

**Mali Cases, 1970-2012**  
**Last Updated: 2 March 2018**

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T1748	ISLAMIC LEGION		1989	1990
T1649	BLACK MALIAN GROUP		1992	1992
T1360	AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM)	16-Jun-09	1996	2012
T446	SALAFIST GROUP FOR CALL AND COMBAT (GSPC)	16-Jun-09	1996	2012
T2301	MAY 23 DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE - IBRAHIM BAHANGA FACTION	31-Aug-07	2007	2009
T287	23 MAY DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (ALGERIA)		2009	2009
T2656	MOVEMENT FOR UNITY AND JIHAD IN WEST AFRICA (MUJWA)	12-Jan-13	2011	2012
T2624	ANSAR AL-DINE (MALI)	24-Jan-12	2012	2012
T2695	SIGNED-IN-BLOOD BATTALION	22-Feb-13	2012	2012
T2627	AZAWAD NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT	24-Jan-12	2012	2012
T2660	NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY AND STATE		2012	2012
T9007	MPLA		0	0
T9008	FIAA		0	0

- I. ISLAMIC LEGION
  - Torg ID: 1748
  - Min. Group Date: 1989
  - Max. Group Date: 1990
  - Onset: NA

Aliases: None

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2082>

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 1972

Group End: 1987 (disband), 1990 (last known attack)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The Islamic Legion was a Libyan mercenary unit that was formed as early as 1972 by Muammar Gaddafi (Global Research 2013; Soldiers of Misfortune n.d.). Qaddafi used the group to carry out his political plans with an aim to unify Arab states under a single Islamic state (Global Research 2013; Soldiers of Misfortune n.d.). It espoused a pan-Arab ideology (Global Research 2013).

## **Geography**

The group's only recorded attack took place on June 29, 1990, although it was likely violent much earlier (GTD 2017). The group's bases were located within Libya (The Atlantic 2011; Jamestown Foundation 2011). The group is transnational. The group was fighting over Ouadi Doum and active in that area (Soldiers of Misfortune n.d.).

## **Organizational Structure**

Muammar Gaddafi, the long-time leader of Libya, was the leader of this group and made efforts to impose Islamic socialism upon his country (Stapleton 2013, 127). The group was composed of poor immigrants from other countries who traveled to Libya (Jamestown Foundation 2011). It had up to 7,000 members (Soldiers of Misfortune n.d.; Global Research 2013; Stapleton 2013). The group had approximately 5,000 members in 1981 (Stapleton 2013, 127). Members were primarily Tuareg and Zaghawa (Jamestown Foundation 2011). Tuareg leaders in the Islamic Legion were Mohamed Ag Najm and Ibrahim Ag Bahanga (Laremont 2013).

## **External Ties**

This group claimed explicit responsibility for its attacks. It also received extensive military and political support from the Libyan government due to the access they had through Gaddafi, and also received support from GUNT, the government of Goukuni in the Central African Republic, who sent over military troops (Global Research 2013; Soldiers of Misfortune n.d.). Algerian intelligence also allegedly provided support to the Islamic Legion (Laremont 2013).

## **Group Outcome**

The Legion participated in several conflict theaters across Chad, Sudan, and Lebanon, but Gaddafi disbanded it by the late 1980s (BBC 2011). Specifically, Gaddafi ended the group in 1987 after the drop in oil price made it difficult for him to continue to finance the group (Douglas-Bowers 2013). After disbanding, many Tuaregs remained in Libya (Laremont 2013). Others went home with "large amounts of combat experience" that would end up materializing during the Tuareg rebellions in the 1990s (Douglas-Bowers 2013).

Qaddafi was forced to disband parts of the Islamic Legion in 1987 due to declining oil prices (Global Research 2013). The group's last attack was on June 29, 1990 (GTD 2017). After the Chad War, Libya lost Ouadi Doum and many of their troops to other countries such as Sudan or eastern Chad, therefore splitting up the Islamic Legion (Soldiers of Misfortune n.d.). Many members from the Islamic Legion returned to Mali and Niger where they helped start the Tuareg rebellions (Jamestown Foundation 2011).

