

## PHILIPPINES ARMED CASES, 1970-2012

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T41	ANANDA MARGA*		1955	1978
T903	KABATAANG MAKABAYAN (KM)		1964	1970
T571	CPP	1969	1968	2012
T328	NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY (NPA)		1969	2012
T302	MORO LIBERATION FRONT (MLF)	1972	1970	2011
T760	MINDANAO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT	1970	1970	1971
T301	MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT	1990	1978	2012
T968	6 APRIL LIBERATION MOVEMENT		1980	1980
T36	ALEX BONCAYAO BRIGADE (ABB)		1984	2008
T1138	JIHAD BRIGADES		1987	1987
T1616	ANTI COMMUNIST VIGILANTE PATROL		1988	1988
T1647	BLACK FOREST COMMAND		1989	1989
T1884	REFORM OF THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT		1989	1991
T1717	GOD OUR FATHER CULT		1990	1990
T4	ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG)	7-May-93	1991	2012
T1819	MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT SPLINTER GROUP		1992	1992
T242	JEMAAH ISLAMIYA		1993	2012
T260	KUMPULAN MUJAHIDIN MALAYSIA		1995	0

T801	REVOLUTIONARY PROLETARIAN ARMY (RPA)		1997	0
T702	REBOLUSYONARYONG PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA - PILIPINAS (RPM-P)		1998	0
T932	MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES (MLPP)		1998	0
T796	REBOLUSYONARYONG HUKBONG BAYAN (RHB)		1998	0
T2472	YOUNG OFFICER UNION OF THE NEW GENERATION AND REFORMIST ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (YOU-RAFP)		1998	2006
T924	NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT (PHILIPPINES)		1999	0
T819	ABDURAJAK JANJALANI BRIGADE (AJB)		1999	0
T1257	RAJAH SOLAIMAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT		2000	2005
T2405	PENTAGON KIDNAP GROUP		2001	2002
T180	FREE VIETNAM REVOLUTIONARY GROUP		2001	0
T216	AD REV		2001	2001
T1025	MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT - NM	2001	2001	2002
T987	FARMER'S MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (KMP)		2005	2008
T2241	AL-KHOBAR		2005	2012
T1470	TAONG BAYAN AT KAWAL		2006	0
T2355	KAWAL NG PILIPINAS (SOLDIER OF THE PHILIPPINES)		2006	2006

T2550	MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT - HABIER MALIK	2007	2007	2007
T2249	ALCUBAR GROUP		2007	2007
T701	BANGSAMORO NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY		2009	2009
T2586	AMPATUAN MILITIA		2009	2009
T2508	BANGSAMORO ISLAMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS	2012	2011	2012
T2661	PARTIDO MARXISTA-LENINISTA NG PILIPINAS		2012	2012
T2628	BANGSAMORO ISLAMIC FREEDOM MOVEMENT (BIFM)		2012	2012

**Philippines VNSA Cases, Part 1: 1955-1979**  
**Last Updated: 11 February 2017**

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I. ANANDA MARGA

Min. Group Date: 1955  
Max. Group Date: 1978  
Onset: NA

Aliases: Ananda Marga, The Ananda Marga Yoga Society, The Universal Army

### Part 1. Bibliography

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## **Part 2. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

Ananda Marga formed in 1955 as a Hindu religious terrorist group (Crovetto 2008, 26). The group, however, rejected the key Hindu philosophy of *ahimsa* or nonviolence (Crovetto 2008, 25). The philosophies of Pranav Sarkar inspired the group's ideology. Ananda Marga opposed social rules and constraints, such as the caste system. It aimed to do away with caste distinctions. Besides spiritual freedom, the group participated in service projects in the areas of education, health services, and disaster relief. The group adheres to an ideology described as "revolutionary mystic socialism" (Crovetto 2008, 26). The group's founder, Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar, believed the group needed military capabilities because he claimed the animal-like nature of humans made war inevitable (Crovetto 2008, 36).

### **Geography**

Ananda Marga has yoga centers in Manila, Philippines. The group recorded one violent incident in Manila in 1978 (GTD [197802070001](#) n.d.). There is no evidence that they ever set up a formal base of operations.

The Ananda Marga operates in several foreign countries. In Australia, the group attacked the Indian embassy (new.com.au 2009). The Ananda Marga had strong bases in the Philippines and the United States. In New York, the group established many Yoga centers. At home its operations divided into four zones - East, West, North and South - with its headquarters in Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi and Bangalore, respectively (IndiaToday 2014)

### **Organizational Structure**

The group has a political wing commonly known as PROUT (full name is PROUTist Universal). Sarkar founded PROUT in 1959 to advance his socio-economic and philosophical goals. PROUT is based in Denmark (Crovetto 2008, 29). Ananda Marga follows an extremely centralized, authoritarian organizational structure (Crovetto 2008, 26). Although the group's philosophy includes equality, members allegedly conform to a strict hierarchy (Crovetto 2008, 35; India Today 2014).

The group has many different types of members. Some members live isolated lives with only other members of the group, some live in agrarian communities, and others have

typical occupations and lives in addition to their involvement (Crovetto 2008, 30). Sakar founded two paramilitary groups: Volunteers Social Service (a male organization) and Girls' Volunteers (a female organization). These groups trained in India and Australia. After the late 1970s, Ananda Marga deemphasized the roles of these two groups (Crovetto 2008, 36-37).

### **External Ties**

There is no evidence of external ties to other state or non-state actors.

### **Group Outcome**

The group's founder, Sakar, was convicted in 1976 of allegedly murdering "half a dozen" ex-disciples. A higher Indian court, however, acquitted Sakar upon retrial on August 2, 1978. While Sakar was imprisoned from 1971 to 1978, he issued statements that drew a line between the use of violence and Ananda Marga's philosophy. Crovetto claims that Sakar's statements led sympathizers to cease violent attacks globally (Crovetto 2008, 32).

The Indian government banned Ananda Marga in India in 1975. Sympathizers globally pushed for repeal of the ban. The group's members were suspected of attacks against Indian interests in India in 1977 and 1997. Ananda Marga was also suspected of a bombing outside the hotel where then-prime minister of India, Morarji Desai, was visiting. These allegations remain disputed (AAP 2009).

### **Part 3. Proposed Changes**

Aliases: no proposed change.

Group Formation: 1955 (Crovetto 2008, 26)

Group End (Outcome): (ceased violence circa 1979 and shifted to politics, still active in politics (Jones and Libicki 2008, 146; India Today 2014; Crovetto 2008).

#### **II. KABATAANG MAKABAYAN (KM)**

Min. Group Date: 1964

Max. Group Date: 1970

Onset: NA

Aliases: Kabataang Makabayan (Km), Kabataang Makabayan, Nationalist Youth, Patriotic Youth

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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## **Part 2. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

KM formed in 1964 as a youth group and sister organization to the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) (IRBC 1989; Abinales 2007, 42). Radical, "self-taught Marxists," including students at the University of the Philippines, initiated KM. PKP recruited these activist students and encouraged them to organize the party's youth, thus resulting in the establishment of KM on November 30, 1964. In the late 1960s, PKP expelled many KM members for their radical views. Infighting among Filipino communists led to the formation of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP; CPP-ML) on December 26, 1968. Many KM members joined the CPP (Abinales 2007, 42). KM formed the majority of CPP's members in the late 1960s (Abinales 2007, 43).

KM principally has sought to organize the political activities of students (Abinales 2007, 43). KM encouraged students to live out socialist practices, including moving from the countryside to join the agrarian movement (Palatino 2015). KM strongly condemned and opposed US involvement in the Philippines, Korea, and Cuba (Sison 2014).

### **Geography**

KM has strong ties with the peasant youth in the Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog regions, dating back to 1963 (Sison 2014). The group claims that members hail from every region of the Philippines, including Mindanao and the BIBAK provinces of the Cordillera (Ibid).

### **Organizational Structure**

KM exhibits clandestine behavior (IRBC 1989; Palatine 2015). KM's only publicly known leaders are Jose María Sison and the surviving participants of the 1970 First Quarter Storm (Palatino 2015). KM organizes chapters in schools, factories, and poor communities in both cities and rural areas. Members include students, young teachers, and other young professionals. Members also have had associations with youth sections of the Lapiang Manggagawa (the center-left workers' party), trade unions, and other peasant associations. Members, which included minority groups, hail from almost every province in the Philippines. KM directs special assistance to these minority groups to address their oppression (Sison 2014).

Each KM chapter comprises an OD and ED team. The OD team's objectives include organizing meetings and holding elections within the chapter. Meanwhile, the ED team seeks to teach recruits the KM ideology through its Constitution and Program of Action. The KM has a central underground leadership cadre that studied the principles of Marxism-Leninism (Sison 2014). Jones and Libicki estimate that the group's peak size ranged in the thousands (Jones & Libicki 2008, 164).

### **External Ties**

KM splintered from the KPK in 1968. Following the splinter, most KM members joined the CPP. In 1968, 25 members splintered from KM due to conflict with KM's then-leader Jose Sison. These defectors formed a rival student organization Samahan ng mga Demokratikong Kabataan (SDK) (Abinales 2007, 43).

KM provided support to the CPP through student activities to help the CPP's overall goal of opposition to the post-WWII Manila government (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989). KM trained leaders of the CPP, NPF, and MNLF (Sison 2014). KM also trained future leaders of revolutionary or separatist movements among Moro and Igorot populations (2014). For example, Nur Misuari, leader of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the early 1970s, had previously belonged to KM while studying at the University of the Philippines (May 1992, 398).

In the late 1960s, the group received fierce criticism from moderate Philippines communists for using ideas connected to China's Cultural Revolution (Palatino 2015;



Abinales 2007, 42). KM leaders visited China to learn about Chinese communism in the late 1960s (Abinales 2007, 42).

### **Group Outcome**

The First Quarter Storm of 1970 incited many protests. Rallies attended by KM members even turned violent (Sison 2014). Critics of former Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos allege that his government formed the youth group Kabataang Barangay (KB; predecessor to Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)) in 1975 to recruit students away from KM (Palatino 2015).

As of 2012, KM continues to operate (Jones & Libicki 2008, 164; Palatino 2015; Sison 2014). However, the group's size and more recent activities are unknown. Some supporters publicly celebrated KM's 50th anniversary at rallies in Manila (Palatino 2015).

### **Part 3. Proposed Changes**

Aliases: Samahang Makabayan (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989) Samahang Kabataang Makabayan (Ibid.)

Group Formation: No proposed change.

Group End (Outcome): Active (Jones and Libicki 2008, 164)

### III. CPP

Min. Group Date: 1968

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 1969

Aliases: Communist Party Of The Philippines, Marxist-Leninist (Cpp-Ml), Communist Party Of The Philippines, Communist Party Of The Philippines, Marxist-Leninist-Maoism (Mlm), Cpp, Cpp-Ml, Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (Ml-Cp), Partido Komunista Ng Pilipinas, CPP, CPP-ML, ML-CP, ML-CPP

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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## **Part 2. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

Jose Maria Sison established the CPP in 1968 on December 26, Mao Zedong's birthday. Sison's ideology included the belief that the three major problems in the Philippines were bureaucratic capitalism, feudalism, and U.S. imperialism. Sison believed Marxism-Leninism and an armed struggle could fix all of these problems (Crenshaw 2015). Sison initially tried to expand the group from its original base of mostly KM youth members and focused on recruiting peasants (Abinales 2007; Crenshaw 2015). The CPP used violence in the form of guerilla style warfare with the goal of directly changing the Philippine political system (BBC 2012; Diola 2014).

The group reportedly first used violent tactics in 1971. In the attack, CPP group members detonated four grenades at a Liberal Party rally in Manila, killing nine people. Then-Filipino dictator Ferdinand Marcos blamed the attack on the CPP, but Sison denied

any involvement. Liberal Party members blamed Marcos for the attack, as it killed Marcos' political rivals. The CPP-NPA gained prominence during the 1970 First Quarter Storm, when a series of leftist student protests, some violent, occurred in the Philippines (Crenshaw 2015).

## **Geography**

The group was initially based in Capas on Luzon (Crenshaw 2015). Sison directed the CPP to attack from mountainous areas and use small groups to conduct quick raids against police and military targets (Ibid.). By the late 1970s, the CPP had spread from Luzon to Mindanao and Visayas and Samar (Crenshaw 2015; Christian Science Monitor 1984). CPP grew in part because Muslim secessionists occupied much of the Philippines' military's attention (Christian Science Monitor 1984). By 1984, the NPA reportedly operated in 60 provinces (Christian Science Monitor 1984). As of 2004, the CPP has reportedly operated in rural Luzon, Visayas, and parts of Mindanao as well as had cells in Manila and other metropolitan centers (Federation of American Scientists 2004).

## **Organizational Structure**

Jose Sison led the CPP under the pseudonym Amado Guerrero. The New People's Army (NPA) is the armed wing of the CPP and formed in 1969. Bernabé Buscayno, who previously in the 1950s led an armed communist group in the Huk Rebellion, led the NPA (Crenshaw 2015). The CPP also has a political wing, the National Democratic Front, which Luis Jalandoni leads (Federation of American Scientists 2004). As of 2004, Jalandoni has resided in the Netherlands (Crenshaw 2015).

After the arrests of Buscayno and Sison in 1976 and 1977, respectively, Rodolfo Salas commanded both the CPP and NPA. In 1987, Sison went into self-imposed exile in the Netherlands. In the late 1980s, "Armando Liwanag," widely believed to be an alias for Sison, succeeded Salas as CPP chairman (Crenshaw 2015).

The CPP received weapons from the Chinese government from 1972 until 1976, when the Chinese and Filipino government's normalized relations (Crenshaw 2015). More recently, in 2011, the Communist Party of China publicly disavowed the CPP (BBC 2012). The group raises funds from local donors and by extorting money from local businesses and politicians in the form of "revolutionary tax." The group also allegedly has donors in Europe (Federation of American Scientists 2004). As of 2012, CPP had at least 10,000 members (BBC 2012). During the 1980s, when the CPP reached its peak strength, the group had approximately 25,000 members (Federation of American Scientists 2004).

## **External Ties**

Members of the KM youth organization, including Sison, splintered from the PKP in the late 1960s and subsequently founded CPP (Abinales 2007, 42-43). The CPP received weapons from the Chinese government from 1972 until 1976 (Crenshaw 2015). The Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB), an urban guerilla unit, broke away from the CPP in the mid-1980s (when the CPP was weakened due to policing efforts) and continued guerilla-style attacks (Crenshaw 2015). In 1977, the NPA supported the Muslim rebel group, MNLF, who sought independence for Mindanao (Christian Science Monitor 1984). As of 2012, the U.S. State Department included the NPA on its list of foreign terrorist organizations (BBC 2012). Since the late 1980s, some CPP leaders such as Sison and Jalandoni have taken up residence in the Netherlands (Crenshaw 2015; Federation of American Scientists 2004).

### **Group Outcome**

The CPP overtook the PKP in popularity after then-President Marcos's government undertook a brutal crackdown against leftist student demonstrators in the First Quarter Storm (Crenshaw 2015). Since members of the KM youth organization founded the CPP, the group has had close ties to First Quarter Storm protesters and recruited these student activists to the CPP (Abinales 2007, 41-43; Crenshaw 2015).

In 1976, the Philippine government arrested CPP leader Buscayno and then Sison in 1977 (Abinales 2007, 41-43; Crenshaw 2015). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, increased policing efforts and infighting significantly weakened CPP. The Philippine government arrested key CPP leaders. Sison published a reform proposal advocating a return to the countryside. As a result, CPP members divided into two camps: "rejectionists" (RJs), who supported reform, and "reaffirmists" (RAs), who disagreed with Sison. Rejectionists left the CPP, yet most rejectionist guerrilla groups quickly dissolved. Nonetheless, the rejectionist ABB continued urban guerrilla attacks in the 1990s (Crenshaw 2015).

Peace talks between the CPP and the Philippine government took place in Oslo in 2004 and unsuccessfully resumed there in 2011. The CPP blames the Philippine government for its inclusion on the U.S. State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, a sticking point in peace talks (BBC 2012).

On July 25, 2016, the Philippine government under President Duterte announced a unilateral ceasefire with the CPP-NPA and other Maoist rebels. On March 12, 2017, the government agreed to resume peace talks. Duterte terminated the peace talks in December 2017 (Global Security 2017).

### **Part 3. Proposed Changes**

Aliases: Communist Party of the Philippines–New People's Army (Crenshaw 2015),

CPP-NPA (Crenshaw 2015)

Group Formation: A new proposed formation date if different than above

Group End (Outcome): Active (Global Security; Crenshaw 2015).

IV. NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY (NPA)

Min. Group Date: 1969

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: New People's Army (Npa), New People's Army, NPA, New People's' Army, New People's Army, Sparrow Squads

**Part 1. Bibliography**

This is the armed wing of the CPP.

**Part 2. Narrative**

**Group Formation**

This is the armed wing of the CPP.

**Geography**

This is the armed wing of the CPP.

**Organizational Structure**

This is the armed wing of the CPP.

**External Ties**

This is the armed wing of the CPP.

**Group Outcome**

This is the armed wing of the CPP.

**Part 3. Proposed Changes**

Aliases: This is the armed wing of the CPP.

Group Formation: This is the armed wing of the CPP.

Group End (Outcome): This is the armed wing of the CPP.

