

ARGENTINA
LAST UPDATED: 10 January 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T1045	COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS		1976	1977
T1074	EL FRENTE ARGENTINO DE LIBERACION (FAL)		1970	1974
T121	LA BRIGADA CHE GUEVARA		1976	1990
T1595	ACTIVE ESPIRIT DE CORPS OF THE ARGENTINA ARMY		1987	1987
T1604	ALL FOR THE FATHERLAND MOVEMENT		1989	1989
T163	EVA PERON ORGANIZATION		1990	1990
T1669	NUCLEO DE CONSPIRADORES POR LA EXTENSIÓN DE KAOS		2011	2011
T1753	ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND		1991	1991
T182	FRENTE DE LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL DEL VIETNAM DEL SUR		1968	1968
T1850	OAS-MRP		1988	1988
T1877	POPULAR RESISTANCE FRONT (FPR)		1989	1989
T129	ARGENTINE COMMITTEE OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM		1972	1972
T1376	CHE GUEVARA ANTI-IMPERIALIST COMMAND		1997	1997
T1427	ARGENTINE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION MOVEMENT (MANO)		1970	1975
T146	DARIO SANTILLAN COMMAND		2004	2004
T1463	RODOLFO WALSH NATIONAL COMMAND		2001	2001
T286	COMANDO DE LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL MARIANO MORENO		2005	2005
T299	MONTONERO PERONIST MOVEMENT		1970	1979
T350	OPR-33		1971	1972

T370	PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ARGENTINA)		1969	
T373	ORGANIZACION REVOLUCIONARIA PUEBLO		1992	1996
T375	FUERZAS ARMADAS PERONISTAS (FAP)		1970	1974
T457	SENDERO LUMINOSO (SHINING PATH)		1978	2012
T600	ANARKISTA JORGE BANOS FRONT OF THE EVERYONE FOR THE HOMELAND MOVEMENT (MTP)		2010	2010
T880	ARGENTINE ANTICOMMUNIST ALLIANCE (AAA)		1974	1978
T961	2 APRIL GROUP		1983	1983
T992	ANTI-IMPERIALIST COMMANDO		1999	1999
T2413	JACINTO ARAUJO INTERNATIONALIST REBEL INSURRECTIONIST BRIGADE		2010	2010
T2510	REVOLUTIONARY CELLS (ARGENTINA)		2009	2010
T2539	VANDALICIA TEODORO SUAREZ		2010	2010
T208	HIZBULLAH		1982	2012
T2289	COMANDO MALVINAS ARGENTINAS		2003	2003

1. Coordination Of United Revolutionary Organizations

Min. Group Date: 1976

Max. Group Date: 1977

Aliases: CORU

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations (CORU) ceased attacks in 2000 and has been inactive since 2012 (Bardach 2006). The founding of CORU is disputed, with most reporting its origins as either in Chile in 1975 (S&J 1998, 527) or in the Dominican Republic in June of 1976 (NSA Archive 1, 1978). CORU's initial goal was a change in the Castro regime (Sweig 2009, 83). Through acts of sabotage and misinformation about who was responsible, CORU sought to undermine Cuba's relationships with other states in the Americas (Schmid and Jongman 1998, 527; NSA Archives 1978). A C.I.A. report attributes 17 acts of international terrorism during 1976 to CORU, three of which occurred in the U.S. (C.I.A. 1997, 5).

The founders of CORU were Cuban exiles Orlando Bosch (a medical doctor) and Luis Posada Carriles (often known as Posada rather than Carriles). Bosch and Posada were schoolmates from the University of Havana, who said they became disillusioned by the Castro regime's unfulfilled promises and oppression (Bardach 2006).

Geography

Using false names and passports, CORU leaders traveled to countries with Cuban exile communities including Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Venezuela (Martin 2011; NSA Archives, 6 re: Venezuela).

Organizational Structure

CORU was an umbrella organization for five anti-Castro paramilitary groups. These groups were: Acción Cuba, Cuban Nationalist Movement, Cuban National Liberation Front, Association of the Veterans of the Bay of Pigs Brigade 2506, and the 17th of April Movement (NSA Archive 1, 1978).

An F.B.I. report described the group as organized in “secret cells.” However, Bosch and Posada were familiar to both law enforcement and the Cuban exile community since the 1960s (NSA Archives 12, 1978; Bardach 2006).

Posada and Bosch are alleged to have organized the mid-flight bombing of Cubana Airlines Flight 455, which resulted in the deaths of all 73 people on board on October 6, 1976 (Sweig 2009, 83). The flight was en route to Havana from Guayana, and had layovers in Trinidad, Barbados, and Jamaica. The plane crashed in the sea about ten minutes after departing from Barbados, and it was the first act of airline terrorism in the Americas (Bardach 2006). According to a declassified C.I.A. memo from June 22, 1976, the CIA had knowledge that CORU was planning to bomb a Cubana Airline Flight (Bamford 2016).

External Ties

The right-wing military in Argentina and CORU both had strong ties to the covert paramilitary network Operation Condor, which reportedly aimed to weaken leftist groups, including the Cuban government (Martin 2011; Kohut and Vilella 2010). U.S. Government investigators have considered it possible (although never confirmed), that the Argentine military may have provided support to CORU as part of the multinational Operation Condor (Bardach 2006).

In fact, Bosch received housing and logistical support from the Chilean military in the latter half of the 1970s. Following the 1973 military coup in Chile that deposed democratically-elected, socialist President Salvador Allende, the Chilean secret police allegedly helped Bosch plan the assassination of Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier in September 1976 (Martin 2011; Bardach 2006; Bamford 2016; Kohut and Vilella 2010). A bomb was placed under Letelier’s car, killing him and his American aide Ronni Karpen Moffitt (Ibid.).

Bosch and Posada allegedly had ties to the CIA beginning in the 1960s. The C.I.A. allegedly provided financial support to Posada until 1976, according to declassified documents and an unclassified summary of his career from court records (McKinley). Bosch has claimed that he received direct support from the C.I.A. for brief paramilitary training in Florida in the early 1960s (Bardach 2006). CORU also had supporters in the Cuban exile community in Miami, Florida (Martin 2011).

Group Outcome

After six prior arrests, Bosch was sentenced to ten years in federal prison in Miami in 1968, though he earned parole in 1972. Bosch and Posada were arrested in Caracas, Venezuela, in connection with the bombing of Cubana Airlines Flight 455 (Bamford 2016). Florida’s then-governor Claude Kirk was among those who lobbied for Bosch’s

parole (Bardach 2006; Martin 2011). Posada fled Venezuela in 1985 and Bosch was released on appeal in 1987 (Bardach 2006).

In November 2000, Posada and three additional Cuban exiles attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro at an international summit in Panama (Bardach 2006; Sweig 2009). Panamanian officials, in collaboration with Cuban intelligence agents, arrested the four plotters, who were found in possession of explosives, a map of Fidel's route, and the summit's agenda (Sweig 2009). The four plotters served three and a half years in Panamanian prison but were then pardoned by President Mireya Moscoso. The reason for the pardon is unclear, although Sweig notes that Moscoso faced allegations of corruption during his presidential term (Ibid.).

The U.S. Justice Department called for Bosch to be deported from Miami in 1989, alleging that Bosch was responsible for 30 acts of sabotage in the United States, Puerto Rico, Panama, and Cuba between 1961 and 1968 (Martin 2011). However, both Bosch (who died in 2011) and Posada (alive as of 2012) were allowed to remain in Florida.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: no proposed change

Group Formation: no proposed change

Group End (Outcome): 2000 (Posada's last known major plot, assassination attempt against Castro, ends with arrest of Posada and colleagues in Panama.)

2. El Frente Argentino De Liberaci3n (FAL)

Min. Group Date: 1970

Max. Group Date: 1974

Aliases: El Frente Argentino De Liberacion, FAL, Argentine Liberation Front (FAL)

Part 1. Bibliography

- S&J, p. 503
- Lewis 2002, "Guerrillas and Generals"
- Moyano 1995, "Argentina's Lost Patrol"

Part 2. Narrative

FAL was a Marxist organization with an initial aim to overturn the Argentinean government (Moyano 1995, 22). After having left the Revolutionary Communist Party in 1967, their leader initially hoped to launch a rural communist insurrection, but changed FAL's primary strategy after Guevara's death in Bolivia (Moyano 1995, 26). The group gained recognition on April 5, 1970 after a military raid at Campo de Mayo (Moyano 1995, 26). It

later attacked a combination of civilian and military posts and kidnapped officials for ransom (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503). The group primarily operated out of Buenos Aires (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503).

The group fell apart by 1972 due to internal divisions and a number of members leaving to become the Liberation Popular Commandos (Comandos Populares de Liberacion) (Moyano 1995, 26). The CPL joined the Montoneros in 1974 while other remaining members of the FAL joined the Montoneros (Moyano 1995, 39).

3. La Brigada Che Guevara

Min. Group Date: 1976

Max. Group Date: 1990

Aliases: Che Guevara Brigade, Che Guevara International Brigade

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Narrative

Note: There may not be enough confirmed information to code this group. I have noted when sources conflict.

Group Formation

La Brigada Che Guevara was a left-wing group active from 1976 until 1990 (TOPS 2008, ID 3982; GTD, START 2016; Jones and Libicki 2008, 153). The group's initial goal was to target officials allegedly involved in the death of transnational guerrilla Ernesto "Che" Guevara (TOPS 2008, ID 3982). The group also sought leftist social revolution and later attacks (circa 1990) targeted U.S.-based businesses in Buenos Aires (GTD, START 2016; Jones and Libicki 2008, 153; U.S. Department of State 1991, 4-5, 8).

La Brigada Che Guevara is allegedly responsible for several well-known attacks, however little is known about the group's organizational structure or external ties (TOPS 2008, ID 3982). La Brigada Che Guevara first came to international attention when a representative claimed responsibility for the assassination of former Bolivian President and leftist general Juan Jose Torres González in Paris in June 1976 (2008, ID 3982). According to TOPS, La Brigada Che Guevara targeted González in Buenos Aires because González allegedly led the military operation that killed Guevara in Bolivia (2008, ID 3982).

Geography

Within Argentina, the group conducted attacks in Buenos Aires (START 2016, GTD). The group allegedly conducted attacks in Paris, France, Bogota, Colombia, and the Italian cities of Brindisi and Rome, however many of these are disputed (START 2016, GTD).

Organizational Structure

La Brigade Che Guevara reportedly had less than 100 members (Jones and Libicki 2008, 153). The group's targets tended to be officials involved in the death of Che Guevara or sites linked to the Argentine government or United States (START 2016, GTD).

External Ties

In November 1999, the Argentine Government ruled González's killing part of Operation Condor, claimed partial responsibility, and awarded \$320,000 in compensation to González's widow (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 309). The Argentine government raised uncertainty about La Brigada Che Guevara's involvement, questioning whether the groups had connections to Latin American governments participating in Operation Condor.

Some sources say La Brigada Che Guevara claimed credit for the assassination of General Joaquín Zenteno Anaya in Paris on May 11, 1976 (TOPS 2008, ID 3982; Greisman 1977, 306; Parry 1976, 253). However, GTD does not attribute La Brigada Che Guevara with Anaya's assassination (START 2016). Calloni claims that the state

actors behind Operation Condor assassinated Anaya, but blamed La Brigada Che Guevara in order to avoid attribution (May 1999, 85). However, Calloni claims that La Brigada Che Guevara never existed at all, which contradicts the entries in GTD and TOPS (Calloni May 1999, 85; TOPS 2008, ID 3982; START 2016, GTD).

A 1991 C.I.A. report noted that some Argentine guerrillas, described as “possibly” La Brigada Che Guevara members, traveled to Peru in mid-July 1990 (NSA Archive 2002, MORI DocID 766907, 4). Once in Peru, the suspected Che Guevara Brigade members allegedly contacted the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which had a similar Marxist-Leninist and anti-imperialist (anti-U.S.) ideology (Ibid.). However, the nature of the alleged communication is unknown. The C.I.A. report classifies the link between the La Brigada Che Guevara and the MRTA as “suspected” but unconfirmed (Ibid.).

Group Outcome

La Brigada Che Guevara is associated with a bomb explosion at a U.S.-owned Parke-Davis Laboratories in Buenos Aires (START 2016, GTD 198803060001). The explosion caused property damage but the extent is unknown (START 2016, GTD 198803060001). *The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism for 1988* and TOPS claim that La Brigada Che Guevara claimed responsibility in a communiqué accusing the U.S. of supporting the British military in the Falkland Islands (TOPS 2008, ID 3982; Gardela and Hoffman 1988, 41). However, GTD says it is unknown if La Brigada Che Guevara claimed responsibility, contradicting the RAND report and TOPS (START 2016, GTD 198803060001).

La Brigada Che Guevara allegedly detonated a bomb at a branch of the state telephone company Entel in the Florencio Varela suburb of Buenos Aires on June 30, 1990, causing significant property damage and lightly injuring two employees (U.S. Department of State 1991, 8). According to a U.S. State Department report, La Brigada Che Guevara claimed responsibility for the bombing in a call to a local radio station (1991, 8). However, a 1991 report from the Canadian government’s Immigration and Refugee Board discounted the group’s claim of responsibility for bombing Entel and instead concluded the “true identity of the terrorists has not been determined” (IRB 1991). The attack was reportedly protesting the Argentine government’s approval for the sale of Entel to two foreign firms including U.S. Bell Atlantic (U.S. Department of State 1991, 8; TOPS 2008, ID 3982). The U.S. State Department report lists two other 1990 incidents in which La Che Guevara bombed U.S.-owned businesses in Buenos Aires (a CitiBank and GTE-owned subsidiary) (U.S. Department of State 1991, 4-5). A purported representative of the group claimed responsibility in a telephone call to local media following both attacks (U.S. Department of State 1991, 4-5). The group splintered in 1990 and is not associated with any attack following 1990 (Jones and Libicki 2008, 153; START 2016, GTD).