Notes for Iris:

- weird that they are missing so much activity
- seems likely that the group was active much earlier
- only real connection to Mali is that fighters were Tuareg

## II. BLACK MALIAN GROUP

Torg ID: 1649

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 1992

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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  - “Black malian group”
  - Black Malian group

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1992

Group End: 1992 (disappear)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

There is not much information available about this group. Their first and only attack took place on June 6, 1992 (GTD 2017).

#### **Geography**

The location of their only recorded attack took place in Gao, Mali (GTD 2017).

#### **Organizational Structure**

No information about the group’s organizational structure can be found for this section.

## External Ties

No information about external ties to other state or non-state actors can be found for this section.

## Group Outcome

No information can be found for this section. The group's last attack was in 1992 (GTD 2017).

### III. AL-QAEDA COMMITTEE IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM)

Torg ID: 1360

Min. Group Date: 1996

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 2009

Aliases: Al-Qa`ida In The Lands Of The Islamic Maghreb (Aqlim), Al-Qaeda Committee In The Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaeda Committee In The Islamic Maghreb (Aqim), Al-Qaeda Organization In The Islamic Maghreb

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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1998

Group End: 2016 (last attack, active)

## Part 3. Narrative

### Group Formation

AQIM was one of the groups that formed when it splintered from the GIA. Their political aims are to overthrow governments such as Libya, Algeria, and Mali and putting fundamentalist governments in effect (Global security n.d.; CFR 2015). The group's first violent attack was in 1998 (Crenshaw 2016).

### Geography

AQIM was based in Algeria and also conducted attacks in Mali (Crenshaw 2016). It had a base in the Kabylie mountains in Algeria (Crenshaw 2016). It also conducted attacks around Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal, Mali (Crenshaw 2016).

### **Organizational Structure**

The group's original leader was Sahraoui who was later succeeded by Abdelmalek Droukdel, who lasted as their permanent emir. In 2017, AQIM merged with a similar group to form JNIM, that announced Iyad Ag Ghali as its leader. The key leaders were veterans from the Soviet Afghan War and the Algerian Civil War. There were several hundred members in AQIM around 2006-2007 (Crenshaw 2016; Counter Extremism n.d.). The group had an estimated 1000 members in 2016 (Crenshaw 2016).

### **External Ties**

The group claimed explicit responsibility for its attacks, and received public support from its other political wings such as the GIA (CSIS 2011). It denounced ISIS in 2015 (Crenshaw 2016).

### **Group Outcome**

The group remains active today. It primarily operates in Mali and has conducted several attacks in Mali in 2016 (GTD 2017). The group suffered a major splinter in 2012 when a faction broke away to form the "Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade" (Crenshaw 2016).

Notes for Iris:

-weak resolve?

#### **IV. SALAFIST GROUP FOR CALL AND COMBAT**

Torg ID: 446

Min. Group Date: 1996

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 2009

Aliases: Salafist Group For Preaching And Fighting (Gspc), Groupe Salafiste Pour La Predication Et Le Combat, Salafist Group For Call And Combat, Salafist Group For Call And Combat (Gspc), Salafist Group For Preaching And Combat, Salafist Group For Preaching And Combat [Gspc]

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: This is an alias for AQIM.

Group Formation: This is an alias for AQIM.

Group End: This is an alias for AQIM.

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

This is an alias for AQIM.

#### **Geography**

This is an alias for AQIM.

#### **Organizational Structure**

This is an alias for AQIM.

#### **External Ties**

This is an alias for AQIM.

#### **Group Outcome**

This is an alias for AQIM.

### V. MAY 23 DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE - IBRAHIM BAHANGA FACTION

Torg ID: 2301

Min. Group Date: 2007

Max. Group Date: 2009

Onset: 2007

Aliases: May 23 Democratic Alliance For Change - Ibrahim Bahanga Faction, Adc - Ib, Alliance D\_mocratique Du 23 Mai Pour Le Changement - Ibrahim Bahanga Faction, Alliance Touareg Nord Mali Pour Le Changement, Atnmc, North Mali Tuareg Alliance For Change

#### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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- "Alliance Touareg Niger-Mali pour le Changement." African Development Information. Last updated 2008. [https://web.archive.org/web/20120520064348/http://www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/org/org\\_69421.html](https://web.archive.org/web/20120520064348/http://www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/org/org_69421.html)
- "Border Turbulence." El Watan. 2008. <https://web.archive.org/web/20090204045600/https://www.elwatan.com/Ibrahim-Ag-Bahanga-rouvre-les>

## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: ATNMC, Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance, Alliance Touareg du Nord Mali pour le Changement, Niger-Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2009 (defeat)

## Part 3. Narrative

## **Group Formation**

The Ibrahim Bahanga faction split from the Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance following the 2006 Algiers Agreement. A faction of the group broke off in June 2006 following the signing of the Algiers Accord. The group splintered because it opposed the government's military presence in Tinzawaten (EI Watan 2008). Bahanga argued the government should not deploy its military presence into Tuareg territory (EI Watan 2008).

