

**Libya Cases, 1970-2012**  
**Last Updated: 31 January 2018**

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T74	ARAB NATIONALIST YOUTH FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (ANYLP)		1974	0
T3	ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION		1974	1998
T35	AL ZULFIKAR		1981	1992
T320	NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF LIBERIA (NPFL)		1984	1996
T1539	NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE SALVATION OF LIBYA		1984	1984
T1364	ARAB COMMANDO CELLS		1986	1986
T28	AL-QA'IDA		1989	2012
T536	ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION (YEMEN)		1990	1998
T1641	BASIC PEOPLE'S CONGRESSES		1992	1992
T278	LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP		1995	0
T203	HARAKAT AL SHUHADAA AL ISLAMIYAH		1996	1996
T1426	MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT (MDD)		1998	2003
T2489	SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ ARMY (SLM/ A)		2001	2012
T2617	NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL (NTC)	4-Mar-11	2011	2011
T2014	ZINTAN MILITIA		2011	2011
T2625	ANSAR AL-SHARIA (LIBYA)		2012	2012
T2633	IMPRISONED SHEIKH OMAR ABDEL-RAHMAN BRIGADES		2012	2012

I. ARAB NATIONALIST YOUTH FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (ANYLP)

Torg ID: 74

Min. Group Date: 1974

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Arab Nationalist Youth For The Liberation Of Palestine (Anylp), Arab National Youth Organization (Anyo), Arab Nationalist Youth Organization For The Liberation Of Palestine (Anyolp), National Organization Of Arab Youth, Seventh Suicide Squad

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- (Carol, Steven. *Understanding the Volatile and Dangerous Middle East: A Comprehensive Analysis*. iUniverse, 2015.) - Reads more like a defense of Israel than research. Is not cited below.
- Search ProQuest
  - "ARAB NATIONALIST YOUTH FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE" (ANYLP)
  - ARAB NATIONALIST YOUTH FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (ANYLP)
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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: ANYOLP

Group Formation: 1972 (*United Press International* 1972)

Group End: 1974 (unknown)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

ANYLP claimed multiple airline hijackings, both successful and failed, between 1972 and 1974. It is rumored to have been supported by Qadhafi's regime in Libya (MIPT 2008). It seems that the organization was set up exclusively to hijack American and Israeli civilian aircraft. The first mentions of ANYLP were in 1972, when it claimed responsibility for hijacking a Lufthansa aircraft (*United Press International* 1972) and retrieving 3 imprisoned members of Black September, the terrorist group responsible for the killings at the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich (Bohr et al. 2012; Burke 2000). Notably, the terrorists were brought to Libya (Bohr et al. 2012). Different reports claim that the Palestinian Liberation Organization or Black September itself was responsible for the hijacking (Bohr et al. 2012; Burke 2000). The CIA attributed it to Black September/al Fatah (CIA 1982, 16). The group likely supported an independent Palestine.

### **Geography**

This group seems to have been based in Libya, and focused on Palestine as the motivating factor for its violence (MIPT 2008). However, given that it hijacked airplanes, its geographical reach was far wider. It has been linked to or claimed responsibility for hijackings that spanned from Beirut, Munich, Zagreb, and Tripoli in 1972 to Beirut, Cyprus, Libya, Malta, and Dubai in 1973 (CIA 1982, 16). Other incidents occurred in other cities in Europe and the Middle East/North Africa region.

## Organizational Structure

Little is known about this organization's structure, other than that it was likely supported by the Libyan regime under Qadhafi (MIPT 2008).

## External Ties

ANYLP did not have good relations, at least not publicly, with any other Palestinian groups. The PLO denied its existence (*United Press International* 1972). Later, the PLO disavowed any association with ANYLP (*Reuters* 1974).

## Group Outcome

In 1973 and 1974, ANYLP was involved in multiple prominent and effective airplane hijackings. In 1973, ANYLP was linked to the hijacking of a Dutch 747 (CIA 1982, 16). In 1974, it was connected (*Reuters* 1974) to a deadly airplane crash on a flight from Tel Aviv to New York (NTSB 1975). ANYLP was also linked to two more hijackings in 1974, one of a flight from Beirut to London via Amsterdam and the other in Dubai, where a flight from London to Singapore was refueling (CIA 1982, 17).

It is unclear why ANYLP ceased hijacking aircraft

Notes for Iris:

-unclear if this is PLO affiliate or Libyan SO

-aim is ambiguous, but likely to extract prisoners or prisoner exchanges

## II. ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION

Torg ID: 3

Min. Group Date: 1974

Max. Group Date: 1988

Onset: NA

Aliases: Abu Nidal Organization (Ano), Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Arab Revolutionary Council, Fatah Al-Majlis Al-Thawri, Fatah Al-Qiyadah Al-Thawriyyah, Fatah Revolutionary Council, Fatah Revolutionary Council (Frc/Ano), Frc/Ano, Revolutionary Organization Of Socialist Muslims

### Part 1. Bibliography

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- "Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), aka Fatah Revolutionary Council, the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, or the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims," Council

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- “Abu Nidal Organization,” Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Ed. Gus Martin, Sage 2011, 5-6

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1974

Group End (Outcome): 2002 (loss of leadership)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

ANO was founded in 1974 by Sabri al Banna as a splinter from the PLO (Martin 2011, 5). The group fought to destroy Israel in order to create a separate Palestinian state (Martin 2011, 5; CFR 2009). It was more extremist than Fatah, which in 1974 announced it would be willing to support a two-state solution (Martin 2011, 5). The group was heavily influenced by the Baathists in Iraq (Martin 2011, 5). It came to attention in 1974 following a hijacking of a TWA airplane (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

### **Geography**

The group operated out of Baghdad, but was involved in attacks throughout Iraq, Israel, and Europe.

### **Organizational Structure**

The group constructed a vast operation of resources in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. It had both a political and a military wing; the former was also responsible for recruitment, propaganda, and financing (Mackenzie Institute 2015). Banna helped the group partially fund itself through the establishment of a trade and investment company in Warsaw, which engaged in arms deals during the Iran-Iraq War (Mackenzie Institute 2015). The group had approximately 500 members and was active in 20 countries across northern Africa, the Middle East, and Europe (Martin 2011, 5). Banna may have “coup-proofed”

parts of his organization in 1989 to remove dissidents (Martin 2011, 5).

### **External Ties**

ANO operated out of Baghdad and received external support from Saddam Hussein in exchange (Martin 2011, 5). The group also received external support from Libya and Syria (FAS 2004). The group was expelled from Baghdad in 1983, but was allowed to return after the Iraq-Iran war ended (CFR 2009). In 1999, Egypt and Libya expelled ANO from operating in the country (Mackenzie Institute 2015). Libya did so in order to secure some sanctions relief (CFR 2009). The Jordanian government responded to ANO with threats to kill Banna and his family if he did not cease operations (Martin 2011, 5). Iraqi and Libyan support for the ANO fell after the Cold War and Banna was forced to retrench to Egypt (Martin 2011, 6).

### **Group Outcome**

Banna was killed in 2002 (Martin 2011, 5). The group is thought to be inactive with former leadership hiding in Lebanon (CFR 2009).

Note: Banna seems to have cult of personality here, loss of external support/base is devastating

### III. AL ZULFIKAR

Torg ID: 35

Min. Group Date: 1981

Max. Group Date: 1992

Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Zulfikar, Al Zulfikar

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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: AZO

Group Formation: 1979

Group End: 1992 (disappear)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

Al-Zulfikar is a leftist terrorist group named after Pakistani's Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali-Bhutto, executed in 1979 (Ehrlich 1981). It formed shortly after Bhutto's execution in 1979 (Paracha 2010). It was formed by PM Bhutto's sons after attempts to stop the execution of their father by Muhammed Zia-ul-Haq failed (Paracha 2010). The group's aim was to overthrow the Pakistani regime (Paracha 2010). Its first attack was as late as 1981 (Paracha 2010).