The 1991 IRB report also noted that the same or other groups using a similar-sounding name were claiming responsibility for various terrorist acts “lacking a clear political purpose” around that time in Argentina (IRB 1991, ARG7522).

Following the 1989 La Tablada attack (cf. MTP), a military intelligence source named La Brigada Che Guevara as among a series of groups posing imminent threats (Schneider 1989, 9). However these predicted attacks never occurred (Ibid.). Contemporary Argentine journalist Joe Schneider claimed that competing liberal/leftist and nationalist factions of the military purported these warnings to fan public distrust of opposing political factions (1989, 9).

The name “Che Guevara Brigade” is also used by a pro-Castro regime group that organizes international trips to Cuba, volunteer work, and transnational communication with leftist activists (Alekseeva and Fitzpatrick 1990, 58; Pagliccia 2014, 87, 89-91, 237; ALBA Movimientos 2014). This pro-Castro group does not appear connected to the terrorist group Che Guevara Brigade in Argentina.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: no proposed change

Group Formation: no proposed change

Group End (Outcome): no proposed change (splintering, S (Jones and Libicki 2008, 153))

4. Active Espirit De Corps Of The Argentina Army

Min. Group Date: 1987

Max. Group Date: 1987

Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [GTD ID 198703210001]. <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198703210001>.
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- I checked and did not find mentions of this group in googlescholar, proquest, Lexisnexis Academic; the keywords I checked: “Active Espirit De Corps Of The Argentina Army” with no date restriction; “active esprit” + date restrict: 1987; “active esprit” with no date restriction; “active esprit” + “Buenos Aires” with no date restriction; “corps of the argentina army” with no date restriction; bomb + general staff + buenos aires + 1987; explosive + general staff + buenos aires + 1987.

- Also not mentioned in Bufano & Teixidó, Lewis 2002, Moyano 1996, Kohut and Vilella 2010, Rand & Libkici “How Terrorist Groups End,” Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research.

Part 2. Narrative

Note: I do not think there is enough information to code this group. The only information I found is the GTD incident summary, which only cites one bombing and does not provide information about the group’s founding, aims, organizational structure, group outcome, or even whether the group claimed responsibility or is just attributed with the attack.

Group Formation

The Active Espirit De Corps Of The Argentina Army first came to attention as a violent group on March, 21 1987 (START 2016 GTD ID 198703210001). As of 2012, the group has been inactive (START 2016 GTD ID 198703210001; TRAC). The group was attributed with a bombing attack in Buenos Aires that targeted the Argentinian Army General Staff (START 2016 GTD ID 198703210001). There were no casualties, though there was some property damage (Ibid.). The group is not associated with any other attacks according to the GTD dataset (START 2016 GTD ID 198703210001).

Geography

The GTD Incident Summary says that the bombing occurred at the “Economy Ministry” in Buenos Aires (START 2016 GTD ID 198703210001). This could refer to the historical building for the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance (“Palacio de Hacienda”), located in the Montserrat district of Buenos Aires (street address Hipólito Yrigoyen 250) and facing the Argentinian presidential residence to the north (Ministerio de Hacienda y Finanzas Públicas 2004). However, it is not clear if the GTD description is referring to this building as opposed to another location in Buenos Aires. It is also unclear why the Argentinian Army General Staff would have been at the Economy Ministry’s building at the time of the attack. The location of the attack thus cannot be independently confirmed due to lack of additional sources about the attack or group.

Organizational Structure

The group’s organizational structure is unknown.

External Ties

The group does not have any known external ties.

Group Outcome

Following the bombing on 21 March 1987, the Active Espirit de Corps of the Argentina Army was not heard from again (START 2016 GTD ID 198703210001).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: no proposed change

Group Formation: no proposed change

Group End (Outcome): 1987-1987 (disappears)

5. All For The Fatherland Movement

Min. Group Date: 1989

Max. Group Date: 1989

Aliases: Movimiento Todos por la Patria, MTP. This is connected to #11 Popular Resistance Front. I could not find evidence for ties, whether operational or shared personnel, between this group and MTP movement #24 although they have similar names. It looks like MTP movement #24 was inspired by MTP group #5, however it is difficult to confirm this independently due to lack of information about MTP movement #24.

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Smith, James F. "Argentine Rebel Yields Control of Troops: Move Comes 30 Hours After Colonel Called a Halt to Mutiny," *Los Angeles Times*, December 6, 1988, accessed November 3, 2016, http://articles.latimes.com/1988-12-06/news/mn-867_1_rebel-unit.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

All for the Fatherland Movement (Movimiento Todos Por La Patria, MTP) has been inactive since 2012. MTP's initial goal was political opposition to the existing regime, and it sought to implement leftist reforms and prosecute Argentinian government officials for atrocities committed in the 1976-1983 Dirty War (Lewis 2002, 229; Aguirre 2015; Kohut and Vilella 2010, 222). The MTP formed in the 1980s as a legal political party that was leftist and grassroots (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 222). Its original membership included human-rights activists and progressive Catholics motivated by liberation theology (Ibid.). The MTP began as a political movement/human-rights organization, but switched from peaceful tactics to violence in 1988 due to Enrique Haroldo Gorriarán Merlo's rise to prominence in the organization (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 222 Lewis 2002, 229; Schneider 1989, 10).

The MTP was politically opposed to then-President Raúl Alfonsín, accusing him of being too lenient with the military, and likely to give amnesty to the military for crimes committed during the 1976-1983 Dirty War (Lewis 2002, 229).

MTP members first turned to violent tactics in 1988, during Colonel Mohamed Ali Seineldin's failed military/right-wing coup (Lewis 2002, 229).¹ The MTP opposed Seineldin's coup, but also felt that the Argentine government was not hard enough on Seineldin's rebels. Government soldiers engaged in a three-day standoff (ending December 4, 1988) against Seineldin and his rebel troops, who were sheltered inside the Villa Martelli base in Buenos Aires (Smith, 5 December 1988). Young MTP members went to the Villa Martelli base, independent of the government's or Seineldin's forces (Lewis 2002, 229). These MTP members first threw rocks and Molotov cocktails at Seineldin's forces. Then, these MTP members began throwing these objects at government troops because the MTP felt that the government troops were not doing enough to defeat Seineldin's rebels. Both Seineldin's forces and government troops shot at these MTP members, killing some (Lewis 2002, 229). However, this incident was largely unplanned. The MTP's first organized use of violence occurred against the La Tablada military barracks in Buenos Aires on January 23, 1989.

Geography

The MTP operated mainly in Buenos Aires.

Organizational Structure

Seineldin's coup attempt gave Gorriarán Merlo a window of opportunity to change the MTP from a political organization to a paramilitary group (Schneider 1989, 10).

¹ Cf. Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA) for information on Colonel Mohamed Ali Seineldin's prior involvement with AAA.

Seineldin's coup attempt was one of numerous "carapintada" coup attempts, all of which increased leftists' fears about a military coup. (The "carapintada" coup attempts were by junior military officers angry that the government might prosecute the military for the Dirty War (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 100).) Gorriarán Merlo exploited leftists' fears of a military coup in the internal politics of the MTP organization (Schneider 1989, 10). He advocated that the MTP adopt violent tactics, under the pretext that the MTP should use paramilitary means to protect the Argentine public against a military or right-wing coup. It is unclear if there was any real threat of a successful military coup, despite Gorriarán Merlo's claims (Lewis 2002, 229). Gorriarán Merlo's support for violent tactics created a power struggle between Gorriarán Merlo (a newer member) and original MTP members (who intended the group to be a leftist political organization with close ties to human rights activists). Gorriarán Merlo won the power struggle: several original MTP members resigned in protest against the use of violence, Gorriarán Merlo took control of MTP leadership, and the MTP adopted violent tactics (Lewis 2002, 229).

External Ties

Gorriarán Merlo was not an original MTP member and only joined the group in the late 1980s. His paramilitary background was different from that of founding MTP members, who were human-rights activists and liberation-theology Catholics (and wanted an exclusively political organization). Before joining the MTP, Gorriarán Merlo was second-in-command of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the armed wing of the Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT) (Schneider 1989, 10). In 1983, Gorriarán Merlo had been criminally charged in a controversial retroactive law under Alfonsín, related to ERP attacks against the democratically-elected government (Lewis 2002, 200). In the late 1980s, Gorriarán Merlo returned to Argentina with help from the leftist opposition party Partido Intransigente which was led by Buenos Aires Governor Oscar Allende (Lewis 2002, 230-31). He then joined the MTP. Cf. Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA) for information on Colonel Mohamed Ali Seineldin's prior involvement with AAA.

It is suspected that Argentine government agents infiltrated the MTP and encouraged the attack at La Tablada; however, this has not been confirmed (Lewis 2002, 229; Schneider 1989, 10). This allegation is popular due to the fact that the MTP, and leftist political opposition groups in general, had lost nearly all public support in Argentina following the La Tablada attack while support for the Argentine military increased (Schneider 1989, 10).

Group Outcome

Approximately 50 MTP militants attacked the La Tablada military barracks in Buenos Aires on January 23, 1989 (Aguirre 2015; Keesing's 1989). Gorriarán Merlo is considered the mastermind of the attack, although sources dispute if he was present at

the barracks (Aguirre 2015; Keesing's 1989; Schneider 1989, 10). At least 30 MTP militants, seven Argentine soldiers, and two policemen died and an estimated 63 were wounded in the attack, which involved clashes for about 36 hours (Aguirre 2015; Keesing's 1989). The Argentinian military reportedly deployed tanks, armed helicopters, heavy artillery (mortars) and used phosphorous bombs to defeat the MTP at La Tablada (Lewis 2002 , 230; Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos 1997; Aguirre 2015).

Some scholars conclude that the La Tablada attack caused Alfonsín to give more power to the military to maintain order, the opposite of what MTP wanted (Lewis 2002, 231; Pereyra 2004, 90). Lewis argues the consequences of La Tablada were that Argentine human rights activists with past ties to the MTP (predating Gorriarán Merlo) were discredited and blamed for the violence, the Argentine military gained prestige, and the Catholic Church condemned liberation theology (Lewis 2002, 231). The Argentine government increased military repression following the attack (Aguirre 2015; Keesing's 1989). Alfonsín established the National Security Council (COSENA), an umbrella organization for state security forces (Schneider 1989, 12). The Argentine military was authorized to collect intelligence domestically, in violation of existing law namely the National Defense Bill of April 1988 (Schneider 1989, 12). The military tortured militants detained after the attack, executed some militants without trial, and four of the detainees were never heard from again (Aguirre 2015; Pereyra 2004). Eleven guerillas including Gorriarán Merlo and his wife were sentenced to life imprisonment (Lewis 2002, 245). However in 2000, all except Gorriarán Merlo and his wife had their sentences reduced and became eligible for release between 2001 and 2006 (Ibid.).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: no proposed change

Group Formation: no proposed change

Group End (Outcome): no proposed change (military force (Aguirre 2015; Keesing's 1989)). Note: there's no Jones and Libicki entry

6. Eva Peron Organization

Min. Group Date: 1990

Max. Group Date: 1990

Aliases: Eva Peron Command

Part 1. Bibliography

- TOPS ID 4016
- GTD

- “Significant Incidents of Political Violence against Americans 1990,” State Department, <http://www.higginsctc.org/politicalviolence/PolitViol1990.pdf>
- Searched Proquest, Keesing, Lexis using alias + country + event info

Part 2. Narrative

The group attacked two banks over a period of five days (GTD). On December 4, 1990, a spokesman for the Eva Peron Organization said the incidents were a “welcome operation for President Bush” who was visiting the country at the time (State Department 1990). They were not heard from again.

There may not be enough information about this group. Could not corroborate group goals mentioned in TOPS that the group “oppose the privatization policies of” Menem.

Note: It looks like there is not enough information to code this group.

7. Nucleo De Conspiradores Por La Extensión De Kaos

Min. Group Date: 2011

Max. Group Date: 2011

Aliases:

Core Conspirators For The Extension Of Chaos (Núcleo De Conspiradores Por La Extensión De Kaos), Core Conspirators For The Extension Of Chaos, Nucleo De Conspiradores Por La Extension De Kaos, Núcleo De Conspiradores Por La Extensión De Kaos

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Estalló una bomba a metros del Ministerio de Seguridad,” *La Nación*, December 22, 2011, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1434656-estallo-una-bomba-a-metros-del-ministerio-de-seguridad>.
- “Fear to Sleep,” a blog with some posts that claimed to be authored by Nucleo De Conspiradores Por La Extensión De Kaos, <http://feartosleep.blogspot.com/2011/12/nucleo-de-conspiradores-por-la.html>
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [GTD ID 201112210025]. <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201112210025>.

Part 2. Narrative

Note: It looks like there is not enough information to code this group.

Group Formation

The group claimed credit on their webpage for one bombing (no casualties) in 2011, but have not acted since. The bomb exploded near the Argentine government’s Ministry of Security in Buenos Aires, at approximately 1 a.m.. However, the group’s purported website does not even have many mentions of the name “Nucleo De Conspiradores Por La Extensión De Kaos” (<http://feartosleep.blogspot.com/2011/12/nucleo-de-conspiradores-por-la.html>).

According to *La Nación*, the bomb (a bottle filled with rags soaked in gasoline) was similar to the explosives used to blow up five ATMs during 2010. Those five prior attacks were attributed to anarchists as well (*La Nación*). However, research indicates that no further connections were found between the 2010 attacks and the 2011 attack attributed to Nucleo De Conspiradores Por La Extensión De Kaos. The group's history, goals, organizational structure, operational environment or ties to other non-state or state actors are unclear.

