

Afghanistan Cases, 1970-2012

Last Updated: 7 January 2018

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T1240	PEOPLE'S MUJAHIDEEN OF AFGHANISTAN		0	0
T598	AFGHAN JIHAD COUNCIL		0	0
T682	COUNCIL FOR THE DEFENSE OF AFGHANISTAN		0	0
T17	AL-FATAH		1959	2009
T104	BLACK DECEMBER		1973	1973
T159	EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD (EIJ)		1973	2008
T212	HEZB-UL ISLAM		1975	2012
T19	AL GAMA'A AL ISLAMIYYA		1977	1998
T722	HIZB-I ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG)		1977	0
T35	AL-ZULFIKAR		1981	1992
T2072	ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS		1987	2011
T28	AL-QA'IDA		1989	2012
T303	MOROCCAN ISLAMIC COMBATANT GROUP (GICM)		1990	2004
T536	ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION (YEMEN)		1990	1998
T1798	MAHAZ-E-MILLI ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN		1991	1991
T1757	ITTEHAD-I-ISLAMI		1991	1994
T1831	NAHZAT E ESLAMI		1991	1991
T1730	HARAKAT-I-INQILAH-I-ISLAMI		1992	1992
T1733	HEZB-E WAHDAT-E ISLAMI-YI AFGHANISTAN		1992	1992

T1762	JAMIAT-E ISLAMI-YI AFGHANISTAN		1992	1994
T1832	NAJIB WATAN PARTY FACTION		1992	1992
T482	TALIBAN	11-Mar-95	1994	2012
T2448	THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE (OR UNITED ISLAMIC FRONT FOR SALVATION OF AFGHANISTAN - UIFSA)	12-Oct-96	1996	2001
T265	LASHKAR-E-JHANGVI (LEJ)		1996	2012
T1396	FREEDOM PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN		1997	0
T231	ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN		1997	2001
T728	WORLD ISLAMIC FRONT FOR THE JIHAD AGAINST THE JEWS AND THE CRUSADERS		1998	0
T918	JUND AL-SHAM		1998	2005
T499	JAMAA COMBATTANTE TUNISIENNE (JCT)		2000	0
T1484	GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR GROUP		2002	2012
T445	SAIF-UL-MUSLIMEEN LASHKAR JIHAD		2003	2003
T312	MUJAHIDEEN MESSAGE		2003	0
T2357	LASHKAR-E-FIDAYAN-E-ISLAM		2003	2003
T237	JAISH-UL-MUSLIMIN		2004	2004
T2443	TELA MOHAMMED		2005	2005
T2162	HAQQANI NETWORK		2006	2012
T2433	SIRRI POWZ		2007	2007
T2376	GHOLAM YAHYA AKBAR		2009	2009
T1825	KHORASAN JIHADI GROUP		2011	2011
T2658	MULLAH DADULLAH FRONT		2012	2012
T2662	PEOPLE'S AMN COMMITTEE		2012	2012

I. PEOPLE'S MUJAHIDEEN OF AFGHANISTAN

Torg ID: 1240

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an umbrella term for the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War.

Group Formation: This is an umbrella term for the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War.

Group End: This is an umbrella term for the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an umbrella term for the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War.

Geography

This is an umbrella term for the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War.

Organizational Structure

This is an umbrella term for the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War.

External Ties

This is an umbrella term for the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War.

Group Outcome

This is an umbrella term for the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War.

II. AFGHAN JIHAD COUNCIL

Torg ID: 598

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Unknown

Group Formation: 1980s?

Group End: unknown

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information about this group and it never clearly conducts any violent attacks. The group is mentioned as a coordinating committee or umbrella faction in the 1980s (Bowering et al. 2013). It was "anti-West and anti-India" (Gul 2015). No other information about its aims, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome were found.

Geography

It is unclear whether the group ever conducts an attack. No other information could be found about the group's activities.

Organizational Structure

No other information about its aims, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome were found.

External Ties

No other information about its aims, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome were found.

Group Outcome

No other information about its aims, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome were found. The group is mentioned as active in the 1980s, but it is unknown when the group stops existing (Bowering et al. 2013).

III. COUNCIL FOR THE DEFENSE OF AFGHANISTAN

Torg ID: 682

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- John Zubrzycki. "Islam's Warriors Meet Afghan 'Lion' in His Lair." Christian Science Monitor. 1997. <https://www.csmonitor.com/1997/0228/022897.intl.intl.3.html>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for the Northern Alliance (Zubrzycki 1997; Akhtar 2014, 46).

Group Formation: This is an alias for the Northern Alliance (Zubrzycki 1997; Akhtar 2014, 46).

Group End: This is an alias for the Northern Alliance (Zubrzycki 1997; Akhtar 2014, 46).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for the Northern Alliance (Zubrzycki 1997; Akhtar 2014, 46).

Geography

This is an alias for the Northern Alliance (Zubrzycki 1997; Akhtar 2014, 46).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for the Northern Alliance (Zubrzycki 1997; Akhtar 2014, 46).

External Ties

This is an alias for the Northern Alliance (Zubrzycki 1997; Akhtar 2014, 46).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for the Northern Alliance (Zubrzycki 1997; Akhtar 2014, 46).

IV. FATAH

Torg ID: 17

Min. Group Date: 1959

Max. Group Date: 2009

Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Fatah, Al-`Asifa, Fatah, Fateh, Harakat Al-Tahrir Al-Watani Al-Filastini, Harekat At-Tahrir Al-Wataniyyeh Al-Filastiniyyeh, Palestinian National Liberation Movement

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Al-Fatah, Al-`Asifa," Paramilitary Groups PLO, Global Security, n.d., <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-fatah.htm>
- "Profile: Fatah Palestinian Movement," BBC, 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13338216>
- Erica Pearson, "Fatah," SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism, 2011, p.198-199 (see Fatah1.png, Fatah2.png)
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Syria: 1) Information on "Fatah", 2) Information on "Mukhabarat", 1 September 1989, SYR2021, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aaaf4.html> [accessed 6 December 2016]
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- Mudiam, Priti-ivi Ram. 1994. *India and the Middle East*. New York: British Academic Press. <https://books.google.com/books?id=jiDYjw4qCzEC&pg=PA177&lpg=PA177&dq=mudiam+i>

[ndia+palestine&source=bl&ots=UNAWdwEtr0&sig=UEjdgEboTlemNdYXAx80py07E_M&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjHk_q-L_RAhUqq1QKHR1_CAAQ6AEIRDAJ#v=onepage&q=mudiam%20india%20palestine&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=5EHJHVXmLeEC&pg=PA178&dq=india+PLO&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjHk_q-L_RAhUqq1QKHR1_CAAQ6AEIRDAJ#v=onepage&q=mudiam%20india%20palestine&f=false)

- Kumaraswamy, P.R. 2010. *India's Israel Policy*. New York: Columbia University Press. https://books.google.com/books?id=5EHJHVXmLeEC&pg=PA178&dq=india+PLO&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj2haaT-b_RAhWmw1QKHZHODTsQ6AEIHDAJ#v=onepage&q=india%20PLO&f=false
- GTD Perpetrator 284. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=284>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: no proposed change.

Group Formation: 1959 (Jones and Libicki 2008, 172)

Group End: Formally renounced violence in a peace deal with Israel in 1993, however Fatah still retains militant commanders and groups and engages in military clashes with its rival Hamas (Pearson 2011, 198).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Fatah/Al-Fatah is the name of two Palestinian Liberation Organization factions. One faction is headed by Yasir Arafat, which opposes the Syrian government (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989). Arafat formally founded Fatah in 1963, but it existed as early as 1959 (Jones and Libicki 2008; Pearson 2011, 198). The Fatah Party is opposed to Israel (Global Security). The group is nationalist and its initial goal was territorial change, particularly the end of the Israeli state (Jones and Libicki 2008, 144). However, the group signed a peace deal with Israel in 1993 and agreed to consider coexistence with Israel (BBC 2011).

Geography

Headquartered in Tunisia, with bases in Lebanon and other Middle Eastern Countries (Global Security). The group committed terrorist attacks and trained insurgents in Western Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Africa during the 1960s and 1970s (Ibid.).

Organizational Structure

The group's membership is estimated at 6,000 to 8,000 (Global Security). The leading political body within Fatah is the Central Committee, with a parallel structure known as

the Revolutionary Committee, which is in charge of organizing armed attacks (Global Security).

Fatah joined the PLO in 1968 and won the leadership role in 1969 (Global Security; Pearson 2011, 198). Fatah has historically remained the most influential faction within the PLO (Pearson 2011, 198). The Chairman of the PLO and president of Palestine is Mahmoud Abbas, sworn in as president in 2005 (Global Security; Pearson 2011, 199).

Three militias have split from Fatah and are considered offshoots: the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which continues to advocate violent attacks against Israel despite the late 1990s/early 2000s peace deals, Force 17, a personal security force for PLO leadership, and the militia Tanzim (Global Security). There is also a pro-Syrian Fatah Revolutionary Council (Fatah "uprising" or "rebels") which opposes Arafat's faction (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989).

External Ties

The Fatah party has historically clashed with Hamas, although they briefly formed a national unity government in 2007 (Global Security). This unity government promised to honor the peace agreements with Israel signed by the Palestine Liberation Organization, however this commitment was tenuous due to Hamas' reluctance to acknowledge Israel (Global Security). The splintering of the PLO-Hamas government later in 2007 led to the dominance of President Abbas, who also received support from the EU and the Arab League (Global Security). When PLO again took over full control of the Palestinian government, Israel and the United States also slightly softened their criticism since Hamas was no longer in political power (Ibid.).

Indian politicians have supported the unification of Palestinian factions, as well as the prospects of an eventual peace settlement between Palestine and Israel (Mudiam 1994, 182). India supported the prominent role of Al Fatah and its leader, Yasser Arafat, due to its nationalistic approach (which Indian politicians consider a form of demanding self-determination) and willingness to make some compromises (relative to more extreme Palestinian factions) (Ibid.). India also may have liked Al Fatah's secular approach (Ibid.). In 1969, an Al-Fatah delegate visited India at the request of the Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity and successfully collected donations (Ibid.). They opened negotiations for establishing Al-Fatah offices in India, however tensions over fighting in Jordan in 1970 slowed this process (Ibid.). India was the first non-Arab country to grant formal diplomatic recognition to the PLO, which it did on 10 January 1975, and the PLO opened an office in New Delhi (Mudiam 1994, 182; Kumaraswamy 2010, 178). India's support for PLO may be considered contrary to its recognition of Israel as a nation, however India maintains that both policy positions are viable (Kumaraswamy 2010, 178).

Fatah has close political and financial associations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan (Global Security). They received weapons, explosives, and training from the former USSR. It is also alleged that China and North Korea have provided weapons, however this claim is less clearly substantiated (Global Security). Fatah helped train other insurgent groups in Western Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Africa during the 1960s and 1970s (Global Security; Pearson 2011, 198).

Group Outcome

The Fatah party eventually became the leading player in the Palestinian government, through its membership in the PLO coalition (Global Security). Fatah formed a more moderate political wing in the late 1980s (Pearson 2011, 198). This shift to relatively more moderate, political advocacy within the PLO earned criticism of Fatah from a splinter group, the militant group Fatah Revolutionary Council (Ibid.) In 1998, Fatah and Arafat successfully convinced the PLO coalition to formally acknowledge Israel's right to coexist with Palestine (Pearson 2011, 198). Pearson claims this acknowledgement was an early sign of PLO and Fatah denouncing terrorism (Ibid.).

Fatah has modified its ideology since its founding and recognized Israel, signing an interim peace deal with Israel in 1993. (BBC 2011). Fatah also disavowed terrorist attacks on Israeli citizens as part of the peace agreement (BBC 2011).

Fatah has declined since Arafat died in 2004, suffering from in-fighting and pushback (political and armed clashes) from Hamas (BBC 2011; Pearson 2011, 199). In June 2006, Fatah lost parliamentary elections to Hamas (BBC 2011). Fatah was largely pushed out of the Gaza strip in 2007 after violent clashes with Hamas (BBC 2011). The group is not thought to have recently carried out terrorist attacks (Global Security).

- V. BLACK DECEMBER
Torg ID: 104
Min. Group Date: 1973
Max. Group Date: 1973
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 3591. Global Terrorism Dataset. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
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<https://books.google.com/books?id=8JxPZmPNzulC&pg=PA428&lpg=PA428&dq=black+december+terrorism&source=bl&ots=gZc7F-MGyc&sig=5hEW5A4i2CE5g2x3oico3iPt8Mc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiGxuD39JPXAhUlrFQKHbl6CJ4Q6AEIQTAE#v=onepage&q=black%20december%20terrorism&f=false>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1973

Group End: 1973

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but its first violent incident occurred in 1973 (GTD 2017; Rangan 1973). Black December opposed the Indian government; there is no evidence of politicized opposition to the Pakistani government (Rangan 1973). The group pushed violently for the release of 90,000 Pakistani prisoners in India in the war of December 1971 (Rangan 1973).

