

Mozambique Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 21 November 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T309	MOZAMBIQUE NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (MNR)		1976	2012
T10	SOUTH AFRICAN NATIVE NATIONAL CONGRESS		1976	1996
T309	MOZAMBIQUE NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (RENAMO)	31-Dec-77	1976	2012
T10	AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (SOUTH AFRICA)		1976	1996
T539	ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONALIST UNION (ZANU)		1978	2002
T2257	ANTI-GOVERNMENT GUERRILLAS		1979	2006
T1827	MOZAMBIQUE LIBERATION FRONT (FRELIMO)	1964	1988	1992

Note: Mozambique achieves independence from Portugal in 1975.

- I. MOZAMBIQUE NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (MNR)
 Min. Group Date: 1976
 Max. Group Date: 2012
 Onset: NA

Aliases: Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Mnr), Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo), Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (Renamo)

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for RENAMO (T309).

Group Formation: This is an alias for RENAMO (T309).

Group End: This is an alias for RENAMO (T309).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for RENAMO (T309).

Geography

This is an alias for RENAMO (T309).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for RENAMO (T309).

External Ties

This is an alias for RENAMO (T309).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for RENAMO (T309).

II. SOUTH AFRICAN NATIVE NATIONAL CONGRESS

Min. Group Date: 1976

Max. Group Date: 1996

Onset: NA

Aliases: African National Congress (South Africa), South African Native National Congress

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for ANC (T10)

Group Formation: This is an alias for ANC (T10)

Group End: This is an alias for ANC (T10)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for ANC (T10)

Geography

This is an alias for ANC (T10)

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for ANC (T10)

External Ties

This is an alias for ANC (T10)

Group Outcome

This is an alias for ANC (T10)

III. MOZAMBIQUE NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (RENAMO)

Min. Group Date: 1976

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 1977

Aliases: Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Mnr), Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo), Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (Renamo)

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Mozambican National Resistance." Information Resource Program. FAS. 1998.
<https://fas.org/irp/world/para/renamo.htm>
- GTD Perpetrator 490. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=490>
- Tom Bowker, Simon Kamm, and Aurelio Sambo. "Mozambique's Invisible Civil War." Foreign Policy. 2016.
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/06/mozambiques-invisible-civil-war-renamo-frelimo-dhla-kama-nyusi/>

- Kristian Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, and David Cunningham. "Mozambique vs Renamo." Non-State Actor Narratives. 2013. P. 459-461.
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
- Hall, Margaret. "The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (Renamo): A Study in the Destruction of an African Country." Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 60, no. 1 (1990): 39-68. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1160426>.
- "Mozambican National Resistance." Global Security. N.d.
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/renamo.htm>
- "Mozambique: RENAMO at a Crossroads." Declassified. Central Intelligence Agency.
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000920555.pdf
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Mozambique: Current information on whether RENAMO controls certain rural areas, and if so, the names of these areas; on whether RENAMO commits human rights violations in the areas under its control, and if so, does it target specific groups or individuals, for example, professionals, students and government workers, 1 February 1996, MOZ22718.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6acd518.html>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Mozambique: Information on the current situation of RENAMO fighters in the rural areas; and on whether the government is forcing doctors to serve in the rural areas in spite of the RENAMO threat, 1 December 1995, MOZ22409.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad8a27.html>
- Jamestown Foundation, Mozambique's RENAMO Conducts Low-Level Insurgency While Running for Election, 26 June 2014, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 13, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/53b3cbe94.html>
- Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1995 - Mozambique, 1 January 1995, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9ff84.html>
- Sue Onslow (2016) The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle, 1977–1992, Cold War History, 16:2, 235-237.
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14682745.2016.1153849>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1976

Group End: 2016

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

RENAMO formed in 1976 by a group of ex-military and ex-intelligence officials in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) (FAS 1998; Hall 1990, 39; Global Security n.d.). Its first violent

attack occurred in 1977 when it began attacking government forces (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 459; CIA 1991). Its political aim was to oppose the FRELIMO government, which came to power in 1975 after defeating the Portuguese (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 459). It had no clear ideology (Hall 1990, 47; CIA 1991).

