

Iran Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 28 February 2018

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T896	GROUP OF THE MARTYRS MOSTAFA SADEKI AND ALI ZADEH		0	0
T1405	ISLAMIC TASK ORGANIZATION		1961	1984
T1246	PEYKAR-E TABAQEH-E KARGAR		1963	1982
T378	RED EAGLES		1967	2012
T310	MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ (MEK)	31-Dec-79	1972	2011
T263	KURDISTAN WORKER'S PARTY (PKK)		1974	2012
T87	HAYASTANI AZATAGRUT'YAN HAY GAGHTNI BANAK		1975	1997
T1387	PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN		1979	1987
T897	ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF QODS		1980	1984
T353	ORLY ORGANIZATION		1981	1983
T208	HEZBOLLAH		1982	2012
T225	ISLAMIC ACTION IN IRAQ		1982	1982
T461	MILLAT-E-ISLAMIA/PAKISTAN		1985	2006
T1001	ARAB STRUGGLE MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF AHVAZ		1986	1986
T133	COMIT_ DE SOUTIEN AVEC LES PRISONNIERS POLITIQUES ET ARABES ET DU MOYEN-ORIENT		1986	1986
T28	AL QAIDA		1989	2012
T1782	KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY-IRAN (KDP)	31-May-46	1989	1990

T895	GENERATION OF ARAB FURY		1989	1989
T1464	SHAHIN (FALCON)		1992	1992
T2254	ANSAR SARALLAH		1999	1999
T2364	MAHDAVIYAT		1999	1999
T1971	KURDISTAN FREE LIFE PARTY	7-Aug-05	2003	2012
T947	JONDULLAH	7-Apr-06	2003	2012
T262	KURDISTAN FREEDOM FALCONS		2004	2012
T1353	AL-AHWAZ ARAB PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC FRONT		2004	2006
T2261	ARMED RENAISSANCE GROUP OF AHVAZ		2005	2005
T1366	ARMED YOUTH OF CHERIKHA-YE FADAYEE		2005	0
T879	ARBAV MARTYRS OF KHUZESTAN		2005	2005
T2419	JIHADI MOVEMENT OF THE SUNNA PEOPLE OF IRAN		2008	2008
T1585	ARAB PEOPLE'S GROUP		2011	2011
T2641	HARAKAT ANSAR IRAN		2012	2012
T9005	APCO		0	0
T9006	FORQAN GROUP		1979	1981

I. GROUP OF THE MARTYRS MOSTAFA SADEKI AND ALI ZADEH

Torg ID: 896

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Hamid Mohtadi and Antu Murshid. "A Global Chronology of Incidents of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, and Nuclear Attacks." 2006.
<https://cpb-us-west-2-iuc1ugur1qwqqo4.stackpathdns.com/people.uwm.edu/dist/0/252/f>

[iles/2016/07/A-Global-Chronology-of-Incidents-of-Chemical-Biological-and-Radionuclear-Attacks.doc-1u8sbvu.pdf](#)

- Search ProQuest
 - GROUP OF THE MARTYRS MOSTAFA SADEKI AND ALI ZADEH

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1993

Group End: 1993 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. In 1993, the group launched an attack upon a bioengineering plant in Zurich, Switzerland (Mohtadi and Murshid 2006). It reportedly carried out this attack as a response to the plant providing Iran with biological weapons (Mohtadi and Murshid 2006).

Geography

In 1993, the group launched an attack upon a bioengineering plant in Zurich, Switzerland (Mohtadi and Murshid 2006).

Organizational Structure

The group's organizational structure is unknown.

External Ties

The group's external ties are unknown.

Group Outcome

The group's only known attack was when it bombed a bioengineering plant in Zurich, Switzerland (Mohtadi and Murshid 2006). Its last attack was in 2003 and then it was not heard from again (Mohtadi and Murshid 2006). No information regarding this group after this attack is known.

II. ISLAMIC TASK ORGANIZATION

Torg ID: 1405
Min. Group Date: 1961
Max. Group Date: 1984
Onset: 0

Aliases: Islamic Action Organization, Islamic Action Organization (Iao), Islamic Task Organization

Part 1. Bibliography

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- "Islamic Task Organization." Global Security. n.d.
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<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2366>
- Schmidt, W. E. (1991, Mar 18). Iraq rebels say saddam hasn't crushed them / fierce fights and protests reported. San Francisco Chronicle (Pre-1997 Fulltext) Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/302625394?accountid=14026>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: *Munazzamat al-'Amal al-Islami*

Group Formation: 1961

Group End (Outcome): 2005 (merger)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

IAO was formed in 1961 by Muhsin al-Husanyi to fight for the creation of an Islamic state in Iraq and later overthrow the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein (Global Security n.d.; MIPT 2008). The group ascribed to an Islamic ideology and was primarily Shia (MIPT 2008). It came to attention in 1980 for an assassination attempt (Global Security n.d.)

Geography

The group launched attacks in and around Baghdad (Middle East Contemporary Center 1986, 171). It was founded in Karbala and has an external base of operations in Iran (Global Security n.d.). It maintains headquarters in Karbala (Global Security n.d.)

Organizational Structure

IAO was led by Ridha Jawad Taqi and Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarissi. IAO membership was diverse and included “Iraqis, Iranians, Bahrainis, Afghans, and North Africans” (Middle East Contemporary Center 1986, 171). The group’s primary tactic was suicide bombings (Middle East Contemporary Center 1986, 171). There are no estimates about the group’s size.

External Ties

The IAO coordinated with the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (Middle East Contemporary Center 1986, 171). It also aligned itself with the Islamic Dawa Party which supported similar goals (MIPT 2008). It receives external funding from Iran and Syria (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

The group splintered in the 1990s into two factions (MIPT 2008). Muhsin al-Husanyi was assassinated in 1980 (Global Security n.d.). US military arrested al-Mudarissi in 2003 (Global Security n.d.). The group later merged with other Shia groups to form the United Iraqi Alliance in 2005 (MIPT 2008).

III. PEYKAR-E TABAQEH-E KARGAR

Torg ID: 1246

Min. Group Date: 1963

Max. Group Date: 1982

Onset: NA

Aliases: Peykar, Organization For Fight For The Freedom Of The Working Classes, Peykar-E Tabaqeh-E Kargar

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Peykar.” Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4204. MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1mBx1qQfhGZTLIRuKUqXI8vkLjmPD9Wum0zdoW1kVOE0/edit>

- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Iran: Information on the Paykar Organization, 1 September 1989, IRN1937, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6abaa44.html>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Iran: Information on the Peykar (Paykar) group; its aims, objectives, leaders, activities and the government's response to its members, 1 March 1993, IRN13416, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aaf180.html>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Iran: Whether a political organization called Peykar (Paykar) was active in 1996-1997 inside or outside of Iran, 1 May 1998, IRN29382.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ac1d54.html>
- Pierre Razoux. "The Iran-Iraq War." Harvard University Press. 2015. P. 544. [https://books.google.com/books?id=rp5XCwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Razoux.+Pierre+\(2015\).+The+Iran-Iraq+War.+Harvard+University+Press.+Appendix+E:+Armed+Opposition&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjo1rDd_8vZAhUE5IMKHdJ-BDIQ6AEILDAA#v=onepage&q=peykar&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=rp5XCwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Razoux.+Pierre+(2015).+The+Iran-Iraq+War.+Harvard+University+Press.+Appendix+E:+Armed+Opposition&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjo1rDd_8vZAhUE5IMKHdJ-BDIQ6AEILDAA#v=onepage&q=peykar&f=false)

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, PMOI, The Marxist-Leninist Branch of the People's Mojahedin organization of Iran, Bakhsh-e Marksisti-Leninisti-ye Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e, The Combat Organization on the Road for the Emancipation of the Working Class, Sazeman-e Paykar dar Rah-e Azadi-ye Tabaqeh-ye Kargar, Paykar organization

Group Formation: 1975 (splinter)

Group End: 1982 (repression)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed in 1975 when it splintered from the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MIPT 2008). The group formed in response to the Shah's arrest of several MEK leaders (MIPT 2008). It was a secular Marxist organization in contrast to the MEK (MIPT 2008; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1993). It wanted to overthrow the Iranian government. The group is also considered traditionalist and dogmatic (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1993).

The group experienced oppression from the Iranian government both under the Shah and following the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (MIPT 2008). The group carried out a series of small guerrilla raids (MIPT 2008). They also took an Iranian consulate hostage in Switzerland in 1982 (GTD 2017; MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group carried out attacks in Northern Iran as well as in Geneva, Tehran, and provinces near the Caspian Sea (MIPT 2008; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989). The group also reportedly carried out an uprising in the city of Tabriz, Azerbaijan (Razoux 2015).

Organizational Structure

The group recruited members from labor settings in factories and oil fields (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989). The group also recruited from urban centers (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989). The group reportedly attracted approximately 10,000 people from various universities at its rallies in 1980 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989). However, it is unclear how many of these supporters were active members. Alizara Ashtiyani and Hossein Ahmadi were reportedly two leaders of the group. The Iranian government arrested many members in 1982 during the larger crackdown against opposition parties (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989; Razoux 2015). The group reportedly had about 3,000 followers at its peak from 1980-1982 (Razoux 2015).

External Ties

The group is a splinter group of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MIPT 2008; Razoux 2015). After many leaders from the group known as Mujahedin-e-Khalq were imprisoned when Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi cracked down on Mujahedin-e-Khalq, the group formed (MIPT 2008). Group members are suspected to have joined with Mujahedin-e-Khalq, forming a movement to oppose Ayatollah Khomeini (MIPT 2008). The group allegedly received funding from the United States (MIPT 2008).

The group did not join the National Council in 1981 (Canada IRB 1989).

Group Outcome

The group began to disappear after the Iranian Revolution. Some members are suspected to have joined with Mujahedin-e-Khalq, forming a movement to oppose Ayatollah Khomeini (MIPT 2008).

When the Iranian president from 1980-1981, Hassan Bani-Sadr, went into exile, the group did not join the National Council of Resistance like other other groups embodying leftist ideals (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989). The government reportedly imprisoned or killed several members of the group after several Mojahedin

guerilla groups carried out violent attacks in 1992 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1993).

The group reportedly suffered from repression in 1981 that led to much of its demise (Razoux 2015). Alizara Ashtiyani and Hossein Ahmadi were captured in 1982, effectively ending the group (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1998). An estimate in 1989 said approximately 1,000 former members - mostly students - were living in exile in Europe (Canada IRB 1989).

Notes for Iris:

- they're originally on good terms with the Ayatollah Khomeini's government, but then he turns on them and starts to crackdown
- they felt marginalized by the new government after Ayatollah came to power so their aims shifted from overthrowing the Shah to overthrowing the Ayatollah.
- good example of major crackdown → demise of group
- temporary alliance during 1979 revolution falls apart quickly

IV. PFLP

Torg ID: 378

Min. Group Date: 1967

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Popular Front For The Liberation Of Palestine (Pflp), Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades, Al-Jabha Ash-Sha'abiya Li-Tahrir Falastin, Al-Jabna Al-Shabiyya Li-Tahrir Filastin, Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades Popular Front For The Liberation Of Palestine, Red Eagles, PFLP

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Profile: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)," BBC, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30099510>
- "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," Para-States, Global Security, n.d., <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pflp.htm>
- "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," International Terrorist Symbols Database, ADL, 2013, http://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/popular_front_pa1.html
- Julia Glum, "What Is The Popular Front For The Liberation Of Palestine?," International Business Times, 2014, <http://www.ibtimes.com/what-popular-front-liberation-palestine-what-know-about-organization-behind-jerusalem-1725550>
- "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," McKenzie Institute, 2016, <http://mackenzieinstitute.com/popular-front-liberation-palestine-pflp/>
- "PFLP Commemorates 46 years in Turkey," PFLP, 2013, <http://pflp.ps/english/2013/12/18/pflp-commemorates-46th-anniversary-in-turkey/>

- "PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, Palestinian Leftists." Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. 2005. <http://www.cfr.org/israel/pflp-dflp-pflp-gc-palestinian-leftists/p9128>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Halhul Gang, Halhul Squad, Palestinian Popular Resistance Forces, PPRF (Mackenzie Institute)

Group Formation: 1967

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PFLP was formed in 1967 by George Habash to fight and destroy Israel after the latter began to occupy parts of the West Bank (BBC 2014). It formed as a merger between two unnamed left-wing factions (IB Times 2014). The group came to attention in 1968 with a series of prominent airplane hijackings and were the first group to employ this tactic (BBC 2014). It was primarily secular, but Habash argued the group was founded on Marxist-Leninist ideals (Global Security n.d., BBC 2014).

