

**Myanmar Cases, 1970-2012**  
**Last Updated: 13 January 2018**

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T252	KAREN NATIONAL UNION (KNU)	31-Dec-66	1949	2011
T1417	KARENNI NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE PARTY (KNPP)	31-Dec-57	1954	2005
T621	KACHIN INDEPENDENCE ORGANIZATION	28-Feb-61	1961	2012
T955	UNITED NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT		1964	2012
T1907	SHAN STATE ARMY	31-Dec-64	1964	2008
T2430	SHAN UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ARMY	31-Dec-69	1969	2003
T1447	PREPAK		1977	2012
T931	PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (INDIA)		1978	2012
T810	SHAN STATE PROGRESS PARTY (SSPP)	21-Mar-11	1979	2011
T1817	MONG THAI ARMY (MTA)	31-Dec-85	1985	1995
T316	NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR BODOLAND		1988	2012
T1657	BURMA COMMUNIST PARTY		1988	1989
T930	NATIONAL SOCIALIST COUNCIL OF NAGALAND - KHAPLANG FACTION	17-Apr-95	1988	2012
T1788	LEAGUE FOR NATIONAL DEMOCRACY		1989	2010
T2195	UNITED WA STATE PARTY	16-Mar-97	1990	2005
T870	ALL BURMA STUDENTS' DEMOCRATIC FRONT (ABSDF)		1991	2009
T1623	ARAKAN ROHINGY ISLAMIC FRONT		1991	1991
T150	DEMOCRATIC KAREN BUDDHIST ARMY		1993	2001
T671	RESTORATION COUNCIL OF SHAN STATES (RCSS)	31-Dec-96	1996	2011

T846	GOD'S ARMY	31-Dec-00	1997	2000
T527	VIGOROUS BURMESE STUDENT WARRIORS		1999	2004
T2582	MONGKO DEFENCE ARMY (MDA)		2000	2000
T2583	MONGKO DEFENCE ARMY - LIN MIN		2000	2000
T2285	CHIN NATIONAL ARMY		2002	2002
T2447	KOKANG		2009	2009
T2585	MYANMAR NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE ARMY	29-Aug-09	2009	2009
T2612	DKBA-5	28-Nov-10	2010	2011
T9063	NEW MON STATE PARTY (NMSP)	1959	1959	1990
T9064	ARAKAN LIBERATION PARTY (ALP)	1977	1977	1977
T9065	ROHINGYA PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF)	1973	1973	1978
T9066	BEIK MON ARMY (BMA)	1996	1996	1996

(A Brief) Timeline of Key Political Events in Burma's History (as told by the sources listed below)

**1948** - Independence from UK - January 4

**1948** - U Nu Wins

**1962** - Burmese Socialist Party takes over and Ne Win coup

**1981** - Ne Win relinquishes the presidency to San Yu

**1988** - The SLROC takes over

Signed ceasefire agreements with insurgent groups over the span of the **1990s**

**8/8/88** protests - Thousands of people are killed in anti-government riots. The State Law and Order Restoration Council (Slorc) is formed

**1995** - Aung San Suu Kyi is released from house arrest

**1997** - Slorc renamed State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)

**2002** - Aung San Suu Kyi released after nearly 20 months of house arrest.

**2004** January - Government and Karen National Union - most significant ethnic group fighting government - agree to end hostilities

**2008** - January- A series of bomb blasts hits the country - State media blame "insurgent destructionists," including ethnic Karen rebels.

**2008** - Referendum on constitution

**2008** - Kokang Incident

**2009** August - Aung San Suu Kyi is convicted of breaching conditions of her house arrest, following a visit by an uninvited US national in May.

**2009** September - US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announces plans for engagement with military rulers.

**2010** - Elections - Thein Sein elected

**2011** - Kachin Conflict in 2011

Fighting between Shan groups and Kachin group broke ceasefire

Burmese authorities agree truce deal with rebels of Shan ethnic group and orders military to stop operations against ethnic Kachin rebels

Thein Sein renews peace talks

**2015** February - Kokang separatists in Shan State near the border with China leave nearly 50 soldiers dead. Government puts the Kokang region under temporary martial law.

**2015** March - A draft ceasefire agreement is signed between the government and 16 rebel groups.

**2017** March - The United Nations human rights council decides to set up an investigation into alleged human rights abuses by the army against the Rohingya Muslim minority.

Sources:

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12992883>

<https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Nmc2DgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=burma+historical+dictionary&ots=2VEEe98B00&sig=YN448KzUcOZk3UPvU9oRBEZt5sE#v=onepage&q&f=false>

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html>

<http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/background/background-overview>

Different Types of Groups

- Karen
- Kachin
- Shan
- Rohingya

#### I. KAREN NATIONAL UNION (KNU)

Torg ID: 252

Min. Group Date: 1949

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: 1966

#### Part 1. Bibliography

- Seth Jones and Martin Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End. RAND Corporation. 2008. P. 164. [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG741-1.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf)
- "Karen National Union." Global Security. N.D. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/karen.htm>
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<http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/stakeholders-overview/161-knu>
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<http://www.refworld.org/docid/5420350724.html>
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<http://asiafoundation.org/publication/ceasefires-governance-development-karen-national-union-times-change/>
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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Karen National Union, Karen National Union (Knu), Karen National Union Knu, Kayin National Union (Knu)

Group Formation: 1947 (Joliffe 2017; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.)

Group End: 2012 (ceasefire + disarmament in exchange for policy concessions)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The KNU formed in 1947 in the pursuit of a separate state and territorial autonomy for the Karen people (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Bjorklund 2010, 25-26). It formed in response to the Aung San-Attlee Agreement which excluded the Karen people from discussions about the new independent, Burmese government (Joliffe 2017, 4). The group is ethno-nationalist and seeks to promote the rights of the Karen population in Burma (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Bjorklund 2010, 24). Its first violent attack occurred in 1949 when it clashed at Insein with government forces following failed negotiations (Joliffe 2017, 4).

### **Geography**

The group was primarily active in Burma, including in “Than Taung, Taungoo, Nyaung Lay Bin, HlaingBwe, Hpa-an, Hpapun, Kawkareik, Kyar-Inn Seik Gyi, Kyeik-don” (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

### **Organizational Structure**

The KNU had both a political wing and an armed wing. The armed wing was known as the Karen National Liberation Army and formed in 1949 following massive indiscriminate repression by government forces against the Karen population in Mergui, Burma (Bjorklund 2010, 26). It had a sophisticated organizational structure, including different committees, administrative districts, judiciary, and local district wings (Joliffe 2017,5). It controlled territory in the northern part of the Tanintharyi region where it operated (Myanmar peace Monitor n.d.; Joliffe 2017, 3). During the 1990s, the group had 4,000-6,000 members (Global Security n.d.). The group had approximately 5,000 members around 2012-2015 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The KNU financed itself through teak wood sales and then later through extortion and local taxation (Bjorklund 2010, 27; Joliffe 2017, 8).

### **External Ties**

The KNU allied with the Communist Party of Burma and worked under the umbrella organization of the Karen National United Party in the 1950s (Bjorklund 2010, 26). Bo Mya was leader of the KNU from 1976 until 2000 (Joliffe 2017, 4). The KNU was allied with the Karen Peace Council and the KKO/DKBA (Joliffe 2017, 3). The group had tensions with the KIO over how it should negotiate and interact with the government during peace talks, although a KNU spokesman denied this (Radio Free Asia 2014). The group allegedly received support from Thailand (Minorities at Risk 2004).

### **Group Outcome**

Clashes broke out in 1949 between the KNU and the Burmese government (Joliffe 2017, 4). In 1952, the Burmese government created the Karen (“Kayin”) state in southeast Burma (Joliffe 2017, 5). During the 1960s, the Burmese government pursued a “four cuts” counterinsurgency policy against the KNU and other armed groups in the region (Joliffe 2017, 2). This included the use of massive indiscriminate repression (“scorched earth campaigns”) in some areas as well as the forced relocation of several areas (Joliffe 2017, 3). In 1994, the government launched a massive counterinsurgency campaign against the group which resulted in massive territorial losses for the KNU (Joliffe 2017, 10). In 1997, the KNU suffered a major blow to its operations during a counterinsurgency campaign (Global Security n.d.). In 2012, the KNU signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese government (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Joliffe 2017, 1).

## II. KARENNI NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE PARTY (KNPP)

Torg ID: 1417

Min. Group Date: 1954

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: 1957

### Part 1. Bibliography

- “Karen National Progressive Party.” Myanmar Peace Monitor. N.D.  
<http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/mpsi/160-knpp?format=pdf>
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### Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Karen National Progressive Party, Karen National Progressive Party (Knpp)

Group Formation: 1957 (ICG 2003, 5; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.)

Group End: 2012

### Part 3. Narrative

#### Group Formation

The KNPP formed in 1957 to fight for an independent Karen state in Burma (ICG 2003, 5; Jones and Libicki 2008, 164; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It was ethno-nationalist and fought on behalf of the Karen people (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Jones and Libicki 2008, 164). It is unknown when its first violent attack occurs.

#### Geography

The group's headquarters were in Nyar Mu, Kayin state (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group was also active in other areas including “Mawchi, Phasaung Loikaw, Shar

Daw, Hoyar (Pharu So township), Daw Tamagyi (Dee Maw So township)” (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

### **Organizational Structure**

The group’s leader was originally Saw Maw Reh and later Hteh Bu Phe (US Citizenship and Immigration Services 2000; ICG 2003, 5). It had an estimated 600 members at an unknown date (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group had an armed wing known as the Karenni Army (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It is unknown how the group funds itself or where its members come from.

### **External Ties**

A faction known as the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF) splintered from the group in 1978 due to ideological disagreements (ICG 2003, 5). The KNPP clashed with the KNPLF several times (ICG 2003, 5). There is no evidence of external support for the group.

### **Group Outcome**

The KNPP signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese government in 1995, but fighting erupted shortly after (ICG 2003, 5). The group suffered a series of splinters in 1978, 1995, and 1999 (ICG 2003, 5). It was engaging in new ceasefire talks with the Burmese government in 2012 and its last known violent attack was in 2012 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Australia Asylum Research 2012, 95).

## **III. KACHIN INDEPENDENCE ORGANIZATION**

Torg ID: 621

Min. Group Date: 1961

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 1961

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- “Kachin Defense Army/Kachin Independence Organization.” Global Security. N.D. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kachin.htm>
- “Burma: Army Committing Abuses in Kachin State.” Human Rights Watch. 2011. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/18/burma-army-committing-abuses-kachin-state>
- Hannah Beech. “Inside the Kachin War Against Burma.” Time Magazine. 2014. <http://time.com/3598969/kachin-independence-army-kia-burma-myanmar-laiza/>
- “Kachin Independence Organization.” Myanmar Peace Monitor. N.D. <http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/component/content/article/57-stakeholders/155-kio>

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Kachin Independence Army (Kia), Kachin Independence Army, Kachin Independence Organization, Kachin Independence Organization (Kio)

Group Formation: 1961

Group End: 2016 (fighting/active)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The KIA formed in 1961 to fight for a separate state for the Kachin people in Burma (Global Security n.d.; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). Its first attack was also in 1961. It is ethno-nationalist and fights on behalf of the Kachin minority in Burma (Global Security n.d.).

#### **Geography**

The group operates alongside the Burmese-Chinese border, but does not appear to have an external base (Beech 2014). Its headquarters are in Laiza, Burma (Beech 2014; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It has 8 different brigades in Puta-O, Tanine, Bhamao, Kutkai, Shan state, Sadon, Pangwa, Mongkoe, Shan state, and Indawgyi (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

#### **Organizational Structure**

The group's current leader is Lanyaw Zawng Hra (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group's political wing is known as the Kachin Independence Organization and the group's armed wing is known as the Kachin Independence Army (Global Security n.d.). The group had approximately 10,000 to 12,000 members at an unspecified date (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It primarily funds itself through the extraction and trade of commodity resources in and around the Kachin state area (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

#### **External Ties**

There is no evidence of external ties to other groups. There is also no evidence of external support for the group.

#### **Group Outcome**



The group reached a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese government in 1994, but the ceasefire fell apart in 2011 during a dam construction and fighting resumed (Global Security n.d.). KIO reached a tentative ceasefire with the Burmese government in 2013, but clashes and fighting was reported as late as 2016 (Global Security n.d.).

