

Bolivia Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 17 July 2019

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T317	CARLOS ARMANDO CACUA GUERRERO FRONT	31-Mar-67	1966	1967
T1696	EJERCITO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (BOLIVIA)		1970	1991
T702498	REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS PARTY OF BOLIVIA (PRTB)		1976	1980
T457	SHINING PATH (SL)		1978	2012
T1075	BOLIVIAN SOCIALIST FALANGE (FSB)		1980	1983
T500	TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA)		1983	1997
T1237	PEOPLE'S COMMAND		1986	1986
T889	BROTHER JULIAN		1987	1987
T869	COMANDO ALEJO CALATAYUD		1987	1990
T534	WORKERS' REVOLUTIONARY PARTY		1988	1988
T538	FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACION ? ZARATE WILLKA		1988	1990
T325	COMISION DE NESTOR PAZ ZAMORA (CNPZ)		1990	1990
T501	TUPAC KATARI GUERRILLA ARMY (EGTK)		1991	1992
T1781	KOLLA BENJO CRUZ COMMAND		1992	1992
T1801	MANUEL ASCENCIO PADILLA GROUP		1992	1992
T490	THE NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION FRONT		1998	2005
T489	THE INEVITABLES		2003	2003

T9038	NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (BOLIVIA)		1987	2003
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I. CARLOS ARMANDO CACUA GUERRERO FRONT

Torg ID: 317

Min. Group Date: 1966

Max. Group Date: 1967

Onset: NA

Aliases: Carlos Alirio Buitrago Front, Carlos Armando Cacua Guerrero Front, Ejercito De Liberacion Nacional - Bolivia, Ejercito De Liberacion Nacional - Bolivia (EIn-B), Jose Maria Becerra Front, National Liberation Army (Bolivia)

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https://books.google.com/books?id=4ikxDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=schmid+jongman&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwif6IXbq7_jAhVdHzQIHR-ICWsQ6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=bolivia&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: National Liberation Army, Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional

Group Formation: This is an alias for ELN (Bolivia) (Schmid and Jongman 1988; MIPT 2008).

Group End: This is an alias for ELN (Bolivia) (Schmid and Jongman 1988; MIPT 2008).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for ELN (Bolivia) (Schmid and Jongman 1988; MIPT 2008).

Geography

This is an alias for ELN (Bolivia) (Schmid and Jongman 1988; MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for ELN (Bolivia) (Schmid and Jongman 1988; MIPT 2008).

External Ties

This is an alias for ELN (Bolivia) (Schmid and Jongman 1988; MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for ELN (Bolivia) (Schmid and Jongman 1988; MIPT 2008).

II. EJERCITO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (BOLIVIA)

Torg ID: 1696

Min. Group Date: 1970

Max. Group Date: 1991

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Ñancahuazú Guerrilla, Carlos Armando Cagua Guerrero Front

Group Formation: 1966

Group End: 1971 (first incarnation), 1993 (second incarnation?)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) was formed by revolutionary Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara in November 1966 in Cuba (MIPT 2008; Kumm 1967). It was a part of Fidel Castro and Guevara’s communist rural guerrilla movements across Latin America (State Department I&R 1967). The group’s initial aim was to galvanize a revolution in Argentina, Guevara’s place of birth (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). The group decided to initiate their operations in Bolivia as a staging location before moving into

Argentina (Gunson et al. 1989, 195). Their first attack was in March of 1967 when the guerilla group attacked a Bolivian military column (Ostria 2010).

Geography

The group originally formed in Cuba before moving to Bolivia (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). The group trained in the Santa Cruz province of Bolivia on a farm (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). All of their attacks were conducted in Bolivia (GTD 2018). They began operations with the intent of spreading across rural Bolivia, but in 1970 became more present in urban areas like La Paz and Cochabamba (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989).

Organizational Structure

As of 1967, the group had 40 members, and it grew to 75 in 1970 (Hanratty and Hudson 1991, 229; Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). A second source says the group had approximately 200 members in 1969 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 5). Che Guevara, the leader of the group was formerly a chief lieutenant for Fidel Castro in Cuba (State Department I&R 1967). In March of 1965, Guevara left Cuba and was not seen until 1966 in Bolivia, when the ELN formed (ibid). Most of the ELN's supporters were students and some of the militants were from Cuba and Argentina (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989; Ostria 2010). Later, after Che's death, the group tried to draw on a network of priests and nuns to attract support for the cause (Schmid and Jongman 1988). After the death of Guevara in 1967, the group remained relatively inactive, with the leader being Inti Peredo until his death in 1969 (Ostria 2010). Osvaldo Peredo, the brother of the late leader became head of the guerilla group in 1970, and remained leader even after being exiled to Chile in the same year (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). The group formed a political wing in 1972, called the Bolivian Revolutionary Workers' Party (ibid). It is allegedly an umbrella organization, with one of its wings being the Nestor Paz Zamora Commission (CNPZ) (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group was supported by the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) whose members sometimes joined the ELN (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). The group also received material and training support from Cuba, as it was part of a violent Communist movement across Latin America supported by Fidel Castro (State Department I&R 1967; Gleditsch et al. 2013). At the end of 1969, Cuba withdrew support for the group (Ostria 2010). It also allegedly received support from the MRTA in Peru (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