V. MORO LIBERATION FRONT (MLF)

Min. Group Date: 1970

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 1972

Aliases: Moro National Liberation Front (Mnlf), MNLF, MLF, Moro Liberation Front (Mlf)

**Part 1. Bibliography**

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**Part 2. Narrative**

**Group Formation**

Abul Khayr Alonto and Jalaludin Santo formed the MLF in 1972 (Federation of American Scientists 2001). The MLF originated as a splinter group from the MIM's youth programs and recruited young Muslims from villages (Federation of American Scientists 2001;

Crenshaw 2015). The MLF seeks to create an independent state for the Islamic minority group, the Moro people. Although the MLF is considered Islamist, its 1974 manifesto focused on nationalist and secular goals (Crenshaw 2015).

The MLF's first known attack was on October 21, 1972, when members simultaneously attacked multiple targets in Marawi City, including the Philippine Constabulary, a government-backed radio station, and a state-backed university (Crenshaw 2015).

## **Geography**

The group is based in the southern Philippine region of Mindanao (Countering Extremism Project). In November 1989, the Philippine government and MLF cooperated to hold a plebiscite over establishing an autonomous zone for Muslim-majority parts of Mindanao (Federation of American Scientists 2001). Only two Mindanao provinces (Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur) and two provinces in the Sulu Archipelago voted in favor of autonomy. In 1990, the Philippine government formally established a four-province autonomous zone. The MLF has used these provinces as strongholds since the 1970s (Sulu and Tawitawi).

## **Organizational Structure**

Hashim Salamat and Nur Misuari held key leadership roles (Crenshaw 2015). After the MLF began to receive weapons and training from the Libyan government in the early 1970s, and the MLF became the leading group involved in the Moro armed struggle, the MLF's membership spiked (Crenshaw 2015; Bale 2003, 15).

Although the MLF had relatively centralized power under Misauri, the MLF had multiple sub-bodies. In 1973, the MLF established a Central Committee that had thirteen members based in Libya and directed the MLF from that external base (Crenshaw 2015). The MLF's armed wing was known as Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) or the Bangsamoro Armed Forces (BAF) (Federation of American Scientists 2001). The MLF had a National Congress for the purpose of legislative actions, but it almost never met. A Women's Committee once served as an auxiliary group for the BMA. In 1975, the MLF had an estimated 30,000 members, and in 1994, it had 14,000 members. In 1996, the group had an estimated 17,000 members (Crenshaw 2015).

## **External Ties**

The MILF is the largest splinter group that has broken from the MLF (Crenshaw 2015; Santos et al. 2010, 64). While both groups have historically competed for resources and membership, today they maintain more friendly relations. The MILF has publicly condemned the ASG. Yet, sometimes the MLF, MILF, and ASG have formed temporary

local alliances to fight against the Philippine army (Crenshaw 2015). The MNLF-RG, founded in 1982, is another splinter group from the MLF (Crenshaw 2015; Santos et al. 2010, 64). In 1974, the MLF published a manifesto that mentioned Islam minimally and instead focused on the oppression of the Philippine government. This prompted the Communist NPA to offer an alliance, which the MLF reportedly turned down (Crenshaw 2015).

In the early 1970s, Nur Misuari and Hashim Salama traveled to Libya and persuaded the Libyan government to supply the MLF with arms. This key factor led to the group's rise as the most prominent Moro armed group (Crenshaw 2015). Many MLF leaders resided in Libya or Malaysia and procured weapons from both countries (Crenshaw 2015; Bale 2003, 15; American Federation of Scientists 2001).

### **Group Outcome**

When the Philippine government tried to initiate peace talks with the MLF in 1975, the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) urged the MLF to reach a political settlement (Crenshaw 2015). The MLF and Philippine government's peace talks resulted in the 1976 Tripoli agreement, which pledged to create an autonomous region after a referendum (Crenshaw 2015; Santos et al. 2010, 63). In 1989, two Mindanao provinces (Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur) and two in the Sulu Archipelago (Sulu and Tawitawi) voted in favor of autonomy, with the votes largely reflecting religious-ethnic demographics in each province (Crenshaw 2015). However, these provinces were in two different areas, resulting in a fragmented autonomous zone that some sources characterize as two different states (Crenshaw 2015; Federation of American Scientists 2001). These four provinces were supposed to part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (BBC 2012).

However, the MLF then rejected the Tripoli agreement because it wanted a unified and more autonomous Moro state. The group then returned to guerilla warfare tactics. In 1986, Misuari began peace talks again with President Corazon Aquino, but the peace talks failed. Under Fidel Ramos, the Philippine government and the MLF reached an agreement in 1996 (Crenshaw 2015). These agreements designated a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) to serve as the autonomous state that the MLF had wanted. Consequently, the MLF demobilized (Crenshaw 2015; Santos et al. 2010, 437).

Tensions, however, arose over the agreement's implementation during the early 2000s. In 2005, the first major hostilities since the peace deal broke out again, in part due to infighting. After Misuari lost political office in the autonomous zone, he led an MLF faction to fight the Philippine Army (Crenshaw 2015; Santos et al. 2010, 439). At this point, Misuari's faction organized enough to fight the Philippine government in conventional warfare. The MLF signed a new peace agreement with the Philippine



government on October 12, 2012; however, some MLF factions continue fighting government forces (Crenshaw 2015).

### **Part 3. Proposed Changes**

Aliases: No proposed changes

Group Formation: No proposed changes

Group End (Outcome): Active (Crenshaw 2015)

## **VI. MINDANAO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT**

Min. Group Date: 1970

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 1972

Aliases: NA

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### **Part 2. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The Muslim Independence Movement, later called the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM), formed in either 1968 or 1969 (ICG 2016, 25; May 1992, 398; Tan 2000, 272). The group formed in response to the 1968 Jabidah Massacre, in which Philippine army commanders murdered at least 28 young Muslim soldiers (Quimpo 2001, 275). The MIM sought to create a separate Muslim state for the minority Moro population in the Mindanao, Palawan, and Sulu regions (Crenshaw 2015; May 1992). The MIM aspired to create a state where the community practiced Islam and observed Sharia law. MIM members joined with UIFO members for military training in Sabah, Malaysia, beginning in 1969 (Tan 2000, 272). The group's first attack occurred in 1970.

### **Geography**

The MIM claimed to represent the Moro people in the Palawan, Mindanao and Sulu regions (May 1992). MIM members trained in Sabah, Malaysia. The Malaysian government allegedly enabled, or at least "tacitly supported," the training (Tan 2000, 272).

### **Organizational Structure**

Datu Udtog Matalam originally led the MIM. The group sent young Muslim recruits to Malaysia to receive military training (Quimpo 2001, 272). In mid-1971, Nur Msuari, a political scientist, led the replacement of traditional MIM tribe leaders with secular ones (Minorities at Risk Project 2003). In 1972, Misuari then dissolved the MIM and founded the MNLF (Minorities at Risk Project 2003).

### **External Ties**

The MIM originally received military aid from Libya and Malaysia, along with political support from the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (Minorities at Risk Project 2003). The MNLF was a splinter group from the youth division of the MIM (Minorities at Risk Project 2003).

Beginning in 1969, MIM members received military training in camps in Sabah, Malaysia. The Malaysian government allegedly enabled, or at least "tacitly supported," the training. UIFO members trained alongside MIM members at these camps (Tan 2000, 272).

### **Group Outcome**

Misuari, an alumni of the University of the Philippines, orchestrated the dissolution of the MIM (Tan 2000, 272). In 1972, Misuari founded the more secular MNLF (Minorities at Risk Project 2003). Although the MIM never achieved broad popular support, the MNLF became the most prominent Moro armed group in the 1970s (Crenshaw 2015).

### Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Muslim Independence Movement (Crenshaw 2015)

Group Formation: 1968 (ICG 2016, 25) or 1969 (Tan 2000; May 1992, 398)

Group End (Outcome): 1972 (splintering (Tan 2009, 52)

MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT

Min. Group Date: 1978

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 1990

Aliases: Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Milf), MILF, Milf, Moro Islamic Liberation Front

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## **Part 2. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The MILF, originally called the New MNLF, formed in 1977 after splintering from the MNLF. The MILF split from the MNLF when Hashim Salamat accused the MNLF leader Nur Misuari of not following Muslim ideals. Although Salamat and Misuari had co-founded the MNLF, Salamat left the group and formed MILF due to these ideological disagreements with Misuari (Crenshaw 2015).

The New MNLF sought to gain independence for the Muslim-minority Mindanao people in the Philippines and establish Islamic law. In contrast to the MNLF, the New MNLF was willing to accept regional autonomy. The New MNLF criticized the MNLF for seeking complete separation from the Philippines (Crenshaw 2015).

After failing to secure funding from foreign countries the New MNLF changed their name to the MILF in an attempt to distinguish themselves. In 1986, the MILF perpetrated its first violent act: a bombing of a Catholic wedding in 1986 (Crenshaw 2015).

### **Geography**

The group is based in Central Mindanao but also has influence in Palawan and Sulu (Crenshaw 2015). MILF troops reportedly operate in Lanao Del Norte, Marawi City, Munai, Pagadian City, Ozamiz, Zamboanga, Kolambugan, Lanao Del Sur, and Iligan City (Refworld 2007, 1-10). During the early 1980s, an estimated 360 New MNLF commanders trained military camps in Afghanistan (Crenshaw 2015).

### **Organizational Structure**

A Central Committee, whose members are religious elite, oversees the MILF. The MILF has three executive branches: the Central Committee, Supreme Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal, and Consultative Council.

The MILF “liberated” various zones in the southern Philippines. Once “liberated,” the MILF instated Islamic law in these regions. The MILF created the Internal Security Force (ISF) to enforce the Islamic law (Crenshaw 2015).

The MILF had an estimated 3,000 fighters in January of 1987 (Global Security 2015). The MILF experienced a spike in membership after the MNLF’s unpopular 1996 agreement with the government (Crenshaw 2015). The MILF allegedly extorts local

businessmen and government officials in areas where the group has powerful influence. These extortions included money and gasoline requests (Refworld 2007, 1).

### **External Ties**

Hashim and other leaders of the New MNLF traveled to other countries, such as Egypt and Pakistan, to appeal for military aid. The requests mostly failed because these countries already supported the MNLF.

During the early 1980s, an estimated 360 New MNLF commanders trained military camps in Afghanistan. An estimated 200 of these New MNLF commanders fought for the mujahideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

The MILF and MNLF often fought over funding and membership. In 2003, Salamat disavowed several violent separatist groups (Crenshaw 2015). The Malaysian government has overseen peace talks between the MILF and the Philippine government since 2003 (BBC 2012).

### **Group Outcome**

In the late 1980s, the government held negotiations with both the MNLF and MILF to diminish tensions between the groups. The government and the MILF signed a peace agreement in 1997 following a spree of violent MILF attacks. In 2000, however, President Joseph Estrada declared an all out war on separatist groups, including the MILF. This war resulted in major losses for the MILF. As a response, the MILF declared a Jihad on the Philippine government. The war ended in 2001 with the election of a new president. Peace talks subsequently restarted. In 2003, Salamat renounced the use of terrorism in the MILF (Crenshaw 2015).

Negotiations leading up to the Memorandum of Agreement for Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) began in 2006 (Global Security 2015). In 2008, the MILF and the Philippine government signed the MOA-AD, which provided the MILF with a larger autonomous region than previous agreements. Nevertheless, public outcry, protest from the MNLF, and the ruling of the Philippine Supreme Court against the MOA-AD destroyed the agreement (Crenshaw 2015). In 2010, the MILF became particularly concerned about the ability of the Philippine government to negotiate a long term peace agreement due to the Philippine government's corruption and refusal to acknowledge points of agreement in the failed 2008 peace treaty (Global Security 2015).

As of 2012, the MILF has been considered the largest and most powerful separatist group in the Philippines (Crenshaw 2015). Some reports suggest the MILF has worked with local Philippine police to stop crime (Refworld 2007, 3).

\*Note on events since 2012: The newest development between the MILF and the Philippine government is a 2014 agreement regarding the creation of Bangsamoro, an autonomous state in Mindanao (Conciliation Resources). On June 16, 2015, MILF began the process of disarmament and reintegration into society (Global Security 2015).

### Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: New MNLF (Crenshaw 2015; Jones and Libicki 2008, 168), MNLF-Reformist Group (Gleditsch 2011, 346).

Group Formation: 1977 (Crenshaw 2015; Jones and Libicki 2008, 168)

Group End (Outcome): Active (Crenshaw 2015)

## Philippines, Part 2: 1980-1991 Last Updated: 26 May 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T968	6 APRIL LIBERATION MOVEMENT		1980	1980
T36	ALEX BONCAYAO BRIGADE (ABB)		1984	2008
T1138	JIHAD BRIGADES		1987	1987
T1616	ANTI COMMUNIST VIGILANTE PATROL		1988	1988
T1647	BLACK FOREST COMMAND		1989	1989
T1884	REFORM OF THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT		1989	1991
T1717	GOD OUR FATHER CULT		1990	1990
T4	ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG)	7-May-93	1991	2012

- I. 6 APRIL LIBERATION MOVEMENT  
Min. Group Date: 1980  
Max. Group Date: 1980  
Onset: NA

Aliases: 6 April Liberation Movement, April 6th Liberation Movement

### Part 1. Bibliography

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\*Note: The Neher source appears to incorrectly cite the date of April 6 protests, after which the group is named, in 1979 when the protest in fact took place in 1978.

## **Part 2. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The 6 April Liberation Movement, a guerrilla group, formed in opposition to the imposition of martial law by Ferdinand Marcos (UPI 1980; Moritz 1980). The group took its name after one of the largest protests Marcos ever faced: the April 6, 1978, protest of the parliamentary elections (UPI 1980). Although the group's goals appear to have centered on the reversal of martial law, the group continued attacks after the government lifted martial law (Kamm 1981; Moritz 1980). The 6 April Liberation Movement committed a wave of bombings in 1980 in the Philippines, killing an American and injuring between 60 and 70 people (UPI 1984; Kamm 1981). Earlier attacks lack documentation. Self-exiled Benigno Aquino Jr. (based in the United States), reportedly led the group and/or the Light a Fire Movement (Moritz 1980).

### **Geography**

The 6 April Liberation Movement claimed responsibility for a wave of bomb attacks in Manila in 1980 (Moritz 1980).

### **Organizational Structure**

The leadership and number of members of the 6 April Liberation Movement are unknown (Neher 1981, 269). Self-exiled Benigno Aquino Jr. (based in the United States), however, may have led the group. The government suspected Rolando Montiel as a leader of 6 April Liberation activities, as Montiel was implicated in the bombing of the American Society of Travel Agent's Convention (Kamm 1981). Steve Psinakis recruited terrorists in America to bomb government buildings and properties owned by Marcos (UPI 1984).

### **External Ties**

Filipinos in California assisted the 6 April Liberation Movement (UPI 1984). Members of the group trained in Arizona and federal records show them testing bombs in the Arizona desert (UPI 1984). The April 6 Movement may have had close ties to the Light a Fire movement, with reports that opposition figures based in the U.S. held lead roles in both groups. However, the April 6 Movement tended to carry out bombings while the Light a Fire Movement tended toward arson (UPI 1984). A suspected April 6 Movement bomber, who was arrested in 1981, allegedly had ties to the Catholic-based opposition to Marcos (Kamm 1981).

According to a 1984 investigation by *The Arizona Republic*, a retired U.S. special forces sergeant allegedly trained four groups related to the April 6 Movement and Light a Fire Movement in detonating explosives in the desert outside of Tucson, Arizona. The militants reportedly returned to the Philippines with smuggled bombs. This alleged training was investigated for multiple years by federal grand juries based in San Francisco. The training was allegedly supported by Filipinos who lived in California (UPI 1984).

### **Group Outcome**

The government stepped up security measures in Manila as a reaction to the 1980 wave of bombings. This included road checks of vehicles and random body searches-- "the tightest security measures seen in Manila since World War II" (Moritz 1980). In 1981, the government arrested a suspect of the bombings without clear charges and detained him in isolation, even though the government had said it had recently lifted martial law (Kamm 1981). Beginning in the early 1980s, alleged organizers of the training camps in Arizona were subjects of U.S. federal grand juries investigations, and two were charged in Filipino military courts (UPI 1984).

### **Part 3. Proposed Changes**

Aliases: Light a Fire Movement (Moritz 1980)

Group Formation: 1979 (UPI 1984)



Group End (Outcome): 1980 (policing)

II. ALEX BONCAYAO BRIGADE (ABB)

Min. Group Date: 1984

Max. Group Date: 2008

Onset: NA

Aliases: Alex Boncayao Brigade (Abb), Alex Boncayao Brigade, Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (Rpa-Abb)

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## **Part 2. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The ABB formed as a splinter of the NPA, which was the armed wing of the CPP (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; Federation of American Scientists 2004). The Manila-Rizal committee, a committee in the NPA, desired that the NPA focus on urban terrorism instead of traditional rural guerilla style warfare (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). In 1984, Felimon “Popoy” Lagman renamed the Committee the Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB) after a deceased committee member (MITP Knowledge Base 2008).

The ABB first came to attention as a violent group for an attack in May 1984 (Kushner 2002, 26). The ABB primarily sought regime change (Jones and Libicki 2008, 144). In March 2000, the group attacked the Department of Energy and Shell Headquarters to protest the rising gas prices (Federation of American Scientists 2004).