Geography

The exact locations of operation and sanctuaries were unknown for the group due to the short lifespan of the group. The group is transnational as Black December targeted Indian diplomatic sites in London and Kabul (GTD 2017; Parry 2013; Rangan 1973). It is unclear whether Black December was actually present in Pakistan or if it simply targeted Pakistani targets.

Organizational Structure

There were at least three members of the group (Parry 2013, 428). Not much is known of the group's leader, membership, resources, or structure due to its secrecy and short life span.

External Ties

Black December radically supported Pakistan as it fought for the release of thousands of Pakistani troops during the war of 1971 (Rangan 1973; Carlton and Schaerf 2015, 42). The Indian state responded with police defense of Indian politicians as well as government issued warnings to the public (Rangan 1973). The group seemed to copy the group Black September but there is no evidence of direct ties between the two groups (Rangan 1973).

Group Outcome

The group's last known violent attack was in 1973 when it targeted an Indian plane in Kabul, Afghanistan (GTD 2017). It is not known why the group stopped using violence. British police shot two members as they tried to storm an Indian consul (Rangan 1973). The Indian and Pakistani government also took several measures. The Pakistani government issued a warning against the group to cease operations (Rangan 1973). The Indian government increased police numbers and presence patrols around the Prime Minister, Cabinet members, and soft targets in Mumbai and New Delhi (Rangan 1973).

The end of the group was not explicit, but its activity ceased two years after the war ended in December of 1971 (GTD Perpetrator 3591 2017).

Notes for Iris:

-no evidence of politicized opposition to Pakistani government

VI. EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD (EIJ)

Torg ID: 159

Min. Group Date: 1973

Max. Group Date: 2008

Onset: NA

Aliases: EIJ, Al-Jihad, Al Jihad, Al-Jihad Al-Islam, Al-Jihad Al-Islami, Egyptain Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Eij), Egyptian Islamic Jihad Movement, Egyptian Islamic Jihad Movement (Eijm), Jihad Group (Egypt), New Jihad Group, Qaeda Al-Jihad, Talaa'al Al-Fateh, Vanguard's Of Conquest, EIJ, EIJM, Tanzim al-Jihad, Holy War, The Organization, Tanzim

Part 1. Bibliography

- Sammy Salama and Joe-Ryan Bergoch, “Al-Jihad al-Islami,” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2008, <http://www.nonproliferation.org/al-jihad-al-islami/>
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- Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, p. 531

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1974

Group End (Outcome): 1998 (merger)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

EIJ was formed in 1974 in Cairo, Egypt by Muhammad Abd al-Salam Farraj as a splinter of the Muslim Brotherhood (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 531; Salama and Bergoch 2008). The group’s initial aim was to overthrow the Egyptian government in order to help create an Islamic state (Salama and Bergoch 2008). It ascribed to a Salafi jihadist ideology (Mapping Militants 2015). EIJ came to attention in 1981 when they helped assassinate Anwar Saddat (Salama and Bergoch 2008).

Geography

The group initially operated out of Cairo and collected support from underground groups throughout the city (Salama and Bergoch 2008). It also had support in Asyut (Schmid

and Jongman 1988, 531).

Organizational Structure

Their organizational structure was a series of cells before consolidating into a more cohesive decision-making body with a central council, preparation wing, financing wing, and propaganda wing (Salama and Bergoch 2008). It is thought to have had a “few hundred” members (Salama and Bergoch 2008). Members were primarily lower-middle class, but literate; leaders were upper class (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 531). A number of members were students (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 531). Their second leader, Aymenn al-Zawahiri was released from jail in 1984. Afterwards, he went to Pakistan where he received training and helped recruit Afghan mujahideen to fight the Soviets (Salama and Bergoch 2008; Mapping Militants). The group recruited members from Afghanistan during this time (Mapping Militants). After being dormant for 10 years, EIJ resumed terrorist and guerrilla activities in Egypt in 1992 with a series of political assassinations (Salama and Bergoch 2008). Their primary tactics include attacks against political officials (Mackenzie Institute 2015). EIJ funded itself through a diaspora of Egyptians around the world as well as Osama bin Laden (Mapping Militants). It also received support from NGOs, money laundering, and criminal activities (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

External Ties

The group had an external base of operations in Sudan from which they launched attacks into Egypt until 1996 when the Sudanese government forced them to leave (Mapping Militants). The group also allegedly has bases of operation in Yemen, Pakistan, Lebanon, and the UK (BBC n.d.). Egypt alleges Iran provided support for the group, but there is no evidence corroborating that (FAS 2004). The group had close ties to Al-Qaeda.

Group Outcome

After Sadat’s assassination, his successor Hosni Mubarak, responded to the EIJ with mass arrests and trials of 302 EIJ and al-Jamaa al-Islamiya members (Salama and Bergoch 2008). Farraj and several other leaders were executed in 1982 (Salama and Bergoch 2008). When the group resumed violent activities in 1992, it had a hard time mustering support due to the targeting of tourist destinations and non-combatants (Fletcher 2008). The Egyptian government launched a massive counterterrorism campaign in the 1990s which deterred financiers and potential recruits within Egypt (Fletcher 2008).

EIJ merged with Al-Qaeda between 1998-2001 following a trial case extraditing one of EIJ’s top military commanders and the EIJ recruitment commander (Mapping Militants).

VII. HEZB-UL ISLAM

Torg ID: 212

Min. Group Date: 1975

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 1980

Aliases: Hizb-I-Islami, Hezb-I-Islami, Hezb-UI Islam, Hisb Al-Islam, Hisbi Islam, Hizb-E-Islami, Hizbul Islaami, Hizbul Islam, Hizbul-I-Islami, Islamic Party

*code as Hizb Islamis Khalis faction

Part 1. Bibliography

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- "Anti-Soviet Mujahideen." Global Security. N.d.(b) <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mujahideen.htm>
- "Afghanistan vs. Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction." Non-State Actor Dataset. 2013. P. 479. http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
- Bill Roggio. "Raid in Afghan east targets Hizb-i-Islami Khalis." Long War Journal. 2011. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/03/raid_in_afghan_east.php

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Hizb-i-Islami Maulawi Khalis, Mujahideen-e-Tora Bora, HIK

Group Formation: 1979

Group End: 2011

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Hizb Islami - Khalis formed in 1979 when it splintered from Hizb-Islami due to ideological disagreements with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (MIPT 2008; Roggio 2011; ISW n.d.). The group ascribes to an Islamist ideology, but is seen as more moderate (Global Security n.d.(a)). Its aim was to overthrow the PDPA and later, during the Soviet-Afghan war, fought against the Soviet invasion (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group had support in Nangarhar, Kabul, and Paktia Provinces (Global Security n.d.(a); Global Security n.d.(b)). The group primarily operated in Nangarhar province (CIA 1984; Roggio 2011). It did not appear to be transnational. Khalis lived in Pakistan. The group partially operated out of Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

Many members of HIK were ex-soldiers (Global Security n.d.(a)). It also recruits from madrassas and “graduates of government schools” (Global Security n.d.(a)). The leader of HIK was Mawlawi Mohammed Yunis Khalis (CIA 1984; Global Security n.d.(a)). Khalis originally fled Afghanistan in 1973 after the coup and lived in Pakistan (Global Security n.d.(a)). Members came from the Ghilzai, Khugiangi and Jadran tribes, which are Pashtun (Global Security n.d.(b)). It had between 1,000 to 3,000 fighters during the Soviet-Afghan War when it was part of the larger mujahideen (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 478).

External Ties

The group may have been affiliated with Al Qaeda (Roggio 2011). It fought alongside Al Qaeda around Tora Bora after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (Weaver 2005). The group fought as part of the larger Afghan mujahideen along with the Afghanistan National Liberation Front, HIG, Harakat-e-Inqilab-i-Islami, Jamiat-e-Islami, Ittihad-I-Islami, and Mahaz-e-Milli (Global Security n.d.(b)).

The group received explicit arms support from the United States, UK, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia during the Soviet-Afghan War (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 479).

Group Outcome

The group was most violent during the 1980s and less violent after 1991 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 479). The group suffered additional splinters and was also expelled by the Taliban in 1996 (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Institute for the Study of War n.d.). After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Khalis renewed his call for jihad (Weaver 2005). It likely fought alongside Al Qaeda around Tora Bora after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (Weaver 2005). HIK was active as late as 2011 (Roggio 2011).

VIII. AL GAMA'A AL ISLAMIYYA

Torg ID: 19

Min. Group Date: 1977

Max. Group Date: 1998

Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Gama'at Al-Islamiyya (Ig), Al Gama'a Al Islamiyya, Al Gama'a Al Islamiyya (Gai), Al Gama'a Al-Islamiyya, Al Gama'a Al-Islamiyya (Gai), Al Gama'at Al Islamiyya (Ig)

Al Gama'at Al-Islamiyya (Ig), Al Gamat Al Islamiya, Al Gamat Al-Islamiya, Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya, Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya (Gai), Al-Gamat Al-Islamiya, Islamic Group (Ig), Jamaat Al-Islamiyya

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1973, 1981 (first attack)

Group End (Outcome): 1997 (splinter)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

As of 2012, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya had made a vow of nonviolence and became the "Building and Development party" (Drevon, Jé. 2015). The group's goal, back in 1974, was initially to move education away from the Western system (for example they went to great lengths to separate college classes based on gender); however, once they managed to absorb the student group, they quickly revealed their true aim: to establish an Islamic state (Middle East Report). Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya was reportedly a sunni Islamist organization (Curry 2002). According to Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim, one of the original members, their reason for violence is "the only way to express yourself in this world is through force, the only language that is understood." (Middle East Report).

Geography

Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya predominantly operates in Sa'id, where they started at one of the universities (Middle East report). The group is based in Egypt, but clearly has support in other places. Not only were they able to stage their assassination attempt in Ethiopia, but when Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim escaped from prison, he managed to escape through Sudan to Pakistan with help (Middle East Report).

Organizational Structure

Over the years al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya has amassed an impressive list of violent attacks. They were directly responsible for the assassination of Anwar Sadat on October 6th, 1981, with which they may or may not have had the help of another Egyptian group: Al-Jihad (Middle East Report). The group assassinated Refaat Al-Mahgoub, the People's Assembly speaker in 1990, Farag Fouda, the secularist writer in 1992, and attempted to assassinate the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while he was in Ethiopia in 1995 (Death in Sinai). Most notably, however, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya was responsible for the massacre at the Hatshepsut temple in Luxor in 1997 (Death in Sinai). This massacre killed 58 tourists (Economist, El. 2015).

Sources disagree on who started the group and when. Certain leaders have arisen over the years, but they appear to be fluid and occasionally overlapping. Omar Abdel-Rahman, currently imprisoned in the United States, is called the "spiritual leader." (Mapping Militant Organizations). Other identified leaders include Karam Zuhdi (Mapping Militant Organizations) and Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim (Middle East Report). According to Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim, a few of the early leaders (1978), Muhi al-Din Ahmad, Najih Ibrahim, and Usama Hafiz, were convinced to leave al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and join The Muslim Brotherhood instead (Middle East Report). The numbers of the group and its organization appear to be fairly unknown, especially because some of the available information is somewhat muddled, Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim, in his interview in 1996, attempts to exaggerate the numbers of followers (Middle East Report). The group began on university campuses in the form of student unions bent on making the schools less western and more strictly following Islamic law; their first followers were drawn almost exclusively from university campuses, and remained the base of the group for a while (Middle East Report). al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya definitely has an official political wing; indeed, their own political party (Drevon, Jé. 2015).

External Ties

Whether al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya receives official funding from other groups is unclear; however, they clearly have official support from several places. For one, they have been linked to Al-Qaeda, albeit vaguely (Curry 2002). The group has worked with Al-Jihad, most notably in their joint effort to assassinate Anwar Sadat (Mapping Militant Organizations). The Muslim Brotherhood provided many members of the group with legal council when they were arrested back in 1978, ostensibly in order to convince these leaders to join their group instead (Middle East Report). While none of these countries

openly declared their support, when Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim escaped from prison, he was able to seek asylum in Pakistan and in Denmark (middle east report).

Group Outcome

There is mixed information about whether there was a split in the late 1990s when the group published its new “nonviolent” ideas (Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim swears there was not). The state appears to have mainly responded to (or preempted) the group's violence with it's own, by cracking down on university protests and upping their police presence (middle east report). The group splintered into two factions in 1997 after a ceasefire agreement was reached (CFR).