The Bolivian army was not prepared to take down the ELN, so while part of the army confined the group in the southwestern part of the country, the United States trained a group in Panama on defeating the organization and others like it (Hanratty and Hudson 1991, 229). In late July of 1967, Bolivian forces began destroying the ELN based on intelligence gleaned from captured ELN members and civilians living in the southwestern area of Bolivia where the group operated (Hanratty and Hudson 1991, 229). In October of 1967, they captured Che Guevara and executed him a day later (Hanratty and Hudson 1991, 229; State Department I&R 1967). Only five ELN members were able to escape after the attacks (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). In 1969, Peredo attempted to revive the group and failed shortly after when security forces killed him (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). In 1970, Osvaldo Peredo attempted to revive the group in rural areas, but weeks later, only 8 militants were still alive (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). The rest had been killed by Bolivian security forces (MIPT 2008; Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). The leaders were forced into exile in Chile (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). The group's last known violent attack was in 1971 when members kidnapped a German manager in La Paz (GTD 2018).

Some members of the group reorganized to form a political wing in 1972, called the Bolivian Revolutionary Workers' Party (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). The group was inactive for over a decade, then allegedly reemerged from 1987 to 1993, when some members joined created the ELN-Renovado, which the Nestor Paz Zamora Commission (CNPZ) is allegedly a wing of (MIPT 2008; Painter 1990). It is unclear whether the group was connected to the original ELN (MIPT 2008). Its last attack was in 1991, with the attempted bombing of an airport in La Paz (ibid). It is inactive.

Notes for Iris:

- What is the ELN post-67? They don't have a very strong structure and attempts to restart the group. The group organizes a political wing in 1972 (PRTB) and a lot of members
- the group gets destroyed over and over (super ineffective at fighting)
- in 1980s, the group restructures and this is what leads to a new wave of leftist violence
- are the later 1980s leftist groups factions or independent? They are likely splinters/independent which members have a lot of shared activity

III. REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS PARTY OF BOLIVIA (PRTB)

Torg ID: 702498

Min. Group Date: 1976

Max. Group Date: 1980

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Revolutionary Party of Bolivian Workers, Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores de Bolivia, PRT-B

Group Formation: 1972

Group End: 1980

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Revolutionary Workers Party of Bolivia (PRTB) began as the political branch of the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Bolivia and later splintered (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). It was founded by Antonio Peredo Leigue in 1972 (Drachkovitch and Gann 1981, 39). Its purpose was to oppose the military dictatorship in Bolivia (Pozzi 2012). The PRTB, with the help of the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) organized support in miners' unions, peasant groups, and followers of former president Juan José Torres (Dinges 2012). Their first attack was in July of 1976 with the bombing of the house of the Planning and Coordination Minister in La Paz (GTD 2018).

Geography

The group's attacks all took place in La Paz, Bolivia (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

The group was a splinter of the National Liberation Army that started as a nonviolent political organization (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). Its leader was Antonio Peredo Leigue (Drachkovitch and Gann 1981, 39). Its source of funding is unclear. The PRTB, with the help of the JCR organized support in miners' unions, peasant groups, and followers of former president Juan José Torres (Dinges 2012).

External Ties

It has ties to the ELN and the JCR (Revolutionary Coordinating Junta) (Dinges 2012).

Group Outcome

The group has been inactive since its last attack, a bombing at a radio station in La Paz on February 15, 1980 (GTD 2018). Part of its decline can also be attributed to the Unidad Democrática y Popular (UDP), a moderate left-leaning political party that had been slowly gaining popularity since the 1978 elections (Pozzi 2012).

- IV. SHINING PATH (SL)
Torg ID: 457
Min. Group Date: 1978
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Shining Path (SL), SL, Sendero Luminoso (SL), Shining Path

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Shining Path, Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui, Partido Comunista del Peru, Communist Party of Peru, The Communist Party of Peru by the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui and Marxism, Leninism, Maoism and the Thoughts of Chairman Gonzalo, Revolutionary Student Front for the Shining Path of Mariategui, Communist

Party of Peru – By Way of the Shining Path of Mariategui, PCP – por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariategui, PCP and PCP-SL

Group Formation: 1980

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Shining Path was started by Abimael Guzmán, a philosophy professor at the University of San Cristóbal del Huamanga in Ayacucho with a goal to overthrow the Peruvian government (Graun 2008, 6-7). The group initially formed “in the 1960s” through a series of student meetings at the local university (Gregory 2009). Its first violent incident occurred in 1978 in Ayacucho, Peru (GTD 2016). The group formally launched their armed campaign against Peru in 1980 (Graun 2008, 7). In 1983, it escalated its attack when it began to kill both noncombatants and political officials (Gregory 2009). SL ascribed to a Marxist-Leninist ideology (Gregory 2009; Graun 2008, 7).

Geography

The group began in Ayacucho at the university where Guzmán taught (Gregory, Katherine). The group’s primary base of operations was in Ayacucho and Huanta as well as Vilcabamba, Peru (COHA 2008).

Organizational Structure

Guzmán was the sole leader of the Shining Path and a leftist university professor (Gregory 2009; Graun 2008, 4-5, 9). SL funded itself through extortion, kidnapping, and drug-trafficking (COHA 2008; Gregory 2009). SL believed in a foco-style of revolution, which could eventually inspire rural communities to rise up and join the fight (

Guzmán drew most of his followers from his former students and other peasants in the area, most of whom were Quechua-speaking natives (Graun 2008). SL had approximately 5000-1000 members at its peak in 1989-1993 (Gleditsch et al. 2009, 315; Mackenzie Institute 2016). It was organized around a hierarchical structure (COHA 2008).