### **Geography**

Al-Zulfikar has bases in London, Tripoli, Libya, Syria, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan (Ehrlich 1981; UK Home Office 2008). It has launched attacks in airports in Karachi and Syria (Ehrlich 1981). Al-Zulfikar's leader announced that, as of 1992, the group was involved in armed resistance inside Pakistan (Times of India 1992).

### **Organizational Structure**

The group is led by Bhutto's son, Murtaza (Paracha 2010). Its recruits were mainly members of Pakistan's People's Party and the People's Students Federation fleeing Zia's military regime (Ibid.). However, most members were killed in Al-Zulfikar's first military attempts in Pakistan (Ibid.). It managed to recover from the losses and recruit new members (Ibid.). A successful plane hijacking of a Singapore Airliner in 1981 increased the group's credibility. The plane was seized between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore by four men, all of whom were killed when Singaporean commandos stormed the plane (Ottawa Citizen, 1991). Demands were made for the release of Benazir

Bhutto's husband from a Karachi prison (Ottawa Citizen, 1991). No passengers were harmed (Ottawa Citizen, 1991).

### **External Ties**

Al-Zulfikar was aided by prominent Muslim leaders such as Colonel Qaddafi in Libya, Haziful Asad in Syria, the PLO's Yasser Arafat, from whom he received weapons and arms (Paracha 2010). Murtaza also called upon KHAD, an Afghan intelligence agency, to help eliminate traitors within the organization (Paracha 2010). Al Zulfikar received funding from Afghanistan and India (UK Home 2008).

### **Group Outcome**

Al-Zulfikar reached the peak of its success from 1981 to 1983 (Ottawa Citizen, 1991). Despite the group's success, Murtaza's paranoia and the consequent infighting led to the group's disintegration (Paracha 2010). The infighting culminated in Murtaza asking KHAD to execute one of his most able officials, Tipu (Paracha 2010). Zulfikar's family abandoned the enterprise. However, in 1986, Murtaza returned and turned Al-Zulfikar into a Sindhi nationalist organization (Paracha 2010). At this time, Benazir Bhutto, Zulfikar's daughter, had returned to mainstream politics in Pakistan and was controlling the PPP. (Paracha 2010). In 1991, Murtaza commented that Al-Zulfikar no longer existed due to in-fighting (Ottawa Citizen, 1991). Its last violent attack was in 1992. Murtaza began his own version of the PPP and ran against Benazir Bhutto's party, and was eventually killed in 1996 by a police ambush (Paracha 2010).

#### **IV. NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF LIBERIA (NPFL)**

Torg ID: 320

Min. Group Date: 1984

Max. Group Date: 1996

Onset: NA

Aliases: NPFL

#### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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  - Gen. Prince Johnson, “The Rise and Fall of President Samuel Doe,” 2003

## **Part 2. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The NPFL was a militia founded in 1984 against then President Samuel Doe (Johnson 2003). It came to attention in 1989. It was led by Charles G. Taylor, a former government official, who was a strong opponent of the presidency of Samuel Doe (Gleditsch et al.). Taylor had originally fled the Doe regime in the early 80s and escaped from jail in Massachusetts in 1985, later returning to Liberia (Waugh 2011, 114-115). From 1988 to December 1989, Taylor traveled to several West African states to recruit members, resources, and avoid detection by potential Liberian security forces trying to track him down (Waugh 2011, 119).

### **Geography**

The group operated around Monrovia and Nimble County, Liberia.

### **Organizational Structure**

NPFL was made up of mostly ethnic Gios and Manos, and their members included former Liberian politicians (HRW 2003). The militants were young boys and teenagers, who were often drunk when executing attacks (HRW 2003). Levitt (2005) argues Taylor assembled a coalition of multi-ethnic Liberians to create the group. The goal of the NPFL was to overthrow President Doe and establish a new regime in Liberia. The group was formed in Cote D’Ivoire, and on Christmas Eve, 1989, NPFL invaded the Liberian Nimba County through Cote D’Ivoire (HRW 2003). There, they found support from ethnic Gios who, too, were opposed to the rule of President Doe, who was part of the Krahn ethnic tribe. Many of the NPFL’s targets were supporters of Doe’s regime and members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups (HRW 2003). Their initial attack was a cross-border raid from Cote D’Ivoire led by Prince Johnson. The group organized themselves into separate military units led by Taylor, Prince Johnson, and Paul Harris (Waugh 2011, 123). They also benefited from the advice of Elmer Johnson who had dual US-Liberian citizenship and also served in the US Marines for a number of years (Waugh 2011, 127). They primarily funded themselves with diamonds and other resources (Waugh 2011, 158).

## **External Ties**

The group had alleged support from Libya and Cote D'Ivoire in terms of military arms and territory (Johnson 2003, 60). Taylor secured support from Mano and Gia individuals in Nimba county, as well as foreign fighters from Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana attracted by the idea of pan-African revolution (Waugh 2011, 124). Taylor traveled to Tripoli on multiple occasions where he met with Gaddafi and was able to train at al-Mathabh al-Tahuriya al-Alamiya (Waugh 2011, 120). Taylor also secured support from Liberian exiles in Cote d'Ivoire (Waugh 2011, 121).

## **Group Outcome**

There have been various attempts at counterinsurgency campaigns by the AFL (Armed Forces of Liberia) against the NPFL as well as attempts at peace agreements by ECOWAS' ECOMOG. The AFL employed indiscriminate tactics against Gio fighters and noncombatants, which, unlike in 1983 and 1985, backfired badly (Waugh 2011, 125-126). AFL was especially vulnerable to attacks because of their inexperience and openness during battle (Waugh 2011, 127; Johnson 2003, 50-51). After the NPFL's 1989 invasion of Liberia, the AFL responded brutally in an attempt to limit the NPFL's reach, using scorched earth methods against residents in Nimba county (HRW 1993; Waugh 2011, 124). The Doe regime also denied they were under attack through multiple denials and counter-statements (Waugh 2011, 125).

In early July 1990, the NPFL rebels occupied the capital of Monrovia, engaging in bloody conflict with both the AFL, Liberia's army, and the INPFL. Additionally, in October 1992, the NPFL surprised the city of Monrovia with Operation Octopus, which included attacks against ECOMOG and the Interim government created by ECOWAS (Ellis 1995). In August 1990, ECOWAS agreed to send ECOMOG into Monrovia in order to impose a ceasefire, create an interim government, and hold a new election within a year. However, NPFL refused to respond to ECOMOG's presence, and continued fighting, forcing ECOMOG to use combat in an attempt to push NPFL out of Monrovia. In November 1990, NPFL finally agreed to a ceasefire, but it was broken in 1992 with Taylor's launch of Operation Octopus, which was a series of direct attacks on ECOMOG and the AFL. In October 1992, ECOMOG conducted a series of bombings and strafing raids using borrowed Nigerian planes; the NPFL did not respond in kind due to their lack of air power (HRW 1993).

In 1990, Prince Johnson, an ethnic Gio, splintered from the NPFL to form the INPFL, which later was responsible for the assassination of President Doe (Gleditsch et al.). Initially, the group only had 200 members, but quickly grew to 1500 (Waugh 2011, 128). The group splintered in 1990 due to leadership tensions between Taylor and Johnson (Waugh 2011, 129). Johnson formed the INPFL soon after.

## **Part 3. Proposed Changes**

Aliases: NPFL

Group Formation: A new proposed formation date if different than above

Group End (Outcome): 1996 (splinter and peace agreement)

V. NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE SALVATION OF LIBYA

Torg ID: 1539

Min. Group Date: 1984

Max. Group Date: 1984

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: October 1981

Group End: 2012 (disarm)

## Part 3. Narrative

### Group Formation

The group was formed in October 1981 in Khartoum, Sudan. Its initial goals were regime change (overthrowing Moammar Gaddafi's dictatorship) and establishing a democratic form of government (Ashour 2012, Fig. 1). The NFSL carried out its first - most well-known - attack in 1984: a failed raid on Gaddafi's headquarters in Tripoli, at the Bab al-Aziziya military compound; 15 NFSL members died during the operation (START 2016). It was anti-Gaddafi and supported a democratic alternative (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 613).

