

Indonesia Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 5 July 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T934	DARUL ISLAM (DI)	1953	1948	1961
T2404	PEMUDA PANCASILA		1959	1999
T710	FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT (OPM)	1965	1963	2012
T1889	REVOLUTIONARY FRONT FOR AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR (FRETILIN)	1975	1974	1998
T2050	NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ULEMAS (MUI)		1975	0
T178	FREE ACEH MOVEMENT (GAM)	1990	1976	2005
T752	KOMANDO JIHAD (INDONESIAN)		1981	1981
T1625	ARMED FORCES FOR LIBERATION OF EAST TIMOR (FALINTIL)		1992	1995
T1208	NINJAS		1993	2003
T242	JEMAAH ISLAMIYA		1993	2012
T260	KUMPULAN MUJAHIDIN MALAYSIA		1995	0
T2010	NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB)		1995	0
T1318	DAYAKS		1997	2001
T184	FRONT PEMBELA ISLAM (FPI)		1997	2006
T2011	KOMANDO LASKAR ISLAM		1998	0
T857	DYNAMIC YOUTH FORUM		1998	2010
T469	SOUTH MALUKU REPUBLIC		1998	0
T2013	MER-C		1998	0
T766	NUSANTARA ISLAMIC MUJAHIDEEN FRONT		1999	0
T2409	PEOPLE'S SOVEREIGNTY PARTY (PDR)		1999	1999
T2015	MUJAHEDIN COUNCIL OF INDONESIA (MMI)		2000	0

T603	MALUKU SOVEREIGNTY FRONT (FKM)		2000	0
T2012	BETAWI BROTHERHOOD FORUM (FBR)		2000	0
T753	LASKAR JIHAD		2000	2002
T340	ANTI-COMMUNIST COMMAND (KAK)		2000	2000
T1187	MUJAHIDEEN DIVISION KHANDAQ		2000	0
T735	MUJAHIDEEN KOMPAK		2001	2001
T2381	MUJAHIDIN AMBON		2005	2005
T2255	ANTI-APOSTATE MOVEMENT ALLIANCE (AGAP)		2005	2007
T2022	AL-QAEDA FOR THE MALAY ARCHIPELAGO		2007	0
T2024	TANZIM QAEDAT AL-JIHAD		2007	0
T2030	SARIYAH		2007	0
T1760	JEMAAH ANSHORUT TAUHID (JAT)		2011	2012

Indonesia Cases Part 1, 1948-1995
Last Updated: 5 July 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T934	DARUL ISLAM (DI)	1953	1948	1961
T2404	PEMUDA PANCASILA		1959	1999
T710	FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT (OPM)	1965	1963	2012
T1889	REVOLUTIONARY FRONT FOR AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR (FRETILIN)	1975	1974	1998
T2050	NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ULEMAS (MUI)		1975	0
T178	FREE ACEH MOVEMENT (GAM)	1990	1976	2005
T752	KOMANDO JIHAD (INDONESIAN)		1981	1981

T1625	ARMED FORCES FOR LIBERATION OF EAST TIMOR (FALINTIL)		1992	1995
T1208	NINJAS		1993	2003
T242	JEMAAH ISLAMIYA		1993	2012
T260	KUMPULAN MUJAHIDIN MALAYSIA		1995	0
T2010	NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB)		1995	0

- I. DARUL ISLAM (DI)
 Min. Group Date: 1948
 Max. Group Date: 1961
 Onset: 1953

Aliases: Darul Islam, Darul Islam (Di), DI

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Dar-al Islam Movement (Oxford Dictionary of Islam. N.D.), Abode of Islam (Schmid 1988 pg 574)

Group Formation: The group first became violent in 1948 (Oxford Dictionary of Islam. N.D.; Refworld 2005 pg 2; Hp 2006 pg 15)

Group End: The last recorded attack was in 2002 (Temby 2010 pg 1)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Kartosuwirjo declared Darul Islam an independent state on August 14th, 1945, but withdrew his declaration three days later when the Republic of Indonesia was announced (Hp 2006 pg 13).

Darul Islam first became violent in 1948 when the militias announced their opposition to the Indonesian government (Paul et al 2013, 118; Oxford Dictionary of Islam. N.D.; Refworld 2005 pg 2; Andrea 2006 pg 15). The first recorded instance of violence was a regional rebellion in West Java led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo (Refworld 2005 pg 2; Paul 2013 pg 118; Temby 2010 pg 3). DI opposed the government of the newly independent Republic of Indonesia (Oxford Dictionary of Islam. N.D.; Paul 2013 pg 118; Hp 2006 pg 1). DI was unhappy with the concessions that the new Indonesian government had made with the Dutch (Refworld 2005 pg 2; Hp 2006 pg 12). DI wanted a federal state that allowed for individual provinces that could elect to enforce Sharia law, but instead a centralized, secular government was put in place (Paul 2013 pg 119; Hp 2006 pg 1). DI wanted to establish as Islamic State (Oxford Dictionary of Islam N.D.; Schmid 1988 pg 574), known as Negaram Islam Indonesia (NII) (Refworld 2005 pg 2).