Despite his veneration of communists like Mao and Lenin, Guzmán was could be extremely contemptuous of the very rural poor he was trying to recruit, and once ordered the slaughter of an entire village for suspected collusion with the government (Starn n.d.).

External Ties

Guzman was averse to outside influence and did not receive any type of external support from other actors (Gregory 2009; Templeman 2009; Gleditsch et al. 2009). The group competed against the MRTA for supporters and resources (Gregory 2009). There is evidence that Guzman visited China in the mid-1960s, but there is no evidence whether this is involved training in guerrilla warfare or other types of education (COHA 2008).

Group Outcome

Initially, SL had large success against the Peruvian government, aided in part by the Peruvian military's indiscriminate use of violence against noncombatants (Graun 2008). In 1988, "the tide had begun to turn" and the military was able to start gathering better intelligence and use force discriminately (Graun 2008, 13). In 1991, the Army implemented a wide-standing reform program including the Civil Defense Committees to train and organize local communities to resist SL (Graun 2008, 13-14).

Guzmán was captured and imprisoned in 1992 where he remains to this day (Graun 2008, 7; Gregory 2009). Support for the group turned as it continued to employ indiscriminate violence against combatants (Graun 2008; MIPT 2008). Membership for the group shrunk from 10,000 members at its max to approximately 500 as of 2008 (MIPT 2008). Several other high-ranking revolutionaries of the Shining Path began being released from prison in 2012 after serving long sentences (Economist 2012). The group still conducts intermittent attacks today from a small base along the Peru-Brazil border (Economist 2012).

V. BOLIVIAN SOCIALIST FALANGE (FSB)

Torg ID: 1075

Min. Group Date: 1980

Max. Group Date: 1983

Onset: NA

Aliases: Falange Socialista Boliviana (Fsb), Bolivian Socialist Falange, Bolivian Socialist Falange (Fsb), Falange Socialista Boliviana

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Partido Falange Socialista Boliviana (PFSB)

Group Formation: 1937

Group End: 1971 (no more polopp), 1983 (last attack), 2008 (active as political party)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Despite its name, the Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) was a fascist right-wing political party formed by Oscar Unzaga de la Vega in 1937. It was modeled after a similar party in Spain at the time (Hudson and Hanratty 1991; CIA 1971). Their members had a wide range of political views, but generally all opposed democracy and populism (CIA 1974). The party became almost insignificant in the 1960s because of conflicting political views among members, but soon reordered itself as a Christian socialist party and planned many failed coups (CIA 1971; Manney 1970). President Hugo Banzer supported the party and used it to spend propaganda in the 1970s (CIA 1974). The group's first attack was in November 1953, with an attempted rebellion against the Bolivian government that resulted in 23 deaths (University of Central Arkansas n.d.).

Geography

The organization is not transnational. Most of the group's attacks were in the city Santa Cruz of Bolivia (GTD 2018). It was also present in La Paz (Grevers 2012).

Organizational Structure

The group's political views attracted small businesses, high school age youth and urban elites (Malloy 1970; Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). In 1970, because of opposing political views, a group called the Left FSB splintered from the original group (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989). The leader of the group in the early 1970s was Dr. Mario Gutiérrez, the foreign minister for President Banzer (ibid). In 1980, the leader of the party, Carlos Valverde ran for president and won 5% of the vote (ibid). It won 3 seats out of 144 in Congress in 1985 (ibid). The source of its funding is unknown.

External Ties

Later, after a right-wing president came to power, the president of Bolivia in the 1970s, Hugo Banzer formed a coalition called the National Popular Front that included the army, the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), and the FSB (CIA 1974). The MNR and FSB have a rivalry that dates back to when President Paz was in power (CIA 1971). In the 1960s, the party was also allied with the National Leftist Revolutionary Party (PRIN) and the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) (CIA 1965). It also worked with the Partido Social Democrático and the Partido Democrático Cristiano (Symmes 1975). Many members left the party and joined the newly formed Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN) led by former President Banzer (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 1989).

Group Outcome

The group had a second notable uprising in 1959 when the FSB was able to seize and control territory in La Paz (UCA n.d.). In 1971, right-wing president Hugo Banzer came to

power at which point the group no longer had any politicized opposition against the state. The group stopped using violence in 1983 (GTD 2018). Its last attack was a kidnapping in November of 1983 in Santa Cruz (GTD 2018). It is unclear why the group stopped using violence. After remaining inactive for a while, the party resurfaced in 2007 (Minority Rights Group International 2008).

Notes for Iris:

-why did they attempt a rebellion in 1953? Unclear transition to violence as the military dictatorship had started much earlier

-most active in the 1950s then trail off (only Minority Rights group alluded to a smaller newer group. Might want to do some extra research on connection)

VI. TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA)

Torg ID: 500

Min. Group Date: 1983

Max. Group Date: 1997

Onset: NA

Aliases: Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1984 (Templeman 2009).