### Geography

The NFSL carried out its most well-known attack in 1984: a failed raid on Gaddafi's headquarters in Tripoli, at the Bab al-Aziziya military compound during which 15 NFSL members died (START 2016). The NFSL operated transnationally. The group broadcast a radio station from Sudan, Egypt, and Chad and published a newsletter in the U.S. and U.K. (BBC Monitoring World Media 2005; Vandewalle 1986, 34). NFSL strongholds during the 2011 civil war were Misrata and Tripoli (Ashour 2012, Fig. 2).

## Organizational Structure

NFSL members had varying ideological and political backgrounds, including both Islamist and secular, but shared a nationalist ideology and acceptance of democratic reforms (Deeb 1992, 61; Ashour 2012, 2, Fig. 1). Some NFSL co-founders previously belonged to the (still-active) Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, but split from that group because they wanted to be part of a broader, umbrella-like organization — which the NFSL became (Ashour 2012, 2). Some NFSL members formerly belonged to the Islamic Association of Libya, which also had ties to the Muslim Brotherhood (Anderson 1986, 232; Deeb 1992, 60). Secular NFSL members often previously served as technocrats in the government, but had become disillusioned by Gaddafi's focus on spreading his revolutionary pan-Arab ideology beyond Libya rather than domestic economic development (Anderson 1986, 231). For example, the founder of the NFSL, Mohamed al-Magarief, was an economist who was the Libyan Ambassador to India when he defected in 1980. Al-Magarief was Libya's interim head of state (Speaker of the National Congress) from August 2012 to May 2013.

## External Ties

The NFSL has offshoots that extend to contemporary actors in Libya and internationally. The NFSL received support from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Chad, and Iraq (Anderson 1986, 233; Tawil April 2011, 8; Tawil *Brothers in Arms*, 58). The support tended to provide refuge for training fighters/media outreach, but sometimes was also financial or logistical (Tawil *Brothers in Arms*). This support was not always consistent; for example, from 1983-1985, Morocco handed over several NFSL members to the Gaddafi regime (Anderson 1986, 232). It has not been officially confirmed, but some reports say that the U.S. gave covert support to the NFSL (Woodward 1987 363, 411; Ryan 2016; Dörre 2014; Ashour 2012, 2). The allegedly U.S.-backed "Algeria Operation" in 1985 and efforts in Chad between 1986-1990 both failed, due to uneven U.S. commitment and the NFSL's limited capabilities (Ashour 2012, 2; Tawil *Brothers in Arms*; Woodward 1987, 442). *The Washington Post* quoted multiple unnamed former U.S. government officials that Khalifa Haftar (a Libyan general and former NFSL member who split from the group after a failed coup attempt in the late 1980s) was a C.I.A. asset while in the NFSL (Ryan 2016).

Haftar moved to Virginia in the 1990s but returned to Libya during the 2011 civil war (ibid.). In February 2014, Haftar announced he would lead an armed force seeking control of areas in Libya (ibid.). Haftar's military actions were not authorized by the new Libyan government (led by his former NFSL colleague al-Magarief). Haftar took control of territory in eastern Libya by May 2016 and was granted some formal authority by the government; however, this has led to power struggles between Haftar and militias in western Libya, particularly regarding Sirte (Blanchard 2016, 4-5).

## Group Outcome

In response to the NFSL and other opposition, the Gaddafi regime devoted significant resources to a military apparatus — a "parallel army" — whose purpose was to defeat

domestic opposition as opposed to another army (Tawil April 2011, 8). This parallel army formed the basis for the Gaddafi brigades (Gaddafi loyalists), military forces loyal to the regime in the contemporary civil war (ibid.). The group's last known violent attack was in 1987. It disarmed, but continued a peaceful struggle against Qadafi.

The NFSL formally abandoned armed tactics and reorganized as the National Front Party after Gaddafi was killed in 2011, since Gaddafi's dictatorship had ended so the group switched its focus to democratic reform. In May 2012, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL) announced that it would no longer conduct armed resistance and reorganized into a political party, named the National Front Party (POMED 2012).

#### VI. ARAB COMMANDO CELLS

Torg ID: 1364

Min. Group Date: 1986

Max. Group Date: 1986

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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- “Lebanon’s Terrorist Groups.” *Washington Post*. August 8, 1989.  
[https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/08/lebanons-terrorist-groups/76b4704a-494d-4211-adc4-392c4e969b58/?utm\\_term=.fa68e1e28355](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/08/lebanons-terrorist-groups/76b4704a-494d-4211-adc4-392c4e969b58/?utm_term=.fa68e1e28355)

Note: seem to support Libya, oppose Lebanon

**This should be an alias duplicate for T321 (Omar Mukhtar Brigade)**

## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Omar Mukhtar Forces, Forces of Omar al-Mukhtar, Arab Revolutionary Cells, Arab Revolutionary Commando Cells, Omar Mukhtar Brigade, Omar al-Mukhtar Brigade (OMB), National Revolutionary Command

Group Formation: Unclear (Only recorded activity was in 1986.) (Nassar and Boggero 2008, 210).

Group End: Inactive (Only recorded activity was in 1986.)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The Omar al-Mukhtar Brigades (OMB), which has been called “Arab Revolutionary Cells” or “Arab Commando Cells,” seems to be a small group Libyan government-backed actors in Lebanon (*Washington Post*, August 1986). A man claiming to be a member of the OMB stated in a phone call that the group was motivated by U.S. strikes in Libya, and British support for those strikes (Nassar and Boggero, 210-211, 215).

Omar al-Mukhtar was a guerrilla leader who fought against colonial rule of Libya before he died in 1931 (Nassar and Boggero 2008, 202). Since then, his name has become a rallying cry against Western influence in the Arab world, and in favor of international Arab cooperation (Nassar and Boggero 2008, 202).

There seem to be multiple groups using the name “Omar al-Mukhtar” forces/brigades/etc. The group referred to as Arab Commando Cells (National Revolutionary Command) is linked to the following incidents in Beirut in March 1986: kidnappings and murders of American and British civilians, two bombings, and two

rocket attacks (Nassar and Boggero 2008, 208; *Washington Post* November 1986). A group calling itself Omar al-Mukhtar Brigades and United Nasserite Organization was linked to a rocket fired at the British ambassador's residence in Beirut in April 1986, and an attack on a British military base in Akrotiri, Cyprus (Nassar and Boggero, 2008, 208). It is unclear whether this is the same group.

## **Geography**

Activities linked to or claimed by this group (OMB - Arab Commando Cells - National Revolutionary Command) took place in Beirut (Norman 1986). A group with a similar name (OMB - United Nasserite Organization) attacked a UK military base in Akrotiri, Cyprus in 1986 (Nassar and Boggero 2008, 208). The group responsible for the attack in Cyprus, was also linked to a rocket fired at the British Ambassador's residence in Beirut in 1986 (Nassar and Boggero, 2008, 208). It is unclear whether these are the same group, though they seem to share motives and missions in retaliating against Western strikes in Libya in 1986.

In 2000-2001, a Palestinian group came to the fore calling itself "Forces of Omar al-Mukhtar (Nassar and Boggero 2008, 211). It seems unlikely that this is the same group. Similarly, a group claiming the name of Omar al-Mukhtar brigades made threats against countries supporting the war in Iraq, and claimed strikes against American forces in Iraq (Nassar and Boggero 211).

## **Organizational Structure**

Little is known about this group's internal structure.

## **External Ties**

It is well accepted that the Arab Commando Cells (OMB) acted with the support of the Libyan government. Some sources even say that Libya controlled their actions (Norman 1986; *Washington Post* August 1986).