Geography

The group primarily operated in Mozambique, but also conducted trans-border attacks in Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia (FAS 1998; GTD 2017). The group had external bases in South Africa, Kenya, and Rhodesia (until 1980) (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 460). The group had a base of operations in Garagua, Mozambique on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border (Hall 1990, 40). It had foreign policy offices in Lisbon, D.C., Paris, and Bonn (Hall 1990, 43).

Organizational Structure

Members were primarily Rhodesian intelligence officers and ex-military officials from the Flechas, a secret Portuguese police unit active during the FRELIMO insurgency (Hall 1990, 39; Global Security n.d.; CIA 1991). They were ethnic Ndau and Sena of the Shona-speaking people; the Shona are part of the larger Bantu ethnic group (Global Security n.d.; Hall 1990, 46; CIA 1991). It also forcibly recruited ex-military members in prison camps and later children (Hall 1990, 39-40, 45). Members received military training (Hall 1990, 40). Initially, the group had "several hundred" members in 1976 (CIA 1991). The group had only 5,000 fighters in 1981, but this grew to 8,000-10,000 by 1982 (Hall 1990 40). The group had approximately 20,000 members at an unknown date (FAS 1998). Other estimates suggest the group had 20,000 fighters in 1987, 10,000 in 1990, and 21,000 fighters in 1992 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 461; CIA 1991). The group struggled to recruit members due to its ties to Rhodesia and the apartheid regime, which is why it forcibly conscripted some fighters (CIA 1991).

The group's first leader was Andre Matsangaissa, but he died in 1979 and was replaced by Afonso Dhlakama (Global Security n.d.). RENAMO's leadership organized under the National Council in the 1980s, led by Afonso Dhlakama (Hall 1990, 43; CIA 1991). The group had a small political wing that operated overseas to lobby funding, but it remained largely subordinate to the military wing (Global Security n.d.; CIA 1991). Dhlakama was the principal leader of the group; military commanders took orders directly from him (Hall 1990, 44). Notably, the group is organized like a conventional military with battalions, platoons, and uses flanking tactics (Hall 1990, 44-45).

External Ties

RENAMO received external support from South Africa and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) (FAS 1998; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 459). Notably, the apartheid governments in South Africa

and Rhodesia chose to sponsor the insurgency because they feared insurgencies in their own countries and wanted to destabilize the Mozambique government. Zimbabwe sponsored the group with weapons, logistics, and funding, until 1980 and South Africa sponsored the group afterwards (Hall 1990, 40; Gleditsch et al 2013, 459-460). Around 1989, South Africa began to limit its commitment to the group due to foreign policy rapprochement with the Mozambique government (Global Security n.d.; CIA 1991). The group may have also allegedly received individual support from private citizens in South Africa, Portugal, Brazil, Germany, and the United States (FAS 1998; Global Security n.d.; CIA 1991). There may have been some covert aid from Malawi and Kenya, but this could not be substantiated (Global Security n.d.; CIA 1991). This assistance may have entailed sanctuary and freedom of movement in Malawi as well as clothes, medicine, food, and other logistical support from Kenya (CIA 1991, 15). There were also rumors that RENAMO received aid from Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait, but this was scant (CIA 1991, 16).