#### IV. UNITED NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

Torg ID: 955

Min. Group Date: 1964

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

##### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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[http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist\\_outfits/UNLF.HTM](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist_outfits/UNLF.HTM)
- Sagarika Dut and Alok Bansal. "Insurgencies in the North East." *South Asia Security: 21st Century Discourses*. Routledge. 2013, p. 180
- Lawrence E. Cline. "Insurgency Environment in Northeast India." *Small Wars and Insurgencies*. Vol. 17 (2). 2006.  
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592310600562894>
- "United Nation Liberation Front." Global Security. N.d.  
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- GTD Perpetrator 20463. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.  
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20463>

##### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: The Manipur People's Army (Sagarika Dut and Alok Bansa 2013) Aliases: United National Liberation Front (Unlf), United National Liberation Front, United National Liberation Front (Unlf)

Group Formation: 1964

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (Active)

##### **Part 3. Narrative**

###### **Group Formation**

The United National Liberation Front is an Indian-Meitei insurgent group pursuing the creation of a separate state in the province of Manipur (SATP). The group's ideology is ethnic nationalist and socialist (SATP). The group was formed on November 24, 1964, by Areambam Samrenda Singh, originally as a social organization and only later

adopting violence (SATP n.d.; Global Security). A radical splinter group, Revolutionary Government of Manipur (RGM), adopted violence in 1968 (Global Security). In 1991, the group as a whole decided to begin armed struggle and consequently formed an armed wing known as Manipur People's Army (MPA) (Global Security; Sagarika Dut and Alok Bansa 2013, 180). Its first violent attack was in 1991 (Global Security n.d.). UNLF tries to avoid targeting civilians and focus on attacking Indian security forces (Sagarika Dut and Alok Bansa 2013, 185).

## **Geography**

The group is active in Jiribam valley and the district of Cachar in Assam province (SATP). The group's support comes mostly from the ethnic group Meitis in the Imphal Valley of Manipur, as well as the North Cachar Hills of Assam (SATP). The UNLF trains its fighters in Myanmar and Bangladesh (SATP). The group's General Headquarters is located in Sajik Tampak in the district of Chandel (Ibid.)

The UNLF mainly operated in the Imphal, Thoubal, and Bishenpur valley districts during the 1980s (Global Security). In the 1990s, the group began operating in the hills of Manipur (Ibid.) The group is currently active in the Churachandpur and the Chandel districts (Ibid.).

## **Organizational Structure**

The group funds itself through extortion of public officials (Global Security). It acquired weapons from the black market in Thailand, Singapore, and Cambodia which they then sell to other insurgencies for profit (Global Security).

The Central Committee holds the highest authority (Global Security). The student wing was created in 1968 and is called the pan-Manipuri Youth League (SATP). The armed wing is named the Manipur People's Army (MPA) and was founded in the early 1990s (SATP; Global Security). The group also has a propaganda wing and a women's wing (SATP). The splinter group, Revolutionary Government of Manipur (RGM), adopted violence in 1968, just over two decades before the mainstream UNLF launched armed struggle (Global Security).

## **External Ties**

Several splinter groups formed in the late 1960s, including PREPAK, Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), the Revolutionary Government of Manipur, and the People's Liberation Army (Cline 2005). A UNLF faction led by Namoijam Oken splintered from the group in 1990 and then merged with groups including PREPAK to form an umbrella coalition known as KYKL (Global Security; Dutt and Bansai 2013, 186). Oken's group

engaged in clashes with the main UNLF, resulting in more than 100 fatalities (Global Security).

They have been fighting a conflict along ethnic lines versus NSCN-IM, a militant group of the Naga people, whom they accuse of anti-Meitei policies (Global Security). The group maintains a close relationship with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang, who in the past provided training camps for the UNLF in the area along the border between Nagaland and Myanmar (NSCN-K) (SATP). However, more recently training camps are in southern hills around Manipur (Ibid.). The group has training camps in Bangladesh and Myanmar (SATP). The group also has a relationship with China and Pakistan although it is unclear whether this relationship entails diplomatic, military, or material support (SATP).

In 1990, the group attempted to form an alliance, called the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front, with other separatist groups in the region (Cline 2005; SATP). Interestingly, this coalition included some Naga people, whom the UNLF historically has clashed with (Ibid.). Cline (2005) suggests that this coalition and another coalition attempt known as the Manipur People's Liberation Front have not been effective due to infighting. UNLF leaders had ties with then-East Pakistan. UNLF had a training campus in East Pakistan and aided the Pakistani army in the 1971 liberation war versus Bangladesh (SATP).

UNLF reportedly has sold weapons to the United National Liberation Front (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), and insurgent groups in Tripura (Global Security)

UNLF has publicly acknowledged its ties to the United Liberation Front of Assam, known as ULFA, for example collaborating on a 2002 terrorist attack (Global Security). UNLF also participated in a "solidarity strike" in support of ULFA militants targeted by Bhutan military action (Global Security).

### **Group Outcome**

India undertook a massive counterterrorism operation in 1971, during the Bangladesh war, which resulted in the arrest of many UNLF leaders (Cline 2005). The group went quiet for two decades, but then decided to launch a new armed struggle in 1990 (Global Security). The group remains active today (START 2016, GTD).

- V. SHAN STATE ARMY
  - Torg ID: 1907
  - Min. Group Date: 1964
  - Max. Group Date: 2008
  - Onset: 1964

## Part 1. Bibliography

- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Burma." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. P. 516. PDF. gDrive.
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- "Briefing: Myanmar's Ethnic Problems." 2012. IRIN Asia Service, Mar 29. <https://search-proquest-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org/docview/956632538?accountid=14026>.
- "Shan-Lenlin." Languages of Security in the Asia Pacific. Australia National University. 2011. [http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/languagesofsecurity/2011/05/27/shan-border/#\\_ftn6](http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/languagesofsecurity/2011/05/27/shan-border/#_ftn6)

## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: SSA, Shan State Army, Shan State National Army

Group Formation: April 24, 1964 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Rohan and Yee 2016 Shan Herald Agency 2014)

Group End: 1989 (splinter)

Note: Gleditsch et al narrative is contradictory

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The group formed on April 24, 1964, as a merger of four different Shan resistance groups, including the Shan National United Front and Shan State Independence Army (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Rohan and Yee 2016, 169; Shan Herald Agency 2014; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 184). It primarily formed in reaction to the 1962 coup in Burma and the arrest of a Shan rebel leader known as Sao Shwe Thaik (Rohan and Yee 2016, 169). It was an ethno-nationalist separatist group fighting for an independent Shan state (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 181). Its first violent attack was in 1964 (UCDP).

#### **Geography**

The group had its headquarters in Wan Hai, Kehsi Township, the northern Shan state (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Rohan and Yee 2016). No external sanctuaries are known. The group was active in Mong Naung, Mongshu, Nat Miao (GTD 2017). The group operated on the Thai-Burma border along the Salween River (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 516). It had a base in Thailand, which it operated from sometime in the 1960s until 1974 (Shan 2011).

#### **Organizational Structure**

The group was led by Hao Lane (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 588). The group had membership of over 8,000 at an unknown time (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 588; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). Members are ethnic Shan and specifically Wa and Paulang (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 516). The group's sources of funding are unknown but the group did have a Central committee and a military sector (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Rohan and Yee 2016, 169). The group had a political wing known as the Shan State Restoration Council or Shan State Progressive Party, which formed in 1971 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Rohan and Yee 2016, 169). It is unknown how the group funded itself, but many armed groups in the area engaged in narco-trafficking and opium production (Gleditsch et al. 2013).

#### **External Ties**

The group's two splinters, SSA-North and SSA-South had different amounts of ties. SSA-N had no external ties but SSA-S was tied to China and the United States

(Minorities at Risk Project 2004). The group fought against SURA for members and resources (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 516). The group received weapons and ammunition from the Burmese Communist Party until 1989 (Rohan and Yee 2016, 169). It had an alliance with the Burmese Communist Party until 1977 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 516).

### **Group Outcome**

The group lost support from the CPB in 1989 (Rohan and Yee 2016, 169). It splintered into two factions known as the SSA-North and the SSA-South (Rohan and Yee 2016, 169). The SSA-North signed a ceasefire agreement with the government, but the SSA-South continued fighting (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Rohan and Yee 2016, 169).

## VI. SHAN UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

Torg ID: 2430

Min. Group Date: 1969

Max. Group Date: 2003

Onset: 1969

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[http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/languagesofsecurity/2011/05/27/shan-border/#\\_ftn6](http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/languagesofsecurity/2011/05/27/shan-border/#_ftn6)

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Tan Gyan Ka Kwei Hei, Tsi Independence Army

Group Formation: 1969

Group End: 1985 (merger) or 1996 (merger)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The Shan United Revolutionary Army formed in 1969 as a small ethno-nationalist separatist group (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 517). Its first violent attack was around 1969 (UCDP). It was anti-communist (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 517). Its aim was to secede from Burma and create an independent Shan state (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 517).

### **Geography**

The group first was in the mountains of the Golden Triangle after facing defeat at the hands of Mao's communists (Global Security n.d.). The group was present in Thailand from the mid-1960s until 1992 and was close with the senior government of the country (Global Security n.d.; Shan 2011). Its specific geographic activity is unknown.

### **Organizational Structure**

The group had 2,000 to 3,000 members at an unknown date and approximately 10,000 members total (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 517). Others estimate the group had 1,000 to 2,000 members at an unknown date (Gleditsch et al 2013, 188). The group's leader was Moh Heng (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 517). It primarily funded itself through drug trafficking (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 517). The group did not have a political wing (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 188).

### **External Ties**

The group fought against the Shan State Army for members and resources (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 516).

In 1985, SURA merged with SSA to become the Thailand Revolutionary Council (TRC) (Wallace 1990; Gleditsch et al 2013, 184). The TRC eventually became the Mong Tai Army (MTA) in the mid-1990s (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 184). Another report says the group merged in 1996 with the Shan State Army and Shan State National Army to become the Shan State National Organization (MAR n.d.). Another report says a faction of the Mong Tai Army splintered away in 1997 and reformed the SURA (MAR n.d.). The leader of this new SURA was Yord Serk (MAR n.d.). In 1998, the new SURA formed an alliance with the Shan State Army and Shan State National Army (MAR n.d.).

### **Group Outcome**

In 1985, SURA merged with SSA to become the Tailand Revolutionary Council (TRC) (Wallace 1990; Gleditsch et al 2013, 184). The TRC eventually became the Mong Tai Army (MTA) in the mid-1990s (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 184). Another report says the group merged in 1996 with the Shan State Army and Shan State National Army to become the Shan State National Organization (MAR n.d.). Another report says a faction of the Mong Tai Army splintered away in 1997 and reformed the SURA (MAR n.d.). The leader of this new SURA was Yord Serk (MAR n.d.). In 1998, the new SURA formed an alliance with the Shan State Army and Shan State National Army (MAR n.d.). The new SURA's last attack was in 2004 when it attacked a farm (MAR n.d.). It is unknown what happened to the group after this incident.

## VII. PREPAK

Torg ID: 1447

Min. Group Date: 1977

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

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### Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: People's Revolutionary Party Of Kangleipak (Prepak), People's Revolutionary Party Of Kangleipak, Prepak

Group Formation: 1977

Group End (Outcome): 2017 (According to South Asia Terrorist Portal, there have been incidents and statements involving PREPAK as recently as 2017).

### Part 3. Narrative

#### Group Formation



PREPAK was formed on October 9, 1977, by R.K. Tulachandra with a goal to establish a separate Meitai state in Manipur (Global Security). It ascribes to a Maoist ideology (Canada IRB 2003). PREPAK came to attention as a violent group because during the late 1970s as the group stole arms from the police and paramilitary forces as well as purchased them from Myanmar soldiers deployed to India (Global Security).

PREPAK collaborated with other Meitei militant organizations to launch a campaign reportedly intended to end social crimes; the group targeted rapists, drug users, dealers, and alcohol vendors during the early 1990s (Global Security). PREPAK also banned the screening of Hindi films in 2003, as they believe the films degrade the social and cultural values of the region (Global Security). In 2003, Mangang, PREPAK's Defense Secretary, declared their intention to work with the UNLF and RPF to fight for the Manipur separatist cause (Ibid.).