Others claim the group formed on July 27, 2007 (AfDevInfo 2008). The faction renamed their group the Northern Tuareg Alliance for Change (ATNMC) and began fighting in August or September 2007 (EI Watan 2008; Westerfield 2012; Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). The group's demands included increased autonomy and additional resources for the Tuareg population (BBC 2008).

## **Geography**

The group carried out attacks in Nampala, Mali (BBC 2008). The group also carried out attacks in Kidal, Nara, Goumbou, Mouridah, Tessalit, Abeibara, Tinzawaten, and Bourghessa (Global Security n.d.).

## **Organizational Structure**

May 23 has many political wings such as the Alliance for Democracy and Change (Global Security N.d.). The group recruited from the nomadic Tuareg population in Mali (RAND 2011). The group's leader was Ibrahim ag Bahanga (EI Watan 2008; Westerfield 2012, 3). Bahanga later died after he created the MNL in 2011 (Westerfield 2012). The group did not have a political wing (Gleditsch et al. 2013).

## **External Ties**

The group originally splintered from the ADC in 2006 following the Algiers Agreement (AfDevInfo 2008). The group also had close ties to the Niger Movement for Justice (AfDevInfo 2008).

## **Group Outcome**

In 2009, a former rebel who had defected from the group, Lt. Col Elhadj Gamou, received permission from the Mali government to organize a special Tuareg unit to fight the ATNMC (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). The unit was able to launch an effective counter-offensive against the group resulting in their defeat in February 2009 (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). The group later joined forces with the Mali government to stop any drug smuggling in the country (Refworld 2008).

VI. 23 MAY DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (ALGERIA)

Torg ID: 287

Min. Group Date: 2009

Max. Group Date: 2009

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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[https://web.archive.org/web/20120519075202/http://www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/org/org\\_69391.html](https://web.archive.org/web/20120519075202/http://www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/org/org_69391.html)
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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: ADC, Democratic Alliance for Change

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2006

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The Democratic Alliance for Change formed in May 2006 (Westerfield 2012; ecocq and Klute 2013, 429). The group formed in response to the government’s perceived failure to uphold the 1992 National Pact peace agreement which had ended the previous uprising. Specifically, the group argued the Mali government had failed to invest in appropriate development funds for the Tuareg population in Northern Mali resulting in disproportionate development across the country (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). The group’s demands included increased autonomy and additional resources for the Tuareg population (BBC 2008).

The group’s first violent attack was on May 23, 2006, when it launched coordinated attacks against military bases in Kidal and Menaka (Thurston and Lebovich 2013).

### **Geography**

The group's first violent attack was on May 23, 2006, when it launched a set of coordinated attacks against military bases in Kidal and Menaka (Global Security n.d.; Thurston and Lebovich 2013). Its main headquarters were in Kidal (AfDevInfo 2008). Between 2006 and 2007, Bahanga moved with several fighters to Libya (El Watan 2008). In Libya, he claimed he would only re-start negotiations with the Mali government if Libya would mediate.

### **Organizational Structure**

Iyad ag Ghali, who had originally led the MPA during the 1990 uprising, reorganized the ADC in 2006 (Thurston and Lebovich 2013). Others allege that ag Ghali did not initially organize the group, but quickly usurped control after its founding (Thurston and Lebovich 2013). Members of the group had originally fought as part of the MPLA and ARLA during the 1990s Tuareg uprising (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). MPLA leadership had served in the Malian Army in between the 1990 uprising and the 2006 uprising.

### **External Ties**

The group conducted attacks against AQIM during its short-lived 2006 uprising (Global Security n.d.; Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). The decision to attack AQIM led to internal divisions within the ADC who felt the attack severely weakened the group's ability to effectively fight against the Malian government (Global Security n.d.).