Group Outcome

In 1979, Mozambique forces raided a camp in Garangua, Mozambique on the Zimbabwe border and killed RENAMO's founder, Andrew Matsangaissa (CIA 1991). This led to a power struggle whereby Afonso Dhlakama took over (CIA 1991). In 1988, the Mozambique government launched an amnesty program for fighters; 3,000 members accepted the amnesty in the first year (Hall 1990, 43). In 1989, Dhlakama reorganized parts of the insurgency, which led to mass disenchantment and undermined the group's organizational capacity (Global Security n.d.). On October 4, 1992, the group signed the Acordo Geral de Paz peace agreement with the FRELIMO government and disarmed to become a political party (Global Security n.d.; Gleditsch et al. 2014, 460; Amnesty International 1995). In 1994, RENAMO participated in elections and won several seats in the north and center of the country (Canada IRB 1995). In 2013, the group renewed its violence in anticipation of an election (Jamestown Foundation 2014). Violence renewed due to Dhlakama's campaign to run for presidency again and RENAMO demanded the Mozambique Armed Forces be 50% FRELIMO and 50% RENAMO members (Jamestown Foundation 2014). The group fed on the grievances of perceived corruption and kleptocracy in the FRELIMO government to rekindle support for their cause (Bowker et al. 2016). In 2014, Dhlakama claimed he would forcibly take power if the election results did not support his candidacy (Bowker et al. 2016). Violence continued to escalate in 2015 and 2016 (Bowker et al. 2016). The group's last violent incident was in 2016 (GTD 2017).

Note: leadership personality of Dhlakama seems enormously important here

- IV. AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (SOUTH AFRICA)
Min. Group Date: 1976
Max. Group Date: 1996

Onset: NA

Aliases: African National Congress (South Africa), South African Native National Congress

Part 1. Bibliography

- TOPS ID 305
- David Smith. "African National Congress: a timeline." Guardian. 2011.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/30/african-national-congress-timeline>
- "A History of the ANC." Associated Press. 2012.
<https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/A-history-of-the-African-National-Congress-20121215>
- "South Africa: The African National Congress in the 1980s." Declassified. Central Intelligence Agency. 1982.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B00225R000100140001-5.pdf>
- "The African National Congress of South Africa: Organization, Communist Ties, and Short-Term Prospects." Declassified. Central Intelligence Agency. 1986.
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000568202.pdf
- Kristian Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, and David Cunningham. "South Africa vs Anti-Apartheid Organizations." Non-State Actor Narratives. 2013. P. 529-531.
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
- Mark Uhlig. "Inside the African National Congress." New York Times. 1986.
<http://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/12/magazine/inside-the-african-national-congress.html?pagewanted=all>
- Nelson Mandela. Long Walk to Freedom.
- GTD Perpetrator 281. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=281>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: MK, Umkhonto we Sizwe

Group Formation: 1912 (formation); violence begins in 1961

Group End: 1996 (Disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The ANC formed in 1912 to protest racial inequality and fight for political reform and inclusion in the South African government (MIPT 2008). The group's first violent attack

occurred in 1961 after deciding it would not achieve its aims without resorting to violence (MIPT 2008; Associated Press 2012). Its ideology stressed egalitarianism, but it did not seem particularly leftist (Uhlig 1986; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 530).

Geography

The group conducted attacks in Pretoria, Johannesburg, and elsewhere in South Africa (CIA 1982, 1; GTD 2017). It had an external base in Mozambique, Tanzania, and headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia (CIA 1982, 3; Uhlig 1986). By 1986, most military members staged operations out of Angola (CIA 1986). The ANC often launched cross-border raids into Swaziland and Lesotho (CIA 1982, 3). It also had offices in Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho for diplomatic and organizational purposes (CIA 1982, 3). By 1986, the group also opened an office in London (CIA 1986).

Organizational Structure

The ANC had a political wing and an armed wing, known as Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) (MIPT 2008; Smith 2011; Associated Press 2012; CIA 1986). The political wing was very well-organized and had a sophisticated command structure although it primarily conducted business from outside South Africa (CIA 1982; CIA 1986). The group had a youth wing known as the Congress Youth League, headed by Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Oliver Tambo (Smith 2011). Members of the group in 1912 were young black professional and tribal chiefs (CIA 1982, 1). Members primarily came from the Xhosa tribe, but the group increasingly recruited Zulu members in the 1980s (CIA 1982, 8).