Security forces killed Ala Mohieddin in 1991 which caused al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya to assassinate the Egyptian parliament leader in exchange (Mapping Militant Organizations). The group had a large swell in its members in 1992 when fighters returned from Afghanistan (Refworld 1998).

- IX. HIZB-I ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG)
Torg ID: 722
Min. Group Date: 1977
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: 1980

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Hizb i Islami - Gulbuddin, HIG, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Faction of the Hezb-e Islami

Group Formation: 1975 (Mackenzie Institute 2015) or 1977 (Institute for the Study of War n.d.)

Group End: 2016, as it signed a peace deal with the Afghanistan government (Al Jazeera 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

HIG formed in 1975 or 1977 (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Institute for the Study of War n.d.). It was a splinter of Rabbani's Jamiat-i-Islami. Their first violent incident was as early as 1977 (MIPT 2008). The group's original goal was to overthrow the Afghan communist government and replace it with an Islamic state (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Institute for the Study of War n.d.). Its goals later shifted to repel Afghan forces (Oxford Islamic Studies n.d.; Global Security n.d.). The group's ideology was Islamist (Global Security N.d.; Oxford Islamic Studies n.d.).

Geography

The group acted in Kabul Ghormach district, Jalalabad, Puli Khumri and other areas (Rosenburg 2013; Global Security N.d.; GTD 2017; Mackenzie Institute 2015). The group operated south of Kabul, Afghanistan during the early 1990s (Global Security n.d.). The group had bases of operation in FATA and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province for funding and recruitment efforts (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Global Security n.d.). The group partially operated out of Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War (Global Security n.d.). Not much is known on the specific bases of operation of the group due to its secrecy.

Organizational Structure

The group was led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and followed the same structure as the group it was a faction of, the Islamic Party ("Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Faction of the Hezb-e Islami, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)" 2015). The group recruited educated elites, and the members were mainly ethnic Pashtun (Institute for the Study of War n.d.). The group's base of support was mainly in Khyber Pass Jalalabad, a region east of Kabul (Global Support n.d.). The group was known to also recruit from refugee camps in Peshawar (Mackenzie Institute 2015). The group had hundreds of members between 2003 and 2004 (FAS 2004). Hekmatyar was originally active with the People's

Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) (Institute for the Study of War n.d). Hekmatyar was famous for his war crimes and abuse of human rights (“Hizbi-Islami” N.d.).

The numbers of supporters of the group are unclear.

The group was originally funded by the governments of Pakistan, America and Saudi Arabia during the Soviet-Afghan War (“Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Faction of the Hezb-e Islami, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)” 2015). After once again being recognized by the Pakistani group as a strong military organization, it once again received funding from its government in 2001 (“Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Faction of the Hezb-e Islami, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)” 2015).

The organizational structure of the group is unclear, other than the fact that it has a military wing led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (“Hizbi-Islami” N.d.; Rosenberg 2013).

External Ties

The Islamic party was allied with several mujahedin groups in Afghanistan in the 1980s (Global Security n.d.; Oxford Islamic Studies n.d.). The group opposed the Afghan groups that formed the Northern Alliance (Global Security n.d.). The group faced several splits including one in 1979 (Institute for the Study of War n.d.). The group was allegedly tied to Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, the blind cleric, through Rasul Sayyaf and his Mujahedin group (Global Security n.d.). The group was explicitly connected to the Taliban and allegedly to Al-Qaeda (Global Security n.d.). Hekmatyar received sanctuary from 1996 till 2002 in Iran (Institute for the Study of War n.d.; Global Security n.d.) The group was supported financially by Pakistan and America to fight against Soviet occupation; the group also received military and logistical support from the US and Pakistan’s ISI during the Soviet-Afghan War (Global Security n.d.; Oxford Islamic Studies n.d.). The group lost support from the Pakistani government around 1994 as it redirected its funding to the Taliban (Global Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2015).

The group was associated with Al-Qaeda and had many terrorist training camps (“Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)” 2004). The group was financially supported by America, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan while it fought to remove the presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (“Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Faction of the Hezb-e Islami, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)” 2015).

Group Outcome

The group splintered and formed two new groups in 1979: Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Hizb-i-Islami Maulawi Khalis. The group suffered additional splinters and was also expelled by the Taliban in 1996 (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Institute for the Study of War n.d.). It formed a political party in 2004 (Institute for the Study of War n.d.;

Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's last violent incident was in 2016 (GTD 2017). In 2017, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar returned to Afghanistan to discuss the details of a peace agreement with the government. Hig signed a peace agreement in 2017, which led the group to disarm (Rasmussen 2017; Constable 2017; Kishore 2017; "Afghanistan: Hezb-i-Islami armed group signs peace deal" 2016; "Hizbi-Islami" N.d.).

Notes for Iris:

- group had distinct reputation for organization cohesion and unification
- group shifts goals over time
- Hekmatyar fled after his war crimes to an unknown location, but they managed to coax him back with a peace agreement (Al Jazeera)
- Afghan government wanted to sue for peace because they're also trying to fight against the Taliban. Hope his participation would entice other groups to join.

- X. AL-ZULFIKAR
Torg ID: 35
Min. Group Date: 1981
Max. Group Date: 1992
Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Zulfikar, Al Zulfikar

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: no proposed change

Group Formation: 1981

Group End (1991) - Murtaza said the group no longer existed (Ottawa Citizen, 1991).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Al-Zulfikar is a leftist militant group named after Pakistani's Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali-Bhutto, executed in 1979 (Ehrlich 1981). It was formed by PM Bhutto's sons after attempts to stop the execution of their father by Muhammed Zia-ul-Haq failed (Paracha 2010). It is unknown precisely when the group formed between 1979 and 1981, but it came to attention for its first violent attack in 1981 when it hijacked a plane (UPI 1981; GTD 2017). Its aim was to oppose Zia ul-Haq's regime (Paracha 2010).

Geography

Al-Zulfikar has bases in London, Tripoli, Libya, Syria, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan (Ehrlich 1981; UK Home Office 2008). It has launched attacks in airports in Karachi and Syria (Ehrlich 1981). Al-Zulfikar's leader announced that, as of 1992, the group was involved in armed resistance inside Pakistan (Times of India 1992).

Organizational Structure

The group is led by Bhutto's son, Murtaza (Paracha 2010). Its recruits were mainly members of Pakistan's People's Party and the People's Students Federation, fleeing Zia's military regime (Ibid.). However, most members were killed in Al-Zulifkar's first operations in Pakistan (Ibid.). It managed, however, to recover from the losses and recruit new members (Ibid.). A successful plane hijacking of a Singapore Airliner in 1981 increased the group's credibility. The plane was seized between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore by four men, all of whom were killed when Singaporean commandos stormed the plane (Ottawa Citizen, 1991). Demands were made for the release of Benazir Bhutto's husband from a Karachi prison (Ottawa Citizen, 1991). No passengers were harmed (Ottawa Citizen, 1991).

External Ties

Al-Zulfikar was aided by prominent Muslim leaders such as Colonel Qaddafi in Libya, Hazifil Asad in Syria, the PLO's Yasser Arafat, from whom he received weapons and arms (Paracha 2010). Murtaza also called upon KHAD, an Afghan intelligence agency, to help eliminate traitors within the organization (Paracha 2010).

Al Zulfikar received funding from Afghanistan and India, because those countries opposed the Zia regime (refworld 2008).

Group Outcome

Al-Zulfikar reached the peak of its success from 1981 to 1983 (Ottawa Citizen, 1991). Despite the group's success, Murtaza's paranoia and the consequent infighting led to the group's disintegration (Paracha 2010). The infighting culminated in Murtaza asking KHAD to execute one of his most able officials, Tipu (Paracha 2010). Zulfikar's family abandoned the enterprise. However, in 1986, Murtaz returned and turned Al-Zulfikar into a Sindh nationalist organization (Paracha 2010). At this time, Benazir Bhutto, Zulfikar's daughter, had returned to mainstream politics in Pakistan and was controlling the PPP. (Paracha 2010). In 1991, Murtaza commented that Al-Zulfikar no longer existed (Ottawa Citizen, 1991). Murtaza began his own version of the PPP and ran against Benazir Bhutto's party, and was eventually killed in 1996 by a police ambush (Paracha 2010).

XI. ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS

Torg ID: 2072

Min. Group Date: 1987

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: NA

Aliases: Islamic Terrorists

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Group Formation: This name is too vague for research.

Group End: This name is too vague for research.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This name is too vague for research.

Geography

This name is too vague for research.

Organizational Structure

This name is too vague for research.

External Ties

This name is too vague for research.

Group Outcome

This name is too vague for research.

XII. AL-QA'IDA

Torg ID: 28

Min. Group Date: 1989

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qa'ida, Al Qaeda, Al Qaida, Al-Qa`Ida, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qa'idat Al-Jihad, The Base

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active) (Crenshaw 2015)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Osama Bin Laden founded al-Qaida in 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's initial goals were to completely remove Western influence/ideas and to abolish the United States and Israel (BAAD 2015). They conducted their first attacks against the US embassy in Africa in 1998 (BAAD 2015; Global Security N.D). Al-Qaida first came to global attention after 9/11 but was active prior to that in its region (FAS 2005). The group has a radical Sunni Muslim ideology (CFR 2012; Global Security N.D).

Geography

Al-Qaida operated mainly within Peshawar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (CFR 2012; PBS N.D). The group hid within cities and hills with particularly mountainous terrain in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan (as shepherds or farmers) (FAS 2005). Bin Laden had a base of operations in Sudan from 1991-1998 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Organizational Structure

Al-Qaida was headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was their sole leader until his assassination in 2011 (although rumors exist that he died earlier or didn't die at all) (CFR 2012). He was from Saudi Arabia and had helped fight the Soviets in the Afghanistan war (Crenshaw 2015). He was replaced by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2011. (Crenshaw 2015;

CFR 2012). The group used a complex system in which members reported to couriers who reported to other couriers eventually making their way up to the head who was initially Bin Laden (RAND 2008). This is what we call a decentralized or cell-based organizational structure. Funding for the organization came from many places, including donations (FTO 2005). The group had different councils to deal with different aspects. For example, they had a “military committee” to deal with “military” matters, and a “consultation council” to plan out terrorist attacks and deal with financial matters (PBS N.D). They have no formal political wing (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida can be considered an umbrella group that consisted of many other terrorist groups within (ibid; Global Security N.D). The organization had an estimated 75 members when it was first formed and up to 18,000 at its peak in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015). Today, it is thought to have less than 1000 members, but these estimates vary (Crenshaw 2015; BAAD 2015).

External Ties

Saudi Arabia allegedly gave some funding to AQ through drug trafficking and diamonds, but these were never proven true (Crenshaw 2015). Iran also allegedly trained and supported AQ members in the early 1990s (ibid; BAAD 2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan allow Al-Qaeda to operate training camps within their borders (ibid). The group has ties to several other terrorist organizations including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Jemaah Islamiya (CFR 2012; PBS N.D).

Group Outcome

The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to find and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements operating in Afghanistan (BAAD 2015). The group's first leader Osama bin Laden was killed during a raid in 2011 (CFR 2012; BAAD 2015). The group is still active today.

XIII. MOROCCAN ISLAMIC COMBATANT GROUP (GICM)

Torg ID: 303

Min. Group Date: 1990

Max. Group Date: 2004

Onset: NA

Aliases: Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, Groupe Islamique Combattant Morrocaïn (Gicm), Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (Gicm)

Part 1. Bibliography

- TOPS ID 4341

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- Democracy Defense Foundation, <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/islamist-extremisms-rising-challenge-to-morocco/>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1998

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

GICM is the acronym for the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group. The group formed in 1998 after Harakat al-Islamiya al-Maghrebiya al-Mukatila (HASM) splintered (CTC 2009; Mapping Militants). The group's goal is to overthrow the Moroccan government and replace it with an Islamic state. GICM adheres to a Salafi jihadi ideology (Mapping Militants).

Geography

The group had prominent attacks in Casablanca, Marrakech, Nador and Fes (CTC 2009).

Organizational Structure

The group may have some transnational networks in Europe. It primarily funds itself through illicit activities in other countries as well as potential external support from AQIM (Mapping Militants). Its membership was initially Moroccan veterans with prior military experience. HASM was founded by veterans of the Soviet-Afghanistan war, some of whom received Taliban training (Mapping Militants; Global Security). Its initial leaders were Abdelkarim el-Mejjati and Nourredine Nafia (CTC 2009). Its most prominent attack involved a train bombing in Casablanca in May 2003. Today, the group appears to operate in cells both in and outside Morocco, but CTC suggests the group has "suffered a loss of operational control to the extent that it is not even mentioned in analyses on Salafi-jihadi terrorism in Morocco" (CTC 2009).

External Ties

It may have potential external support from AQIM (Mapping Militants).