### **Geography**

PREPAK began in the valley in Manipur in the 1980s and later expanded its geographic reach (Global Security). The group has committed attacks in Mizoram and North Tripura (South Asia Terrorist Portal 2017). The group is also active in Nagaland's Mon district, specifically Tizit (South Asia Terrorist Portal 2017). The group primarily operates out of the Imphal Valley, Mizoram, and Assam (Global Security). It reportedly operates training camps in Bangladesh (South Asia Terrorist Portal 2017). In Manipur, combatants are trained mainly in the General Headquarters in Sajik Tampak in the Chandel District as well as training in guerilla warfare in the nearby jungles (Ibid.). There are also training camps in the neighboring Churachandpur District (Global Security).

### **Organizational Structure**

Currently, the group has a very structured, hierarchical decision-making body with a political wing, a military wing called the Red Army, and a women's wing (Global Security). The armed wing, known as the Red Army, is formally led by the group's Commander in Chief and political wing's leader has the title of Chairman (Ibid.). They are organized into district command units, headed by a district commander and including ranks such as lieutenants, sergeants, and corporals (Ibid.) They also have a women's wing (Global Security).

PREPAK became briefly dormant after the death of Tulachandra in 1986 and in-fighting among factions resulted in violent clashes (South Asia Terrorist Portal 2017; Global Security). S. Wanglen then took over as Commander in Chief (South Asia Terrorist Portal 2017.) The PREPAK leader Urrikinbam Sarat (alias Meriaba) was very influential in stopping the in-fighting and re-consolidating the group during the late 1990s (Global Security). The group originally funded itself through extortion, but stopped that in 2002 (Global Security).

As of 2017, Tajila is the C.C. of PREPAK (Ibid.). The group is estimated to have approximately 200 insurgents (South Asia Terrorist Portal 2017). However, sources close to the group have reportedly claimed that the number is closer to 500 (Global Security). Achamba used to be the Chairman of PREPAK, but the party has reportedly removed him, for unknown reasons (Global Security). Members receive training in Sajik Tampak, on the Nagaland-Myanmar border, and reportedly in Bangladesh (SATP; Global Security).

A faction splintered off in 1980 to form the Kangleipak Communist Party (Global Security).

### **External Ties**

The group receives training from the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (South Asia Terrorist Portal 2017). It is part of the Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF) which it formed in 1999 with the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) (South Asia Terrorist Portal 2017). The group used to purchase weapons and training from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) of Myanmar (Global Security). PREPAK has ties with Tripura's ATTF and NLFT (Global Security). The party is further linked with Kuku militants such as the Kuki National Front (KNF) and the Zomi Defense Volunteers (ZDV) (Global Security).

PREPAK has ruled out all negotiations with the Government of India until they agree to consider granting Manipur independence (Global Security)

### **Group Outcome**

Indian security forces killed PREPAK's founder, Tulachandra, on November 12, 1985 (Global Security). The group suffered a series of setbacks and factional in-fighting right after Tulachandra's death, but then re-structured and re-organized (Ibid.). He was eventually replaced by Urrikinbam Sarat (Global Security). The group is still active as of 2012. According to Global Security, PREPAK remains a significant force in the area because the group has reportedly purchased rocket launchers, AK-series guns and other weapons.

- VIII. PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (INDIA)  
Torg ID: 931  
Min. Group Date: 1978  
Max. Group Date: 2012  
Onset: NA

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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Revolutionary People's Front or RPF (the group's political wing according to Global Security), People's Liberation Army (Pla), People's Liberation Army (India), People's Liberation Army (Pla) (India)

Group Formation: 1978

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

## Part 3. Narrative

### Group Formation

The PLA was formed on September 25, 1978, by N. Bisheshwar Singh with the goal of creating an independent state in Manipur (Global Security; SATP). Its first violent attack was in 1979 (GTD 2017). The group began an armed struggle against the Indian government in the early 1980s (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 533). The group splintered from the UNLF (Global Security). It is composed of Meiteis, Nagas, and Kukis, but members are primarily Meitei (SATP; Global Security). The PLA ascribes to a Maoist ideology

(Gleditsch et al. 2011, 533). It has a secondary goal to unite many separatist groups operating in northeast India to expel police and state forces from the area (Global Security).

### **Geography**

The group primarily operates out of Imphal Valley, Chandel, Churachandpur, Manipur and Assam (Global Security; Cline 2006, 128). The PLA allegedly operates training camps in Myanmar and Bangladesh (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 534).

### **Organizational Structure**

The PLA has a political wing called the Revolutionary People's Front (RPF), which was created in either 1979 or 1989. Irengbam Chaoren is the leader of the RPF (Global Security). The military wing of the PLA is very well-organized and comprises four to six divisions organized across three regions (SATP; Global Security). It allegedly also had a Muslim cell at some point, but it was disbanded (Global Security). The group funds itself through extortion measures (SATP). It has at least 1000 members (SATP).

### **External Ties**

The RPF operates out of Bangladesh (SATP). PLA splintered from UNLF (Global Security). PLA is allied with NSCN and reportedly receives external support from Pakistan IS and Myanmar's KIAI as well (Global Security; SATP). It is also allied with UNLF and PREPAK (Global Security). The group maintains external bases of support in Myanmar and Bangladesh (SATP; Gleditsch et al. 2011, 534).

### **Group Outcome**

The Indian government declared a state of emergency in 1980, banned the RPF in 1981, and killed Bisheshwar and several PLA members during a counterterrorism campaign in 1981 (Global Security). A second raid in 1982 killed the PLA's replacement leader (Global Security). Although a surge of Indian troops appeared to have weakened the PLA by 1989, the PLA resumed the armed conflict in 1992 (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 533). The group is still active in 2016 conducting attacks in India, and operating a government-in-exile from its external base of operations in Bangladesh (SATP n.d.; GTD 2017).

- IX. SHAN STATE PROGRESS PARTY (SSPP)  
Torg ID: 810  
Min. Group Date: 1979  
Max. Group Date: 2011  
Onset: 2011

## Part 1. Bibliography

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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Shan State Army - North (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Rohan and Yee 2016), SSA-N (Rohan and Yee 2016) Shan State Progressive Party, Shan State Progress Party, Shan State Progress Party (Spp), Shan State Progressive Party (Sp)

Group Formation: 1989

Group End: 2016 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

## Group Formation

The SSPP was originally the political wing of the Shan State Army (Gleditsch et al. 2013; Rohan and Yee 2016). In 1989, the SSA splintered and the SSPP became its own independent group also known as the Shan State Army -North (Rohan and Yee 2016). The SSA-N was an ethno-nationalist separatist group fighting for a separate Shan state (Rohan and Yee 2016; Gleditsch et al. 2013). The group's first violent attack was in 1989 (GTD 2017).

## **Geography**

The group had its headquarters in Wan Hai, Kehsi Township, the northern Shan state (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Rohan and Yee 2016). The group had no known external sanctuaries. The group was active in Nam Kham, Langkho, Hsipaw, Kyauk Mae, Mong Hsu, Tang Yang, Mongyai, Kehsi, and Lashio Township (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

## **Organizational Structure**

The group had an estimated 3,000 members in 2011 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 191). It had 4,000 members at an unknown date (Rohan and Yee 2016). The group maintained the SSPP as a political wing (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 191; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

## **External Ties**

The group formed in 1989 when the Shan State Army splintered into two factions: Shan State Army-North and Shan State Army-South (Rohan and Yee 2016). The group is a member of the Committee for State Unity alliance.

## **Group Outcome**

The group initially signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 1989 (Rohan and Yee 2016). The ceasefire did not hold, however, and the SSA-N resumed violent attacks at an unknown date. Violence escalated in 2011 when the SSA-N clashed with Burmese forces over a proposed oil pipeline in the region (Gleditsch et al. 2013; Rohan and Yee 2016). The Burmese government and the SSPP agreed to a second ceasefire in 2012 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Rohan and Yee 2016). The ceasefire eventually broke down and fighting resumed in 2013 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group's last known violent attack was in 2016 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

Notes for Iris:

- this splinters from the Shan State Army
- this group coordinates with a lot of other insurgent groups
- hard to find attacks because it's the political wing
- signs a peace agreement with the government, but it doesn't hold
- a newer ceasefire agreement in 2010 could explain why the group is less active

X. MONG THAI ARMY (MTA)

Torg ID: 1817

Min. Group Date: 1985

Max. Group Date: 1995

Onset: 1985

**Part 1. Bibliography**

- “Mong Tai Army.” Global Security. N.d.(a)  
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/wa.htm>
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<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/sua.htm>

**Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Muang Tai Army, Mok Tai Army, Shan United Army

Group Formation: 1985

Group End: 1996 (ceasefire)

**Part 3. Narrative**

**Group Formation**

In 1985, SURA merged with SSA to become the Thailand Revolutionary Council (TRC) (Wallace 1990; Gleditsch et al 2013, 184). The TRC was renamed the Mong Tai Army

(MTA) in the mid-1990s (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 184). The group was an ethno-nationalist separatist organization fighting for a separate Shan state (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 184). It is unknown precisely when the group's first violent attack occurred.

### **Geography**

The group operated along the Burma-Thai border (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 183). It primarily operated in Shan State (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 182-183). It had attacks in Ban Than Don, Wanphwe V., and Tachilek (GTD 2017; MAR 2004). There is no evidence the group had an external base.

### **Organizational Structure**

The MTA's leader was Mon Heng (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 182). The group's leader by 1995 was Khun Sa (Hail 1996; MAR 2004). Members likely had combat experience from SURA and SSA. Members were Shan (MAR 2004). There are wildly different size estimates for the group. In 1990, the group had approximately 8,000 fighters (MAR 2004). In 1993, the group had an estimated 2,100 to 20,000 fighters; in 1994, the group had an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 fighters; and in 1995, the group had an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 fighters (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 182). The group funded itself through drug trafficking and narcotics (MAR 2004; Boyle 2007).

### **External Ties**

The group was a merger between SURA and SSA (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 184). The group splintered in 1995 into several different factions. There is no evidence of external support from other state or non-state actors.

### **Group Outcome**

Fighting escalated in 1995 as the Burmese military attacked a Shan village and killed civilians (MAR 2004). In 1995, the MTA splintered into several different factions after the group announced it would sign a ceasefire agreement (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 182; Hail 1996). In 1996, the MTA signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese government (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 184).

- XI. NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR BODOLAND  
Torg ID: 316  
Min. Group Date: 1988  
Max. Group Date: 2012  
Onset: NA



## Part 1. Bibliography

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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: National Democratic Front Of Bodoland (Ndfb), Bdsf, Bodo Security Force, Bodo Security Force (Bsf), Democratic Front Of Bodoland Ndfb, National Democratic Front For Bodoland, National Democratic Front For Bodoland (Ndfb), Ndfb

Group Formation: 1988

Group End (Outcome): As of 2016, the NDFB still carried out violent activity (Times of India 2016; GTD 2017).

## Part 3. Narrative

### Group Formation

Historically, there has been a large amount conflict in Assam's Bodoland between the indigenous Bodo people and Muslim settlers (Tehelka 2013). The Bodo tribal community's resentment of Muslim settlers as well as government neglect led to a movement for autonomy, which created the Bodo Autonomous Council in 1993 (Tehelka 2013). Frustration with the Council's lack of progress led to the creation of violent groups such as the Bodo Security Force in 1986 or 1988, later renamed the National Democratic Front of Bodoland in 1994 (Global Security n.d.; SATP n.d.). The NDFB seeks the creation of a separate Bodoland and opposes the use of the Devnagari script to write the Bodo language (Tehelka 2013, Global Security n.d.). The NDFB now focuses mainly on repelling non-Assamese influence in Assam (Global Security n.d.). The group's first violent incident came as late as 1992 (GTD 2017).

## **Geography**

The NDFB operates mainly northwest of the Brahmaputra river, in Assam's Bongaigaon, Kokrajhar, Darrang, Barpeta, Dhubri, Nalbari and Sonitpur districts (Global Security n.d.). The Bodos also reportedly use the Manas National Park as a sanctuary and an entry into Bhutan (Global Security n.d.). They had external bases in Myanmar and Bhutan as well (Global Security n.d.).

## **Organizational Structure**

The NDFB has approximately 3,500 members (Global Security n.d.). Members come from the Bodo tribe (Global Security n.d.). They are funded through a "Bhutanese diplomatic bag" which is a diaspora source of funding (Global Security n.d.). They are headed by a Chairman by the name of Ranjan Daimary (Global Security n.d.). In addition, the political party the People's Democratic Party is allegedly the NDFB's formal political front (Global Security n.d.).