In 1976, the group grew when several thousand young men traveled to South Africa from neighboring countries to join the ANC following the Soweto uprisings (CIA 1982, 1; Uhlig 1986). In 1982, the group had approximately 1,000 to 2,000 fighters and 2,000-3,000 additional supporters (CIA 1982, 2). In 1986, the group had 10,000 supporters, including 5,000 fighters (CIA 1986). After 1964, the group's president was Oliver Tambo, the Secretary General was Alfred Nzo, and the military leader was Joe Modise (CIA 1982, 5). Modise was later replaced by Thabo Mbeki (CIA 1982, 5).

External Ties

ANC members received military training in Angola, logistical support from Cuba, and logistical support from the USSR (CIA 1982, iii). The group received up to 90% of arms and logistical support from the USSR in 1983 (CIA 1986). The group also received military training from Cuban and East Germans in Angola (CIA 1986). It had some communist connections, but did not espouse a Communist ideology (CIA 1982, 6).

It had an external base in Mozambique, Tanzania, and headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia (CIA 1982, 3; Uhlig 1986; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 530). By 1986, most military members staged operations out of Angola (CIA 1986).

The Pan-Africanist Congress splintered from the ANC in 1959 (Associated Press 2012; CIA 1982, 9).

Group Outcome

In 1960, the South African government banned the ANC (CIA 1982, MIPT 2008; Associated Press 2012; CIA 1986; Uhlig 1986). In 1960, South African police opened fire on a crowd of peaceful protesters in an event that came to be known as the Sharpeville massacre (Smith 2011). Soon after, the ANC established their armed wing; it is unclear if the incident had any effect on this decision (MIPT 2008; Mandela). In 1963, police raided the MK's headquarters and arrested Mandela and other ANC leaders (Smith 2011). In 1964, police sent most of the ANC leadership to prison (CIA 1982, 1; Smith 2011).

In 1986, the MK still operated and conducted attacks in South Africa; it originally tried to avoid harming civilians, but shifted to allow it in 1985 (CIA 1986). In 1990, the group became a legal political organization (MIPT 2008; Smith 2011). In 1993, South Africa adopted a new constitution allowing the ANC to participate in the political process (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 530). In 1994, the ANC won presidential elections and Mandela became president of South Africa (Smith 2011). The group's last violent attack was around 1996 (GTD 2017).

V. ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONALIST UNION (ZANU)

Min. Group Date: 1978

Max. Group Date: 2002

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- TOPS ID 4323
- "Zimbabwe: The ZANU-ZAPU Rivalry." Declassified. Central Intelligence Agency. 1983. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84S00552R000200030002-4.pdf>
- Bruce Hoffman, Jennifer Taw, and David Arnold. "Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience." RAND. 1991. <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R3998.pdf>
- "Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union." Global Security. N.D. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/zanu.htm>

- Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. "Rhodesia vs ZANU and ZAPU." Non-State Actor Dataset Narratives. P. 423-426.
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
- <https://search.proquest.com/openview/4612e9feff9c1cdcf81131d56b6bcb9d/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=1816367>
- Beth Grill, Christopher Paul, and Molly Dunigan. Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies. 2013. RAND.
- GTD Perpetrator 3716. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3716>
- "Rhodesia closes her frontier with Zambia." New York Times. 1973.
<http://www.nytimes.com/1973/01/10/archives/rhodesia-closes-her-frontier-with-zambia-purpose-of-closure.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1963

Group End: 1979 (become government)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

ZANU formed in 1963 when some members splintered from the Zimbabwe African People's Union (Global Security n.d.). It ascribed to a leftist and pan-African nationalist ideology (Hoffman et al. 1991, 12; Global Security n.d.). Its political aim was to overthrow Ian Smith's apartheid government and establish a new government (Global Security n.d.). The group's first violent attack may have been in 1965 when it began launching cross-border attacks into Zimbabwe from Zambia (Hoffman et al. 1991, 7), but was likely in 1972 when it launched attacks from Mozambique (Global Security n.d.; Hoffman et al. 1991, 10).