Geography

Today, the group primarily operates from the Gaza Strip, attacking Israeli communities in the southern part of the country. It has also had prominent attacks in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Entebbe, Geha junction, Itamar, Ramallah, and Karnei Shomron (Global Security n.d., BBC 2014). Its headquarters were in Damascus (Global Security n.d.)

It's unclear exactly what the ties to Turkey are, but there is a bastion of support in Istanbul according to the PFLP official website (PFLP 2013).

Organizational Structure

The PFLP is a faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (BBC 2014). It was originally created by George Habash - a Christian doctor - and merged with the PLO in 1968 (Global Security n.d.) Habash stepped down in 2000 and was replaced by Abu Ali Mustafa. It has an armed wing known as the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades which was particularly active during the Second Intifada (BBC 2014). The armed wing was led - at some point - by Abu Ali Mustafa and later Ahmed Sadaa (BBC 2014).

The group has an estimated 800 members with potentially more support throughout the West Bank and Gaza (Global Security n.d.) It is currently led by Ahmed Jibril who was formerly head of the PFLP-General Command (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group funds itself from local supporters as well as external sources in Libya and Syria.

The representative of the PFLP in Turkey is Hassan Tahrawi (PFLP 2013).

External Ties

The PFLP has a vast network of alliances including the German Baader-Meinhof organization and Japanese Red Army (BBC 2014). It fought against Hamas early on (BBC 2014). The group received external support from Syria, Libya, USSR, and China in the form of financial support, training, and an external base of operations.

The Turkish branch of the PFLP claims to have an alliance with Kurdish forces and parties in the country (PFLP 2013).

Group Outcome

After the fall of the Soviet Union and fighting by more Islamist groups during the First Intifada (Hamas, PIJ), the PFLP was weakened and lost nearly all of its power and influence in the West Bank by 2000 (ADL n.d., IB Times 2014).

The US designated the group a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1995 (Global Security n.d). The group became partially involved in politics in the 1990s when it sought to become a part of Arafat's government.

Israel killed Mustafa in 2001 and arrested Sadat in 2002 (Global Security n.d.). Today, the group continues to fight Israel and Saadat claims the group will not enter negotiations with the Israeli government (BBC 2014).

V. MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ (MEK)

Torg ID: 310

Min. Group Date: 1972

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: 1979

Aliases: Mujahedin-E Khalq (Mek), Mojahedin Khalq Organisation, Mojahedin-E Khalq (Mko), Mujahedin-E-Khalq (Mek), Mujahideen E Khalq, Mujahideen-E Khalq Organisation (Mko), Mujahideen-I-Khalq (Mk), Muslim Iranian Student's Society, National Council Of Resistance Of Iran (Ncri), National Liberation Army Of Iran (Nla), People's Mujahideen, People's Mujahideen Of Iran (Pmoi)

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3632, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- Jonathan Masters, “Mujahedeen-e-Khalq,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2014, <http://www.cfr.org/iran/mujahadeen-e-khalq-mek/p9158>
- “Iraq,” Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 1988 p. 579
- “Mujahedin e-Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO),” Global Security, n.d., <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mek.htm>
- Daniel Benjamin, “Yes, we do know the MEK has a Terrorism Past,” POLITICO, 2016, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/mek-backtalk-iranian-group-214526>
- David Speedie, “MEK: When Terrorism Becomes Respectable,” Carnegie Council, 2012, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0074.html
- Kristian Gleditsch et al. “Non-State Actor Data.” 2011. UCDP. http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
- GTD Perpetrator 470. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=470>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: National Council of Resistance, PMOI, MKO, NCRI, Muslim Iranian Students, Society, Organization of the People,s Holy Warriors of Iran, the National Liberation Army, Sazeman-e Mujahideen-e Khalq Iran, PMOI, MEK, MKO, NLA, NCRI, MK

Group Formation: 1965

Group End (Outcome): 2014 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

MEK was formed in 1965 to oppose the Iranian regime led by the Pahlavi family (Masters 2014). The group today fights to overthrow the Islamic regime in Iran. The group’s ideology is Marxist-Islamist (Masters 2014). They adhere to a Shi’a conception of Islam (Gleditsch et al. 2011). The group launched its first violent attack in 1971 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 579).

Geography

The group’s political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), initially operated in Tehran before moving to Paris (Masters 2014). MEK operated in exile from Paris, France from 1981-1986 (Masters 2014). The group then set-up a base of operations in eastern Iraq starting in 1986 near the Iran-Iraq border (Global Security n.d.;

Masters 2014). In 2004, the group was active near Khalis, Iraq; Jalawla (Jalula), Iraq; Kut, Iraq; Basra, Iraq; Am-Amarah, Iraq; Miqdadiyah, Iraq. Today, the group is primarily concentrated at Camp Liberty near the Iraqi capital although this functions more as a refugee camp (Masters 2014).

Organizational Structure

The MEK's leader was Massoud Rajavi until his imprisonment in the 1970s by the Shah (Masters 2014). His wife, Maryam Rajavi, oversaw the commander corps. The group was originally composed of different students, but grew to include a more diverse membership (Masters 2014). The military wing was known as the National Liberation Army (Global Security n.d.). The group's political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), initially operated in Tehran before moving to Paris (Masters 2014).

UCDP said there were about 4,500 members in 1991, reaching a peak of 15,000 by 2001 (Gleditsch et al. 2011). The group had approximately 5,000-10,000 members in 2011 (Masters 2014). 30-50% of all members are fighters (Global Security n.d.). Saddam Hussein primarily financed the group during the 1980s and 1990s (Masters 2014). Today, the group funds itself through support from politicians in the US and other diaspora offices (Masters 2014).

External Ties

The MEK worked with different protest groups during the 1979 Iranian Revolution to overthrow the Shah (Masters 2014). It split around 1981 (Masters 2014).

The group was supported by Saddam Hussein with arms to help fight against Iran in the Iran-Iraq war (Masters 2014). This support included weapons, sanctuary, and protection from cross-border raids (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

The Iranian regime arrested several MEK members in the early 1970s and executed others (Masters 2014). Masoud Rajavi disappeared in 2003; it is unknown whether he is still dead or alive (Masters 2014).

After the 1979 revolution, the new regime cracked down on the MEK for its leftist ideology, forcing it to go into exile (Masters 2014). The Iranian regime "arrested and executed thousands of Mujahedeen, who retaliated by assassinating dozens of senior government officials" (Masters 2014). The counterinsurgency campaign culminated with Operation Eternal Light in which the IRGC killed 2000 MEK members (Masters 2014).

The US listed the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization until 2012 following a legal challenge (Masters 2014).

VI. KURDISTAN WORKER'S PARTY (PKK)

Torg ID: 263

Min. Group Date: 1974

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Kurdistan Workers' Party (Pkk), Argk, Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan (Argk), Kadek, Kongra Gele Kurdistan, Kongra-Gel (Kgk), Kongreya Azadi U Demokrasiya Kurdistan, Kurdish Workers' Party (Pkk), Kurdistan Freedom And Defense Congress, Kurdistan Freedom And Democracy Congress, Kurdistan National Liberation Front (Ernk), Kurdistan National Liberty Army, Kurdistan People's Conference, Kurdistan Workers Party, Kurdistan Workers' Party, Kurdistan Worker's Party, Kurdistan Workers Party (Pkk), Kurdistan Worker's Party (Pkk), Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (Pkk), People' S Liberation Army Of Kurdistan (Argk), Peoples Congress Of Kurdistan, People's Congress Of Kurdistan, Peoples Defense Force, People's Defense Force, Peoples Liberation Army Of Kurdistan, People's Liberation Army Of Kurdistan, Peoples Liberation Army Of Kurdistan (Argk), People's Liberation Army Of Kurdistan (Argk), Pkk/Kongra-Gel, The Peoples Congress Of Kurdistan, The People's Congress Of Kurdistan

Part 1. Bibliography

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http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- “Who are the PKK Rebels,” BBC, 2016,
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20971100>
- “Kurdistan Worker’s Party,” Listed Terrorist Organizations, Australian National Security, <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/KurdistanWorkersPartyPKK.aspx>
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<http://mackenzieinstitute.com/kurdistan-workers-party-pkk/>
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- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Turkey: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), including areas of operation and targets, methods of recruitment and activities; state response, 15 June 2012, TUR104075.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4feadb3e2.html> [accessed 2 December 2016]
- Anil Karaca, “An Analysis of the PKK Terrorist Organization,” Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, 2010, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a536525.pdf>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: KADEK, Kurdistan Halk Kongresi (KHK)

Group Formation: 1974

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The PKK was formed in 1974 in Diyarbakir by a group of Kurdish students organized as the National Liberation Army (UKO) (Karaca 2010, 38). The UKO was renamed to be the PKK in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan with a goal to fight for an independent Turkish state (Australian National Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Ocalan was inspired by Marxist ideology (Mackenzie Institute 2016). After the fall of the Soviet Union, the group began to emphasize Kurdish nationalism more than Marxism (Karaca 2010, 37). The group came to attention in 1984 when it launched an armed struggle against the Turkish state (Mackenzie Institute 2016; Australian National Security n.d.).

Geography

The group claims territory in southeastern Turkey as part of Kurdistan, including Hakkari province, Siirt, Adiyaman, Sirnak, and Agriman (Australian National Security n.d.). The PKK bases are located in the "PUK and KDP-controlled regions of the KRG" (Karaca 2010, 76). The HPG operates out of the Qandil mountains (Karaca 2010, 35).

The group primarily operated out of southeastern Turkey until 1991 when it began to move into western Turkey (Karaca 2010, 39).

Organizational Structure

Abdullah Ocalan initially led the PKK. He decided to form the PKK as a university student in the 1970s (Mackenzie Institute 2016). After his arrest, he was replaced by Murat Karayilan (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The PKK has evolved into a very well-organized group. The armed wing is called the People's Defence Forces (HPG) (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The Central Executive Committee oversees everything including the Military Wing (ARGK), External Wing (ERNK), and other subcommittees (Karaca 2010, 33). The ERNK is in charge of propaganda, training, funding, contacts

with other armed groups, and intelligence on Turkish security forces (Karaca 2010, 34). Its women's wing is called YAJK.

From 1984-1986, the PKK purposely targeted noncombatants that did not support their movement (Karaca 2010, 38).

It has approximately 7000 members (Mackenzie Institute 2016). It primarily funds itself through donations from supporters throughout Kurdistan as well as a Kurdish diaspora in Europe (Mackenzie Institute 2016). Members are primarily drawn from the Kurdish ethnic group and in rural areas often through personal connections (Australian National Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group primarily fought against other armed groups in the late 1970s (Karaca 2010). It had an alliance with DHKP/C from 1991 to 1998 (Karaca 2010, 39).

The group received external support from Greece including diplomatic, political, and funding, Syria, Russia, Iran, and Armenia (Karaca 2010, 46-51).

Group Outcome

Until 1980, the PKK mainly fought against other armed groups in Turkey as well as Kurdish tribal leaders (Karaca 2010, 38). After the 1980 military coup, the PKK reorganized to create a formal military wing and in 1984 launched its "people's revolution" against the government (Karaca 2010, 38). Turkish counter-terrorism was largely ineffective at destroying the PKK until 1991 when it launched a series of offensives which pushed the PKK out of villages and towards the Qandil mountains (Karaca 2010, 40-41).

Ocalan was arrested by Turkish police in 1999 and sentenced to death, but it was later commuted (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The arrest had little effect on the group's actions. In 2013, the PKK announced a ceasefire with Turkish forces (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

VII. HAYASTANI AZATAGRUT'YAN HAY GAGHTNI BANAK

Torg ID: 87

Min. Group Date: 1975

Max. Group Date: 1997

Onset:

Aliases: Armenian Secret Army For The Liberation Of Armenia, Armenian Liberation Army, Armenian Secret Army For The Liberation Of Armenia (Asala), Hayastani Azatagrutyán Hay Gaghtni Banak, Hayastani Azatagrut'yan Hay Gaghtni Banak

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Michael Gunter, “Armenian Terrorism: A Reappraisal,” *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 2007, <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewFile/10546/13296>
- “Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), Orly Group, 3rd October Organization,” FAS, 1998, <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/asala.htm>
- “Recent Trends in Palestinian Terrorism,” Bruce Hoffman, RAND, 1984, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2005/P6981.pdf>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Orly Group

Group Formation: 1975

Group End (Outcome): 1992 (splinter, leadership, other?) [J&L say 1997 but no evidence for that]

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

ASALA was formed in 1975 (CIA/FOIA iii). The group ascribes to a Marxist ideology (CIA/FOIA iii). It fought for an independent Armenian state as well as reparations from the Turkish government for the 1915 genocide (FAS 1998).

Geography

ASALA was based out of Beirut until 1982 (CIA/FOIA, 2). It primarily targeted Turks, but did so in France, US, and Turkey (FAS 1998).