A faction of the group broke off in June 2006 following the signing of the Algiers Accord. The group opposed the government's military presence in Tinzawaten (El Watan 2008). This group, led by Ibrahim Bahanga, renamed their group the Northern Tuareg Alliance for Change (ATNMC) and began fighting in September 2007 (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429).

### **Group Outcome**

The group began negotiations with the Mali government shortly after the May 23 attacks. Negotiations between the two actors resulted in the Algiers Agreement of 2006; the Malian government agreed to new concessions by the rebel groups. After the agreement was negotiated, the ADC disarmed in early 2007 (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). As part of the agreement, the Tuaregs had to disarm and stop demanding increased autonomy for northern Mali (El Watan 2008). In exchange, the Mali government had to expedite economic and political development in the north.

Some members of the group might have continued to fight as part of the ADC until 2009, but it is unclear whether these are rogue members or parts of the ATNMC faction (Global Security n.d.).

Some argue the decision to attack AQIM led to internal divisions within the ADC who felt the attack severely weakened the group's ability to effectively fight against the Malian government (Global Security n.d.). Iyad ag Ghali left the country and traveled to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia where he became radicalized, setting the scene for his eventual return to Mali in 2011 (Thurston and Lebovich 2013).

Interesting quote from Global Security;

Mali found itself as a crossroads in 2010. One of Mali's great mistakes, according to Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT), was to agree to demilitarize the north following peace agreements with the Tuareg rebellion in 1992 and to reinforce this move to demilitarize following the Algiers Accords in 2006. As things stood, the Malian army was confined to bases in the cities of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. The Government had failed to set up the special mixed units which were to have incorporated former Tuareg and Arab rebels.

## VII. MOVEMENT FOR UNITY AND JIHAD IN WEST AFRICA (MUJWA)

Torg ID: 2656

Min. Group Date: 2011

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 2013

Aliases: Movement For Oneness And Jihad In West Africa (Mujao), Jama'at At-Tawhid Wal-Jihad Fi Gharb 'Afriqqiya, Mojwa, Mouvement Pour Le Tawhid Et Du Jihad En Afrique De L'ouest, Mouvement Pour Le Tawhid Et Du Jihad En Afrique De L'ouest (Mujao), Movement For Oneness And Jihad In West Africa, Movement For Oneness And Jihad In West Africa, Movement For Oneness And Jihad In West Africa (Mojwa), Movement For Unity And Jihad In West Africa, Movement For Unity And Jihad In West Africa (Mujwa), Mujao, Mujwa

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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: MOJWA, MUJAO, MOJWA, Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest, MUJAO, Jamat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Garbi Afriqqiya and Jamaat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Ifriqiya, Al-Tawhid Wal Jihad in West Africa

Group Formation: 2011

Group End: 2013 (merger) or 2016 (Active)

## Part 3. Narrative

### Group Formation

MUJWA was a splinter group of AQIM that aimed to overthrow Mali’s government and fight against its army forces. The reason the group splintered from AQIM is debated, but generally thought to have stemmed from either a lack of representation in the Malian government or difference in expansionist aims that AQIM could not accommodate (Crenshaw 2016).

MUJWA originally formed in October of 2011 as an offshoot of AQIM for jihadis to cross West Africa (START 2015). Like AQIM, their goal was to spread jihad to places AQIM failed to influence, as well as establish Sharia law (Crenshaw 2016; Al Jazeera 2013). The group’s first attack took place on October 22, 2011, in Tindouf, Algeria (GTD 2017). The group ascribed to a Salafist-jihadist ideology (START 2015).

## **Geography**

The group's first attack took place in Tindouf, Algeria (GTD 2017). After the Malian coup in 2012, the group moved into Mali (Crenshaw 2016). The majority of MUJWA's attacks take place in Mali, but some significant attacks take place in Niger and Algeria (GTD 2017). Their bases are located in Mali (START 2015). The group is transnational.

## **Organizational Structure**

The two founders of the group, Hamad al-Khairi and Ahmed el-Tilemsi, were both former members of AQIM. Another significant leader included Oumar Hamaha, who served as a spokesperson and a military commander before he was shot by the French army (Crenshaw 2016; Mackenzie Institute 2016). In 2013, MUJWA merged with a similar wing, the Masked Men Brigade and formed the group: Al-Mourabitoun which was acknowledged as an alleged terrorist organization in 2014 (Northwestern 2013). The group was composed of former Arab fighters of AQIM (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The number of members ranged from 1,000-3,000 fighters (Crenshaw 2016). Members were mostly Tuareg (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

## **External Ties**

The group received financing from AQIM.