### **Geography**

The most influential ABB factions operate on Luzon, Negros, and the Visayas. The ABB attacked the Department of Energy in Manila (Federation of American Scientists 2004).

### **Organizational Structure**

The group has an estimated 500 members (Federation of American Scientists 2004; Jones 2008, 144). ABB hit men groups were known as “sparrow squads.” Lagman led the ABB until his arrest in 1994. Nilo de la Cruz later led the group. Under de la Cruz’s leadership, the group engaged in more industrial terrorist activities (Kushner 2002, 27).

### **External Ties**

The ABB broke away from the CPP in the mid-1980s. Since then, the ABB and NPA have attacked each other’s members (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). The ABB formed an alliance with the Revolutionary Proletarian Army in 1997 (Kushner 2002, 27; American Federation of Scientists 2004).

### **Group Outcome**

In 1994, a series of arrests of ABB members, including the arrest of the commanding officer Felimon Lagman, weakened the organization (Global Security n.d. ; Kushner 2002, 27). In retaliation, the ABB murdered prominent government officials in 1996 (Global Security n.d.). After Lagman’s arrest, Sergio Romero led the ABB but was suspected of using the ABB as a vehicle for other criminal activities (Leifer 2013, 51). Romero was then arrested in 1997 (Leifer 2013, 51).

The ABB signed a truce with the Filipino Government in December 2000 (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). The terms of this truce included the release of ABB members (Kushner 2002, 27). When Gloria Arroyo assumed the presidency in 2001, the treaty terms were brought under examination (Kushner 2002, 27). The ABB compliance with the treaty is unclear. (Kushner 2002, 27; Martin 2013, 38). The group's last known violent incident was in 2008 (Global Terrorism Database 2016).

### **Part 3. Proposed Changes**

Aliases: ABB (Federation of American Scientists 2004)

Group Formation: No Proposed Changes

Group End (Outcome): There is conflicting information about whether the group has abided by the terms of a 2000 peace treaty (Kushner 2002 pg 27; Martin 2013)

- III. JIHAD BRIGADES  
Min. Group Date: 1987  
Max. Group Date: 1987  
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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- Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans 1987, [https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=vq\\_8Zm-D\\_kQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR4&dq=%22jihad+brigade%22+philippines&ots=8NEKVTL8yP&sig=Vm6qtplyKkUxNynscU97Pnn1efo#v=onepage&q=%22jihad%20brigade%22&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=vq_8Zm-D_kQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR4&dq=%22jihad+brigade%22+philippines&ots=8NEKVTL8yP&sig=Vm6qtplyKkUxNynscU97Pnn1efo#v=onepage&q=%22jihad%20brigade%22&f=false), p. 14

### **Part 2. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The Jihad Brigades first came to attention as a violent group on April 27, 1987, in Manila (GTD 2006; Washington Post 1987). The group reportedly attacked in retaliation for U.S. bomb raids in Libya in 1986 (Jones 1987). The group used explosives and firearms

(GTD 2006). Based on its name, the group was thought to have an Islamic ideology (Jones 1987). The group's goals are unknown.

### **Geography**

The Jihad Brigades committed one attack in a Manila suburb (GTD 2006; Washington Post 1987).

### **Organizational Structure**

Based on its name, the group was thought to have an Islamic ideology (Jones 1987).

### **External Ties**

One news source reported that a suspected attacker spoke with a "non-Filipino accent" when he called a news outlet to claim responsibility. No further information about the attacker is available. The group reportedly attacked in retaliation for U.S. bomb raids in Libya in 1986 (Jones 1987).

### **Group Outcome**

Following its first attack, the group was not heard from again.

## **Part 3. Proposed Changes**

Aliases: No additional aliases encountered

Group Formation: 1987 (Global Terrorism Database)

Group End (Outcome): Their last known attack is in 1987 and then they disappear (Jones 1987)

## **IV. ANTI COMMUNIST VIGILANTE PATROL**

Min. Group Date: 1988

Max. Group Date: 1988

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Note: this does not appear to be a specific group, but a diffuse set of militia groups used in counterinsurgency operations.

## **Part 1. Bibliography**

- Seth Mydans, "RIGHT-WING VIGILANTES SPREADING IN PHILIPPINES," New York Times, April 4, 1987, <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/04/world/right-wing-vigilantes-spreading-in-philippines.html?pagewanted=all>
- GTD Perpetrator 3991, Global Terrorism Database, START Project, Last Updated June 2016, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3991>
- Gregg Jones, "Philippine vigilantes take up fight against communists," St. Petersburg Times, March 29, 1987. Lexis.
- 

## **Part 2. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The Anti-Communist Vigilante Patrol, which comprised of right-wing militia groups, first came to attention as a violent entity in 1986. In the group's first attack, three men gunned down a well-known communist hit man in an urban shantytown. The attack sparked the proliferation of copycat armed vigilante groups across the country. The Philippine government initially supported the idea of anti-communist vigilantes. As these groups developed, however, they seemed beyond state control and a source of terror in their own right (Mydans 1987).

The local militia in Davao formed the Alsa Masa, which was considered the original vigilante group to form after the 1986 attack. Alsa Masa retook territory controlled by the communist insurgency and set up armed patrols, checkpoints, a taxation system, summary justice, and mandatory recruitment. This system ironically shared similarities with the system of their Communist antagonists (Mydans 1987).

Anti-Communist vigilante groups aimed to rid their local neighborhoods of Communist influences, push communist groups underground, and thwart communist insurgent groups in the Philippines (Mydans 1987). For example, on the island Cebu, the Citizens Against Communism Army (CACAA) sent out armed patrol groups and conducted guerilla-style raids (Mydans 1987). In Mindanao and Cebu, right-wing vigilantes have joined with machete armed religious cults, known as the "Tadtad" or "Chop Chop." These cults often ritually mutilated their victims and believed that bullets would not harm them (Mydans 1987). In Cabatuan, on May 4, 1988, these vigilante groups used automatic firearms to assassinate Rene Corder of the League of Filipino students (GTD 2016).

### **Geography**

The Anti-Communist Vigilante Patrol's first attack occurred in the urban shantytown Agdao. The subsequent vigilante groups spread across the country, notably in Manila, Cebu City, Davao and the Mindanao region (Mydans 1987). Many vigilante groups hail

from mountain villages. One anti-Communist vigilante group originated from Luas (Jones 1987, 1).

### **Organizational Structure**

The Anti-Communist Vigilante Patrol appears to encompass a diffuse set of militia groups. The government estimated that there were 10,000 total vigilantes on various islands in the Philippines (Jones 1987, 1).

Tire-dealer Rolando Cagay led the Alsa Masa-- the original vigilante group. The Alsa had weekly benefit dances to fund their fight (Mydans 1987).

### **External Ties**

The Anti-Communist Vigilante groups' most prominent adversary was the New People's Army (NPA) (Jones 1987, 1).

Initially, the anti-communist vigilantes received, at the very least, verbal support from Aquino's government. These groups, however, later began clashing with the Filipino military (Mydans 1987).

External coordination of these groups remains unknown (Mydans 1987).

### **Group Outcome**

Initially, President Corazon C. Aquino and his Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos encouraged Anti-Communist Vigilante groups as way to deal with communist insurgencies. However, some anti-communists vigilantes began to clash with the Filipino military. In an attempt to stop violence from both communist and anti-communist militants, President Aquino's government ordered villages to form "unarmed vigilante groups" (Mydans 1987). The groups' last known violent incident occurred in 1988.

### **Part 3. Proposed Changes**

Aliases: Citizens Against Communism Army (CACA) (Mydans 1987), Alsa Masa (Mydans 1987), Tadtad (Mydans 1987), ChopChop (Mydans 1987), Causa (Mydans 1987)

Group Formation: (1986) (Mydans 1987)

Group End (Outcome): 1988

- V. BLACK FOREST COMMAND  
Min. Group Date: 1989

Max. Group Date: 1989

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- GTD Perpetrator 4395, Global Terrorism Database, START Project, Last Updated June 2016, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=4395>
- “General tells of army plot in Philippines,” Globe and Mail, June 28, 1988. Lexis.

### **Part 2. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

On September 9, 1989, the Black Forest Command attacked the Manila Armory (GTD 2016). In the attack, the group exclusively used firearms (Ibid.). The group sought to bring former President Ferdinand Marcos back from exile (Globe and Mail 1998). A Filipino general also publicly attributed the group to a raid on a police depot on June 11, 1988. The group stole 25 guns (Globe and Mail 1988).

#### **Geography**

The Black Forest Command committed one attack, which occurred in Manila (GTD 2016).

#### **Organizational Structure**

The group was composed of ex-soldiers, who had defected from the Filipino army. The group remained loyal to Marcos, who the military had led in deposing in 1986 (Globe and Mail 1998). Most members of the Black Forest Command reportedly received compensation to commit the attacks. Marcos allegedly indirectly financed the group (Globe and Mail 1998).

#### **External Ties**

Funding for the group reportedly came indirectly from Marcos (Globe and Mail 1998). The Black Forest Command is not known to have had any other external support (Globe and Mail 1998).

#### **Group Outcome**

Following its only confirmed attack on September 9, 1989, the group was not heard from again (GTD 2016).

### **Part 3. Proposed Changes**

Aliases: No aliases encountered

Group Formation: no proposed changes

Group End (Outcome): no proposed changes

#### VI. REFORM OF THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT

Min. Group Date: 1989

Max. Group Date: 1991

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

#### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- Frank Cibulka (1999) The Philippine foreign policy of the Ramos administration: The quest for security of a weak state, *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 7:1, 108-134
- GTD Perpetrator 1568, Global Terrorism Database, START Project, Last Updated June 2016, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1568>
- "14th Infantry Battalion "Avenger"," Armed Forces of the Philippines, Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/philippines/14in.htm>
- Steven Erlanger, "Aquino and the Military: A Threat, but Protection," *New York Times*, Dec. 8, 1989, <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/08/world/aquino-and-the-military-a-threat-but-protection.html>

#### **Part 2. Narrative**

##### **Group Formation**

The Reform Armed Forces Movement (RAM) formed in the Philippine Military Academy under the leadership of a group of junior officers (Erlanger 1989). The RAM played a key role in organizing the removal of President Ferdinand Marcos from power (on August 28, 1987) and the installation of Corazon C. Aquino as president (Erlanger 1989). The RAM targeted businesses, foreign and Filipino government buildings, and military targets (Global Security).

The RAM officers' motive for the coup allegedly emerged from a growing consensus that the government was incompetent and that the military deserved greater political influence given its training (Erlanger 1989). The RAM's first violent incident occurred in 1989 (GTD 2017).



## **Geography**

The RAM conducted attacks in Manila, Florida Blanca, and Cotabato City (GTD 2016).

## **Organizational Structure**

A colonel who had been cashiered, named Gregorio B. Honasan, was one RAM leader in the 1987 coup (Erlanger 1989). The RAM was formed in the Philippine Military Academy by a group of Junior officers (Erlanger 1989). When the RAM was still at the Philippine Military Academy its members were known as the “RAM” boys (Ibid.).

## **External Ties**

The Young Officers Union (YOU) has been linked to RAM (Cibulka 1999).

## **Group Outcome**

The group’s last known violent incident occurred in 1991 (Erlanger 1989; GTD 2017). Although military disciplinary action may have occurred, there are no records of public arrests against the group (Cibulka 1999). Reasons for the group’s termination are unknown.

## **Part 3. Proposed Changes**

Aliases: RAM (Global Security: Erlanger 1989)

Group Formation: 1986 (Cibulka 1989, pg 121)

Group End (Outcome): no proposed changes

VII. GOD OUR FATHER CULT  
Min. Group Date: 1990  
Max. Group Date: 1990  
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

## **Part 1. Bibliography**

- GTD Perpetrator 2142, Global Terrorism Database, START Project, Last Updated June 2016, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2142>
- Searched lexis:
  - “God our father cult”

- God our father cult philippines
- Searched google:
  - “God our father cult”
  - “God our father cult” philippines

## **Part 2. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

On March 23, 1990, the God our Father Cult committed an attack described as a melee in the Philippine city, El Salvador. The group attacked a military target (GTD 2016). The group’s ideology and goals are unidentified.

### **Geography**

The God our Father Cult perpetrated an attack in the Philippine city, El Salvador (GTD 2016).

### **Organizational Structure**

No information could be found about this group’s organizational structure.

### **External Ties**

No information could be found about this group’s external ties.

### **Group Outcome**

No information could be found about this group’s outcome.

## **Part 3. Proposed Changes**

Aliases: No proposed changes

Group Formation: 1990

Group End (Outcome): 1990 (disappear) (GTD 2016)

- VIII. ABU SAYYAF GROUP  
 Min. Group Date: 1991  
 Max. Group Date: 2012  
 Onset: 1993

Aliases: Abu Sayyaf Group (Asg), Abu Sayyaf Group, Al-Harakat Al-Islamiyah, Bearer Of The Sword

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- Abu Sayyaf Group (Asg), Terrorist Organization Profile No. 204, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MBSjzdJ74dLv\\_SbHEa6mRxBdxV99Sf6LMrOJibOMyEY/edit](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MBSjzdJ74dLv_SbHEa6mRxBdxV99Sf6LMrOJibOMyEY/edit)
- “Philippines unrest: Who are the Abu Sayyaf group?,” BBC, Last Modified 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36138554>
- “Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),” National Counterterrorism Center, Last Modified 2014, [https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/abu\\_sayyaf.html](https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/abu_sayyaf.html)
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- “Abu Sayyaf Group,” Terrorism Profiles, Mackenzie Institute, 2015, <http://mackenzieinstitute.com/abu-sayyaf-group-asg-2/>
- Martha Crenshaw. “Abu Sayyaf Group,” Mapping Militants Project. Last Modified 2015. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/152>
- “Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),” Australian National Security, <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/AbuSayyafGroup.aspx>
- “Who are the Abu Sayyaf Group?” CNN, 2016, <http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/04/08/Abu-Sayyaf-terrorist-organization.html>
- Fellman, Zack. Abu Sayyaf Group. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011.

### **Part 2. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, a former MNLF member, formed the Abu Sayyaf Group in 1991 (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Mackenzie Institute 2015; CNN 2016; Fellman 2011). Janjalani became dissatisfied with the MNLF’s strategy and developed ASG as a more radical alternative to establishing a Muslim Moro State (Crenshaw 2015; Fellman 2011). The splinter group is separatist and Islamist (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

ASG’s first recorded use of violence was a grenade attack in Zamboanga City, on April 4, 1991, that left two Christian Americans dead (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015). ASG specifically targets Christians and foreigners in their attacks, though most of their victims are Filipino (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009).

#### **Geography**

Originally, ASG aimed to establish an independent Muslim state in Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, Borneo, and Southern Thailand (MITP Knowledge Base 2008).

The majority of ASG's attacks occurred in the Mindanao and Sulu regions (Crenshaw 2015). In 1991, ASG attacked American Christians in Zamboanga City (Crenshaw 2015). In 2016, ASG perpetrated an attack in Basilan (Crenshaw 2015). There have also been numerous ASG attacks in Manila (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015).

In 2000, ASG conducted a kidnapping in Sipadan, Malaysia (Mackenzie Institute 2015). In 2014, ASG killed 21 Muslims on the island of Jolo in the southwest Philippines. (Crenshaw 2015).

### **Organizational Structure**

Abdujarak Janjalani initially led ASG (Crenshaw 2015). Janjalani radicalized after studying with the Islamic Tabligh and travelling around the Middle East, specifically Libya, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (Crenshaw 2015). The newest ASG leader is Isnilon Hapilon (CNN 2016).

ASG uses traditional clan and familial structures to organize its factions (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

ASG primarily recruited members young Muslim men in and around Mindanao (Australian National Security n.d.). Recruited members typically had few other career options due to the struggling Philippine economy (Crenshaw 2015).

ASG has an estimated 200-500 core members, and up to 2,000 supporters (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; Council on Foreign Relations 2009). Other estimates suggest that ASG has approximately 400 members (BBC 2016; Mackenzie Institute 2015; Australian National Security).

Al Qaeda funded ASG and trained their members (Crenshaw 2015). Mohammad Jamal Khalifa provided financial support, and Ramzi Yousef provided tactical support for ASG (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Fellman 2011).

After the loss of Al Qaeda support, ASG relied on ransom and extortion to fund its activities (Crenshaw 2015; MITP Knowledge Base 2008; Australian National Security; Mackenzie Institute 2015). Along with ransom, ASG procures funding through blackmail, extortion, smuggling, and marijuana sales (Crenshaw 2015).

### **External Ties**

ASG has an informal connection with Al Qaeda because Janjalani met Bin Laden while studying in the Middle East (Crenshaw 2015; Fellman 2011). ASG may have been secretly funded by Libya (Crenshaw 2015). After Janjalani's death in 1998, ASG split into two factions: one led by Abubakar's brother Khadaffy Janjalani, and the other led by Galib Andang (also known as Commander Robot) (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2016; MITP Knowledge Base 2008; Fellman 2011). The two factions merged when Galib Andang was captured in 2003, but ASG has since operated as a collection of independent groups linked by a common purpose (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2016; Council on Foreign Relations 2009).