Geography

The group's sole alleged attack took place in Buenos Aires.

Organizational Structure

The group's organizational structure is unknown.

External Ties

The group's possible external ties are unknown.

Group Outcome

The group has not been attributed with an attack since their purported website claimed responsibility for the bomb explosion in 2011.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: no proposed changes

Group Formation: no proposed changes

Group End (Outcome): no proposed changes (unknown)

8. Islamic Revolutionary Command

Min. Group Date: 1991

Max. Group Date: 1991

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Alon Burstein (2016): *Armies of God, armies of men: A global comparison of secular and religious terror organizations, Terrorism and Political Violence*, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2015.1135424. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1135424>.

- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [GTD ID 199102140001]. <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199102140001>
- Saiya, N. (2013). *The roots of religious terrorism* (Order No. 3585401). Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. (1512221803). Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1512221803?accountid=14026>.
- Steinitz, Mark S. *Middle East Terrorist Activity in Latin America*, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), July 2003, accessed November 3, 2016, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/ppmidleeastterrorist_activityinlamerica%5B1%5D.pdf.
- “Terrorist Groups,” *Inside Gov.* 2015. <http://terrorist-groups.insidegov.com/l/6845/Islamic-Revolutionary-Command>.
- Terrorist Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC). “Islamic Revolutionary Command.” <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/islamic-revolutionary-command>.
- U.S. State Department, *Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans: 1991*, Department of State Publication 9953, June 1992, accessed November 3, 2016. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20308.pdf>.
- *The New York Times*, “Slow-Motion Justice in Argentina,” March 11, 2003, accessed November 3, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/11/opinion/slow-motion-justice-in-argentina.html>.
- James, Brooke. “War in the Gulf: Latin America; War’s Ripples Lap at Latin America,” *The New York Times*, February 4, 1991, accessed November 3, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/04/world/war-in-the-gulf-latin-america-war-s-ripples-lap-at-latin-america.html>.
- Smith, Jeffrey R., “Experts: Islamic Extremists Pose an Aggressive Threat,” *The Washington Post*, March 17, 1993, accessed November 3, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/03/17/experts-islamic-extremists-pose-an-aggressive-threat/82f4486b-6872-4774-a5a7-5430782d28c6/>.

Part 2. Narrative

Note: It looks like there is not enough information to code this group. There are very few mentions of the group online. All of the mentions I saw link back to the GTD source and do not provide additional information. Keesing’s World News Archive does not have any information about this group. Lexis does not have any information about this group or the purported bomb at the Mormon church in Buenos Aires 1991.

Group Formation

GTD associates the Islamic Revolutionary Command with one attack in 1991, which involved a bomb planted at a Mormon Church in Buenos Aires (START 2016, GTD ID 199102140001). According to GTD, there were no casualties (Ibid.). GTD claims that the bomb detonated and property damage occurred (Ibid.). However, a U.S. State Department report says that it was a hoax bomb that never detonated (1992, 8). The State Department report alleges that a handwritten note in Spanish was found near the

purported bomb, in which a previously unknown group called “Revolutionary Islamic Command,” claimed responsibility (Ibid.). The State Department report alleges that the bomb was used “to protest” against U.S. involvement in the Gulf War, however the report does not clarify whether this rationale was explicitly written in the note (Ibid.). It is uncertain whether the Islamic Revolutionary Command claimed responsibility for the attack according to GTD (START 2016, GTD ID 199102140001).

Geography

The group’s only alleged attack occurred at a Mormon Church in Buenos Aires.

Organizational Structure

The group’s organizational structure is unknown.

External Ties

The group’s external ties are unknown.

Group Outcome

The group outcome and government response to the purported bomb by this group are unknown.

Note: Basic context for 1990s Islamic extremism in the Tri-Border Area, however no evidence directly links this contextual history to the Islamic Revolutionary Command. The area where Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil intersect is known as the Tri-Border Area (TBA) or Triple Frontier and has a large Muslim/Arab population, which has made it an area of concern regarding jihadist terrorism, with a few attacks between 1970-1991. Several large-scale attacks took place in the Tri-Border Area beginning on March 17, 1992, when Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) bombed the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires (29 killed and nearly 245 wounded) (Steinitz 2003, 6; Smith, 1993). Saiya suggests that the Islamic Revolutionary Command is part of a global trend: the increase of extremist Islamist organizations beginning in the 1980s (2013). According to Steinitz, there were concerns during the Gulf War that Iraq-sponsored actors had penetrated Latin America (2003, 4). However, no attacks in Latin America were proven to have been sponsored by Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq (Steinitz 2003, 4). Argentina (under then-President Carlos Saúl Menem) was the only Latin American nation that joined the U.S.-led military coalition against Iraq in the 1990-1991 Gulf War (*The New York Times*, 2003; Brooke 1991). Some have suggested that Argentina’s backing of the U.S. in the Gulf War inspired Islamic terrorist attacks against Argentina (Ibid.).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: no proposed change

Group Formation: no proposed change

Group End (Outcome): no proposed change

9. Frente De Liberación Nacional Del Vietnam Del Sur

Min. Group Date: 1968

Max. Group Date: Unknown

Aliases:

Sources:

TOPS ID 4025

Summary: This group falls outside the timeframe of interest.

Geography

This group falls outside the timeframe of interest.

Organizational Structure

This group falls outside the timeframe of interest.

External Ties

This group falls outside the timeframe of interest.

Group Outcome

This group falls outside the timeframe of interest.

From TOPS: The name Frente de Liberación Nacional del Vietnam del Sur first appeared on a note left outside of a U.S. Information Service office (USIS) in Rosario, Argentina after it was machine-gunned on March 8th, 1968. No one was hurt or killed. The perpetrators were never found and the group was never heard from again. The following year, a group of students in Rosario burned an American flag and threw explosives at the same USIS office. It was never determined whether or not they were connected with the Frente. The group's name, a Spanish translation of The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, indicates the attack was a protest against the Vietnam War. The National Liberation Front (NLF) was the official name of the organization of Communist rebels in South Vietnam fighting the U.S. military and the South Vietnamese government. It was allied with the Communist government of North Vietnam, who supplied much of their manpower and equipment throughout much of the war. There are no other records of NLF attacks on the United States outside of Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, with the possible exception of France (see Committee of Coordination). Thus, it is highly

unlikely that members of the Vietnamese NLF conducted the attack in Argentina. The drive-by machine-gunning of the USIS office in Rosario showed none of the sophistication or proficiency typical of the NLF in Vietnam. It is most likely that the shots were fired by Argentine anti-war, anti-U.S. demonstrators. They are credited with no other attacks. The Frente de Liberacion Nacional del Vietnam del Sur has not been heard from since this minor incident. The attack was almost certainly a protest against the American war in Vietnam and a statement of solidarity with the NLF in the wake of the Tet Offensive.

10. OAS-MRP

Min. Group Date: 1988

Max. Group Date: 1988

Aliases: OAS-MRP for Liberation

Part 1. Bibliography

- Enciclopedia argentina de agrupaciones políticas, 1800-2003, https://books.google.com/books?id=XkKIAAAAMAAJ&q=oas+mrp+argentina&dq=oas+mrp+argentina&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi2-8_39tXOAhUW7WMKHZIBD44Q6AEINDAD
- Times of India, "Panic over Recent Attacks in Argentina," 1988, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/750703786/DC20B17D57314F36PQ/2?accountid=14026>
- "The Argentine Connections," Arthur Shapiro, 1988, New Leader, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1308973890/DC20B17D57314F36PQ/1?accountid=14026>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The group arose in 1988 with a mission of "national liberation," but some argue it is a paramilitary group (Times of India 1988). The group bombed a series of movie theaters in Buenos Aires where they left some leaflets featuring pictures of General Jose de San Martin (Shapiro 1988). It was not heard from again.

Geography

The group had a couple bombings in Buenos Aires.

Organizational Structure

It is not known what the group's organizational structure is.

External Ties

It is not known what external ties the group has.

Group Outcome

It is not known what happens to the group or how the government responds.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988

Group End (Outcome): 1988 (unknown)

Note: There may not be enough information to code this group.

11. Popular Resistance Front (FPR)

Min. Group Date: 1989

Max. Group Date: 1989

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Hodges, Donald C. *Argentina's Dirty War: An Intellectual Biography*. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 1991.
<https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=I2rKAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT5&dq=%22Popular+Resistance+Front%22+%2B+%22La+Tablada%22&ots=0ggK7R5i3a&sig=jdf6X8GsVn1ZM4xbtIDNCI9P5dQ#v=snippet&q=FPR&f=false>.
- IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Information on a group called "Todos Por La Patria", Argentina [ARG2707], 19. Oktober 1989 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/169037/284954_de.html (Zugriff am 25. November 2016).
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [GTD ID 198901230004].
<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2437>. Accessed November 24, 2016.
- Schneider, Joe. "Argentina: The Enigma of La Tablada." *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 23:3, 9-13, DOI DOI: 10.1080/10714839.1989.11723247.
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10714839.1989.11723247>.
- Terrorist Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC). "Popular Resistance Front - Argentina (FPR). Accessed November 24, 2016.
<http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/popular-resistance-front-argentina-fpr>.

Part 2. Narrative

Note: I do not think there is enough information to code this group independently of MTP.

Group Formation

The Popular Resistance Front (Frente Popular de Resistencia; FPR) seems connected to #5 the All for the Fatherland Movement (Movimiento Todos Por La Patria; MTP). The GTD and TRAC attribute FPR with involvement in the attack on the Argentine military's La Tablada barracks on January 23, 1989 (START 2016; TRAC). However, most historical accounts attribute the attack to MTP without any mention of FPR.

The FPR first came to attention via two communiqués published from Montevideo, Uruguay, shortly after the La Tablada attack. (Schneider 1989, 9). In the communiqués, the FPR declared itself as a group, claimed to be linked to the MTP and vowed to keep fighting (Schneider 1989, 9; IRB 1989). However, the GTD and TRAC do not attribute the FPR with any attacks except La Tablada (START 2016; TRAC).

Geography

The FPR declared itself in communiqués reportedly published from Montevideo, Uruguay, according to Argentine journalist Joe Schneider (1989, 9). It is unclear if any FPR members participated in the La Tablada attack on the outskirts of Buenos Aires: Schneider does not allege that FPR members were present at La Tablada; however, the GTD and TRAC do attribute FPR with the La Tablada attack.

Organizational Structure

The group's organizational structure is unknown.

External Ties

The longtime newsletter Latin American Weekly Report reportedly published a brief report in April 1989, claiming that FPR was using MTP as a front organization (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada). However, the review of this report by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada is vague and seems to lack understanding of the events. It wrongly refers to MTP as "Movimiento Todos por el Pueblo" (the "P" stands for Patria) and calls MTP a "new party, which could refer to the fact that MTP had recently started using violent tactics, though MTP was well-established as a grassroots organization before 1989 (Ibid.).

Group Outcome

The FPR was never heard from again following its communiqués.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Frente Popular de Resistencia; Frente de Resistencia Popular (Hodges 1991); FRP (Hodges 1991)

Group Formation: no proposed change

Group End (Outcome): no proposed change (unknown, no Jones and Libicki entry)

12. Argentine Committee Of The Struggle Against Imperialism

Min. Group Date: 1972

Max. Group Date: 1972

Aliases: Comite Argentino De Lucha Anti-Imperialisto

Part 1. Bibliography

- TOPS ID 3993
- GTD, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197205120001>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

This group gained attention due to its one attack on May 12, 1972 targeting a series of American firms, but are not heard from again (GTD). It is not clear what their goals or ideology are. I could not corroborate the implied claims from the TOPS summary below.

Geography

The attacks occur in Buenos Aires (GTD).

Organizational Structure

It is unclear what the group's organizational structure is.

External Ties

There is no evidence of any external ties for the group.

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happens to the group, but it is not heard from again after 1972.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: none

Group Formation: none

Group End (Outcome): none (unknown)

From TOPS:

Little is known about the composition of the *Comite Argentino de Lucha Anti-Imperialista* (Argentine Committee of the Struggle against Imperialism). From its name and its choice of targets - American and Dutch corporations operating in Argentina - it can be assumed that the group espoused a left-wing anti-imperialist philosophy. Many leftist groups of this time period, especially those in Latin America, saw the United States as an imperialist power. It remains unclear what significance this group attributed to the Dutch government.

Note: It looks like there is not enough information to code this group.

13. Che Guervara Anti-Imperialist Command

Min. Group Date: 1997

Max. Group Date: 1997

Aliases: Che Guevara Guerillas, Che Guevara Anti-Imperialist Command, Che Guevara Commando

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Leaflet Bombs Against Bush Explode in Argentine Capital." 2005. *BBC Monitoring Americas*, Oct 08, 1. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/460218202?accountid=14026>.
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2008). *Terrorist Organization Profiles* [TOPS ID 4638].
- Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda*. The RAND Corporation, 2008. 153. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- Schmid, Alex P. *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. New York: Routledge, 2011. 358.
- Terrorism Analysis & Research Consortium (TRAC). "Che Guevara Anti-Imperialist Command." <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/che-guevara-anti-imperialist-command-cgaic>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

TORG cites GTD data to say that the group was founded in 1997 (TORG 2014). However, as of 2016, this entry for 1997 is no longer available in the GTD dataset (START 2016). Thus, no information about the Che Guevara Anti-Imperialist Command predating 2005 is available except for the TORG dataset. The group's founders are unknown. According to Jones and Libicki, the Che Guevara Anti-Imperialist Command was small, with its peak size less than one hundred (2008, 153). However, I could not find another source verifying the group's size.