Group End (Outcome): 1997 (military) (Templeman 2009)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The MRTA emerged from the remnants of the MIR via a political organization known as the PSR-ML--MIR-EM (Templeman 2009, 23). The organization emerged in 1980 and was renamed the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement in 1984 (Templeman 2009, 23). It first came to attention for an attack on a US security guard residence in 1983 (CIA 1991, 1). The group ascribed to a Marxist ideology and sought to overthrow the Peruvian government (Gregory 2009; Templeman 2009).

The three founding leaders: Victor Polay, Miguel Rincon and Nester Cerpa like De La Puente, had been part of the political party the APRA once upon a time (Baer 2003). The group published their 12 part platform in 1984 and then retroactively stated they had taken their first armed action in 1982 despite no evidence supporting this (Templeman 2009).

Geography

It was initially active in Lima, Peru (McCormick 2005). It was also very active in the northern region including the towns of San Martin, Lambayeque, and La Libertad (McCormick 2005). The MRTA launched its rural operations in 1987 (McCormick 2005; Baer 2003).

Organizational Structure

The group was led by three men, Victor Polay, Miguel Rincon and Nester Cerpa. Victor Polay and Miguel Rincon were classic middle class revolutionary leaders, but Nester Cerpa was from a working-class family and had previously participated in other reform

attempts (Baer 2003). It mainly wanted to target wealthy elites to demonstrate the inequalities of the system (Templeman 2009). The group funded itself through drug-trafficking sales, extortion, and robberies (CIA 1991, 2; Baer 2003). Jones and Libicki state the group had “tens” of members and the CIA said the group had approximately 1,000 hardcore members (Jones and Libicki 2009, 182; CIA 1991, 2). Members were middle and upper-class and were diverse including peasants, students, professors, and lawyers (CIA 1991, 2). The group was never very well-organized and had a difficult time recruiting members (McCormick 2005). It originally was urban-based and operated as a set of cells (McCormick 2005). Operations later shifted to be a series of five different wings including Political, Military, Communications, Logistics, and Intelligence (CIA 1991, 2).

External Ties

The group was “Cuban-inspired” and a child of the MIR (Gregory 2009). It allegedly received training, arms, and funding from Cuba (CIA 1991, 2). It may have also had training and travel support from Libya in the late 1980s (CIA 1991, 2). They were competing for prominence and followers with the Shining Path and had difficulty acquiring the necessary resources, members, or community support to thrive and sustain an insurgency as effectively as SL (Templeman 2009, 24).

It provided some training and coordination with Colombia’s ELN and CNPZ/ELN in Bolivia (CIA 1991, 2).

Group Outcome

The group enjoyed varied success between 1984--1987 due to the military’s simultaneous fight with SL (McCormick 2005). The CIA reported “resource constraints, poor intelligence, rampant corruption, and interservice rivalry limit its [counterterrorism] effectiveness” (CIA 1991, 2-3). Due to beginning their revolution slightly after the Shining Path, the MRTA underestimated how prepared the Peruvian army had become at dealing with groups such as these (Templeman 2009). As a last effort to revive the movement, the MRTA occupied the Japanese embassy in December 1996 and took 72 hostages for four months (Gregory 2009). The Peruvian government responded with Operation Chavin de Huantar, which killed all 14 MRTA members and effectively killed the movement (Templeman 2009).

VII. PEOPLE'S COMMAND

Torg ID: 1237

Min. Group Date: 1986

Max. Group Date: 1986

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=4680>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Simon Bolivar Command (CNB)

Group Formation: 1986

Group End: 1988

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The People's Command came to attention with its first violent attack in March of 1986, when a dynamite exploded on the roof of the United States Embassy in Bolivia (CIA 1989; GTD 2018). When the People's Command claimed responsibility for the attack, they justified it on the grounds that they opposed United States interference in Libya, which was tense at the time after a naval drill that the US conducted along the Libyan coast (MIPT 2008). Their goal was mainly to attack US buildings and officials to protest

the US and its policies (CIA 1989; MIPT 2008). It was a communist group that was likely a splinter of the Bolivian Communist Party (CIA 1989).

Geography

The group's attacks were mostly in La Paz, Bolivia (GTD 2018). The group operated in urban areas (CIA 1989).

Organizational Structure

The group organized in a series of cells (CIA 1989). Most of the group's members were recruited from the Bolivian Communist Party (CIA 1989). The leader of the group was named Jose Espinosa, an expert of explosives who was trained in Cuba (ibid). There were about a dozen members in the People's Command (ibid). The sources of funding for the group are unknown.

External Ties

Jose Espinosa, the leader of the group, trained in Cuba (CIA 1989). A group called Fuerzas Armas de Liberación - Zarate Wilca also claimed responsibility for the bombing on the roof of the US embassy (CIA 1989). However, there is no evidence of collaboration between the two groups.

Group Outcome

It is unclear what caused the group to stop using violence. The People's Command conducted a series of bombings in American-owned businesses before their last attack (CIA 1989), The last attack that the People's Command claimed responsibility for was in August of 1988, when a bomb exploded near the motorcade of US Secretary of State George Shultz (CIA 1989; Christian 1988).