ASG has ties to Jemaah Islamiya (JI), the MILF, and Mujahidin Indonesia Timu (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; CNN 2016; BBC 2016). The extent of these ties is unclear. A professional bomb maker, Mohammad Khattab, was found deceased after fighting alongside ASG in the Philippines (BBC 2016).

In 2014, Isnilon Hapilon, as ASG leader, pledged his allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State in a YouTube video (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015; Australian National Security; CNN 2016).

ASG is unwilling to negotiate with the Philippine Government (Crenshaw 2015).

### **Group Outcome**

As of 2015, ASG has been active (Crenshaw 2015). The Philippine government has killed key ASG leaders such as Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, Khadafy Janjalani, Albader Parad, Abu Sulaima, and Alhamser Limbong, as well as arresting Galib Andang and Abdul Basir Lati (Crenshaw 2015; Fellman 2011). ASG has deteriorated from its religious roots and now engages in more criminal activity to disrupt the Philippine government and fund itself (MITP Knowledge Base 2008).

ASG suffered a major leadership blow when a 2006 US-led operation, known as "Oplan Ultimatum," killed Janjali. Consequently, ASG lost its last centralized leader (Fellman 2011; Mackenzie Institute 2015). His successor, Sulaiman, was killed in 2007 (Mackenzie Institute 2015). Leadership fell apart until Isnil Hapilon took over the group again and pledged allegiance to ISIS (Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Mackenzie Institute 2015; CNN 2016).

Recently, the Philippine Army and Police Force has targeted ASG (BBC 2016).

The U.S. military assisted the Philippine government in ending a nearly three week siege in the southern city of Marawi (Pitman 2017). The ASG and Maute militant groups had carried out the siege (Pitman 2017). On May 20, 2017, President Duterte declared martial law on the island of Mindanao (Branigin 2017).

### Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Mujahedeen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF) (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015), Al Harakat Al Islamiyya (AHA) , Al-Harakatul-Islamia, Al Harakat Al Aslamiya, Abou Sayaf Armed Band (ASAB), Abu Sayyef Group (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

Group Formation: No proposed changes

Group End (Outcome): Still Active

### Philippines, Part 3 Cases: 1992-2000 Last Updated: 26 May 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T1819	MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT SPLINTER GROUP		1992	1992
T242	JEMAAH ISLAMIYA		1993	2012
T260	KUMPULAN MUJAHIDIN MALAYSIA		1995	0
T801	REVOLUTIONARY PROLETARIAN ARMY (RPA)		1997	0
T702	REBOLUSYONARYONG PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA - PILIPINAS (RPM-P)		1998	0
T932	MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES (MLPP)		1998	0
T796	REBOLUSYONARYONG HUKBONG BAYAN (RHB)		1998	0
T2472	YOUNG OFFICER UNION OF THE NEW GENERATION AND REFORMIST ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (YOU-RAFP)		1998	2006
T924	NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT (PHILIPPINES)		1999	0
T819	ABDURAJAK JANJALANI BRIGADE (AJB)		1999	0
T1257	RAJAH SOLAIMAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT		2000	2005

## I. MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT SPLINTER GROUP

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

### Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 1844, Global Terrorism Database, Study of Terrorism And Responses to Terrorism Project, Last Modified June 2016, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1884>
- Search Proquest
  - “Moro national liberation front splinter group”
  - “Moro national liberation front” splinter group 1992
- Search Lexis
  - “Moro national liberation front splinter group”
  - “Moro national liberation front” splinter group 1992

### Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1992

Group End: 1992 (disappear)

### Part 3. Narrative

#### Group Formation

The Moro National Liberation Front Splinter Group first came to attention as violent in 1992 for the assassination of a local councilman (GTD 2016). Further information about the group could not be found. The research could not identify sufficient evidence to suggest this armed group operated independently from the Moro National Liberation Front.

#### Geography

The 1996 attack by the Moro National Liberation Front Splinter Group occurred in Dinaig, Philippines (GTD 2016). The research could not identify sufficient evidence to suggest this armed group operated independently from the Moro National Liberation Front.

#### Organizational Structure

No information could be found about this group's organizational structure. The research could not identify sufficient evidence to suggest this armed group operated independently from the Moro National Liberation Front.

### **External Ties**

No information could be found about this group's external ties. The research could not identify sufficient evidence to suggest this armed group operated independently from the Moro National Liberation Front.

### **Group Outcome**

No information could be found about this group's outcome. The research could not identify sufficient evidence to suggest this armed group operated independently from the Moro National Liberation Front.

- II. JEMAAH ISLAMIYA  
Min. Group Date: 1993  
Max. Group Date: 2012  
Onset: NA

Aliases: Jemaah Islamiya (Ji), Jemaah Islamiah

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- "Profile: Jemaah Islamiah." 2012. BBC. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16850706>
- "Jemaah Islamiyah." Last Updated 2009. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/background/jemaah-islamiyah-aka-jemaah-islamiah>
- "Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)." N.D. Australian National Security. Australian Government. <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/JemaahIslamiyahJI.aspx>
- "Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)." N.D. Counter Extremism Project. <https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/jemaah-islamiyah-ji>
- Martha Crenshaw. "Jemaah Islamiyah." Last Updated 2015. Mapping Militant Organizations. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/251>
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- David Gordon and Samuel Lindo. "Jemaah Islamiya." 2011. Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Transnational Threats Project. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Case Study Number 6. [https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy\\_files/files/publication/111101\\_Gordon\\_JemaahIslamiyah\\_WEB.pdf](https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/111101_Gordon_JemaahIslamiyah_WEB.pdf)



- “Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI).” 2016. Mackenzie Institute.  
<http://mackenzieinstitute.com/jemah-islamiyyah-ji/>
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- United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 - Philippines, 2 June 2016, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/57518d91a.html>
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- “Jemaah Islamiya.” Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3613, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6\\_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit)

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Jema'a Islamiyya, Jema'a Islamiyyah, Jema'ah Islamiyah, Jema'ah Islamiyyah, Jemaa Islamiya, Jemaa Islamiyya, Jemaah Islamiyya, Jemaa Islamiyyah, Jemaah Islamiyyah, Jemaah Islamiya, Jamaah Islamiyah, Jamaa Islamiya, Jemaah Islam, Jemahh Islamiyah, Jama'ah Islamiyah, Al-Jama'ah Al Islamiyyah, Islamic Group and Islamic Community (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Group Formation: JI was formed in 1993, but the first recorded attack was in December of 2000 (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Crenshaw 2015).

Group End: JI is still active. Their last successful attack was in 2009 (Crenshaw 2015; Counter Extremism Project n.d.)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

There are reports of groups calling themselves Jemaah Islamiyah as early as the 1970's, but these groups were informal gatherings of Indonesian Muslims with similar beliefs (Global Security n.d.). JI was founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in the late 1980s when they fled from Indonesia to Malaysia (Crenshaw 2015; Australian National Security n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 3), to escape prison sentences for their affiliation with Darul Islam (DI), a former Indonesian insurgency (Crenshaw 2015).

In 1992 Sungkar had an ideological dispute with fellow DI leader Ajengan Masduki, which led him to leave DI and form JI (Gordon 2011 pg 3). JI became an official group in 1993 (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

Jl's goal was to overthrow the Indonesian government and establish an Islamic State encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and the southern Philippines (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Global Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016; MIPT Knowledge Base 2008). In Malaysia, they gathered a group of Southeast Asian Muslims to send to Afghanistan for military training and for fighting the USSR (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Gordon 2011, pg 3; Mackenzie Institute 2016). While training in Afghanistan Jl members made lasting connections with Afghan militant leaders, including Osama Bin Laden (Gordon 2011, pg 3). Al Qaeda influenced Jl leaders to use violent tactics to achieve their goals (BBC 2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2009).

Jl relocated several training camps to the Philippines by the mid-1990's (Crenshaw 2015). The first verifiable attack by Jl was a string of attacks on Christian Churches and clergy members throughout Southeast Asia in December of 2000 (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Refworld 2016 pg 3). In the early 2000s, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir announced the focus of Jl attacks would shift from Southeast Asian Christians to Western and specifically American targets (Crenshaw 2015). The attacks then began to occur in public places, as Jl became more willing to have Muslim lives become collateral damage in their attacks (Crenshaw 2015; Gordon 2011, pg 4). Jl has also been recorded to have opposed Jewish interests (Australian National Security n.d.).

## **Geography**

Jl was founded in Malaysia by Indonesians (Crenshaw 2015; Gordon 2011, pg 3). Jl recruits originally trained in Afghanistan (Crenshaw 2015; Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

Jl established training camps in the southern Philippines by the mid 1990's (Crenshaw 2015; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 3). One such camp was within the MILF's Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao (Gordon 2011, pg 3). Jl members also trained in Pakistan (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 3). Jl relocated to Indonesia in 1998 in response to an economic and political crisis caused by the death of the Indonesian President (Crenshaw 2015; Gordon 2011 pg 3). Jl has branches in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, and the Philippines (BBC 2012; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Global Security n.d.).

Jl members attacked Christian churches and clergy members in West Java, Sumatra and Lombok (Crenshaw 2015; Gordon 2000, pg 4), as well as in Maluku and Sulawesi (Australian National Security n.d.). The majority of Jl's members are concentrated in Java (Australian National Security n.d.). Jl bombed Christian churches in Indonesia and the Philippines in December 2000 (Crenshaw 2015; Australian National Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016). In 2002, Jl bombed nightclubs in Bali (Crenshaw 2015; BBC

2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Australian National Security n.d.; Global Security n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 1; Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Jl unsuccessfully planned to attack the American, Australian, Israeli, and British embassies in Singapore (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Australian National Security n.d.; Global Security n.d.). Jl bombed hotels and the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Australian National Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016). In 2005, there was a suicide bomber attacked attributed to Jl in Bali (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Gordon 2011 pg 1; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Jl has sent members to fight in the Islamic resistance in Syria (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Jl had a cell in Australia (Australian National Security n.d.).

### **Organizational Structure**

Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir founded Jl (Crenshaw 2015; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Abdullah Sungkar died from natural causes in 1998 in Indonesia (Crenshaw 2015; Gordon 2011, pg 3; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Noordin Top was the leader of the cell that perpetrated the 2004 Jakarta and 2005 Bali violent attacks (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Gordon 2011, pg 4). Noordin Top was a prominent Jl leader until he was killed by Indonesian police in 2009 (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Jl was estimated to have more than 900 members in Indonesia alone in 2007 (Refworld 2016, pg 1; Crenshaw 2015), and around 3,000 total members in 2012 (Crenshaw 2015). Jl recruits members from a network of Islamic boarding schools that teach an extremist interpretation of Islam (Crenshaw 2015; Australian National Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Jl also recruits from prisons and religious study groups (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Jl recruits from social outreach programs, such as providing relief after natural disasters or providing opportunities for the poor (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Global Security n.d.).

Al Qaeda provided funding for Jl during its' formation (Crenshaw 2015). Since then, Jl has acquired funding through charities, legal and illegal business, member contributions, and financiers from the Middle East, specifically Yemen and Saudi Arabia (Crenshaw 2015). Jl split into two factions; members who wanted to use violence to achieve their goals, and proselytizers who wanted to spread Jl ideology through preaching (BBC 2012; Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

Jl has a charter and operational guide known as "General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah" (PUPJI) which describes Jl's governing religious principles and objectives (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 3). This charter describes the operational organization of Jl; Jl is divided into

regional units referred to as Mantiqi (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 3). Each Mantiqi serves a different administrative purpose: Mantiqi I in Singapore and Malaysia finances JI operations; Mantiqi II in Indonesia is where most of JI's attacks occur; Mantiqi III includes training camps in Mindanao, Borneo and Sulawesi; Mantiqi IV in Australia and West Papua provides fundraising (Ibid.). Each Mantiqi is divided into smaller cells known as Wakalah (Ibid.). The decentralized nature of JI allows it to continue its activities even when important leadership is arrested or killed (Ibid.).

### **External Ties**

Al Qaeda provided tactical advice and funding for JI during its formation (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Australian National Security n.d.; Global Security n.d.). Some refer to JI as Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian wing (Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Gordon 2011 pg 3).

Ji members continue to train with the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Gordon 2011 pg 3). Iraq, Libya, and Syria all financed and supported JI prior to 1987 (Global Security n.d.).

Ji once had an Australian cell called Mantiqi IV that opposed Jewish interests in Australia but never committed a violent attack against them (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). JI regional leaders were involved with a second plane attack on the United States that was meant to follow the 9/11 bombings (Australian National Security n.d.).

Ji and the MILF had strong ties (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012; Australian National Security n.d.; Gordon 2011 pg 3). JI also has ties to ASG (Australian National Security n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 3). After the Bali bombings, radical splinter groups and associates continued to perpetrate violent attacks in the name of JI (Crenshaw 2015); these are collectively known as non-structural JI (Gordon 2011, pg 4). JI members have worked with the Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI) (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Global Security n.d.).

Ji has sent members to fight in the Islamic resistance in Syria (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). In 2014, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir declared JI's allegiance to ISIS from prison, while active leadership of JI is firmly anti-ISIS (Crenshaw 2015). JI has ties to many other Southeast Asian groups also inspired by DI, including Jamaah Anshurat Tauhid, Front Pembela Islam, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, KOMPAK, Lashkar Jundullah, and Majelis Dakwah Umat Indonesia (Crenshaw 2015; Australian National Security n.d.). JI has extensive ties with the Nusra Front (Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

## Group Outcome

The Singaporean, Philippine, and Malaysian governments have all actively opposed JI operations within their own country (Crenshaw 2015).

Indonesia resisted foreign pressure, especially from the United States, to take action against JI until the Bali bombings of 2002 (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009). After the government persecution following the Bali bombings, JI leaders wanted to shift the group's purpose to religious outreach rather than violent public attacks (Crenshaw 2015; Global Security n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 2). The bombings and ensuing violence in Bali in 2005 shifted the public's view of JI and made it acceptable for politicians to persecute JI (Gordon 2011, pg 6). By the mid 2000s, JI was crippled by the national security efforts of several countries (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012). The Indonesian Government has targeted and disabled the Mantiqi system (Gordon 2011, pg 6). JI has been downsized to the territory of Mantiqi II, and is likely not growing in size (Refworld 2016 pg 1).

Southeast Asian governments have arrested over 400 members and essential leaders of JI since 2002 while also killing much of JI's leadership (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012). JI splinter groups and other extremist groups in Indonesia have been more active than JI lately (Crenshaw 2015). In 2007, a suspected JI member, Wiwin Kalahe, turned himself in and informed the Indonesian authorities about a number of JI safe houses in Java (Refworld 2016 pg 1-2). The Indonesian government then put the safe houses under surveillance (Ibid.). They followed two men from the safe house and were led to a home with a weapon stockpile (Ibid.). There, the police arrested four men and killed one; one of the arrested men led them to a weapon and explosives cache (Ibid.). The last recorded attack by JI is in 2009 (Crenshaw 2015; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). In 2015, Philippine armed forces raided a JI camp in Mamasapano and forty-three Philippine police officers were killed (Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

### III. KUMPULAN MUJAHIDIN MALAYSIA

Min. Group Date: 1995

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (Kmm), KMM, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia

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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Malaysian Mujahideen Movement, Malaysian Mujahideen Group (Global Security n.d.) MASSA-Pakindo, Halaqoh-Pakindo (Aslan 2009 pg 119 & 121)

Group Formation: KMM was formed in 1995 (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; Abdullah 2016; Aslan 2009 pg 114). KMM was first discovered by the Malaysian government in 2001, KMM perpetrated attacks beforehand, but not all were recorded.

Group End: KMM stopped using violence in 2003. Arrests made by the Malaysian government crippled KMM and it is no longer active.

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

Zainon Ismail established KMM in 1995 (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; Abdullah 2016; Aslan 2009, 114). Some sources suggest the group formed in 1996 (Arosoaie 2016). KMM was originally known as MASSA-Pakindo (Aslan

2009, 119). KMM originally operated as a secret organization within the PAS (Aslan 2009, 119). Zainon Ismail founded KMM by gathering members of Halaqah Pakindo, a group of Malaysian ex-Mujahidin. These early members had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets (Abdullah 2015, 2 & 13). MASSA-Pakindo became KMM when Zainon Ismail handed over leadership to Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz in 1999 (Aslan 2009, 121).

KMM seeks to establish an Islamic state (Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara) encompassing Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Southern Philippines (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; Arosoaie 2016; MITP Knowledge Base 2008; US Department of State 2005). KMM aims to overthrow the Mahathir government (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). KMM kills Muslims who converted to another religion or denounced Islam (Abdullah 2016, 16; Aslan 2009, 120). The Malaysian police suspected that three Indonesian extremists inspired KMM to use militant strategies to achieve their goals (Federation of American Scientists 2003). Salafi-Wahhabi tenets influenced KMM (Arosoaie 2016). KMM's first attack was a robbery in Selangor (Arosoaie 2016).