Except for the TORG dataset, the group's first attack is listed as July 25, 2005, when two homemade bombs detonated near the Buenos Aires City Legislature and damaged the building (TOPS 2008, ID 4638). Leaflets at the scene were signed by the "Che Guevara Commando" (Ibid.) The leaflets called for the release of political prisoners who had been arrested on July 16, 2004, for attacking the legislature (Ibid.). The bombings occurred during violent protests, in which 17 people were detained, against the legislature's attempt to change Buenos Aires' civil code (Ibid.). It is unclear if the group's goals changed over time; initially the group violently protested the Buenos Aires legislature but later the group conducted attacks in protest of U.S. capitalist interests and the Summit of the Americas meeting in October 2005 (BBC Monitoring Americas 2005; TOPS 2008, ID 4638). According to Jones and Libicki, the Che Guevara Anti-Imperialist Command had left-wing ambitions and sought social revolution. (2008, 153).

Note: A group self-identified as the "Che Guevara guerrillas" (a supposed alias of the Che Guevara Anti-Imperialist Command) exploded a bomb in a subway car, causing property damage but no casualties, in Caracas, Venezuela, on August 28, 1997 (START 2016, GTD ID 19970828009). However, it is not clear that the two groups are connected because the Che Guevara Anti-Imperialist Command did not claim its first attack until much later, in 2005. Also, group names referencing Che Guevara are common, so they may be two different groups.

Geography

The Che Guevara Anti-Imperialist Command claimed responsibility for attacks in Buenos Aires (outside of the Buenos Aires City Legislature) and in highly populated suburbs within 30 km of Buenos Aires, within Greater Buenos Aires (BBC Monitoring Americas 2005). Cf. earlier note about a possible related attack in Caracas, Venezuela.

Organizational Structure

The group's organizational structure is unknown. The Che Guevara Anti-Imperialist Command was not tied to any attacks after 2005 (TOPS 2008, ID 4638).

External Ties

The group does not have any known external ties.

Group Outcome

The Che Guevara Anti-Imperialist Command was linked to three bomb explosions on November 6, 2005, in three different suburbs within 30 km of Buenos Aires (BBC Monitoring Americas 2005; TOPS 2008, ID 4638). The bombs were thrown at two Citibank branches, in the San Miguel district and in Quilmes, and a Blockbuster Video

store in the San Martin district (BBC Monitoring Americas 2005). The bombs caused property damage due to fire from the explosion but no casualties, partly because the attacks occurred between 1:30 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. so no one was at the businesses (BBC Monitoring Americas 2005). Leaflets left at the scene criticized then-President George W. Bush's visit to Mar del Plata, Argentina, for the Summit of the Americas from November 3-5, 2005 (BBC Monitoring Americas 2005; TOPS 2008, ID 4638). The leaflets were signed by the "Che Guevara Anti-Imperialist Command" as well as the "Colonel Dorrego Anti-Imperialist Command," a known alias (BBC Monitoring Americas 2005). The leaflets denounced President Bush as tied to "imperialism" (BBC Monitoring Americas 2005; TOPS 2008, ID 4638). The attacks occurred during many popular demonstrations, some violent with protesters throwing Molotov cocktails at police, against globalization and proposals for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (TOPS 2008, ID 4638).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: no proposed change

Group Formation: no proposed change

Group End (Outcome): 2005 (politics, PT) (Jones and Libicki 2008, 153)

14. Argentine National Organization Movement (MANO)

Min. Group Date: 1970

Max. Group Date: 1975

Aliases: Movimiento Armado Nacionalista Organizacion (MANO)

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Part 2. Narrative

Note: Sergio Bufano's and Lucrecia Teixidó's allegations, discussed in the "Group Formation" and "Group Outcome" sections, may be influenced by bias against former Argentine President Juan Perón. Although they are well-known writers with multiple scholarly publications, Bufano and Teixido describe themselves in their author biographies as "militante de la izquierda en los setenta (a militant/activist on behalf of the left during the 1970s)" (2015). Bufano and Teixidó may be biased against MANO due to its anti-Communist ideology or against Perón, who later in his career directed state security forces against communists and other more leftist actors.

Group Formation

Note: Based on my research, it seems that Argentine National Organization Movement is not an alias, but rather a different group from Movimiento Armado Nacionalista Organización (Peru/Mexico). Cf. "External Ties" section. This profile is about the Argentinean group.

Argentine National Organization Movement has been inactive since 2012. MANO had a right-wing ideology (Newton 2002, 228; Browne 1970). Bufano and Teixidó write that MANO's founder is Carlos Benigno Balbuena, a deputy inspector with the Argentine federal police (2015, 252). According to Bufano and Teixidó, Balbuena was inspired by the Movimiento Anticomunista Nacional Organizado de Guatemala (known alias is Mano Blanco), a right-wing death squad active by 1966 with ties to Guatemalan security forces (Bufano and Teixidó 2015, 252; Anderson 1988, 26; Hey 1995, 134). However, I was not able to verify Bufano's and Teixidó's information about MANO's founding with another source.

It is not clear when the group formed, but their first attack was a car ambush on March 29, 1970 (Newton 2002, 228). Four MANO militants ambushed a car containing two Soviet diplomats outside the Soviet embassy in Buenos Aires (Ibid.). The gunmen briefly held one of the diplomats captive (commercial attaché Yuri Pivovarov), but the kidnapers lost control and crashed during the subsequent firefight and chase with police (Newton 2002, 228; Peterson 1978, 53; Jenkins and Johnson 1975, 20; Connelly 1976, 76; GTD ID 197003290001). Pivovarov was not wounded seriously (Newton 2002, 228). Police detained three of the kidnapers (Newton 2002, 228; Browne 1970).

The day after the attack, one of the kidnapers was identified as Carlos Benigno Balbuena, at the time a deputy inspector with the Argentine federal police (Newton 2002, 228; Browne 1970). The two other detained kidnapers (Guillermo John Jansen and Albert Germinal Borrell) did not have known ties to the Argentine government (Newton 2002, 228; Browne 1970). Argentine President Juan Carlos Onganía denied government sponsorship of the kidnapping attempt, and he ordered a full investigation into the incident (Browne 1970; Baurmann 1973, 73). All embassies in Argentina received additional police guards after the attack (Browne 1970).

MANO claimed the car ambush was in retaliation to the kidnapping of a Paraguayan consul (Joaquin Waldemar Sanchez) in Argentina by left-wing militants of the FAL group on March 24, 1970 (Jenkins and Johnson 1975, 20; Andrew 2001, 379; Baurmann 1973, 73, 167). Two days prior to the car ambush (on March 27, 1970), MANO had publicly threatened to kill the Soviet ambassador to Argentina and his family to avenge Sanchez's kidnapping (Jenkins and Johnson 1975, 20; Baurmann 1973, 73). However, Sanchez was released after four days (one day prior to MANO's car ambush), even though the Argentine government refused to meet the leftist terrorists' demand that two political prisoners be released (Browne 1970). Subsequent to the car ambush, MANO threatened to kill or kidnap additional Soviet officials, relatives and associates (Browne 1970).

Geography

GTD attributes MANO with attacks in the Argentine cities of Buenos Aires and Córdoba (START 2016, GTD ID 197504040001 and 19700329001). However, it is not clear if the group claimed responsibility for the attack in Córdoba (START 2016, GTD ID 197504040001).

Organizational Structure

It is not clear what MANO's organizational structure was.

External Ties

Cf. "Group Outcome" section regarding Bufano's and Teixidó's allegations of ties between MANO's founder, Carlos Benigno Balbuena, and Argentine security forces (pro-state, right-wing death squads) beginning in Juan Perón's 1973-1974 presidential term (2015, 252-254).

MANO is not known to have ties to actors outside of Argentina, except for Balbuena allegedly having been inspired by the Guatemalan Mano Blanco (Bufano and Teixidó 2015, 252). The TOPS dataset, the RAND Terrorism Incidents Database, and the Rand report "How Terrorist Groups End" do not contain an entry on the Argentine National Organization Movement/Movimiento Argentino Nacional Organizado (START 2016, TOPS ID 4638; RAND Terrorism Incidents Database 2009; Jones and Libicki 2008, 168). These three sources do mention the similarly-named Movimiento Armado Nacionalista Organización (also uses the acronym MANO), an anti-communist group which claimed responsibility for a letter bomb sent to the Cuban Embassy in Peru on February 4th, 1974. However, Movimiento Armado Nacionalista Organización operated in Peru and Mexico instead of Argentina. Except for the similar name/acronym, there is

no indication that the Argentine National Organization Movement and the Movimiento Armado Nacionalista Organización are related.

Group Outcome

After the car ambush in 1970, the Supreme Court of Argentina (la Corte Suprema de Justicia de La Nación) convicted Balbuena of violating Pivarov's rights as a diplomat under international law (Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación 2009, 1; Gilbert 2011). However, military dictator Alejandro Augustín Lanusse pardoned Balbuena in either 1972 (Bufano and Teixidó 2015, 253) or 1973 (Gilbert 2011). There is no clear evidence as to why Lanusse pardoned Balbuena. Gilbert, a former Soviet state-sponsored journalist, alleged that the pardon may indicate that MANO had been receiving support from the Argentine security forces (2011). However, the Argentine government denied supporting MANO (Browne 1970; Baurmann 1973, 73). Shortly after pardoning Balbuena, Lanusse lost the 1973 presidential election to Juan Perón (who returned from exile to assume the presidency). Bufano and Teixidó alleged that Perón's administration reinstated Balbuena in the Argentine federal police (2015, 253). Bufano and Teixidó allege that Balbuena was part of the right-leaning death squads directed against leftists beginning with Peron's third presidential term in 1973 (the most well-known is the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance, AAA) (2015, 253). A bombing of an American business in Córdoba, Argentina, on April 4, 1975, is attributed to MANO, however it is not clear if the group claimed responsibility (START 2016, GTD ID 197504040001).

Although MANO's outcome following Balbuena's pardon is unclear, it is confirmed that other right-wing death squads enjoyed state support and continued to target leftists under Perón, Perón's presidential successor and wife Isabel Perón, and under the military dictatorship that deposed Isabel Perón in the March 1976 coup and ruled until 1983 (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 214-216).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 1970 (first attack)

Group End (Outcome): 1975 (last purported attack, unknown)

15. Dario Santillan Command

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2004

Aliases:

Sources:
TOPS ID 4368

Summary:

From TOPS:

Beyond the pamphlets left at the scene of the two bombings for foreign-owned businesses claimed by the Dario Santillan Command, little is known about this organization. **The pamphlets called for the Argentine government to default on its foreign debt payments and demanded that the IMF Managing Director Rodrigo Rato, who was meeting Argentina's President to discuss debt restructuring, to leave the country.** The group takes its name from Dario Santillan, a 21-year old man who was shot and killed by Argentine police while taking part in a mass protest against IMF-imposed austerity measures in the Buenos Aires suburb of Avellaneda in June 2002. Santillan had been a member of the Anibal Veron Unemployed Workers Movement. It is likely that the group is inspired by Argentina's ongoing financial problems which many Argentine's believe have been caused by free market reforms and globalization.

16. Rodolfo Walsh National Command

Min. Group Date: 2001

Max. Group Date: 2001

Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Argentina: Bomb Blast At Foundation With Links to Government Economic Team." 2001. *BBC Monitoring Americas - Political*, March 19. Accessed December 13, 2016, via ProQuest. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/452232207?accountid=14026>.
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Note: Not mentioned in Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research or Schmid & Jongman *Political Terrorism* 2008. No TOPS ID. No results in Lexis

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Rodolfo Walsh National Command was unknown until it claimed responsibility for a homemade pamphlet bomb that exploded in the Retiro neighborhood of Buenos Aires in March 1981. (START 2016, GTD ID 200103190006). No one was injured. The bomb exploded outside the headquarters of a non-profit think tank, shattering the building's glass windows (the Latin American Economic Research Foundation, known as FIEL) (Ibid.). Reports at the time suggested that the Rodolfo Walsh National Command may have targeted the nonprofit because the recently-appointed Argentinian Economic Minister and some of his advisors had previously worked there (Ibid.; "Explosion at HQ of Argentine Economy Chief" 2001). The group claimed responsibility in pamphlets left near the bomb ("Argentina: Bomb Blast At Foundation With Links to Government Economic Team," 2001). The pamphlets criticized the Argentine government's austerity plan, which incited several violent protests during Argentina's economic depression from 1991-2002 (Ibid., START 2016 GTD ID 200103190006; Levitsky and Maria Murillo 2003, 152). The pamphlets reportedly criticized the nonprofit's employees as "sell-outs" to "the empire" and said, "Either you leave or we throw you out. Motherland or Death!" ("Argentina: Bomb Blast At Foundation With Links to Government Economic Team." 2001) Law enforcement arrived at the scene and said they would analyze the leftover bomb material, however sources do not say whether anyone was arrested in connection to the attack (Ibid.). This bombing is the only attack that GTD attributes to the group.

The only information about the group's ideology and aims is what the pamphlets left near the bomb and the group's namesake suggest, but it is difficult to verify any of these claims independently. These suggest that the group is left-wing. The group seems to have named itself after the investigative journalist and leftist Rodolfo Walsh, who was abducted by Argentine security forces on March 25, 1977, one day after publishing an open letter denouncing political repression and torture under Argentina's military junta (Moyano 1996, 2). Walsh is considered a "desaparecido," as he was never heard from again (Ibid.). Walsh had worked as a writer for the newly established Castro regime in Cuba (Ibid.). He returned to Argentina in the late 1960s and joined the Castro-inspired guerrilla group FAP, which merged with the Montoneros in 1970 (Lewis 2002, 20; Kohut and Vilella 2010, 162). Walsh rose within FAP, and at one point even held the role of directing intelligence operations (Moyano 1996, 1; c.f. FAP profile for more information on the FAP's dissolution). However, Walsh disavowed the guerrilla struggle in 1977 because he disagreed with the emphasis on violent tactics (Ibid.). Additionally, the pamphlets left near the bomb in 2001 suggest that Rodolfo Walsh National Command opposed the austerity proposals of the center-left politicians who had recently been

elected in Argentina ("Argentina: Economy Minister Says Unity Government could "Modify" Austerity Plan" 2001; "Explosion at HQ of Argentine Economy Chief" 2001).