## **Group Outcome**

Little is known about this group after its attacks in March 1986. Other groups bearing the name "Omar al-Mukhtar" forces/brigades cropped up in Beirut/Cyprus in 1986, Israel and the Palestinian territories in 2000-2001, and Iraq in 2004-2006 (Nassar and Boggero 2008, 208). It is not clear whether all instances of this group name are connected, other than by ideological inspiration.

Notes for Iris:

-in 1986 there are two groups by the same name (different target, different tactics)



- in 2001, there was a different group by the name in Israel
- in 2006, there was another group by this name in Israel
- likely lots of different groups by this name**
- unclear whether this group is transnational (UNO)
- fix with LEB cases

VII. AL-QA'IDA  
 Torg ID: 28  
 Min. Group Date: 1989  
 Max. Group Date: 2012  
 Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qa'ida, Al Qaeda, Al Qaida, Al-Qa`Ida, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qa'idat Al-Jihad, The Base

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<http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/al-qaida>

### Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active) (Crenshaw 2015)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

Osama Bin Laden founded al-Qaida in 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's initial goals were to completely remove Western influence/ideas and to abolish the United States and Israel (BAAD 2015). They conducted their first attacks against the US embassy in Africa in 1998 (BAAD 2015; Global Security N.D). Al-Qaida first came to global attention after 9/11 but was active prior to that in its region (FAS 2005). The group has a radical Sunni Muslim ideology (CFR 2012; Global Security N.D).

#### **Geography**

Al-Qaida operated mainly within Peshawar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (CFR 2012; PBS N.D). The group hid within cities and hills with particularly mountainous terrain in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan (as shepherds or farmers) (FAS 2005). Bin Laden had a base of operations in Sudan from 1991-1998 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

#### **Organizational Structure**

Al-Qaida was headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was their sole leader until his assassination in 2011 (although rumors exist that he died earlier or didn't die at all) (CFR 2012). He was from Saudi Arabia and had helped fight the Soviets in the Afghanistan war (Crenshaw 2015). He was replaced by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2011. (Crenshaw 2015; CFR 2012). The group used a complex system in which members reported to couriers who reported to other couriers eventually making their way up to the head who was initially Bin Laden (RAND 2008). This is what we call a decentralized or cell-based organizational structure. Funding for the organization came from many places, including donations (FTO 2005). The group had different councils to deal with different aspects. For example, they had a "military committee" to deal with "military" matters, and a "consultation council" to plan out terrorist attacks and deal with financial matters (PBS N.D). They have no formal political wing (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida can be considered an umbrella group that consisted of many other terrorist groups within (ibid; Global Security N.D). The organization had an estimated 75 members when it was first formed and up to 18,000 at its peak in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015). Today, it is thought to have less than 1000 members, but these estimates vary (Crenshaw 2015; BAAD 2015).

#### **External Ties**

Saudi Arabia allegedly gave some funding to AQ through drug trafficking and diamonds, but these were never proven true (Crenshaw 2015). Iran also allegedly trained and supported AQ members in the early 1990s (ibid; BAAD 2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan allow Al-Qaeda to operate training camps within their borders (ibid). The group has ties to several other terrorist organizations including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Jemaah Islamiya (CFR 2012; PBS N.D).

### **Group Outcome**

The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to find and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements operating in Afghanistan (BAAD 2015). The group's first leader Osama bin Laden was killed during a raid in 2011 (CFR 2012; BAAD 2015). The group is still active today.

#### VIII. ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION (YEMEN)

Torg ID: 536

Min. Group Date: 1990

Max. Group Date: 1998

Onset: NA

Aliases: Islamic Jihad Organization (Yemen), Yemen Islamic Jihad

#### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: This seems like either an alias for EIJ or AQ because of Zawahiri's leadership role (BBC 2002).

Group Formation: This seems like either an alias for EIJ or AQ because of Zawahiri's leadership role (BBC 2002).

Group End: This seems like either an alias for EIJ or AQ because of Zawahiri's leadership role (BBC 2002).

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

This seems like either an alias for EIJ or AQ because of Zawahiri's leadership role (BBC 2002).

### **Geography**

This seems like either an alias for EIJ or AQ because of Zawahiri's leadership role (BBC 2002).

### **Organizational Structure**

This seems like either an alias for EIJ or AQ because of Zawahiri's leadership role (BBC 2002).

### **External Ties**

This seems like either an alias for EIJ or AQ because of Zawahiri's leadership role (BBC 2002).

### **Group Outcome**

This seems like either an alias for EIJ or AQ because of Zawahiri's leadership role (BBC 2002).

## **IX. BASIC PEOPLE'S CONGRESSES**

Torg ID: 1641

Min. Group Date: 1992  
Max. Group Date: 1992  
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1556>
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<http://countrystudies.us/libya/73.htm>

### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: This is a government institution and not an armed group (Metz 1987).

Group Formation: This is a government institution and not an armed group (Metz 1987).

Group End: This is a government institution and not an armed group (Metz 1987).

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

This is a government institution and not an armed group (Metz 1987).

#### **Geography**

This is a government institution and not an armed group (Metz 1987).

#### **Organizational Structure**

This is a government institution and not an armed group (Metz 1987).

#### **External Ties**

This is a government institution and not an armed group (Metz 1987).

#### **Group Outcome**

This is a government institution and not an armed group (Metz 1987).

X. LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP

Torg ID: 278

Min. Group Date: 1995

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (Lifg), Al Jama Al Islamiyyah Al Muqatilah, Al-Jama Al-Islamiyyah Al-Muqatilah, Al-Jam'a Al-Islamiyyah Al-Muqatilah, Fighting Islamic Group, Libyan Fighting Group, Libyan Islamic Group

**Part 1. Bibliography**

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<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/05/libya-manchester-connection-170528081044095.html>
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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1990s (Crenshaw 2017; Global Security n.d.), first confirmed action 1995 (Crenshaw 2017)

Group End: 2010 (Crenshaw 2017)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The LIFG was a movement of Sunni Islamists dedicated to overthrowing the Qaddafi regime and replacing it with an Islamic state (Crenshaw 2017; MIPT 2008; Witter 2011). Their support grew out of a community of Sunni Muslims who supported the Sanussi monarchy, which held power from 1951 to 1969 (Witter 2011). Members of a jihadi group led by Emir Awatha Al-Zuwawi in the 1980s were exiled to Afghanistan in 1989; when they returned from fighting the Soviets with al-Qa’ida in the early 1990s, they founded the group that would come to be known in 1995 as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (Crenshaw 2017). In 1995, one of their operations went wrong and they declared themselves in the aftermath (Crenshaw 2017).

### **Geography**

Based in Benghazi, the LIFG was active throughout eastern Libya and particularly in the province of Cyrenaica (Crenshaw 2017). It conducted transnational attacks. It also sponsored a bombing in Casablanca, Morocco by the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group in 2003 (Crenshaw 2017). The LIFG is rumored to have cooperated in Iraq with Al Qa’ida in Iraq (Crenshaw 2017). The LIFG trained its fighters at Al-Qa’ida-affiliated training camps in Sudan in the 1990s (Crenshaw 2017).

### **Organizational Structure**

The LIFG had a well-defined internal leadership structure, which comprised four bodies. The group had a political wing. The political bureau was in charge of both politics and military operations. The consultative committee (Majlis Shura) exercised a guiding executive role. The judicial committee answered theological questions and created propaganda. Finally, the information bureau tasked itself with messaging directed at Libyan civilians (Crenshaw 2017). Two figures stand out among the LIFG's leadership. First, Abdelhakim Belhadj, or Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq, held the position of Emir, and was the head of the LIFG (Crenshaw 2017). Second, Sami "Abu al-Munder" al-Saadi was the religious leader of the LIFG. Belhadj and al-Saadi were imprisoned by the regime between 2004 and 2010. They were released after agreeing to issue a proclamation denouncing al-Qa'ida in September 2009 and disbanding the LIFG in 2010 (Black 2011; Crenshaw 2017; Global Security n.d.). Its peak size has been estimated at 1,000 members around 1996 (Black 2011). In 2011, the group only had "several hundred" members (Crenshaw 2017).