The DI command in West Java established a three part doctrine focusing on iman (faith), hijrah (emigration), and jihad (war) (Refworld 2005, 6). This ideology means that if the faithful are politically and militarily prosecuted they should move to a safer place where they can build their strength to return and wage jihad on their enemy (Refworld 2005 pg 6).

Geography

DI rebellions occurred in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh (Jones n.d.; Refworld 2005 pg 2; Schmid 1988 pg 574). There was a DI rebellion in South Kalimantan (Hp 2006 pg 16). Malingping, West Java was a DI stronghold (Jones n.d.). DI had regional command centers in Priangan Timur, East Java, Central Java, South Sulawesi, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Serang-Banten, Bogor, Garut, Sumedang, Bandung, Lampung, and Jakarta (Refworld 2005 pg 2). DI leaders met at a house on Jalan Mahoni in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta (Refworld 2005 pg 5). DI was in Limbangan, Garut (Refworld 2005 pg 7). In 1976 DI bombed a state-sponsored Quran reading contest, an Apollo bar, a movie theatre, and a Methodist Church in Medan (Refworld 2005 pg 7; Temby 2010 pg 18). DI bombed a Baptist Hotel in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, and the Nurul Iman mosque in Padang (Refworld 2005 pg 7). DI members found shelter in the Tanjuk Prior neighborhood of Jakarta (Refworld 2005 pg 8). DI members attempted to assassinate Ali

Moertopo in Semarang, Central Java (Refworld 2005 pg 9). DI recruited members in the Condet area of Jakarta (Refworld 2005 pg 9). DI held a meeting in Cisarua (Refworld 2005 pg 23). Kang Jaja recruited members in Cigarung (Refworld 2005 pg 29). In 1981, DI members attacked the Chinese population in Banda Aceh (Schmid 1988 pg 574). DI operated in mountainous bases, so they could raid rural villages and nearby roads (Pal 2013 pg 119).

Organizational Structure

DI originally was three separate rebellions across Indonesia, but then became a coherent national movement (Jones n.d.; Refworld 2005 pg 2). DI was led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo (Oxford Dictionary of Islam. N.D.).

DI originally had a military force known as Indonesian Islamic Army (Oxford Dictionary of Islam. N.D.). Members came from Indonesia militias that formed during World War II. Other DI leaders were Sekarmadji Kartosoewirjo, Kahar Muzakkar and Daud Beureueh (Jones n.d.; Refworld 2005 pg 2). Haji Faleh and Achmad Hussein from Kudus; Muhammad Zainuri from Madiun; and Bukhori from Magetan were DI leaders during the 1970's-1980's (Jones n.d.). Adah Djaelani became the head (Imam) of DI in 1979 after a conference of 16 DI leaders (Refworld 2005 pg 10). Ajengan Masduki became the Imam in 1987 (Refworld 2005 pg 21). Between 1983 and 1984, many DI leaders were released from prison, this caused conflicts between long-serving leaders and ones who had been recently appointed (Refworld 2005 pg 22). In 1998, a conference was called to determine whether Adah Djaelani, who had just been released from jail, or Ajengan Masduki should be Imam (Refworld 2005 pg 23). When Adah Djaelani was chosen as Imam, Masduki's supporters, specifically young people, were outraged (Refworld 2005 pg 23). Haji Ismail Pranoto, or Hispran, was an influential DI leader (Temby 2010 pg 11).

Two networks, Ring Condet and Ring Santa, emerged in East Jakarta that listened to the command center in Central Java rather than the command center in Jakarta (Refworld 2005 pg 15). Ring Condet consisted of high schoolers, vegetable merchants, wealthy contractors, and drivers (Refworld 2005 pg 15). Ring Santa consisted of gang members trying to protect themselves from being killed by the government (Refworld 2005 pg 15).

In 1953, DI was divided into seven regional commands; later, two more regional commands were added (Refworld 2005 pg 2; Temby 2010 pg 16). DI leadership in 1974 was restructured with Daud Beureueh as imam and KPSI, Gaos Taufik as military commander, Daud Beureueh and Ale A.T. sharing the foreign affairs portfolio, Adah Djaelani, assisted by Aceng Kurnia and Dodo Mohamad Darda (alias Abu Darda), as minister for home affairs, and Danu Muhamad Hassan as military commander for West Java (Refworld 2005 pg 5 pg 1). DI classified areas as either D1, D2, or D3; D1 meant the area was fully under DI control and the Islamic State could be established, D2 meant that the area was not fully under control but where holdouts for religious preaching and

education could be established, D3 meant areas that could only be controlled through military action (Refworld 2005 pg 5).