## **Geography**

The group is transnational but primarily operates in Malaysia with secondary operations in the Philippines and Indonesia. KMM reportedly has branches in the Malaysian states of Perak, Johor, Kedah, Selangor, Terengganu, and Kelantan. KMM also has branches in the Federal Territories (Wilayah Persukutuan), including Kuala Lumpur (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; US Department of State 2005). KMM had a meeting in Kampung Seri Aman, Puchong to appoint a leader (Global Security n.d.). KMM has sent members to fight Christians in Ambon, Indonesia (Global Security n.d.; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). KMM bombed the port city of Klang in 2000 (Global Security n.d.). KMM bombed a Hindu temple in Kuala Lumpur in 2000 (Global Security n.d.; Abdullah 2016, 16; Aslan 2009, 148). KMM killed a provincial assembly legislator and raided a police arsenal in Kedah in November of 2000 (Global Security n.d.; Aslan 2009, 147; Jones 2005, 175). KMM members train in the Southern Philippines at the Abu Bakar and Hudaibiyah camps (Arosoaie 2016). KMM members from the Selangor cell trained in the Indonesian Mujahidin in Pulau Moti Halmahera, North Maluku, and Pulau Ngele-ngele Maluku (Abdullah 2016, 16)

## **Organizational Structure**

Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz became the leader of KMM in 1999 (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz is suspected to be a puppet leader appointed due to his father's reputation (Aslan 2009, 124). Abu Bakar Bashir and Hambali were suspected to have the real power (Aslan 2009, 124; MITP

Knowledge Base 2008). Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz studied in Pakistan, and visited Afghanistan after the Russians met defeat (Global Security n.d.).

KMM became more organized with Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz as the leader (Abdullah 2016, 14-17; Aslan 2009, 125-135). He established committees known as “Iujnah” (Abdullah 2016, 14-17; Aslan 2009, 125-135). Zainuri Kamarudin headed the Economic Committee. The Economic Committee generated funds from donations and membership funds; each member was expected to contribute between nine and seventeen Australian dollars a month (Abdullah 2016, 14-17; Aslan 2009, 125-135). Nik Adli himself was in charge of the Training Committee (Tarbiyyah). The Training Committee increased membership, poaching University students, and recruiting talented student leaders (Abdullah 2016, 14-17; Aslan 2009, 125-135). Solehan Abd Ghafar was the head of the Communications Committee. The Communications Committee transported members to and from Pakistan for military training (Abdullah 2016, 14-17; Aslan 2009, 125-135). The two committees permitted to use violence were the Operational committee led by Zulkifli Abd Hir, and the Mu’askar Committee (Military) led by Tajudin Abu Bakar (Abdullah 2016, 14-17; Aslan 2009, 125-135). The Operational committee’s job was to kill Muslims who converted to another religion or denounced Islam, use violence against non-Muslims and be prepared to launch Jihad against the Mahathir government (Abdullah 2016, 14-17; Aslan 2009, 125-135). The Mu’askar Committee served to assist the Operational Committee by obtaining weapons (Abdullah 2016, 14-17; Aslan 2009, 125-135). There were KMM cells in the Malaysian states of Perak, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, Selangor and Johore that were led by a leader with no committee members (Abdullah 2016, 14-17; Aslan 2009, 125-135).

KMM has an estimated to have 70-80 members (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). KMM recruited members through the Halaqa Pakindon to avoid government detection (Abdullah 2016, 13). Many KMM members went to Islamic schools in Pakistan, Egypt, and India (Arosoaie 2016). The majority of KMM members originated from the Malaysian states of Selangor, Kedah, Terengganu, Perak, Kelantan and Johor (Arosoaie 2016). KMM members train in the Southern Philippines at the Abu Bakar and Hudaibiyah camps (Arosoaie 2016). In April 2000, the Selangor cell sent two groups to train in Indonesia (Abdullah 2016, 16). To gain proficiency in military strategy, KMM members enlisted in the Askar Wataniya, a reserve of the Malaysian Army (Arosoaie 2016; Abdullah 2016, 23).

KMM is suspected to be self-funded (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; US Department of State 2005). KMM bought weapons from arms dealers in Southern Thailand and Batam island, Indonesia (Aslan 2009, 126).

***NOTE: (LT) There is a super informative chart on the organizational structure on page 15 of the Abdullah source***



## **External Ties**

KMM is reported to have connections with Laskar Jihad and the Thai separatist group PULO (Global Security n.d.; MITP Knowledge Base 2008.). KMM has sent members to fight Christians in Indonesia (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). Arrested members of KMM reported to have fought with the Afghan Mujahidin against the Soviets (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; Arosoaie 2016; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). Other arrested members reported having ties to Muslim separatist groups in Indonesia and the Philippines (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). The Malaysian government suspects smaller and more violent groups with the same ideology have splintered off KMM (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). KMM members became Malay IS members (Arosoaie 2016). KMM has ties with the KMK and the KPIP (Aslan 2009, pg 116). The Selangor cell of KMM, known as K3M, had close ties with JI and Al Qaeda (Arosoaie 2016). K3M became a more radical splinter of KMM (Aslan 2009, pg 141). KMM had close ties with JI and Al Qaeda (Abdullah 2016, pg 24; Aslan 2009, pg 114; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). JI and KMM members assisted KMM members with transportation to training camps (Abdullah 2016 pg 16). Relations between JI and KMM evolved through personal relationships of group members (Abdullah 2016, pg 23). JI then helped KMM meet with MILF leaders to work out a deal where KMM members could train at MILF camps, but the deal did not work out because KMM could not afford the payment the MILF requested (Abdullah 2016, pgs 23-24).

## **Group Outcome**

KMM was first discovered by the Malaysian government after a botched robbery on May 18th, 2001 (Aslan 2009, pg 114). In 2000, the Malaysian Government arrested 10 KMM members under the International security Act (ISA) (Global Security n.d.). 9 of the 10 members arrested in 2000 under the ISA had their detainments extended for two more years (Global Security n.d.). Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz was held by the Malaysian government under the ISA (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; Aslan 2009, pg 114; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). In 2002, the Malaysian government investigated over 200 suspected members of KMM (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). In 2003, the Malaysian government held 48 members of KMM under the ISA (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). The Malaysian government held KMM sympathizers as well as members under the ISA (Arosoaie 2016). When the Royal Malaysian Police began arresting “terrorists” they did not know the difference between JI and KMM members (Aslan 2009, pg 124). The Malaysian government’s constant monitoring and 2001-2002 arrests of the KMM members and sympathizers crippled the group’s ability to carry out violent acts (Arosoaie 2016; Aslan 2009 pg 162). No information could be found about Indonesian counterinsurgency operations against the group.

- **Flag Malay IS** → look up
- **Selangor cell** → favors Indonesia over Philippines → look up status of K3M in 2017
- **2002 context (9/11) key**

#### IV. REVOLUTIONARY PROLETARIAN ARMY (RPA)

Min. Group Date: 1997

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

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##### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: 1993 (Micaller 1997)

Group End: 1997 (merger with ABB Micaller 1997)

##### **Part 3. Narrative**

###### **Group Formation**

The RPA, also known as the Communist Hitmen, formed in 1993 as a splinter of the Communist Party of the Philippines (Micaller 1997, 1; Alquitran 2009). The RPA conducted political violence in urban areas, specifically cities, to launch a communist takeover of the Ramos administration. The RPA sought to target corrupt government officials, police, drug cartels, abusive capitalists, and counterinsurgency experts (Micaller 1997, 1).

### **Geography**

The RPA is based on the island of Negros (Micaller 1997, 1). Six RPA-ABB members attacked a Metropolitan Manila Development official, his son, and his driver in San Pedro, Laguna (Alquitran 2009). An RPA-ABB member stabbed another RPA-ABB member in Metro Manila District Jail in Bicutan, Taguig City (Alquitran 2009).

### **Organizational Structure**

Arturo Tabara led the RPA (Alquitran 2009). Carapali Lualhati led the RPA-ABB (Alquitran 2009). Sergio Romero, a RPA leader, announced that membership would increase after the RPA-ABB merger (Micaller 1997, 1). Group membership, organizational structure, source of funding, and source of membership are unknown.

### **External Ties**

The RPA merged with ABB to become the Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB) (Alquitran 2009; Micaller 1997, 1). Once the RPA and ABB merged, another communist party in the Philippines, known as the Revolutionary Workers Party, managed the group (Micaller 1997, 1). The RPA is political allies with the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas (RPMP) (Alquitran 2009). Communist insurgencies in Vietnam, Cuba and Nicaragua inspired the RPA (Micaller 1997 pg 2). There is no evidence of external support for the group.

### **Group Outcome**

The RPA merged with ABB in 1997 (Micaller 1997, 1; Oxford University Press 2008, 362). In 1997, the Philippine government declared that the RPA-ABB merger was merely propaganda (Micaller 1997, 2).

The RPA attempted to come to a peace agreement with the government during the Estrada administration. The RPA, along with the ABB and RPMP, signed a temporary peace agreement with the government in 2000. The merged RPA-ABB's last known violent attack occurred in 2009 (Alquitran 2009).

## **V. REBOLUSYONARYONG PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA - PILIPINAS (RPM-P)**

Min. Group Date: 1998  
Max. Group Date: 0  
Onset: NA

Aliases: Filipino Workers Party, Filipino Workers Party (Rpm-P), 0Rebolusyonyong Partido Ng Manggagawa - Pilipinas (Rpm-P)

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Kapatiran para sa Progresong Panlipunan (Brotherhood for Social Progress) (Targeted News Service 2013), RPA-ABB

Group Formation: 1995 (Philippines Government Development Plan 2011)

Group End: The group signed a peace agreement with the government in 2000, but fought against the NPA as late as 2010 (Santos and Santos 2010, 280).

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

RPM-P formed as the Central Mindanao Region branch of the CPP (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). As a CPP cadre, it focused on alliances with Moro groups, such as the MILF and MNLF, and the indigenous groups the Lumads and Moros (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). In 1992, representatives of the Central Mindanao Region, as well as two of the five other Mindanao regions signed a document questioning the CPP's leadership's policies regarding self-determination for minorities (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). In 1993, only the Central Mindanao region strongly disagreed with central CPP leadership. As a consequence, the Central Mindanao region leaders were expelled (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). In 1994, the still-intact Central Mindanao region cadre called a conference of all the rejected CPP members from around the Philippines and abroad (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). During that conference, the Central Mindanao region became the People's Communist Party (PCP) (Grenzeloos.org n.d.).

This pre-formation stage of the PCP lasted until an ideological summit in 1995, when the group officially formed (Grenzeloos.org n.d.; Philippines Government Development Plan 2011). In 1998, the PCP merged with the Visayas Committee Party and the Manila RIZAL (MR) Committee to become the RPM-P, a national group (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). In 1998, the armed wing of the RPM-P, the ABB/RPA also formed (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). Both the RPM-P and the ABB/RPA rejected Maoism (Philippines Government Development Plan Glossary 2011, 365).

Marxist and Leninist principles guided the RPM-P (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). The RPM-P aimed to create a just society, where the poor could also enjoy the benefits of economic development (United Nations Peacemaker 2002, 1).

### **Geography**

RPM-P originated in the Central Mindanao Region (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). The RPM-P held its first congress in a mountain base in Mindanao (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). The RPM-P had branches in Luzon and MR (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). The treaty with the Philippine government was signed in Quezon City (United Nations Peacemaker 2002, 1).

### **Organizational Structure**

The RPM-P had branches nationally (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). In 1998, during a formation congress, the RPM-P leadership was elected, and a constitution was written (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). The RPM-P has a core of approximately 3,000 members (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). In 2012, the RPM-P had an estimated 700 members (Asia News

Monitor 2012). Nilo De La Cruz led the RPM-P (United Nations Peacemaker 2002, 1). The RPM-P was the formal political wing of the alliance with the RPA/ABB (Philippines News Agency 2014). RPA/ABB was the armed wing (Philippines News Agency 2014; Grenzeloos n.d.).

### **External Ties**

While still the PCP, the pre-RPM-P established ties to anti-imperialist groups and the Fourth International (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). The Mindanao branch of the RPM-P broke off and became the RPM-M in March 2001 (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). The CPP/NPA undermined and attacked the RPM-P (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). In 2014, the RPM-P publicly approved the treaty the MILF signed with the Philippine government (The Philippines News Agency 2014). The RPA/ABB was the armed wing of the RPM-P (Philippines News Agency 2014; Grenzeloos n.d.). In 2001, the RPA/ABB had an ideological dispute and severed ties (Grenzeloos.org n.d.).

### **Group Outcome**

In 1999, the RPM-P initiated peace talks with the Estrada administration (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). The peace talks lasted from 1999 to 2000 (Grenzeloos.org n.d.). The Philippine government and the RPM-P signed the treaty on December 6, 2000 (United Nations Peacemaker 2002, 1). The treaty recognized the common ideology between the Philippines government and the RPM-P (United Nations Peacemaker 2002, 1). In the treaty, the Philippine government agreed to release prisoners, fund development projects for impoverished areas, implement policy reforms, and give 100 former members licenses and permits to carry firearms in exchange for a ceasefire (United Nations Peacemaker 2002, 1-4).

In 2012, peace talks required the RPM-P, alongside its armed wing the ABB/RPA, to profile its members and provide an inventory of its weaponry (Asia News Monitor 2012). In 2013, the RPM-P transformed into a legitimate political organization: the Kapatiran para sa Progresong Panlipunan (KPP) (Targeted News Service 2013).

Note: this may be a merger with the group (RPA-ABB) above.

## **VI. MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES (MLPP)**

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Marxist-Leninist Party Of The Philippines, Marxist-Leninist Party Of The Philippines (Mlpp)

## **Part 1. Bibliography**

- Soliman M. Santos, Jr. and Paz Verdades M. Santos. 2010. "Partido Marxista-Leninista ng Pilipinas (Marxist-Leninist Party of the Philippines) and its Partisano (Partisans) Group (PMLP-Partisano)." p. 306. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security in the Philippines.  
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.432.9002&rep=rep1&type=pdf#page=51>
- "RHB." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4540, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism,  
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6\\_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit)
- Soliman M. Santos, Jr. and Paz Verdades M. Santos. 2010. "Marxist-Leninist Party of the Philippines and its Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan (Revolutionary People's Army) (MLPP-RHB)." p. 310. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security in the Philippines.  
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.432.9002&rep=rep1&type=pdf#page=51>
- Siobhan O'Neil. 2014. "Dealing with the Devil? Explaining Onset of Strategic State-Terrorist Negotiations." Ph.D. Dissertation, UCLA.  
<http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5td7j61f#page-2> (and folder)

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: 1998 (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; Santos 2010 pg 311).

Group End: still active, though weakened by the CPP and Philippine government's attacks (Santos 2010 pg 315).

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

In 1998, the MLPP formed when members of the Luzon CPP cadre refused their transfer from urban to rural areas (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; Santos 2010, 310; O'neil 2014, 390). The armed wing of the MLPP is the Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan (RHB) (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; Santos 2010, 310; O'neil 2014, 390). The MLPP, a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist group, seeks to overthrow the Philippine government through the use of violence (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; Santos 2010, 310). The RBH has targeted journalists and the Philippine army (MITP Knowledge Base 2008) .

### **Geography**

The MLPP operates mostly in Luzon (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). The MLPP operates in urban areas (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). The MLPP includes a Metro Manila faction (Santos 2010, 310). The MLPP and CPP have clashed in Southern Tagalog and Eastern Visayas (Santos 2010, 311). The Philippine government has confiscated weapons from the MLPP in Visayas, Nueva Ecija, Bataan, and Ilocos (Santos 2010, 314).

### **Organizational Structure**

Nicholas Magdangal, also known as Francisco Pascual, originally led the MLPP (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). The group has a formal political wing known as the MLPP and an armed wing known as the RHB (Santos 2010, 310). Pascua left the MLPP by 2002, and his wife replaced him (Santos 2010, 312). The MLPP has a central committee that governs the MLPP and RHB (Santos 2010, 312). The MLPP allegedly had 500 members when it formed (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; Santos 2010, 313). At its peak in 2003, the MLPP had 271 armed cadres (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; Santos 2010, 313). Each RHB/MLPP squadron has between seven and nine people (Santos 2010, 313). The majority of MLPP recruits are impoverished people from Luzon and ex-CPP members (Santos 2010, 312). The MLPP relies on robbery to fund itself (Santos 2010, 311). The MLPP claims donations, and five peso monthly dues from its members fund the group (Santos 2010, 313).

### **External Ties**

The MLPP and the CPP have an ongoing feud that has resulted in violence (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; Santos 2010, 310; O'neil 2014, 391). Reportedly a turf war, the feud between the two groups has involved criminal activities and extortion (MITP Knowledge Base 2008).

### **Group Outcome**

The Philippine government initially targeted the MLPP, but decided to let the violence between the MLPP and the CPP continue to weaken both groups (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). By 2008, the group had stopped political activities and only engaged in criminal activities and violence (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). In 2007, law enforcement arrested two top MLPP leaders, Domingo Tarectecan and Christopher de Guzman (Santos 2010, 310). The MLPP has not expressed willingness to sign a treaty with the Philippine government (Santos 2010, 315; O'neil 2014, 391). However, the MLPP did sign an agreement not to use landmines (Santos 2010, 315).

- VII. REBOLUSYONARYONG HUKBONG BAYAN (RHB)  
Min. Group Date: 1998



Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- Soliman M. Santos, Jr. and Paz Verdades M. Santos. "Marxist-Leninist Party of the Philippines and its Rebolusyonyong Hukbong Bayan (Revolutionary People's Army) (MLPP-RHB)." p. 310. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security in the Philippines.  
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.432.9002&rep=rep1&type=pdf#page=51>
- "RHB." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4540, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism,  
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6\\_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit)

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: MLPP, Marxist-Leninist Party of the Philippines

Group Formation: NA

Group End: NA

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

This is the armed wing of the MLPP (Santos and Santos 2010, 310).