Organizational Structure

ASALA's leader was Hagop Hagopian (FAS 1998). The group primarily engages in indiscriminate violence against diplomats, noncombatants, security officials, and Turkish and non-Turkish individuals (CIA/FOIA). The CIA argues that there is not much popular support for the group among the Armenian community and Churches have, in fact,

disavowed it (CIA/FOIA 9). It had a “few hundred members and sympathizers” (FAS 1998).

External Ties

ASALA has an external base in Lebanon and is thought to receive some external support from Syria (CIA/FOIA). The group has ties to the PFLP and PFLP-GC (FAS 1998).

Group Outcome

Initially, the Turkish government did very little to counter ASALA, but began investing in counterterrorism squads after other European leaders called them out on it (CIA/FOIA 9). Hagopian was assassinated in 1988 (FAS 1998). The group began to splinter by 1983 and was relatively inactive by 1990 (CIA/FOIA, FAS 1998). Their last known attack was in 1992 (FAS 1998).

VIII. PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN

Torg ID: 1387

Min. Group Date: 1979

Max. Group Date: 1987

Onset: NA

Aliases: Fedayeen Khalq (People's Commandos), Fedayeen Khalq Organization (Fko), Peoples Commandos, People's Commandos, People's Fedayeen, People's Fedayeen Guerrillas, People's Fedayeen Guerrillas Organization, People's Fedayeen Movement

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4018, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Iran: Treatment of supporters of opposition groups or parties since 2003; whether ordinary supporters of political causes or groups distribute pamphlets by hand and, if so, the response of the Iranian authorities; whether persons perceived as political opponents can work for state companies (2003 - June 2006), 28 June 2006, IRN101301.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/45f147542f.html> [accessed 25 December 2016]
- GTD, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2534>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Iran: Update to IRN24072.E and IRN30624.E on the Fedayeen-e-Khalq (various spellings); treatment of members; distribution of pamphlets and penalties for distributing Fedayeen-e-Khalq materials; symbols or insignia; the Iranian People's Fedayee Guerillas (I.P.F.G.); the Fedaiyan Minority, 1 January 1999, IRN30880.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab624c.html> [accessed 25 December 2016]

- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Iran: Information on the activities of the Fedayeen-e Khalq (Feda'iyān-e Khalq) Organization since 1989, 1 June 1993, IRN14307, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad8220.html> [accessed 25 December 2016]
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Iran: Information on the Fadyianneh (Fedayian or Fedayeen) Khalq, 1 November 1994, IRN18867.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad3c13.html> [accessed 25 December 2016]
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- Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Iran: A Country Study. 1989. Washington, DC: Department of the Army.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Fedayeen Khalq Organization, People's Fedayeen, People's Fedayeen Guerrillas, People's Fedayeen Guerrillas Organization, People's Fedayeen Movement (TRAC), People's Commandos, Feda'iyān-e Khalq, Fedayan-e Khalq (Metz 1989, 117), People's Warriors (Metz 1989, 117), Iranian People's Fadaee Guerrillas, Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas

Group Formation: 1963 (form), Siahkal attack (1971)

Group End (Outcome): 1996 (TOPS 2008)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Fedayeen Khalq (FKO) is a leftist terrorist organization that formed in 1963 and came to attention for a prominent attack in the Siahkal region in 1971. The group was initially allied with Ayatollah Khomeini as part of the broader anti-Shah movement (Ibid.). However, when Ayatollah Khomeini took control after the revolution, the group quickly stopped supporting Khomeini because FKO opposed the Ayatollah's goal of Shariah law in Iran (TOPS 2008). Instead, FKO's three main goals after the revolution were: 1) to overthrow Khomeini's Islamic government, 2) to implement democratic reforms, and 3) to free political prisoners (Ibid.). FKO ascribes to Marxist and atheist ideologies and supports a secular state (Canada IRB 1991). FKO first came to attention as a violent group in 1971, when it first began guerilla warfare against the Iranian monarchy (Metz 1989, xlii).

Geography

The Fedayeen Khalq originally operated within Iran, typically conducting guerilla-style raids in urban settings like many other leftist groups in Iran during the 1980s (TOPS 2008). The group was banned in Iran in the early 1980s, but continued to operate clandestinely and carry out attacks (Ibid.). The group also has bases within Europe (especially in Germany) and North America (TRAC n.d.). According to GTD, FKO has carried out attacks in Oslo, Frankfurt, Paris, Brussels, New Delhi, and Tehran (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

The Fedayeen Khalq is a left-wing terrorist organization led by a petrochemical engineer named Mehdi Saame (TOPS 2008). Saame was imprisoned for ten years under the Shah (Ibid.). The group has a political wing known as the National Council of Iranian Resistance or NCRI, which as of 2008 remained active as a political entity (Canada IRB 2006; TOPS 2008). As of 2006, FKO also continued to operate an online news service, Gooya News, although Iranian intelligence censors the website (Canada IRB 2006). The group has a student wing known as Peeshgham although many of its members were arrested in 1981 (Canada IRB 1996).

There is limited information regarding the leadership of the organization; however, when Fedayeen Khalq started opposing Ayatollah Khoemini, many leaders as well as rank-and-file members fled to Europe, where a majority of them received political asylum (TOPS 2008). Similar to the leadership, there is limited information regarding the membership recruitment patterns and the funding of the Fedayeen Khalq. It is thought that leadership in FKO depended significantly on family ties, historically a common practice in Iran (Metz 1989, 113).

FKO is known for experiencing splintering throughout its history (Canada IRB 1993; Canada IRB 1999). Splinter groups include: the Organization of Iranian People's Fedaiian (Majority) the Organization of Fedaiian (Minority) and the Iranian People's Fedaii Guerrillas (Ibid.).

External Ties

There is no explicit information available regarding the Fedayeen Khalq's external ties. The group does have bases within Europe (especially in Germany) and North America, which might signify external ties with those two continents (TOPS).

Group Outcome

Quickly after taking control in 1979, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps launched a massive crackdown against all opposition groups, including the Fedayeen Khalq (Metz

1989, 269). This severely weakened the group's membership and capabilities (Canada IRB 1996). One example of this government response is that a group of female FKO supporters were arrested in Iran in the early 1980s and remained in prison as of 1991 (Canada IRB 1993). Currently, the Fedayeen Khalq is an inactive terrorist group (TOPS 2008). The Iranian Information Minister Mohammad Ray-shahri declared that FKO had been "broken up" in January 1986, when 60 allegedly high-profile members were arrested (Ibid.).

FKO was not entirely disbanded at that point, but within two years the group had clearly dissolved (Ibid.) TOPS (2008) states that FKO was inactive from 1988 until 1996; in 1996, the group re-emerged to commit one more attack in retaliation for the execution of many Fedayeen members in Iran and the capture of an FKO member in Baku, Azerbaijan. Several female members were arrested in early 1980s (Canada IRB 1993). Recently, the organization has reemerged in Iran but does not engage in terrorism — it has only engaged in politics (TOPS).

IX. ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF QODS

Torg ID: 897

Min. Group Date: 1980

Max. Group Date: 1984

Onset: NA

Aliases: Guardsmen of Islam

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Guardsmen of Islam." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4044. MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1mBx1qQfhGZTLIRuKUqXI8vkLjmPD9Wum0zdoW1kVOE0/edit>
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- "Iran Says Hijackers Threaten to Kill French on Jet." New York Times. 1984. <http://www.nytimes.com/1984/08/02/world/iran-says-hijackers-threaten-to-kill-french-on-jet.html>
- Peter Grier. "Hijacking is down, but aims have changed." Christian Science Monitor. 1984. <https://www.csmonitor.com/1984/1207/120742.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1980 (first attack)

Group End: 1984 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group's precise date of formation is not known, but they first came to attention in 1980 after they carried out a failed assassination of Shahpur Bakhtiar, the former Prime Minister of Iran prior to the 1979 Revolution (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). The men were identified to be Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian (MIPT 2008). There was suspicion that the government of Iran staged the attack, but the foreign minister of the Iranian government denied these claims (MIPT 2008). Three members from the group hijacked a French airplane to demand that the three men be released (MIPT 2008; New York Times 1984). The hijackers reportedly declared that one passenger aboard the plane would be killed every hour until the men imprisoned were released (New York Times 1984; Grier 1984). The hijackers submitted to authorities later on and were exiled to Iran (MIPT 2008).

Geography

Three members from the group hijacked a French airplane to demand that the three men be released (MIPT 2008; New York Times 1984). The plane was flying from Frankfurt to Paris (MIPT 2008). The hijackers then proceeded to land the plane in Iran (MIPT 2008). Both attacks carried out by the group occurred in Paris, France (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group is suspected to have received funding from the Iranian government (MIPT 2008). The three members were Iranian (Christian Science Monitor 1984).

External Ties

The group is suspected to have ties with the Iranian government, and that the Iranian government staged the attempted murder of Shahpur Bakhtiar (MIPT 2008). The group is also suspected to have received funding from the Iranian government (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

During the hijacking, the hijackers proceeded to land the plane in Iran and later blow up the cockpit (Christian Science Monitor 1984). Shahpur Bakhtiar was later killed in 1991 (MIPT 2008). The attack was reportedly carried out by unrelated agents from Iran (MIPT 2008). There has been no further activity from the group after the 1984 hijacking (MIPT

2008; GTD 2017). The hijackers submitted to authorities later on and were exiled to Iran (MIPT 2008).

Notes for Iris:

-they try to assassinate the former Prime Minister and express allegiance to Iranian government

-there's no actual politicized opposition to the Ayatollah's, just an ex-politician from the Shah

X. ORLY ORGANIZATION

Torg ID: 353

Min. Group Date: 1981

Max. Group Date: 1983

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for ASALA.

Group Formation: This is an alias for ASALA.

Group End: This is an alias for ASALA.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for ASALA.

Geography

This is an alias for ASALA.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for ASALA.

External Ties

This is an alias for ASALA.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for ASALA.

XI. HEZBOLLAH

Torg ID: 208

Min. Group Date: 1982

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Hizbullah, Hizbollah, Hezbollah, Hezballah, Hizbullah, The Party of God, Islamic Jihad (Islamic Holy War), Islamic Jihad Organization, Islamic Resistance, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, Ansar al-Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansarollah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansar Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance), Organization of the Oppressed, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of Right Against Wrong and Followers of the Prophet Muhammed, Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Jonathan Masters. "Hezbollah, Hizbollah, Hizbullah." Council on Foreign Relations, 2014. <http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155>
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- "Hizballah," Mackenzie Institute, 2016, <http://mackenzieinstitute.com/hizballah/>
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- Robert Worth. "A Timeline of Hezbollah's Rise." New York Times. 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/weekinreview/16worth.html>
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<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/the-origins-of-hezbollah/280809/>
- GTD Perpetrator 407. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=407>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Islamic Jihad Organization

Group Formation: 1982

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Hezbollah formed in 1982, in the midst of the civil war within Lebanon, as a splinter of the prominent Shiite political party Amal (Martin 2011, 254; Masters 2014; Christian Science Monitor 2012). It formed in reaction to Israel's invasion of Lebanon (NCTC n.d.; Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.). Hezbollah supported the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon and the Palestinian fight against Israel (Martin 2011, 254; BBC 2016). It ascribes to a Shiite ideology and believes the eventual Islamic state should also be Shiite (Mackenzie Institute 2016; Global Security n.d.; Al Jazeera English 2016; Christian Science Monitor 2012). The group is strongly opposed to western countries as well as Israel (Masters 2014; Al Jazeera English 2016). The group's first violent incident is generally considered to be the bombing of military barracks in Beirut in 1983 (GTD 2017; Martin 2011, 255; Global Security n.d.).

Today, the group is involved in the Syrian civil war; they support the Assad regime (Masters 2014; BBC 2016). The group is also involved in Lebanese politics as a result of the Taif agreement; they competed in the 1992 elections (Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.; BBC 2016). The group has reportedly moved from having deep Khomeinist roots to embodying a greater Islamic nationalist ideal (Masters 2014). The group removed Saad Hariri's government, which was backed by Saudi Arabia and rooted in Sunni ideals (Masters 2014). The group also aims to liberate Jerusalem (Global Security n.d.). The group also reportedly targets Jewish individuals (BBC 2016).

Geography

The group came to attention in 1983 with the bombing of US military barracks in Beirut (Martin 2011, 255; Global Security n.d.). The group operates out of Al Biqa' (Bekaa Valley), southern Beirut, and Ba'albek in Lebanon (Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.; Christian Science Monitor 2012). Hezbollah also maintains external bases and cells around the world including in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe (Global Security; Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.). The group has also carried out attacks in the Shebaa Farms zone which is disputed by the group and Israel (Masters 2014; BBC 2016). The group has also carried out attacks in Israel (Masters 2014).