Geography

The Rodolfo Walsh Command's only alleged attack took place in the Retiro neighborhood of Buenos Aires, Argentina, at the address 637 Cordoba Avenue (START 2016 GTD ID 200103190006). This avenue is one of the city's principal thoroughfares.

Organizational Structure

The group's organizational structure and membership are unknown. News reports about the March 19, 2001, bombing describe it as an "urban guerrilla group" but lack additional details.

External Ties

The group has no known external ties.

Group Outcome

The Rodolfo Walsh Command was not heard from again following the bombing on March 19, 2001.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: No proposed change

Group Formation: No proposed change

Group End (Outcome): 2001 (disappears) (START 2016, GTD ID 200103190006)

17. Comando De Liberacion Nacional Mariano Moreno
Min. Group Date: 2005
Max. Group Date: 2005

Aliases: Mariano Moreno National Liberation Commando, Comando De LiberaciçN Nacional Mariano Moreno

Part 1. Bibliography

- TOPS ID 4578
- "Argentina: 3 Bombs found, none injured," UPI, June 6, 2006, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/468906652/720403CA5D34AB9PQ/2?accountid=14026>

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

In 2005, the group set off a bomb at Blockbuster, McDonalds, and Citibank with a note condemning capitalism and calling for an end of “imperialism” (UPI 2006). The group has not been heard from again. It is unclear what the group’s goals, ideology, organizational structure, or ties to other state actors were.

Geography

The group attacks are in Buenos Aires.

Organizational Structure

It is unclear what the group goals, ideology, organizational structure, or ties to other state actors is.

External Ties

It is unclear what the group goals, ideology, organizational structure, or ties to other state actors is.

Group Outcome

In 2005, the group set off a bomb at Blockbuster, McDonalds, and Citibank with a note condemning capitalism and calling for an end of “imperialism” (UPI 2006). The group is not heard from again.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2005

Group End (Outcome): 2005 (unknown)

18. Montonero Peronist Movement

Min. Group Date: 1970

Max. Group Date: 1979

Aliases:

Montoneros, Montonero Peronist Movement, Montoneros (Argentina), Movimiento Peronista Montonero, MPM

Part 1. Bibliography

- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2008). Terrorist Organization Profiles [TOPS ID 236].
- Lewis, Paul H. 2002. *Guerrillas and Generals: The "Dirty War" in Argentina*. Westport, CT: Praeger. 42.
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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Montoneros were founded in 1968 with an initial aim of restoring Peronist political influence and removing the military dictatorship (Jones and Libicki 2009; Kohut and Vilhella 2010, 214). The Montoneros emerged from a Catholic youth group called the Camilo Torres Command created in 1967 and led by Fernando Abal Medina, Carlos Ramus, and Mario Firmenich (Kohut and Vilhella 2010, 214; Lewis 2002, 28). Its ideology reflected a combination of Catholicism and Peronism and built on the writings of Colombian priest Camilo Torres Restrepo (Kohut and Vilhella 2010, 214). They came to prominence in 1970 with the assassination of former Argentinean president Pedro Aramburu (Kohut and Vilhella 2010, 214).

Geography

The group was originally active in Buenos Aires.

Organizational Structure

Its members were relatively young and had attended several prestigious elitist high schools in Buenos Aires during the 1960s (Lewis 2002, 23). Additional members came from the pro-Peronist youth group Peronist Youth (JP) and the Marxist-Leninist Tacuara Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (Lewis 2002, 34-35). As the Montoneros grew, they targeted older people to provide intelligence and information about movements in and around neighborhoods (Lewis 2002, 43). The Montoneros structure was similar to the ERP and the ALN. It was composed of several underground cells that reported to the political/legal arm of the Montoneros - the Peronist Youth (Lewis 2002, 42). It had a hierarchical organization including a war department, military leadership, and several front organizations in charge of propaganda (Lewis 2002, 43). By 1975, the Montoneros had approximately 3,000-15,000 armed guerrillas and 5,000-40,000 supporters overall (Moyano 1995; Lewis 2002, 46). The Montoneros funded themselves through kidnapping, ransoms, and other extortion measures (Lewis 2002, 58).

External Ties

There is no evidence of external support for the group (Gleditsch et al. 122). They originally worked with other Peronist groups including the FAR and FAP.

Group Outcome

After Peron returned to politics in 1974, he sided with the right-wing Peronist coalition thereby excluding the Montoneros from the new political system (Kohut and Vilhella 2010, 215). After Isabel Peron returned to power, the Montoneros changed their strategy, opposing her government, and launching a series of prominent attacks in the fall of 1974 against her administration (Kohut and Vilhella 2010, 216). The government banned the group in 1975 and empowered the army to launch wide-scale operations against the group to tamper them (Kohut and Vilhella 2010, 216). These were largely effective at destroying the group.

Note: Interesting similarity to Marcos reaction to CPP here.

Note: Ties to Staniland horizontal ties – university students, leftist supporters, etc.

19. Opr-33

Min. Group Date: 1971

Max. Group Date: 1972

Aliases: Opr-33, Organizacion Popular Revolucionaria - 33

Part 1. Bibliography

- TOPS ID 4172
- NSA Archive, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB185/>

- NSA Archive, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB185/19760500%20Relacion%20de%20Requeridos%20del%20OPR%2033.pdf>
- Eduardo Tristan, [La izquierda revolucionaria uruguaya: 1955-1973 \(Sp*\)](#)
- The Federacion Anarquista Uruguay (FAU), Mechoso and Prieto, <http://www.katesharpleylibrary.net/n02wnq>

Part 2. Narrative

c.f. Uruguay FAU (Abigail)

Group Formation

The OPR-33 is the armed wing of the political group the Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (Mechoso and Prieto 2009). Its aim was to overthrow the existing government and challenge existing political structures. The FAU was founded in Uruguay in 1965 by Juan Carlos Mechoso.

Geography

The group was originally from Uruguay.

Organizational Structure

The FAU was founded in Uruguay in 1965 by Juan Carlos Mechoso. It attracted support from laborers, students and unions (Mechoso and Prieto 2009). The OPR-33 was created in 1971 when the FAU decided to become an armed movement (Tristan 242).

Because OPR-33 was under the banner of the FAU, and the FAU drew predominantly from blue-collar workers who were feeling the economic downturn in Uruguay, the majority of the members of OPR-33 came from working families in Montevideo (FAU interview).

Despite the fact that OPR-33 never had autonomy outside of the agenda of the FAU, they did have a few “leaders.” Notably was Juan Carlos Mechoso, one of the original founders of the FAU, who was born into a working family before the economic downturn. He supposedly first began to sympathize with anarchist groups at age 14 (FAU interview). Another article names Gilberto Coghlan, as a leader of a railroad union and OPR-33 militant (operativos represivos contra el partido por la victoria del pueblo). Due to the lack of autonomy OPR-33 had, coupled with the fact that the government came down hard on the group, the leadership of OPR-33 remains hard to decipher (FAU interview). Another known leader was Idilio De León Bermúdez, who was shot and killed in a 1974 police shootout after leading at least a “column” of OPR-33 (FAU interview). Many of the leaders of OPR-33 and of pvp were “disappeared” in the mid-70s (FAU interview).

As of the mid-70s, OPR-33 has only about 30 “operatives” inside Uruguay (FAU interview). There is evidence that when OPR-33 moved some of its operations/operatives to Argentina this gave rise to the PVP (El Partido por la Victoria del Pueblo) (Operativos represivos contra el partido por la victoria del pueblo). They had moved many of their people to Argentina, which was not under military rule at the time; however, this prompted a joint Uruguayan-Argentinian government movement to find and capture many of the operatives, of both OPR-33 and PVP. The group started as the FAU, which worked closely with workers unions and similar groups. The pvp appears to be an Argentinian political party that still exists today (Quienes somos). The FAU (and, therefore, OPR-33) drew predominantly from urban anarchist-sympathizers who had been hit hard by the economic downturn (FAU interview). Mechoso is a classic example of someone who enjoyed the flourishing blue-collar working economy of Montevideo (along with his family) when he was a young man, and then saw the job market and his family’s prospects dry up (FAU interview).

External Ties

Information is not forthcoming on external support. Besides the fact that they clearly had operatives in Argentina in order to be able to move their people there, there is no evidence of other groups lending their support. While there is no evidence of a direct alliance between the FAU and the Tupamaros, TC or MIR, however the interview does reference FAU pulling some of its members from these groups (FAU interview).

The U.S. played an active support role in helping the Uruguayan government fight the OPR-33. In 1976, reports show that the U.S. provided covert support to help Uruguayan armed forces defeat the group through a project known as Operation Condor (NSA Archive).

Group Outcome

Generally the state’s responses (including responses by the Uruguayan government, the Argentinian government, or a combination of both) were extreme and violent. They would kidnap and interrogate (torture) suspected leaders of OPR-33. Juan Mechoso’s brother, Alberto Mechoso, managed to escape from one of these camps, yet many other leaders were never seen again (FAU interview). In addition, Operation Condor, a military operation that spanned many governments of South America, along with that of the United States, also worked to suppress the actions of anarchist groups, sometimes violently (Operation Condor: Deciphering the U.S. Role). With some US assistance, (operation Condor apparently had a detailed list of Opr-33 operatives and their locations) it seems that the Uruguayan and Argentine militaries came together to bring about the end of OPR-33 in ~1975, though they continued to round up members through 1976 (FAU interview).

Note: this group is transnational and targets the Uruguayan government, not the Argentinean

Min. Group Date: 1969

Max. Group Date: --

Onset: 1974

Aliases:

People's Revolutionary Army (Argentina), Ejército Revolucionario Del Pueblo (ERP) (Argentina), ERP

Part 1. Bibliography

- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2008). Terrorist Organization Profiles [TOPS ID 238].
- Lewis, Paul H. 2002. *Guerrillas and Generals: The "Dirty War" in Argentina*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

ERP is the armed wing of the communist/Trotskyite Revolutionary Party of Workers (PRT). The PRT emerged in 1965 as the byproduct of a merger between the Trotskyite Workers Party (Palabra Obrera) and an ethnic Tucuman group called the Frente Indoamericano Popular (FRIP) (Moyano 1995, 26). The ERP was created in 1968 by Mario Robert Santucho and recruited university students around Buenos Aires (Lewis 2002, 29). It was formally launched in 1970 at the Fifth Party Congress of the PRT (Moyano 1995, 27).

The ERP's initial aim was to overthrow the Argentinean government through guerilla warfare, staging a mass communist revolution (Lewis 2002, 36). It is identified as Marxist (Moyano 1995, 22). ERP soldiers did not have to officially be a member of the PRT, but they did have to ascribe to its ideology and leadership. The group first gained recognition for a prominent political kidnapping in May 1971, and this grew after the Trelew Massacre in August 1972, in which several ERP, FAR, and Montonero inmates were brutally executed after an escape attempt.

Geography

Operations took place in rural and urban environments, but shifted from Buenos Aires to Tucuman in May 1974 following the coup. (Lewis 2002, 46, 105-106). Moyano speculates this move to the countryside - in an attempt to mimic the Vietnamese insurgency around the world - was the death blow to the group, as they could not defend this strategy successfully (Moyano 1995, 40).

Organizational Structure

By 1974, the composition of the group had expanded from original party members to now include laborers from working-class backgrounds and other blue collar jobs (Lewis 2002, 46). Santucho was charismatic, from an upper-middle class family, and went to Cuba in 1961 for guerrilla military training (Lewis 2002, 35). Later on, however, he surrounded himself by yes-men and isolated himself from other members (Lewis 2002, 66). When the group formed in 1969, its organizational structure was initially cellular and underground (Schimid and Jongman 1988, 504). Each cell was composed of three members and instructions flowed down in a hierarchical manner (Lewis 202, 45). Penalties were high for denunciations or defections, and the original 50 PRT activists were handpicked by Santucho to fight, and its members wore uniforms. An estimate by Kenneth Johnson suggests the group had 250,000 supporters by 1975, of which 1/10 were active guerrilla fighters (Lewis 2002, 47).

They would routinely kidnap foreign executives and hold them ransom in order to finance their campaign (Lewis 2002, 58). They adopted the techniques of the Brazilian ALN,

choosing to operate in an urban environment, in part, due to Che Guevara's assassination in Bolivia.

External Ties

The group received external support from Cuba in the form of military training. They also had ties to several other leftist movements in South America, including the Tupamaros in Uruguay, MIR in Chile, and the ELN in Bolivia (Lewis 2002, 45).

Group Outcome

The Lanusse government responded to the ERP with new criminal rules including the establishment of the death penalty, Criminal Code, and establishment of maximum security prisons (Moyano 1995, 28). Isabel Peron formally banned the group on September 24, 1973, following an attack against a military compound (Moyano 1995, 38). The Argentinian military, led by General Acdel Edgardo Vilas, responded to the Tucucuman move by launching a scorched earth campaign against the guerrillas in an attempt to undermine their potential support bases (Lewis 2002, 106-108). Army intelligence also secured a spy, Jesus Rames Ranier, who provided critical intelligence to military forces, enabling them to intercept support convoys that further weakened the group (Lewis 2002, 121). The group fell apart by 1976 or 1977 (Moyano 2002; Schmid and Jongman 1988).