Following the ceasefire of 2005, the NDFB split into the NDFB(P), NDFB(R), and NDFB(S), the last of which has continued its violence activity (Global Security n.d.).

## **External Ties**

In 2001, the group publicly announced that the outfits the All Students' Bodo Association, the Bodo Sahitya Sabha, the Bodo People's Action Committee, and the All Bodo Women's Welfare Federation were "rival organizations" (Chadha 2005). The NDFB also clashes with the BLTF (Chadha 2005). The CNLA, a violent group in Myanmar, supplies the NDFB arms (Global Security n.d.). It is allied with the United Liberation Front of Assam, formally uniting with them in 1999 (Global Security n.d.). The NDFB is also friendly with NSCN-IM (Global Security n.d.).

## Group Outcome

In 2005, NDFB signed a ceasefire with the Assam government, but it didn't hold and factions of the group continued fighting under the original group name (Times of India 2016). The group's last known attack was in 2016 (GTD 2017). In 2014, the Indian Government responded with a "large-scale military operation" known as Operation All-Out (Times of India 2016).

Despite a series of unsuccessful peace talks with the government, the NDFB continues to use violence (Times of India 2016).

## XII. BURMA COMMUNIST PARTY

Torg ID: 1657

Min. Group Date: 1988

Max. Group Date: 1989

Onset: 1948

### Part 1. Bibliography

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### Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Burmese Communist Party (White Flags), White Flags

Group Formation: 1939 (CIA 1982), 1946 (White Flags form)

Group End: 1989 (GTD 2017) - dissolve

### Part 3. Narrative

#### Group Formation

The group was formed in 1939 in Rangoon, though it formally splintered in 1946 into two separate factions, the White Flag Faction and the Red Flag Faction (CIA 1982; Global Security; Schmid and Jongman 1988). The White Flag faction became known as the de

facto BCP. The group's founding was partially supported by the Chinese during the Chinese Revolution (CIA 1982). The group's ideology and main goal was seeking autonomy. The White Flag faction had mixed political aims - it wanted territories in Shan State to gain autonomous status, but also wanted more power in the central government (CIA 1982; Global Security n.d.; Schmid and Jongman 1988). It ascribed to a leftist Trotskyite ideology (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The exact date of its first attack is unknown, but it is known it occurred in March of 1948 after reconciliation between the government and the group failed (Global Security n.d.) .

## **Geography**

The group was active primarily in Shan State and also somewhat active in Kayah State, Kachin State, and in western Burma; the group's radio station was broadcast from Chinese territory (CIA 1982). The group also moved its troops into the Pegu mountains in central Burma (CIA 1982; Global Security n.d.). There is no evidence the group was transnational. While it partially operated in China, it is unknown precisely when they moved there.

## **Organizational Structure**

The group was initially led by Thakin Soe (Global Security n.d.). Most of the early members of the group were ethnically Chinese (CIA 1982). The group relied on drug trade, jade smuggling, and upped tax collection on hill tribes to finance the party and its operations afterward (CIA 1982; Global Security n.d.).

After being mostly destroyed by the Burmese Army 1975, a new group formed, which consisted mainly of minority groups along the border of the country (CIA 1982; Schmid and Jongman 1988). The group's structure consisted of six brigades of military and a Central Committee, as well as a radio station called the "Voice of the People of Burma," which formed in 1971 (CIA 1982). The military sector of the group consisted of 12,000 to 14,000 militants in 1982, and somewhere between 8,000 and 15,000 around 1988 (CIA 1982; Schmid and Jongman 1988).

The White Flag faction had as many as 25,000 rebels between 1948 and 1951 (Global Security n.d.). Members originally came from the Burmese communist party political movement. The group split into two factions, the Red and White Flags in 1946 (CIA 1982; Schmid and Jongman 1988). The military leader of the Red Flag Faction was Peng Chia'a-fa, and Thakin Soe continued as the leader of this group (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Global Security n.d.). The Central Committee split from the group in 1980 due to differences (CIA 1982). The group also created an offshoot called the Burma Communist Party which was led by Naw Seng (Global Security n.d.)

## **External Ties**

The group faced inter-group competition over funding (CIA 1982).

The group was created by the Chinese during the Chinese Revolution (CIA 1982). Members of the CPB were ethnically Chinese. The group was heavily supported by China with arms and ammunition until the mid-1970s (CIA 1982; Schmid and Jongman 1988; Global Security n.d.). The group also bought industrial products and diamonds from Thailand (CIA 1982). The group was linked to other Burmese liberation groups and trafficking groups; the group also armed ethnic groups like the Pa-o State Nationalities Liberation Group, Kachin Independence Army, and the group sold opium to the Shan United Army (CIA 1982; Global Security n.d.). The group was known to be a part of the Golden Triangle, known as one of the world's largest illegal opium producers (Global Security n.d.).

### **Group Outcome**

The government tried to negotiate with the group in 1948, but the attempt failed and the two factions of the group revolted (Global Security n.d.). A majority of the group was destroyed by the Burmese Army in the 1970s (CIA 1982). The group also moved its troops into the Pegu mountains in central Burma (CIA 1982).

Counterinsurgency operations by the Burmese Army in the 1980s proved to be ineffective (CIA 1982). Due to the Burmese Army's poor communication, the group was cognizant of operations well before they were executed; the group also had better weapons than the government (CIA 1982).

The group and both of its faction were banned by the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) in 1946 (CIA 1982). The US anti-narcotics program did not have a major impact on the group as its control over opium production in the area continued to grow (CIA 1982; Schmid and Jongman 1988). The White Flag faction was mostly eradicated by 1975 after security forces killed their leader (CIA 1982; Global Security n.d.). Communist forces were nearly eradicated by the 1980s in Burma, but the group did claim responsibility for two attacks in 1988 and 1989 (GTD 2017). The group formally disarmed in 1989 (Global Security n.d.). The group has not been active since these two attacks so it is assumed to be inactive

Interesting quote from Global Security:

“In October 1949, the People's Republic of China was proclaimed. Burma was the first noncommunist nation to recognize the new Beijing government, on December 16, 1949, hoping in part to stem the perceived threat of Chinese aid to communists within Burma. The neutralist turn in Burmese foreign policy dates from this time.”

there is a literal bargaining failure → war here.

Notes for Iris:

-why does support rise and fall with China in the 1970s

-loss of external support here is devastating for the group and leads in part to its demise

-the group formally disintegrates by 1989, but they're never really as effective as in the 1970s

### XIII. NATIONAL SOCIALIST COUNCIL OF NAGALAND - KHAPLANG FACTION

Torg ID: 930

Min. Group Date: 1988

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

#### Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4599, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PCw479b0nJD3cj-DuWizT0vw-WSVxDA6hY0U4Uno7BA/edit>
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- Samudra Kashyap, "NSCN-K weaker, but retains the potential for damage," Indian Express, Nov 18, 2015, <http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/nscn-k-weaker-but-retains-the-potential-for-damage/>
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#### Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Aliases: National Socialist Council Of Nagaland-Khaplang (Nscn-K), National Socialist Council Of Nagaland - Khaplang (Nscn-K), National Socialist Council Of

Nagaland - Khaplang Faction, National Socialist Council Of Nagland-Khaplang (Nscn-K), Nscn-K

Group Formation: 1988

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The NCSN-K splintered from the NCSN in 1988 (Express News Service 2015). This was due to the failure to assassinate the NCSN's leader, Muivah (Global Security n.d.). The NCSN-K aims to create an independent Christian Naga state (Global Security n.d.). Its first violent incident was in 1988 when it clashed with NSCN-IM forces (SATP n.d.).

#### **Geography**

The NCSN-K operates along the Indo-Myanmar border (Express News Service 2015). Although the group once occupied Dhimar, Kohima, Longmisa, and Suruhoto in Nagaland, attacks by the NCSN-IM around 2003 forced the NCSN-K to evacuate these areas (Global Security n.d.). However, the group made a comeback, and is now established in many northern Nagaland districts such as Longleng, Wokha, Dimapur, Kohima, as well as areas of Manipur and South Assam (Global Security n.d.).

#### **Organizational Structure**

From 1989 to 1990, the NSCN-K renovated its hierarchy through the recruitment of new youth (Global Security n.d.). It has approximately 2,000 cadres (SATP n.d.) The organization is divided into the military and civil wings, which then have different branches for different regions (Global Security n.d.) Each regional group is headed by a "Rajapeyu," who has subordinates known as "Ranapeyus" (Global Security n.d.). The highest authority in the group is the Chairman, Mr. Khaplang (Global Security n.d.) The NSCN-K established a Nagaland government-in-exile known as the Government of the People's Republic of Nagaland, NSCN-K (SATP n.d.). The group funds itself through extortion and kidnapping (SATP n.d.)

#### **External Ties**

In 2007, a group styling themselves NSCN (Unification) split from the NCSN-K (Kashyap 2015). In 2011, the group known as the NCSN KK split from the original group (Kashyap 2015). Yet another split group known as NSCN (Reformation) splintered from the NSCN-K as well.

Many clashes occurred between the NSCN-K and NCSN-IM in 1999, leading many noncombatants to flee Nagaland to Burma and India (Minorities At Risk Project 2004). The NSCN-K is strongly linked to ULFA and other underground groups in Northeast India, providing them training (Global Security n.d.). The group is allied with the UNLF in the south of Assam. The NSCN-K is supported by the Ao, Konyak, Khemungans, Phom, Angami, Semas, Yimchunger, Sangtham and Chang tribes of Nagaland (Global Security n.d.).

### **Group Outcome**

The NSCN-K agreed to a ceasefire with the Government of India in 2001, but reneged on the agreement and again began using violence in 2015 (Kashyap 2015). However, the NSCN-K has been weakened by the fact that many of its members left the organization in the years of the ceasefire, most of which joined the rival NSCN-IM (Kashyap 2015). The NSCN-K was further weakened by a funding crisis and a movement known as the Action Committee Against Unabated Taxation which countered the forced “tax” collection that was the group’s main source of income (Kashyap 2015). Its last violent incident was in 2016 (GTD 2017).

#### XIV. LEAGUE FOR NATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Torg ID: 1788

Min. Group Date: 1989

Max. Group Date: 2010

Onset: NA

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: National League For Democracy, League For National Democracy



Group Formation: 1988 (Harvard N.d.; BBC 2015)

Group End: 1989 (GTD - last violent attack), 2018 (The group is still active as a political party, though it does not seem to use violence now)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The group formed at some point during the revolutions of 1988 (Harvard N.d.). The group formed in opposition to the military control over the government following the elections of 1990 (Harvard N.d.; BBC 2015). The group was known to be liberal, pro-democracy (Los Angeles Times N.d.). The group's first - and only likely violent attack was on July 7, 1989, when it bombed an oil refinery (GTD 2017).

#### **Geography**

The group was known to operate around the capital and the city Yangon (Los Angeles Times N.d.). The group conducted attacks in Rangoon and Laukkai (GTD 2017). The group was not known to have any external sanctuaries.

#### **Organizational Structure**

The group was founded by Tin Oo (BBC 2015). The party was led in recent years by Aung San Suu Kyi (Los Angeles Times; Harvard N.d.; BBC 2015; Human Rights Watch 2017). Suu Kyi was under house arrest for her opposition for nearly two decades (HRW 2017). The president of the group is Htin Kyaw (Human Rights Watch 2017). The group had at least 392 members in 1990 and 390 in 2015, based on the number of seats the party claimed (BBC 2015). Its sources of funding are unknown.

#### **External Ties**

The group has no known alliances, splinters, or forms of external support.

#### **Group Outcome**

The group's first - and only - attack was in 1989 under suspicious conditions (GTD 2017). The group's participated in the 1990 elections, but the military government annulled the election altogether (Harvard N.d.; BBC 2015). The party went on to win the elections by a landslide in 2015, while Aung San Suu Kyi was still under house arrest, ending half a decade of military rule (Harvard N.d.; BBC 2015; Human Rights Watch 2017). The group is still active in Burma.

