nsemi, the group's self-proclaimed king and prophet (IRB 2003; BBC 2017). Nsemi is of the minority ethnicity, the Bakongo (BBC 2017). In 2006, Nsemi was elected into DRC parliament as an independent (BBC 2017). The group has an estimated 100,000 followers although it is unclear how many of those are fighters (Global Security n.d.). It has a political wing known as Bundu dia Malaya (Ireland RDC 2013). The BDK has been accused of using child soldiers (Global Security n.d.). No evidence about its funding was found.

External Ties

No external ties were found.

Group Outcome

In 2002, the Kibala led government banned the BDK (IRB 2003). In 2006, Nsemi was elected into DRC parliament as an independent (BBC 2017). In 2007 and 2008, the group launched a series of attacks in northern Congo to push out "non-natives" (IBT 2017). The DRC government launched a military operation in response to suppress the group (IBT 2017). In 2010, he formed the Bundu dia Mayala (BDM) after Kabila banned the BDK (BBC 2017). That year, Nsemi was arrested (BBC 2017). On May 23, 2011, the DRC prohibited the BDM movement despite its popularity in Bas-Congo (RDC 2013). In 2017, followers of the BDK movement helped Nsemi escape from prison (BBC 2017; Independent 2017). The DRC government claims the group incited attacks throughout western DRC in the beginning of 2017 (Independent 2017). MONUSCO, the UN's mission in the DRC, affirms the rebirth and rearmament of the BDK in 2017 (IBT 2017).

Notes for Iris:

-reminiscent of holy spirit movement from Uganda

-BDK is originally a political movement that later turns violent in response to arrests

Interesting quote from IBT: The resource-rich region formerly known as Bas-Congo, is the only province in the DRC with direct access to the sea.

II. PEOPLE'S REDEMPTION ARMY (PRA)

Torg ID: 2041

Min. Group Date: 2001

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: People's Redemption Army, People's Redemption Army, People's Redemption Army (Pra), People's Redemption Army (Pra)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2001

Group End: 2004 (last mention that group is active - unknown what happens)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

After Dr. Kizza Besigye of the FDC lost the 2001 Ugandan presidential elections, Col Kyakabale and Col Mande fled to Rwanda and created a call center to establish contacts in Uganda (Observer 2015). With the help of Besigye, the two Ugandan army officers formed the center-seeking, paramilitary group, the PRA around 2001 (Xinhua 2004; RDC 2009, 2). Their original objective was to attack government forces throughout Uganda and overthrow its government from bases in the DRC (Observer 2015; Amnesty International 2005; News24 2004). The group's only recorded attack was a raid 6,000 km from the Ugandan border in the DRC in 2003 (Akaki 2007). Notably, the group only came to attention because the Ugandan military announced the group was a threat (News24 2004).

Geography

After the 2001 presidential elections, two Ugandan army officers known as Col. Kyakabale and Col. Mande fled to Rwanda and created a call center to establish contacts in Uganda (Observer 2015). The group set up camps in eastern DRC in which they would receive recruits from Uganda and reorganize remnants of rebels around the camps (Observer 2015). The PRA's bases have been established in eastern DRC (Observer 2015). The group has not incited an attack in Uganda (Observer 2015).

Organizational Structure

The group was allegedly led by Col. Samson Mande (who denies the PRA exists/existed) and Lt. Col. Anthony Kyakabale (Observer 2015). According to Lt Col Kyakabale, the group's poor organization ultimately caused it to fail (Observer 2015). The poor organization was caused by a shift in leadership from Col. Kyakabale to Col Mande and conflicting operational orders (Observer 2015). In Rwanda, the PRA claimed to have 120 rebels (Observer 2015). The group had an estimated 200 trained rebels in 2004 (News24 2004). Some of its members included former UPDF officers (the armed forces of Uganda) (News24 2004; Observer 2015).

External Ties

The group allegedly received vocal support from Rwanda (Observer 2015). In November 2004, the governments of Uganda and Rwanda expelled two diplomats from each others' embassy in retaliation to Uganda's accusation that Rwanda allegedly trained a member of the PRA (Amnesty International 2005). The PRA allegedly tried to partner with remnant members of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (News24 2004). Two members allegedly received training in Rwanda, but it is unknown from whom (Amnesty International 2005).

Group Outcome

In 2003, high ranking members of the PRA were arrested by Rwandan security operatives and put under house arrest and later relocated to Sweden (Observer 2015). Many other members were later arrested and charged with treason, however their cases were dismissed in 2007 (Observer 2005). The group's last recorded attack was in 2003 (Akaki 2007). In December 2004, eight members of the PRA were charged with plotting to overthrow the government (Amnesty International 2005). Additionally, in 2004 DRC President Kabila launched 10,000 soldiers into eastern DRC to heighten security after claims that the PRA was planning an attack against Uganda (Xinhua 2004; News24 2004). Kyakabale claims the group failed to claim power because of its poor organization (Observer 2015).

Ellie notes for Iris:

- Group is somewhat comical - the Observer 2015 sounds kind of like an onion article in which ex leaders state they received "moral support" from Rwanda and a sudden arrest "disrupted their war plans"
- Does the group exist? Probably but the Ugandan government seems to exaggerate the threat

III. CONGOLESE RALLY FOR DEMOCRACY-NATIONAL

Torg ID: 1546

Min. Group Date: 2001

Max. Group Date: 2003

Onset: NA

Aliases: Congolese Rally For Democracy-National (Rcd-N), Congolese Rally For Democracy-National, Rassemblement Congolais Pour La Democratie-National, Rassemblement Congolais Pour La D_mocratie-National, Rassemblement Congolais Pour La Democratie-National (Rcd-N), Rassemblement Congolais Pour La D_mocratie-National (Rcd-N)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: RCD-National

Group Formation: 2001

Group End: 2005 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The RCD-N was originally created in 2000 by Roger Lumbala as a front organization for Ugandans to profit off of the diamond wealth of Bafwasende, a town in the DRC (HRW 2003; HRW 2001). It is a splinter group of RCD-Goma (Amnesty International 2003, 7). The group’s specific foundation date was not stated, however it most likely was formed the year Lumbala leaves the Rcd-ML (HRW 2001). The first attack was not stated.

Geography

The RCD-N is based in Isiro and Watcha areas of northern DRC (HRW 2003; HRW 2005). Fighting between the RCD-N, MLC, and RCD-ML occurred in Isiro-Bafwasende-Beni-Watsa of northeastern DRC (UN News Service 2002).

Organizational Structure

The RCD-N is led by Roger Lumbala (HRW 2003; RDC 2017). Lumbala was accused by the DRC government of participating in the M23 rebellion (RDC 2017; Jeune Afrique 2017). The M23 rebellion refers to the rebels of the Congolese Revolutionary Army who, in 2012, rose up against DRC president Kabila, but were later squashed by DRC government troops (BBC 2013). These charges were later dropped (Jeune Afrique

2017). Lumbala was originally a member of the RCD-Goma until 2000 (HRW 2001). He later joined the RCD-ML, however claimed it was too neglected and formed the RCD-N (HRW 2001). Many of the group's members are ex RCD-ML (HRW 2001). The group has few members and is severely disorganized (HRW 2003; HRW 2001). The RCD-N is split into smaller splinter groups that lack personal and/or local objectives (HRW 2001). The RCD-N is a faction of the RCD-Goma (Amnesty International 2003). The group, like most RCD groups, receive funding by taxing controlled areas (Amnesty International 2003). The group had a political wing that exerted political and administrative control over the group's territory in northeast DRC (Amnesty International 2003, 51). Prior to its creation, RCD-N leader Lumbala allegedly embezzled money from the RCD-ML (HRW 2001).

External Ties

In 2001 and 2002, the RCD-N allied with the MLC to capture mineral rich areas held by the RCD-ML (HRW 2003). Due to its small size, the RCD-N relies on the MLC for assistance to stay active (HRW 2003). The group has received military and political backing from the Ugandan government (Amnesty International 2003). Lumbala was accused by the DRC government of participating in the M23 rebellion (RDC 2017; Jeune Afrique 2017).

Group Outcome

In 2003, UN peacekeepers helped negotiate a ceasefire between the RCD-N, MLC, and RCD-ML (UN News Service 2002). The pact included a mutual agreement to cease fighting and allow the movement of civilians and humanitarian organizations (UN News Service 2002). MONUC, the UN mission in the DRC, agreed to immediately deploy military observation to ensure the upholding of the ceasefire (UN News Service 2002). In 2005, the group was integrated into the Congolese transitional government (HRW 2005). The group does not appear to have been violent after 2003.