Note: Gorrian Merlo was in ERP. Mention this in the external ties section. Check Lewis 2002 index, eg pg 92

Note: interesting COIN strategy by Argentina here

Note: TOPS is SO OFF - good means to demonstrate improvement in this data

From TOPS: The People's Revolutionary Army of Argentina terrorized the Argentine government and foreign corporations from 1960 until 1977. The People's Revolutionary Army, or ERP, was founded as the armed wing of the communist political organization, the Workers Revolutionary Army Argentina. Despite its Trotskyite ideology, ERP members had ties with the Castro regime in Cuba. ERP's principal goal was to overthrow Argentina's military-ruled government. However, ERP continued its terrorist activities even after the military regime ended in 1973. From 1969 to 1973, the People's Revolutionary Army concentrated its terrorist activities in Argentina's cities. After exiled dictator Juan Domingo Peron returned to Argentina in 1973, ERP attempted a shift in terrorist strategy. Moving away from urban terrorism, ERP attempted to control large rural areas from which it could operate. The Argentine military no longer controlled Argentina, but, ironically, ERP's continuing activities would indirectly cause a resurgence of military power. Because of the continuing terrorist activities by ERP and other terrorist organizations, the civilian Argentine government granted the military expanded powers to eradicate these terrorist elements. Thus, beginning in 1975, the Argentine military began its "dirty war." By July 1976, the ERP's commander, Roberto Santucho, had been killed. By the end of 1977, the People's Revolutionary Army was eradicated.

21. Organizacion Revolucionaria Pueblo

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 1996

Aliases:

People's Revolutionary Organization, Organizacion Revolucionaria Pueblo

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the ORP was officially created, but its first attack either occurred in March 1983 (in Colombia) or 1992 (in Argentina) (Boston Globe 1983; Washington Post 1992). The group attacked several ATMS and banks in 1992 as a means to "denounce the government [economic] policies" (UPI 1992). It is ascribed a leftist ideology (UPI 1992). It is unclear if they proposed an alternative or simply meant to criticize the groups. A separate incident in 1992 involved a ransom demand (Washington Post 1992).

Geography

The group's two bank incidents were in Buenos Aires (UPI 1992)

Organizational Structure

The Argentinean government speculates that some members of the ORP might be part of the MTP group which attacked police in 1989 (UPI 1992).

External Ties

The Argentinian government was investigating whether the group had ties to Uruguay, but this was never corroborated (UPI 1992). TOPS alleged state ties, but it is unclear where this came from.

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happened to the group.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1983 or 1992

Group End (Outcome): 1992 (unknown)

22. Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (FAP)

Min. Group Date: 1970

Max. Group Date: 1974

Aliases: Peronist Armed Forces (FAP), Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (FAP), 17 October Montenero Detachment of the Peronist Armed Forces, Destacamento Montonero 17 de Octubre de las Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Assumption of Office by President Campora. - Formation of Peronista Cabinet. - Return of General Peron. - Widespread Act," Keesing's, Volume 19 (1973), Issue No. 12 (December), Page 26021, <http://www.keesings.com/article/13060>
- Maria Moyano, Argentina's Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969-1979
- "Argentina," Ed. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, 1988, Political Terrorism, p. 504
- Lewis 2002, p. 38

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

FAP was created in 1968 by Nestor Verdinelli, Carlos Caride, and Envar El Khadri (Moyano 1995, 22; Lewis 2002, 38). The group was strongly Peronist and initially supported the overthrow of the military government in order to enable Peron to return from exile and become President (Moyano 1995, 22). They came to the attention of the government on January 6, 1970, through a public protest.

Geography

It operated out of Tucuman near the town of Taco Ralo, but a local police raid appropriated most of its weapons early on (Lewis 2002, 38).

Organizational Structure

Kahdri and Caride have former military experience from the Peronist Youth. FAP had support from the Juventud Peronista (Peronist Youth) and union members. The group was considered incredibly strong when it emerged because it accrued supplies and memberships through well-executed robberies and ransoms (Moyano 1995, 23).

External Ties

The group provided sanctuary to the Tupamaros and provided logistical support to other Peronist groups in the early 1970s (Moyano 1995, 23).

Group Outcome

After the police raid in Tucuman, Caride and Walsh left the group and FAP was forced to go underground. Shortly thereafter, around 1970, the group had shifted to urban operations attempting to garner more support through factories (Lewis 2002, 39). The group dissolved in either 1971 or 1972 due to internal divisions between members about the group's ideology in the wake of Peron's imminent return. Some members wanted the group to adopt more violent tactics, including assassinations, but others opposed (Moyano 1995, 39). Some members splintered off and formed the Montoneros, while others joined the ERP (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 504; Moyano 1995, 25). There is some evidence they might have existed longer, as they continued to issue joint communiqués with ERP, FAL, and FAR through 1974 (Keesings).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: A new proposed formation date if different than above

Group End (Outcome): 1971-1972 (splinter)

23. Sendero Luminoso (SL)

Min. Group Date: 1978

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 1978

Aliases: Shining Path (SL), SL, Sendero Luminoso (SL), Shining Path

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

Shining Path was established by Abimael Guzmán, a philosophy professor at the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho with a goal to overthrow the Peruvian government (Graun 2008, 6-7). The group initially formed "in the 1960s" through a series of student meetings at the local university (Gregory 2009). Its first violent incident occurred in 1978 in Ayacucho, Peru (GTD 2016). The group formally

launched their armed campaign against Peru in 1980 (Graun 2008, 7). In 1983, it escalated its attack when it began to kill both noncombatants and political officials (Gregory 2009). SL ascribed to a Marxist-Leninist ideology (Gregory 2009; Graun 2008, 7).

Geography

The group began in Ayacucho at the university where Guzmán taught (Gregory, Katherine). The group's primary base of operations was in Ayacucho and Huanta as well as Vilcabamba, Peru (COHA 2008).

Organizational Structure

Guzmán was the sole leader of the Shining Path and a leftist university professor (Gregory 2009; Graun 2008, 4-5, 9). SL funded itself through extortion, kidnapping, and drug-trafficking (COHA 2008; Gregory 2009). SL believed in a foco-style of revolution, which could eventually inspire rural communities to rise up and join the fight (

Guzmán drew most of his followers from his former students and other peasants in the area, most of whom were Quechua-speaking natives (Graun 2008). SL had approximately 5,000-1,000 members at its peak in 1989-1993 (Gleditsch et al. 2009, 315; Mackenzie Institute 2016). It was organized around a hierarchical structure (COHA 2008).

Despite his veneration of communists like Mao and Lenin, Guzmán could be extremely contemptuous of the very rural poor he was trying to recruit. He once ordered the slaughter of an entire village for suspected collusion with the government (Starn n.d.).

External Ties

Guzman was averse to outside influence and did not receive any type of external support from other actors (Gregory 2009; Templeman 2009; Gleditsch et al. 2009). The group competed against the MRTA for supporters and resources (Gregory 2009). There is evidence that Guzman visited China in the mid-1960s, but there is no evidence whether this is involved training in guerrilla warfare or other types of education (COHA 2008).

Group Outcome

Initially, SL had large success against the Peruvian government, aided in part by the Peruvian military's indiscriminate use of violence against noncombatants (Graun 2008). In 1988, "the tide had begun to turn" and the military was able to start gathering better intelligence and use force discriminately (Graun 2008, 13). In 1991, the Army

implemented a wide-standing reform program including the Civil Defense Committees to train and organize local communities to resist SL (Graun 2008, 13-14).

Guzmán was captured and imprisoned in 1992 where he remains to this day (Graun 2008, 7; Gregory 2009). Support for the group turned as it continued to employ indiscriminate violence against combatants (Graun 2008; MIPT 2008). Membership for the group shrunk from 10,000 members at its max to approximately 500 as of 2008 (MIPT 2008). Several other high-ranking revolutionaries of the Shining Path began being released from prison in 2012 after serving long sentences (Economist 2012). The group still conducts intermittent attacks today from a small base along the Peru-Brazil border (Economist 2012).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Shining Path, Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui, Partido Comunista del Peru, The Communist Party of Peru by the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui and Marxism, Leninism, Maoism and the Thoughts of Chairman Gonzalo, Revolutionary Student Front for the Shining Path of Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru – By Way of the Shining Path of Mariategui, PCP – por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariategui, PCP and PCP-SL

Group Formation: 1980

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

24. Anarkista Jorge Banos Front Of The Everyone For The Homeland Movement (MTP)

Min. Group Date: 2010

Max. Group Date: 2010

Aliases: Movimiento Todos por la Patria, MTP (?)

Part 1. Bibliography

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***Executive Intelligence Review* (EIR) credible and have not cited it in the profile. EIR, founded by controversial American activist Lyndon LaRouche, has promoted conspiracy theories on a range of topics and has been accused of anti-semitism, according to the Center for Media and Democracy ([Lyndon LaRouche profile, CMD](#)).**

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

As of 2012, the Anarkista Jorge Banos Front Of The Everyone For The Homeland Movement (MTP) has been inactive (START 2016 GTD ID 201012200006). The group was unknown until it was associated with a bombing in Buenos Aires on December 20, 2010 (Ibid.). An improvised bomb exploded outside an Argentinian bank in the Recoleta neighborhood in the Retiro district of Buenos Aires, causing minor damage to the building's windows and door (Ibid.). There were no casualties (Ibid.). Pamphlets decrying repression of the indigenous Qom population were reportedly found near the bomb (Ibid.). No group claimed responsibility for the bomb, but the bombing was attributed to the Anarkista Jorge Banos Front Of The Everyone For The Homeland Movement (MTP) (Ibid.).

Geography

The group's only attack (bombing on 20 December 2010) occurred in the Recoleta neighborhood in the Retiro district of Buenos Aires.

Organizational Structure

The group's organizational structure is unknown.

External Ties

The group does not appear to have external ties, although the lack of information about the group makes this difficult to confirm independently. There is no evidence that the group has operational or personnel ties to the All for the Fatherland Movement (also known as MTP), which conducted the attack on the La Tablada barracks near Buenos Aires in 1989. After government forces defeated MTP militants at La Tablada, the All for the Fatherland Movement dissolved due to increased military repression by the Argentine government (cf. All for the Fatherland Movement profile).

The name Anarkista Jorge Baños Front Of The Everyone For The Homeland Movement (MTP) suggests that the group (operating in 2010) may have been inspired by leftist activist and human rights lawyer Jorge Baños. Baños was reportedly a leader of the 1989 MTP group and was killed during the attack at La Tablada (*The Gazette* 1989). However, this inference cannot be independently confirmed due to lack of information. Also, Jorge Baños was not known as an anarchist but rather a lawyer who focused on human rights (Hodges 2014, 284). Hodges alleges that Baños surrendered, was taken prisoner, and was subsequently shot by government forces. However, this claim is disputed (Hodges 2014, 284; Méndez 1991, 79).

Group Outcome

Following the bombing on 20 December 2010, the group was not heard from again. It is unknown what happened to them.

Part 3: Proposed Changes

Aliases: no proposed change

Group Formation: no proposed change

Group End (Outcome): 2010-2010 (disappears (START 2016 GTD ID 201012200006))

25. Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA)

Min. Group Date: 1973

Max. Group Date: 1978

Aliases: Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance, Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (AAA), Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA), Triple A

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Narrative

Captain Mohammed Ali Seineldín, a Special Forces officer in the early 1970s, allegedly organized secret arms transfers between state security forces and the AAA (Lewis 2002, 91; Bufano and Teixidó 2015, 252).

Note: Sergio Bufano and Lucrecia Teixidó may be biased against former Argentine President Juan Perón and right-wing Peronists. Although they are well-known writers with multiple scholarly publications, Bufano and Teixidó describe themselves in their author biographies as “militante de la izquierda en los setenta (a militant/activist on behalf of the left during the 1970s)” (2015). Bufano and Teixidó may be biased against MANO due to its anti-Communist ideology or against Perón, who later in his career directed state security forces against communists and other more leftist actors. However, Bufano’s and Teixidó’s allegations about Argentine state support for the AAA in the “External Support” section is corroborated by Lewis 2002.

Group Formation

The Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA) was a right-wing, paramilitary death squad formed in 1973 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503). The group’s initial aim was to help the Peronist government fight leftist organizations. (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503). The group targeted not only radical leftists, such as communists, but also left-leaning actors within the Peronist movement (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 10).

The AAA was formed after the incident at Ezeiza Airport on June 20, 1973, upon Perón’s return from exile in 1955 (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 10). A private army organized by right-wing Peronists José López Rega (a confidant of Juan and Isabel Perón) and Jorge Osinde, engaged in a firefight with leftist Peronists, resulting in up to 200 fatalities among militants and civilians who had gathered to attend Perón’s return to Argentina (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 10; Lewis 2002, 88-89). The AAA was formed due to concern that leftists would gain popular support and discredit the Peronist government as a result of the Ezeiza Airport incident (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 10).

The AAA’s ideology is the right-wing version of Peronism that Perón pursued during his third presidential term in 1973-1974 (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 10). Peronism (known in Spanish as “Justicialismo”) is idiosyncratic and difficult to define (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 258), however its key aspects are populism and nationalism (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 258). Perón described his political ideology as a middle path between capitalism and communism (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 258).

The AAA came to attention on November 21, 1973, when it claimed responsibility for its first attack: a car bomb that injured the leftist senator Hipólito Solari (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 10; Moyano 1996, 83).

Geography

The AAA operated in Argentine cities, particularly Buenos Aires. The offices of the newly-launched magazine *El Caudillo*, in Buenos Aires reportedly doubled as the headquarters for the AAA (Moyano 1996, 83).