Members originally fought as part of the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s as "Libyan Afghans" (Crenshaw 2017). They formed the basis of the LIFG when it formed.

### **External Ties**

The LIFG had a complicated, long-term relationship with Al-Qa'ida that began before the LIFG's official founding, when future LIFG members were fighting with Al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan (Crenshaw 2017). Al-Qa'ida and LIFG members mingled at training camps in Sudan in 1996 (Crenshaw 2017). The LIFG never endorsed Al-Qa'ida's attacks on the West, but appears to have cooperated or at least communicated with al-Qa'ida and Osama bin Laden (Black 2011; Crenshaw 2017; MIPT 2008; Witter 2011). In 2007, Al-Qa'ida's Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that LIFG was now part of Al-Qa'ida (Crenshaw 2017; Witter 2011). This claim was disputed in 2009, and LIFG members in Libyan prisons declared through a manifesto (417 pages) that they opposed Al-Qa'ida's tactics (Crenshaw 2017; Global Security n.d.; UN 2016; US Department of State 2015).

There are alleged links between the LIFG and the UK, where a logistical structure was set up between 2000 and 2006, when it was disbanded by the police (Crenshaw 2017). There are also allegations that British intelligence financed (\$160,000) a failed LIFG assassination attempt on Qadhafi in 1996 (Crenshaw 2017; Gambill 2005; Sloan 2017).

The LIFG may have been funded by Iran (Crenshaw 2017).

The LIFG has been associated with the Armed Islamic Group and with the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group. It conducted a bombing in Casablanca in 2003 with the latter (Crenshaw 2017).

### **Group Outcome**



After it revealed itself in 1995, the LIFG faced a harsh government crackdown; martial law was imposed, and electricity and water were denied to areas where the LIFG had support (Crenshaw 2017). By the late 1990s, the LIFG was extremely weak within Libya; over 150 of its fighters were arrested in 1998 (Black 2011; Crenshaw 2017). Many LIFG fighters fled elsewhere (Afghanistan, Sudan, and Iraq), and many joined Al-Qa'ida (Black 2011; Crenshaw 2017). Though the group continued to function, its activities were diminished. This was especially true after 2004, when key members of its leadership were arrested and sent back to Libyan prisons (Crenshaw 2017).

A logistical structure was set up between 2000 and 2006 in the United Kingdom, but was disbanded by the police (Crenshaw 2017).

In 2007, Al-Qa'ida's Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that LIFG was now part of Al-Qa'ida (Crenshaw 2017; Witter 2011). This claim was disputed in 2009, and LIFG members in Libyan prisons (Belhadj and al-Saadi) declared through a manifesto (417 pages) that they opposed Al-Qa'ida's tactics (Crenshaw 2017; Global Security n.d.; UN 2016; US Department of State 2015). The organization disbanded officially in 2010 (Crenshaw 2017).

After renouncing al-Qa'ida, leaders like Belhadj were able to play roles in Libyan politics as legitimate moderate Islamists (Raghavan 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- Libyan government is very strong during the 1990s and able to put down these groups Very effectively
- case where state capacity supersedes militant organization
- UK allows them to fundraise in UK without interference, but unclear whether govt provides more explicit support (tacit support)
- Zuwawi is originally operating in Libya, movement moves to Afghanistan to support Soviet mujahideen, returns in early 1990s
- they get discovered too early before they're ready. 1998 - crushed by government - become transnational
- AQ tries to co opt the LIFG but there's no evidence the LIFG actually supports them
- AQ may absorb some members of this group, but there's no evidence they actually attracted leadership
- only Belhadj traceable; other fighters disappear

XI. HAKARAT AL SHUHADAA AL ISLAMIIYAH  
Torg ID: 203  
Min. Group Date: 1996  
Max. Group Date: 1996  
Onset: NA

Aliases: Harakat Al-Shuhada'a Al-Islamiyah, Harakat Al Shuhadaa Al Islamiyah, Harakat Al-Shuhadaa Al-Islamiyah, Islamic Martyrs Movement (IMM), Islamic Movement Of Martyrs

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### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: None

Group Formation: May 1996 (GTD 2017)

Group End: Unclear (1998 is the last recorded attack) (Pargeter 2005).

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

Little is known about the Islamic Martyrs’ Movement (IMM)’s founding or formation. It appears to have been mostly composed of fighters from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and is mentioned in the context of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which

was much larger but operated with similar goals and in similar areas (Cristiani 2012; Pargeter 2005). It may have wanted to overthrow the Qadafi regime and ascribed to an Islamist ideology (Cristiani 2012; Pargeter 2005). The IMM came into conflict with Libyan government forces in Benghazi in the late 1990s and had its first attack as late as 1996 (GTD 2017; Keesing's 1996). The IMM tried and failed to assassinate Qadhafi in 1998 (Keesing's 1998).

### **Geography**

The IMM seems to have been active mostly in the region of Benghazi, in eastern Libya. It is not known to be linked to any significant incidents far from Benghazi (GTD 2017; Keesing's 1996; Keesing's 1998).

### **Organizational Structure**

Little is known about this organization's structure. One source states that its leader's name was Al-Hami (Pargeter 2005). It appears to have been mostly composed of fighters from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and is mentioned in the context of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which was much larger but operated with similar goals in similar areas (Cristiani 2012; Pargeter 2005).

### **External Ties**

This group is mentioned in the context of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which was much larger but operated with similar goals in and similar areas (Cristiani 2012; Pargeter 2005). The LIFG reportedly tried to unite groups like the IMM and Ansar Allah (Supporters of Allah) in eastern Libya in the late 1990s (Pargeter 2005). It appears that the IMM and the Militant Islamic Group (MIG) were fighting against government forces in Benghazi at the same time (Keesing's 1996). In 1997, there were rumors that the IMM would merge with the MIG, and the topic seems to have been discussed, but it does not appear that the merger occurred successfully (MIPT 2008).

The group may have later had ties to the February 17 Brigade in Benghazi, Libya during the onset of the Libyan Civil War (Jamestown Foundation 2012).

### **Group Outcome**

Little is known about what happened to this group. It has not been connected to incidents since 1998. It seems likely that the same crackdown that forced the LIFG into hiding also reduced the IMM's operational capabilities (Pargeter 2005).

- XII. MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT (MDD)  
Torg ID: 1426

Min. Group Date: 1998  
Max. Group Date: 2003  
Onset: NA

Aliases: Movement For Democracy And Development (MDD), Mouvement Pour La Democratie Et Le Developpement, Movement For Development And Democracy

### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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- Canada IRB, 1999, "Any connection between the Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD), and Youssouf Togoimi and his Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT); date of the foundation of MDJT [TCD32956.E]," [https://www.ecoi.net/local\\_link/196304/314980\\_de.html](https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/196304/314980_de.html)
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### **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1991

Group End (Outcome): 1996 (peace agreement)

### **Part 3. Narrative**

#### **Group Formation**

MDD was formed on October 15, 1991, with an objective to overthrow the Idriss Deby regime. It operated out of the Lake Chad region in Chad and its leaders were Goukouni Guet, Hussein Habre, and Moussa Medella who had previously been involved in the rebellion (Canada IRB 1998). It came to attention in December 1991 when it attacked

Chad and launched a series of attacks from Nigeria (UCA DADM Project).

## **Geography**

Lake Chad

## **Organizational Structure**

The group purports to have an eclectic membership of several different ethnic groups, religions, and regions from across Chad.

## **External Ties**

The group maintains external bases and political representatives to provide the group greater legitimacy in “Libya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Congo Brazzaville, Nigeria, Sudan, Cameroon, Paris, London and Amsterdam” (Canada IRB 1998). The group formed an alliance with the MDJT around 1998 (Canada IRB 1999).