Notes for Iris:

-The group's one attack was not in line with their goals so likely unsanctioned electoral violence by supporters

-the military gov't bans the group from 1989 until 2015 which is when the NLD gains power over the junta

XV. UNITED WA STATE PARTY

Torg ID: 2195

Min. Group Date: 1990

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: 1997

**Part 1. Bibliography**

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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Shan State (North) Special Region - 2, United Wa State Army, Red Wa, United Wa State Army (Uwsa), United Wa State Party, United Wa State Party (Uwsp) (Myanmar Peace Monitor N.d.; O'Hara and Selling 2012) and Red Wa (O'Hara and Selling 2012)

Group Formation: April 17 1989 (Myanmar Peace Monitor N.d.)

Group End: 2016 (RFA 2016)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The group was founded on April 17, 1989, as a partial splinter of the BCP (Myanmar Peace Monitor N.d.; Global Security N.d.). The group was formed from members of the Communist Party of Burma after it ceased activity in 1989 (Myanmar Peace Monitor N.d.; O'Hara and Selling 2012; Stratfor 2013; Sun 2016). The group fought for the establishment of an autonomous Wa state within Burma, yet also wanted to integrate the Wa population into the Union of Burma (ACCORD 2011; Global Security N.d.; Stratfor 2013; O'Hara and Selling 2012; Tripathi 2014). It is unknown when the group's first violent attack occurred, but occurred as late as 1989 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

### **Geography**

The group operated out of Pangkham, and overall the north-east border near China and South Burma near Thailand (Myanmar Peace Monitor N.d.; Tripathi 2014; Stratfor 2013; Reuters 2016; Reuters 2017). The group was mainly active in the areas of Pangsang, Mongma, Pangwai, Nahphan, Mongpawt, Hopan, Mak Marng, Mongton, Mong Hsat, Tachileik, Mong Pan, Mongyaung (Myanmar Peace Monitor N.d.). The group allegedly had divisions along the Thailand and China borders (Tripathi 2014). Some troops and bases were in Thailand (Naing 2016).

## **Organizational Structure**

The group was founded and at first led by Chao Ngi Lai (Tripathi 2014). The group was then led by Bao Yu Xiang (Myanmar Peace Monitor N.d.). The current leader of the group is Pao Yu Hsiang (Reuters 2017). It had approximately 16,000 members in 2005 (Global Security n.d.). The group allegedly had 30,000 members and 10,000 auxiliary members around 2013 (Myanmar Peace Monitor N.d.; Global Security n.d.; Stratfor 2013; Reuters 2016). Other sources claim that the group had 20,000 to 25,000 members (ACCORD 2011; O'Hara and Selling 2012; Radio Free Asia 2016). They are the largest insurgency in Myanmar (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group was mainly ethnic Chinese members from Wa (ACCORD 2011; Tripathi 2014; Radio Free Asia 2016).

The group was known for its opium and heroin drug trade, though the group claimed it was not responsible for drug trade and was in fact helping counter drug presence in Burma (Myanmar Peace Monitor N.d.; O'Hara and Selling 2012; Stratfor 2013; Sun 2016; Reuters 2016). Beijing was allegedly responsible for funding and arming the group (ACCORD 2011; Global Security N.d.). The group followed the structure of the Chinese Communist Party (Reuters 2017).

The political wing of the group was the United Wa State Party (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The military wing of the group was the United Wa State Army (Myanmar Peace Monitor N.d.).

## **External Ties**

The group was formed from members of the Communist Party of Burma after it ceased activity in 1989 (Myanmar Peace Monitor N.d.; O'Hara and Selling 2012; Stratfor 2013; Sun 2016). The group was closely tied to China as well as Thailand (Myanmar Peace Monitor N.d.; Tripathi 2014; O'Hara and Selling 2012; Stratfor 2013). The National League for Democracy was tied to the group as peace progress would allegedly not be possible without their cooperation (Reuters 2017). The group received weapons from China to defend their drug laboratories on the Thai-Burma border (Tripathi 2014). The group also helped distribute Chinese weapons to other insurgent groups in Burma (Tripathi 2014). The group had an alliance with the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) (Tripathi 2014).

## **Group Outcome**

The group supported the Myanmar military fight against the Shan State Army from 1996-1997 (Tripathi 2014). The group established a Wa region which included Hopang, Mongmau, Panwai, Nahpah, Metman, and Panghsang in Shan state (Myanmar Peace Monitor N.d.). The group signed a ceasefire on May 18, 1989, which was eventually rejected due to a conflict over territory (Myanmar Peace Monitor N.d.; ACCORD 2011;

Sun 2016). There was a state level ceasefire on September 6, 2011, and a union level ceasefire December of 2011 (Myanmar Peace Monitor N.d.). Peace talks with the group fell apart in 1996 after a misunderstanding that caused the group's delegation to walk out of the negotiations (RFA 2016).

Notes for Iris:

-why 1997?

XVI. ALL BURMA STUDENTS' DEMOCRATIC FRONT (ABSDF)

Torg ID: 870

Min. Group Date: 1991

Max. Group Date: 2009

Onset: NA

**Part 1. Bibliography**

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**Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: ABSDF

Group Formation: 1988

Group End: 2013

**Part 3. Narrative**

**Group Formation**

The ABSDF formed in 1988 after the 8/8 protests in Burma (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). They fought for policy changes to create a more democratic government in Burma

and opposed the military junta (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group's first violent attack was as late as 1990 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 62).

### **Geography**

The group had a series of training camps along the Burma-Thai, Burma-India, and Burma-China border and thus may have had external bases (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group primarily operated in the same areas as the KNU and KIA (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It has offices in Myawaddy and Muse (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It also has an office in the Lahkum Bum area (Zar 2014).

### **Organizational Structure**

The leader of the ABSDF was U Than Khae (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Zar 2014). The group had an estimated 400 members (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group had a formal political wing involving three year political terms (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 62). Members of the group were students (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 61).

### **External Ties**

The group had external wings operating in the US and Australia although it is unclear what they received in exchange (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group was heavily dependent on support from other insurgent groups operating in Burma and fought alongside the KIA from 1998-1996 and from 2011 onward (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 61; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

### **Group Outcome**

The group has fought alongside the KIA in the Kachin conflict since its inception. It signed a preliminary ceasefire with the Burmese government in 2013 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Struggle for Peace and Conflict 2014, 157).

## **XVII. ARAKAN ROHINGY ISLAMIC FRONT**

Torg ID: 1623

Min. Group Date: 1991

Max. Group Date: 1991

Onset: NA

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (International Crisis Group 2016)

Group Formation: 1986 (Daily Mirror 2017)

Group End: 1998 (transition to non-violent lobbying as ARNO)

## Part 3. Narrative

### Group Formation

The group formed in 1986 when it splintered from the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (Sanderson 2017; Daily Mirror 2017). The group wanted to secede or join Bangladesh (Daily Mirror 2017). They also wanted control of the Rakhine area, which was dominated by the Rohingya (Daily Mirror 2017). The group was an ethno-nationalist separatist organization (Daily Mirror 2017). Its first attack was as late as November 10, 1991, but it seems like it was active earlier (GTD 2017).

## **Geography**

The group was active in the northwest of Burma and the Rakhine area specifically (Daily Mirror 2017). The group was active mainly in the Shan State and was responsible for an attack in Mongdow (Daily Mirror 2017; GTD 2017).

## **Organizational Structure**

The group was led by Nurul Islam (SATP n.d.; Far East Economic Review 1991). The members of the group were Muslim Rohingya (Daily Mirror 2017). The group's membership size is unclear but it was estimated at around 200 in 1991 (Far East Economic Review 1991). Another estimate says the group never had more than a few dozen fighters (Lintner n.d.). Members came from the RSO. The group was funded by a Rohingya diaspora from overseas, mainly from Saudi Arabia (Far East Economic Review 1991). The group later developed a political wing known as ARNO, which operated outside Bangladesh.

## **External Ties**

The group pledged to prevent harm to Muslims in Burma to the Overseas Islamic Countries and the International Islamic Organization (MAR N.d.). The group was a splinter of the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, with which it formed a loose alliance (International Crisis Group 2016; CSIS 2017). The group later absorbed some members from the RSO in 1998 and reorganized itself into the Arakan Rohingya National Organization (Tripathi 2014; ICG 2016).

The group was funded by a Rohingya diaspora from overseas, mainly from Saudi Arabia (Far East Economic Review 1991). The group also formed an alliance with four other Muslim groups called the Democratic Alliance of Burma, which included the Central Rohingya Jammatal Ulama, the Ittehadul Mujahiddial, the Rohingya Islamic Liberation Organization, and the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (MAR N.d.).

## **Group Outcome**

The group was responsible for a skirmish with the government in 1989 and an attack in 1991 (Far East Economic Review 1991; GTD 2017). To counter the group and other Muslim groups, there was a Burmese army build-up in Arakan (Far East Economic Review 1991).

In 1998, the group renamed itself the Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) and moved to Chittagong to operate the group in exile (Lintner n.d.). It has not been very violent since then.



In 2009, the military operations in Rohingya caused thousands of Rohingyas to flee to Thailand and Indonesia (Daily Mirror 2017). At an unspecified time between 2012 and 2015, the group was banned and declared a security threat to Burma (Daily Mirror 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- the group is pretty small
- when the government bans the group it is actually pretty meaningful and they're not able to muster a strong response
- possible some members from this group → ARSA
- even being as small as it was, it still had an impact; being allies with other groups might have been helpful because it was able to coordinate attacks

#### XVIII. DEMOCRATIC KAREN BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION

Torg ID: 150

Min. Group Date: 1993

Max. Group Date: 2001

Onset: NA

##### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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<http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/myanmar-peace-center/159-dkba-5>
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<http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-public/data/pgag/280/>
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<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=678>
- “Kayin State Profile.” UNHCR Southeast Myanmar Information Management Unit. Last Updated 2014.
- Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD), Myanmar: COI Compilation - 7 October 2011 (as of 5 September 2011), 7 October 2011, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e9291912.html>

##### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, DKBA-5, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army - Brigade 5, Karen Klo-Htoo-Baw Organisation (KKO), Kalo Htoo Baw armed group (Former Democratic Karen Buddhist Army - Brigade 5), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (Dkba), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, Democratic Karen Buddhist Association, Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization, Progressive Buddhist Karen Nationals Organization

Group Formation: 1994

Group End: 2014

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The DKBA formed in 1994 when it splintered from the KNU (Carey and Mitchell 2013). The group emerged to support the Burmese government with local security efforts to maintain the border (Austrian Center 2011, 66). Its first violent attack was in 1995 (GTD 2016).

#### **Geography**

The group fought to protect the Burmese-Thai border (Carey and Mitchell 2013). The group had several attacks in Thailand in Mae Sot, Ban Mae La, and northwest Thailand (GTD 2016). In Burma, it had attacks in the Myawaddy and Kyaikmayaw districts (GTD 2016).

#### **Organizational Structure**

The DKBA has an armed wing known as Klo Htoo Baw Battalion and a formal political wing known as Klo Htoo Baw or the Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). Members of the group are former militants and ethnically Karen (Carey and Mitchell 2013). They had approximately 1,500 members at an unknown date (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

#### **External Ties**

The group splintered from the KNU in 1994 (Carey and Mitchell 1994). The group then attacked the KNU several times (GTD 2016). The group supported the Burmese government (Carey and Mitchell 2013).

#### **Group Outcome**

Many members of the DKBA left the group after it began to support the military junta (Austrian Center 2011, 66). In 2010, a splinter group known as DKBA-5 formed and took many members with it (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group clashed with the KNU several times and was as active as late as 2014 (GTD 2016).