Organizational Structure

The group was founded by a man named Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, Imad Fayez Mughniyeh, and Muhammad Hussein (Counter Extremism Project). The group reportedly consists of a seven member council called the Shura Council (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's initial leader was Sheikh Sobhi Tufeilii; he was replaced by Abbas Musawi in 1992 (Martin 2011, 254; Mackenzie Institute 2016). After he was assassinated, Hassan Nasrallah replaced him as the leader of the group (Masters 2014; Mackenzie Institute 2016; Al Jazeera English 2016; Christian Science Monitor 2012). Naim Qassem was second-in-command of the group, and a man named Hussein al-Khalil was a top advisor to the leader of the group politically (Masters 2014). Another official of the group was a man named Imad Fayez Mugniyah, who was killed in 2008 (Masters 2014).

The group has developed a strong political wing which has even engaged in Lebanese politics placing members in Parliament continuously since 1992 (Martin 2011, 254-255). It organized a series of cells across southern Lebanon, but consolidated into a political party organization in 1985 when it released a formal manifesto (CFR 2014). The group gained popular support in the 1980s by fighting against occupying IDF forces in southern Lebanon and other communist militias (Global Security n.d.). Hezbollah is led by the Shura Council including the group's leader, the Secretary General (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group estimates it had 5,000-10,000 different fighters and additional supporters as of 1993, but this has since dropped to about 500 (Global Security n.d.). The group also reportedly has ties with a group called Imam al-Mahdi, made up of youth that eventually join Hezbollah (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group coordinates with Tanzim, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the PFLP (Global Security n.d.). It may have also provided external support to Tanzim in the Palestinian territories to fund their actions. President Reagan publicly agreed to not negotiate with Hezbollah following the events, but privately set up a secure channel and secured an

arms-for-hostages deal (Martin 2011, 256). It is well known that the IRGC supports Hezbollah with money, weapons, training, and other aid totaling up to \$200 million/year (CFR 2014; Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.; New York Times 2011). Syria also supports Hezbollah (Global Security; Masters 2014). The group also has a charity and collects support through a Shi'a diaspora around the world (Global Security). The EU and the United States have accused the group of receiving support from the Quds Force of Iran (Masters 2014). The group is also reportedly allied with Iraq (Global Security n.d.). The group offers support for the Syrian president (Global Security n.d.; Masters 2014; New York Times 2011; Christian Science Monitor 2012). The group also reportedly has ties with Afghanistan (Global Security n.d.). The group also reportedly has ties with a group called Imam al-Mahdi, made up of youth that eventually join Hezbollah (Global Security n.d.). The group uses tactics such as hijacking, kidnapping, mortar and rocket attacks, tunneling, firearm attacks, suicide bombing, assassination, and explosive devices (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group has also exploited fundraising in Europe, the United States, and Arab Peninsula (Mackenzie Institute 2016; BBC 2016).

Group Outcome

The group's last known attack was reportedly in 2016 (GTD 2017). Hezbollah is still active today and has a strong presence in Lebanese politics (Global Security n.d.).

XII. ISLAMIC ACTION IN IRAQ

Torg ID: 225

Min. Group Date: 1982

Max. Group Date: 1982

Onset: NA

Aliases: Movement Of Islamic Action Of Iraq, Islamic Action In Iraq, Organization Of Islamic Action In Iraq

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4067, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- GTD Perpetrator 2960. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2960>
- Bomb hits iraqi embassy in paris. (1982, Aug 12). The Atlanta Constitution (1946-1984) Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1623097324?accountid=14026>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1982

Group End (Outcome): 2003 (politics)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group was founded, but it first came to attention in 1982 during a series of two attacks in Bangkok and Paris (GTD n.d.). The group is Shiite Muslim (Atlanta Constitution 1982). Their original goal was to overthrow the Hussein government (MIPT 2008).

Geography

According to TOPS, the group was very active during the 1991 uprising and captured Kirkuk, Duhuk, Karbala, Samawa, and Naseriya (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

It is unknown how large the group was or how it was organized during the 1980s and 1990s. In 2005, when it became a political party, it announced Alaa Hamoud Salih as its leader (MIPT 2008). The group is Shiite Muslim (Atlanta Constitution 1982).

External Ties

The group allegedly has ties with Hezbollah and receives external support from Iran (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

The Hussein government fought back against the group during the 1991 uprising and successfully defeated them (MIPT 2008). After the 2003 invasion, the group renamed itself the Organization of Islamic Action in Iraq and became a political party which participated in the 2005 elections (MIPT 2008).

- XIII. MILLAT-E-ISLAMIA/PAKISTAN
Torg ID: 461
Min. Group Date: 1985
Max. Group Date: 2006
Onset: NA

Aliases: Sipah-E-Sahaba/Pakistan (Ssp), Anjuman Sipah-E-Sahaba, Guardians Of The Friends Of The Prophets, Millat-E-Islamia/Pakistan, Sipah-E-Sahaba Pakistan, Sipah-E-Sahaba Pakistan (Ssp)

Aliases: Sipah-E-Sahaba/Pakistan (Ssp), Anjuman Sipah-E-Sahaba, Guardians Of The Friends Of The Prophets, Millat-E-Islamia/Pakistan, Sipah-E-Sahaba Pakistan, Sipah-E-Sahaba Pakistan (Ssp)

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Sipah-e-Sahaba." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3870, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xlxKLVDKssaexVeDs-rzfMX3FIZ2xyc9Vtx-NKRyLcc/edit>
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- "Sipah-e-Sahaba." South Asia Terrorist Portal. N.d. <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ssp.htm>
- Martha Crenshaw. "Sipah-e-Sahaba." Mapping Militants Project. Stanford University. Last Updated 2012. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/147>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Pakistan: The Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP), including its activities and status (January 2003 - July 2005), 26 July 2005, PAK100060.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/440ed73f34.html>
- Animesh Roul. "Sipah-e-Sahaba: Fomenting Sectarian Violence in Pakistan." Terrorism Monitor Vol. 3, Issue 2. Jamestown Foundation. 2005. <https://jamestown.org/program/sipah-e-sahaba-fomenting-sectarian-violence-in-pakistan/>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Pakistan: The (Anjuman) Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP, ASSP), including its leaders and members, mandate, organizational structure, activities, relationship with other groups, and whether the SSP units in Kamalpur Alam and Hazro town, District Attock, Punjab engaged in acts of violence, particularly in September 1994, 1 April 1999, PAK31672.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab941c.html>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Pakistan: Update to PAK37990.E of 14 November 2001 on the Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP), including events surrounding the murder of Maulana Azam Tariq and the status of the SSP since it was banned by the Pakistani government in 2002, 1 December 2003, PAK42160.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/403dd20e10.html>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Pakistan: Information since January 1996 on whether Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) is in conflict with any group, 1 February 1997, PAK26071.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab3214.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Army of the Friend of the Prophet (IRB 2005).

Group Formation: Disputed whether it formed in 1984 or 1985, but most sources agree it is 1985 (Canada IRB 1999; Crenshaw 2012)

Group End: The group is not known to have disbanded but has not been active since 2012 (Crenshaw 2012; SATP n.d.).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The organization's founding year is disputed, but it is mainly said the group formed in September of 1985 (Canada IRB 1999; Crenshaw 2012; Roul 2005). The group is a Sunni Deobandi group that formed to oppose the support of the Shi'a population in the area of Punjab (Crenshaw 2012; Canada IRB 1999). Their political aims are to minimize Shia influence in the Pakistani government. The group wanted Pakistan to be a Sunni state (SATP n.d.). The group's first violent incident was in 1987 (Crenshaw 2012).

Geography

The group was known to be across Pakistan, but was specifically present in Punjab and Sind provinces, FATA, and Karachi (Crenshaw 2012; Canada IRB 1999). The group was also present in several cities like Zahedan, Lahore, Jhang, and Verahi (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group was formed by Haq Nawaz Jhangvi; the second leader was Maulana Azam Tariq (Canada IRB 2003; Crenshaw 2012; SATP n.d.). Both leaders were proponents of anti-Shi'a laws (Canada IRB 2003). The group recruited many members from madrassas (Crenshaw 2012). The group had 3,000-6,000 members at an unknown time period, and it is known that it had 5,000 members in 2004 and 2,000-3,000 members in 2009 (SATP n.d.; Crenshaw 2012). Many members of the group were Punjabi (SATP n.d.). It is disputed whether the group was a splinter from Jaish-e-Mohammed or Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam (Crenshaw 2012; Canada IRB 1999). The group received funding from Persian Gulf countries and the central Pakistani government (Crenshaw 2012). The group received funding from Sunni businessmen, madrassas, and the Pakistani government (Roul 2005; Crenshaw 2012; SATP n.d.). The group had a political wing that actively participated in politics (Roul 2005; Crenshaw 2012; SATP n.d.).

External Ties

The group was funded by many unspecified Persian Gulf countries (Crenshaw 2012). The group has alleged alliance ties to Jaish-e-Mohammed, Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam, and the Taliban (Crenshaw 2012; Canada IRB 1999; SATP n.d.). Several members of the SSP left to join the Pakistani Taliban (Brandt 2010). The group had several splinters including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Tanzeem-e-Dawan, and other smaller organizations (Canada IRB 1999; Crenshaw 2012).

Group Outcome

The group itself aimed to influence the government but was banned by the Pakistani government in 2002; the government also arrested more than 1,500 of its members that year (Roul 2005; Crenshaw 2012). The group's last attack was in 2012 (Crenshaw 2010; SATP n.d.). The reason for the drop in activity of the group is not specifically known.

XIV. ARAB STRUGGLE MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF AHVAZ

Torg ID: 1001

Min. Group Date: 1986

Max. Group Date: 1986

Onset: NA

Aliases: Arab Struggle, Arab Struggle Movement For The Liberation Of Ahvaz

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1999/2005

Group End: 2017 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group allegedly formed in 1999. The group’s first attack is unknown, but its most famous attack was in 2005 (MIPT 2008). The group is an ethno-nationalist separatist group, and it advocates for the Arab minority called the Ahvazi, mostly living in Ahvaz (a city in the province of Khuzestan), to gain independence from Iran (MIPT 2008; Jamestown Foundation 2014).

The province of Khuzestan is one of the poorest in Iran despite having a plethora of oil deposits (MIPT 2008; Jamestown Foundation 2014). The Arabs living in Khuzestan feel as if the government, dominated by Persians, deny the Iranian Arabs the wealth gained from the oil in the region (MIPT 2008; Jamestown Foundation 2014).

The group claimed responsibility for the four bombings on June 12th 2005, which was five days before the elections in Iran (MIPT 2008). The group reportedly released a statement saying that its Moheddine al-Nasser Martyr Brigade carried out the attack (MIPT 2008). Other groups such as Arbav Martyrs of Khuzestan also claimed responsibility for the attack, raising the question of whether or not these are all the same group acting under different names (MIPT 2008). The group also claimed responsibility for an attack on January 24th 2006, around the time in which the president of Iran,

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was going to deliver a speech in Ahvaz (MIPT 2008). The group reportedly issued a statement saying the act of violence was “revenge for the blood of our martyrs” as well as a demonstration of “rejection to the terrorist Ahmadinejad’s defiling the land of Ahvaz in his visit” (MIPT 2008). The group issued the statement taking responsibility for the attack on Ahvazi Arabic Revolution’s website; Ahvazi Arabic Revolution is an umbrella group that consists of various smaller groups (MIPT 2008). The group reportedly claimed responsibility for an attack on a natural gas pipeline located between Shadegan and Sarbandar (Jamestown Foundation 2014). The attack was also reportedly carried out by the Moheddine al-Nasser Martyr Brigade section of the group (Jamestown Foundation 2014). The group has reportedly launched attacks in the form of traditional terrorist as well as insurgent style attacks in which they have attacked state symbols, killed religious as well as political leaders, and civilian locations such as banks (Jamestown Foundation 2014). In addition, they have mainly attacked critical energy infrastructures (Jamestown Foundation 2014). The group also supports the opposition in the Syrian Civil War (Jamestown Foundation 2014).

Geography

The group allegedly carried out an attack in Beirut, Lebanon in 1986 (GTD 2017). The group operates in the Khuzestan region (MIPT 2008; Jamestown Foundation 2014). The group carried out two attacks in the city of Ahvaz in Iran (MIPT 2008). The group also reportedly claimed responsibility for an attack on a natural gas pipeline located between Shadegan and Sarbandar (Jamestown Foundation 2014). A taped recording showed that members of the group launched an attack upon a natural gas pipeline located in a city named Shush in Iran (Jamestown Foundation 2014).