## **Group Outcome**

The group splintered in 1992 into the MDD-FANT led by Habre and the MDD-FAO led by led by Medella (Canada IRB 1998). Initially, the government signed a peace agreement with the group in 1992, but this faltered after government forces attacked the MDD-FAO in Lake Chad (Canada IRB 1998). Additional meetings led to a peace agreement between the government and the MDD in 1995 (UCA DADM Project). Peace talks in 1996 led to a second peace agreement between the government and Medella’s faction (MDD-FAO) (Canada IRB 1997).

### XIII. SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ ARMY (SLM/ A)

Torg ID: 2489

Min. Group Date: 2001

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army (Slm/A), Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army (Slm/A), Sudan Liberation Movement, Sudan Liberation Movement (Slm)

#### **Part 1. Bibliography**

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## **Part 2. Basic Coding**

Aliases: Darfur Liberation Front/Army (DLF/A)

Group Formation: 2001 (ACCORD 2014)

Group End: 2016 (present and active) (Gleditsch 2013; GTD 2017)

## **Part 3. Narrative**

### **Group Formation**

The SLA was originally founded in 2001 under the name Darfur Liberation Front/Army (DLF/A), at the time they were led by Abdul Wahid Mohammed al-Nur (ACCORD 2014). The SLA was one of two of the primary groups in the region formed to oppose the government of Sudan (GOS), the other being the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (BBC 2010). The SLA/M’s main priorities are separatist and include gaining regional autonomy, or simply greater representation, for Darfur, a region considered to be socially and economically neglected (DOJ 2009). The group’s first violent incident occurred in 2001(GTD 2017). Originally, the group represented different ethnic groups and had no clear ideology. After it splinters, the splinter groups harbor ethnonationalist ideologies.

### **Geography**

The SLA/M primarily operated throughout the region of Darfur (BBC 2010; DOJ 2009; ACCORD 2014; Global Security n.d.). Some of their more specific attacks occurred in: Nertiti, Tawilah, Katrom, Sileia, Nina Kass, Ed Dueim, Al-Fashir, Nyala, Deribat, Kuma, Kwajok, Kufra, Gereida, and Kiechkuon (GTD 2017). The SLA-Abdel Wahid is thought to have controlled much of the Jebel Murra mountains after the split (BBC 2010).

### **Organizational Structure**

The SLA was originally founded in 2001 under the name Darfur Liberation Front/Army (DLF/A) and was led by Abdul Wahid Mohammed al-Nur (ACCORD 2014). The SLA was one of two of the primary groups in the region formed to oppose the government of Sudan (GOS), the other being the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (BBC 2010). At their height, the group was thought to have nearly 11,000 troops (Gleditsch 2013). For the most part, members of the group were Fur (Abdel Wahid faction) or Zaghawa (Minni Minawi faction) - the two largest non-Arab tribes in Darfur (BBC 2010; ACCORD 2014). The SLA/M was supported financially by Eritrea, Libya, and Chad (Gleditsch 2013). It had no political wing (Gleditsch et al. 2013).

Throughout the conflict in Darfur, the SLA was plagued with infighting and fractionalization (Gleditsch 2013). The three main splinter groups were the SLM/A - Unity faction, the SLM/A - Minni Minawi (SLA/M-MM) faction, and the SLA/M - Abdel Wahid faction (BBC 2010; Gleditsch 2013). The SLA/M-Unity faction continued to fight until the end of the conflict in 2009, while the SLA/M-MM faction was a signatory of the 2006 Darfur Peace Accords (Gleditsch 2013). After signing, some of the members of Minawi's faction left the group and either joined others to continue the fight or became part of a new group which opposed the agreement called the National Redemption Front (NRF) (Gleditsch 2013).

### **External Ties**

The SLA/M received unspecified support from Eritrea (Gleditsch 2013). The original SLA was a member of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which opposed the government in Khartoum (Global Security n.d.). Throughout the conflict in Darfur, the SLA was plagued with infighting and fractionalization (Gleditsch 2013). The three main splinter groups were the SLM/A - Unity faction, the SLM/A - Minni Minawi (SLA/M-MM) faction, and the SLA/M - Abdel Wahid faction (BBC 2010; Gleditsch 2013). The SLA/M-Unity faction continued to fight until the end of the conflict in 2009, while the SLA/M-MM faction was a signatory of the 2006 Darfur Peace Accords (Gleditsch 2013). After signing, some of the members of Minawi's faction left the group and either joined others to continue the fight or became part of a new group which opposed the agreement called the National Redemption Front (NRF) (Gleditsch 2013).

### **Group Outcome**

Throughout the conflict in Darfur, the SLA was plagued with infighting and fractionalization (Gleditsch 2013). The three main splinter groups were the SLM/A - Unity faction, the SLM/A - Minni Minawi (SLA/M-MM) faction, and the SLA/M - Abdel Wahid faction (BBC 2010; Gleditsch 2013). The SLA/M-Unity faction continued to fight until the end of the conflict in 2009, while the SLA/M-MM faction was a signatory of the 2006 Darfur Peace Accords (Gleditsch 2013).

After signing, some of the members of Minawi's faction left the group and either joined others to continue the fight or became part of a new group which opposed the agreement called the National Redemption Front (NRF) (Gleditsch 2013). In 2008, an African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation to stabilize Darfur began (DOJ 2009). Their efforts were rendered ineffective for multiple reasons, one of which being that key factions of the SLM boycotted talks (DOJ 2008). It is acknowledged that they remained active into 2010, and their last incidence of suspected violence took place in 2016 (GTD 2017). The group is likely still active.

Notes for Iris:

-SLM had at least three major splinters: SLM/Unity, Mini Minawi, and Wahid factions

#### XIV. NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL (NTC)

Torg ID: 2617

Min. Group Date: 2011

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: 2011

Aliases: National Transitional Council (Ntc), National Transitional Council

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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Transitional National Council (Becker and Shane, *The New York Times*)

Group Formation: February 27, 2011 (Grote and Röder 2016, 315)

Group End: 2011 (official recognition - gain control of capital)

## Part 3. Narrative

### Group Formation

The National Transitional Council (NTC) was a self-appointed group of Libyan elites whose initial goal was to replace the Gaddafi regime and serve as an interim governing body (Stephen 2011). The NTC was first publicly announced as an organization on February 27, 2011, about two weeks after widespread anti-government protests had started (Grote and Röder 2016, 315). It formed as part of the larger Arab Spring uprising in the Middle East and North Africa. It is unknown when their first violent attack occurred, but it happened sometime in 2011 (UCDP 2017). The group pledged to draft a constitution and schedule a general election. The NTC organized nationwide elections in July 2012 and formally handed over power to the elected General National Congress in August 2012.

## **Geography**

The group operated in Libya. It had attacks in Misrata, Benghazi, Murzuq, and Sabha (UCDP 2017). There is no evidence the group was transnational.

## **Organizational Structure**

The exact number of members is unknown, with reports ranging from 33 to about 50 members (Stephen 2011). Many NTC members are heirs of aristocratic or bourgeois families who held power during the Libyan monarchy (1951-69), but whom Gaddafi sidelined or exiled (Lacher 2011). Longtime Gaddafi associates who have since defected also hold leadership positions in the NTC (ibid.). In addition to elites, the northeastern part of Libya was overrepresented in NTC membership and its executive committee, particularly during the group's earliest stages (ibid.). This northeastern region (Cyrenaica), includes the urban centers Benghazi, Bayda, Derna and Tobruk. The disproportionately high representation was partly because the rebellion began in Benghazi and the NTC was headquartered there. However, elites from northeastern Libya in the NTC soon became involved in power struggles against leaders of localized revolutionary brigades (particularly from Misrata and the Western Mountains) (ibid.).