IV. UNION OF CONGOLESE PATRIOTS

Torg ID: 2186

Min. Group Date: 2002

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Union Of Congolese Patriots (Upc), Union Of Congolese Patriots

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2000

Group End: 2015 (last attack)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The UPC is an ethno-nationalist militant group (HRW 2003). The group was founded by Thomas Lubanga and a few others on September 15, 2000, to promote the interests of the Gegere and Herma ethnicities (HRW 2003; ICC 2006). Overtime, the group’s objectives evolved (ICC 2006). Originally, the group sought to control Ituri land and

resources. The dispute evolved in an inter-ethnic conflict (BBC 2009). By 2002, the UPC became strictly Hema and aimed to establish Hema dominance within the government of the Ituri region (ICC 2006). The group incited violence to achieve its objective and targeted non-Herma populations within the Ituri region (ICC 2006). During the second half of 2002 and beginning of 2003, under Lubanga's leadership, the UPC and its military wing, the FPLC, began to engage in armed conflict with non-Herma militias, particularly the Lendu militia known as the Front Nationaliste Intégrationniste (FNI) (ICC 2006). During this time of conflict, the UPC incited violence against countless Lendu civilians as well as members of other ethnicities tied to the Lendu such as the Ngiti (ICC 2006; Global Security n.d.). Both of these ethnic groups were viewed as supporters of the Rcd-ML (Global Security n.d.). The inter-ethnic violence ultimately killed 50,000 people (IRIN 2008). The group's first recorded attack occurred on November 5, 2003, against the government in Bunia (GTD 2017). There were no fatalities (GTD 2017).

Geography

The UPC's headquarters are located in Bunia - a city in the Ituri region of the DRC (ICC 2006). The group is the primary party in power in the Ituri region (ICC 2006). The region is rich in gold (BBC 2009). Ituri is located in north-eastern DRC (BBC 2003).

Organizational Structure

The UPC is led by Thomas Lubanga, who is of Gegere-Herma ethnicity (HRW 2003; ICC 2006). The UPC is the political wing. Lubanga is commander-in-chief of the group's military wing, Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) (ICC 2006). The FPLC was founded in 2002 (ICC 2006). Members of the UPC and FPLC are primarily of the Hema ethnicity (ICC 2006). Membership size grew significantly as the FPLC recruited pre-existing Hema militias and soldiers (ICC 2006). In 2002, the membership size of the FPLC quickly reached 15,000 - over half of them were children under eighteen years old and some as young as eight (ICC 2006; BBC 2003). In 2006, Lubanga was arrested by the International Criminal Court for his forced recruitment and use of child soldiers (ICC 2006; IRIN 2008; Hague Justice Portal n.d.). On July 2, 2008, he was granted unconditional release despite being allegedly responsible for the mass murder of over 400 people (REDRESS 2008; BBC 2009). In 2012, he was finally prosecuted to 14 years of imprisonment (Global Security n.d.).

During the beginning of its formation, founders of the UPC established clear, organized military structures (ICC 2006). The organization of the group paralleled well-organized armies - each military sector was commanded by a trained military officer (ICC 2006). The FPLC, due to its organization, was able to adjust its structure as objectives shifted (ICC 2006). In 2003, the UPC split into two factions - the UPC-K under Kisembo Bahemuka and UPC-L under Thomas Lubanga (HRW 2005). The UPC-L was stronger militarily (HRW 2005).

External Ties

The UPC's president and FPLC's commander in chief, Thomas Lubanga, received military training in Uganda in 2000 (ICC 2006). In 2002, Uganda helped the UPC rise in power (HRW 2003; HRW 2005). The UPC was led by three Ugandan generals (Global Security n.d.). However, the group eventually politically turned from Uganda and in 2003 was pushed out of Bunia by the Ugandan army (HRW 2003). A few months later, the UPC fought back in Bunia (HRW 2003). After being excluded by the RCD-ML and MLC from the Mambassa ceasefire accords in 2002, the group allied with the Rwandan-backed Rcd-Goma in 2003 (HRW 2003; UK 2008). The group fought against the RCD-ML (Global Security n.d.).

In 2003, the UPC split into two factions - the UPC-K under Kisembo Bahemuka and UPC-L under Thomas Lubanga (HRW 2005). The UPC-L was stronger militarily (HRW 2005).

Group Outcome

The war in Ituri lasted from 1999-2003, during which the UPC along with six militias slowly dissolved as the Ugandan army became involved (BBC 2009). In addition, as the Ituri war continued to occur, French troops were deployed into Bunia, the capital of the Ituri region (BBC 2009). In 2003, after politically turning from Uganda, the UPC was pushed out of Bunia by the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) (HRW 2003; Global Security n.d.). The UPC fought back in Bunia a few months later (HRW 2003).

In 2003, the UPC split into two factions - the UPC-K under Kisembo Bahemuka and UPC-L under Thomas Lubanga (HRW 2005). The UPC-L was stronger militarily (HRW 2005).

In 2006, Lubanga was arrested by the International Criminal Court for his forced recruitment and use of child soldiers (ICC 2006; IRIN 2008; Hague Justice Portal n.d.). On July 2, 2008, he was granted unconditional release despite being allegedly responsible for the mass murder of over 400 people (REDRESS 2008; BBC 2009).

Violence declined after Lubanaga's arrest in 2006 (France 24 2012). The group resumed activity in 2012 at the start of the M23 rebellion (France 24 2012). The group's last recorded attack occurred on June 2, 2015, in Goma, DRC (GTD 2017). The attack, along with the Mai Mai, killed 7 people (GTD 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- Group rapidly rises then falls.
- lots of child soldiers

- ethnic conflict looks very different
- UPC seems more organized than RCD
- there are different tactics involved in this conflict than center-seeking group
- ethnic conflict is more violent

V. ITURI PATRIOTIC RESISTANCE FRONT (FRPI)

Torg ID: 2403

Min. Group Date: 2002

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: NA

Aliases: Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri (Frpi), Ituri Patriotic Resistance Front (Frpi)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: FRPI (Forces de Résistance Patriotique d'Ituri)

Group Formation: 2002

Group End: 2016 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The FRPI is a Lendu armed militia and political party in the Ituri province of the DRC (IBT 2017). It was founded in 2002 to assist local militias and leaders to fight the UPC (HRW 2003; IRIN News 2005). Violence caused by the FRPI militias is most commonly described as banditry rather than politically or ethnically motivated violence (Global Security n.d.). The group’s first recorded attack occurred on May 12, 2005, in Geti, DRC (GTD 2017). From 2014 to 2016, the FRPI’s number of incited attacks spiked after a silent period from 2006 to 20013 (GTD 2017).

Geography

The FRPI operates south of Bunia in the Ituri province of the DRC (HRW 2005). All recorded attacks occurred in the DRC (GTD 2017). In May 2003, along with the FNI, the group controlled Bunia (HRW 2003). The FRPI and its splinter group the FPJC operate in southern Ituri (IRIN 2010). The group is not transnational and does not have an external base.

Organizational Structure

The FRPI is a Lendu armed militia and political party in the Ituri province of the DRC (IBT 2017). Members of the FRPI are of the Ngiti ethnicity (HRW 2005). The Ngitis are Lendus from Southern DRC (IBT 2017). The group’s leader in 2005 was Adirodo (HRW 2003; IRIN News 2005). The group’s leader in 2013 was a former army commander known as Cobra Matata (IRIN News 2013). The group is commanded by Germain

Katanga (IBT 2017). In 2014, Katanga was tried and prosecuted by the ICC for war crimes including the recruitment of child soldiers, rape, and the mass murder of hundred of civilians in Ituri in 2003 (IBT 2017). The group had an estimated 9,000 members around 2003 (HRW 2003). The FRPI is organized in small groups to increase mobility (IRIN 2013). They perform in guerilla warfare The FRPI is viewed as the army of the FNI (HRW 2003). The FPJC is a splinter group of the FRPI (IRIN 2010).