#### **Geography**

This is the armed wing of the MLPP (Santos and Santos 2010, 310).

#### **Organizational Structure**

This is the armed wing of the MLPP (Santos and Santos 2010, 310).

#### **External Ties**

This is the armed wing of the MLPP (Santos and Santos 2010, 310).

## Group Outcome

This is the armed wing of the MLPP (Santos and Santos 2010, 310).

### VIII. YOUNG OFFICER UNION OF THE NEW GENERATION AND REFORMIST ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (YOU-RAFP)

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 2006

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

#### Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2047, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20479>
- Searched Proquest
  - YOUNG OFFICER UNION OF THE NEW GENERATION AND REFORMIST ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (YOU-RAFP)
  - YOUNG OFFICER UNION OF THE NEW GENERATION AND REFORMIST ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (YOU-RAFP) 2006
  - "Blast Rocks Philippine Palace Grounds, No Casualties," Agence France Presse, February 20, 2006.
  - "2nd Roundup: Explosion Rocks Philippine Presidential Palace," Deutsche Presse Agentur, February 20, 2006.
  - "Soldiers Group Claims Responsibility for Blast at Philippine Presidential Palace," Taliba, February 21, 2006.
  -

#### Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: unknown, 2006 first violent incident (GTD 2016)

Group End: 2006 (disappear)

#### Part 3. Narrative

##### Group Formation

Little information exists about this group. In 2006, the group attacked the government in Manila (GTD 2016).

## **Geography**

The group's 2006 attack occurred in Manila (GTD 2016).

## **Organizational Structure**

No information could be found about this group's organizational structure.

## **External Ties**

No information could be found about this group's external ties.

## **Group Outcome**

The group disappeared from record after its one attack in Manila in 2006 (GTD 2016). More information could not be found about this group's outcome

### **IX. NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT (PHILIPPINES)**

Min. Group Date: 1999

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

#### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- Lt. Col. Orlando Buenaventura. 1989. "The Communist Party of the Philippines/National Democratic Front Network Abroad." Global Security.  
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1989/BOG.htm>

#### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: CPP, NPA, Communist Party of the Philippines

Group Formation: NA

Group End: NA

#### **Part 3. Narrative**

##### **Group Formation**

This is an umbrella group name for the CPP and NPA.

## **Geography**

This is an umbrella group name for the CPP and NPA.

## **Organizational Structure**

This is an umbrella group name for the CPP and NPA.

## **External Ties**

This is an umbrella group name for the CPP and NPA.

## **Group Outcome**

This is an umbrella group name for the CPP and NPA.

- X. ABDURAJAK JANJALANI BRIGADE (AJB)  
Min. Group Date: 1999  
Max. Group Date: 0  
Onset: NA

Aliases: Abdurajak Janjalani Brigade (Ajb), Janjalani Brigade (Ajb)

## **Part 1. Bibliography**

- Jack Pinkowski. 2008. "The Abu Sayyaf Group and Maritime Security." Homeland Security Handbook. CRC Press. P. 157  
[https://books.google.com/books?id=XEmVaxZBXXQC&pg=PA157&lpg=PA157&dq=ABDURAJAK+JANJALANI+BRIGADE+\(AJB\)&source=bl&ots=YhPtO6ld0-&sig=p-JjxHNSuFJEA4OMF55j8\\_8aYhA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewj2jfHezpPUAhUY02MKHVQxCM4Q6AEIVzAO#v=onepage&q=ABDURAJAK%20JANJALANI%20BRIGADE%20\(AJB\)&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=XEmVaxZBXXQC&pg=PA157&lpg=PA157&dq=ABDURAJAK+JANJALANI+BRIGADE+(AJB)&source=bl&ots=YhPtO6ld0-&sig=p-JjxHNSuFJEA4OMF55j8_8aYhA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewj2jfHezpPUAhUY02MKHVQxCM4Q6AEIVzAO#v=onepage&q=ABDURAJAK%20JANJALANI%20BRIGADE%20(AJB)&f=false)
- "Abdurajak Janjalani Brigade (AJB)." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3544, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism,  
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6\\_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit)

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: No additional aliases encountered

Group Formation: 1998 (splinter from ASG, Pinkowski)

Group End: The group's last known violent attack was in 1999 (MIPT 2008) and it is believed to have disarmed or merged back into ASG shortly after (Pinkowski 2008).

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The Abdurajak Janjalani Brigade (AJB) formed as a splinter of ASG (Pinkowski 2008 n.p.; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). In December 1998, the Philippines police killed Abdurajak Janjalani, an ASG leader (Pinkowski 2008). The AJB formed to avenge his death (Pinkowski 2008; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). The AJB had one violent attack in January 1999 that resulted in no casualties (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). The group dissolved after its one attack in 1999 (MIPT 2008).

#### **Geography**

In 1999, the AJB attacked two villages in the Basilan Province (MITP Knowledge Base 2008).

#### **Organizational Structure**

Anih and Itin Sailan, both ASG commanders, led the AJB (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). All AJB members had also been involved with the ASG (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). It is unknown how the group funded itself or how large the group was.

#### **External Ties**

Some reports suggest that the AJB formed as a tribute to a fallen ASG leader, rather than as a splinter from ASG (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). As such, the AJB may not have been an independent organization.

#### **Group Outcome**

Members of the ABJ have rejoined the ASG (Pinkowski 2008). The ABJ's last known violent attack occurred in 1999. The group disbanded thereafter (MIPT 2008).

Note: this group may be merged with ASG

- XI. RAJAH SOLAIMAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT  
Min. Group Date: 2000  
Max. Group Date: 2005  
Onset: NA

## **Part 1. Bibliography**

- Soliman M. Santos, Jr. and Paz Verdades M. Santos. 2010. "Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM)." p. 380. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security in the Philippines.  
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.432.9002&rep=rep1&type=pdf#page=51>
- Blanca Palacian de Inza. 2012. "Islamic Terrorism in the Philippines." Instituto Espanol de Estudios Estrategicos. P. 14.  
[http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs\\_analisis/2012/DIEEEA41-2012\\_TerrorismolsIamicoFilipinas\\_BPI\\_ENGLISH.pdf](http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs_analisis/2012/DIEEEA41-2012_TerrorismolsIamicoFilipinas_BPI_ENGLISH.pdf)
- "Rajah Sulaiman Movement." 2006. Chapter 8; Other Groups of Concern. Country Reports on Terrorism 2005. US State Department. Investigative Project on Terrorism.  
<https://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/158/rajah-sulaiman-movement-rsm>
- "Philippines Arrest Key Militants." BBC. 2005.  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4377610.stm>

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Rajah Solaiman Movement (Palacian 2012 pg 14), RSM (Santos 2010 pg xxviii)

Group Formation: Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement was formed in 2001 (Palacian 2012 pg 9).

Group End: The recorded RSM last attack was in 2005 (Santos 2010 pg 388). Group leaders were arrested up until 2009, and the group has since disappeared ( Palacian 2012 pg 14).

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement (RSM) formed in 2001 under the leadership of Ahmed Santos (Palacian 2012, 9). Other sources suggest RSM formed in the late 1990s (Santos 2010, 14; BBC 2005). The group formed in northern Luzon after Santos converted to Islam (Palacian 2012, 14). The group aims to overthrow the existing government and create an Islamic state (Palacian 2012, 14; Santos 2010, 380; US State Department 2005). RSM mainly attacks Westerners and Filipino Christians (US State Department 2005). The group practices Islamic jihadism (Santos 2010, 382).

### **Geography**

RSM formed in northern Luzon (Palacian 2012, 14). RSM's members primarily hail from Manila and Luzon (Palacian 2012, 14). There is RSM activity in Zamboanga City (US

State Department 2005; BBC 2005). An RSM weapon cache was discovered in Manila (BBC 2005).

### **Organizational Structure**

When it first formed, RSM had 20 members (Palacian 2012, 14). In 2012, the group had an estimated 30 members (Palacian 2012, 14). The group had an estimated 28 members in 2010 (Santos 2010, 238). Members are generally Filipino Christians who have converted to Islam (Palacian 2012, 2). The ASG and JI train the members (Palacian 2012, 14; Santos 2010, 388; US State Department 2005).

Ahmed Santos initially led RSM. After Santo's arrest, Sheikh Omar Lavilla became the group's leader. Under Lavilla, members were referred to as "Urban Mujahidieens." After Lavilla's arrest in 2008, Khalil Pareja commanded the group, until his own arrest in 2009. The identity of the current leader is unknown (Palacian 2012, 14).

*IM Note: Good quote. Santos 2010, 387: "The RSM appears to have been grand on plans but short on capabilities."*

### **External Ties**

RSM has ties to Al Qaeda (Palacian 2012, 6; BBC 2005). ASG and JI have ties with the Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement (Palacian 2012, 12 & 14; Santos 2010, 364; US State Department 2005; BBC 2005). RSM usually coordinates its attacks with JI or ASG (Santos 2010, 380). The MILF and RSM have had waning ties (Santos 2010, 388). They may also receive funds from Middle East-based NGOs (US State Department 2005).

### **Group Outcome**

The Philippine government arrested Santos in 2005 (Palacian 2012, 14; US State Department 2005; BBC 2005). Since then, the Philippine government has arrested two other RSM leaders (Palacian 2012, 14). The Philippines government confiscated 1,300 pounds of explosives found in an RSM safe house (US State Department 2005). The group's last recorded attack, known as the Valentine's Day bombing, occurred in 2005 (Santos 2010, 388). The Philippine Government continued to arrest RSM leaders until 2009 (Palacian 2012, 14). The group's small size, lack of a strong leader, and lack of resources contributed to its disappearance. The group was last reported "reorganizing" in 2006 but failed to regroup (Santos 2010, 238 & 380; Palacian 2012, 14). Although the Philippine government thought RSM to pose a major security concern in 2006, the government no longer considers RSM a threat (Santos 2010, 380).

**Philippines, Part 4: 2001-2012**  
**Last Updated: 26 May 2017**

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T2405	PENTAGON KIDNAP GROUP		2001	2002
T180	FREE VIETNAM REVOLUTIONARY GROUP		2001	0
T216	AD REV		2001	2001
T1025	MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT - NM	2001	2001	2002
T987	FARMER'S MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (KMP)		2005	2008
T2241	AL-KHOBAR		2005	2012
T1470	TAONG BAYAN AT KAWAL		2006	0
T2355	KAWAL NG PILIPINAS (SOLDIER OF THE PHILIPPINES)		2006	2006
T2550	MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT - HABIER MALIK	2007	2007	2007
T2249	ALCUBAR GROUP		2007	2007
T701	BANGSAMORO NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY		2009	2009
T2586	AMPATUAN MILITIA		2009	2009
T2508	BANGSAMORO ISLAMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS	2012	2011	2012
T2661	PARTIDO MARXISTA-LENINISTA NG PILIPINAS		2012	2012
T2628	BANGSAMORO ISLAMIC FREEDOM MOVEMENT (BIFM)		2012	2012

- I. PENTAGON KIDNAP GROUP  
 Min. Group Date: 2001  
 Max. Group Date: 2002  
 Onset: NA

**Part 1. Bibliography**



- Soliman M. Santos, Jr. and Paz Verdades M. Santos. 2010. "Pentagon Gang and Other Obscure Moro Armed Groups." p. 393. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security in the Philippines.  
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.432.9002&rep=rep1&type=pdf#page=51>
- "Leader of Pentagon gang dead - military." Philippine Daily Inquirer. 2011.  
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/56793/leader-of-pentagon-gang-dead%E2%80%93military>
- "Philippine Gang Leader Shot Dead." BBC. 2002.  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2215382.stm>
- "Pentagon Gang strikes again, takes 4 captives." Philippine Daily Inquirer. 2015.  
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/683534/pentagon-gang-strikes-again-takes-4-captives>

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Pentagon Gang (PG) (Santos 2010 pg xxvii), Pentagon kidnap for ransom gang (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2011)

Group Formation: The Pentagon Gang was formed in the late 1980's (Santos 2010 pg 394). The first violent attack was on October 17th, 2000 (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2015).

Group End: Still active

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

Faisal Marohombsar founded the Pentagon Gang (PG) in the late 1980s (Santos 2010, 394; Philippine Daily Inquirer 2015). Marohombsar left the MNLF by surrendering under the rebel-returnee program. When the Philippine government did not fulfill its promise to provide livelihood projects for the former MNLF members, Marohombsar and other former MNLF members turned to kidnapping to financially support themselves (Santos 2010, 394). VNSA's view PG as a criminal group (Santos 2010, 352). PG is not known to have an ideology outside of financial gain (Santos 2010, 393). PG allegedly bombed Manila and Central Mindanao (Santos 2010, 396-397). The group's first recorded attack occurred on October 17, 2000, when PG members kidnapped Italian priest Fr. Giuseppe Piarantoni (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2015).

### **Geography**

The Pentagon Gang operates in Central Mindanao. The PG base is in Liguasan Marsh (Santos 2010, 393). The founder of PG, Faisal Marohombsar, was killed in Cavite province outside of Metro Manila. Tahir Alonto led a PG unit in Pagalungan town in Maguindanao (Santos 2010, 395).

In 2001, PG abducted five Chinese engineers in Carmen, North Cotabato (Santos 2010, 396; BBC 2002). In 2002, PG abducted a Filipino-American teenager in Cagayan de Oro in Northern Mindanao. PG has also staged kidnappings in Manila and the Dole Plantation in Southern Mindanao (Santos 2010, 396). PG had a hideout in Barangay Langgapanen, Sultan sa Barongis, Maguindanao (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2011). The Pentagon Gang also operated on the Zamboanga Peninsula (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2011).

### **Organizational Structure**

PG funds itself by kidnapping for ransom (Santos 2010, 8). The leaders of PG are former MNLF members (Santos 2010, 101 & 393). PG members are primarily former MNLF and MILF members (Santos 2010, 393 & 398). The two most prominent leaders of PG are Faisal Marohombsar and Tahir Alonto. Both leaders come from prominent families in the Lanao province (Santos 2010, 394). After Marohombsar's death, PG began to recruit more young Moro Muslim men (Santos 2010, 395).

A control group and five bandit groups led by Commander Mubarak, Mubarak II, Tigre, Tropical, Aguila, and Commander Wonderful lead PG. Each bandit group has seven functions to fulfill: abduction, negotiation, strike, security, safe keeping, surveillance/casing, and support. The Philippine army estimated PG had 200 members in 2003 (Santos 2010, 396). The police estimated that PG possesses around 400 guns (Santos 2010, 399).

### **External Ties**

Pentagon Gang members are primarily former MNLF and MILF members (Santos 2010, 393 & 398). PG and the MILF operate in a similar geographic region. The MILF reportedly supplied the Philippine government with information to perpetrate the 2004 airstrike (Santos 2010, 395).

### **Group Outcome**

The Philippine government arrested Tahir Alonto in 1999. Alonto's followers blasted a hole in the jail and rescued him (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2011). In August 2002, a police and military operation in Cavite resulted in the death of Faisal Marohombsar, the leader of PG (Santos 2010, 395; BBC 2002; Philippine Daily Inquirer 2015). During her presidency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cracked down on kidnap-for-ransom gangs, including PG (BBC 2002). The Philippine government had a five million peso bounty for Tahir Alonto before his death (Santos 2010, 395). The Armed Forces of the Philippines had a successful airstrike against PG in August 2004. PG leader Tahir Alonto

was falsely reported dead (Santos 2010, 105). Alonto died in 2011 of illness (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2011).

In 2006, a PG member and aide of Alonto was killed when trying to escape police custody (Santos 2010, 395). PG is reportedly contained but still active in the Liguasan Marsh area (Santos 2010, 399). Al-Khobar Gang appears to have recently taken the place of PG in Central Mindanao (Santos 2010, 401). In 2015, a PG member held four people for ransom (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2015). The group is still active today.

## II. FREE VIETNAM REVOLUTIONARY GROUP

Min. Group Date: 2001

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

### Part 1. Bibliography

- "Free Vietnam Revolutionary Group." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3598, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6\\_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit)
- "Philippines: Three Arrested for Alleged Plan to Bomb Vietnam Embassy." 2001(a).BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, Aug 31, 1. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/449991189?accountid=14026>.
- "Philippine Authorities Arrest One Japanese, Two Vietnamese on Bomb Charges." 2001(b).BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, Sep 03, 1. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/449715599?accountid=14026>.
- "US Ranks the Philippines as Terrorist Lair in Southeast Asia." 2005.Xinhua News Agency - CEIS, Sep 19, 1. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/452709263?accountid=14026>.

### Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: FVRG (BBC 2001 August)

Group Formation: The first recorded attack was in 2000 (BBC 2001a).

Group End: The last recorded attack was in 2001 (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; BBC 2001a; BBC 2001b). The reason for stopping political violence is unknown

### Part 3. Narrative

#### Group Formation

The Free Vietnam Revolutionary Group (FVRG) reportedly formed in 2001 (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). Reports, however, attribute a September 2, 2000 attack to the group (BBC 2001b). The FVRG, an anti-communist group, aims to rid Vietnam of Communism (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; BBC 2001a; BBC 2001b). The FVRG seeks to eventually overthrow the Vietnamese communist government (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). The FVRG primarily targets Vietnamese embassies abroad (MITP Knowledge Base 2008).