## **Group Outcome**

In 2013, the group merged with Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade to form al-Murabitoun. Although this ended MUJWA's activity, the media continued to attribute the merged group's attacks to MUJWA (Refworld 2012; START 2015; UN Security Council 2012).

Notes for Iris:

- originally a splinter for AQIM
- attacks after 2013 should be attributed to al-Murabitoun
- the group worked with AQIM during its time active, sharing resources, etc
- why does the group merge in 2013? There was a lot of competition for popular support and resources in 2012 so they merged to aggregate capabilities

- VIII. ANSAR AL-DINE (MALI)  
Torg ID: 2624  
Min. Group Date: 2012  
Max. Group Date: 2012  
Onset: 2012

Aliases: Ansar Al-Dine (Mali), Ancar Deen, Ansar Ad-Dine, Ansar Al-Dine, Ansar Dine



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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Ansar Dine, Ansar al Din

Group Formation: 2011

Group End: 2016? (active)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

Ansar Dine or Defenders of the Faith, formed in 2011 with an aim to establish Sharia law in Western locations and Mali. It was one of the two significant Islamist military groups in Mali (Crenshaw 2016; Global Security n.d.). The group's first attack occurred on April 15, 2012 in Mali (GTD 2017). The group ascribes to a Salafi-jihadist ideology (Crenshaw 2016).

### **Geography**

The majority of Ansar Dine's attacks take place outside of Northern Mali (GTD 2017). Their bases are located in Mali, and they are not transnational (Crenshaw 2016).

### **Organizational Structure**

Ansar Dine was founded by Iyad ag Ghali, who played a diplomatic leadership role of negotiating between Al Qaeda, AQIM, and the government of Mali before his role in Ansar Dine. Ansar Dine's wings include AQIM (who they followed most closely in terms of activity and beliefs), MUJAO, and IMA (BBC 2013; Crenshaw 2016). The group is mostly composed of local Tuaregs, Arabs, and other closely related ethnicities, seeking to impose Sharia law upon various locations within Mali (Al Jazeera 2013). The group funded itself through kidnappings and drug trafficking. It was also allegedly financed by the government of Qatar (Crenshaw 2016; Refworld 2012; Thurston and Lebovich 2013). The group had no known size estimates in 2013 (US State Department 2013).

### **External Ties**

The group funded itself through revenues collected from kidnappings and drug trafficking. It was also allegedly financed by the government of Qatar (Crenshaw 2016; Refworld 2012; Thurston and Lebovich 2013). The group conducted coordinated attacks with the Macina Liberation Front, AQIM, and al-Murabitoun (GTD 2017).

### **Group Outcome**

It is unclear when exactly Ansar Dine's last attack took place due to the emergence of a new group called the Macina Liberation Front. The MLF gained a lot of public attention for their attacks in Mali in 2015, many of which were attributed to Ansar Dine. The group was inactive in 2014 after they began to discuss peace with the Malian government and lost popularity (Refworld 2012; Globalsecurity n.d.; Crenshaw 2016). The group had a large number of attacks in 2016 in Banamba, Dillio, and Talahandock, Mali (GTD 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- the group starts to engage in peace talks with the Malian government in 2014
- the MLF appropriated a lot of support from Ansar Dine which then hurt its ability to keep conducting attacks
- gradual decline in attacks
- see if they sign the Algiers Accord in 2014/2015?
- Iyad ag Ghali is the original founder of the MPA
- unusual that this country has leaders who form groups, group gets destroyed, and then they form another group (MPA and Ansar Dine, 23 May and MNLA)

#### VIII. SIGNED-IN-BLOOD BATTALION

Torg ID: 2695

Min. Group Date: 2012

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 2013

Aliases: Al-Mulathameen Brigade, Al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam, Signed-In-Blood Battalion, Signed-In-Blood Battalion, The Masked Brigade, Those Who Sign With Blood Battalion

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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Al Mulathamun, Al-Mourabitoun, The Masked Men, The Sentinels, Those who Sign in Blood Brigade

Group Formation: 2012

Group End: 2013 (merger)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The Those who Sign in Blood Brigade group was founded in December 2012 when it splintered from AQIM. Its political aim was to establish Sharia law in Western locations and Mali, and originally operated as part of AQIM (Crenshaw 2016; Counter Extremism n.d.). The group's first attack took place on April 15, 2012, in Mali (GTD 2017). The group ascribed to a Salafi-jihadist ideology (Crenshaw 2016).