Group Outcome

The group has been the target of Western counterterrorism activities, including attacks on cells in Europe and sanctioning by the US (Mapping Militants; Global Security). The Moroccan government has responded to attacks through large arrests which have been particularly devastating (CTC 2009). The US designated GICM a foreign terrorist organization in 2004. The group pledged support for GSPC/AQIM in the early 2000s (Defend Democracy).

XIV. ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION (YEMEN)

Torg ID: 536

Min. Group Date: 1990

Max. Group Date: 1998

Onset: NA

Aliases: Islamic Jihad Organization (Yemen), Yemen Islamic Jihad

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases:

Group Formation: This seems like either an alias for EIJ or AQ because of Zawahiri's leadership role (BBC 2002).

Group End: This seems like either an alias for EIJ or AQ because of Zawahiri's leadership role (BBC 2002).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This seems like either an alias for EIJ or AQ because of Zawahiri's leadership role (BBC 2002).

Geography

This seems like either an alias for EIJ or AQ because of Zawahiri's leadership role (BBC 2002).

Organizational Structure

This seems like either an alias for EIJ or AQ because of Zawahiri's leadership role (BBC 2002).

External Ties

This seems like either an alias for EIJ or AQ because of Zawahiri's leadership role (BBC 2002).

Group Outcome

This seems like either an alias for EIJ or AQ because of Zawahiri's leadership role (BBC 2002).

- XV. MAHAZ-E-MILLI ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN
Torg ID: 1798
Min. Group Date: 1991
Max. Group Date: 1991
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NIFA, National Islamic Front of Afghanistan

Group Formation: 1978

Group End: 1991

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown precisely when the group formed, but it happened sometime between 1978 and 1979 when Gailani left Afghanistan and the Soviets invaded Afghanistan (Esposito 2003). It is unknown when the group's first violent attack occurred.

The group was Sufi Islamist, but considered more moderate than other groups part of the Mujahedeen (HRW 1991; Canada IRB 1998). The group's aim was to expel the Soviet and restore an old royalist government (HRW 1991).

Geography

Most of the group's support came from Paktia, Ghazni, and Kandahar (Global Security n.d.). The group partially operated out of Peshawar, Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War (Esposito 2003; Global Security n.d.). The group primarily operated and conducted attacks in eastern Afghanistan (CIA 1984).

Organizational Structure

The group's founder was Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani (Global Security n.d.; Canada IRB 1998; Esposito 2003). Gailani was a businessman (HRW 1991). Members were Pashtun, specifically the Zadran, Mangal, Jaji, Ahmadzai, Tareen, Kochi, and Sulemankhel tribes (Global Security n.d.). Some members were former military and government officials (Global security N.d.). The group had between 2000 to 3000 fighters during the Soviet-Afghan War (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 473).

External Ties

The group received explicit arms support from the United States, UK, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia during the Soviet-Afghan War (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 473-474).

Group Outcome

The group's last violent attack was in 1991 (GTD 2017). After the Soviet withdrew, the group primarily operated out of Quetta, Pakistan (Canada IRB 1998). The group tried to participate in power-sharing negotiations for a new government, but was excluded (Canada IRB 1998)

XVI. ITTEHAD-I-ISLAMI
Torg ID: 1757
Min. Group Date: 1991
Max. Group Date: 1994
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Islamic Unity, Islamic Dawah Organization, Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, Etehad-e Islami (EIA)

Group Formation: 1980 (form), 1991 (first attack)

Group End: 1994 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan aimed to overthrow the PDPA and create an Islamic state in Afghanistan (Guidere 2012, 147; Clements 2003, 128). Their

group formed in 1980 when it splintered from the Islamic Alliance (Guidere 2012, 147; Clements 2003, 128). Their ideology is conservative Islamist, specifically anti-Shia'a, and Pashtun nationalist (Clements 2003, 128). The group fought against the Soviets during the Soviet-Afghan War. The group has implemented symbolic measures to demonstrate its Islamic credentials such as banning female television hostesses (Clements 2003, 128). It came to attention when it tried to seize control of Kabul in 1993, but was active earlier (Guidere 2012, 147).

Geography

The group executed an attack in Afghanistan and one in Pakistan in the 1990s (GTD Perpetrator 2017). The location of attacks are unknown. Its members come from west of Kabul and the Kunduz Province (Clements 2003, 128). The group is transnational. The Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan's base is in Paghman, Afghanistan (Katzman 2012, 71).

Organizational Structure

The group mostly receives funding by Wahabi networks in Saudi Arabia (Clements 2003, 128). Its membership mainly consists of Pashtuns from west of Kabul and in the Kunduz Province (Clements 2003, 128). The group was originally founded by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a former leader of the Islamic Alliance (Guidere 2012, 47; Clements 2003, 128). No information could be found about group size. The group also had Arab foreign fighters (Guidere 2012, 147). The group had a political wing (Guidere 2012, 147).

External Ties

Islamic Unity was a member of the Afghan Mujahideen and later member of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan (Clements 2003, 128; Guidere 2012, 47; Katzman 2017). The group allegedly received US weaponry during the Soviet-Afghan War (Katzman 2017, 71). In addition, Sayyaf had "close ties" with Saudi Arabia although it is unclear what this support entailed (Katzman 2017). The group also fought alongside Jamaat e Islami and Hizb e Islamic in 1993 when it tried to take over Kabul (Human Rights Watch 1998; Guidere 2012, 147).

Group Outcome

The group tried to seize control of Kabul in 1993 with Jamaat e Islami and Hizb e Islami, but they failed (Human Rights Watch 1998; Guidere 2012, 147). The last case of the group using violence was on March 4th, 1994 (GTD Perpetrator 2017). They attacked the government in Pakistan, taking one person hostage (GTD Perpetrator 2017). There are no other known instances of violence committed by the group since then (GTD Perpetrator 2017). The group is still active today, but primarily as a political party (Katzman 2017).

XVII. NAHZAT E ESLAMI
Torg ID: 1831
Min. Group Date: 1991
Max. Group Date: 1991
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Harakat Islami, Harakat-e-Islami, Islamic Movement, Harakat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan, Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, Hizb-i-Harakat-i-Islami-i-Afghanistan

Group Formation: 1979?

Group End: 2001 (last violent attack), now political party

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown precisely when the group formed, but it first came to attention during the Soviet-Afghan War as a member of the Mujahideen (Global Security n.d.). The group ascribed to a Shia ideology and wanted to expel the Soviet forces (Global Security n.d.; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 477).

Geography

The group had its headquarters in Iran (Global Security n.d.). It is unknown where it fought or conducted attacks inside Afghanistan.

Organizational Structure

Its founder was Ayatollah Asef Muhsini (HRW 1991; Global Security n.d.). Members did not come from a single ethnic group, and were mostly middle to upper class (Global Security n.d.). The group had a political wing and an armed wing known as Harakat-e Islami-ye Mardom-e Afghanistan (Australia RRT 2013). It had approximately 2,000 to 3,000 fighters during the Soviet-Afghan War (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 477).

External Ties

The group was not part of the Hezb Wahdat pro-Pakistan faction (Australia RRT 2013). It did not receive any support from other state or non-state actors (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 477). The group fought against the Taliban Regime under the Northern Alliance until 2001 (US Bureau CIS 1999).

Group Outcome

The group's last attack was in 2001 as part of the Northern Alliance. It transitioned into a political party and participated in the 2001 Bonn Conference after the Taliban regime fell (Australia RRT 2013).

XVIII. HAKAKAT-I-INQILAH-I-ISLAMII
Torg ID: 1730
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 1992
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami, Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Afghanistan

Group Formation: 1979

Group End: 1992 (Attack), 2015 (political party)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Harakat Inqilab formed in late 1979 or early 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Ruttig 2015). It sought to expel the Soviet government during the 1980s (Global Security n.d.). It ascribed to a moderate Islamist ideology (Global Security n.d.).

Geography

The group primarily operated in eastern Afghanistan (CIA 1984). It had a base in Miran Shah (Ruttig 2015). The group had an attack in Maydan Shahr, Afghanistan (GTD 2017). It may have had a base in Pakistan (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The group's founder was Muhammad Nabi Muhammad (CIA 1984; Global Security n.d.). Members are also part of the "traditionalist clergy" (CIA 1984; HRW 1991). Members are Pashtun, specifically from the Andar, Gilhzai, Mahmud, Hotak, and Durrani tribes (CIA 1984; HRW 1991; Global Security n.d.). The group also had some support from the Tajik and Uzbek population (HRW 1991). It had approximately 2,000 to 3,000 members during the Soviet-Afghan war (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 471).

External Ties

The group received explicit material and financial support from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States (Ruttig 2015). The group received finances from an Afghan diaspora in Karachi, Pakistan (Ruttig 2015).

The group was a member of the Peshawar Seven, an umbrella organization of mujahideen fighting the Soviet (Ruttig 2015).

The group had an alliance with the Taliban (Ruttig 2015).

Group Outcome

The group's last violence incident was around 1992 (GTD 2017). In 1992, when the communist regime fell, Harakat joined the mujahedin government and Muhammad became vice president for a year (BBC 2002; Ruttig 2015). In 1993, Rabbani of Jamiat-e-Islami reorganized the government and Harakat left (Ruttig 2015). In 1994, Harakat encouraged members to join the Taliban (Ruttig 2015). Party leadership left the country.

In 2002, Ahmad Nabi Muhammadi, the son of Harakat Inqilab's leader, returned to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime and registered the group as a political party (Ruttig 2015).

In 2015, the group was operating as a political party (Ruttig 2015).

- XIX. HEZB-E WAHDAT-E ISLAMI-YI AFGHANISTAN
Torg ID: 1733
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 1992

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/northern_alliance.htm

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Hizb-i Wahdat (The Unity Party)

Group Formation: 1989

Group End: 2001 (last attack)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Hezb e Wahdat formed in 1989 from the merger of several Shia groups (Australia RRT 2013; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 467; Global Security n.d.). It ascribes to a Shia Islamist ideology (US Bureau CIS 2003). The group's aim was to overthrow the Afghan government after the Soviet Union withdrew (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 467). It's first attack was as late as 1992 (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group had attacks in Kabul, Afghanistan (GTD 2017). It controlled territory in central Afghanistan at some point (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The group's leader was Abdul Ali Mazara (HRW 2005, 131). The group primarily recruits members from the Hazara population (US Bureau CIS 2003). Members are Shia (US Bureau CIS 2003). The group had approximately 86,000 members between 1993 and 1995 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 467). The group's leader in 2002 was Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq (US Bureau CIS 2003).

External Ties

The group was a member of the Northern Alliance and fought against the Taliban regime until 2001 (Global Security n.d.b; US Bureau CIS 2003). The group received unspecified support from Iran (HRW 2005, 131; Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

The group was primarily active between 1992-1993 (HRW 2005, 131). It was conducting attacks as late as 1995 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 467). Mazara died in 1996 (HRW 2005, 131). In 1996, the group announced it had formed an alliance with Rabbani's Jamaat e Islami (Global Security n.d.). In 1996, the Taliban pushed Wahdat out of Central Afghanistan (Global Security n.d.). The group continued fighting against the Taliban regime as part of the Northern Alliance through 2001 when the group fell (US Bureau CIS 2003). In 2001 and 2002, the group participated in negotiations to help form a transitional government after it fell (US Bureau CIS 2003).

Sometime between 1997 and 2009, Wahdat splintered into four different factions (Global Security n.d.; Australia RRT 2013).

XX. JAMIAT-E ISLAMI-YI AFGHANISTAN

Torg ID: 1762

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 1994

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Jamiat-e-Islami, Jamiati Islami, Jamiat, Islamic Society, JIA

Group Formation: 1968

Group End: 2001 (last attack), 2013 (active as political party)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Burhanuddin Rabbani founded Jamiat e Islami in 1968 (Global Security n.d.; HRW 2015). It originally formed to overthrow the monarchy and replace it with an Islamic state, but was not associated with any violent attacks (Netherlands MFA 1998). In 1974, Rabbani fled to Pakistan. It later fought against the Soviet invasion and was part of the larger mujahedeen force in Afghanistan (Global Security n.d.). It ascribed to an Islamic fundamentalist ideology (CIA 1984; Global Security n.d.).

Geography

Jamiat e Islami operated from Pakistan starting in 1974. Jamiat-e-Islami had support in northern Afghanistan (CIA 1984; Global Security n.d.). The group was particularly active in Lowgar, Samangan, Faryab, Farah and Nimroz provinces (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The group's leader was Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik (CIA 1984; Global Security n.d.). Rabbani was originally a professor of Islamic law (Netherlands MFA 1998, 14; HRW 2015; HRW 2005, 131). Members were primarily Tajik (about 60%), but also had some Uzbek and Pashtun members (Netherlands MFA 1998; Global Security n.d.; CIA 1984). Original members were Rabbani's university students from Kabul University (HRW 2001, 131). It recruited from madrassas (Global Security n.d.). It was a political organization. The group had an armed wing known as Shura-e-Nazar (Netherlands MFA 1998, 47; HRW 2015). The leader of the armed wing was Ahmad Shah Massoud; Massoud was assassinated on September 9, 2001 (HRW 2005, 5).