In 1975, Djaja Sudjadi, Kadar Solihat formed a non-violent wing of DI known as fillah (Refworld 2005 pg 7). Fillah focused on education and social welfare (Refworld 2005 pg 7; Temby 2010 pg 14). The jihad-waging wing became known as fisabilillah (Refworld 2005 pg 7; Temby 2010 pg 14). The two factions began to clash in 1978 (Refworld 2005 pg 9; Temby 2010 pg 14).

Between 1956 and 1957, DI had 12,000 to 15,000 members (Refworld 2005 pg 3). DI recruits old members and family members of old members every time it reemerges (Refworld 2005 pg 7). DI recruits were originally mostly from pesantren masses (boarding schools) and traditionalist circles (Temby 2010 pg 10). DI used the Usroh method (10-15 people living together by Islamic law and principle) to recruit and train members (Refworld 2005 pg 12; Temby 2010 pg 27). Kang Jaja recruited members in Cigarung (Refworld 2005 pg 29).

In the first wave of DI from 1948-1963, DI had no external funding and was completely funded by its own members and looting its enemies (Paul 2013 pg 119). In 1974, the practice of robbing non-believers to fund jihad (fa'i) was implemented (Refworld 2005 pg 5). Asep Warman and the West Java team's 1979 fa'i was so profitable that DI incorporated the team into its regular structure (Refworld 2005 pg 9). Warman stole television sets and robbed Universities (Refworld 2005 pg 9). After Warman's death in 1981, DI wanted the fa'i income to continue, so they recruited thugs from the Condet area in Jakarta (Refworld 2005 pg 9). DI acquired weapons through raiding police stations (Refworld 2005 pg 8).

External Ties

DI was initially supported by villagers and rural Muslim leaders in West Java (Oxford Dictionary of Islam. N.D.). DI members found refuge at a pesantren called Misi Islam in Jakarta (Refworld 2005 pg 8). Former DI members have formed JI (Jones n.d.; Refworld 2005 pg i; Temby 2010 pg 2 & 29). Ahmad Sobari, the DI leader in Priangan Timur during the 1960's, left DI and founded Negara Islam Tejamaya (NIT), but was arrested before NIT became powerful (Refworld 2005 pgs 2-3). In 1999, a group called the Abu Bakar battalion splintered from DI in response from DI's lack of action in response to Ambon (Refworld 2005 pg 24). A group called Ring Banten splintered from JI in 2004 (Refworld 2005 pg 27).

DI recruits were later sent to Afghanistan to train (Refworld 2005 pg 21). In 1988, DI sent a delegation to Afghanistan and Pakistan to strengthen ties (Refworld 2005 pg 21). DI members trained at the MILF's Camp Abubakar in Mindanao between 1998 and 2000 (Refworld 2005 pg 27-28).

The Indonesian government provided weapons for anti-communist DI leaders who helped with the elimination of suspected PKI members (Jones n.d.; Refworld 200 pg 3). DI worked with the military to help eliminate PKI (Refworld 2005 pg 3; Temby 2010 pg 6). DI sent Rifai Ahmad to Kuala Lumpur to ask the Libyan Embassy for Arms; The Libyan Embassy agreed to supply DI with arms but never sent them (Refworld 2005 pg 8).

Group Outcome

The first wave of DI was eventually eradicated by government troops (Oxford Dictionary of Islam. N.D.). The Indonesian government developed a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy called Planning Guidance for Perfecting Peace and Security (P4K) (Paul 2013 pg 120). The Indonesian government sometimes used a strategy called pagar bettis, or "fence of legs," in which civilians from local villages created a physical barrier around DI controlled hills armed with pots and bamboo sticks, and signaled nearby military units when DI members attempted to leave the surrounded area (Paul 2013 pg 121). Sekarmadji Kartosuwiryo was captured in 1962 and later executed (Jones n.d.; Refworld 2005 pg 2; temby 2010 pg 1) Sekarmadji Kartosoewirjo's lieutenants were given amnesty and provided with livelihood assistance (Jones n.d.; Refworld 2005 pg 2) Kahar Muzakkar was killed in a 1965 military raid (Jones n.d.). Daud Beureueh signed a peace treaty in 1963 to end his DI rebellion in Aceh (Jones n.d.).

The Indonesian government defeated the first round of DI rebellions by forcing the local population to help with pacification efforts, eliminating the DI leadership through intense cordon-and-search tactics (Paul 2013 pg 118). The Indonesian government was able to defeat DI so effectively because they did not face international scrutiny for their harsh counterinsurgency tactics (Paul 2013 pg 118). Daud Beureueh later became involved with the nationwide DI rebellion in 1974 and was arrested again in 1978 (Jones n.d.). He was sentenced to house arrest for the remainder of his life (Jones n.d.; Schmid 1988 pg 574). Opa Mustopa tried to reform DI but was arrested and spent three years in prison (Refworld 2005 pg 3). Timsar Zubil orchestrated a series of bombings in 1976; he was sentenced to death in 1979 and was released in 1999 (Refworld 2005 pg 8). Abdullah Umar and Asep Warman were arrested in 1979; Warman escaped prison soon after but was killed by the military in 1981 (Refworld 2005 pg 9). Adah Djaelani was briefly the head of DI before he and his leadership were arrested (Refworld 2005 pg 11; Temby 2010 pg 15). Starting in 1983, the Usroh method of recruitment faced repression (Refworld 2005 pg 14).