### **Geography**

The majority of the group's attacks took place within Mali while some attacks focused on Niger and Algeria. The group originally operated in Amenas, Algeria before moving to northern Mali around Timbuktu (Crenshaw 2016). Their bases were located within Mali's boundaries (Crenshaw 2016). The group controlled territory in Gao and Timbuktu in 2012 (Crenshaw 2016). The group is transnational.

### **Organizational Structure**

The group was founded by Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The group's closest allies included AQIM, Al Qaeda, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO (Crenshaw 2016; Thurston and Lebovich 2013; Counter extremism n.d.). The group funded itself through kidnappings and drug trafficking (Crenshaw 2016; Refworld 2012; Thurston and Lebovich 2013). In 2014, size estimates were unknown (US State Department 2014).

### **External Ties**

When it splintered from AQIM, it was unusual in that the splintering was announced virtually. The group's closest allies included AQIM, Al Qaeda, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO (Crenshaw 2016; Thurston and Lebovich 2013; Counter extremism n.d.). The group later merged with Al Mourabitoun.

### **Group Outcome**

In 2013, Belmokhtar decided to merge the group with MUJAO to form Al Mourabitoun for greater influence in Northern Africa (Counter Extremism n.d.; Crenshaw 2016; Refworld 2014). The group remained active after the merger in 2013.

Notes for Iris:

-see MUJAO for notes on reason for merger

## **IX. AZAWAD NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT**

Torg ID: 2627

Min. Group Date: 2012

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 2012

Aliases: Azawad National Liberation Movement (Mnla), Azawad National Liberation Movement, Mouvement National Pour La Liberation De L'azawad, Mouvement National Pour La Liberation De L'azawad (Mnla), National Movement For The Liberation Of Azawad, Tankra N Tumast D Aslalu N Azawd

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)

Group Formation: 2010 or 2011

Group End: 2015

## Part 3. Narrative

### Group Formation

In 2010, Tuaregs organized a political movement known as the National Movement for Azawad in order to demand increased autonomy for the Tuareg population (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). Members of the group soon joined forces with foreign fighters returning from Libya after Qaddafi's downfall to form a new group known as the MNLA. MNLA formed in 2010 or 2011 with an aim to create a separate Tuareg state in Mali (Stratfor 2012; Welsh 2013; McGregor 2017). It was one of the two significant armed groups in Mali (Stratfor 2012; Canada IRB 2012). The group's first attack took place in January 2012 during a coordinated attack on Menaka, Aguelhok, and Tessalit, Mali (Thurston and Lebovich 2013). The group was considered a secular ethnonationalist group, which differentiated it from the other Tuareg militant groups (Welsh 2013).

## **Geography**

The majority of MNLA's attacks took place inside of Northern Mali (Canada IRB 2012). It primarily claims territory in the "Azawad," which includes northern Mali east of Timbuktu (NPR 2012). Their bases are located in northern Mali around the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains (Stratfor 2012).

## **Organizational Structure**

The founder of the ATNMC, Ibrahim Bahanga, created the group after the ATNMC's 2009 defeat. Bahanga died after he created the MNLA in 2011 (Westerfield 2012). The leader after his death was Bilal ag Cherif (Welsh 2013). The group is mostly composed of local Tuaregs, Arabs, and other closely related ethnicities, seeking to impose Sharia law upon various locations within Mali (Welsh 2013). However, approximately 1% of the group is also Songhai (Welsh 2013).

The group coordinated attacks with Ansar Dine (NPR 2012). It had a political wing originally formed as part of the National Movement of Azawad (Stratfor 2012; Lecocq and Klute 2013, 430).

## **External Ties**

The group coordinated attacks with Ansar Dine (NPR 2012). The group also controlled territory in Gao and Kidal (Welsh 2013). In 2015, the group participated in the Algiers Accord, which was a peace agreement between other Tuareg groups (under the auspices of the Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA)) (McGregor 2017).