The group had approximately 12,000 members in 1989, less than 12,000 in 1990, and less than 10,000 in 1992 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 466).

External Ties

The group received some material support from the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia during the Soviet-Afghan War, but not as much as HIG (Global Security n.d.; Gleditsch et al. 2013). The group was later a member of the Northern Alliance during the Taliban regime (Global Security n.d.b).

Group Outcome

In 1974, Rabbani fled Afghanistan to live in Pakistan (Global Security n.d.). After the Soviets withdrew, Rabbani became president of the interim government in 1992 (Netherlands MFA 1998, 47). The group's last violent act was in 1992 before it became part of the mujahidin government (GTD 2017). After Rabbani came into power, Hekmatyar mobilized his forces to unseat the central government, launching the new Afghan Civil War in 1992 (HRW 2005, 16-17).

In 1997, the group fought against the Taliban regime (Canada IRB 1998). In 2001, they still clashed with the Taliban as the head of their armed wing was assassinated (HRW 2005, 5). The group was part of political negotiations after the Taliban fell in 2001 and Jamiat members served in the transitional government (HRW 2005, 131). In 2011, Taliban forces assassinated Rabbani when he was serving on the Afghanistan High Peace Council (Aikins 2011). In 2013, the group was still active as a political party in Afghanistan (Ruttig 2013).

XXI. NAJIB WATAN PARTY FACTION

Torg ID: 1832

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 1992

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Watan Party, PDPA, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Hizb-i Demokratik-i Khalq-i Afghanistan, Hezb-e-Watan, Hezb-e Dimokratik-e Khalq-e Afghanistan

Group Formation: 1965

Group End: 1978 (take over government), 1992-2012 (nonexistent), 2012 (political party)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PDPA formed in 1965 as a leftist communist political party in Afghanistan (Bosin 2009, 13; Riedel 2016, 5; Ruttig and Adili 2017). The group wanted to overthrow the monarchy and supported the 1973 coup (Bosin 2009, 13). In 1978, the PDPA paired up with the army to overthrow Mohammad Daoud in Kabul (Bosin 2009, 13; Riedel 2016, 5-6).

Geography

The coup occurred in Kabul, Afghanistan (Riedel 2016; HRW n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The PDPA was originally a leftist political party. It gained seats in Parliament after Daoud came into power in 1973 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 470; Bosin 2009, 13-14). It had a political wing and an armed wing. The PDPA split into two factions in 1967: Parcham (urban, educated Pashtuns) and Khalq (rural, educated Pashtuns) (HRW n.d.). They also recruited military and police officers (Ruttig and Adili 2017).

In 1977, the two factions re-emerged (HRW n.d.). The leader of the Khalq faction - Nur Muhammad Taraki - led the coup in 1978 and became the new leader of Afghanistan (Riedel 2016, 6). The PDPA had approximately 600 members carry out the coup (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 470). In 1990, the political party had 185,000 members (Ruttig and Adili 2017).

The group's leader in 2017 was Abdul Jabbar Qahraman (Ruttig and Adili 2017). Qahraman has helped revitalize PDPA (now Hezb-e-Watan) and won seats in Parliament (Ruttig and Adili 2017).

External Ties

There is disputed evidence whether the Soviet Union helped the PDPA carry out the coup in 1978 although the KGB likely knew about the plot in advance (Riedel 2016, 16). The group faced sharp resistance from the Mujahideen, who opposed the PDPA's rule and the subsequent Soviet occupation (Bosin 2009, 14). The PDPA received Soviet support from 1978 until 1992 (Bosin 2009, 14; ; Ruttig and Adili 2017).

Group Outcome

In 1978, the group took control over the government with help from army officers (Bosin 2009, 13-14; Ruttig and Adili 2017). In response, several groups rebelled against the PDPA in Khazarajat, Nuristan, and eastern Afghanistan undermining the PDPA's power (Bosin 2009, 14). In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded to help the regime (Bosin 2009, 14). In 1988, parties signed the Geneva Accords governing the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (HRW n.d.0. In 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan (Bosin 2004, 14). The group renamed itself Hezb-e-Watan in 1990 and dropped its leftist platform (Ruttig and Adili 2017). The government weakened in 1992 when Boris Yeltsin cut off support for the PDPA (Ruttig and Adili 2017). In 1992, the PDPA lost power after the Northern Alliance seized control over the Kabul airport (HRW n.d.; Bosin 2009, 14).

The new Rabbani government banned the PDPA in 1992 and most leaders left Afghanistan (Ruttig and Adili 2017). The group tried to reorganize after 2001, but failed (Ruttig and Adili 2017). It re-emerged in 2012 again (Ruttig and Adili 2017).

XXII. TALIBAN
Torg ID: 482
Min. Group Date: 1994
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: 1995

Aliases: Taliban, Taleban

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Afghan Taliban

Group Formation: 1994

Group End: 2017 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed in 1994 under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar (Crenshaw 2016; Council on Foreign Relations 2014; Katzman 2017, 4). It formed from an Afghan faction of Mujahideen, or Islamic fighters that fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Council on Foreign Relations 2014; Katzman 2017, 4). The group's first

violent act was in 1994 in Afghanistan (Crenshaw 2016; GTD 2017). They ascribed to Deobandism (Katzman 2017, 4; Crenshaw 2016).

The Taliban controls parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan and have threatened to topple the governments of these countries (BBC 2016). Their central goal is to form a Taliban controlled government in Afghanistan in addition to implementing Sharia law (Crenshaw 2016; PBS 2011; Al Jazeera 2009; BBC 2016). The group also opposes the education of girls that are over the age of ten, and, in addition, they believe that men must have long beards and women must wear an all-covering burqa (BBC 2016).

Geography

The Taliban has launched attacks in various cities in Pakistan and Afghanistan (GTD 2017). These attacks have targeted citizens, the government, American forces, military personnel, as well as the food and water supply and transportation and telecommunication (GTD 2017). The group is transnational since it had an external base of operations in Pakistan from 2001-2005 (Crenshaw 2016; Council on Foreign Relations 2014). The group originated in the south around Kandahar (Crenshaw 2016; Council on Foreign Relations 2014).

Organizational Structure

The Taliban was headed by Mullah Omar from 1996-2014 (Council on Foreign Relations 2014; Katzman 2017). After his death, Mullah Akhtar Mansour was the leader of the Taliban (BBC 2016). However, he was killed in a drone strike that took place in 2016 (BBC 2016). Afterwards, the leadership passed to Mullah Hibatullah Akhunzada (BBC 2016). Below the rank of the leader are the deputies (BBC 2016). The position is held by Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob (BBC 2016). Below the deputies is the leadership council, which consists of 18+ people that are responsible for overall decision making in policy and strategy (BBC 2016). After that are the Commissions and Field commanders and shadow governors (BBC 2016).

It is estimated that 20%-40% of Taliban forces fighting were of Pakistani origin (Mapping Militant Organizations 2016). The group members were ex-Mujahideen and students from madrassas in Pakistan (Council on Foreign Relations 2014; Katzman 2017). The group members were primarily Pashto (BBC 2016; Crenshaw 2016; Council on Foreign Relations; Katzman 2017). The group had approximately 25000 fighters in 1995 (Gleditsch et al 2013, 464). The group encompassed approximately 15,000 fighters in 2015 (Crenshaw 2016). The group reportedly has a political wing (Crenshaw 2016; Council on Foreign Relations 2014; BBC 2016). The Quetta Shura is made up of the leaders of the group; it ran the Afghan government until 2001 and then operated out of Pakistan in exile after 2001 (Carlstrom 2010).

External Ties

The Taliban gave the group Al Qaeda sanctuary as long as they did not attack the United States; however, when bin Laden bombed U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, tension formed between the Taliban and Al Qaeda (Council on Foreign Relations 2014).

When the Taliban first formed, it received a great deal of support from the Pakistani government as well as its ISI. Rumors emerged that the Taliban was still receiving financial support from the Pakistani government, but there has been no concrete proof to these claims (Mapping Militant Organizations 2016). It is also reported that the Taliban receives funding from local mosques and businessmen (Mapping Militant Organizations 2016). The group also receives funding from countries bordering Pakistan as well as countries near the Gulf area (Mapping Militant Organizations 2016). The group opposes IS-K and the Northern Alliance (Crenshaw 2016).

Group Outcome

The Taliban's most recent act of violence was on December 30, 2016 (GTD 2017). In 1999, the UN issued a peace treaty between the group and the Northern Alliance, but it was broken only months later (Al Jazeera 2009). The UN then also established an air embargo and an arms embargo on the Taliban (Al Jazeera 2009). In 2001, the US and British intensely bombed the Taliban's forces (Al Jazeera 2009; BBC 2016; Council on Foreign Relations 2014). The U.S. has sent troops to Afghanistan and Pakistan to combat the Taliban (Al Jazeera 2009; BBC 2016; Council on Foreign Relations 2014). The Pakistani and Afghan governments have also linked together to combat the Taliban (Al Jazeera 2009). The group was the Afghan government from 1994-2001 (Katzman 2017; PBS 2011). The Taliban and Afghan government made efforts at peace talks in 2015, but these eventually fell apart (BBC 2016).

XXIII. THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE (OR UNITED ISLAMIC FRONT FOR SALVATION OF AFGHANISTAN - UIFSA)

Torg ID: 2448

Min. Group Date: 1996

Max. Group Date: 2001

Onset: 1996

Aliases: The Northern Alliance (Or United Islamic Front For Salvation Of Afghanistan - Uifsa), The Northern Alliance, The Northern Alliance (Or United Islamic Front For Salvation Of Afghanistan - Uifsa), Uifsa, United Islamic Front For Salvation Of Afghanistan, United Islamic Front For Salvation Of Afghanistan (Uifsa)

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an umbrella organization of Jamiat-e-Islam, Hezb-i-Wahdat, Hezb-e-Islami, and Harakat-e-Islami (Global Security n.d.; US Bureau CIS 1999).

Group Formation: This is an umbrella organization of Jamiat-e-Islam, Hezb-i-Wahdat, Hezb-e-Islami, and Harakat-e-Islami (Global Security n.d.; US Bureau CIS 1999).

Group End: This is an umbrella organization of Jamiat-e-Islam, Hezb-i-Wahdat, Hezb-e-Islami, and Harakat-e-Islami (Global Security n.d.; US Bureau CIS 1999).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an umbrella organization of Jamiat-e-Islam, Hezb-i-Wahdat, Hezb-e-Islami, and Harakat-e-Islami (Global Security n.d.; US Bureau CIS 1999).

Geography

This is an umbrella organization of Jamiat-e-Islam, Hezb-i-Wahdat, Hezb-e-Islami, and Harakat-e-Islami (Global Security n.d.; US Bureau CIS 1999).

Organizational Structure

This is an umbrella organization of Jamiat-e-Islam, Hezb-i-Wahdat, Hezb-e-Islami, and Harakat-e-Islami (Global Security n.d.; US Bureau CIS 1999).

External Ties

This is an umbrella organization of Jamiat-e-Islam, Hezb-i-Wahdat, Hezb-e-Islami, and Harakat-e-Islami (Global Security n.d.; US Bureau CIS 1999).

Group Outcome

This is an umbrella organization of Jamiat-e-Islam, Hezb-i-Wahdat, Hezb-e-Islami, and Harakat-e-Islami (Global Security n.d.; US Bureau CIS 1999).

XXIV. LASHKAR-E-JHANGVI (LEJ)
Torg ID: 265
Min. Group Date: 1996
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Lashkar-E-Jhangvi, Army Of Jhangvi, Lashkar E Jhangvi (Lej), Lashkar E-Jhangvi (Lej), Lashkar I Jhangvi, Lashkar I-Jhangvi, Lashkar-E-Jhangvi (Lej), Lashkar-I-Jhangvi

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: The group formed in 1996 and was first active August 1996 when they assaulted a Shiite (Crenshaw 2015; GTD 2016).

Group End: The group’s last attack was on a military officer in Quetta in December 2016 (GTD 2016).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

LeJ was founded in 1996 by Riaz Basra, Akram Lahori, and Malik Isaq, three ex-Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) members who felt that SiS had departed from Jhangvi’s initial ideology after a conflict with TNFJ (Crenshaw 2015; Farooqi 2013). LeJ was formed as a sectarian, deoband, anti-Shiite militant group that wanted to eliminate all Shiites from Pakistan in order to establish a Sunni state (Crenshaw 2015; Zahid 2016). The group was first active in August 1996 when they assaulted a Shiite (Crenshaw 2015; GTD 2016).