### **Geography**

The FVRG has allegedly attempted attacks on Vietnamese embassies in Bangkok and Manila (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). The FVRG attacked the Vietnamese embassy in London on September 2, 2000 (BBC 2001a). FVRG members planned attacks at the San Juan town complex in Metro Manila (BBC 2001 a; BBC 2001b).

### **Organizational Structure**

The FVRG is the armed wing of the Government of Free Vietnam Movement (GVFM) (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). Makoto Ito, Vu Va Doc, and Huynh Thuan Ngoc were all members of the Free Vietnam Revolutionary Group (BBC 2001a). Vu Van Doc operates a FVRG cell in Manila (BBC 2001a).

There is no information about group size, membership or funding.

### **External Ties**

The FVRG is the armed wing of the Government of Free Vietnam Movement (GVFM) (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). After two of its members were arrested for attempted terrorism in Manila, the FVRG proclaimed all its members were also members of the GVFM (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). In a fax intercepted by the Philippine Government, the GVFM claimed it had no ties to the FVRG (BBC 2001b).

### **Group Outcome**

A 62-year-old Japanese man, a 42-year-old Swiss-Vietnamese, and a 41-year-old American Vietnamese man were arrested on August 31, 2001 (BBC 2001a; MITP Knowledge Base 2008; BBC 2001b). Two other FVRG members were arrested in Manila for attempted terrorism in Manila (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). Vu Van Doc was wanted in Thailand for attempting to attack Vietnamese Embassy in Bangkok (BBC 2001 August). It is unknown why the group stopped using violence.

- III. AD REV  
Min. Group Date: 2001

Max. Group Date: 2001

Onset: NA

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- “Ad Rev.” Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3608, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6\\_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit)
- Soliman M. Santos, Jr. and Paz Verdades M. Santos. 2010. “Indigenous People’s Federal Army and Other Lumad Armed Groups.” p. 404. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security in the Philippines. <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.432.9002&rep=rep1&type=pdf#page=51>
- “GMA calls bomb scare group ‘publicity seekers.’ 2002. Philippine Star. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2002/04/04/156021/gma-calls-bomb-scare-group-145publicity-seekers146>
- Al Jacinto. “14 killed, 50 injured in bomb blasts.” Gulf News. 2002. <http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/general/14-killed-50-injured-in-bomb-blasts-1.439060>

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Aliases: Indigenous People's Federal Army (Ipfa), Ad Rev, Indigenous Federal State Army (Ifsa), Ancestral Domain Revolution (AD Rev)

Group Formation: The IFPA was formed in December 2001 (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). The IFPA first came to attention as a violent group in March 2002 (Santos 2010 pg 404).

Group End: The last recorded IFPA attack was in April of 2002 (Jacinto 2002).

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The Indigenous People's Federal Army (IFPA) formed in December 2001 (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). The IFPA first came to attention as a violent group in March 2002 when it placed a dozen dud bombs in public places in Metro Manila (Santos 2010, 404). The IFPA seeks a governing system of three federations (Santos 2010, 404; Jacinto 2002). These federations would create three distinct federal states for Christians, Muslims, and Indigenous people (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). The IFPA aims to recover the ancestral lands of the Indigenous Lumad people (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). IFPA appears to be ethno-nationalist (MIPT 2008).

## **Geography**

The IFPA placed a dozen dud bombs in Metro Manila. The IFPA repeated this tactic in Mindanao. Group members paraded before the media in South Upi, Maguindanao province (Santos 2010, 404). The IFPA set off three bombs in General Santos City on April 22, 2002. The bombs exploded at Pit Mark (a department store), Simuay bridge, and the Bulaong bus terminal (Jacinto 2002).

## **Organizational Structure**

Rogelio Adamat is suspected to be the leader of the IFPA (Santos 2010, 405). The IFPA had 100 members in 2002 (Santos 2010, 405). The IFPA includes former members of the CPP-NPA, MILF, and MNLF (Santos 2010, 405). Lumads are members of the IFPA (Santos 2010, 405).

The IFPA issued a "Federal Manifesto" outlining its desired government structure (Santos 2010, 404).

## **External Ties**

The IPFA is the closest Lumad Armed Group to the Communist breakaway faction Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Mindanao (Santos 2010, 404). Fathur Rahman Al Ghozi, a known JI member, was suspected to have helped the IFPA orchestrate the General Santos City bombing (Jacinto 2002).

## **Group Outcome**

The IFPA has perpetrated no further instances of violence since 2002 (Santos 2010, 405). The last recorded IFPA attack occurred in April 2002 (Jacinto 2002).

### **Notes for Iris:**

- overthrow Filipino government and create three new states from the Philippines**  
→ **separatist group**
- similar to border issues in ME**
- thought to temporarily ally with MNLF (Muslim separatist group) because seeking same goals**
- since bombs were duds, hard to get attention from the government\***

- IV. MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT - NM  
Min. Group Date: 2001  
Max. Group Date: 2002  
Onset: 2001

Note: this appears to be continuation of MNLF post-1996 peace agreement but represents a splinter/faction.

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- “MNLF Misuari faction to be engaged by government separately.” 2016. Philippines Government Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process.  
<https://peace.gov.ph/2016/11/misuari-govt-engage/>
- Jerome Aning. “Misuari to Abu Sayyaf: Enough, we cannot tolerate you forever.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 2013.  
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/355491/misuari-to-abu-sayyaf-enough-we-cannot-tolerate-you-forever>
- Rufi Vigilar. “Philippine Separatists may merge.” 2001. CNN.  
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/11/20/phil.merger/index.html>

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Moro National Liberation Front - Nur Misauri Faction, Moro National Liberation Front - Nm, Moro National Liberation Front - Nur Misauri

Group Formation: 2001 (CNN 2001).

Group End: 2016 (Philippines Government Office 2016)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The MNLF-NM is a splinter of the MNLF, which sought an independent Muslim state in Mindanao (Philippines Government Office 2016). After the 1996 peace agreement between the MNLF and Philippine government came into force, MNLF members were supposed to join the police force. Since other parts of the treaty were not immediately implemented, the MNLF did not join the police force (Aning 2013). Instead, MNLF members took up arms as the MNLF-NM (Aning 2013). The MNLF-NM first returned to employing violence in 2001, when it bombed a military camp running an election Nur Misuari was projected to lose (CNN 2001). The bombing came shortly after Nur Misauri was displaced from his political office. The MNLF-NM claimed it wanted the 1996 treaty to be fully and properly implemented (Philippines Government Office 2016).

#### **Geography**

MNLF-NM and ASG forces clashed in Sulu (Aning 2013). The MNLF-NM also bombed a military camp in Sulu (CNN 2001).

## Organizational Structure

Nur Misuari led the MNLF-Nur Misuari (Aning 2013). Members are ex-MNLF members (Aning 2013). Information about the group's size, organizational structure, and funding could not be found.

## External Ties

ASG attacked MNLF forces in February 2013 (Aning 2013). While supportive of the attack, Nur Misuari denied ordering MNLF-NM forces to attack ASG (Aning 2013). The OIC recognizes the MNLF as the representative voice of Filipino Muslims (Aning 2013). In 2001, Malaysia offered to broker a peace deal between the Philippines and the MNLF-NM (CNN 2001).

## Group Outcome

In 2016, the Philippine government announced it would have peace talks with the MNLF-NM separately from the MILF and the MNLF-Musliman Sema (Philippine Government Office 2016).

## Notes for Iris:

- disgruntled by lack of implementation of provisions of 1996 agreement (not just loss of economic opportunities like Pentagon Group)
- slightly different than MNLF-HM, but MNLF-HM seems more like a faction of MNLF-NM because they're coordinating attacks (potential to be merged?)

- V. FARMER'S MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (KMP)  
Min. Group Date: 2005  
Max. Group Date: 2008  
Onset: NA

## Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 30024, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30024>
- WALKOM, THOMAS. 1987. "An Icon Cracks... Cory's Vital Image Sorely Tried by the Massacre in Manila." The Globe and Mail, Jan 24. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/386294798?accountid=14026>.
- Searched proquest
  - "FARMER'S MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES"
  - "FARMERS MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES"

## Part 2. Basic Coding



Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: The group was in existence in 1987 (Thomas 1987) The group had its first violent attack in 2008 (Global Terrorism Database 2016).

Group End: The Farmers Movement of the Philippines has not had an attack since 2013 (Global Terrorism Database 2016).

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The Farmer's Movement of the Philippines has existed publicly since its formation, which occurred as late as 1987 (Thomas 1987). The Farmer's Movement of the Philippines first came to attention as a violent group in May 2008 (GTD 2016). The Farmer's Movement of the Philippines attacked government/police targets and another non-state militia (GTD 2016). The group's aim appears related to land reform and land redistribution efforts (Thomas 1987).

#### **Geography**

The Farmer's Movement of the Philippines attacked a government/police target in Quezon City. The Farmer's Movement of the Philippines attacked another non-state militia in Davao City (GTD 2016)

#### **Organizational Structure**

Jaime Tadeo led the Farmer's Movement of the Philippines. In 1987, the Farmer's Movement of the Philippines was the largest peasant movement in the Philippines. Members of the Farmers Movement are peasants (Thomas 1987).

#### **External Ties**

No information could be found about this group's external ties.

#### **Group Outcome**

The Farmers Movement of the Philippines has not perpetrated an attack since 2013 (GTD 2016). There is no evidence of a government counterinsurgency response.

- VI. AL-KHOBAR  
Min. Group Date: 2005

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- GTD Perpetrator 20024, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016,  
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20024>
- Maria Ressa. 2011. "Philippines' evolving terrorism threat." CNN.  
<http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/01/31/maria.ressa.bus.bombing/>
- Jamie Elona. 2013. "Police arrest leader of notorious al-Khobar group." Philippine Daily Inquirer.  
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/522479/police-arrest-leader-of-notorious-terrorist-al-khobar-group>
- Rommel Banlaoi. "Al-Khobar Group." Philippine Security in the Age of Terror: National, Regional, and Global Challenges in the Post-9/11 World. CRC Press. 2009. p. 67.  
[https://books.google.com/books?id=hi\\_NBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA67&lpg=PA67&dq=al-khobar+philippines+terrorism&source=bl&ots=4mtCEaQe9v&sig=O9YTT3JwLLMSQ\\_wkijsb9JxJoaA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwik09OJ4JPUAhUV8mMKHXIMDO4Q6AEITTAH#v=onepage&q=al-khobar%20philippines%20terrorism&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=hi_NBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA67&lpg=PA67&dq=al-khobar+philippines+terrorism&source=bl&ots=4mtCEaQe9v&sig=O9YTT3JwLLMSQ_wkijsb9JxJoaA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwik09OJ4JPUAhUV8mMKHXIMDO4Q6AEITTAH#v=onepage&q=al-khobar%20philippines%20terrorism&f=false)
- Peter Ritter. 2008. "Philippines Bomb Blast Hits South." Time Magazine.  
<http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1837959,00.html>

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2006 (Elona 2013)

Group End: The last recorded attack was in 2016 (Global Terrorism Database 2016) It is likely the group is still active

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

Al-Khobar formed in 2006 (Elona 2013). The MILF-SOG splintered from the MILF and formed Al-Khobar (Ressa 2011). Al-Khobar is an extortion team that targets bus companies (Ressa 2011; Banlaoi 2009). Al-Khobar also targets local governments and small businesses for extortion (Banlaoi 2009). Al-Khobar has attacked utility, transportation, and the private property of citizens (GTD 2016). The group calls the target before the attack and demands payment in exchange for the attack not being carried out (Banlaoi 2009). The first recorded Al-Khobar attack occurred on October 10,

2006 (Banlaoi 2009). It does not appear to have any politicized opposition to the Filipino national government.

### **Geography**

Al-Khobar operates mainly in Mindanao (Ressa 2011). Jabide Abdul, also known as Zabide/Beds, was arrested in Barangay Titulok, Bagumbayan, Sultan Kudara (Banlaoi 2009). Al-Khobar is suspected to be based in the marshlands of Maguindanao (Banlaoi 2009). Al-Khobar has perpetrated attacks in Pagangan, Makilala, Batulawan, Polomolok, Kabacan, Libungan, Tacurong City, Carmen, Matalam, Digos City, Koronadal, and Cotabato (Global Terrorism Database 2016; Banlaoi 2009).

### **Organizational Structure**

Jabide Abdul is the suspected leader of Al-Khobar (Banlaoi 2009). The group had different units that engaged in criminal activities. In 2008, an arrested Al-Khobar member told officials that a MILF field commander, different from Jabide Abdul, led his unit (Ressa 2011; Ritter 2008). The group funds itself through extortion (Ritter 2008). Members of Al-Khobar were ex-militants from the MILF-SOG, which was a criminal extortion gang that engaged in activities to fund the MILF (Ressa 2011).

### **External Ties**

Al-Khobar is a splinter of MILF-SOG (Ressa 2011). The MILF denies ties to Al-Khobar (Ressa 2011). In 2008, an arrested Al-Khobar member told officials that a MILF commander led his unit (Ressa 2011; Ritter 2008). Other reports say Al-Khobar was created to financially support JI and FMJ through extortion (Banlaoi 2009). Al-Khobar may have ties to the NPA, although these reports have not been corroborated (Ritter 2008).

### **Group Outcome**

The Philippine government offered 3.3 million pesos for information that would lead to the arrest of Jabide Abdul (Banlaoi 2009). The Philippine government arrested Abdul on November 7, 2013 (Banlaoi 2009). The last recorded attack occurred on March 2, 2016 (GTD 2016). The group likely remains active.

- VII. TAONG BAYAN AT KAWAL  
Min. Group Date: 2006  
Max. Group Date: 0  
Onset: NA

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- “Taong Bayan At Kawal” Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4704, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6\\_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TivEIPHY6_askny5NMQ3JD7Adiy-kEbkyb0KtloBVqw/edit)
- “Bombers taunt PNP, blast rocks major police camp.” 2006. GMA Network. <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/8410/bombers-taunt-pnp-blast-rocks-major-police-camp/story/>
- “Manila police HQ bombed, no injuries reported.” 2006. Hindustan Times. [http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/manila-police-hq-bombed-no-injuries-reported/story\\_-0J1EHyVHdIphnFDzEjd6XN.html](http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/manila-police-hq-bombed-no-injuries-reported/story_-0J1EHyVHdIphnFDzEjd6XN.html)

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Taong Bayan At Kawal, Citizen And Soldier, Masses And Soldiers, Secret Bad Men, Secret Warriors, Tabak (Machete) Group, The People And The Soldiers, TABAK (MITP Knowledge Base 2008).

Group Formation: June 2006 (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; GMA Network 2006).

Group End: Tabak has had no reported attacks since 2006

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

TABAK first came to attention as a violent group after a series of bombings around Filipino Independence Day in June 2006 (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). The group targeted the National Capital Region Police Headquarters, a PNP field office, and the home of Mayor Dennis Pineda (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). TABAK claims the blasts were intended to send a political message (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). TABAK claims they never meant to harm citizens and that their attacks instead sought to protect citizens (GMA Network 2006; Hindustan Times 2006). TABAK sought to overthrow President Gloria Arroyo (MITP Knowledge Base 2008; GMA Network 2006). TABAK accused President Gloria Arroyo of unfairly establishing a police state (MITP Knowledge Base 2008).

### **Geography**

TABAK detonated a bomb at Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig -- the National Capital Region Police Office Headquarter (GMA Network 2006). TABAK also set off blasts in Metro Manila and Quezon City (GMA Network 2006; Hindustan Times 2006).

### **Organizational Structure**

Members had ties to the Magdalo group, which consisted of ex-soldiers (MIPT 2008). It is unknown how many Magdalo members joined TABAK.

Other information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.

### **External Ties**

TABAK is allegedly the reformation of the Magdalo group. The Magdalo group comprised 231 soldiers and low ranking military officers, who had become disenchanted with Gloria Arroyo's Presidency and attempted to stage a coup in July 2003 (MITP Knowledge Base 2008). TABAK reportedly has ties with the organized crime group Black Shark (MITP Knowledge Base 2008).

### **Group Outcome**

TABAK has had no reported attacks since 2006 (GMA Network 2006; Hindustan Times 2006). Other information about the group's outcome could not be found.

## VIII. KAWAL NG PILIPINAS (SOLDIER OF THE PHILIPPINES)

Min. Group Date: 2006

Max. Group Date: 2006

Onset: NA

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- GTD Event ID 200601300009 , Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200601300009>
- "Dark Group of Junior Officers Claim Responsibility for Manila Blast." 2006.Xinhua News Agency - CEIS, Jan 31, 1. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/452608405?accountid=14026>.
- "Philippine Army Chief Says Rebel Military-Communist Alliance "Deeply Rooted". 2006.BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, Mar 23, 1. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/460654805?accountid=14026>.
- Andrade, Jeannete I. 2006. "NEW 'REAL' TABAK DISOWNS BLASTS." The Manila Times, Jun 20. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/380857772?accountid=14026>.

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Kawal Ng Pilipinas (Soldier Of The Philippines), Kawal Ng Pilipinas, Philippine Warriors (Xinhua News Agency 2006)

Group Formation: 2006 (Global Terrorism Database 2016; Xinhua News Agency 2006)

Group End: 2006 (Global Terrorism Database 2016)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

Kawal Ng Pilipinas first came to attention in January 2006, when it bombed the military headquarters, Camp Aguinaldo. The group seeks the resignations of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the military chief, Generoso Senga. Kawal Ng Pilipinas also aims to stop the amendment of the 1987 constitution. Kawal Ng Pilipinas embodies the resentment that soldiers and low ranking officers foster due to their poor treatment (Xinhua News Agency 2006).