Later the government provided weapons for anti-communist DI leaders who helped with the elimination of suspected PKI members (Jones n.d.; Refworld 2005 pg 3). In 1971, former DI leaders were brought together by the military in the hopes of reviving DI (Jones n.d.; Refworld 2005 pg 4; Temby 2010 pg 7). DI worked with the military to help eliminate PKI (Refworld 2005 pg 3). The revived DI soon went underground and began to work against the Indonesian government (Jones n.d.). The government then began to crackdown on DI in the late 1970's to the 1980's (Jones n.d.). Haji Faleh and Achmad

Hussein from Kudus; Muhammad Zainuri from Madiun; and Bukhori from Magetan were all DI leaders who were arrested from 1977-1982 (Jones n.d.; Refworld 2005 pg i). On October 12th, 2002, a man named Iqbal blew himself up in a nightclub in Bali (Temby 2010 pg 1).

Notes for Iris:

- The bomber in the Bali bombing had a note on him which said he was carrying out the attack in the name of DI (c.f. Temby original source).
- The Bali bombing is perpetrated by one actor in the name of a separate organization
- JI likely gets a lot of members from DI
- DI would always congregate in mountainous areas so the government employed noncombatants to contain the threat and then they would walk towards the center of the circle to trap DI militants
- Pagar bettis worked pretty well. They would identify a stronghold and then attack them.

II. PEMUDA PANCASILA
Min. Group Date: 1959
Max. Group Date: 1999
Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Pancasila Youth (Global Terrorism Database 2017; PBS 2014), AMPI (Angkatan Muda Pemuda Pancasila Indonesia) (Daves 2016)

Group Formation: Formed in 1959 (Daves 2016)

Group End: 1999 (Global Terrorism Database 2017).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Pemuda Pancasila was established by General Abdul Haris Nasution in 1959 as the youth wing for the Veterans Party (IPKI) (Daves 2016). Pemuda Pancasila served as the unofficial government supported paramilitary group under the Golkar regime (Daves 2016). The first recorded Pemuda Pancasila attack was a slaughtering of PKI members and suspected Communists in Medan and Aceh in 1965-1966 (Daves 2016; Loren 1998 pg 56). Chinese individuals and intellectuals were also targeted (PBS 2014). Pemuda Pancasila claims its goals are to support the government, defend Pancasila, and uphold the 1945 constitution (Loren 1998 pg 47). Pemuda Pancasila is anti-Communist (Loren 1998 pg 54).

Geography

Pemuda Pancasila conducted an attack in Purbalingga, Central Java (Global Terrorism Database 2017). Pemuda Pancasila members slaughtered PKI members and suspected Communists in Medan and Aceh (Daves 2016; Loren 1998 pg 56). Pemuda Pancasila is strongest in North Sumatra, especially around Belawan Port in Medan (Daves 2016). Pemuda Pancasila organized an attack on the Jakarta PDI headquarters (Daves 2016). Pemuda Pancasila protected regime timber and mining resources in Irian Jaya (Daves 2016). Pemuda Pancasila existed mostly in Medan in the 1980's (Loren 1998 pg 55). The group was not transnational and did not have a transnational base of operations.

Organizational Structure

Pemuda Pancasila was established as the youth wing for the Veterans Party (IPKI), a political-military movement in Indonesia (Daves 2016). In the 1970's and 1980's, Pemuda Pancasila recruited local criminals, gang members and ex-convicts (Daves 2016). When Yapto was Pemuda Pancasila leader, he put his friends in charge of Pemuda Pancasila chapters (Daves 2016). Pemuda Pancasila claimed it had six million members throughout Indonesia (Daves 2016; Loren 1998 pg 47). Pemuda Pancasila was estimated to have 3 million members in 2014 (PBS 2014). The group had approximately 300,000 members in the "late 1990s."

Pemuda Pancasila was involved in prostitution, smuggling, drugs, and protection rackets (Daves 2016). The government supported Pemuda Pancasila and did not regulate its illicit activities (Daves 2016). The group does not have a political wing. Pemuda Pancasila was established by General Abdul Haris Nasution (Daves 2016). Yapto Soelistyo Soeryosoemarno became the Pemuda Pancasila leader in the 1980's (Daves 2016; Loren 1998 pg 52). Yorrys Raweyai was Yapto's second in command (Daves 2016; Loren 1998 pg 46). Anwar Congo was a former criminal who participated in the 1965-1966 slaughter (PBS 2014).

External Ties

Pemuda Pancasila was established by General Abdul Haris Nasution in 1959 as the youth wing for the Veterans Party (IPKI) (Daves 2016).