Geography

The outfit is mainly concentrated in Punjab; however, cells are located in Lahore, Gujranwala, Rawalpindi, Sargodha, Faisalabad, Multan, Bahawalpur, and Bhakkar (SATP n.d.). The group is associated with a couple transnational attacks in India and Afghanistan, but the group primarily operates in Pakistan (GTD 2017). The group, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, had a training camp in Sairobi, Afghanistan (SATP n.d.).

Organizational Structure

Rizwan Ahmad, Qari Zafar, Qari Abdul Hai, Riaz Basra, Akram Lahori, and Maliq Ishaq have all been leaders of the organization since its conception (Crenshaw 2015). Ahmad, Hai, Basra, and Ishaq were all arrested and killed by authorities while Zafar was killed in a drone strike by American forces and Basra chose to leave the group due to ideological and strategic differences (Crenshaw 2015). Ishaq led the organization until 2013, when

he was arrested by the Pakistani police force (Crenshaw 2015). Ishaq was killed by the police in a shootout in 2015 (Crenshaw 2015; Al Jazeera 2015). As of 2013, the organization's numbers were in the low hundreds (Crenshaw 2015). Lahori led until 2015 (Crenshaw 2015; SATP n.d.).

All LeJ leaders are Jihadis who were involved in fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan (SATP n.d.). Many cadres consist of students from Sunni madrassas (Crenshaw 2015; SATP n.d.). It is unclear if any SSP members joined the group when it initially formed. LeJ consists of sub-units all over Pakistan that have little to no contact with each other; each subunit has its own chief and eight to ten cadres (SATP n.d.). The cadres tend to disperse after an attack and then reconvene at training camps (SATP n.d.). The group primarily funds itself through donations from financiers in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni states (Crenshaw 2015). The group also engages in extortion (Crenshaw 2015).

External Ties

LeJ has coordinated attacks with Taliban, ISIS, and Al Qaeda (Zahid 2016; Shahid 2016). The group hasn't pledged allegiance yet to ISIS and hasn't been tied to Al-Qaeda in awhile (Shahid 2016). Taliban provided sanctuary to members while they ruled in Afghanistan (SATP n.d.). HuM has also housed LeJ members in Afghanistan (SATP n.d.). LeJ has allegedly been funded by the Saudi Arabian government (SATP n.d.).

Group Outcome

The Pakistani Government banned LeJ in 2001 (Crenshaw 2015; SATP n.d.). Ahmad, Hai, Basra, and Ishaq were all arrested and killed by authorities while Zafar was killed in a drone strike by American forces. Ishaq led the organization until 2013, when he was arrested by the Pakistani police force (Crenshaw 2015). Ishaq was killed by the police in a shootout in 2015 (Crenshaw 2015; Al Jazeera 2015). The group's last attack was on a military officer in Quetta in December 2016 (GTD 2016).

XXV. FREEDOM PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN
Torg ID: 1396
Min. Group Date: 1997
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Hezb-E Azadi-Ye Afghanistan, Freedom Party Of Afghanistan

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Freedom Party of Afghanistan." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4703, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Freedom Party of Afghanistan

Group Formation: 1997

Group End: 2013 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Freedom Party formed in 1997 as a local militia fighting against the Taliban regime (MIPT 2008). The group was a splinter of Abdul Rashid Dostum’s militia (MIPT 2008). The group was a militia that later turned on the Taliban at an unknown date (MIPT 2008; Teiggeler 2015).

Geography

The group operated in Faryab in northern Afghanistan (RFERL 2006; Australia RRT 2013, 12).

Organizational Structure

The group’s leader was an Uzbek warlord known as Malik Pahlawan (MIPT 2008). When the group originally formed, it was a local militia (MIPT 2008). After 9/11, the group developed a political wing (RFERL 2006; Australia RRT 2013).

External Ties

The group originally allied with the Taliban (MIPT 2008). At an unknown date, the group turned on the Taliban and launched a massive attack against them (MIPT 2008; Teiggeler

2015). The group clashed with Hizb-e Junbish-e-Melli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan even after the Taliban regime fell (RFERL 2006).

Group Outcome

After 9/11, the group transitioned into a political party (MIPT 2008). It continued fighting and attacking other militias in northern Afghanistan (Australia RRT 2013, 12). The group was active as a political-militia as late as 2013 (Australia RRT 2013, 12).

XXVI. ISLAMIC PARTY OF UZBEKISTAN

Torg ID: 1396

Min. Group Date: 1997

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: NA

Aliases: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Party of Turkestan, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1998

Group End (Outcome): 2012 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

IMU was formed in 1998 by Juma Namangani and Tahir Yuldashev (Stein 2013; Sanderson et al. 2010). Its roots go back even earlier as Namangani and Yuldashev originally protested against Karimov in 1991, but fled to Tajikistan following a harsh crackdown (Sanderson et al. 2010). In 1997, they returned from Tajikistan after the resolution of the Tajik Civil War and decided to restart their movement (Sanderson et al. 2010; Stein 2013). The group’s original goal was to overthrow the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan and establish an Islamic caliphate in the Ferghana Valley; however, over time that goal seems to have shifted to be more about establishing an Islamic state and acquiring wealth through criminal activities (Stein 2013; Mackenzie Institute 2016). The IMU’s ideology remains Salafi (Mackenzie Institute 2006). Some notable attacks are when in 1999 IMU fighters “captured several hostages... and expressed their demands from the Uzbek government,” as well as a number of highly successful guerrilla attacks in 2000 near Tashkent (Yakin 2005, 76).

Geography

The group was active in Ferghana Valley, Tashkent, Namangan, and parts of Tajikistan (Stein 2013; Mackenzie Institute 2016).

The group’s base of operations has changed over the years. Although Adolat was based in Namangan, Uzbekistan, the IMU originally operated out of the Tavildara district of Tajikistan, which was then used to establish a base in Afghanistan (Sanderson et al. 2010; Zenn 2013; Stein 2013). Operation Enduring Freedom forced the group to go into hiding in South Waziristan, Pakistan until 2009, where it seems to have remained (Stein 2013). Since 2001, it has expanded operations into Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China (Zenn 2013). Gleditsch et al. (2013) claim the group never

controlled territory, although there is no evidence to corroborate this (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 745).

Organizational Structure

As mentioned earlier, Namangani and Yuldashev ruled the group together from 1998 to Namangani's death in 2001, with Namangani as the military leader and Yuldashev as the ideological one (Cuciolla 2014; Mackenzie Institute 2016). After Yuldashev's death in 2009, leadership of the group allegedly passed to Usman Odil, who himself died in 2012 and left the group without a clear leader (Stein 2013). The group is organized into cells. It started as a political movement (aka Adolat) but became militarized after the Tajik civil war and repression from the government of Uzbekistan (Sanderson et al. 2010; Stein 2013). The IMU's supporters were originally mostly ethnic Uzbeks, notably unemployed young men, but have now diversified to include Afghans and Turks (Stein 2013). The group is mostly male (Stein 2013). The IMU funded itself with support from the Pakistani ISI, Taliban, and drug smuggling (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

External Ties

Though some allege that the group is supported by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Afghanistan, they offer few specifics and no evidence (Rashid 2002; NAGS n.d.). They are also allegedly allied with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, with significant evidence to corroborate these claims (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The type of aid they may get from those two groups remains somewhat unclear, though it seems that both groups allow IMU fighters to hide in territory they control. The IMU has a number of splinters, notably the IJU (Stein 2013). The group pledged support to ISIS in 2015 (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Group Outcome

In February 1999, the Uzbek government blamed the IMU for a prominent attack in Tashkent although this was never confirmed (Sanderson et al. 2010). The Uzbek government also purportedly blamed HT for the attack and arrested thousands in response - the majority being HT members and not IMU members (Yakin 2005, 75-76). In August 1999, IMU kidnapped several prominent officials in response and asked for a ransom (Yakin 2005, 76). In response, Uzbekistan conducted air strikes in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (Cucciolla 2014).

The group remains active and attacked the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi in 2014. It primarily operates out of Pakistan today (Zenn 2013). The state has responded to the IMU in a number of ways: Uzbekistan has mounted air strikes, arrested fighters, blamed the IMU for terrorist incidents (like the March 2004 suicide bombings) as well as mined its borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan though they started the process of de-mining them in 2004 (Stein 2013; Zenn 2013; Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Why 1999 onset?

IMU's onset is the result of the Uzbekistan government's miscalculation in response to the 1999 attacks. While the Uzbekistan government was never able to firmly identify who was behind the bombings, Karimov focused on targeting Hizb ut-Tahrir rather than IMU in his follow-up campaign. The Uzbekistan government arrests approximately 7000 people in relation to the incident with the vast majority being HT members (Yakin 2005, 79). This leads it to underestimate the necessary response against IMU, enabling it to plan and organize its retaliatory response in August 1999, which escalated the fight (Stein 2013; Cucciolla 2014). This is particularly damning because IMU has leadership with plenty of military experience and training from the Tajikistan Civil War, enabling it to organize an insurgency with relatively few material capabilities.

Note quote: Central Asia: Islam and the State ICG Asia Report N°59, 10 July 2003, 4
"The appearance of Islamist groups challenging the secular nature of the state shocked the largely secular, Soviet-era elite, who had little concept of how to deal with political Islam."

Note: 1999 attacks - never attribute - evid of private info problem and why attacks don't necessarily signal resolve. Some scholars wonder if Karimov's government staged the February attacks as a pretext to consolidate power and get rid of Islamist groups in the country. If so, then this strategy backfired.

Alternate Explanations

- *Shock to Capabilities?* There is no evidence of a shock to IMU's capabilities or the government's capabilities in this period.
- *Window of opportunity?* One could argue the 1999 attacks are a "window," but there is a delay between the initial attacks and the August ransoms. Further, the "start" of the insurgency in August 1999 is in response to government CT/COIN efforts.

XXVII. WORLD ISLAMIC FRONT FOR THE JIHAD AGAINST THE JEWS AND THE CRUSADERS

Torg ID: 728

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: World Islamic Front For The Jihad Against The Jews And The Crusaders,
International Islamic Front For Jihad Against The Us And Israel

Part 1. Bibliography

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*umbrella

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1998

Group End: 1998 (unknown?)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In 1998, Osama bin Laden created an umbrella group for Islamic jihadist groups known as the World Islamic Front (Martin 2011, 30). The group issued a fatwa in 1998 that Muslims should kill Americans around the world (Martin 2011, 30). The umbrella organization never conducted an attack although individual member groups like Al Qaeda conducted numerous attacks (Martin 2011, 30).

Geography

Bin Laden announced the group's founding in Khost, Afghanistan (Lacayo 2001).

Organizational Structure

Members of the umbrella group included EIJ, the Egyptian Armed Group, the Pakistan Scholars Society, the Partisan Movement in Kashmir, the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh, and the military wing of the Advice and Reform Committee (Martin 2011, 30). The leader of the umbrella group was Osama bin Laden (Martin 2011, 30).

External Ties

Members of the umbrella group included EIJ, the Egyptian Armed Group, the Pakistan Scholars Society, the Partisan Movement in Kashmir, the Jihad Movement in

Bangladesh, and the military wing of the Advice and Reform Committee (Martin 2011, 30).

Group Outcome

The group never conducted an attack. Their most significant action was in 1998 when this issued a famous fatwa against America (Martin 2011, 30). It is unknown if the umbrella organization still exists today.

XXVIII. JUND AL-SHAM
Torg ID: 918
Min. Group Date: 1998
Max. Group Date: 2005
Onset: NA

Aliases: Organization Of Soldiers Of The Levant, Army Of The Levant, Jund Al-Sham, Soldiers Of Greater Syria

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://jamestown.org/program/fighting-in-lebanons-palestinian-refugee-camps-result-of-increased-islamist-influence/>

Part 2. Basic Coding

***note Zarqawi set-up a training camp known as Jund al-Sham in 1999 in Afghanistan, but this seems to be either an alias or immediate precursor to TWTJ.**

**See more: Bill Roggio, “Exodus and Ascent.” Long War Journal. 2005.
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2005/03/exodus_and_asce.php**

Aliases: Soldiers of Syria, Jund al-Sham for Tawhid and Jihad

Group Formation: 1989/1990

Group End: 2015 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Jund al-Sham formed in 1989 or 1990 when it splintered from Asbat al-Ansar (Abdel-Latif 2008, 18; Mackenzie Institute 2015). It first came to attention in 2004 in Lebanon when it attacked a Hezbollah affiliate (Washington Post 2006). The group’s goal is to create an Islamic state in Lebanon (Abdel-Latif 2008, 18). It also allegedly targets the Syrian government and military forces in Lebanon (Washington Post 2006). It ascribes to a Sunni Islamist ideology (Abdel-Latif 2008, 18).