Geography

The group formed in Gwelo, Zimbabwe (Global Security n.d.). It had an external base of operations in Mozambique (Global Security n.d.). It also had an external base of operations in Tanzania and Zambia (Hoffman et al. 1991, 7; New York Times 1973; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 425). It launched its armed campaign around the Centenary area along the Mozambique-Rhodesia border (Global Security n.d.). It primarily conducted

attacks in Rhodesia, and later Zimbabwe (GTD 2017). It also had attacks in Namibia (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

Ndabaningi Sithole founded ZANU in 1963 and was its first leader; he was later replaced by Robert Mugabe in 1974 (Global Security n.d.; CIA 1983). Sithole became famous for writing a pamphlet on black nationalism in 1959 (Global Security n.d.). Members were Shona-speaking (Global Security n.d.). It had an armed wing known as the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army also known as ZANLA (Global Security n.d.). It primarily employed rural Maoist guerrilla tactics to secure territory and enjoyed massive popular support in the areas it controlled (Hoffman et al. 1991, 12). The political wing was the Zimbabwe African National Union (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 423). In 1976, ZANU and ZAPU had approximately 1,000 fighters (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 423). It had over 50,000 supporters in 1979 (Global Security n.d.). Another source states approximately 22,000 fighters disarmed in 1979 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 423).

External Ties

ZANU received weapons from China (Global Security n.d.; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 423). Algeria, China, and Tanzania provided military training for recruits starting in 1965 (Global Security n.d.; Hoffman et al. 1991, 3, 7). ZANU was a splinter of the ZAPU, but they both fought together against the Rhodesian government in 1972 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 423). ZANU and ZAPU also received recognition from NGOs in Africa like the OAU, World Council of Churches, and the Third World lobby (Hoffman et al. 1991, 3).

Group Outcome

Zimbabwe banned the group in 1963 (Global Security n.d.). Zimbabwe arrested Sithole and Mugabe in 1964 (Global Security n.d.). In 1965, Rhodesian forces quickly overran rebel forces during their training and pre-empted any attacks (Hoffman et al. 1991, 7). This forced ZANU to retrench and seek military training from the Chinese (Hoffman et al. 1991, 7). In 1974, the Rhodesian government began peace talks with ZANU and ZAPU after making massive inroads against ZANU (Hoffman et al. 1991, 10; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 423). In the late 1970s, South Africa placed sanctions on the Rhodesian government, undermining its ability to fight the insurgency (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 423). In 1979, the Rhodesian government and the rebels reached a peace agreement (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 423). ZANU disarmed and took over the government. In 1980, Rhodesia became Zimbabwe (CIA 1983). The group still conducted some attacks as a violent political party as late as 2014, but the insurgency ceased in 1979 (GTD 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 423).

Interesting quote from Hoffman et al. 1991

“One of the greatest weaknesses of the Rhodesian counterinsurgency campaign was its lack of emphasis on military intelligence” (28-29) - interesting anecdotes about Rhodesian counterintelligence and their assessments about external support

VI. ANTI-GOVERNMENT GUERRILLAS

Min. Group Date: 1979

Max. Group Date: 2006

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Group Formation: This name is too vague for research.

Group End: This name is too vague for research.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This name is too vague for research.

Geography

This name is too vague for research.

Organizational Structure

This name is too vague for research.

External Ties

This name is too vague for research.

Group Outcome

This name is too vague for research.

