

Senegal VNSA Cases
Last Updated: 11 October 2016

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T1792	LIBERATION FRONT OF THE SENEGALESE PEOPLE		1988	1988
T2374	MOUVEMENT DES FORCES DEMOCRATIQUES DE CASAMANCE	1990	1982	2012
T2565	MFDC-FN		2002	2002
T2567	MOVEMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES OF THE CASAMANCE - S		2006	2006
T2566	MOVEMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES OF THE CASAMANCE - NORTHERN FRONT MAGNE DI„M„ FACTION		2006	2006

I. Liberation Front of the Senegalese People

Min. Group Date: 1988

Max. Group Date: 1988

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD,
<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198812080004>
- Searched Keesings name
- Searched PQ name
- Lexis was down
- Searched google + gscholar "name"

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

No information could be found about this group.

Geography

No information could be found about this group.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about this group.

External Ties

No information could be found about this group.

Group Outcome

No information could be found about this group.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: Unknown

Group End (Outcome): Unknown (Unknown)

II. Mouvement Des Forces Democratiques de Casamance

Min. Group Date: 1982

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 1990

Aliases: Movement Of Democratic Forces Of Casamance, Mouvement Des Forces Democratiques De Casamance, Mouvement Des Forces Democratiques De Casamance, Movement Of Democratic Forces Of Casamance (MFDC), MFDC, Front Sud

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The MFDC has its origins in a Casamance political party, which formed in 1947 (Humphreys and Mohamed n.d., 8). On December 26, 1982 during a series of peaceful protests by individuals in Ziguinchor calling for Casamance's independence from Senegal, government forces ended the march peacefully (Fall 2010, 16; Evans 2004, 3). One year later, on December 18, 1983 government forces opened fire on a series of peaceful protesters, which was followed by the creation of the MFDC (Evans 2004, 3). The group had no well-defined religious ideology, and its members were Christian, Islamist, and Animist (Fall 2010, 14). It had its first violent attack in 1988 (GTD 2017). Violence escalated in 1990.

Geography

The group operated in the Casamance region of Senegal.

Organizational Structure

Members of the MFDC came from throughout the Casamance region and were primarily Diola (Fall 2010, 7-8). The majority ethnic group in Senegal, in contrast, is Wolof.

MFDC's leader was a Catholic priest named Augustin Diamacoune Senghor (Fall 2010, 17). The MFDC took their name from a former political party created in the 1940s, but

were not actually tied to it (Fall 2010, 17). The group was organized into a political wing and a military wing. The former, Atika, was led by Sidy Badji until 2003, who had some military experience as a soldier in the French army (Fall 2010, 18-21). A second influential military leader was Leopold Sagna, who was a former corporal in the Senegalese army (Evans 2004, 9). Recruits received military training (Evans 2004, 9). The group is thought to have between 300-4000 members, but it's unclear how many of these are supporters or soldiers (US Bureau 1998; Evans 2004, 6). Gleditsch et al. (2013, 602) argue that compared to the Senegal Army's 10,000 troops, it had approximately 2,000 soldiers in 1993 (Faye 2006, 37).

MFDC funded itself, in part, through a diaspora of Diaola living in France. Later, the organization engaged in looting, ransoms, and drug-trafficking to fund itself during the latter parts of the war (Fall 2010, 19, 22). It also funded itself through cashew and cannabis sales.

External Ties

MFDC created rebel sanctuaries in Guinea-Bissau and potentially secured weapons from Gambia (Fall 2010, 20; Minteh 2009).

MFDC allegedly procured Iraqi or Libyan weapons, although not independently confirmed (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 602). If true, this could explain changes in tactics and training.

In 1990, the US and France explicitly provided external support to Senegal to fight the rebels (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 602).

Group Outcome

The Senegal government initially responded to protests by organizing counter-protests in 1982 and 1983. From 1983-1990, the Senegalese government primarily used repression against the movement, including a series of high-profile arrests of MFDC leadership like Senghor (Fall 2010, 20-21). They also offered a series of administrative reforms, replacing the leadership of Casamancais with a non-Wolof individual, while simultaneously continuing to secretly arrest and torture individuals (Evans 2004, 4). This drove the movement underground, and the MFDC began developing an armed wing known as Atika (Humphreys, Evan). In 1990, MFDC launched an attack on a border post (Fall 2010, 21). Senegalese armed forces responded with a scorched earth campaign (Fall 2010, 22).