Geography

The group’s headquarters are in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in Sidon, Lebanon (Abdel-Latif 2008, 18; Washington Post 2006). The group also had attacks in Beirut, Sidon, and Ain al-Hilweh (Washington Post 2006; GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group’s original leadership was Muhammad Ahmed Sharqiyya (Abdel-Latif 2008, 18). He was a former member of Fatah (Saab and Ranstorp 2007; Berti 2008). The group’s leadership changed in 2004 and the new leader is Ghandy Sahmarani (Berti 2008). The group only had approximately 30 members in 2007-2008 (Abdel-Latif 2008, 18). Members are Lebanese (Berti 2008).

External Ties

The group is a splinter group of Asbat al-Ansar (Berti 2008; Mackenzie Institute 2015). The group promotes the ideological beliefs of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb al-Tahrir (Abdel-Latif 2008, 18). Asbat al-Ansar has the “task of keeping them under control” (Abdel-Latif 2008, 18). The group allied with Fatah al-Islam in 2007 (Berti 2008).

The group allegedly has ties to AQI and Zarqawi (Washington Post 2006; Berti 2008).

Group Outcome

There are disputed reports about whether the group merged with Asbat al-Ansar in 2007 (Berti 2008). In spring 2008, Fatah and Jund al-Sham fought multiple times after Fatah arrested a Jund al-Sham member and gave him to Lebanese security forces (Berti 2008). Asbat al-Ansar came to Jund al-Sham’s aid and helped them (Berti 2008). GTD reports the group’s last attack occurred in 2015 (GTD 2017).

XXIX. JAMAA COMBATTANTE TUNISIENNE (JCT)
Torg ID: 499
Min. Group Date: 2000
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Tunisian Combatant Group (Tcg), Groupe Combattant Tunisien, Jama A Combattante Tunisienne (Jct), Jamaa Combattante Tunisienne (Jct), Jama'a Combattante Tunisienne (Jct), Tunisian Combat Group, Tunisian Islamic Fighting Group

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Tunisian Combat Group.” Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4346, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MdIYniaJDjRA8lc7cqFkYqN3zYrUglZP-2EOkwuwV9Y/edit>
- “Tunisian Combatant Group.” SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE PURSUANT TO RESOLUTIONS 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) AND 2253 (2015) CONCERNING ISIL (DA'ESH) AL-QAIDA AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS GROUPS UNDERTAKINGS AND ENTITIES. UN. Last updated 2018. https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/qa_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/tunisian-combatant-group
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- Lounnas, Djallil. "The Tunisian Jihad: Between al-Qaeda and ISIS." *Middle East Policy* 26, no. 1 (2019): 97-116.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Tunisian Combatant Group allegedly formed around 2000 to create an Islamic state in Tunisia (FAS 2003; MIPT 2008). The group's first attack was the assassination of a Northern Alliance leader on September 9, 2001 (Joscelyn 2012; Arieff and Humud 2014). The group allegedly plotted an attack in Rome in December 2001, but failed to carry it out (FAS 2000).

Geography

The group operated in Afghanistan and Western Europe (FAS 2003; MIPT 2008). Most of its violent activities seemed to occur in Afghanistan (Arieff and Humud 2014). Specifically, the group had cells in France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and UK (UN 2018). The group pledged allegiance to al Qaeda at a meeting in Khost, Afghanistan (UN 2018).

Organizational Structure

The group's leaders are Tarek Maaroufi and Saifallah Ben Hassine (FAS 2003). Members are Tunisian (FAS 20043). The group operated in cells allegedly in Afghanistan and Western Europe, which is strange (MIPT 2008). Many members received training in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan before operating in Europe (UN 2018).

External Ties

The group had an "association" with Al Qaeda and pledged support to them at some date (FAS 2003; UN 2018). Members trained in Al Qaeda camps (UN 2018). The group also had unspecified ties with the GSPC/AQIM (FAS 2003; UN 2018). The group also coordinated its activities with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (UN 2018).

Group Outcome

In 2000, the UN imposed sanctions on the group for their affiliation with Al Qaeda (FAS 2003). In 2001, Belgian police arrested Maaroufi (FAS 2003; MIPT 2008). In 2002, the US government placed TCG leadership on the SDN list (Arieff and Humud 2014). In 2003, an Italian court convicted several TCG members (MIPT 2008). Also in 2003, Turkey arrested Hassine on charges of an al Qaeda affiliation (UN 2018). In 2011, a member - Abou lyadh - renamed the group Ansar al Sharia Tunisia - after his release from prison (Arieff and Humud 2014). Maaroufi also left prison in 2011 and returned to Tunisia (Arieff and Humud 2014). In 2012, the group launched an attack against a school in Tunis (Joscelyn 2012).

Part 3. Basic Coding

Aliases: Ansar al Sharia Tunisia

Group Formation: 2000

Group End: 2012 (unknown)

XXX. GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR GROUP
Torg ID: 1484
Min. Group Date: 2002
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: HIG

Group Formation: This is an alias for HIG.

Group End: This is an alias for HIG.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for HIG.

Geography

This is an alias for HIG.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for HIG.

External Ties

This is an alias for HIG.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for HIG.

XXXI. SAIF-UL-MUSLIMEEN LASHKAR JIHAD
Torg ID: 445
Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 2003
Onset: NA

Aliases: Saif-UI-Muslimeen, Saif-UI-Muslimeen Lashkar Jihad, Sword Of Muslims

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20400. Global Terrorism Dataset. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20400>
- “Saif-ul-Muslimeen.” Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3677, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MdIYniaJDjRA8lc7cqFkYqN3zYrUgIZP-2EOkwuwV9Y/edit>
- Search ProQuest
 - SAIF-UL-MUSLIMEEN LASHKAR JIHAD
 - SAIF-UL-MUSLIMEEN LASHKAR JIHAD afghanistan
- Search Keesings
 - SAIF-UL-MUSLIMEEN LASHKAR JIHAD

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2003

Group End: 2003 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 2003 for an attack on a military airport in Jalalabad, Afghanistan (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). The group claimed responsibility for the attack saying they opposed the US military presence in Afghanistan (GTD 2017).

Geography

The attack took place in Jalalabad, Afghanistan (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the group's organizational structure.

External Ties

The group conducted the attack with Lashkar-e-Fidayan-e-Islam (GTD 2017).

Group Outcome

The group last came to attention in 2003 for an attack on a military airport in Jalalabad, Afghanistan (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). It is unknown what happened to the group after this incident.

XXXII. MUJAHIDEEN MESSAGE

Torg ID: 312

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Mujahideen Message." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4142, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MdIYniaJDjRA8lc7cqFkYqN3zYrUglZP-2EOkwuwV9Y/edit>
- Search ProQuest

- "MUJAHIDEEN MESSAGE"
- "MUJAHIDEEN MESSAGE" 2003 attack

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2003 (unknown)

Group End: 2003 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 2003 for attacking a girl's school in Logar Province, Afghanistan (MIPT 2008). It is unknown what the group's ideology or political aim was.

Geography

The attack occurred in Logar Province, Afghanistan (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the group's organizational structure.

External Ties

The group may have been linked to the Taliban (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

It last came to attention in 2003 for attacking a girl's school in Logar Province, Afghanistan (MIPT 2008). It is unknown what happened to the group after this incident.

XXXIII. LASHKAR-E-FIDAYAN-E-ISLAM
Torg ID: 2357
Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 2003
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20273. Global Terrorism Dataset. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20273>
- Search ProQuest
 - "LASHKAR-E-FIDAYAN-E-ISLAM"
 - LASHKAR-E-FIDAYAN-E-ISLAM afghanistan

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2003

Group End: 2003 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 2003 for an attack on a military airport in Jalalabad, Afghanistan (GTD 2017). The group claimed responsibility for the attack saying they opposed the US military presence in Afghanistan (GTD 2017).

Geography

The attack took place in Jalalabad, Afghanistan (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the group's organizational structure.

External Ties

The group conducted the attack with Salif ul Muslimeen (GTD 2017).

Group Outcome

The group last came to attention in 2003 for an attack on a military airport in Jalalabad, Afghanistan (GTD 2017). It is unknown what happened to the group after this incident.

XXXIV. JAISH-UL-MUSLIMIN
Torg ID: 237
Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 2004
Onset: NA

Aliases: Jaysh Al-Muslimin (Army Of The Muslims), Jaish-UI-Muslimin

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20239. Global Terrorism Dataset. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20239>
- “Jaish ul Muslimeen.” Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4377, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MdIYniaJDjRA8Ic7cqFkYqN3zYrUglZP-2EOkwuwV9Y/edit>
- “Former Taliban officials say US talks started.” New York Times via Afghanistan Analysts. 2012.
<https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/miscellaneous/recommended-reading/former-taliban-officials-say-u-s-talks-started/>
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<https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/messages-in-chalk-islamic-state-haunting-afghanistan/>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End: unknown - sometime between 2008 and 2012 merge with Taliban (Osman 2014)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown precisely when the group formed, but it first came to attention for a series of kidnappings in 2004 (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). The group was a splinter of the Taliban

(Afghanistan Analysts Network 2012). The group's aim was to oppose the US occupation of Afghanistan and overthrow the post-Taliban regime (MIPT 2008). The group additionally called for the release of 26 Taliban prisoners in Guantanamo and the end of UN work (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group conducted attacks in Mehrpol, Kabul, and Spin Boldak, Afghanistan (GTD 2017). The group is not transnational and did not appear to have an external base.

Organizational Structure

The group's leader was Sayed Akbar Akbar (Afghanistan Analysts Network 2012; Tolo News 2013; Chalk 2014). Members are ex-Taliban fighters (MIPT 2008). It is unknown how many members the group had or whether it had a political wing.

External Ties

The group splintered from the Taliban and eventually rejoined them (Afghanistan Analysts Network 2012; Chalk 2014).

Group Outcome

The group's last known violent attack was in 2008 when it conducted an attack with the Taliban (GTD 2017). In response, police arrested 7 members (GTD 2017). Between 2008 and 2012, the group merged to re-join the Taliban (GTD 2017; Chalk 2014). Police arrested Agha and put him in Pul-e-Charkhi prison (Chalk 2014). Karzai eventually freed Agha and he went on to help negotiate negotiations between US and Taliban officials (Afghanistan Analysts Network 2012; Chalk 2014).

XXXV. TELA MOHAMMED
Torg ID: 2443
Min. Group Date: 2005
Max. Group Date: 2005
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20429. Global Terrorism Dataset. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20429>

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- “Italian hostage in Afghanistan in good health.” Radio Australia. 2012.
<http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2005-05-18/italian-hostage-in-afghanistan-in-good-health/768758>
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<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/widows-pray-for-abducted-aid-worker-vkxr02n5wrx>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2005

Group End: 2005 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in 2005 when it kidnapped an Italian aid worker in Kabul, Afghanistan (Philip 2005; GTD 2017). The group claimed they wanted their leader Tela Mohammad released from police custody (ABC News 2005; Radio Australia 2012).

Geography

The kidnapping occurred in Kabul, Afghanistan (Radio Australia 2012).

Organizational Structure

The group was a criminal gang (ABC News 2005; Radio Australia 2012). The group’s leader was Tela Mohammad (ABC News 2005; Radio Australia 2012). No other information about the group’s funding, organizational structure, or size were found.

External Ties

The group allegedly had “links” with unnamed Islamic groups in Afghanistan (GTD 2017).

Group Outcome

Prior to the kidnapping, the Afghan government arrested members of the Tela Mohammad gang (ABC News 2005). The Afghan government denied the Tela Mohammad group was responsible for the kidnapping (Radio Australia 2012). The kidnapping was the group's last incident. After 24 days, the group released the Australian aid worker unharmed (GTD 2017). It is unknown if they received a ransom or had their demand met.

XXXVI. HAQQANI NETWORK
Torg ID: 2162
Min. Group Date: 2006
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1973

Group End: 2016 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown precisely when the group formed, but first came to attention for its declaration of jihad around 1973 (Crenshaw 2017). The group's first violent attack was on June 22nd in 1975 in Afghanistan against the governor of the Ziruk district (Crenshaw 2017). The group was formed by Jalaluddin Haqqani in the late 1970s, who later pledged allegiance to the Taliban in 1995 (Zahid and Anwar 2017; Crenshaw 2017). The group aims to form an Islamic state in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as form a caliphate with Islamic law (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). It first came to attention as a mujahedeen group fighting the Soviets in the 1980s (Crenshaw 2017; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Weinbaum and Babbar 2016).

Geography

The group has launched attacks in various cities in Afghanistan including Kabul, Sury, and Khost (GTD 2017). These attacks have been targeted at private citizens, education, media, police, government, businesses, and the military (GTD 2017). The group is transnational; it also allegedly operates and conducts attacks around the southeastern area of Afghanistan as well as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in northwestern Pakistan (Crenshaw 2017). The group is allegedly based in Waziristan, Pakistan (Counter Extremism Project; CNN 2012).