### XIX. RESTORATION COUNCIL OF SHAN STATES (RCSS)

Torg ID: 671

Min. Group Date: 1996

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: 1996

### Part 1. Bibliography

- "RCSS." Myanmar Peace Monitor. N.d.  
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- Daniel Otis. "Partying with one of Burma's largest rebel states." VICE News. 2014.  
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- Gunaratna Rohan, Kam Stefanie Li Yee. "Shan State Army-South/RCSS." Handbook of Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific. World Scientific. 2016.  
<https://books.google.com/books?id=Y3XQDAAQBAJ&pg=PA170&lpg=PA170&dq=shan+united+revolutionary+army+ssa-s&source=bl&ots=4Upqen4o4B&sig=GglaECPdDhcYpxA0zPiyFe5eImE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiyxOWXv9jYAhUDRN8KHZoXDCQQ6AEIXDAL#v=onepage&q=shan%20united%20revolutionary%20army%20ssa-s&f=false>
- GTD Perpetrator 40506. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.  
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=40506>
- "Shan State Rebels Agree to Sign Myanmar Peace Accord." RFA. 2015.  
<http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/accord-10072015171355.html>
- Radio Free Asia, Shan state rebels agree to sign Myanmar peace accord, 7 October 2015, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/567403688.html>
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- N. Ganesan. Bilateral Legacies in East and Southeast Asia. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 2015.  
<https://books.google.com/books?id=cv-gCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA128&lpg=PA128&dq=mong+thai+army+thailand+base&source=bl&ots=yc-w9DXGiS&sig=LjvZGg06pY44OHBp3om8xtKOiO0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjUsPKjrt3ZAhUHh1QKHx4BNEQ6AEIfTAL#v=onepage&q=mong%20thai%20army%20thailand%20base&f=false>

### Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Restoration Council Of Shan States, Restoration Council Of Shan States (Rcss), Shan State Army-South Command, Shan State Army-South Command (Ssa-S)

Group Formation: 1996

Group End: 2015 (Ceasefire)

### Part 3. Narrative

## **Group Formation**

In 1996, the MTA signed a ceasefire agreement with the government. This decision led the MTA to splinter into several factions as some members refused to abide by the agreement. One of the factions that splintered from the MTA and continued fighting in 1996 and became the RCSS (Rohan and Yee 2016). The SSA-S was an ethno-nationalist separatist state pursuing a separate Shan state.

## **Geography**

The group's headquarters are in Loi Tai Leng (Rohan and Yee 2016). It allegedly had an external base in Thailand as early as 1995 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 183; Ganesan 2015, 128).

## **Organizational Structure**

Most members of the RCSS were originally members in the SSA-S before it merged with SURA (Rohan and Yee 2016). Members were ethnic Shan (Otis 2014; Rohan and Yee 2016). It had approximately 6,000 soldiers at an unknown date (Rohan and Yee 2016). In 2010, the group had 7,000 members (Austrian CCORD 2011). The armed wing is known as the SSA-S and the political wing is known as the RCSS (Otis 2014). The group's leader was Yawd Serk (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d).

## **External Ties**

The SSNA joined the group in 2006 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It allegedly received sanctuary from Thailand, but Thailand denied the accusations (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 183).

## **Group Outcome**

The group signed a ceasefire with the Burmese government in 2011, but it failed to hold (Otis 2014). The group signed a partial ceasefire in 2015 (Radio Free Asia 2015; Rohan and Yee 2016; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

- XX. GOD'S ARMY  
Torg ID: 846  
Min. Group Date: 1997  
Max. Group Date: 2000  
Onset: 2000

## **Part 1. Bibliography**

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- "God's Army." Global Security. N.D. [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/gods\\_army.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/gods_army.htm)
- "Two Little Boys." The Guardian. 2000. <https://www.theguardian.com/g2/story/0,3604,347432,00.html>
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- GTD Perpetrator 20180. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20180>

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: God's Army of the Holy Mountain

Group Formation: 1997

Group End: 2000 (repressed)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

God's Army splintered from the KNU in 1997 after the Burmese military launched a huge indiscriminate violent campaign against the KNU (Time 2000; Global Security n.d.). The God's Army was a Christian group and fought as part of the larger Karen conflict in Burma (Global Security n.d.). It ascribed to Christian eschatological beliefs about the world (Mydans 2000). The group carried out transnational attacks in Ratchaburi, Thailand in 2000 (Ritchburg 2000; Mydans 2000).

## **Geography**

The group's headquarters were in Ka Mar Pa Law in Burma (Global Security n.d.). It also had a camp in Ler Per Her, Karen State at one point (Guardian 2000). The group carried out transnational attacks in Ratchaburi, Thailand in 2000 (Ritchburg 2000; Mydans 2000).

## **Organizational Structure**

The leaders of the God's Army were two twin boys named Johnny and Luther Htoo (Global Security n.d.). The boys had a cult following due to their relatively young age (9 when the group began) and messianic beliefs (Time 2000). Group members were mainly ex-fighters and students (Global Security n.d.). Members are Christian Karen (Global Security n.d.; Guardian 2000). It is estimated to have had approximately 500 members in 1998 (Guardian 2000). In 2000, the group had approximately 200 members (Time 2000).

## **External Ties**

The group received weapons from the KNU (Global Security n.d.). It also provided some sanctuary to members of the Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors in 1999 (Global Security n.d.). In 2000, the group lost support from the KNU and other Karen separatist groups after a disastrous attack on a Thai hospital killed several civilians (Ritchburg 2000; Mydans 2000).

## **Group Outcome**

The group's last known attack was in 2000 (Mydans 2000; New York Times 2013). After the hospital attack in 2000, the Burmese and Thai militaries launched joint operations to suppress the group (New York Times 2013). In 2006, Johnny Htoo and eight remaining members of the God's Army surrendered to Burmese forces (New York Times 2013).

### **XXI. VIGOROUS BURMESE STUDENT WARRIORS**

Torg ID: 527

Min. Group Date: 1999

Max. Group Date: 2004

Onset: NA

#### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- Seth Jones and Martin Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End. RAND Corporation. 2008. P. 151. [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG741-1.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf)
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- GTD Perpetrator 20469, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20469>

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors, The Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors

Group Formation: 1999

Group End: 2004 (disappear)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in 1999 when its members took over the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand (New York Times 1999; Global Security n.d.). The group issued a fax demanding that the Burmese military junta release political prisoners and work to implement new democratic policy reforms (New York Times 1999; Global Security n.d.). The group was liberal and pro-democracy.

### **Geography**

The group's attacks took place in Bangkok, Thailand and Hpa-an, Burma (GTD 2016).

### **Organizational Structure**

The group was composed of students and had at least 12 members (New York Times 1999; FAS 2000). There is no information about the group's leadership, source of funding, or organizational structure.

### **External Ties**

After the 1999 embassy bombing, members of the group took sanctuary with the God's Army group in Burma (Global Security n.d.; FAS 2000). There is no other evidence of external support involving the group.

## Group Outcome

After the 1999 Embassy raid, members were allowed to flee in exchange for releasing all the prisoners (Global Security n.d.). The group's last known incident was in 2004 when it claimed responsibility for bombing a sporting goods store and passenger bus (GTD 2016). There is no evidence of a follow-up and it is unclear what happened to the group after this incident.

### XXII. MONGKO DEFENCE ARMY (MDA)

Torg ID: 2582

Min. Group Date: 2000

Max. Group Date: 2000

Onset: NA

#### Part 1. Bibliography

- Actor ID 830. Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset. Last Modified 2017.  
<http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/830>
- "Burmese Ethnic Group Reportedly Building Hotel with Casino Near Border." 2000a. BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, Apr 28, 1.  
<https://search-proquest-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org/docview/449789213?accountid=14026>.
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<https://search-proquest-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org/docview/449747144?accountid=14026>.

#### Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Aliases: Mongko Defence Army (Mda), Mongko Defence Army

Group Formation: 1989 (BBC 2000a)

Group End: Late October of 2000 (UCDP 2017; BBC 2000b)

#### Part 3. Narrative

##### Group Formation

The group was formed in 1989 (BBC 2000a). The goal of the group was de facto autonomy over the Shan State (UCDP 2017). The group was ethnonationalist, but did not advocate for a separate state (UCDP 2017). The date the group first came to attention as a violent group is unknown. There is debate over which organization the



group was a splinter of - either the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army or the Communist Party of Burma in 1989 (UCDP 2017; BBC 2000a).

### **Geography**

The group was active in the Mongko area of Kokang region in the Shan State of Myanmar (UCDP 2017). No external sanctuaries or transnational attacks are known.

### **Organizational Structure**

The leader of the group was named Mong Sala (UCDP 2017). The membership of the group was unknown. The group was financed through drug cultivation and trade, and the area of Kokang was known to be a key contributor to the Golden Triangle; the group was also involved in the taxation of the population it ruled (UCDP 2017; BBC 2000a). The group might have built a casino and hotel in 2000 for visitors from China to fund itself (UCDP 2017; BBC 2000a). Its specific structure is unknown.

### **External Ties**

There is debate over which organization the group was a splinter of - either the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army or the Communist Party of Burma in 1989 (UCDP 2017; BBC 2000a). Members of the group allegedly joined the United Wa State Army as it collapsed (UCDP 2017).

The group later had two splinters which fought each other for control (UCDP 2017; BBC 2000b). The group had no known external support.

### **Group Outcome**

The group initially reached a ceasefire in 1995, but it didn't hold (UCDP 2017). The group collapsed in 2000 when the group splintered into two factions, which began to struggle for power; one faction was led by Mong Sala and another by Lin Min and Khong Lao-Su (UCDP 2017; BBC 2000b). The Burmese army took advantage of the infighting to destroy the group and by November of 2000, the army was in control of Mongko, arrested Mong Sala, and destroyed the group essentially (UCDP 2017; BBC 2000b). The group has not been active since 2000, so it is assumed to be inactive.

Notes for Iris:

-infighting weakened the group and then the Burmese government was able to quickly repress

- uppsala source is very good here

Torg ID: 2583  
Min. Group Date: 2000  
Max. Group Date: 2000  
Onset: NA

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- Actor ID 831. Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset. Last modified 2017.  
<http://ucdp.uu.se/#/actor/831>
- "Burma Cracks Down on Cease-Fire Groups in Northeast." 2000b.BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, Dec 14, 1.  
<https://search-proquest-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org/docview/449747144?accountid=14026>.

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Mongko Defence Army - Lin Min, Mda - Lm, Mda-Lm, Mongko Defence Army - Lin Min Faction

Group Formation: 2000 (UCDP 2017)

Group End: 2000 by repression (UCDP 2017)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The group formed in October of 2000 after in-fighting in the Mongko Defence Army led a faction to splinter (UCDP 2017; BBC 2000b). The group fought for control over Shan State, but did not seem to advocate for a separate state (UCDP 2017). The group was a paramilitary group (UCDP 2017). The group was first seen as violent during clashes between the two factions of the group in October of 2000 (UCDP 2017).

#### **Geography**

The group operated on the immediate border of China in the Kokang area of Shan State (UCDP 2017). The group was in conflict with the other faction of the Mongko Defence Army in this area as well (UCDP 2017).

#### **Organizational Structure**

The group was led by Lin Min and Khong Lao-Su (UCDP 2017). Its specific membership, funding, and wings are unknown. It is assumed to follow the structure of the original Mongko Defence Army.

## External Ties

The group was a faction of the Mongko Defence Army (UCDP 2017). The group was in direct conflict with the Mong Sala faction of the Mongko Defence Army and tried unsuccessfully to “coup” the leader of the MDA (UCDP 2017; BBC 2000b). After the dissolution of the group, many members joined other insurgent groups in Burma like the United Wa State Party (UWSP) (UCDP 2017).

## Group Outcome

The group was in direct conflict with the other faction of the Mongko Defence Army from October to the end of November of 2000 (UCDP 2017; BBC 2000b). The group’s leader Lin Min was shot in the conflict (UCDP 2017; BBC 2000b). Khong Lao Su allegedly fled to China (UCDP 2017). The Burmese military took advantage of the in-fighting to destroy the group during a massive offensive in late 2000 (UCDP 2000). Security forces destroyed the MDA and MDA-LM by November 25, 2000 (UCDP 2017).

Notes for Iris:

-c.f. MDA profile as well. Government realized the conflict was escalating so intervened to exploit and managed to

-why did in-fighting occur? Slightly unclear but those groups dynamic lead to the group’s downfall

-similar to the MDA the group doesn’t want to secede, but just wants increased autonomy

XXIV. CHIN NATIONAL ARMY  
Torg ID: 2285  
Min. Group Date: 2002  
Max. Group Date: 20002  
Onset: NA

### Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20121. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.  
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20121>
- “Chin National Front/Chin National Army.” Global Security. N.d.  
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<http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/stakeholders-overview/158-cnf>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Burma: Chin National Front (CNF); its size, aims, fundraising, supporters, treatment by authorities, 19 April 2000, BUR34203.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad4e78.html>

- “Chin: Myanmar Government and Chin National Front Sign Peace Agreements.” Unrepresented Nation and People Organizations. 2012. <http://unpo.org/article/15261>
- United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Burma (Myanmar): Information on the Chin National Front / Chin National Army, 26 February 2004, MMR04001.ZMI, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/414ee2e24.html>
- Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC), Myanmar Query Response: Chin State, 31 July 2017, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/597f06624.html>
- Human Rights Watch, "We Are Like Forgotten People": The Chin People of Burma: Unsafe in Burma, Unprotected in India, 27 January 2009, 2-56432-426-5, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4980163a2.html>

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: CNA (Global Security n.d.)