Pemuda Pancasila was in direct opposition with the PKI youth wing, Pemuda Rakyat (Daves 2016; Loren 1998 pg 56). Pemuda Pancasila has attacked PKI cadres (Daves 2016). Pemuda Pancasila members attacked members of groups associated with PKI, including the Indonesian Farmers Front and Baperki (Loren 1998 pg 56). Pemuda Pancasila was allied with the New Order Regime (Daves 2016). Pemuda Pancasila did the government's "dirty work" (Daves 2016).

Group Outcome

The Golkar Regime supported and sponsored Pemuda Pancasila (Daves 2016). The military and Soeharto family often employ Pemuda Pancasila to be bodyguards, attack pro-democracy rallies, counter anti-government protests, distribute bribes to vote for Golkar, clear land for developers, intimidate activists, threaten those who challenged Golkar's political dominance (Daves 2016; Loren 1998 pg 46). The government in Jakarta loaned Pemuda Pancasila 30-40 pistols to attack Communists (Loren 1998 pg 56-57). Military officials have protected Yapto and his lieutenants from being charged with anything (Daves 2016). Yapto, Yorrys and heads of Pemuda Pancasila chapters graduated into lucrative government and private sector positions (Daves 2016). Dozens of pro-Golkar, ex-Pemuda Pancasila members became parliament members (Daves 2016). After the Soeharto regime, Pemuda Pancasila continued to exist, but its ties with the military became less obvious (Daves 2016). The last recorded Pemuda Pancasila attack was on Akbar Tandjung's entourage in 1999 (Global Terrorism Database 2017). It stopped using violence in 1999 after the Soeharto government stepped down.

Notes for Iris:

- Once Indonesia democratized in 1998/1999, the government "shuts down" the organization and they also lose the support of the military.
- A lot of them disarm and integrate into the military.

III. FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT (OPM)

Min. Group Date: 1963

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 1965

Aliases: Free Papua Movement (Opm-Organisasi Papua Merdeka), Free Papua Movement, Free Papua Movement (Opm), Liberation Army Of The Free Papau Movement, Liberation Army Of The Free Papua Movement, Liberation Army/Free Papua

Movement, Opm-Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Opm), Organization For A Free Papua

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: 1963 (MIPT 2008)

Group End: 2017 (Jakarta Post 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

OPM was founded by exiled Papuans, Elkie Bemei and Seth Rumkorem, when Indonesia took Irian Jaya (Schmid and Jongman 1988 pg 576). OPM is a separatist group seeking freedom for the indigenous people of West Papua from the Indonesian Government (MIPT 2008; Global Security n.d.; FAS 2000; Radheya 2015; Muhammed n.d. Pg 7; Vermonte 2007 pg 284). OPM wants the Indigenous people of West Papua to return to their traditional way of life (MIPT 2008).

OPM has been active since 1963 (MIPT 2008). Other sources claim that OPM was formed in March 1965 (UNPO 2014). OPM had two major factions, which could explain the discrepancy in the start dates (Muhammed n.d. pg 6). One OPM action was formed by Permenas (Ferry) Awom and Terianus Aronggear (UNPO 2014; Muhammed n.d. Pg 6). The second OPM faction was formed by Aser Demotekay (Muhammed n.d. pg 6). OPM originally was a group of fighters who called themselves the West Papuan Freedom Fighters (Radheya 2015).

Geography

OPM operates in the mountainous areas of West Papua (MIPT 2008). OPM operates on Irian Jaya (Global Security n.d.; FAS 2000). In 1996, OPM took hostages in Irian Jaya (FAS 2000). In 1997, Opm took 26 hostages in Mapenduma Village (FAS 2000). OPM blew up gas pipelines in Freeport (Radheya 2015). OPM opened a Mission in Dakar (Radheya 2015). The original OPM faction was founded in Jayapura (Muhammed n.d. pg 6; Vermonte 2007 pg 2). Another OPM faction was formed in Manokwari (UNPO 2014; Muhammed n.d. Pg 6). OPM leaders had a public reconciliation in Port Villa (Muhammed n.d. Pg 7). OPM and Indonesian forces clashed in the Jayawijaya Highlands (Humans Rights Watch 2001). Modern OPM members come from Kampung Weni and Kampung Rumagi in Mageabume, Puncak Jaya (Jarkarta Post 2017). The OPMRC operates in Madang, Papua New Guinea (Vermonte 2007 pg 284). The group had a transnational base of operations in Papua New Guinea after PNG gained independence in 1975 (Nyameke and Premdas 1979).

OPM has targeted foreigners (MIPT 2008; FAS 2000).

Organizational Structure

OPM is the political wing of the insurgency movement (MIPT 2008). The Liberation Army of the Free Papua Movement (TPN) is the armed wing of the insurgency (MIPT 2008). The Libyan Dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, supplied OPM with weapons in the 1990's (Radheya 2015).