Organizational Structure

The group was formed by Jalaluddin Haqqani in the late 1970s. He later pledged allegiance to the Taliban in 1995 (Global Security n.d.; Zahid and Anwar 2017; Crenshaw 2017). Due to his failing health, Jalaluddin Haqqani later handed the right to rule to his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani (Global Security n.d.; Zahid and Anwar 2017; Crenshaw 2017; National Counterterrorism Project n.d.; CNN 2012). He also serves as

the deputy leader of the Taliban (Zahid and Anwar 2017). Other former leaders of the group include Ibrahim Haqqani and Khalil al-Rahman Haqqani (Crenshaw 2017).

A significant source of funding for the group is Khalil al-Rahman Haqqani, who is also responsible for weapon training and distribution in the group (Zahid and Anwar 2017). Other alleged sources of funding for the group include wealthy individuals from the Arab Gulf region as well as smuggling mineral supplies, jewels, and precious metals from Afghanistan (Zahid and Anwar 2017; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; National Counterterrorism Project n.d.; Middle East Institute 2016).

Officials of the United States as well as Kabul officials have made accusations that the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence have been providing sanctuaries and resources for the group (Zahid and Anwar 2017; Washington Post 2017).

The group's size is estimated to be between 3,000 to over 10,000 (Zahid and Anwar 2017). In 2009 and 2012, the group had approximately 4,000 fighters (Crenshaw 2017). It was originally organized around the Haqqani family. The group allegedly recruits from a network of madrassas in North Waziristan as well as Wahhabi madrassas that are funded by the Saudi (Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

External Ties

Jalaluddin Haqqani pledged allegiance to the Taliban in 1995 (Zahid and Anwar 2017; Crenshaw 2017). The group has logistical ties with the Taliban in addition to alliances with al-Qaeda, Tehreek-i-Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, as well as Lashkar-e-Taiba (Zahid and Anwar 2017; Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

The group also allegedly has ties with Pakistan's ISI and receives logistical support from them (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Crenshaw 2017). The group also has links with extremist individuals such as Mullah Mohammed Omar, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, and Osama bin Laden (Counter Extremism Project).

Group Outcome

The group's last known violent attack was on August 26th 2016 in the Jani Khel district of Afghanistan (GTD 2017). Afghan and U.S. forces continue to fight this group (Zahid and Anwar 2017). International terrorism authorities as well as Afghan officials consider one of the most lethal terrorist groups located in Afghanistan (Zahid and Anwar 2017). The United States Secretary of State had the group designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2012 (Crenshaw 2017). The group was listed by the United Nations as a terrorist organization (Crenshaw 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- they currently recruit from madrassas and originally recruited from the family
- the relationship between Taliban and HN is really interesting

XXXVII. SIRRI POWZ
Torg ID: 2433
Min. Group Date: 2007
Max. Group Date: 2007
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20413>
- Searched ProQuest
 - “Sirri powz”
 - Sirri powz afghanistan
- Search Keesings
 - Sirri powz afghanistan

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2007

Group End: 2007 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 2007 for an attack on a security post in Baghlan, Afghanistan (GTD 2017). It is unknown what the group’s political aim or ideology was, but may have opposed the post-Taliban regime (GTD 2017).

Geography

The attack occurred in Baghlan, Afghanistan (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the group's organizational structure.

External Ties

The group claimed the attack along with Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami (GTD 2017).

Group Outcome

It last came to attention in 2007 for a joint attack on a security post in Baghlan, Afghanistan with the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami (GTD 2017). It is unknown what happened to the group after this incident.

XXXVIII. GHOLAM YAHYA AKBAR

Torg ID: 2376

Min. Group Date: 2009

Max. Group Date: 2009

Onset: NA

Aliases: Gholam Yahya Akbar, Gholam Yahya Akbari, Ghulam Yahya Akbar, Ghulam Yahya Akbari

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Gholam Yahya Akbari Jihadi Group, Mujahideen of Herat, Herat Taliban

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2009 (disarm after leadership decapitation)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Akbari formed a warlord militia in 2006 after the governor of Herat province fired him from the department of public works (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2009). His first violent attack occurred soon after. He exerted control over Gozara, Afghanistan and imposed Sharia law (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2009). He claims he had the same goals as the Taliban to overthrow the current regime and reimpose Sharia law (Roggio 2009a).

Geography

The group had an attack in Herat, Afghanistan (GTD 2017). It primarily operated in and around Gozara, Afghanistan (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2009).

Organizational Structure

The leader was Ghulam Yahya Akbari (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2009). Akbari had fought against the Soviets in the 1980s and been mayor Herat City from the early 1990s until the Taliban took over it in 1995 (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2009; Roggio 2009a). He lived in Iran in exile until the Taliban fell in 2001 (Washington Post 2010). He may have been Tajik (Roggio 2009a).

Akbari's deputy was Suleiman Amiri and Sharif (Washington Post 2010). One estimate claims the group had approximately 220 members in 2009 (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2009). Another estimate claims the group had approximately 600 fighters and 20 bases in 2009 (Roggio 2009c). Another estimate claims he started with 5 to 6 people in 2006 then grew to 300-400 at its peak (Washington Post 2010).

External Ties

The group had ties to the Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami and al Qaeda, but Akbari denied these connections (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2009; Roggio 2009a). The group allegedly provided sanctuary to Al Qaeda foreign fighters traveling from Iran (Roggio 2009c). Lashkar al Zil also allegedly fought with the group in Gazara (Roggio 2009c).

The group allegedly received money, weapons, and six explosive experts from the Taliban (Washington Post 2010).

Group Outcome

Security forces killed Akbari in October 2009 in a clash that also killed 22 other fighters (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2009; Roggio 2009b). Two weeks later, 69 members disarmed (Roggio 2009c). Eventually, 300 members disarmed from the group (Washington Post 2010). Fighters said the government promised them jobs in exchange for disarming, but the government was slow to provide them (Washington Post 2010).

XXXIX. KHORASAN JIHADI GROUP

Torg ID: 1825

Min. Group Date: 2011

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/03/taliban_create_lashk.php
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Lashkar e Khorasan

Group Formation: 2011

Group End: 2018 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Taliban and Haqqani Network formed Lashkar e Khorasan in 2011 (Roggio 2011). Its aim was to target locals suspected of providing intelligence about Taliban and

Haqqani whereabouts to security forces (Roggio 2011). It conducted its first attack in 2011 (Roggio 2011). It did not oppose the Pakistan or Afghan governments.

Geography

The group primarily operated around Datta Khel, Mir Ali, and Miranshah in the Pakistani FATA region (Roggio 2011). It is unknown if the group was transnational. It did not have an external base.

Organizational Structure

The group had an informal organizational structure as members could join and exit as they wished (Roggio 2011). It had approximately 300 members (Roggio 2011). It is unknown who members were although the Taliban and Haqqani Network formed the group so they might have been ex-militants from those organizations (Roggio 2011).

External Ties

The Taliban and Haqqani Network formed Lashkar e Khorasan in 2011 (Roggio 2011). The group later developed ties to the ISIS wilayat in Afghanistan - IS-K (Roul 2018).

Group Outcome

It is unknown when the group's last violent attack occurred. It was allegedly active as late as 2018 (Roul 2018).

XL. MULLAH DADULLAH FRONT
Torg ID: 2658
Min. Group Date: 2012
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Mullah Dadullah Front, Dadullah Front, Mullah Dadullah Lang Allegiance, Mullah Dadullah Mahaz

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/05/meet-new-more-radical-insurgent-group-afghanistan/327901/>
- Taimoor Shah and David Jolly. “Leader of Taliban Splinter Group Allied with ISIS is Killed.” New York Times. 2015.
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https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/01/mullah_omar_confirms.php

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Mullah Dadullah Mahaz

Group Formation: 2007 (splinter)

Group End: 2016 (re-merge)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In 2007, Mullah Dadullah, a local Taliban commander, died (Institute for the Study of War 2012; Ruttig 2012). Dadullah originally helped rebuild and reorganize the Taliban after they went into exile in Quetta Shura (Institute for the Study of War 2012; Ruttig 2012). The Mullah Dadullah Group formed in December 2007 when Mullah Omar fired Mansur Dadullah for becoming too close to Al Qaeda (Roggio 2008; New York Times 2012). It

may have splintered around 2007-2008 from the Taliban after Dadullah's brother - Bakht Muhammad (Mansur Dadullah) - fell out of favor with the Taliban (Institute for the Study of War 2012; Ruttig 2012). The group's ideology was considered more extremist than the Taliban, but they appeared to have the same political aims to overthrow the Kabul government (New York Times 2012; Connor 2012).

It came to attention in 2008 for its first attack when it abducted several Afghan National Army soldiers in southern Afghanistan (Ruttig 2012).

Geography

The group conducted attacks in Kandahar and Spin Boldak, Afghanistan (Ruttig 2012; GTD 2017). It operated in Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, Nilmruz, Farah, and Uruzgan across southern Afghanistan (Roggio 2008; Roggio 2016).

Organizational Structure

The group's leader may have been Mansur Dadullah, but there are reported Pakistani officials arrested him in 2008 in Pakistan (Ruttig 2012). He may have been released in 2011 (Ruttig 2012). As of 2015, he was in charge of the group again (Shah and Jolly 2015; Roggio 2016). The front leader was later mentioned to be Mulla Faruq Mansur, but is unclear whether this is an alias (Ruttig 2012). Another report claimed the leader was Mullah A[bd]ul Qayoum Zakir, a senior Taliban commander previously held in Guantanamo Bay (Ruttig 2012). Members came from the Taliban and likely had militant experience. It is unknown how large the group was or if it had a political wing.

External Ties

It is slightly unclear whether the Mullah Dadullah group is a faction of the Taliban or an alias (Ruttig 2012). Ruttig believes the tangled leadership and known connections to senior Taliban leadership hints at decentralization rather than a real splinter (Ruttig 2012). The Taliban denied the group existed and disavowed any attacks (New York Times 2012; Connor 2012). The group later clashed directly with the Taliban (Shah and Jolly 2015).

The group may have pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015 (Shah and Jolly 2015).

Group Outcome

In 2012, Afghan police allegedly arrested three members of the Mullah Dadullah Front (Ruttig 2012). That same year, the group claimed responsibility for assassinating Maulvi Arsala Rahmani - a mediator in Afghan-Taliban talks (Institute for the Study of War 2012; Stratfor 2012). In 2015, Dadullah acquired Uzbek fighters around Zabul and pledged

loyalty to the Islamic State (Shah and Jolly 2015). In 2015, Mansur Dadullah died in a clash with Taliban forces in Zabul (Shah and Jolly 2015). In 2016, the Mullah Dadullah faction re-merged with the Taliban (Roggio 2016).

XLI. PEOPLE'S AMN COMMITTEE

Torg ID: 2662

Min. Group Date: 2012

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: People's Amn Committee, Peoples' Aman Committee, People's Aman Committee, Peoples' Aman Committee (Pac), People's Aman Committee (Pac), Peoples' Amn Committee, Peoples' Amn Committee (Pac), People's Amn Committee (Pac), Peoples' Peace Committee, People's Peace Committee

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://tribune.com.pk/story/165276/defunct-peoples-amn-committee-govt-given-three-days-to-bring-peace-to-lyari/>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: PAC

Group Formation: 2008

Group End: 2013 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Rehman Dakait founded the People's Amn Committee in 2008 after a gang war in Lyari, Karachi, Pakistan ended (Zia 2010). The group's aim was to operate as a local vigilante organization to combat crime in and around Lyari, Karachi (Zia 2010). It formed as the armed wing of the PPP and may not have been an independent organization (Committee to Protect Journalists 2011). The group's first violent attack was as early as 2009 when it clashed with police (Pakistan Tribune 2011). It is unclear what this group's connection to Afghanistan is.

Geography

The group operated in Lyari in Karachi, Pakistan (Zia 2010). The group conducted attacks in Karachi and Kharadar, Pakistan (GTD 2010).

Organizational Structure

PAC's founder was Rehman Dakait (alias Sardar Abdur Rehman Baloch) (Pakistan Tribune 2011). The group originally started as the armed wing of the Pakistani political party PPP (Pakistan Tribune 2011). The group operated as a gang in and around Karachi (Zia 2010). Members came from the PPP party (Zia 2010). No estimates could be found about size estimates.

External Ties

The group originally started as the armed wing of the Pakistani political party PPP (Pakistan Tribune 2011).

Group Outcome

In 2009, Rehman Dakait died during a clash with police (Pakistan Tribune 2011). The group's last violent attack was in 2013 when they attacked members of the MQM party (GTD 2017).