## **Group Outcome**

By 2012, the group was already suffering from internal disagreements and fracturing (Stratfor 2012). The group is often disregarded because it is not as violent as Ansar Dine (NPR 2012). In 2015, the group participated in the Algiers Accord, which was a peace agreement between other Tuareg groups (under the auspices of the Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA)) (McGregor 2017).

Interesting quote from Al Jazeera:

The MNLA is generally disregarded and underestimated because it has receded and allowed al-Qaeda-linked groups to take over the field.

- X. NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY AND STATE  
Torg ID: 2660  
Min. Group Date: 2012  
Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: National Committee For The Restoration Of Democracy And State (Cnrdr),  
Cnrdr, National Committee For The Restoration Of Democracy And State

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### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: National Committee for Redressement of Democracy (CNRDR)

Group Formation: 2012

Group End: 2012 (seize power)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

CNRDR formed in 2012 to take over the regime of Amadou Toumani Toure through a coup (Channelstv 2012). The group demanded a more democratic government. The group's first - and only - attack was a coup in March 2012 (Nossiter 2012; Guardian 2012; Al Jazeera 2012).



## Geography

The group's only attack was a coup in the capital of Bamako (Nossiter 2012).

## Organizational Structure

The group was led by Amadou Konare, and was thought to be the replacement government until a new democratic elected president took its place (Channelstv 2012; Refworld 2012; IBP 2015). The group was composed of soldiers from the Malian army (Nossiter 2012).

## External Ties

The group's members originally had served in the Malian military when they staged the coup in 2012. While the coup occurred in partial response to the Tuareg uprising in northern Mali, there is no evidence of any connections to those groups.

## Group Outcome

The coup was successful and the group seized power in 2012 (Nossiter 2012). At this point, they became a state actor.

XI. MPLA  
Torg ID: 9007  
Min. Group Date: 0  
Max. Group Date: 0  
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Azawad, MPA, People's Movement for the Liberation of Azawad

Group Formation: 1988

Group End: 1991

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

The MPLA formed in 1988 when the Islamic Legion disbanded and Tuareg fighters returned to Mali (Humphreys and Mohamed n.d. 255). Iyad ag Ghali organized other foreign fighters into the MPLA upon returning home (Thurston and Lebovich 2013, 11). The MPLA launched an attack on Menaka, Tidarmene, and Ikadewan in 1990, launching the Tuareg rebellion. It was an ethno-nationalist separatist group that demanded increased autonomy from the Malian government (Thurston and Lebovich 2013, 11). The group's first attack took place on June 28, 1990 (DADM n.d.; Humphreys and Mohamed n.d.; UCA n.d.)

#### **Geography**

The majority of the group's attacks took place in Mali, and their bases were located in Northern Mali (Pezard and Sherkin 2015). It conducted its first attack in Menaka, Mali in June 1990 when they stormed a prison and freed several prisoners (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 426). The MPLA also launched attacks in Menaka, Tidarmene, and Ikadewan in 1990, launching the Tuareg rebellion. The group is not transnational.

#### **Organizational Structure**

The group's leader was Iyad Ag Ghali (Refworld 2012). The group had approximately 200 "experienced fighters" during the 1990 uprising, some of which had previously been part of the Islamic Legion (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 426). The group's affiliated wings were the FPLA, which sometimes participated in collaborative efforts to protest against the Malian government. The members were described as "light-skinned Tuaregs" (Europa Publications 2004). It is unknown how many members were in the group. Many members had previously been part of the Islamic Legion and had combat experience, which helped them resist government offensives.

#### **External Ties**

The group received some militia support from other politically affiliated groups and public support from other inactive Tuaregs (Refworld 2017; Refworld 2012; Pezard and Sherkin 2015). Some members eventually splintered away to form the Popular Liberation Front of Azawad (FPLA) and the Arab Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azawad (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 427). The group clashed with the Arab Revolutionary Liberation Army during

the 1990s uprising because it was led by a rival leader, El Hajj Gamou -- a figure who would later turn on the ATNMC after the 2006 uprising (Thurston and Lebovich 2013).