VII. MOZAMBIQUE LIBERATION FRONT (FRELIMO)

Min. Group Date: 1988

Max. Group Date: 1992

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

*Brogan

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Mozambique Liberation Party." Global Security. N.d.
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/frelimo.htm>
- Alex Vines and Dylan Hendrickson "Key Actors in the War and Peace Process." Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective. Accord. 1998.
http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%20Mozambique_Key%20actors.pdf
- Timothy Stapleton. "Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO)." The Encyclopedia of War. 2012.
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow218/asset/wbeow218.pdf?v=1&t=jaromqj&s=3d6d5637505978259bd40ea6d544cb8775a1a53b>
- Jamestown Foundation, Mozambique's RENAMO Conducts Low-Level Insurgency While Running for Election, 26 June 2014, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 13, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/53b3cbe94.html>
- GTD Perpetrator 1734. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1734>
- Kristian Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, and David Cunningham. "Portugal vs FRELIMO." Non-State Actor Narratives. 2013. P. 255-257.
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
- Sue Onslow (2016) The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle, 1977–1992, Cold War History, 16:2, 235-237.
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14682745.2016.1153849>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: FAM, FPLM

Group Formation: 1962

Group End: 2016

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

FRELIMO formed in 1962 as a merger of three African nationalist, leftist militant groups (Global Security n.d.; Vines and Hendrickson 1998; Stapleton 2012, 1; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 255). It was a merger of Mozambique African National Union (MANU), the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO), and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI) (Global Security n.d.). The group's first violent attack was in 1964 when they invaded Mozambique from Tanzania (Stapleton 2012, 1; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 255). The group's political aim was to expel the Portuguese colonial rule and overthrow the existing government (Stapleton 2012, 1). It ascribed to a Marxist-Leninist ideology (Vines and Hendrickson 1998; Stapleton 2012, 1).

Geography

The group originally formed in exile in Tanzania (Stapleton 2012, 1; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 256). It had an external base in Zambia around 1968 as well (Stapleton 2012, 1). It controlled territory in Cabo Delgado and Niassa where it established a proto-state and provided public services (Stapleton 2012, 1).

Organizational Structure

The leader of FRELIMO was Eduardo Mondlane, a UN employee (Stapleton 2012, 1). In 1969, the Portuguese assassinated Mondlane with a parcel bomb leading to a power struggle within FRELIMO (Vines and Hendrickson 1998; Stapleton 2012, 1). His successor, Samora Machel, emerged from a power struggle; he was more leftist than his predecessor (Stapleton 2012). The political wing included a congressional council with members from each of the three merged groups (Global Security n.d.). The group had a formal armed wing known as the Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM) or FPLM (Vines and Hendrickson 1998). In 1965, the group had approximately 150-250 well-trained fighters (Global Security n.d.). By 1970, the group had approximately 10,000 fighters (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

FRELIMO received external military assistance, namely weapons, from the USSR and China in the 1960s (Global Security n.d.; Stapleton 2012, 1; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 256). Members received guerrilla training in Algeria, China, and the USSR (Global Security n.d.). The group also received logistical support from unspecified 'Scandinavian' countries and the Organization of African Unity (Stapleton 2012, 1). It received recognition as a legitimate organization by the OAU (Global Security n.d.). The group received an external base of operations from Tanzania (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

In 1969, Portuguese assassinated Mondlane with a parcel bomb leading to a power struggle within FRELIMO (Vines and Hendrickson 1998; Stapleton 2012, 1). In 1970, Portuguese officials launched Operation Gordion Knot to overpower FRELIMO using counterinsurgency tactics copied from the Americans; it failed due to weather problems (Global Security n.d.; Stapleton 2012, 1). In 1972, FRELIMO launched a second offensive that the Portuguese military countered with indiscriminate violence (Stapleton 2012, 2). The 1974 political coup in Portugal led to an immediate ceasefire and the Lusaka Agreement, which facilitated Mozambique's decolonization in 1975 (Global Security n.d.; Stapleton 2012; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 256). FRELIMO became the dominant ruling party and remained in control of Mozambique through 2017 (Jamestown Foundation 2014). It sometimes still conducts attacks as a violent political party (GTD 2017). FRELIMO's last violent attack was in Beira in 2016 (GTD 2017).