Members of the group allegedly admitted to have received support financially and in the form of operational training in Dubai (Jamestown Foundation 2014). The group has also reportedly launched attacks near a town named Omidiyeh and the port of Deylam but these claims were later denied by Iran’s Interior Ministry (Reuters 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group reportedly had an armed wing known as the Moheddine al-Nasser Martyr Brigade (MIPT 2008; Independent UK 2017). The group issued a statement taking responsibility for a 2006 attack on the Ahvazi Arabic Revolution’s website; Ahvazi Arabic Revolution is an umbrella group that consists of various smaller groups (MIPT 2008). A man named Habib Nabgan is reportedly one of the spokesmen of the group as well as the leader of the group’s political wing, the National Resistance of al-Ahwaz (Jamestown Foundation 2014). The group also reportedly has Baloch and Kurdish militant counterparts (Jamestown Foundation 2014). The group was reportedly founded by a man named Ahmad Mola Nissi (Independent UK 2017). The group may have also had a leader known as Sayyid Hashim Sayyid Adnan (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 577).

External Ties

The group issued a statement taking responsibility for a 2006 attack on the Ahvazi Arabic Revolution's website; Ahvazi Arabic Revolution is an umbrella group that consists of various smaller groups (MIPT 2008). Members of the group allegedly admitted to have received support financially and in the form of operational training in Dubai (Jamestown Foundation 2014). The group also allegedly received support from the Hussein government in the 1980s (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 577).

Group Outcome

The group's last attack was reportedly in 2017 when it killed two IRGC guards (Independent UK 2017). In 2017, the group's leader, Ahmad Nissi, died in the Netherlands (Independent UK 2017).

Notes for Iris:

-the 1986 attack in Lebanon seems out of place with the group

- XV. COMIT_ DE SOUTIEN AVEC LES PRISONNIERS POLITIQUES ET ARABES ET DU MOYEN-ORIENT
Torg ID: 133
Min. Group Date: 1986
Max. Group Date: 1986
Onset: NA

Aliases: Committee Of Solidarity With Arab And Middle East Political Prisoners (Csppa), Comit_ De Soutien Avec Les Prisonniers Politiques Et Arabes Et Du Moyen-Orient

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1985

Group End: 1986

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This Lebanese group reportedly adheres to nationalist, separatist, and Shiite ideals (MIPT 2008; Guidere 2012). It is reportedly based in Paris and has ties with Hezbollah (MIPT 2008). The group reportedly carried out a series of bombings from 1985-1986 as an attempt by Iran to influence the policy of France towards Iran as well as its allies (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). Iran reportedly wanted to pursue a one billion dollar financial claim negotiation against the government of France as well as convince the French government to cease providing weapons to Iraq (MIPT 2008). The group also attempted to convince France to free prisoners linked to Hezbollah as well as the government of Iran, including Anis Naccache, Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, and Waroujian Garabedjian (MIPT 2008; Guidere 2012; New York Times 1986; Butturini 1986). The group has also reportedly made threats towards Italy when it warned diplomats from Italy based in Beirut that it would carry out attacks in Italy unless they freed the Arab prisoners that they held hostage (Butturini 1986).

Geography

The group is reportedly based in France (MIPT 2008). The group has carried out attacks in Beirut and Paris (GTD 2017; New York Times 1986).

Organizational Structure

The group is reportedly led by a man named Fouad Ben Ali Saleh (MIPT 2008). It consists of less than fifty members (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

The group has close ties with Hezbollah as well as the Iranian government which reportedly funds it (MIPT 2008; Guidere 2012). The group is reportedly an offshoot of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (Butturini 1986).

Group Outcome

In order to stop the aggression of the group in France, Jacques Chirac, the French prime minister agreed to either free or impose a light sentence upon Georges Ibrahim Abdallah; however, after the trial, he was still sentenced to life imprisonment (Guidere 2012). The Iranian and French government reportedly broke off diplomatic relations in 1987 (MIPT 2008). However, diplomatic relations were restored in 1988 (MIPT 2008). The Iranian government reportedly claimed that the French government repaid Iranian loans at a faster rate, and they also claimed the French cracked down on a regime based in France that was opposed to Iran (MIPT 2008). In addition, they also claimed that the French government paid the kidnapers from Lebanon several million dollars (MIPT 2008). However, Jacques Chirac, the prime minister of France, denied such claims (MIPT 2008). The group's leader, Fouad Ben Ali Saleh along with two of his accomplices were sentenced to life imprisonment (MIPT 2008; Guidere 2012). Many citizens from Lebanon were put on trial for leaving their country (MIPT 2008). There has been no reported activity from the group since 1986 (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- they want to influence French foreign policy with Iran and want to make it more conciliatory towards Iran
- they seem to support Iran's goals and interest
- disappear when they all get arrested
- there are some partial policy changes, but it is unclear if it was part of the CSPPA or something else

XVI. AL QAIDA
Torg ID: 28

Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qa'ida, Al Qaeda, Al Qaida, Al-Qa`Ida, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qa'idat Al-Jihad, The Base

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active) (Crenshaw 2015)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Osama Bin Laden founded al-Qaida in 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's initial goals were to completely remove Western influence/ideas and to abolish the United States and Israel (BAAD 2015). They conducted their first attacks against the US embassy in Africa in 1998 (BAAD 2015; Global Security N.D). Al-Qaida first came to global attention after 9/11 but was active prior to that in its region (FAS 2005). The group has a radical Sunni Muslim ideology (CFR 2012; Global Security N.D).

Geography

Al-Qaida operated mainly within Peshawar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (CFR 2012; PBS N.D). The group hid within cities and hills with particularly mountainous terrain in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan (as shepherds or farmers) (FAS 2005). Bin Laden had a base of operations in Sudan from 1991-1998 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Organizational Structure

Al-Qaida was headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was their sole leader until his assassination in 2011 (although rumors exist that he died earlier or didn't die at all) (CFR 2012). He was from Saudi Arabia and had helped fight the Soviets in the Afghanistan war (Crenshaw 2015). He was replaced by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2011. (Crenshaw 2015; CFR 2012). The group used a complex system in which members reported to couriers who reported to other couriers eventually making their way up to the head who was initially Bin Laden (RAND 2008). This is what we call a decentralized or cell-based organizational structure. Funding for the organization came from many places, including donations (FTO 2005). The group had different councils to deal with different aspects. For example, they had a "military committee" to deal with "military" matters, and a "consultation council" to plan out terrorist attacks and deal with financial matters (PBS N.D). They have no formal political wing (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida can be considered an umbrella group that consisted of many other terrorist groups within (ibid; Global Security N.D). The organization had an estimated 75 members when it was first formed and up to 18,000 at its peak in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015). Today, it is thought to have less than 1000 members, but these estimates vary (Crenshaw 2015; BAAD 2015).

External Ties

Saudi Arabia allegedly gave some funding to AQ through drug trafficking and diamonds, but these were never proven true (Crenshaw 2015). Iran also allegedly trained and supported AQ members in the early 1990s (ibid; BAAD 2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan allow Al-Qaeda to operate training camps within their borders (ibid). The group has ties to several other terrorist organizations including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Jemaah Islamiya (CFR 2012; PBS N.D).

Group Outcome

The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to find and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements operating in Afghanistan (BAAD 2015). The group's first leader Osama bin Laden was killed during a raid in 2011 (CFR 2012; BAAD 2015). The group is still active today.

XVII. KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY-IRAN (KDP)

Torg ID: 1782

Min. Group Date: 1989

Max. Group Date: 1990

Onset: 1946

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, KDPI, PDKI

Group Formation: 1945

Group End: 2016

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group reportedly formed after World War II in 1945 (Global Security n.d.; UK 2016; UK 2009; Bruinessen 2017). The group is reportedly a splinter of another group called the Association for the Resurrection of Kurdistan (Global Security n.d.). The Kurdish activists of the group reportedly adhere to left-leaning ideals, and they formed a group called the Komala Party (Global Security n.d.). The Komala Party then proceeded to adopt the name Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (Global Security n.d.). The group was almost liquidated in 1966-1967 when a rebellion consisting of Kurds was crushed, but the group formed again in 1973 (Global Security n.d.). The group reportedly carried out military confrontations and operations with the regime in Iran after the leader of the party, Abdol Rahman was killed (Global Security n.d.).

The Kurds live in Northwestern Iran under poor, unstable conditions and are often discriminated against (Global Security n.d.; Neuhof 2016). In 2016, the group announced that its main goal was to gather more recruits and enlarge its contacts with Kurds in Iran (Global Security n.d.). The leaders of the group reportedly believe that the group's military activity (defensive actions against forces of the Iranian state) is a display of the group's dynamism which may, in turn, add strength to the group's support from the population (Global Security n.d.; Neuhof 2016). The group helped end the reign of the Shah in 1979 (Neuhof 2016).

The group seeks autonomy for Kurds in Iran (Global Security n.d.; Neuhof 2016; Bruinessen 2017). The group has been subject to attacks from the Iranian regime (Global Security n.d.). The group reportedly adheres to separatist, democratic, and

socialist views (Global Security n.d.; UK Home Office 2016). The group is reportedly building a network consisting of party cadres in Northwestern Iran (Neuhof 2016). Ever since their exile from Iran, the group has focused their attention on re-entry into Iran (Neuhof 2016; UK 2016). The group also opposed the Shiites in Iran (UK Home Office 2009).

Geography

The group's fighters were mostly based in Northern Iran (Global Security n.d.). The group, since 1984, has been based in Iraq (Global Security n.d.). The group has operated in western Iran and inside Iraq, including the town Choman (Global Security n.d.; Neuhof 2016; UK Home Office 2009). The group has launched attacks in Sardasht, Paveh, Kermanshah, and Mahabad in Iran (GTD 2017; IRB Canada 1998; UK Home Office 2009). The group was stationed at the Iranian border until the government flushed them out during the First Gulf War (Neuhof 2016). The group has a headquarters in Koya, Iraq (Neuhof 2016). The group was founded in Mahabad (UK Home Office 2016; IRB Canada 1998; UK Home Office 2009; Bruinessen 2017). The group reportedly has representatives in Paris (UK Home Office 2016). A supply route for the group was reportedly established near Nowdesheh and Qasr-e Shirin by Saddam Husayn (Entessar 2009).

Organizational Structure

The leader of the party was Abdol Rahman until he was assassinated (Global Security n.d.). In 1973, Dr. Abd ar-Rahman was the secretary general, and after him, Mostafa Hejri held the position (Global Security n.d.). A man named Abdallah Hassanzadeh was the secretary general of the group in 1992 (IRB Canada 1998). Another man named Mustafa Hijri was also secretary general at one point (UK Home Office 2009). The group consists of two wings: Mala Abdulla Hasanzada and Moustapha Hedjri (Global Security n.d.). Part of the group broke away as a result of personal differences within the group and called themselves the KDP (Global Security n.d.; UK Home Office 2009; Bruinessen 2017). The group reportedly consists of a Central Committee that makes the highest decisions within the group (UK Home Office 2016). The group also consists of a group called the Youth Organization of KDPI for those who wish to join the group but are not 18 yet (UK Home Office 2016).

External Ties

The group is reportedly a splinter of another group called the Association for the Resurrection of Kurdistan (Global Security n.d.). The Kurdish activists of the group reportedly adhere to left-leaning ideals, and they formed a group called the Komala Party (Global Security n.d.). The Komala Party then proceeded to adopt the name Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (Global Security n.d.). The group reportedly has

representatives in Paris (UK Home Office 2016). A supply route for the group was reportedly established near Nowdesheh and Qasr-e Shirin by Saddam Husayn (Entessar 2009).

Group Outcome

The group was almost liquidated in 1966-1967 when a rebellion consisting of Kurds was crushed, but the group reconsolidated again in 1973 (Global Security n.d.).

In 1997, the group proclaimed a ceasefire and stopped using violence (Global Security n.d.). Some autonomy was granted to the Kurds in Iran in 1980 after a battle between the group and the Revolutionary Guards (Global Security n.d.; UK Home Office 2009). Kurdish leaders Sadik Sharafkindi along with three other men with him were assassinated 1992 (Global Security n.d.). Abdol Rahman was assassinated in 1989 (Global Security n.d.). There has reportedly been internal problems in the group since 1994, and as a result the two wings of the group, Mala Abdullah Hasanzada and Moustapha Hedjri separated in 2006 (Global Security n.d.). There have been major splits in the group since 2006 (Global Security n.d.). The group was stationed in Iraq after being exiled from Iran (Neuhof 2016).