VIII. BROTHER JULIAN
Torg ID: 889
Min. Group Date: 1987
Max. Group Date: 1987
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=100010>

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- "April 14, 1987." Significant Incidents Against Americans 1987. US State Department. 1988. PDF.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: 1987

Group End: 1987

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group's first and only attack was the bombing of the United States Embassy on April 14, 1987 in La Paz, Bolivia (GTD 2018; US State Department 1987). A young Bolivian male allegedly threw the IED at the door of the embassy (US State Department 1987). It occurred during a march led by the Bolivian Labor Federation (COB) that included many student groups yelling anti-American chants (ibid)

Geography

The group's sole attack was conducted in La Paz, Bolivia on the US embassy (GTD 2018; US State Department 1987).

Organizational Structure

Leadership, membership, and funding are unknown.

External Ties

External ties are unknown.

Group Outcome

The group only conducted one attack on the United States Embassy in La Paz in 1987 (GTD 2018; US State Department 1987). It is unknown what happened to the group after this incident and it disappeared.

Torg ID: 869
Min. Group Date: 1987
Max. Group Date: 1990
Onset: NA

Aliases: Alejo Calatayu, Comando Alejo Calatayud

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2004. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018.
<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2004>
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<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Hd3wCAn-gGOqCIDWMilamd-K3VRAXdc23UyZ199EBt4/edit>
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- "Operation Blast Furnace." Global Security. n.d. Accessed July 25, 2019.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/blast_furnace.htm

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Alejo Calatayud Command, CAC

Group Formation: 1987 (form & first attack)

Group End: 1990 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Comando Alejo Calatayud (CAC) formed in 1987 in the city of Cochabamba in Bolivia (CIA 1989). It was named after revolutionary Alejo Calatayud and formed after US Operation Blast Furnace, in which US military forces aided Bolivian troops in demolishing coca-processing factories (Global Security n.d.). The goal of the CAC was to incite anti-American sentiment among local farmers and carry out attacks against Americans (CIA 1989). It was also considered a left-wing group (CIA 1989). The organization's first attack was a bombing close to the home of a USAID contractor in May of 1987 (CIA 1989, GTD 2018). The woman who called to claim the CAC's

responsibility for the attack told the press that it was in protest of US troops training the Bolivian soldiers (US State Department 1988).

Geography

The group is based in urban areas and both of its attacks have been carried out in Cochabamba (CIA 1989, GTD 2018). There is no evidence the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Members of the group sought to convince local farmers that US presence in the area was bad and that the troops were very violent (CIA 1989). The group made appeals to peasants to support its cause (CIA 1989), but it is unclear whether that was also the group's primary social base. Local drug traffickers allegedly funded the group (ibid). The leadership is unknown.

External Ties

The CAC was thought to be run by a drug trafficking organization (MIPT 2008). It was connected with the National Liberation Army that reemerged in the 1980s, as many members of the CAC also belonged to the National Liberation Army (CIA 1989).

Group Outcome

After activists of the group took part in anti-American protests in June 1987, the group was quiet until 1990, when a grenade exploded in a Mormon church in Cochabamba (GTD 2018). Some speculate that the group might have merged with the ELN around 1989 (CIA 1989). After this attack in 1990, the group stopped using violence. The reason for the group's stop in violence is unknown.

Notes for Iris:

- Operation Blast Furnace occurred when the US military trained a bunch of military to take out coca-processing furnaces (likely controlled by drug cartels)
- this had a second-order effect of also destroying the crops of farmers (and their livelihoods) and so the farmers mobilized in response
- the group opposed the US presence, not the Bolivian government
- this group is distinct in the late 1980s groups by not having any ties to the ELN

X. WORKERS' REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

Torg ID: 534

Min. Group Date: 1988

Max. Group Date: 1988

Onset: NA

Aliases: Workers' Revolutionary Party, Partido Obrero Revolucionario

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 4369. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018.
<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=4369>
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https://pages.uoregon.edu/caguirre/Aguirre_Punishment%20and%20Extermination.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Shining Path, Sendero Luminoso

Group Formation: This is an alias for the Shining Path (United States Embassy 1989, MIPT 2008; Aguirre 2013).

Group End: This is an alias for the Shining Path (United States Embassy 1989, MIPT 2008; Aguirre 2013).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for the Shining Path (United States Embassy 1989, MIPT 2008; Aguirre 2013).

Geography

This is an alias for the Shining Path (United States Embassy 1989, MIPT 2008; Aguirre 2013).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for the Shining Path (United States Embassy 1989, MIPT 2008; Aguirre 2013).

External Ties

This is an alias for the Shining Path (United States Embassy 1989, MIPT 2008; Aguirre 2013).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for the Shining Path (United States Embassy 1989, MIPT 2008; Aguirre 2013).

- XI. FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACION ? ZARATE WILLKA
Torg ID: 538
Min. Group Date: 1988
Max. Group Date: 1990
Onset: NA

Aliases: Zarate Willka Armed Forces Of Liberation, Fuerzas Armadas De Liberacion ? Zarate Willka

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2075. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018.
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- "FALN Zarate Willka." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4321. MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Hd3wCAn-gGOqCIDWMilamd-K3VRAXdc23UyZ199EBt4/edit>
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<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP94T00885R000200140001-2.pdf>
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https://m.la-razon.com/suplementos/animal_politico/Johnny-Peralta-zapatistas-autentico-dia_0_2448355155.html