Aser Demotekay was the original leader of one OPM faction (Muhammed n.d. pg 6; Vermonte 2007 pg 284). He was replaced by Jacob Prai (Muhammed n.d. pg 6). Terianus Arrongear and Permenas Awom led the other Opm faction (Muhammed n.d. Pg 6; UNPO 2014; Vermonte 2007 pg 284z). OPM leaders Jacob Prai and Seth Rumkorem had disputes on how to run the organization (Muhammed n.d. Pg 7). Prai and Rumkorem had a public reconciliation overseen by the Prime Minister of Vanuatu (Muhammed n.d. Pg 7). The members were originally "comrades", but it is unknown if they had any prior military experience (Radheya 2015). OPM consists of two branches; the armed branch which operates in West Papua, and the OPM Revolutionary Council (OPMRC), which operates outside of Indonesia in Papua New Guinea (Vermonte 2007 pg 284). The chairman of The OPMRC is Moses Werror (Vermonte 2007 pg 2). Markus Kaisiepo and Nicolas Jouwe are OPM leaders in Europe who have actively provided tactical support (Vermonte 2007 pg 285).

Indigenous people from Biak, Sukarnapura, Ajamaru, and Central Berg land all joined OPM to fight against Indonesia (UNPO 2014). OPM members are indigenous people of West Papua (MIPT 2008). One OPM faction consisted of former PVK members. OPM claimed to have 10,000 members in 1977; in 1978 it was estimated that there were 5,000 OPM members (Schmid 1988 pg 576). (Muhammed n.d. pg 6). OPM had at least 154 members in 2017 (Jakarta Post 2017; Schmid 1988 pg 576).

External Ties

OPM members often retreated to Papua New Guinea for sanctuary (MIPT 2008; CIA 1984). The Papua New Guinea Government has burned villages where OPM members hide (MIPT 2008).

The Liberation Army of the Free Papua Movement (TPN) is the armed wing of the OPM (MIPT 2008). The armed wing of OPM has ties to the Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi (Radheya 2015). OPM members have trained in Libya (Radheya 2015). OPM is supported by the Government of Senegal (Radheya 2015; Vermonte 2007 pg 288). Prai and Rumkorem had a public reconciliation overseen by the Prime Minister of Vanuatu (Muhammed n.d. Pg 7). The Governments of Nauru, Vanuatu, Tuvalu, and recently, Guyana all publicly support OPM (Muhammed n.d. Pg 11). OPM has supporters abroad, specifically in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Senegal (Vermonte 2007 pgs 285 & 288). Young neo-Marxists are advocating for OPM abroad (Vermonte 2007 pg 288)

Group Outcome

The Indonesian government placed military officers in charge of the province where OPM was active (Vermonte 2007 pg 288). The Papua New Guinea Government has burned villages where OPM members hide (MIPT 2008). The Indonesian Government

captured Terianus Arrongear in 1965 (Muhammed n.d. Pg 6; Vermonte 2007 pg 286). 154 members of OPM surrendered to the Indonesian Government and pledged their allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta Post 2017). The surrendering members simply requested that they not be harmed and that their leader in captivity be allowed to live in a traditional Papuan House (Jakarta Post 2017). The last recorded instance of violence was in 2017 (Jakarta Post 2017).

The Indonesian government forced former OPM members to kill a current OPM member to prove their loyalty to the Indonesian Government; they had to return with a foot, hand, or head as a momento (Humans Rights Watch 2001). Indonesian forces in 2004 refused to let native Papuans fly their flag (Vermonte 2007 pg 279).

Note for Iris:

- The start date is heavily disputed because factions emerged at different times.
- The start date has to do with the original occupation/invasion of Papua by INS forces.

IV. REVOLUTIONARY FRONT FOR AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR (FRETILIN)

Min. Group Date: 1974

Max. Group Date: 1998

Onset: 1975

Aliases: Revolutionary Front For An Independent East Timor (Fretilin), Frente Revolucion_ria De Timor Leste Independente, Fretilin, Revolutionary Front For An Independent East Timor

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<https://fas.org/irp/world/para/timor.htm>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Falintil (armed wing)

Group Formation: 1974 (Schmid 1988 pg 576)

Group End: 1999 (FAS 1999)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Fretilin was established on May 20th, 1974, when it launched a rebellion against the Portuguese (Schmid and Jongman 1988, pg 576). Fretilin was a left leaning, separatist group (National Security Archive 2001). Fretilin won a civil war and took control of East Timor on September 8th, 1975 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, pg 576). Fretilin declared East Timor an independent nation in November 1975 (BBC 2017; National Security Archive 2001; Tanter 1977 pg 1; Schmid 1988 pg 576). Indonesia invaded East Timor in December 1975, and Fretilin opposed them (BBC 2017; Schmid and Jongman 1988, pg 576). The first recorded instance of violence was the Fretilin response to the UTD coup in early 1975 (FAS 1999; National Security Archive 2001).

Geography

Fretilin defeated UTD in Dilli (National Security Archive 2001). Fretilin took over all of East Timor except Atauro in 1975 (National Security Archive 2001; Tanter 1977). Fretilin fought the Indonesians over these villages; Zumalai, Letefoho, Soibada, Laclubar, Alaspuelicai Vemasse, Barique, Sat Berliu, Ossu, Uatolari, Venilale, Tutuala, Turis-casi and Lospalo (Tanter 1977, pg 2).