External Ties

The FRPI received unspecified support from the DRC and Uganda armies to combat the Union of Congolese Patriots (IBT 2017; HRW 2003). In an effort to defeat the Herma led UPC, the group allied with the Ngiti led Nationalist Integrationist Front (FNI) (IRIN 2005; HRW 2003). Both groups supported the Ugandan army's offensive to drive the UPC out of Bunia in 2003 (IRIN 2005). The FRPI receives military training and weapons from the RCD-ML (HRW 2003). In 2007, most commanders of the FRPI merged into the Congolese army (IBT 2017). The FPJC is a splinter group of the FRPI (IRIN 2010).

Group Outcome

In 2002, the FRPI became an official political party and an armed movement at the same time (IRIN 2005). In 2006, the FRPI along with the FNI and MRC signed a ceasefire agreement with the DRC government (Global Security n.d.; UN 2007). However, the FRPI reneged on the peace agreement in 2010 and continued to incite violence against the Ituri civilian population (Global Security n.d.). In 2017, the Congolese army along with support from MONUSCO launched an effective operation against the FRPI (IBT 2017). The group's last attack occurred on July 21, 2016, in Gety, DRC (GTD 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- these are participants in the larger conflict between the UPC and RCD
- these groups helped push the UPC out of Bunia with Ugandan assistance
- all these groups are part of the larger Lundu ethnic group
- they become violent in 2002 because the UPC starts to escalate its campaign at that time

VI. FRONT FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION (FRP)

Torg ID: 1478

tMin. Group Date: 2002

Max. Group Date: 2002

Onset: NA

Aliases: Front For Peace And Reconciliation (Frp), Front For Peace And Reconciliation

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/wp-content/uploads/0207/12/BN-0702-DRCMonuc.pdf>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Hemia militia, Front pour la réconciliation populaire

Group Formation: 2002

Group End: 2002 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Hemia FRP participated in the 2002 and 2003 ethnic conflict within the Ituri province (Africa Research Institute 2007). The group’s first and only attack occurred on August 29, 2002 in Bunia, DRC (GTD 2017). There were no injuries or fatalities (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group’s first and only attack occurred on August 29, 2002, in Bunia, DRC (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

No information found.

External Ties

The FRP is opposed to the RCD-K-ML (IRIN 2002). The group accused the DRC government of supplying the RCD-K-ML with logistical and military aid (IRIN 2002).

Group Outcome

Prior to 2007, the FRP signed a peace agreement and began to disarm and reintegrate (Africa Research Institute 2007). After the agreement, the group disappears (Africa Research Institute 2007).

Notes for Iris:

- Hemia and Lundu are distinct organizations so may not be an alias
- details of the group make it seem like they aren't the same group

VII. CONGOLESE RALLY FOR DEMOCRACY - PATRICK MASUNZU (RCD-PM)

Torg ID: 1022

Min. Group Date: 2002

Max. Group Date: 2002

Onset: NA

Aliases: Congolese Rally For Democracy - Patrick Masunzu (Rcd-Pm), Congolese Rally For Democracy - Patrick Masunzu, Rassemblement Congolais Pour La Democratie - Patrick Mazunsu, Rassemblement Congolais Pour La Democratie - Patrick Mazunsu (Rcd-Pm)

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for RCD-Goma (IRIN 2002).

Group Formation: This is an alias for RCD-Goma (IRIN 2002).

Group End: This is an alias for RCD-Goma (IRIN 2002).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for RCD-Goma (IRIN 2002).

Geography

This is an alias for RCD-Goma (IRIN 2002).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for RCD-Goma (IRIN 2002).

External Ties

This is an alias for RCD-Goma (IRIN 2002).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for RCD-Goma (IRIN 2002).

VIII. NATIONALIST INTEGRATIONIST FRONT

Torg ID: 2394

Min. Group Date: 2002

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: NA

Aliases: Nationalist Integrationist Front (Fni), Nationalist Integrationist Front

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<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20332>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2002

Group End: 2007 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

During 2002 and 2003, the Ituri central government was non-existent, allowing multiple ethnic militias to gain power across the region (Global Security n.d.). In an ethnic conflict, each militia sought to seize control of the region's mineral wealth (particularly the gold mining regions in central Ituri) (Global Security n.d.). The FNI is an ethno-nationalist Lendu politico-military movement that participated in the larger fight against the UPC (HRW 2008; RVI 2013, 26). The group was founded in 2002 by Floribert Ngabu and advocates for Lendu interests (HRW 2005; RVI 2013, 26). Sources record FNI military activity since 2003 (RVI 2013, 27). The FNI held economic, political, and military control across northern Bunia (Global Security n.d.).

Geography

The FNI held economic, political, and military control across northern Bunia (Global Security n.d.). The group was not transnational and did not have an external base of operations.

Organizational Structure

The FNI is led by Floribert Ngabu (HRW 2008). The political party has a military wing that organizes Lendu militias (HRW 2008). At first, the FNI joined the Ngiti militia, which consisted of southern Lendus (HRW 2005). Members are ethnic Lendu. However, the two branches split after leadership disputes in 2004 (HRW 2005). When forming the FNI, its president, Floribert Ngabu sought to create a politico-military group similar to the structure of the UPC (RVI 2013, 26). During the Arua peace talks in which the FNI began to appoint commissioners, the group deliberately established members of different ethnic groups as the group's executives (RVI 2013, 27).

In 2003, the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) alongside the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) launched thousands of peacekeeping troops in the Ituri region (Global Security n.d.). This operation significantly decreased the number of militants from an estimated 25,000 in 2003 to 2,000 by mid-2006 (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

Originally, the Lendu elders resisted foreign interference, but eventually accepted unspecified Ugandan assistance (RVI 2013, 26). On March 6, 2003, the FNI partnered

with the Ugandan army and FRPI to drive the UPC out of Bunia, DRC (HRW 2008; RVI 2013, 30). Both groups supported the Ugandan army's offensive to drive the UPC out of Bunia in 2003 (IRIN 2005). Some sources consider the FRPI as the military wing of the FNI (RVI 2013, 30). The two branches split after leadership disputes in 2004 (HRW 2005). The FNI received military training and aid from the RCD-ML (HRW 2008; HRW 2005).

Group Outcome

A month after its formation, the Ugandan government invited the FNI and UPC to the Arua peace talks (RVI 2013, 26).

In 2003, the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) alongside the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) launched thousands of peacekeeping troops in the Ituri region (Global Security n.d.). This operation significantly decreased the number of militants from an estimated 25,000 in 2003 to 2,000 by mid-2006 (Global Security n.d.).

In 2007, the FNI along with the MRC and FRPI agreed to disarm and reintegrate into the community (UN News Center 2007). The group no longer had any violent attacks after it disarmed.

Notes for Iris:

- the group is similar to the FRPI and has a lot of similarities
- FNI and FRPI are more centralized than the RCD which operates in a more fragmented manner
- FNI originally wanted to model its organizational structure off of the UPC
- leadership didn't want to stress ethno-nationalist ideology even though they primarily recruited from one ethnic group

IX. CONGOLESE PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES (FAPC)

Torg ID: 2187

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 2004

Onset: NA

Aliases: Popular Armed Forces Of Congo (Fapc), Armed Forces Of The Congolese People, Armed Forces Of The Congolese People (Fapc), Congolese People's Armed Forces Fapc, Forces Armees Du Peuple Congolais, Forces Armees Du Peuple Congolais, Forces Armees Du Peuple Congolais (Fapc), Forces Armees Du Peuple Congolais (Fapc), People's Armed Forces Of Congo, People's Armed Forces Of Congo (Fapc)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2003

Group End: 2005 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

On September 6, 2002, the Kampala government signed an agreement with Kinshasa to retreat Ugandan influences in eastern DRC (Titeca 2011, 48). In an effort to continue control over the northeastern DRC’s resource-rich region of Ituri, Uganda turned to military leader Jérôme Kakwavu Bukande to create the FAPC (Titeca 2011, 44, 48). The group was founded in 2003 (HRW 2005). ICG says the group may have been founded as early as 2001, but no other sources could confirm this (ICG 2008, 29). The group was a local militia that became political when Uganda intervened to provide support so it could promote Ugandan aims. The group was already violent in 2003.

Geography

The FAPC is based in northeastern Congo in Aru and Mahagi (HRW 2005). The region is rich in natural resources including gold and timber (Titeca 2011, 44). In addition, the area is a significant trading center that controls several trade routes (Titeca 2011, 44).