Notes for Iris

- the Association for Kurdistan is an unknown group. Unclear if it was a political organization or a militant organization
- the group is still active, but its last violent attack was around 1997

XVIII. GENERATION OF ARAB FURY

Torg ID: 895

Min. Group Date: 1989

Max. Group Date: 1989

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1989

Group End: 1989 (disappear or repression)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but first came to attention in 1989 when it carried out two bombings during the Hajj in Mecca, Saudi Arabia (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). The group’s political aim was for KSA to remove its recognition of Israel (Deseret News 1989). The explosives were reportedly obtained by the group from the Iranian Embassy located in Kuwait (MIPT 2008). There has reportedly been tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia at the time in which these attacks took place (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group launched two attacks in Mecca, Saudi Arabia (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). The group reportedly originated in west Beirut (Deseret News 1989).

Organizational Structure

There is not much information available about the group’s organizational structure. Members may have been Kuwaiti or Lebanese (Deseret News 1989; MIPT 2008).

External Ties

The explosives used in the two bombings carried out by the group were reportedly obtained by the group from the Iranian Embassy located in Kuwait (MIPT 2008). The group was allegedly funded by the Iranian government (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

The group has not carried out anymore attacks after 1989 (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). Saudi Arabia arrested and killed 16 Kuwaitis in response to the attack in 1989 (MIPT 2008).

XIX. SHAHIN (FALCON)
Torg ID: 1464
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 1992
Onset: NA

Aliases: Shahin (Falcon), Falcon, Shahin

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1992

Group End: 1992

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but first emerged in 1992 when it bombed the Turkish Consulate, located in the city of Tabriz, in Iran (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). It is a Kurdish ethno-nationalist group (MIPT 2008). The group reportedly carried out this bombing as a reaction to the treatment received by the Iraqi Kurds from the Turkish people, in addition to the United States military's use of an airbase belonging to Turkey (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group bombed the Turkish Consulate, located in the city of Tabriz, in Iran (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). It appeared to target Turkey, not Iran.

Organizational Structure

There is some dispute over the group's organizational structure (MIPT 2008). MIPT notes "some speculation" that the group is made up of Iraqi Kurds who were rejected at the border between Iraq and Turkey (MIPT 2008). However, since the group expressed that one of the reasons why they carried out the bombing was because they were unhappy with the fact that the United States was using a Turkish airbase, MIPT notes that the previous theory seems unlikely since Iraqi Kurds are generally very pro-American (MIPT 2008). The group was Kurdish (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

The group's external ties are unknown.

Group Outcome

The group has not carried out any attacks since the bombing in 1992 (GTD 2017). It is not known what happened to the group after this incident. The current state of the group is unknown.

Notes for Iris:

-organizational structure disputed information about membership. Some say Iraqi Kurds, but then their aims wouldn't make sense.

-who does the group oppose? It's a reaction to how Turkey treats Kurds. Might be non-Iraqi Kurds which would mean they oppose both the US and Turkey. MIPT specul

XX. ANSAR SARALLAH
Torg ID: 2254
Min. Group Date: 1999
Max. Group Date: 1999
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20053. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20053>
- Search ProQuest
 - "Ansar Sarallah" Iran

- Ansar Sarallah iran 1992

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1999

Group End: 1999 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It is unknown when the group formed, but it first emerged in 1999 when it launched an attack on the government Construction Office in Tehran, Iran (GTD 2017). When the group claimed responsibility, they threatened to use additional violence if “the Imam’s commands went unheeded” (GTD 2017). No information could be found about the group’s ideology, aim, organizational structure, or external ties.

Geography

The group launched an attack in Tehran, Iran (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group’s organizational structure is unknown. No information could be found about the group’s ideology, aim, organizational structure, or external ties.

External Ties

The group’s external ties are unknown. No information could be found about the group’s ideology, aim, organizational structure, or external ties.

Group Outcome

The group’s first and only act of violence was in 1999 (GTD 2017). It is unknown what happened to the group after this incident. The current state of the group is unknown.

XXI. MAHDAVIYAT
Torg ID: 2364
Min. Group Date: 1999

Max. Group Date: 1999

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20284. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20284>
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<https://search-proquest-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org/docview/451430954?accountid=14026> (accessed March 1, 2018). PDF. gDrive.

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1999

Group End: 1999 (arrested and sentenced)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group's first and only attack was on January 5, 1999 (GTD 2017). The attack took place in Tehran, Iran, and it targeted the government (GTD 2017). The group is reportedly a Shia group (BBC 2000). The group's goal seems to be to assassinate government officials (Canada IRB 2003).

Geography

The group's only attack took place in Tehran, Iran (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group's leader is a man named Sheikh Mahmud Halabi (Canada IRB 2003). The group consists of at least 30 members (BBC 2000). The members come from the religious Hojjatieh Society organization (Canada IRB 2003).

External Ties

The group reportedly has ties to the IRGC, but later opposed the Iranian government (Canada IRB 2003).

Group Outcome

In 1999, 34 members of the group were arrested and then sentenced (Canada IRB 2003). They were declared guilty on the basis that they had connections with foreign supporters, stole weapons from four mosques, carried out and supported anti-Sunni actions, and planned President Kahtami's assassination (BBC 2000; Canada IRB 2003). The group's only attack was on January 5, 1999. There have been no further incidents involving this group, and it is unknown what has become of the group since then.

XXII. KURDISTAN FREE LIFE PARTY

Torg ID: 1971

Min. Group Date: 2003

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 2005

Aliases: Kurdistan Free Life Party, Parti Jiyani Azadi Kurdistan, Part" Jiyani" Azad" Kurdistan, Parti Jiyani Azadi Kurdistan (Pjak), Part" Jiyani" Azad" Kurdistan (Pjak), Party For A Free Life In Kurdistan, Party For A Free Life In Kurdistan (Pjak), PJAK, Pjak, The Free Life Party Of Kurdistan

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://alnakhlah.org/2013/05/01/terrorism-in-iran-an-analysis-of-non-state-militant-organizations-in-the-islamic-republic-by-micah-peckarsky/>
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<https://jamestown.org/program/pjak-iran-and-the-united-states-kurdish-militants-designated-terrorists-by-the-united-states/>
- Kristian Gleditsch et al. "Non-State Actor Data." 2011.
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

- GTD Perpetrator 20271. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20271>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End (Outcome): 2017 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

PJAK formed in 2004 when it splintered from the PKK (Kardas 2009; Global Security n.d.). PJAK is an ethno-nationalist leftist militant group fighting for a separate state and an identity for the Kurdish people (Global Security n.d.; Washington Times 2006). The group also promotes sexual equality between men and women (Washington Times 2006). It began launching attacks against the Iranian military in 2004 (Washington Times 2006).

Violence escalated when the Iranian government reacted adversely to the killing of 10 Iranian Kurds during a peaceful demonstration in the city of Mahabad in 2004. The group was driven out of Iran and into the area of northern Iraq in 2011 (Peckarsky 2013; Hersh 2008). This action resulted in an agreement between the group and the government of Iran that ended the violence between the two as a result of a military offense and killings and arrests of top officials of the group carried out by the Iranian government (Peckarsky 2013). As a result of this deal, the group was forced to remove its military from Iran and into the Qandil Mountains, which is where their base is (Peckarsky 2013).

The group may still have some degree of operational presence in the Kurdistan region of Iran (Peckarsky 2013). The group may still continue military related operations in Iran as a result of its grievances against the government of Iran (Peckarsky 2013). In a statement released in 2017, the group called on the Iranian citizens to stand and fight together (Global Security n.d.).

Geography

The group operates primarily out of the Qandil mountains in Northern Iran on the Turkish-Iranian border (Global Security n.d.; Washington Times 2006; Hersh 2008). They primarily target areas in Iran, including Mahabad and the Meriwan region (Kardas 2009).

The group was driven out of Iran and into the area of northern Iraq in 2011 (Peckarsky 2013). The group is based in the Qandil Mountains (Peckarsky 2013). The group has launched attacks in cities such as Golchidar, Sardasht, Marivan, Paveh, Tehran, Piranshahr, Khoy, Ravansar, and the Chaldoran district (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

PJAK was originally a peaceful student-based movement fighting to address civil rights. A government crackdown in 1999 led the student organization to move towards the PKK, which heavily influenced the group's political ideas and military strategies (Global Security n.d.). It splintered from PKK around 2003 and gained the support of many PKK fighters who helped the group create a military wing and develop its military capabilities (Global Security n.d.; Kardas 2009).

The group allegedly had about 1500 members when the conflict started (Gleditsch et al 2011). It had a separate political and military wing. "PJAK had a clear command structure that coordinated the efforts of the organization" (Gleditsch et al. 2011, 507). The group consists of a forty person central committee (Global Security n.d.). A man named Hajji Ahmadi became the General Secretary of the group (Global Security n.d.). Iranian Kurds were brought into the group's leadership cadres (Kardas 2009).

External Ties

PJAK allegedly received support from the PKK and Turkey (Gleditsch et al 2011). There is one report that it also received broad support from Israel and the US in 2006, but this was never confirmed and the source may be suspect (Hersh 2008; Global Security n.d.; Washington Times 2006). They use Iraq as an external sanctuary base for raids into Iran. The leaders of the group permitted members to form another group called the KGK, which is splinter of the group (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

Violence escalated when the Iranian government reacted adversely to the killing of 10 Iranian Kurds during a peaceful demonstration in the city of Mahabad in 2004.

The Iranian government attacked peaceful demonstrators, sparking riots. In response, PJAK launched large offensives against Iran. Iran has launched cross-border raids or attacks into the Qandil mountains to attack PJAK forces (Kardas 2009).

The group was still launching attacks in 2016 (GTD 2017).

As a result of a deal made with the Iranian government, the group was forced to remove its military from Iran and into the Qandil Mountains, which is where their base is

(Peckarsky 2013). The group may still have some degree of operational presence in the Kurdistan region of Iran (Peckarsky 2013). The group may still continue military related operations in Iran as a result of its grievances against the government of Iran (Peckarsky 2013).

XXIII. JONDULLAH
Torg ID: 947
Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: 2006

Aliases: Jundallah, Godês Army, Jondollah, Jondullah, Jund Allah Organization For The Sunni Mujahideen In Iran, Tanzeem Jund Allah Li-Mujaheedi Al-Sunnah Fi Iran

Part 1. Bibliography

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- “Jundullah.” Project on Violent Conflict. Big Allied and Dangerous Narratives Dataset. Last updated 2015. <http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/jundallah>
-

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Jundallah (Iran); People's Resistance Movement of Iran (BBC 2010; CNN 2010)

Group Formation: 2002 (form)

Group End: 2010

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group reportedly formed in 2002 with the purpose of defending the Sunni and Baluchi minority (Al Jazeera English 2010; BBC 2010; Stratfor 2010; Project on Violent Conflict 2015). The group launched its first violent attack in 2003 or 2005 when they kidnapped a man named Shehab Mansuri, who was reportedly an intelligence official from Iran, though the fact that he was an intelligence official was denied by Iranian officials (MIPT 2008; Al Jazeera English 2010; Aslan 2010). The group reportedly carried out this kidnapping to demand other members of the group who were imprisoned be released (MIPT 2008). The group is made up of extremist Sunni Salafis (PBS 2009; Stratfor 2010). The members of the group that were imprisoned before this attack were possibly imprisoned for reasons other than terrorist attacks, for the Sunni population in Iran is highly oppressed (MIPT 2008). The group reportedly wants more rights for the Baluchi people in Iran (Al Jazeera English 2010; BBC 2010; PBS 2009). Abdulmalek Rigi, a former leader of the group, denied that the group advocated for radical sectarian or separatist ideals (Al Jazeera English 2010).

They also plan on fighting the Shia government until Sistan-Baluchestan's economic conditions improve (Al Jazeera English 2010). The group takes part in oil smuggling, drug trafficking, kidnappings, suicide attacks, ambushes, and targeted assassinations (Al Jazeera English 2010; CNN 2010; PBS 2009; Cappuccino 2017). The group targets the IRGC, police officers, government officials, and civilians in Iran (CNN 2010; PBS 2009; Aslan 2010; Zambelis 2014). The group also reportedly adheres to an ethno-nationalist ideal (Stratfor 2010). The group launched an attack upon President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's motorcade (Stratfor 2010). He reportedly reversed a policy that granted the Balochis access to higher level jobs with the government in addition to autonomy for the Balochis (Stratfor 2010). The group also promotes Islamist ideals (Cappuccino 2017). The group uses guerilla tactics (Cappuccino 2017).

Geography

The group has launched attacks in the southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchestan in Iran (Al Jazeera English 2010; BBC 2010; PBS 2009; Stratfor 2010). In

Sistan-Baluchestan, the group has launched attacks in a mosque located in Zahedan (Al Jazeera English 2010; CNN 2010; Project on Violent Conflict 2015). The group has also launched attacks in Saravan, Zahedan, Tehran, Pishin, Chabahar, and Kerman (Al Jazeera English 2010; GTD 2017; Stratfor 2010; Aslan 2010). There is no evidence the group is transnational.