- “August 8, 1988.” Significant Incidents Against Americans 1988. US State Department. 1989. p. 12. <http://www.higginsctc.org/politicalviolence/PolitViol1988.pdf>
- “May 25, 1989.” Significant Incidents Against Americans 1989. US State Department. 1990. p. 6. <http://www.higginsctc.org/politicalviolence/PolitViol1989.pdf>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Pablo Zare Wilca Force, FAL-ZW, Pablo Zarate Wilca Force, Zarate Wilca

Group Formation: 1985

Group End: 1990

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group was founded in 1985 by dissidents from the National Liberation Army (ELN) (Zamorano 2016). One of these founders was Johnny Justino Peralta Espinoza (ibid). The group was against US imperialism, and the group’s namesake, Zarate Willka also held the same views against imperialism (Cedema 2011). The group later expanded its attacks to also target the Bolivian government. They held Katarismo and Marxist-Leninist views (MIPT 2008; CIA 1989). The FAL-ZW first came to attention when it claimed responsibility for the bombing of the caravan of US Secretary of State Schultz in August of 1988, for which the Simon Bolivar Command also claimed responsibility (US State Department 1988). The next violent attack it claimed responsibility for was the assassinations of two Mormon missionaries from the United States in May of 1989 (US State Department 1989). It claimed the killings were in protest of the US violating Bolivian sovereignty (ibid).

Geography

All the attacks the group conducted were in La Paz, Bolivia (CIA 1989; GTD 2018). The organization was not transnational.

Organizational Structure

The group’s founders came from the original ELN (Zamorano 2016; CIA 1989). They allegedly had around 100 members (MIPT 2008). Their source of funding is unknown.

External Ties

They were connected to the ELN and Alejo Calatayud Command, as they shared members with both these groups (CIA 1989). They also were allegedly tied to the National Patriotic Convergence Axis (EJE-P) (ibid). The People's Command also claimed responsibility for the Shultz caravan bombing (CIA 1989).

Group Outcome

The group conducted bombings near the Bolivian Congress in December of 1988 (CIA 1989). The last violent attack it claimed responsibility for was the January 1990 bombing of the Planning and Economic Coordination Ministry in La Paz (GTD 2018) However, because of the previous assassinations of two Mormon missionaries from the United States in 1989, police had begun arresting members of the group in 1990 in connection with the killings (US State Department 1989). In 1992, Johnny Justino Peralta Espinoza, one of the leaders of the FAL-ZW was arrested as well (MIPT 2008, Zamorano 2016). After the 1990 arrests, the group became inactive (Zamorano 2016).

Notes for Iris:

- the groups had different leadership which might indicate they are independent organizations despite having members of the ELN
- it seems more likely that the Simon Bolivar group conducted the attack on Secretary Shultz over the Zarate group because some attacks had been misattributed to Zarate in the past

XII. COMISION DE NESTOR PAZ ZAMORA (CNPZ)

Torg ID: 325

Min. Group Date: 1990

Max. Group Date: 1990

Onset: NA

Aliases: Nestor Paz Zamora Commission, Comisi_n De N_stor Paz Zamora, Comision De Nestor Paz Zamora (Cnpz), Comisi_n De N_stor Paz Zamora (Cnpz), Nestor Paz Zamora Commission (Cnpz)

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- GTD Perpetrator 509. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018.
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<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Hd3wCAn-gGOqCIDWMilamd-K3VRAXdc23UyZ199EBt4/edit>

- Stephen Sloan and Sean Anderson. "Nestor Paz Zamora Commission (CNPZ)." Historical Dictionary of Terrorism. Scarecrow Press. 2009. P. 488.
https://books.google.com/books?id=aVcG7EkuPgAC&pg=PA488&dq=historical+dictiona+ry+terrorism+zamora&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiYleHZvr_jAhVgJzQIHWCJAg0Q6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=historical%20dictionary%20terrorism%20zamora&f=false
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<https://www.csmonitor.com/1990/1221/oboli.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: CNPZ-ELN, Nestor Paz Zamora Commission-National Liberation Army

Group Formation: 1982 (form)

Group End: 1990

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Nestor Paz Zamora Commission was part of the revitalized ELN umbrella group (MIPT 2008; Sloan and Anderson 2009, 488). The group wanted to replace the democratic Bolivian government with a Marxist regime that resembled the Cuban government (Sloan and Anderson 2009, 488). The organization was named after a leftist

guerilla, Nestor Paz Zamora, who emerged after the death of revolutionary Che Guevara in 1967 (Sloan and Anderson 2009). Many of its attacks were aimed at the United States (MIPT 2008). Although the group is thought to have formed in 1982, the CNPZ's first violent attack occurred on June 11, 1990 with the kidnapping of Jorge Lonsdale, the president of Coca-Cola in Bolivia (Sloan and Anderson 2009; Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1992; Christian Science Monitor 1990; Noticia Fides 2017).

Geography

All of the CNPZ attacks were carried out in La Paz, Bolivia (GTD 2018). More specifically, the group held the kidnapped Jorge Lonsdale in a house in the La Paz suburb of Sopocachi (Christian Science Monitor 1990).

Organizational Structure

The CNPZ was thought to have at least one hundred members (Sloan and Anderson 2009, 488). The group's alleged leader was killed in a gunfight with the police in December of 1990 (Christian Science Monitor 1990). The CNPZ received funding from the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Federation of American Scientists n.d.).

External Ties

The CNPZ called itself part of the revitalized National Liberation Army (ELN) umbrella and also received financial help and training from the Peruvian Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Sloan and Anderson 2009, 488; Federation of American Scientists n.d.).