Organizational Structure

The FAPC is led by Jérôme Kakwavu Bukande, a Banyarwanda from North Kivu (HRW 2005). Bukande has been accused of war crimes (HRW 2005; HRW 2003). The group has continuously switched its alliances between the government and Uganda (HRW 2005). In 2002, Bukande was accused of the recruitment of child soldiers (UN Security Council 2014). Prior to the group's formation, Bukande frequently switched groups (HRW 2005). Bukande was originally part of the RCD-ML, however transitioned to the RCD-N, and finally the UPC before establishing his own group, the FAPC (HRW 2005; HRW 2003). The group consisted of mostly foreign members - predominantly of the Rwandan ethnicity, the Tutsi Banyamulenge (Titeca 2011, 50). Group size is an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 people at an unknown date (Titeca 2011, 50). The group probably funded itself through extortion using trade routes in the region (Titeca 2011).

External Ties

The FAPC was founded with support from Uganda in an effort to protect the country's interests within the northeastern DRC (HRW 2005; Titeca 2011, 44). In May 2003, Bukande faced a rebellion; however, the attempt to overthrow his leadership was quickly quashed with Ugandan support (HRW 2005). The group controls illegal border posts between Uganda and the DRC (UN Security Council 2014).

Group Outcome

In May 2003, Bukande faced a coup attempt, but it failed when he mobilized Ugandan support (HRW 2005).

In January 2005, Bukande joined the Congolese army (FARDC) as a general (HRW 2005). Under his leadership in the FARDC, Bukande incited a series of war crimes including arbitrary execution, rape, arbitrary arrest, torture, and illegal detention throughout the Ituri region (UN News Service 2014). During the same year, the FAPC demobilized and joined the FARDC (Basongo 2005).

Notes for Iris:

-cult of personality around Bukande? RCD-LN: group political opposition changes back and forth Leadership change → disarm

- X. PARTY FOR UNITY AND SAFEGUARDING OF THE INTEGRITY OF CONGO
Torg ID: 2603

Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 2003
Onset: NA

Aliases: Pusic, Parti Pour L'unite Et La Sauvegarde De L'integrite Du Congo, Parti Pour L'unit_ Et La Sauvegarde De L'int_grit_ Du Congo, Parti Pour L'unite Et La Sauvegarde De L'integrite Du Congo (Pusic), Parti Pour L'unit_ Et La Sauvegarde De L'int_grit_ Du Congo (Pusic), Party For Unity And Safeguarding Of The Integrity Of Congo, Pusic

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2003

Group End: 2003

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In February 2003, Kawa Panga Mandro, the UPC's Minister of Defense founded PUSIC in retaliation to the southern Hema's dissatisfaction with the UPC (ICG 2008, 28; HRW 2003). PUSIC is a Hema militia (Reuters 2003). It is a splinter group of the UPC (US Department of State 2004). PUSIC serves as to protect Hemas against attacks incited by the FNI, FRPI, and UPC (ICG 2008, 29). UNICEF accused PUSIC of mobilizing child soldiers (US Department of State 2004). The group is presumably violent the year it forms. It was a militia trying to protect against other militias.

Geography

The group has a stronghold in the major town of Bunia in Ituri, eastern DRC (Reuters 2003). PUSIC controls territory along the Ugandan border, near Lake Albert (Reuters 2003). The area allegedly contains oil (Reuters 2003).

Organizational Structure

PUSIC is led by Chief Ysef Kahwa, a former member of the UPC (Reuters 2003). It is a splinter group of the UPC (US Department of State 2004). With a membership size of 3,100 militiamen, the group is considered one of the smallest militias operating along the Uganda-DRC border (Reuters 2003). Members are predominantly southern Hemas (HRW 2003). PUSIC has been accused of using child soldiers (US Department of State 2004).

External Ties

The group has support from Uganda (Reuters 2003; HRW 2003). The Ugandan government supplies weapons to PUSIC in exchange for the group's control of the Kasenyi Port on Lake Albert and the Kasenyi Bunia axis (ICG 2008, 28). By securing this trading port, PUSIC benefits the UPDF and Ugandan trade (ICG 2008, 28). Uganda military trained at least 250 children sent by PUSIC (US Department of State 2004). PUSIC possibly allied with the UPC during the offensive against the Lendu in Bunia 2003, however the probable alliance was most likely short-lived (HRW 2003).

PUSIC leader Kahwa claims he was supported by Rwanda when he was involved with the UPC (HRW 2003). However, he denies any ties with Rwanda while working with PUSIC (HRW 2003).

Group Outcome

In 2002, with Ugandan support, a former PUSIC leader along with two leaders from the FNI and FPDC created the FIPI, a coalition of militant groups (HRW 2003). The group was formed to destroy the UPC (HRW 2003). In 2003, the UN formed an agreement with PUSIC, and the group agreed to disarm (Reuters 2003).

- XI. RCD-LN
Torg ID: 2570
Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 2004
Onset: NA

Aliases: Congolese Rally For Democracy - Laurent Nkunda (Rcd-Ln), Congolese Rally For Democracy - Laurent Nkunda Faction, Congolese Rally For Democracy - Ln, Rassemblement Congolais Pour La Democratie - Laurent Nkunda Faction, Rassemblement Congolais Pour La D_mocratie - Laurent Nkunda Faction, Rcd-Ln

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<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/cndp.htm>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: National Synergy for Peace and Concord, Synergie, Synergie nationale pour la paix et la concorde

Group Formation: 2003 (splinter from RCD-Goma)

Group End: 2006 (merges or reorganizes into CNDP)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

As a leader in the RCD, Laurent Nkunda, along with two other rebel officers refused to integrate into the Congolese transitioning government in 2003 (RVI 2012, 18). His refusal was due to security concerns and mistrust of the Congolese government (RVI 2012, 18). He may have originally organized the group as the National Synergy for Peace and Concord to recruit support against the Congolese government (RVI 2012, 19). The RCD-LN was founded and led by Tutsi rebel leader Laurent Nkunda (RFI 2008). Although Nkunda stated that his militia only aimed to protect the Congolese Tutsi

minority (Banyamulenge) and overthrow the Kinshasa government, his opponents accuse him of committing atrocities for personal material gain (RFI 2008; Reuters 2009).

In 2004, along with 4,000 soldiers, Nkunda led a Congolese Tutsi rebellion and seized Bukavu - the capital of South Kivu (Reuters 2009).

Geography

The RCD-LN operated along the Great Lakes border (Reuters 2009). The group conducted attacks in Bukavu (Reuters 2009; HRW 2006). There is no evidence the group operated in another country or conducted transnational attacks.

Organizational Structure

The RCD-LN was founded and led by Tutsi rebel leader Laurent Nkunda (RFI 2008). Previous to the RCD, Nkunda fought with the RPF, AFDL, and the PRP (RFI 2008). Nkunda commanded the RCD-Goma army (RFI 2008). He was accused by the United Nations and Congolese government for inciting war crimes and treason (Al Jazeera 2009; HRW 2005). In 2004, Nkunda was named general of a new national Congolese army (HRW 2005). However, after refusing the position, Nkunda and his forces in the Masisi forests in North Kivu (HRW 2005). A year later, Nkunda organized a new rebellion, however no military operations were launched (HRW 2005).

External Ties

Rwanda allegedly supports Laurent Nkunda's refusal to integrate into the Congolese transitional government (RVI 2012, 19).

Group Outcome

In 2006, Nkunda and the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) signed a ceasefire agreement and agreed to integrate into the FARDC (Global Security n.d.). The group reorganized and created the CNDP in 2006 (Guardian 2009).