#### **Geography**

Kawal Ng Pilipinas attacked the Court of Appeals building in the Barangay neighborhood of Manila (GTD 2016). Kawal Ng Pilipinas bombed the military headquarters, Camp Aguinaldo (Xinhua News Agency 2006).

#### **Organizational Structure**

Members of Kawal Ng Pilipinas are junior officers. Kawal Ng Pilipinas claims to have 200 members (Xinhua News Agency 2006).

#### **External Ties**

Kawal Ng Pilipina allegedly committed an attack on the 20th anniversary of the famous People Power movement that overthrew the Marcos movement (Xinhua News Agency 2006). There are disputed reports about the group's responsibility for a string of bombings in 2006. The TABAK claimed responsibility for these bombings, which the Kawal Ng Pilipina disavowed (Andrade 2006).

#### **Group Outcome**

Kawal Ng Pilipina claims the government orchestrated the June 2006 attacks (Jeanette 2006). There were no further Kawal Ng Pilipina attacks after 2006. It is unknown why the group stopped using violence.

### **IX. MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT - HABIER MALIK** Min. Group Date: 2007

Max. Group Date: 2007

Onset: 2007

Aliases: Moro National Liberation Front - Habier Malik Faction, Moro National Liberation Front - Habier Malik, Moro National Liberation Front - Hm

Note: similar to MNLF-NM this seems like a partial splinter from MNLF after 1996 peace talks, but there may be more to the story.

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- Jim Gomez. "20 Freed from Rebel Camp in Philippines." Washington Post. 2007.  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/04/AR2007020400161.html>
- Carmel Crimmins. "Muslim rebels release Philippines general, aides." Washington Post. 2007.  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/04/AR2007020400219.html>
- Simone Orendain. 2013. "Philippines say Zamboanga Crisis 'over.'" Voice of America.  
<http://www.voanews.com/a/all-hostages-freed-in-philippines-rebel-fight/1758902.html>
- Alexis Romero. "Malik died of bullet wounds, complications." Philippine Star. 2014.  
<http://news.abs-cbn.com/nation/regions/01/08/14/afp-malik-died-bullet-wounds-complications>
- Nikko Dizon. "Diabetes killed MNLF commander wanted for Zamboanga battle-military." Philippine Daily Inquirer. 2013.  
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/553095/diabetes-killed-mnlf-commander-wanted-for-zamboanga-battle-military>

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: 2001 (Orendain 2013)

Group End: The last recorded attack was in 2013 (Orendain 2013; Romero 2014; Dizon 2013)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

Note: this group does not appear to be distinct or independent from MNLF-NM.

### **Group Formation**

The Moro National Liberation Front - Habier Malik (MNLF-HM) is a continuation of the MNLF and appears to be a faction of the splinter group MNLF-NM (Gomez 2007; Orendain 2013). The MNLF signed a peace treaty with the government in 1996 but began fighting again under Habier Malik in 2001 (Orendain 2013). The MNLF-HM desires the government to fully implement the 1996 treaty terms (Gomez 2007; Crimmins 2007; Orendain 2013; Dizon 2013). The MNLF under Habier Malik hopes for the OIC to oversee a meeting between the MNLF and the Philippine government in Saudi Arabia to discuss the enforcement of the 1996 treaty (Gomez 2007; Crimmins 2007). Habier Malik desired an apology for the killing of MNLF members and civilians in a recent clash (Crimmins 2007).

### **Geography**

The MNLF-HM has a remote stronghold in Bitan-ag, on Jolo island near Panamao town (Gomez 2007; Crimmins 2007). The MNLF-HM attempted to take over Zamboanga City (Orendain 2013; Dizon 2013; Romero 2014). Habier Malik was last seen in Kalingga Ang Kalawang in Sulu (Romero 2014).

### **Organizational Structure**

Habier Malik leads the MNLF-HM (Gomez 2007; Crimmins 2007). At least 375 MNLF members were involved in the 2013 Zamboanga City attack (Orendain 2013). The MNLF-HM remains loyal to Nur Misuari (Orendain 2013; Romero 2014). The group appears to be a faction of MNLF-NM and still obey Nur Misuari (Orendain 2013).

### **External Ties**

The MNLF-HM is a continuation of the MNLF and appears to be a faction of the splinter group MNLF-NM (Gomez 2007; Orendain 2013).

### **Group Outcome**

A Philippine general and 19 others were not allowed to leave the MNLF camp until they agreed to a meeting about enforcing the 1996 treaty (Gomez 2007; Crimmins 2007). The government claims that it killed Habier Malik in 2013, but other sources report he died of diabetes complications (Romero 2014; Dizon 2013). Rebellion charges against Misuari and 83 other members of the MNLF faction led by Habier Malik were filed (Romero 2014).

- X. ALCUBAR GROUP  
Min. Group Date: 2007  
Max. Group Date: 2007  
Onset: NA



### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- GTD Perpetrator 20043, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20043>
- Searched Proquest
  - “Alcubar group”
  - Kidapawan bombing suspects charged
  - Kidapawan bombing alcubar group

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: 2007 (Global Terrorism Database 2016)

Group End: 2007 (Global Terrorism Database 2016)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The Alcubar group first came to attention as a violent group when it attacked a citizen and private property target in 2007 (GTD 2016). The group’s goals, ideology, or political aims could not be found.

#### **Geography**

Alcubar group perpetrated an attack in Kidapawan (GTD 2016).

#### **Organizational Structure**

No information could be found about this group’s organizational structure.

#### **External Ties**

No information could be found about this group’s external ties.

#### **Group Outcome**

No information could be found about this group’s outcome.

## **XI. BANGSAMORO NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY**

Min. Group Date: 2009  
Max. Group Date: 2009  
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- Ivan Welch. "Islamic Insurgency in Bangsamoro: Philippines." Foreign Military Studies OE Watch. 2013.  
[http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/OEWatch/201305/Special\\_Essay\\_01.html](http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/OEWatch/201305/Special_Essay_01.html)
- "Conflicts without Borders: Mindanao, Philippines." 2010. Unclassified US Department of State.  
<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/B5A79F6FEF2C4635C12577D1005D31E2-map.pdf>
- GTD Perpetrator 30096, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016,  
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30096>
- Al Jacinto. "Military offensive disrupts 'Hairaya' festival in Sulu." Manila Times via Press Reader. 2009.  
<https://www.pressreader.com/philippines/manila-times/20090921/281655366116647>

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: BNLA (Welch 2013)

Group Formation: 2009 (Welch 2013; US Department of State 2010; Global Terrorism Database 2016).

Group End: Last recorded attack was in October 2009 (Global Terrorism Database 2016)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The Bangsamoro National Liberation Army (BNLA) first came to attention as a violent group in September 2009. In the attack, the group blew up a vehicle carrying two US Special Operations Task Force soldiers and a Philippine Marine (Welch 2013; US Department of State 2010). BNLA calls for the solidarity of all Muslims and has declared Jihad against the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Jacinto 2009).

#### **Geography**

BNLA blew up a vehicle on Jolo Island in Sulu (Welch 2013; US Department of State 2010). BNLA was suspected of perpetrating an attack using explosives in Cotabato City (GTD 2016).

### **Organizational Structure**

Madarang Sali is the self-proclaimed spokesperson of BNLA (Welch 2013; Jacinto 2009).

No information could be found about the group's size, funding, membership, or organizational structure.

### **External Ties**

BNLA is allegedly allied with the MNLF (US Department of State 2010).

### **Group Outcome**

In November 2011, a Philippine air strike meant to target ASG killed Madarand Sali (Welch 2013).

Other information about this group's outcome could not be found.

- XII. AMPATUAN MILITIA  
Min. Group Date: 2009  
Max. Group Date: 2009  
Onset: NA

#### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- "Conflicts without Borders: Mindanao, Philippines." 2010. Unclassified US Department of State.  
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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: 1992 (Human Rights Watch 2010)

Group End: 2010 (Christian Science Monitor 2009)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The Ampatuan militia first came to attention as a violent group in 1992 when the head of the Ampatuan militia killed a candidate for municipal councilor and his two children (Human Rights Watch 2010). The Ampatuan militia serves to eliminate anyone who threatens the power of the Ampatuan clan (Human Rights Watch 2010).

The Ampatuan family is a Muslim clan that first rose to power by allying themselves with President Marcos in the 1970s (US Department of State 2010). The clan became very powerful when Patriarch Andal Ampatuan became the Governor of Maguindanao in 2000 (Murphy 2009; Christian Science Monitor 2009). He maintained power by establishing a close relationship to the presidency by continually rigging elections (Murphy 2009).

Under President Arroyo, private militias became legal in 2006 (Murphy 2009). The Ampatuan militia is a paramilitary group.

### **Geography**

The most infamous Ampatuan militia attack took place outside of Shariff Aguak (Murphy 2009;). This attack occurred in a rural hilly area (Sydney Morning Herald 2014). The Ampatuan militia set off a bomb in the Shariff Aguak market (Human Rights Watch 2010). The Ampatuan militia killed people harvesting rice in the Barangay Tapihan (Human Rights Watch 2010). The Ampatuan militia publically shot a key witness in Parang town, Maguindanao (Human Rights Watch 2010). Other attacks have taken place in Dicalongan, a coconut field in Ampatuan, national highway in Makir, an entertainment venue in Davao City, and Cotabato City (Human Rights Watch 2010).

### **Organizational Structure**

The Ampatuan clan led and paid for the Ampatuan militia (Murphy 2009; US Department of State 2010). The militia, a private informal army, has an estimated 200-500 members (Murphy 2009). Other reports say the militia consists of around 5,000 members (Sydney Morning Herald 2014).

### **External Ties**

The Ampatuan militia often clashes with the MILF (Murphy 2009). Andal Ampatuan maintained power by establishing a close relationship with the current president through continually rigging elections (Murphy 2009). Under President Arroyo, private militias became legal in 2006 (Murphy 2009).

### **Group Outcome**

The last recorded incident of violence occurred on June 14, 2010, when a key witness in the trial against Andal Ampatuan was shot (Christian Science Monitor 2009). Several members of the Ampatuan family and militia, including Andal Ampatuan and Datu Unsay, are on trial for their infamous massacre of women and journalists in 2009 (Sydney Morning Herald 2014). The trials have proceeded slowly because key witnesses have been killed and lawyers have allegedly been bribed (Sydney Morning Herald).

## XIII. BANGSAMORO ISLAMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS

Min. Group Date: 2011

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 2012

Aliases: Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (Biff), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters

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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM) (Crenshaw 2015)

Group Formation: 2008 or 2010 (Crenshaw 2015; Global Security n.d.)

Group End: 2017 (Unson 2017; ABS-CBN 2017)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

BIFF is an MILF splinter group that came to attention as a violent group in 2012 (Crenshaw 2015; Global Security. N.D.). The group's date of formation is disputed. Some sources suggest Umbra Ameril Kato formed BIFF in 2010 (Crenshaw 2015; Chalk 2013; Unson 2016). Other sources claim BIFF formed in 2008 after breaking away from the MILF following a Supreme Court decision on the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain which dismantled an earlier MILF-Philippines peace agreement (Global Security. N.D.).

BIFF seeks to create an independent state for Filipino Muslim Moros in Mindanao (Crenshaw 2015). It might have also splintered from the MILF due to disagreements

about the group's political goals. Whereas BIFF strictly sought an independent state, the MILF stated it would be amenable to partial concessions (Crenshaw 2015; Chalk 2013).

## **Geography**

BIFF and BIAF/MILF clash over territory in Maguindanao (Crenshaw 2015; Chalk 2013). BIFF attacked Midsayap (Crenshaw 2015). BIFF and the Philippine government have clashed in Cotabato and Maguindanao (Crenshaw 2015). BIFF bombed a bus in Bukidnon (Crenshaw 2015). BIFF has a presence around the Liguasan Marsh (Chalk 2013). BIFF's two main camps are Ganta in the town of Shariff Saydona Mustapha and Damabla in the town of Datu Piang (Chalk 2013). BIFF committed a landmine attack in Shariff Saydona Mustapha (Chalk 2013). Philippine Special Action Forces and BIFF clashed in the town of Mamasapano (Samson-Espiritu 2015). BIFF attacked an army detachment in Barangay Nabalawag in the town of Midsayap (Unson 2017).

## **Organizational Structure**

Ameril Umbra Kato, sometimes referred to as Omra Ameril Kato, led BIFF (Crenshaw 2015). Kato studied Islam in Saudi Arabia. Afterwards, he joined the MNLF and later the MILF. In the MILF, he rose to power but was demoted because of his extremist views (Crenshaw 2015; Chalk 2013). In 2011, Kato had a stroke, and Mohammad Ali Tambako became the leader of BIFF. In 2015, Tambako was captured and Kato died. Ismael Abubakar then became the leader of BIFF.

BIFF members are mostly former MILF 105th Base Command members. Kato claimed BIFF originally had 5,000 members, but it is estimated he actually started with 300 members (Crenshaw 2015). Other sources claim BIFF has between 100 and 200 members (Cox 2011). The Philippine military claims BIFF funds itself through extortion, but BIFF claims it receives funds from donations offered by politicians, businesses, and the community (Crenshaw 2015).

The group has a political wing (Crenshaw 2015).

## **External Ties**

BIFF is an MILF splinter (Crenshaw 2015). BIFF often clashes with the armed wing of the MILF, the BIAF, over territory in Maguindanao (Crenshaw 2015). BIFF and the MILF's relationship is ambiguous because BIFF attacked villages to undermine the MILF and the Philippine Government's peace talks. BIFF, however, halted these attacks at the MILF's request later that month (Crenshaw 2015). In 2014, BIFF and the MILF declared an alliance (Crenshaw 2015).

In 2013, BIFF forced out Tambako. He formed another militant group called JIM (Crenshaw 2015). Nevertheless, Tambako rejoined BIFF soon after. BIFF and JIM have reportedly worked together (Crenshaw 2015). BIFF declared allegiance to IS in August 2014 (Crenshaw 2015; Global Security. N.D.). ASG and BIFF have conducted joint attacks together (Crenshaw 2015; Chalk 2013).

By 2016, BIFF was split into two factions; one led by Bongos and one led by Karialan (Unson 2016). These two factions disagreed on jihad and how to deal with the MILF (Unson 2016). Five radical Islamic clerics left BIFF to form alliances with ASG and the Maute terror group, and establish an Asian caliphate in the Philippines (Unson 2016). BIFF fights alongside ASG, Ansar Khilafa, Katibat Marakah al Ansar, Jund al Tawhid, Jamaat al Tawhid wal Jihad, and factions of the MILF in the name of IS against government forces (Weiss 2017).

### **Group Outcome**

To counter BIFF, the Philippine government launched a major counterinsurgency offensive called Operation Darkhorse on January 27, 2014 (Crenshaw 2015; Global Security. N.D.). Operation Darkhorse resulted in losses for BIFF: 52 deaths, 49 injuries, and the destruction of four camps, including one that had a bomb making facility (Crenshaw 2015). BIFF has expressed willingness to start peace talks with the Philippine government, but none have started (Crenshaw 2015). The Philippines assembled a Special Action Force to target two prominent bomb makers under BIFF protection (Crenshaw 2015; Samson-Espiritu 2015). In 2015, the Philippine government captured Tambako (Crenshaw 2015). The Philippine government launched a month-long offensive against BIFF, in which they killed 151 members, injured 65 and arrested 12 (Global Security. N.D.).

BIFF remains active and perpetrated multiple attacks in 2017 (Unson 2017; ABS-CBN 2017). BIFF fights alongside ASG, Ansar Khilafa, Katibat Marakah al Ansar, Jund al Tawhid, Jamaat al Tawhid wal Jihad, and factions of the MILF in the name of IS against government forces (Weiss 2017).

### **Notes for Iris:**

- interesting relationship dynamics and interactions between MILF/BIFF over time
- unclear why there's a change in their willingness to engage in negotiations, but nothing has happened
- look at current events to see if BIFF is involved in current ASG-AFP clashes
- pledged allegiance to IS/part of IS - Philippines wilayah

XIV. PARTIDO MARXISTA-LENINISTA NG PILIPINAS  
Min. Group Date: 2012



Max. Group Date: 2012  
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: This is an alias for the MLPP.

Group Formation: NA

Group End: NA

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

This is an alias for the MLPP.

#### **Geography**

This is an alias for the MLPP.

#### **Organizational Structure**

This is an alias for the MLPP.

#### **External Ties**

This is an alias for the MLPP.

#### **Group Outcome**

This is an alias for the MLPP.

- XV. BANGSAMORO ISLAMIC FREEDOM MOVEMENT (BIFM)  
Min. Group Date: 2012  
Max. Group Date: 2012  
Onset: NA

Aliases: Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (Bifm), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: 2010

Group End: 2017 (Still Active)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

This is an alias for the BIFF above.

#### **Geography**

This is an alias for the BIFF above.

#### **Organizational Structure**

This is an alias for the BIFF above.

#### **External Ties**

This is an alias for the BIFF above.

#### **Group Outcome**

This is an alias for the BIFF above.