Organizational Structure

The original membership of the AAA came from López Rega's and Osinde's private army, which numbered approximately 3,000 (Lewis 2002, 88, 90). As of 1996, there were 159 publicly alleged members of the AAA, 66 of whom served in the Argentinian security forces (Moyano, 83). AAA recruits tended to come from two groups (Moyano 1996, 83). The first group is active police officers or former police officers who had been dishonorably discharged (Moyano 1996, 83; Lewis 2002, 88). The second group is personnel employed by the Ministry of Social Welfare, in security posts, as well as policy or administrative positions (Moyano 1996, 83). Another AAA founder was Alberto Villar. The military dictatorship had previously discharged Villar from the federal police, but Perón had reinstated him during Perón's 1973-1974 presidential term (Moyano 1996, 83).

José López Rega was the AAA's primary leader. The AAA had five sections: one each for collaboration with the police; administration; transportation (primarily cars); medical care; and publications (Moyano 1996, 83). There were two other task forces: one oversaw finances and psychological operations and the second organized groups of three to five men who carried out killings (Ibid.).

However, AAA may have lacked strict command and control nationwide or even within one city, as attacks attributed to AAA sharply increased (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503). AAA is associated with between 1,000 and 2,000 deaths between 1973 and mid-1976 (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 10; Rebossio 2009).

The pretext of the Argentine government clamping down on leftist armed guerillas provided the AAA with a window of opportunity to target any political opposition (Springer, 21, Lewis 2002). AAA targeted some guerillas, but most of the group's victims were non-militant leftists including politicians, journalists, academics, trade union officials, priests, and students (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503; Springer, 21).

The AAA had three main tactics. First, the group threatened public figures with death unless they left Argentina within 24 hours, and people threatened in this way often did leave the country (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 10; Moyano 1996, 83). Second, the AAA sought to repress militancy among labor unions (Moyano 1996, 83). Third, the AAA sought the elimination of opponents to Perón's regime (Moyano 1996, 83). AAA agents were known to ride in Ford Falcons without license plates.

The AAA was principally funded by the Argentine state, as the group's leaders who held government positions diverted government budgets to the AAA (Lewis 2002, 88). Cf. The "external support" section for more information about state support.

External support

AAA received support from multiple sectors of Argentinian security forces. Osinde built up the private army while holding the government position of secretary of sports and tourism in the Social Welfare Ministry (Lewis 2002, 88). The Argentinian Ministry of Social Welfare had one of the largest budgets in the government, which Osinde diverted to fund AAA (Lewis 2002, 90). The Ministry of Social Welfare was in charge of drug control, so Osinde had access to U.S. loans to buy small arms; these weapons were

ostensibly for anti-drug trafficking operations but may have been directed to the AAA (Lewis 2002, 91). Argentina's military intelligence service (la Secretaría de Inteligencia de Estado, SIDE), led by General Otto Paladino, allegedly provided AAA with logistical support (Lewis 2002, 91). General Numa Laplane, a right-wing nationalist who commanded the Argentine Army's First Corps, allegedly gave the AAA light arms (Lewis 2002, 91). Captain Mohammed Ali Seineldín, a Special Forces officer in the early 1970s, allegedly organized secret arms transfers between state security forces and the AAA (Lewis 2002, 91; Bufano and Teixidó 2015, 252).

Note: Over one decade later, in 1988, Seineldín led a failed three-day military uprising inside the Villa Martelli base in Buenos Aires (Smith, 5 December 1988). Seineldín's 1988 uprising was one of multiple "carapintada" coup attempts, by junior military officers angry that the government might prosecute the military for the Dirty War (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 100, 222; Lewis 2002, 229).

GTD attributes the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance with 10 attacks in Spain and one attack in France from 1973-1979 (START 2016, GTD). However, most sources indicate that the attacks in question were committed by the Apostolic Anticommunist Alliance, a Spanish right-wing, nationalist group that also used the acronym AAA (Angulo 1978; Schmid and Jongman 2008, 660). There is some connection: some Argentine Triple A members, most prominently Almirón, fled to Spain and allegedly participated in the Montejurra massacre with Spanish right-wing militants linked to the Spanish Triple A (Belloch 1976; García 2006).

Group outcome

The AAA ceased almost all activity in Argentina after 1976, because the military dictatorship placed many AAA personnel under its command (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 10; TOPS 2008, ID 3946). The military junta also implemented AAA tactics, so the AAA is considered a precursor to state repression during the 1976-1983 Dirty War (TOPS 2008, ID 3946).

AAA leader José López Rega was a close advisor to Juan Perón as well as Perón's presidential successor and wife Isabel Perón (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503). López Rega left Argentina due to the 1976 military coup (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503; Flint 1989). López Rega evaded prosecution by living in hiding for nearly one decade, with rumours that he went to the Bahamas, the United States, Switzerland, Spain and Panama (Flint 1989; Martínez 2006; Sewell 1986). In 1986, López Rega surrendered to FBI agents and was extradited to Argentina (Flint 1989; Sewell 1986). López Rega died on June 9, 1989, while in a Buenos Aires prison awaiting trial (Flint 1989).

Rodolfo Almirón, another AAA leader, fled to Spain with López Rega. In 1983, Almirón was revealed to be working as a bodyguard for Manuel Fraga Iribarne, at the time the leader of the prominent Spanish political party "Alianza Popular" (Rebossio 2009). The revelation was a national scandal in Spain (Ibid.). The newly-formed democratic government of Argentina prosecuted Almirón but dropped charges against him in 1989 (Ibid.). Almirón then worked various waitressing jobs in Madrid and other Spanish cities (Ibid.). Between 2003 and 2007, under then-President Néstor Kirchner, Argentina

abolished many of its amnesty laws related to security forces during the Dirty War (Ibid). In 2006, Almirón was arrested in the Spanish city of Valencia and extradited to Argentina one year later (Ibid). Under house arrest, Almirón died while his trial was ongoing because he had suffered a stroke (Ibid).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: no proposed change

Group Formation: no proposed change

Group End (Outcome): no proposed change (integrated into politics, PT (Jones and Libicki 2008, 148))

26. 2 April Group

Min. Group Date: 1983

Max. Group Date: 1983

Aliases: as 2 April Group-Capt. Giacchino Command

Sources:

- TRAC
- GTD, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198303240005>
- GTD, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198304060001>
- Searched Proquest, Lexis, Keesings, gscholar, and google with name, alias, event info

Summary:

It's a left-wing transnational group with incidents against British citizens at St Johns school in 1983 over a period of two weeks (GTD). No additional information could be found.

Note: May have something to do with the fact that the Falklands War started on April 2, 1982.

27. Anti-Imperialist Commando (Argentina)

Min. Group Date: 1999

Max. Group Date: 1999

Aliases: none

Part I. Bibliography

- Not mentioned in Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research
- Not mentioned in Jones & Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End

- “Anti-NATO Explosive Device Explodes in Downtown BA.” 1999. *Buenos Aires Herald*, April 17. (Cited in START 2016, GTD ID, however I could not locate this article in my own research).
- "WORLD in Brief." 1999. *The Washington Post*, Apr 17, A12. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/408470927?accountid=14026>. Accessed 28 December 2016.
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [GTD ID 199904160001]. Accessed 28 December 2016. Retrieved from <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199904160001>.
- U.S. Department of State. 2000. *Political Violence Against Americans: 2000*. Bureau of Diplomatic Security: 11. Accessed 28 December 2016. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24968.pdf>.
- Terrorist Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC). “Anti-Imperialist Commando.” Accessed 28 December 2016. <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/anti-imperialist-commando>. (Note: TRAC doesn't have any information on the group besides an approximate founding date.)
- Ashild, KJØK, et. al. 2003. “Restoring Peace of Provoking Terrorism? Exploring the Links Between Multilateral Military Interventions and International Terrorism.” Norwegian Defence Research Establishment: 103. Accessed 28 December 2016. <https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/03-01547.pdf>.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Anti-Imperialist Commando was not previously known to Argentinian authorities, though the group claimed responsibility for a homemade bomb that detonated on April 16, 1999 at approximately 3:30 a.m., near an American-owned bank (BankBoston) in Buenos Aires (*The Washington Post* 1999; U.S. Department of State 2000, 11). The bomb was also near the building of the American Club, a social club for Americans in Buenos Aires, according to the U.S. State Department report (2000, 11). The explosion scattered pamphlets (packed inside the bomb) with the message “Assassin NATO out of Yugoslavia,” (*The Washington Post* 1999; U.S. Department of State 2000, 11; Ashild et. al. 2003, 103). The pamphlets reportedly criticized the NATO intervention in Kosovo (START 2016 GTD ID 199904160001; *The Washington Post* 1999; U.S. Department of State 2000, 11). The bomb reportedly damaged nearby windows and the bank’s entrance but did not cause casualties (*The Washington Post* 1999; U.S. Department of State 2000, 11; Ashild et. al. 2003, 103). According to the GTD database, the group claimed responsibility for the attack; however it is not clear how they communicated (such as through a communiqué or a different mode) (START 2016 GTD ID 199904160001).

The message reportedly found on the pamphlets suggests that the group’s ideology was anti-imperialist and possibly anti-American, though this inference cannot be

independently confirmed due to lack of additional information about the group. It is not clear if the group had any aims beyond criticizing the NATO interventions in Kosovo. Ashild et. al. include the April 17, 1999, attack in their dataset of terrorist attacks generated by opposition to multilateral intervention efforts (2003, 7, 103).

Geography

The bomb detonated in downtown Buenos Aires, near a branch of the American-owned BankBoston and a social club for Americans abroad (*The Washington Post* 1999; U.S. Department of State 2000, 11).

Organizational Structure

The group's organizational structure is unknown.

External support

The group does not have any known external ties.

Group outcome

After the bombing on April 16, 1999, the Anti-Imperialist Commando did not conduct other attacks and was not heard from again (START 2016 GTD ID 199904160001). I could not find information explaining why the group dissolved.

The Argentine government's response was to give press briefings, in which they stated that the government had no prior knowledge of the Anti-Imperialist Commando group (START 2016 GTD ID 199904160001; *The Washington Post* 1999). I could not find information on whether authorities made any arrests in connection to the bombing on April 16, 1999.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: no proposed changes.

Group Formation: no proposed changes.

Group End (Outcome): 1999-1999 (disappears (START 2016 GTD ID 199904160001)).

28. Jacinto Araujo Internationalist Rebel Insurrectionist Brigade

Min. Group Date: 2010

Max. Group Date: 2010

Aliases: Rebels of Jacinto Arauz

Part I. Bibliography

- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [GTD ID 201002030020]. Accessed December 28, 2016. Retrieved from <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201002030020>.
- BBC Monitoring Latin America. 2010. "Group Bombs Chilean Airline Office in Argentina." *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*. February 3. Accessed December 28, 2016. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.stanford.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=7XPM-CY91-2R51-706S&csi=270944,270077,11059,8411&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true>.
- Capiello, Hernán. 2010. "Bombas en cajeros: la pista chilena." *La Nación*. September 6. Accessed January 10, 2017. <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1301782-bombas-en-cajeros-la-pista-chilena>.
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [GTD ID 200908040016].
- Searched google, gscholar, and Proquest for additional articles using keywords:
 - names + alias + LAN
 - name + airline
 - event info
 - No additional articles were found
- Not mentioned in Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research or Jones & Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*.
- Alexa also searched Keesings, and did not find anything, using keywords: "Jacinto Araujo Internationalist Rebel Insurrectionist Brigade"; "Rebels of Jacinto Arauz"; LAN + bomb + Argentina; Neuquen + LAN.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Jacinto Araujo Internationalist Rebel Insurrectionist Brigade first came to attention on February 3, 2010, when a homemade bomb exploded in front of an office of the Chilean airline LAN in Neuquen, Argentina (BBC Monitoring Latin America 2010; START 2016 GTD ID 201002030020). The attack took place at 300 Irigoyen Avenue, Niquen, at 5:00 a.m (Ibid.). There were no casualties, although the explosion damaged the building's facade and a nearby truck (Ibid.).

The group claimed responsibility for the bomb in a note that law enforcement found near the scene of the explosion (BBC Monitoring Latin America 2010; START 2016 GTD ID 201002030020). The note called for the release of political prisoners, proletariats taking power, and promotion of indigenous rights (BBC Monitoring Latin America 2010). Based on the note, the group's ideology appears to be anti-imperialist, marxist/socialist/pro-labor (the note condemns "jailers of the proletariat" (BBC Monitoring Latin America 2010)), and supportive of indigenous peoples' rights. However, there is no

additional evidence or sources to independently corroborate the group's initial aims or ideology. This is the group's only incident (START 2016 GTD ID 201002030020).

Geography

The attack took place at 300 Irigoyen Avenue in the central urban area of Neuquen, Argentina.

Organizational Structure

The group's organizational structure is unknown.

External support

The group does not have any known external ties.

Group outcome

Prior to the group's February 3, 2010 attack, a homemade bomb exploded in front of a LAN airlines office in Buenos Aires, at the intersection of Cerrito Avenue and Paraguay Street, on August 4, 2009 (BBC Monitoring Latin America 2010). The group Revolutionary Cells Mauricio Morales Brigade (las Células Revolucionarias Brigada Mauricio Morales) claimed responsibility in pamphlets found near the August 4, 2009 bomb (Cappiello 2010; GTD ID 200908040016). After the bombing on February 3, 2010, the Jacinto Araujo Internationalist Rebel Insurrectionist Brigade was not heard from again (START 2016 GTD ID 201002030020; BBC Monitoring Latin America 2010). Local police gave the note left from the bomb to federal authorities investigating the incident, though it does not appear that anyone was arrested in connection with the attack (BBC Monitoring Latin America 2010).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: no proposed changes.

Group Formation: no proposed changes.

Group End (Outcome): 2010-2010 (disappears (START 2016 GTD ID 201002030020)).