XII. CONGOLESE RALLY FOR DEMOCRACY - CHRISTIAN PAY PAY (RCD-CP)

Torg ID: 2598

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2004

Onset: NA

Aliases: Congolese Rally For Democracy - Christian Pay Pay (Rcd-Cp), Congolese Rally For Democracy - Christian Pay Pay, Congolese Rally For Democracy - Christian Pay Pay, Congolese Rally For Democracy - Christian Pay Faction, Rassemblement

Congolais Pour La D_mocratie - Christian Pay Pay Faction
Rcd - Cp

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/07/13/democratic-republic-congo-civilians-attacked-north-kivu>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for RCD-Goma (HRW 2005)

Group Formation: This is an alias for RCD-Goma (HRW 2005)

Group End: This is an alias for RCD-Goma (HRW 2005)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for RCD-Goma (HRW 2005)

Geography

This is an alias for RCD-Goma (HRW 2005)

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for RCD-Goma (HRW 2005)

External Ties

This is an alias for RCD-Goma (HRW 2005)

Group Outcome

This is an alias for RCD-Goma (HRW 2005)

DRC Cases Part 3: 2005-2012
Last Updated: 3 February 2018

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T2306	NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE PEOPLE (CNDP)	28-Nov-06	2006	2008
T2590	PARECO		2007	2008
T2589	BANGADI MILITIA		2008	2008
T717	CONGOLESE PATRIOTIC RESISTENCE-PATRIOTIC ARMED FORCES (PARECO/FAP)		2009	2012
T2502	POPULAR FRONT FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONGO		2009	2009
T983	ENYELE MILITIA		2010	2010
T2615	MAYI MAYI COMPLET		2010	2010
T2688	ANGRY CITIZENS (SWAHILI)		2011	2012
T2496	FORCES DE DEFENSE CONGOLAISE		2011	2011
T2689	ALLIANCE OF THE PEOPLE FOR A FREE AND SOVEREIGN CONGO	27-Feb-13	2012	2012
T2653	MAI MAI SIMBA MILITIA		2012	2012
T2687	MAYI MAYI LUMUMBA		2012	2012
T2652	MARCH 23 MOVEMENT (M23)	6-Jun-12	2012	2012

I. CONGRES NATIONAL POUR LA DEFENSE DU PEUPLE

Torg ID: 2306

Min. Group Date: 2006

Max. Group Date: 2008

Onset: 2006

Aliases: National Congress For The Defense Of The People (Cndp), Congres National Pour La Defense Du Peuple, Congrès National Pour La D_fense Du Peuple, Congres National Pour La Defense Du Peuple (Cndp), Congrès National Pour La D_fense Du Peuple (Cndp), National Congress For Defence Of The People, National Congress For Defence Of The People (Cndp), National Congress For Defense Of The People (Cndp), National Congress For The Defence Of The People, National Congress For The Defence Of The People (Cndp)

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://www.irinnews.org/report/89494/drc-who%E2%80%99s-who-among-armed-groups-east>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: CNDP

Group Formation: 2006 (reorganize from RCD-LN)

Group End: 2009 (disarm - transition to political party)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In 2005, Nkunda announced the group planned to overthrow the DRC government (Guardian 2009). CNDP formally formed in 2006 when Laurent Nkunda substantially reorganized the RCD-LN (Global Security n.d.; Buchanan 2017). Nkunda refused to disarm and integrate into the Congolese armed forces in 2003 (Guardian 2009). He

claimed he wanted to protect the Tutsi population from government abuses, and would be forced to take it to the capital if necessary (Amnesty International 2008). Instead, he took his remaining forces to North Kivu and avoided government forces (Guardian 2009). It was ethnonationalist.

Geography

The group conducted attacks in Goma, Ngungu, Murambi, and Nyanzale, DRC (GTD 2017). It had its headquarters in North Kivu (Guardian 2009).

Organizational Structure

The CNDP was organized into three different brigades (Global Security n.d.). The leader of the CNDP was Laurent Nkunda (Global Security n.d.). Nkunda had previous rebel experience, serving as a senior commander in the RCD-Goma during the Second Congo War (Guardian 2009). Most members were ex-militants who either refused to disarm in 2003 or had been fighting since 2003 in RCD-LN (Global Security n.d.). It may also have some foreign fighters from Rwanda (Canada IRB 2008). Members were mostly Tutsi, but also included some Hutus (Amnesty International 2008; Guardian 2009). The group originally had 2,000 members in 2006 (Buchanan 2017). The group had 8,000 to 8,500 members by 2007 (Buchanan 2017). It had 4,000 to 6,000 members in 2008 (Amnesty International 2008).

External Ties

In 2009, a faction of the CNDP splintered off and allied with the DRC military (Guardian 2009). The group may have originally received some type of support from the Rwandan government, but lost support sometime between 2008 and 2009 (Amnesty International 2008; Guardian 2009). Some members of the CNDP who did not disarm went on to form the M23 movement (RVI 2012, 39).

Group Outcome

In 2008, Nkunda signed a peace agreement that would lead the CNDP to disarm, but he reneged on this shortly after (Global Security n.d.). In early 2009, Ntaganda announced he was replacing Nkunda due to "mismanagement" (RVI 2012, 34). In 2009, authorities arrested Nkunda (Guardian 2009). This placed a lot of strain on the group and some splintered away (RVI 2012, 36). Rwanda placed Nkunda under house arrest and the CNDP transitioned into a political party (Buchanan 2017). In 2009, 3,000-4,000 members disarmed and integrated into the DRC military (Buchanan 2017). The group signed a final peace agreement known as the March 23 agreement (RVI 2012, 41).

Notes for Iris:

-faction splintering off and switching sides is similar to Mantiep (?) in Sudan and Sri Lankan group

- II. PARECO
Torg ID: 2590
Min. Group Date: 2007
Max. Group Date: 2008
Onset: NA

Aliases: Coalition Of Congolese Patriotic Resistance, Pareco, Parti Des Resistants Congolais, Parti Des Resistants Congolais

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for PARECO/FAP (T717).

Group Formation: This is an alias for PARECO/FAP (T717).

Group End: This is an alias for PARECO/FAP (T717).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for PARECO/FAP (T717).

Geography

This is an alias for PARECO/FAP (T717).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for PARECO/FAP (T717).

External Ties

This is an alias for PARECO/FAP (T717).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for PARECO/FAP (T717).

III. BANGADI MILITIA
Torg ID: 2589
Min. Group Date: 2008
Max. Group Date: 2008
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Lionel Healing. "DRC Town Takes Stand Against Ugandan Rebels." Mail and Guardian. 2009. <https://mg.co.za/article/2009-02-24-drc-town-takes-stand-against-ugandan-rebels>
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- "DR Congo: Body Says Ugandan Rebels Killed 113 in September." 2008. BBC Monitoring Africa, Oct 25.
<https://search-proquest-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org/docview/458509988?accountid=14026>.
- Search Keesings
 - BANGADI MILITIA

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2008

Group End: 2009 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Bangadi militia formed in 2008 in response to border incursions and militant attacks by the LRA on the Uganda-DRC border (Faul 2009; Healing 2009). The Bangadi militia first came to attention in 2008 when it clashed with the Ugandan LRA (Healing 2009; Faul 2009; BBC 2008). The group's aim was to push the LRA out of Bangadi and did not seem to oppose the DRC (Faul 2009).

Geography

The group defended the northeast town of Bangadi, DRC about 100 km from the Uganda border (Healing 2009). There is no evidence the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

The militia included about 360 men in 2009 (Healing 2009). The group's intelligence leader was Hilaire Kabadunga (Healing 2009). Members came from the local community and organized as a militia (Faul 2009; Healing 2009). No other information could be found about the group's leadership or funding.

External Ties

The group fought against the LRA in September and October 2008 (Faul 2009).

Group Outcome

The group fought against the LRA in September and October 2008 (Faul 2009). In January 2009, the Congolese military arrived in Bangadi to continue fighting against the LRA (Faul 2009). The group is not heard of after February 2009 and may have disarmed (Faul 2009).

IV. CONGOLESE PATRIOTIC RESISTENCE-PATRIOTIC ARMED FORCES (PARECO/FAP)

Torg ID: 717

Min. Group Date: 2009

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f5dbb9b2.html>

*may-may affiliate

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: PARECO; Congolese Patriot Resistants; Patriotes Résistants Congolais

Group Formation: 2007

Group End: 2009 (integrated into military forces)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In December 2006, the CNDP partially integrated into the Congolese national army (RVI 2013, 26). The unification of the two groups allowed CNDP officials to rise in the army’s ranks, and ultimately increase Nkunda’s power (RVI 2013, 26). Nkunda’s rise in power triggered the creation of PARECO - a political coalition of mayi-mayi militias, formed as an auto-defense mechanism for Congolese civilians (Amnesty International 2008; IRIN 2007; NYT 2011; RVI 2013, 26). The group was officially formed on March 14, 2007 (RVI 2013, 26).

The coalition’s objectives are vague, but they aspire to suppress Laurent Nkunda’s rise in power, oppose the CNDP, and restore peace and security in eastern DRC (IRIN 2007; RVI 2013, 26). They also aimed to protest the demobilization of CNDP (RVI 2013). The coalition denies fighting in the 1998-2003 conflict (IRIN 2007). The group is a merger (UK Home Office, 68).