Group Formation: 1988 (Global Security n.d.)

Group End: December 11, 2012 (Unrepresented Nation and People Organizations 2012), Peace agreements

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The group was formed on November 20, 1988, as the Chin National Front (Global Security n.d.; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group fought to oppose the conversion of the Chin State to a majority Buddhist faith, restore democracy, and establish a Federal Union of Burma (Global Security n.d.; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2000). They also wanted more autonomy (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 2004). The group was never seen as a relatively violent group, but was in conflict with the Burmese government as early as 1988 (Global Security n.d.; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

### **Geography**

The group was active in Chin State of Burma, on the west, bordering India (Global Security n.d.; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group's headquarter was in Thant Lang in Chin State (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group did not have control over a significant amount of territory (Global Security n.d.; United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2004). The group was blamed for an landmine explosion that caused a 13 year old girl to lose her legs near Haimwal Ywathit Village (GTD 2017). There is no evidence the group was transnational and it did not appear to have an external base.

## **Organizational Structure**

The group's leader was allegedly John Khaw Kim, but the Burmese government claimed this was not true and the real leader and founder of the group was in custody (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2000). The group's membership was mainly ethnic Chin, who are mainly Christian (Global Security n.d.). The Chin National Army's membership was about 500 in 2002 and over 200 at an unknown time (Global Security n.d.; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group was allegedly involved in drug and arms trafficking in Burma (Global Security n.d.). The group has also allegedly been involved in extortion, such as tax collection within Chin State and interfering with cross-border trade (Global Security n.d.; United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2004). The group's members were very disciplined, and claimed to never attack the citizens of Chin State (Global Security n.d.). The group's political wing was known as the Chin National Front (Global Security n.d.).

## **External Ties**

The group was a faction of the Chin National Front, which was allied with the National Democratic Front (NDF) and the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) (Global Security n.d.; United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2004). The group does not seem to be an international group or have external ties (Global Security n.d.; United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2004).

## **Group Outcome**

The group refused to sign a peace deal with the Burmese government (Global Security n.d.). The Burmese state ordered the group to end all abuse against the Chin population or else action would be taken against them (Human Rights Watch 2009). The group was actively violent till 2004 (Global Security n.d.). Violence in Chin State caused a significant amount of the population to flee to India, Malaysia, Canada, and the US (Global Security n.d.; United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2004). The US has no proof the group was involved in any large scale terrorism or trafficking (Global Security n.d.). The Burmese army blamed the group for the death of a monk crossing the Burma-India border, which it denied responsibility for (Global Security n.d.; United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2004). The group was blamed for an landmine explosion that caused a 13 year old girl to lose her legs (GTD 2017). At least 70 members of the group were killed in conflict with the Burmese government from 1988 to 2012, but the group's last known violent attack was in 2003 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group shut down border trade between India and Burma (Global Security n.d.). The group continued opposition to the government, including the 2008 Constitution (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). Peace agreements were

signed in Yangon on December 11, 2012 (Unrepresented Nation and People Organizations 2012). The group signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2015 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

Interesting quote from US Bureau CIS

“the CNF is one of only four main forces not to have ceasefires [with the government], but two of these– the Karen National Union and Karenni National Progressive Party– are having talks with the SPDC [State Peace and Development Council, or Government of Burma] at present, and it is thought likely that both will agree [to] terms during the year. In 2004, the SPDC appears very keen to try and achieve as much peace as possible, prior to pushing ahead with a recently-announced roadmap for political reform”

Notes for Iris:

- Global Security source details religious proselytization between Burmese government and the population (weird because they just repress Rohingya)
- decade long struggle between the two groups
- the group engages in intermittent violence - comparatively less violent than the other groups (Kachin, Karen)
- group is small and does not have an external support
- group's last attack was in 2003; doesn't sign a peace agreement until 2012.
- 2012 peace agreement is mass agreement; Myanmar Peace Monitor doesn't note any major direct negotiations between this group and the others

XXV. KOKANG  
Torg ID: 2447  
Min. Group Date: 2009  
Max. Group Date: 2009  
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- Conflict ID 439. Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset. Last modified 2017.  
<http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/439>

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: This is a conflict, not an actor (UCDP 2017).

Group Formation: This is a conflict, not an actor (UCDP 2017).

Group End: This is a conflict, not an actor (UCDP 2017).

### **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

This is a conflict, not an actor (UCDP 2017).

### **Geography**

This is a conflict, not an actor (UCDP 2017).

### **Organizational Structure**

This is a conflict, not an actor (UCDP 2017).

### **External Ties**

This is a conflict, not an actor (UCDP 2017).

### **Group Outcome**

This is a conflict, not an actor (UCDP 2017).

XXVI. MYANMAR NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE ARMY  
Torg ID: 2585  
Min. Group Date: 2009  
Max. Group Date: 2009  
Onset: 2009

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<https://books.google.com/books?id=Y3XQDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA171&lpg=PA171&dq=Dem>

[ocratic+Karen+Buddhist+Army+Brigade+5&source=bl&ots=4Upqeo3kaA&sig=h9GeHgZrqsqkARIDh0YtohAW\\_7A&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiAkdS439jYAhULhOAKHS7RDLU4ChDoAQgwMAI#v=onepage&q=Democratic%20Karen%20Buddhist%20Army%20Brigade%205&f=false](https://www.refworld.org/docid/4e9291912.html)

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- Clifford Coonan. "Burmese army clashes with rebels cast doubt over ceasefire hopes." Irish Times. 2015.  
<https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/burmese-army-clashes-with-rebels-cast-doubt-over-ceasefire-hopes-1.2104886>
- Feliz Solomon. "'This Will Be the Worst War': Fears of Mass Displacement as Thousands Flee Conflict in Myanmar's Northeast." Time Magazine. 2017.  
<http://time.com/4694841/myanmar-kokang-conflict-refugees-displaced/>

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Mndaa, Kokang People's Liberation Front, Kokang Army (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.), Shan state special region 1 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.)

Group Formation: 1989 (form), 2009 (first attack)

Group End: 2017 (Active)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The group was formed as a splinter of the Communist Party of Burma on March 11, 1989 because the Communist Party of Burma signed a ceasefire with the State Law and Order Restoration Council in 1989 (Global Security n.d.; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Rohan and Yee 2016; Radio Free Asia 2015). The MNDAA fought against oppression on behalf of the Kokang people (Reuters 2017). It was the armed wing of the Shan area, which experienced relative autonomy until 2009. The group's first known violent attack occurred in 2009 when Burmese army attacked members of the MNDAA after they refused to disarm and integrate into the Border Guard Forces (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

### **Geography**

The group's headquarter is in Hongyan (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group was active in Mong Koe and Laukkai of the Kokang area (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.);



Coonan 2015). The group operated close to the border, but there is no clear evidence any militants operated in China or conducted attacks in China.

### **Organizational Structure**

The group was led by Peng Jiasheng (Global Security n.d.). The group's membership was estimated at over 2,000 at an unknown time and over 3,000 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Radio Free Asia 2015). The group was the armed wing of the Myanmar Truth and Justice Party (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group allegedly relied on crowdsource funding from Chinese state firms, from which it raised half a million dollars (Reuters 2017). The group's membership was mainly ethnic Chinese Kokang (Reuters 2017; Coonan 2015; Radio Free Asia 2015). The group is actively involved in drug production, and its leader was identified as a major trafficker within Burma by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) (Reuters 2017; Rohan and Yee 2016; Radio Free Asia 2015). The Burmese government claimed the group abducted 270 Kokang civilians to be trained, but the group denied these allegations (Reuters 2017).

### **External Ties**

The group was a part of the UNFC and NCCT from 2013 until June of 2017 and 2015, respectively (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group joined the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) in April of 2017. The group is allied with large insurgent groups within Burma, including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and other smaller groups (Reuters 2017). The group is known to have unspecified support from China, which allegedly interfered in peace talks with the group (Rohan and Yee 2016; Coonan 2015; Parameswaran 2015).

### **Group Outcome**

The Burmese army attacked the group on September 27, 2009, after it rejected to join the Border Guard Force (BGF) (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Rohan and Yee 2016; ACCORD 2011). Fighting that ensued led to thousands of civilians fleeing to China, which angered Beijing (Reuters 2017). One of its factions joined the BGF while another went underground with its leader (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Rohan and Yee 2016).

The group was active as of 2017, but unclear if it was conducting attacks or not (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group's last known violent attack was allegedly in 2017 when the Burmese government claimed the group abducted 270 Kokang civilians, but the group denied these allegations (Reuters 2017). The group was also allegedly responsible for an attack on a hotel in Laukkai in 2017 (Solomon 2017). The MNDAA refused to disarm or participate in peace talks with the government (Reuters 2017).

The group is actively involved in drug production, and its leader was identified as a major trafficker within Burma by the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) (Reuters 2017). The group was to be labelled as a terrorist group, but the proposal was rejected (Reuters 2017).

Notes for Iris:

-there are a lot of splinters of CPB

-recall CPB loses external support from China around 1970s and limp along -->

XXVII. DKBA-5  
Torg ID: 2612  
Min. Group Date: 2010  
Max. Group Date: 2011  
Onset: 2010

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- "DKBA-5." Myanmar Peace Monitor. N.d.  
<http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/myanmar-peace-center/159-dkba-5>
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[https://books.google.com/books?id=Y3XQDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA171&lpg=PA171&dq=Democratic+Karen+Buddhist+Army+Brigade+5&source=bl&ots=4Upqeo3kaA&sig=h9GeHgZrqsqkARIDh0YtoHAW\\_7A&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiAkdS439jYAhULhOAKHS7RDLU4ChDoAQgwMAI#v=onepage&q=Democratic%20Karen%20Buddhist%20Army%20Brigade%205&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=Y3XQDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA171&lpg=PA171&dq=Democratic+Karen+Buddhist+Army+Brigade+5&source=bl&ots=4Upqeo3kaA&sig=h9GeHgZrqsqkARIDh0YtoHAW_7A&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiAkdS439jYAhULhOAKHS7RDLU4ChDoAQgwMAI#v=onepage&q=Democratic%20Karen%20Buddhist%20Army%20Brigade%205&f=false)
- "Myanmar Rebel Army Joins Forces." Al Jazeera. 2010.  
<http://www.aljazeera.com/video/asia-pacific/2010/11/2010111245020326197.html>

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Democratic Karen Buddhist Army Brigade 5, Dkba 5, Dkba5, Dkba-5, Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Rohan and Yee 2016), Karen Klo-Htoo-Baw Organisation (KKO) (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.); DKBA Brigade 5 (Rohan and Yee 2016)

Group Formation: 2010 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.)

Group End: 2015, as they signed a ceasefire (Rohan and Yee 2016)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The group was a splinter of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group formed on November 8, 2010 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group was autonomy-seeking (Al Jazeera 2010). The group opposed the BGF and joined forces with the KLNA (Al Jazeera 2010; Rohan and Yee 2016, 171). The group was first active in November 2010, when they took over Myawaddy (Rohan and Yee 2016, 171). The group formed after two of DKBA's brigades integrated into the Burmese military in 2010 (Rohan and Yee 2016, 171).

## **Geography**

The group's headquarters was in Sonese Myaing, Myawaddy township of Karen State (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group was active in the Three Pagodas Pass, Myine Gyi Ngu, HlaingBwe and Kyar-In-Seik-Gyi, as well as Kawkareik townships (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group also took over the town of Myawaddy (Rohan and Yee 2016, 171). There is no evidence the group was transnational.

## **Organizational Structure**

The group was led by General Saw Lah Pwe (Rohan and Yee 2016, 171). The original DKBA had about 6,000 members before 2010 (Rohan and Yee 2016, 171). The membership of the group was over 1,500 at an unknown point in time (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group has a political wing, the Klo Htoo Baw (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). Members were Buddhist Karens (Rohan and Yee 2016, 171).