The NTC was a military organization, but also included political figures who represented its associated forces to other nations and the media (Non-State Actor Data 2013, 757). The NTC attempted to centralize military command and control, but it was largely unsuccessful. Revolutionary brigades officially pledged allegiance to the NTC, but operated largely independently and sometimes even worked against NTC aims, for example clashes between rebel groups in Tripoli (Lacher 2011). NTC-associated groups faced organizational chaos when Maj. Gen. Abdul Fattah Younes (or Abdel Fattah Younis) was killed on July 28, 2011, potentially by a rival rebel militia (Lacher 2011; Vanderwalle 2012). The leader of the NTC for most of 2011, Mahmoud Jibril, faced calls to resign from Misrata rebels and some Islamists. However, Jibril resigned at the moment he himself had previously promised to: after Gaddafi was killed in October 2011 (BBC 2012). Jibril ran in the 2012 election as president of the political party the National

Forces Alliance (NFA). Jibril lost the vote for prime minister, but the NFA won the largest number of seats. The NFA has some Islamist elements, but received significantly more support than the Justice and Construction Party (the Libyan political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood) (Vanderwalle 2012, 10).

### **External Ties**

The U.S. covertly provided lethal assistance (weaponry) to the NTC (Becker and Shane 2016). Non-State Actor Data also cites arms, logistics and supplies provided to the NTC from Egypt, France, Italy, Poland, Qatar, Sudan and United Arab Emirates, U.K and U.S. NATO forces (2013, 758.) France announced that it would unfreeze 1.5 billion Euros in Libyan assets to the NTC on September 1, 2011 (CNN Library 2016).

### **Group Outcome**

The forces of Muammar Gaddafi reportedly killed dozens, likely hundreds, of civilians after anti-government protests broke out in February 2011 (Blanchard and Zanotti 2011, 1; UNSC 2011). While opposition groups gained control of some eastern and western cities in February 2011, by March pro-Gaddafi forces had turned the tide against opposition forces (ibid.). This raised fears that Gaddafi would retaliate if he regained power (Becker and Shane 2016). Under a U.N. Security Council resolution, the U.S. and some European and Arab nations provided airstrikes and lethal assistance to the NTC in order to protect Libyan civilians -- ultimately leading to the defeat of Gaddafi's forces (ibid.).

After Gaddafi lost nationwide control, his forces controlled his hometown Sirte (on the Mediterranean coast) until NTC brigades seized control and killed Gaddafi in Sirte (Non-State Actor Data 2013, 758).

The U.S. State Department recognized the NTC as the government of Libya on July 15, 2011, and the U.N. General Assembly did so in September. It technically ended its insurgency on this date since it was now in control of the capital. The NTC ordered rebels to lay down their arms or join the official army or security forces after Gaddafi's death; however, as of spring 2012, this had not happened and militias continued to operate without the rule of law (Rovera 2012, 33).

- XV. ZINTAN MILITIA  
Torg ID: 2014  
Min. Group Date: 2011  
Max. Group Date: 2011  
Onset: NA

Aliases: Zintani Militia, Zintan Militia

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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Zintan Revolutionaries’ Military Council, Zintan Brigades, ZRMC, Zintan Revolutionary Military Council, Zintan Military Council, Zintan militia

Group Formation: 2011 (GTD 10103 2017).

Group End: 2017 (active) (Heras 2017)

## Part 3. Narrative

### Group Formation

Zintan is a city in the Nafusa mountains southwest of Tripoli. Many Zintanis had adversarial relations with the Qadhafi regime for years, and some supported a failed

attempt to depose him in 1993 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2013). An individual named Mohammed Ali Madani organized Zintani militias to join the uprising against Qadhafi in 2011, and fighters from Zintan fought their way into Tripoli, where they retained a strong presence until 2014 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2013; *Al Jazeera* July 2014). The Zintanis have fought in opposition to the Qadhafi regime, Islamists, and the General National Congress (GNC) (*Al Jazeera* June 2014). The Zintanis have been labeled “pro-government” by the international community and non-Islamist (BBC 2016).

## **Geography**

Zintani fighters retain an important presence in western Libya, particularly in the Nafusa mountains southwest of Tripoli that surround the city of Zintan. Between 2011 and 2014, the Zintanis also had a strong presence in Tripoli itself (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2013).

## **Organizational Structure**

The Zintan militias were initially led by Mohammed Ali Madani, who died fighting in 2011 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2013). It is unclear when the Zintan Revolutionary Military Council was set up, but it is evident that the ZRMC came to exert control over many militias (23 in 2014) from Zintan and the Nafusa mountains (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). The ZRMC may not control all Zintani fighters, but it is an important force in directing them. In 2017, one source estimated the strength of the ZRMC at 3,000 fighters (Heras 2017). The ZRMC was led by Mukhtar Khalifa Shahub in 2014, but, since 2017, has been led by Osama al-Juwaili (Heras 2017; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014).

## **External Ties**

Zintani militias are linked to the Sawa’iqa Brigade (al-Sawaiq Battalion), the Qa’qa’ Brigade/Battalion, the Tripoli Revolutionary Council, and Operation Dignity (BBC 2016; Heras 2017; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). The Sawa’iqa Brigade, also from Zintan, is a particularly well-equipped group that has also fought against Islamists and Qadhafi’s regime (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). The Qa’qa’ Brigade had an amicable relationship with Osama al-Juwaili before he became leader of the ZRMC, and has also fought against Islamists and the GNC (BBC 2016; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). The connection between the Tripoli Revolutionary Council (TRC) and Zintani militias is unconfirmed; the former wished to maintain its identity as a group formed out of the residents of Tripoli (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). The Zintanis have also cooperated on occasion with Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army and Operation Dignity (BBC 2016; Heras 2017). The group uses

its control over the airport to receive weapons from unspecified sponsors (Netherlands MFA 2014). The group later lost control over the airport sometime after 2012.

### **Group Outcome**

After 2012, the ZRMC and Zintani militias maintained a strong presence in Tripoli until they were pushed out by militias from Misrata, in a clash that culminated in violence at Tripoli's airport (*Al Jazeera* July 2014; Heras 2017). The ZRMC remains an important force that may help swing the balance in favor of the Government of National Accord or back towards war (Heras 2017). The group was still active as of 2017.

Notes for Iris:

- the group is pro-government because it supports the NTC
- coalition of different militias from the broader Zintan area, but there is no one clear group. ZRMC seemed to be most organized and oversee leadership
- no clear evidence that this group exists beforehand, but seems plausible it is a local militia beforehand based on other countries in the region

XVI. ANSAR AL-SHARIA  
Torg ID: 2625  
Min. Group Date: 2012  
Max. Group Date: 2012  
Onset: NA

Aliases: Ansar Al-Sharia (Libya), Ansar Al-Sharia, Ansar Al-Sharia Battalion, Partisans Of Islamic Law, Partisans Of Sharia, Partisans Of Shari'a

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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Aliases: Partisans of Islamic Law, Partisans of Sharia (BAAD Dataset Version 2 2015), AAS

Group Formation: 2012

Group End: 2016 (active)

## Part 3. Narrative

### Group Formation

The Libyan branch of Ansar Al-Sharia was founded in 2012, following the death of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, and has remained active during the Libyan civil war (BAAD Dataset Version 2 2015). The group's ideology is pro-al Qaeda, Salafi-Jihadist, and anti-Western. Ansar al-Sharia's initial goal was the implementation of Sharia law in Libya (Khalaf 2012). On June 18, 2012, armed individuals associated with Ansar al-Sharia Libya stormed the Tunisian consulate in Benghazi, allegedly to protest an art exhibition that they claimed insulted Islam (Lieberman and Collins 2012, 7).

## **Geography**

In late 2015, Ansar al-Sharia was linked to three attacks (in Ziltan, Tripoli and Benghazi) that in total killed 13 and injured 41 (START 2016). The U.S. State Department has said that two Ansar al-Sharia groups were involved in the fatal 2012 attacks on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi (2014). The group has denied involvement in the attack, but has claimed responsibility for destroying Sufi shrines (Khalaf 2012; Wehrey 2012). Jihadists claiming to belong to Ansar al-Sharia have been documented from Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Mali and Morocco (Khalaf 2012; Associated Press 2015; Malka 2013). It is unclear if different branches of Ansar al-Sharia work together. Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia and Libya reportedly have some collaboration regarding operations, finances and logistics (Mapping Militant Organizations). The group may conduct transnational attacks as part of the larger Ansar al Sharia umbrella, but no evidence of an external base was found.