29. Revolutionary Cells (Argentina)

Min. Group Date: 2009

Max. Group Date: 2010

Aliases: Luciano Arruga Brigade

Part 1. Bibliography

- Revolutionary Cells Home Page/Blog, <https://thisisourjob.wordpress.com/tag/revolutionary-cells/>
- Searched proquest, lexis, gscholar with name + alias + event info with no additional information found

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The group appears to be anarchist with the aim of overthrowing the government. The writings on their website reflect a combination of leftist and anarchist ideology (Blog). They are involved in an attack against a private security company in 2009 in General Pacheco and Quilmes (GTD).

Geography

They were involved in an attack against a private security company in 2009 in General Pacheco and Quilmes (GTD).

Organizational Structure

It is unknown what the group's organizational structure is.

External Ties

They issued several joint communiques with several smaller groups Diego Petrisans Nucleus, Leandro Morel Nucleus, Juan Bianchi Nucleus, August 22 Classist Collective, Simon Radowitsky Nucleus, Bonefoi-Carrasco Unit, Cardenas-Fuentealba Unit, and Heroes of the Tragic Week Unit.

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happens to the group; their blog posts stopped in 2010.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 2009

Group End (Outcome): 2010 (unknown)

30. Vandalicia Teodoro Suarez
 Min. Group Date: 2010
 Max. Group Date: 2010

Onset: N/A

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [GTD ID 201009160003]. Accessed 3 January 2017. Retrieved from <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201009160003>.
- La Gaceta. 2010. "Una bomba explotó en dos oficinas del centro porteño." September 16. Accessed 3 January 2017. <http://www.lagaceta.com.ar/nota/398843/argentina/bomba-exploto-dos-oficinas-centro-porteno.html>.
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- Not mentioned Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, in Argentina or Chile, or in Jones & Libicki "How Terrorist Groups End," I found only two sources in ProQuest, which I've added to the bibliography. Nothing on LexisNexis Academic.
 - Keywords searched in ProQuest, LexisNexis, JSTOR: Vandalicia Teodoro Suarez; Vandalicia Teodoro Suarez + Buenos Aires; American Airlines + Buenos Aires + bomb, date restrict: 2010
- Dillehay, Tom D., and Francisco Rothhammer. 2013. "Quest for the Origins and Implications for Social Rights of the Mapuche in the Southern Cone of South America." *Latin American Antiquity* 24, no. 2 (June): 149-63. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43746216>.
- "Bomba Daña Oficinas De American Airlines y Alitalia En Buenos Aires." 2010. *EFE News Service*, Sep 16. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/750843648?accountid=14026>.
- "Bombazo En Buenos Aires De Supuestos Anarquistas Chilenos." 2010. *La Nación*, Sep 17. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/751071336?accountid=14026>.
- "Bomb Damages Shopping Mall in Argentine Capital." 2010. *EFE News Service*, Sep 16. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/750901767?accountid=14026>.
- "EFE News Briefs for Thursday, Sept. 16." 2010. *EFE News Service*, Sep 17. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/751027338?accountid=14026>.
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- “Conmoción por una muerte tras atentado con bomba.” 2010. *La Nación* July 13. Accessed January 10, 2017. http://www.rionegro.com.ar/policiales/conmocion-por-una-muerte-tras-atentado-con-bom-BURN_414764.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The first, and only, attack for which Vandalicia Teodoro Suarez claimed responsibility occurred on September 16, 2016, when an improvised explosive device detonated outside of the offices of American Airlines and the Italian airline Alitalia (START 2016, GTD ID 201009160003; *La Gaceta* 2010; *La Nación* 17 September 2010). The offices were located in a shopping mall in the Retiro district of Buenos Aires, at 881-885 Santa Fe Avenue (sources differ on the exact address) (START 2016, GTD ID 201009160003; *La Gaceta* 2010; *La Nación* 17 September 2010). The explosion took place at approximately 4:00 a.m. (START 2016, GTD ID 201009160003; *El Diario* 24 2010). There were no casualties, although the explosion broke the building’s windows and caused other minor property damage (START 2016, GTD ID 201009160003; *La Gaceta* 2010). Vandalicia Teodoro Suarez claimed responsibility for the attack in leaflets left at the scene (*Ibid.*). Witnesses reportedly said that a man dressed in black, with a hood covering his head, left the explosive device at the scene two minutes before it exploded (START 2016, GTD ID 201009160003; *La Gaceta* 2010; *El Diario* 24 2010). According to a local news report published on the same day as the attack, Argentinian police said that no arrests had yet been made in connection to the bomb (*El Diario* 24 2010).

Local news reports describe Vandalicia Teodoro Suarez as an anarchist, transnational group originating in Chile (*La Gaceta* 2010; *El Diario* 24 2010; *La Nación* 17 September 2010). The group also appears to be anti-imperialist and supportive of the indigenous Mapuche population in present-day Chile and Argentina, which I have inferred from the fact that group’s leaflets reportedly demanded that land conquered by Spanish colonists be returned to the Mapuche (*La Nación* 17 September 2010; *La Gaceta* 2010). However, besides news accounts about the note, I could not find other sources to independently confirm Vandalicia Teodoro Suarez’s initial aims or ideology.

Geography

Vandalicia Teodoro Suarez’s only attack took place at 881-885 Santa Fe Avenue (sources differ on the exact address) in the Retiro district of Buenos Aires, in front of offices of American Airlines and the Italian airline Alitalia (START 2016, GTD ID 201009160003; *La Gaceta* 2010; *La Nación* 17 September 2010).

Organizational Structure

The group's organizational structure is not known.

External Ties

I did not find evidence or allegations concerning any external ties regarding Vandalicia Teodoro Suarez or to the indigenous Qom community mentioned in the group's pamphlets.

For context, the group's only attack took place during a 2009-2010 period in which Buenos Aires suffered multiple homemade explosive attacks, for which supposed Chilean anarchist groups claimed responsibility via pamphlets left at the scenes (Cappiello 2010; La Nación 17 September 2010). Since many different groups were named, some were suspected of being aliases or front organizations (Cappiello 2010). The only person arrested with alleged connection to these anarchist groups was a Chilean national, Juan Manuel Aliste Vega, who was wanted for various crimes in Chile and Argentina and was arrested while in Argentina (Cappiello 2010; La Nación 17 September 2010; Río Negro 2010). However, I did not find any sources with an explanation for why Chilean anarchist groups would be operating in Argentina.

Group Outcome

During 2009 and 2010, around the time Vandalicia Teodoro Suarez first appeared, a series of homemade explosive attacks took place in Buenos Aires (Cappiello 2010; La Nación 17 September 2010). These attacks were attributed to different Chilean anarchist groups, usually via pamphlets containing an alleged group's name found near the bomb (Ibid.). There was one death as a result of the attacks: A municipal worker killed by an explosion at approximately 3 a.m. on July 13, 2010, in Cipolletti, Argentina, at the corner of the streets Fernández Oro y Sáenz Peña near a police academy (Ibid.). In September 2010, Argentinian press reported that federal law enforcement had opened an investigation into the series of bombings attributed to Chilean anarchist groups (Ibid.). Argentinian authorities reportedly shared information with Chilean law enforcement, who were dealing with a similar string of attacks in Chile (Cappiello 2010). However, as of September 17, 2010, there had only been one related arrest: Juan Aliste Vega, a Chilean who was wanted in connection to the anarchist groups' bombings, as well as for a bank robbery years earlier (Cappiello 2010; La Nación 17 September 2010; Río Negro 2010).

A U.S. State Department report and the media outlet La Nación claim that pamphlets signed by Pandilla Vandalika Teodoro Suarez (alias) were also found at a bombing at a Banco Frances office in Buenos Aires on August 24 or 25, 2010 (U.S. Department of State 2011, 6; La Nación 17 September 2010). However, another U.S. Intelligence report

attributes the attack to a different group, Celulas Revolucionarias Brigada Andrea Salsedo (NDSLIC 2010, 6). The U.S. State Department also attributes Vandalicia Teodoro Suarez with a 30 March 2010 bombing at a Banco Nación in Buenos Aires (U.S. Department of State 2011, 8). However, this State Department report has a clear error, as it incorrectly cites the date of Vandalicia Teodoro Suarez's only confirmed attack (September, not August, 2010).

Vandalicia Teodoro Suarez was not heard from again after its only confirmed attack, which took place on September 16, 2010 (START 2016, GTD ID 201009160003).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Pandilla Vandalika Teodoro Suarez (U.S. Department of State 2010, 8); Teodoro Suarez Vandalism Gang (U.S. Department of State 2010, 8)

Group Formation: No proposed change.

Group End (Outcome): No proposed change. 2010 (disappears, START 2016, GTD ID 201009160003)

31. Hizbullah

Min. Group Date: 1982

Max. Group Date: 2012

Note: transnational, tangential to actual Hezbollah intentions

Aliases: Hizbullah, Hizbollah, Hezbollah, Hezballah, Hizbullah, The Party of God, Islamic Jihad (Islamic Holy War), Islamic Jihad Organization, Islamic Resistance, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, Ansar al-Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansarollah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansar Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance), Organization of the Oppressed, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of Right Against Wrong and Followers of the Prophet Muhammed, Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

Hezbollah was formed in 1982 as a splinter of a prominent Shiite political party Amal (Martin 2011, 254). It formed in reaction to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, and it supported both the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon and the Palestinian fight against Israel (NCTC; Martin 2011, 254). It ascribes to a Shiite ideology, and believes the eventual Islamic state should also be Shiite (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Hezbollah carried out a series of bombings against Israeli targets in Argentina (Embassy) in 1992. Argentina has the largest Jewish population in Latin America, and many believe the attacks were triggered by President Menem’s decision to bolster relations with the US and Israel while withdrawing support for Iran’s nuclear technology program (Times of Israel).

Geography

Hezbollah carried out a series of bombings against Israeli targets in Argentina (Embassy) in 1992. Hezbollah and Iran were responsible for the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center that killed 85 people in the worst terrorist attack on the nation (Atlantic).

Organizational Structure

The group’s initial leader was Sheikh Sobhi Tufeili, though he was replaced by Abbas Musawi in 1992 (Martin 2011, 254). The group developed a strong political wing, which even engaged in Lebanese politics, placing members in Parliament continuously since 1992 (Martin 2011, 254-255). It was organized as a series of cells across southern Lebanon, but consolidated into a political party organization in 1985 when it released a formal manifesto (CFR 2014). The group gained popular support in the 1980s by fighting

against occupying IDF forces in southern Lebanon and other communist militias (Global Security). Hezbollah is led by the Shura Council including the group's leader, the Secretary General (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group estimates it had 5,000-10,000 different fighters and additional supporters as of 1993, but this has since dropped to about 500 (Global Security).

External Ties

The group coordinates with Tanzim, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the PFLP (Global Security). It may also provide external support to Tanzim in the Palestinian territories. President Reagan publicly agreed to not negotiate with Hezbollah following the events, but privately set up a secure channel and secured an arms-for-hostages deal (Martin 2011, 256). It is well known that the IRGC supports Hezbollah with money, weapons, training, and other aid totaling up to \$200 million/year (CFR 2014). Syria also supports Hezbollah (Global Security). The group also has a charity and collects support through a Shi'a diaspora around the world (Global Security).

Group Outcome

Hezbollah is still active today and has a strong presence in Lebanese politics (Global Security).

32. Comando Malvinas Argentinas

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 2003

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [GTD ID 200304170002].
- Terrorist Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC). "Comando Malvinas Argentinas." <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/comando-malvinas-argentinas>. *This TRAC page does not contribute additional information and is more vague than GTD incident report.*
- CRÓNICA/AFP. 2003. "Se atribuye 'Comando Malvinas Argentinas' atentado a banco español." April 4. Accessed January 10, 2017. <http://www.cronica.com.mx/notas/2003/59858.html#>.
- Not mentioned in Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research or Jones & Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End
- Searched and found no results in Proquest, LexisNexis Academic, Keesing's, Google Scholar, and JSTOR with keywords: Comando Malvinas Argentinas; Comando Malvinas Argentinas + Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria; Comando Malvinas Argentinas + BBVA; Jose Maria Aznar + Buenos Aires + bomb; BBVA + bomb/a; Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria + bomb.

- I searched and did not find anything using the list of suggested sources in the codebook.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

Comando Malvinas Argentinas' first and only attack was a bombing outside a Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) branch office in Buenos Aires on April 17, 2003 (START 2016, GTD ID 200304170002). The group was unknown prior to this attack (Ibid.). The homemade explosive did not cause any casualties, but it did damage the bank office's windows and door (Ibid.).

In a communiqué, the group reportedly said that its aim was to protest Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Anzar's support for the 2003 Iraq war (Ibid.). The group reportedly sent its communique to Agence France-Presse (CRÓNICA/AFP 2003). The group's communiqué criticized the United States, United Kingdom, and Spain as "expansionist." The group's ideology was anti-imperialist as well as anti-American, as the communiqué also criticized the U.S. soldiers' presence in "our land."

Geography

The bombing occurred outside a BBVA branch office in the Villa del Parque neighborhood of Buenos Aires (START 2016, GTD ID 200304170002; CRÓNICA/AFP 2003).

Organizational Structure

The group's organizational structure is not known.

External Ties

I did not find any evidence or allegations of external ties.

Group Outcome

Comando Malvinas Argentinas was not heard from again following their only attack.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: no proposed change.

Group Formation: no proposed change.

Group End (Outcome): 2003 (disappears, START 2016 GTD ID 200304170002)

Big questions:

- Urban/rural?
- Anti-imperialist/dirty war legacy?
- Why are blockbusters a popular target? They have blockbusters in Argentina? Is there enough to distinguish between civilian vs military/police/govt targets?