Organizational Structure

Abdulmalek Rigi, a Sunni fundamentalist, was the founder and leader of the group until he was killed (Al Jazeera English 2010; BBC 2010; PBS 2009; Stratfor 2010; Cappuccino 2017; Aslan 2010; Zambelis 2014; Project on Violent Conflict 2015). Al-Hajj Mohammed Dhahir Baluch replaced him as the leader afterwards (CNN 2010; Project on Violent Conflict 2015). The group is reportedly now led by a man named Muhammad Dhahir Baluch (Cappuccino 2017). The group reportedly had less than 1,000 fighters around 2009-2010 (Al Jazeera English 2010; PBS 2009; Stratfor 2010). However, there are reports that the group consists of up to 2,000 fighters (Cappuccino 2017). Members are thought to have been recruited from other militant groups, such as Lashkar Rasoolulallah, Militant Organization of Balochistan and Sistan, the Alforghan Party, Dorra Shah, the Balochi People's Movement, and al Jihad Balochistan (Stratfor 2010). Several Balochi tribes are reportedly opposed to the group (Stratfor 2010). Many of the fighters are reportedly recruited from religious seminaries located in Pakistan and Iran (Cappuccino 2017).

External Ties

The group reportedly has ties with al-Qaeda (Al Jazeera English 2010). The Iranian government has accused Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of offering support for the group (Al Jazeera English 2010; BBC 2010). After Rigi's execution, a statement was released claiming that the group had ties with foreign intelligence services, among these being the Israeli government and U.S. intelligence services through NATO (there have been reports that the US is supporting the group to lessen the stability in Iran) (Al Jazeera English 2010; PBS 2009; Stratfor 2010; Cappuccino 2017; Aslan 2010). The United States, however, has since designated the group as a terrorist organization (CNN 2010). The group also reportedly has links with the Taliban (PBS 2009). The financial support received by the group is reportedly from exiles from Iran with connections to Gulf States and European countries (PBS 2009). The group has also reportedly received support from a network that was created by a past Taliban leader, Baitullah Mesud (Project on Violent Conflict 2015).

Group Outcome

Even after the execution of the group's leader, it has still remained intact, though it was a blow to the group as a whole (Stratfor 2010). However, the group began to weaken by 2011 (Zambelis 2014).

XXIV. KURDISTAN FREEDOM FALCONS

Torg ID: 262

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (Tak), Kurdish Vengeance Brigade, Kurdistan Freedom Falcons, Kurdistan Freedom Falcons Organization, Kurdistan Freedom Hawks, Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan (Tak)

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004 (splinter)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

TAK was formed in 2004 by Bahoz Erdal when it splintered from the PKK (Mackenzie Institute 2016). Its goal is to create a Kurdish state from parts of Iraq and Turkey and believes the complete destruction of the Turkish state is a necessary part of that (Mackenzie Institute 2016; National Interest 2016). It differs from the PKK in that it primarily focuses on urban environments. The government tends to underestimate it believing it is part of the PKK so ignores urban operations to contain it. It ascribes to Kurdish ethno-nationalism (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Geography

TAK has carried out specific attacks in urban environments, such as Ankara, Istanbul, Marmaris, and Antalya (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Organizational Structure

There is very little known about the group's organizational structure. It is allegedly led by Bahoz Erdal who was a former leader of the PKK (Mackenzie Institute 2016). Its members are primarily Kurdish; in 2006 they had a "few dozen active members" but that number has probably grown (Jamestown Foundation 2006). It is believed its members live in Kurdish diasporas in western Turkey and Istanbul (Jamestown Foundation 2006).

External Ties

It formed in 2004 after the PKK called off a 2004 truce. Although it started bombing soft targets in 2004, TAK has begun to conduct increasingly lethal attacks. TAK pushes for pro-Kurdish policies including the creation of an independent Kurdish state, but does not coordinate nor cooperate with the PKK and has been a rival of it since 2006. In contrast to the PKK, the TAK targets foreign and civilian targets (Jamestown Foundation 2006).

Group Outcome

The group is still active and has had many attacks in Turkey in 2016. Turkey treats the TAK as part of the PKK, but this means that TAK largely goes ignored because PKK counterterrorism operations in the southeast do not affect TAK, which seems to operate out of Ankara underground. Even when US intelligence believes the TAK has

perpetrated an attack, Turkish officials tend to blame alternate groups (Arango and Yeginsu 2016).

XXV. AL-AHWAZ ARAB PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC FRONT

Torg ID: 1353

Min. Group Date: 2004

Max. Group Date: 2006

Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Ahwaz Arab People's Democratic Front, Al-Ahwaz Arab People's Democratic Front (Apdf), Al-Ahwaz Arab Popular Democratic Front, Arab Peoples Democratic Front, Arab People's Democratic Front, Democratic Popular Front For The Arab People Of Ahwaz

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Ahwazi Democratic Popular Front (RefWorld 2009) Arab People's Democratic Front, Democratic Popular Front for the Arab People of Ahwaz (Terrorist Profiles N.d) Ahwazian Arab People's Democratic Popular Front (Ref World 2002)

Group Formation: 2001 (Canada IRB 2002); 2005 (MIPT 2008)

Group End: 2006 (GTD 2017) or 2009 (UNPO)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown precisely when the group formed, but was active as early as 2001 (Canada IRB 2001). The group was originally nonviolent (Canada IRB 2002). The group's first violent attack occurred in 2005 when it launched a series of attacks in Ahwaz, five days before a presidential election (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). The group is an ethno-nationalist separatist group (Terrorist Profiles N.d). The group supports the separatist goals of the Arab minority in Iran's Khuzestan region (MIPT 2008). Their leader is Mamuh Ahmad Al-Ahwazi also known as Abu Bashar (Terrorist Profiles N.d). The organization came to attention on June 12, 2005, in the city of Ahwaz (Ahwaz) came five days before the presidential election (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group is primarily based out of London since they are banned in Iran (Canada IRB 2002; MIPT 2008). All of their attacks occurred in Iran, which makes them not transnational (GTD 2017). The group has an external base in London, but it is unknown where they operate in Iran (Canada IRB 2002; MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

The group's leader is Mamuh Ahmad Al-Ahwazi who is also known as Abu Bashar (Terrorist Profiles N.d). The organization has no known wings and its size is uncertain, but the group is made up of Ahwaz/Arabs (Al Jazeera 2005; Australia RRT 2009).

External Ties

There are no explicit alliances with the group; however, Iran claimed that the UK, US, Canada, Saudi Arabia, and Shell Oil Company were also involved in the violence in the oil-rich Khuzestan province (Terrorist Profiles N.d). It should be noted as well that the attack the group claimed to be responsible for was also claimed by the Arbav Martyrs of Khuzestan and Armed Renaissance Group of Ahvaz (GTD 2017).

Group Outcome

Iran has responded by arresting a number of activists and prominently executing 19. The Iranian government attributed the attack to APDF, but the group denied involvement (MIPT 2008). Iran claimed to arrest those responsible for the attacks, but never charged or put anyone on trial (Australia RRT 2009). The group was associated with a few more attacks over the next year. The group's last attack was in 2006 (GTD 2017) and the group signed a joint statement with several other Ahwaz separatist groups in 2009 (UNPO 2009). As of 2012, the group is most likely inactive.

Note for Iris: So the group is said to be created in 2005 yet there are articles on them since 2002.

XXVI. ARMED RENAISSANCE GROUP OF AHVAZ

Torg ID: 2261

Min. Group Date: 2005

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20079. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20079>
- "Ahvaz Bombings Seen as Warning." Al Jazeera English. 2005.
<https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/06/2008491461289406.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2005

Group End: 2005 (Disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group's first and only attack occurred on June 12, 2005, in Ahvaz, Iran (GTD 2017). It emerged just a few days prior to the start of Iran's presidential election. There has reportedly been civil unrest in the southwest region of Iran, including the city of Ahvaz, which is home to an Arab ethno-nationalist separatist movement (Al Jazeera English 2005). Although the group did not claim responsibility for the attack, Iranian officials laid the blame on the Armed Renaissance Group as well as several other Arab separatist groups (Al Jazeera English 2005).

Geography

The group's first and only attack was in Ahvaz, Iran (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group's organizational structure is unknown. A large Arab population lives in the Ahvaz region (Al Jazeera 2005).

External Ties

The group conducted the attack with several other Arab groups including the Arbav Martyrs of Khuzestan and the Al-Ahvaz Arab People's Democratic Front. There is no evidence of external support from other state or non-state actors.

Group Outcome

The group's first - and last - known attack was on June 12, 2005 (GTD 2017). It is unknown what has become of the group since then.

Notes for Iris:

- there are a lot of armed groups associated with this one attack and then they are never heard from again
- the context for the group is some protests in April/May 2005 and then the timing is with the election
- there is no evidence the government actually arrests anyone and it doesn't affect the election
- why only one attack here? Could be associated with particular candidate and then after the election happens there is no need to keep using violence so disappear
- the attack injured 85 and killed 9

Torg ID: 1366
Min. Group Date: 2005
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Armed Youth of Cherikha-Ye Fadayee.” Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4621. MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1mBx1qQfhGZTLIRuKUqXI8vkLjmPD9Wum0zdoW1kVOE0/edit>
- Babak Ganji. “President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad: A Turning Point in Iranian Politics and Strategy?” Middle East Series. 2005. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/28824/05_Nov_3.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2005

Group End: 2005 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information about this group. The group carried out its first attack in August 2005 when it claimed to have assassinated Judge Hassan Moqaddas (MIPT 2008; Middle East Series 2005). The judge reportedly sentenced a journalist to six years in prison as punishment for gathering confidential data that was harming national security and sharing propaganda that was against the Iranian government (MIPT 2008; Middle East Series 2005). The act was seen as violating human rights (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group assassinated Judge Moqaddas while he was departing from his office in Tehran, Iran (MIPT 2008; Middle East Series 2005).

Organizational Structure

The group’s organizational structure is unknown.

External Ties

The group's external ties are also unknown.

Group Outcome

The group has not claimed to have carried out any attacks since its assassination of the judge (MIPT 2008). It is unknown what has become of the group since then.

Notes for Iris:

- the reason they assassinated the judge was because he had sentenced someone for a sentencing
- disagreement with a judge's ruling only and not clear that they released a formal claim of responsibility
- unclear if they wanted anything else besides killing the judge

XXVIII. ARBAV MARTYRS OF KHUZESTAN

Torg ID: 879

Min. Group Date: 2005

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Arbav Martyrs of Khuzestan." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4567. MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1mBx1qQfhGZTLIRuKUqXi8vkLjmPD9Wum0zdoW1kVOE0/edit>
- GTD Perpetrator 20072. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20072>
- "Ahvaz Bombings Seen as Warning." Al Jazeera English. 2005. <https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/06/2008491461289406.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2005

Group End: 2005 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group carried out some coordinated bombings on June 12, 2005 (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). The group was considered part of the larger Arab separatist movement in Ahvaz. The group, along with three others, claimed to have carried out a collection of bombings in the city of Ahvaz, Iran (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). The bombings occurred a couple days before the presidential election in Iran (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group carried out bombings in the cities of Ahvaz and Tehran (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group's organizational structure is unknown. A large Arab population lives in the Ahvaz region (Al Jazeera 2005).

External Ties

The group, in addition to three other groups known as Arab People's Democratic Front, Afwaj al-Nahdah al-Mussallahah Al-Ahwaz, and the Arab Struggle Movement for Liberating Ahvaz, claimed to have carried out the attack (GTD 2017; MIPT 2008). It is unknown whether or not the group actually has any ties with these groups.

There is no evidence of external support from other state or non-state actors.

Group Outcome

Though the group claimed responsibility for the attacks in 2005, it is unknown whether or not it actually had any link to the attack (GTD 2017; MIPT 2008). It is unknown what has become of the group since the attack in 2005, as it has not carried out any attacks since then.

XXIX. JIHADI MOVEMENT OF THE SUNNA PEOPLE OF IRAN
Torg ID: 2419
Min. Group Date: 2008
Max. Group Date: 2008
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 30038. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30038>
- “Iran: Little-Known Group Claims Shiraz Bombing.” Stratfor. 2008.
<https://worldview.stratfor.com/situation-report/iran-little-known-group-claims-shiraz-bombing>
- “Sunni group claims bombing of Iran mosque.” Reuters. 2008.
<https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-group-claim/sunni-group-claims-bombing-of-iran-mosque-idUKL1840003220080618?rpc=401>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2008

Group End: 2008 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group carried out its first and only attack on April 12, 2008, when it bombed a mosque (GTD 2017; Stratfor 2008; Reuters 2008). The group reportedly carried out the attack as a means of revenge for two men who were dissidents in the Balochistan and Sistan provinces (Stratfor 2008; Reuters 2008). It reportedly wants to oppose the Shiites for its mistreatment of the Sunnis (Reuters 2008). Iran reportedly blames the UK, the United States, and Israel for the attack (Reuters 2008).