Geography

PARECO is present throughout North Kivu, in eastern DRC (NYT 2011).

Organizational Structure

PARECO is a political wing for a series of Mayi-Mayi militias (Amnesty International 2008; IRIN 2007). Despite reports of the group's use of child soldiers, in 2011, they claim to no longer utilize them (NYT 2011). One source claims many child soldiers of the Mayi-Mayi militias willingly joined the rebellion due to a lack of security (NYT 2011). PARECO is led by General Kakule Sikuli Vasaka Lafontaine (NYT 2011). PARECO has a weak infrastructure and many of its members are untrained (NYT 2011). The group has a police force (RVI 2013, 26). The group is a merger of Congolese, Hutu, Hunde, and Nande ethnic groups (UK Home Office 2012, 68; RVI 2013, 10). Members are army officers and "political elites" (RVI 2013, 9). The group suffered a lot of infighting and defections (RVI 2013, 35).

External Ties

PARECO is an auto-defense organisation and therefore fights any other non-state group that poses a threat to the civilian population (NYT 2011). The group's General claims to have spoken to FDLR leaders and persuaded them to stop raping and stealing from civilians; however, PARECO rebels continue to rape and steal from the people they claim to protect (NYT 2011).

Group Outcome

In January 2008, delegations from the United States, African Union, and European Union facilitated a peacekeeping agreement amongst the DRC government, the CNDP, PARECO and other groups (Amnesty International 2008). On January 23, the CNDP and PARECO, along with other Kivu armed groups, agreed to an immediate ceasefire, disarmament, and end of human rights violations (Amnesty International 2008). In March 2009, PARECO promised to transition into a peaceful political party and integrate into armed forces (RVI 2013, 39; UK Home Office 2012, 69; IBT 2017). However, the group continued to incite an attack in 2009 and 2012 (GTD 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- recall: may may are all local militias with each one named after their leader
- they're an auto defense militia, but more criminal organization given how they attack locals
- PARECO is basically a political wing for a large set of unnamed May May militias and it opposes the CNDP, not the DRC?
- they're still active as late as 2012
- able to recruit child soldiers from LRA
- all the May May militias are operating in the same corner of the country
- big catalyst is 2006 CNDP agreement
- the group merges behind PARECO in order to establish a larger political wing

V. POPULAR FRONT FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONGO

Torg ID: 2502

Min. Group Date: 2009

Max. Group Date: 2009

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30154>
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<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7664954.stm>
- “The Curse of Gold.” Human Rights Watch. 2005.
<https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/drc0505/6.htm>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: FPJC

Group Formation: 2008

Group End: 2010 (repression)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group splintered from the Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri around 2008 (BBC 2008; IRIN News 2010; IRIN News 2011). It fought against the DRC military in 2009 (IRIN News 2010). The group claimed it was fighting the government because it failed to

provide local security and services in the Ituri area (IRIN 2009). It also claimed it formed to force the implementation of an amnesty deal the government offered militants, but was slow to enforce (BBC 2008).

Geography

The group conducted attacks in Ituri, DRC and Bunia, DRC (GTD 2017). It operated in the local forests around Tchei near Bunia, DRC (IRIN News 2009).

Organizational Structure

Members came from local militias and the FRPI (IRIN News 2009). It allegedly only had about 100 members (IRIN News 2011). One leader of the FPJC was Jean-Claude Baraka (UK Home Office 2012, 70). Members of the FRPI - and possibly FPJC - are of the Ngiti ethnicity (HRW 2005). Members likely Lendu since FRPI was Lendu.

External Ties

The group worked with its parent organization FRPI conducting attacks (IRIN News 2010).

Group Outcome

In 2009, UN forces and DRC forces launched an offensive against the FPJC (IRIN News 2009). The group's last known attack was in 2010 when it murdered 52 civilians (IRIN News 2011). In 2010, the DRC army launched a second offensive against the group (IRIN News 2011). In 2010, the DRC arrested Baraka (UK Home Office 2012, 70). The group does not appear to conduct any additional attacks after 2010.

VI. ENYELE MILITIA
Torg ID: 983
Min. Group Date: 2010
Max. Group Date: 2010
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 30113. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30113>

- United Kingdom: Home Office, Country of Origin Information Report - The Democratic Republic of Congo , 9 March 2012, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f5dbb9b2.html>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: INDEPENDENT MOVEMENT OF LIBERATION AND ALLIES (MILIA), MILIA, Mouvement de Libération indépendante des Alliés (MILIA)

Group Formation: 2009

Group End: 2014 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention around November 2009 when it began attacking local Munzaya civilians in the western DRC area around Equator (IRIN 2009; UK Home Office 2012, 70). Fighting erupted over fishing rights between two ethnic communities (UK Home Office 2012, 70).

Geography

The group had attacks in Mbandaku, DRC (GTD 2017). It also conducted attacks in Dongo (IRIN 2009). The group may have had attacks in Kisangi, DRC (Buchanan 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group was a local militia (UN News Services 2010). Members were ethnic Enyele or Lobala (IRIN 2009; UK Home Office 2012, 70). The group's leader was Ondjani Mangbama (Ireland RDC 2011; UK Home Office 2012, 70). It had approximately 60 fighters (Ireland RDC 2011).

External Ties

The group attacked Munzayas in 2010 (UN News Services 2010). 20 members of the militia trained in Angola (Ireland RDC 2011).

Group Outcome

In 2010, the DRC army intervened after the militia attacked Munzayas and forced 100,000 to flee (UN News Services 2010; Buchanan 2017). The group's last confirmed attack was in 2010 (UN News Services 2010). In 2014, DRC confirmed Mangbama had been shot and killed (Buchanan 2017).

The group is associated with an attack in 2014, but they never claimed responsibility (GTD 2014).

VII. MAYI MAYI COMPLET
Torg ID: 2615
Min. Group Date: 2010
Max. Group Date: 2010
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- UCDP Actor ID 1114. Uppsala Conflict Actor Database. Last modified 2017. <http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/1114>
- Search Proquest
 - May may complet
 - Mayi mayi complet
 - "Colonel complet" may may

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2010

Group End: 2012 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 2010 for an attack against civilians in Nyamilima, DRC (UCDP 2017). The Mayi-Mayi Complet is a Congolese militia based in North Kivu (UCDP 2017). It was a defensive militia and did not have a clear political aim.

Geography

The Mayi-Mayi Complet was active around Nyamilima, Rutshuru in North Kivu, DRC (UCDP 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group was led by Col. Complet (UCDP 2017). Complet died in March 2012 after an FDLR attack (UCDP 2017). Information on group members and size was not found.

External Ties

The group was tied with the FPLC, however the alliance was broken off after an attack in Nyamilima (UCDP 2017). The Mayi-Mayi Complet also allied with the FDLR to oversee charcoal trade in the North Kivu region (UCDP 2017).

Group Outcome

Insufficient sources on group outcome. Complet died in March 2012 after an FDLR attack (UCDP 2017). It is unknown whether the group is still active after this incident or not.

VIII. ANGRY CITIZENS (SWAHILI)

Torg ID: 2688

Min. Group Date: 2011

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Raia Mutomboki, Angry Citizens (Swahili), Outraged Citizens (Swahili)

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Civilian Population in Masisi at risk." IRIN News. 2012.
<http://www.irinnews.org/report/96899/drc-civilian-population-masisi-risk>

- Minority Rights Group International, State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2014 - Democratic Republic of the Congo, 3 July 2014, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/53ba8df614.html>
- “Scores killed as Mai Mai target Kinyarwanda speakers.” IRIN News. IRIN News. 2012.
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Angered Citizens

Group Formation: 2011 (militia turns political)

Group End: 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed in 2005 as a local militia (RVI 2013, 12; IRIN News 2013). The group originally formed as a militia to fend off FDLR attacks and protect local communities (IRIN News 2013; Buchanan 2017). The group aims to secure legal recognition as a “legitimate security force” because the DRC military cannot adequately protect citizens in the area (Buchanan 2017).

In 2009, the DRC government agreed to the new March 23 agreement, which included provisions for local militants to disarm and integrate into the new militia (RVI 2013, 21). However, the DRC failed to follow-through on parts of the agreement and not all the FDLR disarmed, leading to continued attacks against citizens in northern Kivu (RVI 2013, 23). A military officer defected. The group’s escalated their attacks in 2011 when they announced their opposition to the DRC’s new military restructuring (RVI 2013, 8; IRIN News 2013; Buchanan 2017).