## **Organizational Structure**

As of 2012, the Ansar al-Sharia group in Benghazi was estimated to contain between 50 and 200 members (Kirkpatrick, et. al. 2012). The founding leader of the broader organization Ansar al-Sharia was Mohammed al Zahawi, who met with Osama Bin Laden in the 1990s and was killed in unknown circumstances in 2014 or 2015 (Joscelyn 2015). Abu Khalid al Madani succeeded Zahawai. Sufian bin Qumu, the Ansar al-Sharia leader in Derna, is a former Guantanamo Bay detainee (Malka 2013). Ahmed Abu Khattalah, the senior leader of the Benghazi branch, was previously imprisoned for many years under the Gaddafi regime (DeYoung, et. al. 2014). In June 2014, U.S. Special Forces captured Abu Khattalah near Benghazi (ibid.). The U.S. Justice Department is prosecuting Abu Khattalah in federal court for involvement in attacking the U.S. consulate in Benghazi (Hsu 2016).

## **External Ties**

Jihadists claiming to belong to Ansar al-Sharia have been documented from Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Mali and Morocco (Khalaf 2012; Associated Press 2015; Malka 2013). It is unclear if different branches of Ansar al-Sharia work together. Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia and Libya reportedly have some collaboration regarding



operations, finances and logistics (Mapping Militants Organizations). The U.S. State Department has designated three branches of Ansar al-Sharia (in Tunisia, Benghazi and Derna) as separate Foreign Terrorist Organizations (2014).

Ansar al-Sharia is suspected of receiving financial and material support from al-Qaeda (BAAD Dataset Version 2 2015). Ansar al-Sharia is part of the coalition Ajdabiya Shura Council (ASC), leads the Benghazi Revolutionaries, and maintains other alliances (Joscelyn 2015). Ansar al-Sharia leaders have ties to Egyptian Islamic Jihad, although the extent of relations is unclear (BAAD Dataset Version 2 2015). The Libyan public and civic organizations have largely condemned Ansar al-Sharia (Kirkpatrick, et. al. 2012; Wherey 2016).

### **Group Outcome**

The U.S. State Department has said that two Ansar al-Sharia groups were involved in the fatal 2012 attacks on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi (2014). The group has denied involvement in the attack, but has claimed responsibility for destroying Sufi shrines (Khalaf 2012; Wehrey 2012). After the 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate, Ansar al-Sharia was forced out of Libya through popular demonstrations in support of the new Libyan government (Graff and Al-Khalidi 2012).

In a report on the September 11, 2012, Benghazi attack, the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security criticized the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) for “a failure [...] to focus sufficiently on terrorist groups that have weak or no operational ties to core al Qaeda and its main affiliates” (2012). The report mentioned Ansar Al-Sharia (Libya) as among the threats that the IC allegedly underestimated (ibid., 6).

Ansar al-Sharia reportedly returned to Benghazi in 2013, providing security patrols and humanitarian services (BAAD Dataset Version 2 2015). In late 2015, Ansar al-Sharia was linked to three attacks (in Ziltan, Tripoli and Benghazi) that in total killed 13 and injured 41 (START 2016).

#### **XVII. IMPRISONED SHEIKH OMAR ABDEL-RAHMAN BRIGADES**

Torg ID: 2633

Min. Group Date: 2012

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Brigades Of Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman Brigades

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## Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Omar Abdurrahman group (SSCI 2014, 12)

Group Formation: 2012

Group End: 2012 (disappear)

## Part 3. Narrative

## **Group Formation**

The Brigades is named after Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, a religious extremist known as the “blind sheik.” In 1996, Abdel Rahman was sentenced to life imprisonment in the U.S. for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and plotting other unrealized attacks in New York (Lynch and Hauslohner 2013). Abdel Rahman’s initial goal was the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt (Weaver 1996). He traveled internationally, preaching Islamic extremism during the 1980s and 1990s. He continues to be a popular inspirational figure for jihadists despite being in U.S. prison (Weaver 1996; Lynch and Hauslohner 2013). It is an al Qaeda affiliate. It is unknown precisely when this group formed, but first came to attention in 2012.

The group is pro-al Qaeda, Salafi-Jihadist (Robertson et. al. Sept. 2012). The group has been suspected of conducting the September 11, 2012, attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi that killed four Americans, including U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens (ibid.). Leaflets reportedly left at the scene were said to credit the Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman Brigades, claiming the attack was in retaliation for the fatal drone strike on al-Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi (Karadsheh and Robertson 2012). The group’s first known attack took place on May 22, 2012: Two RPG rounds hit the International Committee for the Red Cross/Red Crescent (ICRC) building in Benghazi, causing property damage but no casualties. Not much is known about the group’s founding. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) described the group as a “previously unknown organization” until it claimed responsibility for the May 2012 attack (2014). The brigades made an unsubstantiated claim of responsibility for an IED attack that occurred at night between June 5 and 6, 2012, and targeted the U.S. Temporary Mission Facility in Benghazi (SSCI 2014, 12). The IED explosion blew a 9x12 foot hole in the compound’s exterior wall but did not cause casualties (ibid., 13). The brigades said the attack was in retaliation to the killing of al-Libi in a reported drone strike in Northern Waziristan (ibid., 12). The brigades also claimed responsibility for an explosive device that detonated at the ICRC office in Misrata on June 12, 2012, injuring one civilian (START 2016). The brigades accused the ICRC of proselytizing Christianity (START 2016; Lieberman and Collins 2012, 6).

## **Geography**

The group’s first known attack took place on May 22, 2012: Two RPG rounds hit the International Committee for the Red Cross/Red Crescent (ICRC) building in Benghazi, causing property damage but no casualties. Not much is known about the group’s founding. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) described the group as a “previously unknown organization” until it claimed responsibility for the May 2012 attack (2014). The brigades made an unsubstantiated claim of responsibility for an IED attack that occurred at night between June 5 and 6, 2012, and targeted the U.S. Temporary Mission Facility in Benghazi (SSCI 2014, 12). The IED explosion blew a 9x12

foot hole in the compound's exterior wall but did not cause casualties (ibid., 13). The brigades said the attack was in retaliation to the killing of al-Libi in a reported drone strike in Northern Waziristan (ibid., 12). The brigades also claimed responsibility for an explosive device that detonated at the ICRC office in Misrata on June 12, 2012, injuring one civilian (START 2016). The brigades accused the ICRC of proselytizing Christianity (START 2016; Lieberman and Collins 2012, 6).

The organization has claimed responsibility for attacks in urban centers, but little else is known about where the group operates or its organizational structure. In a report on the September 11, 2012, Benghazi attack, the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security criticized the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) for “a failure [...] to focus sufficiently on terrorist groups that have weak or no operational ties to core al Qaeda and its main affiliates” (2012).

### **Organizational Structure**

The Brigades has claimed responsibility for attacks in urban centers, but little else is known about where the group operates or its organizational structure.

### **External Ties**

It is allegedly an al Qaeda affiliate. Additionally, according to a congressional report, al Qaeda has sought to expand in Libya by operating clandestinely or through front organizations (Joscelyn 2012). Al Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi, whose death the Brigades have claimed as motivation for attacks, was reportedly involved in expanding al Qaeda in Libya (Joscelyn 2012). Al Qaeda reportedly has grown the most in northeastern Libya (Cyrenaica), mainly near Derna although the region also includes Benghazi (Robertson, et. al. May 2012).

### **Group Outcome**

In a report on the September 11, 2012, Benghazi attack, the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security criticized the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) for “a failure [...] to focus sufficiently on terrorist groups that have weak or no operational ties to core al Qaeda and its main affiliates” (2012). The report mentioned the Brigades of the Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman as among the threats that the U.S. IC allegedly underestimated (ibid., 6). The group was not heard from again after these incidents (GTD 2016).