Badji signed the first peace agreement in 1991, but it failed due to different factions continuing to fight (Front Sud and Front Nord) fighting (Fall 2010, 22). MFDC began to suffer internal organizational problems in the mid-90s, as Sagna and Sadio fought each

other for control of the party (Evans 2004, 4-5). MFDC splintered in 1999 after MFDC reached a ceasefire agreement as the more extremist MFDC-FN and MFDC-Sadio broke off (Fall 2010, 18). MFDC became known as the Front Sud. It has been difficult to sign a final political agreement because the political and military wings operate relatively independently (Evans 2004, 13).

Why 1990 Onset?

According to UCDP (v4.0), the conflict between Senegal and the MFDC escalated in 1990. This is the same date that (Simpson and Diallo).

The onset of the conflict is a surprise to the Senegalese government for two reasons. First, they had offered a number of concessions to the group since the initial wave of protests in 1983. This included Cabinet appointments and minor land reforms necessary to address the underlying grievances in the Casamance region (Evans 2004, 4). The government had divided the area into two separate regions, and seen local incidents of violence dissipate due to local repression (Fall 2010, 21-22). As such, the Senegalese government thought the group's resolve had dissipated over the waning years.

Second, the government had received bad intelligence from local residents in the area. In addition to the concessions, the Senegalese military kidnapped and interrogated several combatants and noncombatants in the area. This intelligence, however, was "dubious" and likely coerced according to one Casamance fighter looking back to 1990 (Humphreys and Mohamed). The government also had poor intelligence about the group's capabilities at the time because the MFDC had moved "underground" and "out of sight in the region's forests and across the border in Guinea-Bissau" (Evans 2004, 4).

When the group finally launched their attack in 1990, they suddenly had assault rifles and new tactics, while the Senegalese government still expected them to be fighting with old weaponry (Lewis 2012). As one soldier said, "If Senegal had the military means to resolve it, they would have done it in the last 30 years...If we have failed to resolve the crisis it is because the army and the state underestimated the rebellion" (Lewis 2012). The Senegalese government suddenly found that their previous efforts had been inadequate and, in an attempt to match the new group, launched a scorched earth campaign (Fall 2010, 22). It didn't matter, however, as "the MFDC retained the initiative in these attacks" (Faye 2006, 35). As late as October, 1990, the Senegalese government was still constructing land reforms and new measures to address these grievances (Faye 2006, 18). Together, this suggests the government miscalculated their initial response, and was unable to successfully repress the movement starting in 1990 as they had previously.

Alternate Explanations:

- **Shock to Rebel Capabilities:** Gleditsch et al. (2013) report MFDC may have received assault rifles from Iraq or Libya, this is only alleged and never confirmed. Any increase in rebel capabilities is also offset by evidence that France and the U.S. also provide additional assistance to Senegal at the same time (Gleditsch et al. 2013).
- **State Capacity:** Humphreys and Mohamed examine risk factors for civil war in Senegal in 1989-1990 and note - counterintuitively - that conditions made Senegal less susceptible to war in 1990 than before.
- **Window of opportunity:** It's possible that rebels 'exploited' growing tensions between Senegal and Mauritania, which had begun in 1989 due to the Mauritanian mass killing of 2,000 Senegalese people (Fall 2010, 21). This raises the question of why they waited an additional year before stepping up their attacks. The attacks in 1990 also coincide with the start of the "Oil War" between Senegal and Guinea Bissau, but the interstate conflict started one month *after* the start of the MFDC (Faye 2006, 43).

Note: Interesting concessions first by government and differences between leaders and timing (1990) cause

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1982

Group End (Outcome): 1999 (peace agreement and splintering)

III. MFDC-FN

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 2002

Aliases: Movement Of The Democratic Forces Of The Casamance - Northern Front, MFDC - FN, Mouvement Des Forces Democratiques De Casamance - Front Nord, Movement Of The Democratic Forces Of The Casamance - Northern Front Md, MFDC Front Nord - MD, MFDC Northern Front - MD, Mouvement Des Forces Democratiques De Casamance - Front Nord Magne Dieme, Mouvement Des Forces Democratiques De Casamance - Front Nord MD, Movement Of The Democratic Forces Of The Casamance - Northern Front Magne Dieme Faction

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

MFDC-FN was a splinter group of MFDC which emerged in April 1992 after the first cease-fire agreement (Fall 2010, 18). One potential reason for the splinter was that the Northern part of the Casamance region was more Muslim, while the South was more Christian and Animist (RFI 2001). The group had the same goal as its parent organization and wanted more autonomous control of the Casamance region (Fall 2010, 18).

Geography

The group operated in northwest Biogna.

Organizational Structure

It is composed of both Diola and non-Diola members (US Bureau 1998). Badji, the leader of the military wing of MFDC, took soldiers from the MFDC-FN. FN's leadership included military commanders with prior experience fighting in Algeria and Indochina with the French Army (Fall 2010, 22). Badji, the leader of MFDC-FN died in 2003 (Evans 2004, 5). The MFDC-FN created an armed wing after splintering from the MFDC. The armed wing was led by Kamougue Diatta and Jean-Marie Tendeny (US Bureau 1998).