Geography

The group operated in Shabunda in South Kivu province (RVI 2013; Buchanan 2017). The group originally formed in Bunyakiri, DRC (IRIN News 2013; Buchanan 2017). The group created a training camp along the border of the Kahuzi-Biega National Park (RVI 2013, 21). The four factions of Raia Mutomboki operated in “southern Shabunda, northern Shabunda/Bunyakiri/ southern Walikale, north-eastern Shabunda, and south-eastern Walikale/ southern Masisi” (RVI 2013, 39).

Organizational Structure

The group’s leader was a local pastor and ex-soldier known as Pastor Jean Musumbu (IRIN News 2013). The group gained a lot of local support and legitimacy after it successfully beat back FDLR attacks (Buchanan 2017). The group operated as a local legal tribunal, which helped it gain further recruits, because it was seen as fair and judicial (Buchanan 2017). The group funded itself through an “effort de guerre” or war contribution from each local family it ostensibly defended (Buchanan 2017). The group also funded itself through local extortion (RVI 2013, 11). The group partially exerted control over territories through the use of sexual violence (Minority Rights Group International 2014).

The group is organized into a series of four separate factions across the Kivu region (RVI 2013, 11; Vice 2016). Some of the factions fought against each other (Vice 2016). As the group grew more popular in the area, some local militias adopted the name Raia Mutomboki to co-opt this popularity, leading to a more decentralized organization (RVI 2013, 18). No specific size estimates could be found, but in 2016 the group was considered “one of the largest rebel groups” in the DRC (Vice 2016).

External Ties

The group collaborated with M23 (IRIN News 2013). It may also receive some unspecified support from M23 in northern Kivu (IRIN News 2013). Some scholars reference it as one of the larger Mai Mai groups in the area (IRIN News 2012).

Group Outcome

The group was largely inactive between 2007 and 2011 (RVI 2013, 11). In 2013, the group’s goals changed slightly to include the expulsion of all Rwandophones in South Kivu (IRIN News 2013).

The group was still active and conducting attacks as late as 2016 (Vice 2016). The DRC government had begun to employ other local militant groups to combat this, the M23, and RM rebellions, but it wasn’t clear whether this was effective (RVI 2013).

IX. FORCES DE DEFENSE CONGOLAISE

Torg ID: 2496

Min. Group Date: 2011

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: NA

Aliases: Forces De Defense Congolaise (Fdc), Congolese Defence Force, Congolese Defence Force (Fdc), Congolese Defense Force, Congolese Defense Force (Fdc), Forces De Defense Congolaise

Part 1. Bibliography

- UCDP Actor ID 1136. Uppsala Actor Conflict Database. Last updated 2017.
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- "Armed Groups in Eastern DRC." IRIN News. 2013.
<http://www.irinnews.org/report/99037/briefing-armed-groups-eastern-drc>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Mai Mai Guides, FDC-Guides

Group Formation: 2011

Group End: 2014 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Originally known as the Mai-Mai guides, the group reorganized and renamed itself the FDC in November 2011 (UCDP 2017). The FDC was formed by ex guides for the Congolese national army and civilians who helped in the Umoja Weta operation - a Rwanda/DRC joint offensive (UCDP 2017). The group was formed to act as a local defense force against the FDLR and the DRC armed forces, FARDC (IRIN 2013).

Geography

The FDC was active in the Masisi territory in North Kivu (UCDP 2017). In early 2012, the group incited attacks in regions around Ntoto and Kimua (IRIN 2013).

Organizational Structure

Members of the FDC are primarily youths from the Bahunde and Wanianga communities (UCDP 2017). In 2011, the group was led by General Luanda Butu, an ex officer of the

CNDP (UCDP 2017; IRIN 2013). The FDC was formed by ex guides for the Congolese national army and civilians who helped in the Umoja Weta operation - a Rwanda/DRC joint offensive (UCDP 2017).

External Ties

The FDC has alleged ties to the Mai Mai Cheka, Raïa Mutomboki, and a faction of M23 led by Bosco Ntaganda (UCDP 2017; IRIN 2013). Ntaganda supplied arms and ammunition to the group in late 2011 (UCDP 2017; IRIN 2013).

Group Outcome

The group partially splintered in 2012 as some members chose to start supporting M23 and other members continued to support the CNDP (UCDP 2017). The group's last violent attack was in 2014 (UCDP 2017). It is unclear what happened to the group after that.

X. ALLIANCE OF THE PEOPLE FOR A FREE AND SOVEREIGN CONGO

Torg ID: 2689

Min. Group Date: 2012

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 2013

Aliases: Alliance Of The People For A Free And Sovereign Congo (Apcls), Alliance Des Patriotes Pour Un Congo Libre Et Souverain, Alliance Des Patriotes Pour Un Congo Libre Et Souverain (Apcls), Alliance Of The People For A Free And Sovereign Congo

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://www.irinnews.org/report/99037/briefing-armed-groups-eastern-drc>
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<https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/DRC-Militia-force-chief-ready-for-war-20120823>
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<http://www.refworld.org/docid/5139acec2.html>
- IRIN, Democratic Republic of Congo: Tough bargaining with armed groups, 18 October 2012, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/508666cc2.html>

- United Kingdom: Home Office, Country of Origin Information Report - The Democratic Republic of Congo , 9 March 2012, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f5dbb9b2.html> [accessed 8 February 2018]
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: APCLS, PARECO-Hunde

Group Formation: 2008

Group End: 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

APCLS originally formed in 2006 as a faction of PARECO, but formally splintered in 2008 when it refused to disarm as part of the Goma Accords (Global Security n.d.). Its aim is to protect the local Hunde population and non-Tutsis from the CNDP (Global Security n.d.; IRIN News 2013). The group demanded the DRC government ensure demobilized militants work in their home regions and that the DRC expel the CNDP (UK Home Office 2012, 67).

Geography

The group primarily operated in Masisi territory in Northern Kivu (Global Security n.d.). It specifically operated in the mountains near Kitchanga (DW n.d.). The group also conducted attacks in Mpati, Busumba, Kashabere, Buhimba, Bukondo, Biriba, and Nyabondo, DRC (GTD 2017). There is no evidence the group is transnational or had an external base. The group had a training camp and headquarters in Nyabondo, DRC (News 24 2012; VOA 2013).

Organizational Structure

Members primarily come from the Hunde ethnic group (Global Security n.d.). It had approximately 1,500 well-equipped members at an unknown date (IRIN News 2013; Global Security n.d.). The group’s leader is Janvier Buingo Karairi (Global Security n.d.; IRIN News 2013). Karairi had previously headed the Hunde faction of PARECO (UK Home Office 2012, 67). Most of the senior leadership had previously served in the DRC military (Global Security n.d.). The group funds itself through local taxation as well as the sponsorship from several prominent Hunde leaders and businessmen in the area (Global

Security n.d.). It may also fund itself through mining tantalum in Masisi (IRIN News 2013).

External Ties

The group coordinated with FDLR and may have fought against the DRC government with the FDLR (Global Security n.d.). The group clashed with the Mai Mai Sheka militia (IRIN News 2013).

Group Outcome

A local Hunde Mai Mai leader opposed the APCLS (Global Security n.d.). In late 2012, the APCLS made a partial agreement with the DRC government to disarm, but it fell apart soon after (IRIN News 2012; VOA 2013). Violence escalated in 2013 when 500 APCLS fighters clashed with 1,000 FARDC (DRC military) near Kitchanga (IRIN 2013). The APCLS said they would not disarm or negotiate with the FARDC because it was working too closely (through negotiations) with M23 (IRIN 2013). The group's last violent attack was in 2016 (GTD 2017).