Geography

The group carried out their attack in Shiraz (GTD 2017; Stratfor 2008; Reuters 2008).

Organizational Structure

The group’s organizational structure is unknown. It appears related to the larger Baluchi separatist movement in the south (Stratfor 2008; Reuters 2008). Members were likely ethnic Baluchi (Reuters 2008).

External Ties

The Iranian government reportedly blamed the UK, the United States, and Israel for the attack (Stratfor 2008; Reuters 2008). However, there are no confirmed external ties to the group.

Group Outcome

The group has not carried out any attacks since its mosque bombing in 2008 (GTD 2017; Stratfor 2008; Reuters 2008). It is unknown what has become of the group since then.

XXX. ARAB PEOPLE'S GROUP

Torg ID: 1585

Min. Group Date: 2011

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: NA

Aliases: Arab People's Group, Arab Peoples Group

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 30220. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30220>
- "Iran: Investigate Reported Killing of Demonstrators." Human Rights Watch. 2011.
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/29/iran-investigate-reported-killings-demonstrators>
- "Iran: Outside the Spotlight, Arab Uprising Smolders in country's southwest." Los Angeles Times. 2011.
<http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2011/04/iran-ahvaz-protests-violence-human-rights-arab-seperatism.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2011

Group End: 2011 (Arrested)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed. The group's first and only attack occurred on April 15, 2011, in Ahvaz, Iran (GTD 2017; HRW 2011). Eight members of the group attacked a police station, killing three people (HRW 2011; GTD 2017; LA Times 2011). The group was considered part of the larger Arab separatist movement in Ahvaz (LA Times 2011). The timing coincided with the April 2005 protests in Khuzestan (HRW 2011).

Geography

The group carried out an attack in Ahvaz, Iran (GTD 2017; HRW 2011).

Organizational Structure

The group's organizational structure is unknown. It is considered part of the larger Arab separatist movement in Ahvaz (LA Times 2011).

External Ties

The group's external ties are unknown.

Group Outcome

The group's last and only attack was in 2011 (GTD 2017). Group members were arrested by the state police following this incident (HRW 2011). It is unknown what has become of the group since then.

XXXI. HAKAKAT ANSAR IRAN

Torg ID: 2641

Min. Group Date: 2012

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Harakat Ansar Iran (Hai), Harakat Ansar Iran

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 40157. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=40157>
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<https://ctc.usma.edu/the-evolution-of-the-ethnic-baluch-insurgency-in-iran/>

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<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/10729946/Iran-calls-for-return-of-abducted-border-guards-held-in-Pakistan.html>
- “Baloch insurgents in Iran.” Iran Primer. United States Institute for Peace. 2017.
<http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2017/apr/05/baluch-insurgents-iran>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: Late 2011 or early 2012 (exact date unclear)

Group End: 2013 (merger)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group reportedly formed around late 2011, though the exact date is unclear (Zambelis 2014). It launched its first attack in 2012 (Paraszczuk 2013; GTD 2017). It is active in Sistan va Baluchestan, which is mostly Sunni (Paraszczuk 2013; Zambelis 2014; Merat 2014). The group’s purpose is to fight against authorities in Tehran, and the group announced that their goal is to fight against the “Safavids,” or the Iranians (Paraszczuk 2013). There are reports that the group is a splinter from Jundullah (United States Institute for Peace 2017).

The group has launched attacks against Iranian security forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Basij members, and groups such as Qods Karman in addition to Sepah Salman Zahedan-21 Brigades (Paraszczuk 2013; Zambelis 2014; Merat 2014). The group has also attacked Iranian symbols, religious and political leaders, and Shia mosques (Zambelis 2014). Before merging with Hizbul-Furqan, the group adopted not only a new name, but also a new banner (Paraszczuk 2013). The symbols presented on the banner reflect a transnational jihadist movement design as opposed to the group’s ethno-religious cause located in Sistan va Baluchestan (Paraszczuk 2013). The group’s new name also dropped “Iran” from it (Paraszczuk 2013). Even though the group targets local ethno-religious issues, it has become part of the transnational jihadist movement (Paraszczuk 2013).

Geography

The group has carried out attacks in Sistan va Baluchestan, the largest being one in Chabahar (Paraszczuk 2013; GTD 2017; Zambelis 2014; Merat 2014).

Organizational Structure

There are reports that the group is a splinter from Jundallah (United States Institute for Peace 2017). The group was reportedly founded by two men named Abu Yasir Muskootani and Abu Hafs al-Baluchi, who were friends with the deceased Jundallah leader (Zambelis 2014). The group merged with Hizbul-Furqan, another Sunni group, and it announced that their new name would be Ansar al-Furqan (Paraszczuk 2013). Another group known as Al Farooq Media handles the group's media activity (Paraszczuk 2013). Many of the group's members are reportedly Baluchi from Jundallah (Merat 2014).

External Ties

The group merged with Hizbul-Furqan, another Sunni group, and it announced that their new name would be Ansar al-Furqan (Paraszczuk 2013; Zambelis 2014). Another group known as Al Farooq Media handles the group's media activity (Paraszczuk 2013). The group has expressed reverence for Jundallah, and there are reports that the group is a splinter from Jundallah (Zambelis 2014; United States Institute for Peace 2017). The group also reportedly has ties with another group called Sepah-e-Sahaba Iran (Zambelis 2014; United States Institute for Peace 2017). The group reportedly received support in the form of funding from the Gulf States (United States Institute for Peace 2017).

Group Outcome

In 2013, the group merged with Hizbul-Furqan, another Sunni group, and it announced that their new name would be Ansar al-Furqan (Paraszczuk 2013). Many of the group's members were captured and targeted by security forces in Iran, more specifically in Sistan va Baluchestan (Paraszczuk 2013). This arrest prompted a lull in the group's activity, and the group proceeded to merge with Hizbul-Furqan (Paraszczuk 2013). In 2014, however, there were reports that the group re-emerged with the goal of supporting the Syrian president; the new re-emerged group could be a different one acting under the same name, however (United States Institute for Peace 2017).

Notes for Iris:

-the new group is in Iran, but it's just unclear if it is an alias

XXXII. APCO
Torg ID: 9005
Min. Group Date: 0
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Arab Political and Cultural Organization

Part 1. Bibliography

- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Iran." Political Terrorism. Routledge. 1988.
<https://books.google.com/books?id=Up4uDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=schmid+jongman+political+terrorism&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiOp6GwnczZAhVinuAKHchmBQ4Q6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=iran&f=false>
- Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. "Iran vs APCO." Non-State Actor Dataset Narratives.
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
- "Assessment for Arabs in Iran." Minorities at Risk Project. Last updated 2006.
<http://www.mar.umd.edu/assessment.asp?groupId=63009>
- A. Saleh. "Ethnic Identity and the State in Iran." Springer. 2013.
https://books.google.com/books?id=gmSYAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA71&lpg=PA71&dq=Arab+Political+and+Cultural+Organization&source=bl&ots=UEM0yhRnFT&sig=OjSUG22ZMHE_32Z4_EzEhK1j9k&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjaj5adis7ZAhVFx1QKH5zDZUQ6AEIajAG#v=onepage&q=Arab%20Political%20and%20Cultural%20Organization&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1979

Group End: 1979

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group reportedly formed in 1979 and conducted its first attack the same year (Minorities at Risk Project 2006; Saleh 2013). Those who backed the organization advocated for larger economic and political shares for the Khuzestan population (Saleh 2013). The group was given permission to create a provincial council consisting of a limited amount of autonomy (Minorities at Risk Project 2006). The presence of another group called the Revolutionary Guards caused unrest (Minorities at Risk Project 2006; Saleh 2013). The unrest caused Arabs to launch bombings upon oil pipelines and refineries and proceed to bomb the Iranian embassy located in London (Minorities at Risk Project 2006).

Geography

The group led demonstrations in Khorramshahr (Saleh 2013). The group reportedly seized the Iranian Embassy in London (MAR 2006; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 509).

Organizational Structure

-add leadership info from Schmid and Jongman

The group is reportedly led by a man named Shaikh Mohammed Taher Shobeir Khaghani (Schmid and Jongman 1988).

External Ties

The group's external ties are unknown.

Group Outcome

-add that Iran provided some concessions to the group from Schmid and Jongman

-add that UK seized embassy from APCO and gave it back to Iran from Gleditsch et al.

There have been no reports of the group being violent since 1980 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 510). Iran has reportedly provided the group with some concessions (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The United Kingdom seized the embassy from the group and gave it back to Iran (Gleditsch et al. 2013).

XXXIII. FORQAN GROUP
Torg ID: 9005
Min. Group Date: 1979
Max. Group Date: 1981
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Iran." Political Terrorism. Routledge. 1988.
<https://books.google.com/books?id=Up4uDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=schmid+jongman+political+terrorism&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiOp6GwnczZAhVinuAKHchmB04Q6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=iran&f=false>
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<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3201>
- Ronen Cohen. "The Emergence of the Forqan Group." Revolution Under Attack. 2015. Pp. 21-22. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137502506_2

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https://books.google.com/books?id=bQ3ACQAAQBAJ&pg=PA32&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false
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<https://books.google.com/books?id=wEih57-GWQQC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Guide+to+Islamist+Movements&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjit5vBkM7ZAhWoslQKHUwAY4Q6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=forqan&f=false>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Iran: Information on a group called Forqan, active around the period of the revolution, 1 March 1990, IRN4254, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad7e1c.html>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Furghan Group, Forqan Group, Furqan Group, Grouh-e-Forghan, GF

Group Formation: 1963

Group End: 1981

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group was founded in 1963 at the time of an uprising by Savak (IRB 1990). Others say the group formed in 1979 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 578). It was founded by a man named Akbar Goudarzi (Sahimi 2009). Akbar Goudarzi assassinated Ayatollah Motahhari, a leading progressive Islamic scholar, in 1979 (Sahimi 2009; Rubin 2010). The group adheres to leftist ideals (Sahimi 2009). The group's members are greatly influenced by Dr. Ali Shariati's writings (Sahimi 2009; IRB 1999). He was an Islamic scholar and a sociologist (Sahimi 2009). The group views God as absolute evolution, while in Islam God is generally taught as absolute perfection (Sahimi 2009). The group cites the clergy, communists, and the Pahlavi family which ruled Iran at the time as the three greatest enemies of Iran who needed to be defeated (Sahimi 2009; IRB 1990). Ayatollah Motahhari criticized the group's ideology as "gullible materialism," which angered members of the group, leading Akbar Goudarzi to assassinate him (Sahimi 2009). The group has also assassinated other individuals such as Haj Mehdi, Lieutenant General Mohammad Vali Qarani, Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Ali Qazi Tabatabaei, a man who was an aide to Ayatollah Khomeini, and Ayatollah Dr. Mohammad Mofatteh; they attempted to assassinate Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president of

Iran (Sahimi 2009; Rubin 2010). The group opposed an institution called the Hosseinieh Ershad, led by Ayatollah Murtaza Motahhari (Cohen).

The group supports the thoughts and teachings of Ali Shariati (Cohen 2015). The group reportedly chose “the idea of contention instead of peace and friendship” and “in order to disorganize this order, conflict and contention is inevitable,” ideals which they adopted from Shariati (Cohen 2015). The group often adheres to extremist ideology, similar to that of Shariati (Cohen 2015). The group opposed the revolutionary system established by the Islamic revolution’s leaders, and they proceeded to kill the revolution’s promoters (Cohen 2015). The group has also reportedly targeted Marxists and some merchants (Rubin 2010; IRB 1990). The group also reportedly attempted to assassinate a man named Hojatalislam Hashemi-Rafsanjani (IRB 1990). The group is also reportedly opposed to wealthy bazaarists and politicians adhering to liberal ideals (IRB 1990). It also opposed religious leaders getting involved in politics and abides by fundamentalist ideals (IRB 1999). The group has also reportedly killed several activists and writers (IRB 1999).

Geography

The group has launched attacks in cities in Iran such as Shiraz, Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, and Qom (GTD 2017). There is no evidence the group is transnational.

Organizational Structure

The group was founded in 1975 by a man named Akbar Goudarzi, who also led the group (Sahimi 2009; Cohen 2015).

External Ties

The group took responsibility for a violent attack carried out by another group called Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, though it is unknown as to whether or not these two groups have any form of connection (Cohen 2015).

Group Outcome

Fifteen members of the group were reportedly arrested in 1980 (IRB 1999). The group reportedly carried out their last attack in 1980, but there were reports in 1982 that they attempted to kill a man who was part of the Supreme Defense Council (Cohen 2015; IRB 1999).