It funded itself through the sale of cannabis, timber, and charcoal (Evans 2004, 10; Mohamed and Humphreys nd). It had approximately 1,000 members in 1993 (Faye 2006, 37).

External Ties

They received some support from Gambia, although not as much as MFDC and MFDC-Front Sud (Faye 2006, 40). They fought against the MFDC Front Sud (Faye 2006, 40).

Group Outcome

Notably, the group did not directly engage with Senegalese Forces after the splinter, although it also did not disarm completely after 1992 (Evans 2004, 5). In 1993, the MFDC-FN signed a separate peace agreement in 1993 with Senegal, while the main MFDC wing continued to fight (RFI 2001). They refrained from violence and in exchange tacitly received de facto control of northwest Biogna from Senegal (Evans 2004, 5). Badji, the leader of MFDC-FN died in 2003 (Evans 2004, 5).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1992

Group End (Outcome): Unknown, stopped fighting in 1993 (RFI 2001), last known violent incident in 2002 (TORG), and the leader died in 2003 (Evans 2004)

IV. MFDC-S

Min. Group Date: 2006

Max. Group Date: 2006

Onset: NA

Aliases: Movement Of The Democratic Forces Of The Casamance - Sadio, Mfdc - S, Mfdc - Sadio, Mfdc-S, Mfdc-Sadio, Mouvement Des Forces Democratiques De Casamance - S, Mouvement Des Forces Democratiques De Casamance - Sadio, Movement Of The Democratic Forces Of The Casamance - S, Movement Of The Democratic Forces Of The Casamance - Salif, Sadio Faction, Baraka Mandioka

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

MFDC-Sadio was a splinter group from MFDC which emerged in 2006. The MFDC signed a cease-fire agreement with the Senegalese government in 2004 which included a generous amnesty package (Geneva Academy 2008; Fall 2010, 27). By 1998-1999, the two prominent leaders of the MFDC were Leopold Sagna and Salif Sadio (Mohamed and Humphreys 15). Sadio organized a group of individuals to replace Sanga and it is now believed that Sagna is dead (Mohamed and Humphrey 15).

Geography

The group was active in the Casamance region.

Organizational Structure

By 1998-1999, the two prominent leaders of the MFDC were Leopold Sagna and Salif Sadio (Mohamed and Humphreys 15). Sadio organized a group of individuals to replace Sanga and it is now believed that Sagna is dead (Mohamed and Humphrey 15).

External Ties

There is no evidence of external support.

Group Outcome

In 2006, MFDC-Sadio began fighting the Senegal government again with an uptick in fighting around the time of President Abdoulaye Wade’s re-election campaign (Geneva Academy 2008). The Senegal army responded with joint counterinsurgency campaigns

with Guinea-Bissau against Sadio (AllAfrica 2012). In 2014, Sadio announced a ceasefire agreement with the Senegal government (Economist 2014).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2006

Group End (Outcome): 2014 (ceasefire)

V. MFDC-Northern

Min. Group Date: 2006

Max. Group Date: 2006

Aliases: This appears to be an alias for MFDC-FN

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

None; this appears to be an alias for MFDC-FN.

Geography

None; this appears to be an alias for MFDC-FN.

Organizational Structure

None; this appears to be an alias for MFDC-FN.

External Ties

None; this appears to be an alias for MFDC-FN.

Group Outcome

None; this appears to be an alias for MFDC-FN.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: MFDC-FN

Group Formation: None

Group End (Outcome): None

Patterns:

- MFDC is the only group to escalate despite two other potential competitors with same goals (MFDC-FN) and (MFDC-S)
- MFDC-FN gets de facto control of territory without fighting much
 - MFDC-FN also has military leadership
- MFDC-S plays war of attrition game with state and inevitably declares unilateral ceasefire
- MFDC gets amnesty program, but without benefits in 2004 deal - reverts back to SQO
- Why not civil war?
 - Get what you want without fighting (MFDC-FN)
 - Government doesn't engage, group never gets enough support (MFDC-S)
- Why civil war?
 - International distraction/window of opportunity to attack?
 - MFDC missing its leadership for most of incubation period pre-1990
 - Capitalize on some concessions to fight harder (resolve?)
 - Note: coalition is ethnically heterogeneous despite regional discrimination.
 - Note missing leadership (no vertical ties per staniland story).
 - Note government tries to offer concessions and it backfires due to non-credibility of attempts coupled with secret arrests and torture
 - Note organizational structure has distinct wings (mixel?)