- XI. MAI MAI SIMBA MILITIA
Torg ID: 2653
Min. Group Date: 2012
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Mai Mai Simba Militia, Mai Mai Simba

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 40042. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=40042>
- "Armed Groups in Eastern DRC." IRIN News. 2013.
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- "Congo's forgotten war: the militia of Mambasa." IRIN News. 2016.
<http://www.irinnews.org/report/102342/congo%E2%80%99s-forgotten-war-militia-mambasa>
- UCDP Actor ID 1198. Uppsala Armed Conflict Database. Last updated 2017.
<http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/1198>
- Amnesty International, Amnesty International Annual Report 2013 - Democratic Republic of The Congo, 23 May 2013, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/519f51a561.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Armée Populaire de Libération Nationale Congolaise-Lumumba;
APLNC/Lumumba

Group Formation: 1964 (“origins”) or 1990s

Group End: 2017 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Mai Mai Simba is known as the oldest Congolese armed groups and has origins dating back to 1964 (IRIN 2013). The Simba militia is an umbrella name for Mai Mai groups that operate within the Ituri region (IRIN 2016). Most Mai Mai groups did not become active until the First Congo War in 1996 (Buchanan 2017). The group seeks to “remodel” the DRC government into the political views of the country’s first president, President Patrice Lumumba (IRIN 2013). However, many claim the group has no political agenda and seeks only to provoke criminal activity (IRIN 2016).

The Mai Mai Simba’s first recorded attack in GTD occurred on May 4, 2012, in Mambasa, DRC against the military, but they were likely active much earlier (GTD 2017). There were 27 fatalities (GTD 2017). The group has incited countless attacks on civilians - especially women (IRIN 2016). They are notorious for perpetrating sexual violence against women (IRIN 2016). In 2015, a human rights group recorded an estimated 150 rapes and abductions caused by the Simba militia (IRIN 2016). The militia controls and steals the region’s minerals and civilian’s valuable goods (IRIN 2016).

Geography

The group operates in the Maniema, Orientale, and Ituri provinces (IRIN 2013; IRIN 2016). They are most active in Bakaiko (IRIN 2016).

Organizational Structure

Group size was an estimated 150-200 members around 2013 (IRIN 2013). Despite committing countless human rights violations against women, the militia is unorganized and poorly equipped (IRIN 2016). The group’s leaders are Mando Mazero and Lucien Simba (IRIN 2013). In 2012, the Mai Mai Morgan splintered from the group (UCDP 2017). Morgan was killed in 2014 (UCDP 2017). The Mai Mai Simba was later led by Paul Sadala (UCDP 2017). After Paul Sadala was killed, the group was led by Manu and

Mangaribi, the brother of the leader of Mai Mai Morgan (UCDP 2017). The militia supplies itself with weaponry by stealing from Congolese soldiers (IRIN 2016).

External Ties

The group has worked alongside the FARDC, Maï Maï Morgan, Raïa Mutomboki and Sheka/NDC elements (IRIN 2016). The militia supplies itself with weaponry by stealing from Congolese soldiers (IRIN 2016).

Group Outcome

The group's last recorded attack occurred on May 21, 2016, in Etabe (GTD 2017). There were no fatalities (GTD 2017). There has never been a joint force of operations between MONUSCO and the Congolese Army to combat the Simba militia (IRIN 2016). This is due to the Congolese government's focus on foreign groups, rather than domestic militias (IRIN 2016). The group remains active in 2016 (IRIN 2016).

Notes for Iris:

- group's origins go back to 1964, but it seems unlikely the Mai Mai Simba existed before the early 1990s (c.f. Mai Mai main profile)
- group's first violent date is technically unknown, but likely before 2012
- joint force of operations: normally MONUSCO and FARDC came together to combat certain groups in Rwanda, but they would then ignore the local Mai Mai militia groups
- MONUSCO might be prevented from targeting Simba militia
- political aims are a little unclear, but they seem slightly different from other Mai Mai groups more directed at local defense

XII. MAYI MAYI LUMUMBA
Torg ID: 2687
Min. Group Date: 2012
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Amnesty International, Amnesty International Annual Report 2013 - Democratic Republic of The Congo, 23 May 2013, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/519f51a561.html>
- UCDP Actor ID 1198. Uppsala Armed Conflict Database. Last updated 2017. <http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/1198>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for Mai Mai Simba (UCDP 2017).

Group Formation: This is an alias for Mai Mai Simba (UCDP 2017).

Group End: This is an alias for Mai Mai Simba (UCDP 2017).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for Mai Mai Simba (UCDP 2017).

Geography

This is an alias for Mai Mai Simba (UCDP 2017).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for Mai Mai Simba (UCDP 2017).

External Ties

This is an alias for Mai Mai Simba (UCDP 2017).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for Mai Mai Simba (UCDP 2017).

XIII. MARCH 23 MOVEMENT (M23)

Torg ID: 2652

Min. Group Date: 2012

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 2012

Aliases: M23, Congolese Revolutionary Army, March 23 Movement, March 23 Movement (M23), Mouvement Du 23-Mars

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=40093>
- "Briefing: M23, One Year On." IRIN News. 2013.
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- Melanie Gouby. “What does the M23 Want?” Newsweek. 2012. <http://www.newsweek.com/what-does-m23-want-63503>
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- IRIN, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Understanding armed group M23 , 22 June 2012, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4fe9ad252.html>
- Ireland: Refugee Documentation Centre, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Any information on the armed group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo known as M23? When was it founded? Any information on leadership, number of fighters, recent activities?, 4 July 2012, Q15540, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/50068b262.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2012

Group End: 2013 (repression)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

M23 was named after a March 23, 2009, peace agreement that integrated members of the CNDP and PARECO into the Congolese army (IDC 2012). The group seeks to establish the full implementation of the 2009 peace agreement (IDC 2012). M23 claims the agreement was a failure, and did not provide adequate food, pay, living situations, or promotion for members integrated into the Congolese army (IDC 2012; IRIN 2012). They claim to have no ideology and view themselves as a revolutionary movement, rather than a rebellion (Newsweek 2012). Other sources claim the group wanted a larger share of the widespread mineral wealth in the DRC (Al Jazeera 2013).

They began to rebel in April 2012 when Tutsi soldiers in FARDC mutinied (IRIN 2013; Al Jazeera 2013). The group's largest recorded attack occurred on November 15, 2012, against the Congolese military in an unrecorded location (GTD 2017). There were 153 fatalities (GTD 2017).

Geography

M23 is active in the North Kivu Province of eastern DRC (IDC 2012). Attacks are sporadic and underreported. Information on attack locations was not found.

Organizational Structure

Members of the M23 consist of former members of the CNDP and PARECO (IDC 2012). The two groups were integrated into the national Congolese army after a peace agreement in 2009 (IDC 2012).

Many members are of the Tutsi ethnicity, a minority group that holds close ties to the Tutsi-led Rwandan government (Al Jazeera 2013). It is led by Sultani Makenga and Bosco Ntaganda (IDC 2012). Ntaganda was a high ranking official in the CNDP (IDC 2012). Makenga was the military leader (Newsweek 2012). Both leaders were accused of human rights violations, including the recruitment of child soldiers (IDC 2012). M23 denies any ties to Ntaganda, as the ICC tried him for perpetrating war crimes in 2002-2003 (Newsweek 2012; Al Jazeera 2013). The group has incited numerous human rights violations against Congolese citizens including massacres, mass rape, and recruitment of child soldiers (IDC 2012).

M23 has a political branch (Newsweek 2012). The branch is led by its president, Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero (Newsweek 2012; Al Jazeera 2013).

External Ties

The M23 received weapons, ammunition, and around 200 to 300 fighters from the Rwandan military, including around 200 children (IDC 2012). The group has also received military support from Uganda (Newsweek 2012). However, both countries and M23 rebels deny the support, despite numerous U.N. reports (Newsweek 2012). M23 allies itself with groups that had received support from the RDF (IDC 2012).

Group Outcome

M23 has caused the displacement of over 800,000 people (BBC 2013). In 2012, the UN peacekeeping mission was unable to stop M23 from seizing the Ituri region's capital, Goma (BBC 2013). In 2013, a UN peacekeeping mission launched an offensive against the M23 and eventually worked with the group to get it to agree to disarm (Al Jazeera

2013). The Congolese government claims to have defeated the group in 2013 (BBC 2013).

Notes for Iris:

- what makes this group so different? M23 has a huge attack in November 2012 - one of the biggest we've ever seen. They're able to inflict a bunch of damage
- allegedly used as a proxy by Uganda/Rwanda
- this group draws most of the support
- M23 -external ties key because of poor Congo-Rwanda
- political wing used to contest legitimacy of elections
- Rwanda sent 200 children soldiers to assist M23

Quote from RDC: "Between March and April 2012, Rwanda recruited around 200 very young children which it trained and sent out as combat troops in M23," said Mende."