East Timor is mountainous, which is well suited for guerilla warfare (Tanter 1977, pg 2). In 1975, Indonesian forces captured towns along the Portuguese road system, but Fretilin controlled the surrounding areas (Tanter 1977, pg 2). Fretilin retreated to the mountains after being defeated by the Indonesians (Schmid and Jongman 1988, pg 576).

Organizational Structure

Falintil is the armed wing of Fretilin (BBC 2017; FAS 1999). Xanana Gusmao became the leader of Falintil in 1981 (BBC 2017; FAS 1999). Nicolau Lobato was the President of Fretilin (FAS 1999). Fretilin armed itself with Portugal's NATO arsenal (Tanter 1977, pg 2). Indonesian Intelligence reported Fretilin had an estimated 5,000 fighters in 1977 (Tanter 1977, pg 2). Fretilin was estimated to have 4,000 members in 1988 (Schmid

1988, pg 576). Fretilin had an estimated 200 members by the late 1990's (FAS 1999). Fretilin members are native Timorese who want independence (BBC 2017). There is no recorded evidence of how it funded itself, but Fretilin had foreign support.

Fretilin seems like it was an insurgency followed by a political party/movement and then it became an insurgency again when Indonesia invaded in 1975.

External Ties

Fretilin allied with the Timorese Democratic Union (UTD) in January 1975 (National Security Archive 2001). By August 1975, the alliance fell apart (National Security Archive 2001). UTD staged a coup in Dili and attacked Fretilin members (National Security Archive 2001; FAS 1999). Fretilin has support from labor, aid, student, and religious organizations in Australia (Tanter 1977, pg 4). While Australia never diplomatically backed Fretilin, the Australian government favored Fretilin's control over East Timor instead of Portugal due to the large amount of oil on the coastal shelf (Tanter 1977, pg 5). Australia felt that they could negotiate better terms regarding the oil with Fretilin instead of Portugal (Ibid.).

Mozambique, China, Cambodia, and Vietnam all supported Fretilin in name, but were unable to send supplies because of diplomatic complications (Tanter 1977, pg 5).

Group Outcome

Xanana Gusmao was arrested in 1992 (BBC 2017; FAS 1999). Gusmao was freed in 1999 after a referendum held by the UN showed the people of East Timor favored freedom (BBC 2017). The Indonesian government convinced UTD that Fretilin was planning a coup in 1975 (National Security Archive 2001).

Indonesian special forces attempted to incite clashes between Fretilin and anti-Fretilin groups including UTD (National Security Archive 2001). The Indonesian Government then invaded East Timor (National Security Archive 2001). Suharto labeled Fretilin as an almost Communist group (National Security Archive 2001). In 1975, Indonesian forces captured towns along the Portuguese road system, but Fretilin controlled the surrounding areas (Tanter 1977, pg 2). Indonesian forces used napalm, heavy bombings, and defoliants against Fretilin (Schmid and Jongman 1988, pg 576). Fretilin was defeated by the Indonesian forces by 1976 (FAS 1999). Once Fretilin was defeated and retreated to the mountainous areas, the Indonesian government attempted to starve Fretilin forces by cutting off food supply (Schmid and Jongman 1988 pg 576).

The Indonesian Government began Operation Seroja after their victory (FAS 1999). Operation Seroja consisted of the mass surrender of Fretilin fighters and leaders, culminating with the execution of Fretilin leader Nicolau Lobato (FAS 1999). Fretilin's last

guerilla activities were in 1999, though no specific instances are cited (FAS 1999). The insurgency ended in 1999 after a referendum that resulted in East Timor becoming an independent state (BBC 2017).

Notes for Iris:

-FRETILIN was originally a political movement that then declared themselves an insurgency.

-Civil war ends in 1999 and East Timor gains independence effectively ending the insurgency

V. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ULEMAS (MUI)

Min. Group Date: 1975

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: National Council Of Ulemas (Mui), Indonesian Council Of Ulemas (Mui), Indonesian Ulema Council, Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Mui)

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is a political council and not a militant group.

Group Formation: This is a political council and not a militant group.

Group End: This is a political council and not a militant group.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is no evidence this group was ever violent.

Geography

There is no evidence this group was ever violent.

Organizational Structure

There is no evidence this group was ever violent.

External Ties

There is no evidence this group was ever violent.

Group Outcome

There is no evidence this group was ever violent.