### **Group Outcome**

In 1991, the group began to lose public support as it grew weaker from counter attacks by the regime. Some members splintered away to form the Popular Liberation Front of Azawad (FPLA) and the Arab Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azawad (Lecocq and Klute 2014, 427). Following the splinter, the group changed its name to the Popular Movement of Azawad (MPA) (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 427). President Traore offered a cease-fire agreement with the MPLA and the FIAA in 1991, stating that Tuaregs would have their own government in Northern Mali. On January 26, 1991, the parties agreed to the Tamanrasset Accord which would have provided special status to Tuaregs in the north and facilitate economic development for the region. However, on March 26, a coup overthrew the president of Mali, Moussa Traore, negating the agreement (Boutellis and Zahar 2017). In 1992, the group agreed to a second agreement known as the National Pact which incorporated many facets of the original Tamanrasset Accord (Boutellis and Zahar 2017).

This officially satisfied the group, ending their activity in 1996 when they formally integrated into the army (Thurston and Lebovich 2013; Pezard and Sherkin 2015).

Notes for Iris:

- the MPLA accepts the ceasefire pretty quickly and formally disbanded in 1996 (But no real incidents of fighting after 1991)
- the agreement granted them more independent, autonomous status
- the agreement isn't enforced after 2006 → leads Ghali to start fighting again

XII. FIAA  
Torg ID: 9008  
Min. Group Date: 0  
Max. Group Date: 0  
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Front Islamique Arabe de l'Azawad

Group Formation: 1990

Group End: 1995 (disarm)

## Part 3. Narrative

### Group Formation

The group formed in 1990 as a splinter group of the MPLA due to beliefs a segment of the ethnic Touareg population was dominating the group (UCDP n.d.). It hoped to create a separate state for the Arab population (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 427; Pezard and Shurkin 2015). It is believed its first attack occurred in 1990 (UCDP n.d.).

### **Geography**

The majority of the group's attacks took place in Mali, and their bases were located in Northern Mali (Pezard and Sherkin 2015). The group had an attack in 1994 in Bokoko in the Timbuktu region of Mali (UCDP n.d.). Mali claimed that the group had an external base in Mauritania; Mauritania denied the claim (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 591).

### **Organizational Structure**

The group's leader was Zahabi Ould Sidi Mohamed (Pezard and Sherkin 2015; UCDP n.d.). Members were Arab (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 427; Pezard and Shurkin 2015). In 1994, the FIAA repeatedly attacked a popular anti-Tuareg group known as the Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koye or MPGK (IRIN 2012). There was no evidence of a political wing (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 591).

### **External Ties**

Mali claimed that the group had an external base in Mauritania; Mauritania denied the claim (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 591). Mali also accused Libya of sheltering the FIAA's leader at an unknown date (UCDP n.d.). The group fought alongside the MPA during the first Tuareg uprising. It also formed an umbrella organization with ARLA, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Azawad, and MPA in 1991 (UCDP n.d.).

In 1994, the FIAA repeatedly attacked a popular anti-Tuareg group known as the Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koye or MPGK (IRIN 2012).

### **Group Outcome**

In 1991, the group began to lose public support as it grew weaker from counter attacks by the regime. President Traore offered to agree upon a cease-fire agreement with the MPLA and the FIAA known as the Tamanrasset Accords. On January 26, 1991, the parties agreed to the Tamanrasset Accord which would have provided special status to Tuaregs in the north and facilitate economic development for the region. However, on March 26, a coup overthrew the president of Mali, Moussa Traore, negating the agreement (Boutellis and Zahar 2017).

A local militia composed of ethnic Songhai ex-military officers formed in 1994 to fight against the FIAA (IRIN 2012). The militia gained notoriety for their use of indiscriminate

violence against the Arab community and triggered violent reprisals from the FIAA (IRIN 2012).

In 1992, the MPA agreed to a second agreement known as the National Pact which incorporated many facets of the original Tamanrasset Accord (Boutellis and Zahar 2017). However, the FIAA broke from the agreement and continued fighting until January 1995 when it agreed to the National Peace Pact (Pezard and Sherkin 2015).

Notes for Iris:

- the groups are very similar to each other. Seems likely that FIAA splintered
- MPGK is a pro-government militia
- they reject a peace agreement in 1991, but finally accept it in 1995. The 1995 policy is known as the Mopti Accord. It has special disarmament and demobilization privileges for the FIAA.