Group Outcome

The group's last violent act occurred on December 10, 1990 in La Paz with the bombing of the Defense Ministry (GTD 2018). However, five days prior to this attack, the group had a shootout with government forces trying to recover hostage Jorge Lonsdale, who had been held for ransom for six months (Noticias Fides 2017). This led to the deaths of four members of the CNPZ, allegedly including the leader of the group (Noticias Fides 2017; Christian Science Monitor 1990). After 1990, the group was not responsible for any violence, although the Bolivian government accused it of planning attacks in 1997 (MIPT 2008). It is inactive.

Notes for Iris:

-group can't be a direct splinter of ELN because of gap between when ELN was destroyed and members, likely part of umbrella coalition of revitalized ELN that forms later

XIII. TUPAC KATARI GUERRILLA ARMY (EGTK)

Torg ID: 501

Min. Group Date: 1991

Max. Group Date: 1992

Onset: NA

Aliases: Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (Egk), Ej_Rcito Guerrillero T&Pac Katari (Egk)

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Ejército Guerrillero Túpac Katari (EGTK)

Group Formation: 1988

Group End: 1993

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed after splintering from a native Indian ethno-nationalist political party known as the Tupac Katari Revolutionary Movement–Liberation (MRTK–L) (CIA 1989). The leader of the group was Apolinar Condori (CIA 1989). In 1988, they formed in a rural village north of Lake Titicaca (CIA 1989). There the group created a training program called the “Tupac Katari School for Combatants.” They targeted rural police and military (CIA 1989). Their first attack was on July 4, 1991, with the bombing of electricity pylons and oil pipelines near La Paz (Martin 2011). This set off a series of 40 other bombings of similar structures (Martin 2011). The group aimed to overthrow the government and restore power to the indigeneous population (MIPT 2008; Martin 2011).

Geography

The group organized and conducted attacks in mostly rural parts of Bolivia (GTD 2018; CIA 1989; US State Department via Naval Postgraduate School 1995). It operated near the Peru border and in the Altiplano region (US State Department via Naval Postgraduate School 1995). The altiplano area north of Lake Titicaca was where the group’s base was located (CIA 1989).

Organizational Structure

The EGTK weapons supply was allegedly stolen from the Bolivian Air Force (CIA 1989). The leader of the group was Apolinar Condori and many members of his family were Tupac Kataristas (CIA 1989). Most of the group’s members were indigenous Aymara speaking peasants (CIA 1989; Martin 2011). Apolinar Condori was arrested in either 1988 or 1989 in an effort by the Bolivian government to stop the group before it increased its presence (CIA 1989). One member, Álvaro García Linera later became the Vice President of Bolivia (Farthing 2010, 30). The group is thought to have around 100 members at an unknown date (MIPT 2008; RAND 2008, 184; US State Department via Naval Postgraduate School 1995). They used robberies for their funding (Martin 2011).

External Ties

The group may have been connected to Sendero Luminoso, a Peruvian militant group that sometimes operated in the same rural area as the EGTK (CIA 1989; Martin 2011).

Group Outcome

The EGTK's last attack occurred on November 30, 1992, when they again bombed a high tension line tower in Infiernillos (GTD 2018). The group ended in 1993, after 11 members and the leader of the group were arrested (Minorities at Risk Project 2004).

Notes for Iris:

According to CIA, the group had a string of bad luck when "a chance encounter between a group of foreign mountain climbers and a Tupac Katari patrol" led to the group's discovery in 1989 and allowed Bolivian Security Forces "to disrupt the movement before it could become well-entrenched"

XIV. KOLLA BENJO CRUZ COMMAND

Torg ID: 1781

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 1992

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://search.proquest.com/docview/256186970?accountid=14026> (accessed July 18, 2019). PDF.
- "Bolivia: Que Me Digan Casiano...*" [Bolivia: Tell Me Casiano...*]. Prensa Indígena. Accessed August 5, 2019.
https://www.prensaindigena.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10725:bolivia-que-me-digan-casiano&catid=86

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1992

Group End: 1992

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Kolla Benjo Cruz Command was an indigenous group that conducted its first attack on May 5, 1992, when it bombed a telephone in Cochabamba, Bolivia (Austin American Statesman 1992; GTD 2018). The command was named after Benjo Cruz, a singer whose songs protested the Bolivian government (Prensa Indígena n.d.). Benjo Cruz later joined the revitalized National Liberation Army (ELN) (ibid).

Geography

The group's two attacks were both conducted in Cochabamba, Bolivia (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

The Kolla Benjo Cruz Command was an indigenous group that conducted its first attack on May 5, 1992, when it bombed a telephone in Cochabamba, Bolivia (Austin American Statesman 1992; GTD 2018).

External Ties

Any external connections are unknown.

Group Outcome

The group's last attack was the bombing of the Justice Ministry building in Cochabamba on Columbus Day October 12, 1992, the same day that many indigenous groups protested Columbus Day in Bolivia and across the Americas (GTD 2018; Austin American Statesman 1992). The reasons for the group's inactivity is unknown.