## **External Ties**

The group was a splinter of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group opposed the BGF and joined forces with the KLNA (Al Jazeera 2010; Rohan and Yee 2016, 171). The group worked together with the KNLA to oppose the Burmese government crackdown after the 2010 elections (Al Jazeera 2010). The group agreed to work together with the KLNA, KNDO, and KPC as the Burmese military presence increased in Karen State (Rohan and Yee 2016, 171).

## **Group Outcome**

The group was responsible for an attack on government troops and security forces in Myawaddy of Karen State during the elections of 2010 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). Due to violence in Karen state caused by the group, thousands of the Karen population fled to Thailand (Al Jazeera 2010; Rohan and Yee 2016, 171). The Burmese army took advantage of the group splitting off from the original DKBA, making the original group sign a ceasefire (Rohan and Yee 2016, 171). The group opposed the BGF and joined forces with the KLNA (Al Jazeera 2010; Rohan and Yee 2016, 171). The group agreed to work together with the KLNA, KNDO, and KPC as the Burmese military presence

increased in Karen State (Rohan and Yee 2016, 171). The DKBA-5 signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Accord in October of 2015 (Rohan and Yee 2016, 171).

Notes for Iris:

- 2009 BGF agreement has militant groups disarm and integrate into the Border Guard Forces → but this splinter rejected the BGF
- why did they reject the BGF? They wanted to continue fighting

## XXVIII. NEW MON STATE PARTY (NMSP)

Torg ID: 9063

Min. Group Date: 1959

Max. Group Date: 1990

Onset: 1959

### Part 1. Bibliography

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### Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Mon People's Front, Mon Peoples Front, Mon National Liberation Army, MNLA, NMSP/MNLA

Group Formation: 1949 or 1958

Group End:

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

There are conflicting dates about the group's origins. Some sources claim the group formed sometime around 1949 under its original name of the Mon People's Front (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 516; Radio Free Asia 1949). Other sources state the group formed in July 1958 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; International Crisis Group 2013; Seekins 2017, 400). These two dates might be reconcilable if we speculate 1958 is when the group changed its name from the Mon People's Front to the New Mon State Party. It is unclear when the group's first violent attack occurred, but was no later than 1959 (UCPD n.d.).

The group was an ethnonationalist separatist group fighting on behalf of the Mon population for increased autonomy in Myanmar (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 516).

#### **Geography**

The group was primarily operational in "Thaton, Paung, Chaungson, Mawlamyine, Hpa-an, Kawkareik, Kyeikmayaw, Mudon, Thanbyuzayat, Ye, Yayphyu, Three Pagoda Pass, Myeik-Dawei, and Kyar-Inn-Seik Gyi" (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It controlled territory in Thaninthayi Division as early as 1949 when it was still known as the Mon Peoples Front (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group's headquarters are in Ye Chaung Phya (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). While it operated along the Thai-Burmese border at one point (e.g. Seekins 2017, 400). There is no evidence of an external base of operations or transnational attacks.

#### **Organizational Structure**

The group had both an armed wing known as the Mon National Liberation Army and a political wing known as the New Mon State Party (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 515). The armed wing was led by Gen. Taw Mon and had an estimated 3,000 members sometime in the 1980s (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 515; FAS 2000).

In 1995, the head of the NMSP was Nai Shwe Kyin (Minorities at Risk 2004). At an unknown date, the head of the NMSP was Nai Htaw Mon (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group's political organization was hierarchical and well-defined around a Central Committee and Central Military Committee (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group primarily recruited from the Mon population. It's unclear what its original membership base was, but it grew in size during the 1960s due to student support following the 1963 peace talks.

In 1971, the group had an estimated 1,000 members and 1,500 members in the “late 1980s” (Seekins 2017, 400). In 1990, approximately 300 members of the NMSP attacked a police station in Ye (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). At an unknown date, the group still had approximately 800 active members (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

### **External Ties**

The NMSP was a member of the National Democratic United Front (NDUF) and the Federal National Democratic Front (FNDF) (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 516; Seekins 2017, 400). It also had alliances with the UNFC, NCCT, SD, and DPN (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

In 1996, the NMSP signed a cooperation agreement with the KNU and KNPP to conduct joint operations against the Burmese government (Minorities at Risk 2004).

### **Group Outcome**

The group was most violent during the 1950s and 1960s before becoming latent again in the 1970s (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 516). The group was again violent in the early 1990s (Minorities at Risk 2004).

In June 1995, the group signed a ceasefire agreement with the State Law and Order Restoration Council (military junta) (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Minorities at Risk 2004). In 1996, approximately 300 NMSP members splintered away to form the Beik Mon Army over criticisms that the NMSP “made too many concessions” in negotiating the agreement (Minorities at Risk 2004). In 2001, a second splinter group known as the Hongsawatoi Restoration Party broke away because members wanted to stop abiding by the ceasefire (Seekins 2017, 400).

Tensions spiked in 2010 after the NMSP refused to demobilize and transition into a border guard force. This eventually led to a second ceasefire agreement signed in February 2012 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). This ceasefire did not last long and fighting soon resumed. In February 2018, the group signed an additional agreement as part of the nationwide ceasefire agreement (Radio Free Asia 2019).

XXIX. ARAKAN LIBERATION PARTY (ALP)  
Torg ID: 9064  
Min. Group Date: 1977  
Max. Group Date: 1977  
Onset: 1977

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

- UCDP Actor ID 1048. Uppsala Armed Conflict Database. N.d.  
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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Rakhine State Liberation Party (RSLP), RSLP, Arakan Liberation Army (ALA), ALP/ALA, Arakan Liberation Party

Group Formation: 1967 (form), unknown (first violent)

Group End: 2016 (still active)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

Some sources claim the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) formed in the 1950s with support from the Karen National Union, but dissolved shortly after when Burmese forces arrested the group’s leaders (ACCORD 2012, 100).

The second incarnation of the group formed in either April 1967 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; UCDP n.d.) or 1968 (ACCORD 2012, 101). The group’s armed wing formed

in 1974 (ACCORD 2012, 101). The group was an ethnonationalist autonomy-seeking group which fought on behalf of the Rakhine ethnic group for a separate state (ACCORD 2012, 101; UCPD n.d.). The group later modified its aim to fight for a federal system within Myanmar (UCDP n.d.).

## **Geography**

The group's headquarters are along the Indo-Burmese border (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group is also operational in Rakhine and Karen states (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It clashed with Burmese forces along the Indo-Burma and Thai-Burma borders (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

## **Organizational Structure**

The group's leader in 1968 was Khaing Pray Thein (ACCORD 2012, 101). The group reformed in the 1970s under the leadership of Khaing Moe Linn and Khaing Ba Kyaw (ACCORD 2012, 101). In the 1980s, the group's leader was Khai Ray Khai. In the 2010s, the group's leaders were Khine Ray Khine and Soe Naing Aung (UCDP n.d.).

The group had both an armed wing and a political wing. The armed wing was known as the Arakan Liberation Army while the political wing was known as the Arakan Liberation Party or Rakhine State Liberation Party (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The chairman of the political wing in 2014 was U Khine Ray Kine (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

The armed wing was divided into four battalions which straddled the Bangladesh and Indian borders (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

During the 1970s, the ALA had at least 300 members (ACCORD 2012, 101). At an unknown date, the group had 60-100 active members and 2,000 "party members" (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). In 2012, the group was considered "one of the smallest" armed groups in Myanmar as the ALA only had 60-100 fighters (ACCORD 2012, 101).

## **External Ties**

The group received extensive support from other non-state groups in Burma. The group initially formed with support from the Karen National Union (KNU) and was again revitalized by the KNU in the 1970s (ACCORD 2012, 101). The armed wing of the KNU, the Karen National Liberation Army, trained and provided weapons to 300 ALA soldiers during the 1970s (ACCORD 2012, 101).

After the creation of the National Democratic Front in 1976, the ALA joined and became a prominent member (ACCORD 2012, 101).



## Group Outcome

The Burmese government arrested the group's leadership after its initial formation causing the group to fall apart (ACCORD 2012, 101; UCDP n.d.). In the early 1970s, the group reorganized again after an amnesty program released key ALP leaders from jail. The group again reorganized in 1981 (ACCORD 2012, 101).

In April 2012, the group signed a ceasefire agreement with the government (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group's last known violent attack was in 2015 (GTD 2019). The group was described as still active in 2016 and trying to combat a "perceived Muslim threat" by Harakah al-Yaqin (ICG 2016) .

XXX. ROHINGYA PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF)  
Torg ID: 9065  
Min. Group Date: 1973  
Max. Group Date: 1978  
Onset: 1973

### Part 1. Bibliography

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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1964

Group End: 1986 (splinter)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The group initially formed as the Rohingya Independent Force in April 1964 before renaming itself the Rohingya Independent Army in 1969 and the Rohingya Patriotic Front in 1973 (Singh 2007, 43; Human Rights Watch 2000). The RIF formed after Ne Win's 1962 coup resulted in his administration implementing several discriminatory anti-Muslim policies (Wire 2017). The group was an ethnonationalist autonomy-seeking group that fought to promote the rights of the Rohingya people by advocating for increased autonomy (Singh 207, 43). It is unknown precisely when the group's first violent attack occurred, but was no later than 1973.

### **Geography**

The group originally formed in Maungdaw in Arakan State (Singh 2007, 43). The group represented an ethnic population that primarily lived along the Burma-Bangladesh border in western Arakan state (Rowland n.d.). The group had an external base of operations in Bangladesh (Rowland n.d.; Lintner n.d.).

### **Organizational Structure**

The RIF's founder in 1964 was Sultan Ahmed and Jafar Habib. Habib went on to lead the group as the RPF (Singh 2007, 43; Lintner n.d.). After 1973, the RPF grew from 200

to 500 members (Rowland n.d.). The group had a political wing known as the Rohingya Liberation Party (RLP) (Rowland n.d.). Members were Rohingya Muslims (Rowland n.d.).

### **External Ties**

There is speculation the group “smuggled in weapons and supplies across the Bangladesh border” but it is unknown whether this came from state actors, non-state actors, or diaspora support (Rowland n.d.). Some RPF members splintered off to form the Rohingya Solidarity Organization in the early 1980s (Rowland n.d.).

### **Group Outcome**

In 1978, the Burmese army launched a series of counterinsurgency operations against Arakan armed groups including the RPF known as Operation King Dragon (Martin 2018). The success of these operations prompted nearly 200,000 people to migrate to Bangladesh (Wire 2017; Leider 2018). It also severely undercut the group’s ability to continue operating. Concurrently, the group suffered from extensive infighting which led to it fall apart in 1978 (Singh 207, 43). Some RPF members splintered off to form the Rohingya Solidarity Organization in the early 1980s (Rowland n.d.). Remaining RPF members merged with the RSO to form the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front in 1986 (Rowland n.d.; Human Rights Watch 2000).

XXXI. BEIK MON ARMY (BMA)  
Torg ID: 9066  
Min. Group Date: 1996  
Max. Group Date: 1996  
Onset: 1996

#### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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#### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: BMA

Group Formation: 1996 (splinter)

Group End: 1997 (repression)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The Beik Mon Army formed in December 1996 when 300 members splintered from the New Mon State Party (Minorities at Risk 2004). The group splintered because members disagreed with the NMSP's decisions to continue abiding by a 1995 ceasefire agreement. The group's first violent attack was in 1996 (UCDP n.d.).

The group was a Mon autonomy-seeking group that, like the NMSP, fought to promote the rights of the Mon population in Myanmar.

#### **Geography**

The group conducted attacks in the Tenasserim Division of southern Burma and along the Thai-Burma border (Minorities at Risk 2004). There is no evidence of an external base of operations or transnational attacks.

#### **Organizational Structure**

Members were ethnic Mon and had previously been a part of the New Mon State Party (Minorities at Risk 2004). In 1996, the group had approximately 300 members. In 1997, the group had over 300 members (Minorities at Risk 2004). It is unclear who the group's leader was, how it organized, or how it funded itself.

#### **External Ties**

The group was a splinter of the NMSP (Minorities at Risk 2004). There are no clear ties to other state or non-state actors.

#### **Group Outcome**

In May 1997, Burmese military troops launched a massive counterinsurgency campaign against the BMA and Karen rebels in southern Burma (Minorities at Risk 2004). In June 1997, over 300 members of the BMA surrendered to the Burmese government and demobilized (Minorities at Risk 2004). The group's last known violent attack was in May 1997 when it clashed with government forces.