XV. MANUEL ASCENCIO PADILLA GROUP

Torg ID: 1801

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 1992

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Galasso, Norberto. "Manuel Ascencio Padilla." Periódico Vas. Accessed August 6, 2019.
<https://www.periodicovas.com/manuel-ascencio-padilla/>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1992

Group End: 1992

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group's namesake was an important revolutionary in the early 1800s in Bolivia (Periódico Vas n.d.). The group's sole attack was the May 16, 1992 bombing of a statue of the Spanish conqueror Pedro Ansué de Campo Redondo to protest the celebrations of the 500th anniversary of European contact with the Americas (Mickolus and Simmons 1997, 164; GTD 2018).

Geography

The group's only attack was conducted in Sucre, Bolivia (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

The leadership, membership, and source of funding is unknown.

External Ties

External support is unknown.

Group Outcome

After the group's 1992 bombing of the statue in Sucre, no other violence from the group were reported (GTD 2018). It is inactive.

Notes for Iris:

- who is Padilla? In the 1800s he had been a martyr and the group named itself off the martyr
- their political aim was limited to protest a historical event

XVI. THE NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION FRONT

Torg ID: 490

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: NA

Aliases: National Anti-Corruption Front (Fna), Frente Nacional De La Contra-Corrupcion, National Anti-Corruption Front, The National Anti-Corruption Front

Part 1. Bibliography

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https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10125515

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Patriotic Bloc

Group Formation: 2005

Group End: 2005

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The National Anti-Corruption Front first came to attention with its bombing of the car of an employee of the Brazilian oil company Petrobras in Santa Cruz, Bolivia on May 13, 2005 (GTD 2018, MIPT 2008). The group later provided a local TV station with a videotape recording that had masked men threatening President Carlos Mesa with more attacks if he did not nationalize Bolivia's natural resources (MIPT 2008; New Zealand Herald 2005). Three days prior to the attack, President Mesa had vetoed a bill that would add new taxes on foreign oil companies (New Zealand Herald 2005).

Geography

The bombing of the Petrobras employee's car occurred outside of the company's headquarters in Santa Cruz de la Sierra (GTD 2018; MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

The group is estimated to have around a dozen members (RAND 2008, 171). The leadership and source of funding for the group are unknown.

External Ties

External support is unknown.

Group Outcome

After the National Anti-Corruption Front's bombing in Santa Cruz in 2005, it did not conduct any other attacks (GTD 2018). It remains inactive today and it is unknown what happened to the group.

Notes for Iris:

-possible 1998 activity is a typo because there is no other evidence from traditional sources tying it to pre-2005

XVII. THE INEVITABLES
Torg ID: 489
Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 2003
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20437. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018.
<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20437>
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<https://search.proquest.com/docview/460210189?accountid=14026> (accessed July 18, 2019). PDF.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2003

Group End: 2003

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Inevitables conducted its first and only attack on December 29, 2003, when it bombed the Canadian Center for International Studies and Cooperation in the city of Caranavi, Bolivia (GTD 2018; MIPT 2008). The Inevitables claimed responsibility with a pamphlet left at the place of the bombing that talked about opposition to US imperialism in Bolivia (BBC Monitoring Americas, 2003). The group is suspected to have been protesting America's Plan Bolivia with the attack (MIPT 2008). It is thought to be opposed to American destruction of coca fields in Bolivia (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group's only attack took place in Caranavi, Bolivia (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

The group had around a dozen members (RAND 2008).

External Ties

External support is unknown, although it is suspected that the group may be connected to the ELN (BBC Monitoring Americas 2003).

Group Outcome

Investigators from the Judicial Technical Police in Bolivia were sent to Caranavi to arrest members of the group after its 2003 attack (BBC Monitoring Americas 2003). After this bombing the group did not claim responsibility for any other violence after its only 2003 attack, and is inactive (GTD 2018).

XVIII. NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (THE SECOND)

Torg ID: 489

Min. Group Date: 1987

Max. Group Date: 2003

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20437. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018.
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<https://www.csmonitor.com/1990/1221/oboli.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

-perfect; no edits needed

Aliases: ELN-Renovado, Renewed ELN

Group Formation: 1987

Group End: 2003

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group was formed in 1987, when members of the original ELN came together with a new generation of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries (Painter 1990; Global Security n.d.). It is thought to be an umbrella group for several organizations, including the Nestor Paz Zamora Commission (Global Security n.d.). The second ELN's first attack was in 1990, with the bombing at the El Alto airport in La Paz Bolivia on April 3rd (GTD 2018).

Geography

The group's attack occurred in La Paz, Bolivia (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

The group is thought to have hundreds of members (RAND 2008). Its leadership and source of funding are unknown.

External Ties

The second ELN allegedly receives training and other support from Peru's MRTA (Global Security n.d.). It is thought to be an umbrella group of which the Nestor Paz Zamora Commission is a part (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

The group's first attack, the bombing of the El Alto Airport, is also thought to be its last attack (GTD 2018). It is inactive.

Notes for Iris:

- what is the relation between the first Che Guevara ELN and this group? The second group had some membership overlap but they chose new leadership. The PRTB doesn't seem to have any connection for the other group
- the group is just considered an "umbrella" for a lot of smaller organizations. There seems to be ample evidence this group is umbrella

Country-Level Trends:

- mostly left-wing groups that oppose the military dictatorship and other smaller groups that oppose American imperialism (some ideological overlap between those 2 types, e.g. Zarata Wilca group)
- country violence has been pretty quiet since 2005