VI. FREE ACEH MOVEMENT (GAM)

Min. Group Date: 1976

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: 1990

Aliases: Free Aceh Movement (Gam), Aceh Security Disturbance Movement, Free Aceh Movement, Free Aceh Movement Government Council (Mp-Gam), Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Gam), Gerakin Aceh Merdeka (Gam)

Part 1. Bibliography

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- "Aceh Redux: the tsunami that helped stop a war." IRIN News. 2014. <http://www.irinnews.org/report/100960/aceh-redux-tsunami-helped-stop-war>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Aceh Security Disturbance Movement (GPK) (FAS 1999)

Group Formation: 1976 (MIPT 2008; BBC 2002)

Group End: 2005 treaty (MIPT 2008; Global Security n.d.; International Crisis Group 2006; IRIN News 2014).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

GAM seeks to establish an independent Islamic State in Aceh (MIPT 2008; Schmid 1988 pg 575; Paul 2013 pg 403). It is a separatist organization. GAM was formed in the 1970's and issued a formal declaration establishing itself in 1976 (MIPT 2008; FAS 1999; Schmid 1988, pg 575; Paul 2013, pg 404). GAM formed in response to centralized policies, which were unpopular in the area, passed by the Indonesian government (Paul 2013, pg 403). GAM was founded by Hassan Di Tiro (MIPT 2008; Paul 2013, pg 404). GAM opposed the Indonesian military (Paul 2013, pg 403, MIPT 2008), and targeted natural gas facilities (MIPT 2008; Paul 2013, pg 405). Its first violent attack was around 1976 (Global Security n.d.).

Geography

GAM is active in Aceh, the Northern tip of Sumatra (MIPT 2008; Schmid 1988 pg 575). The group is not transnational and does not have a transnational base of operations.

Organizational Structure

Iran and Libya provide GAM with funding and weapons (MIPT 2008). Hassan Di Tiro was the founder of GAM (MIPT 2008; Paul 2013, pg 404). Irwandi Yusuf was a GAM leader who was imprisoned (IRIN News 2014). GAM originally had 150 members when it formed (BBC 2002). It had a political wing known as MP-GAM.

GAM had between 24-200 members prior to the 1980s (Paul 2013, pg 404). In 1989, 150-800 GAM fighters returned from training in Libya (Paul 2013, pg 406). By 1999, GAM had 1000-2000 members (Paul 2013, pg 408). Members are Acehnese people who want autonomy (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The GAM leader, Hassan Di Tiro, lived in exile in Switzerland (MIPT 2008; FAS 1999), other sources say he resided in Sweden (Paul 2013 pg 407). Hassan Di Tiro led a GAM splinter known as Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ANSLF) (MIPT 2008). The original faction then became known as MP-GAM (MIPT 2008). In 2012 GAM split into

two political parties (IRIN News 2014). GAM was influenced by the Abode of Islam (Schmid 1988 pg 575).

During the 1980's GAM members trained in Libya (Paul 2013 pg 405). MP-GAM, the rival to GAM, is led by a Malaysian named, Teungku Don Zulfari (MIPT 2008). Iran and Libya explicitly provided GAM with funding and weapons (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

When GAM was first established, the Indonesian military arrested and often tortured GAM members and supporters (Paul 2013, pg 405). If they evaded arrest their families would be held hostage until they turned themselves in (Paul 2013, pg 405). The Indonesian government drove Hassan Di Tiro into exile before 1980 (Paul 2013, pg 405).

In 1989, GAM re-emerged. In response, the Indonesian government dispatched 6,000 soldiers to fight GAM and used Pagar bettis tactics (Paul 2013, pg 407). The Indonesian government could not agree on how to deal with GAM after 1998 (MIPT 2008). TNI wanted to impose martial law on Aceh (MIPT 2008). The United States wanted to train Indonesian forces in anti-terrorist methods but lobbied against the Indonesian Government imposing martial law (MIPT 2008).

The 2004 tsunami restarted negotiations between GAM and the Indonesian government (MIPT 2008; Paul 2013, pg 403). Indonesia declared martial law in Aceh in 2003 (IRIN News 2014; Paul 2013, pg 410).

GAM and the Indonesian government signed a comprehensive peace treaty in 2005 (MIPT 2008; Global Security n.d.; International Crisis Group 2006; IRIN News 2014; Paul 2013, pg 40). The treaty agreed that all local TNI agents would leave Aceh, GAM would disarm, all of its members would be granted amnesty, and that GAM would have local self-governance (MIPT 2008). GAM murdered 19 people in 2000 (BBC 2002). The Indonesian Government allowed former GAM leaders to run for Government in 2006 (International Crisis Group 2006). GAM leader Hassan Di Tiro, was suspected to have died in October 1980 (Schmid 1988 pg 575). Irwandi Yusuf was a GAM leader who was imprisoned (IRIN News 2014).

Notes for Iris:

- what separates GAM from OPM from FRETILIN?
- the tsunami has a huge effect on the group's capabilities
- cultural similarity between GAM and government in Jakarta
- they had a lot more support than the other insurgencies
- GAM didn't want to be a terrorist group which created incentives for the US government to pressure Indonesia to make a deal

VII. KOMANDO JIHAD (INDONESIAN)

Min. Group Date: 1981

Max. Group Date: 1981

Onset: NA

Aliases: Komando Jihad (Indonesian), Holy War Command, Indonesian Islamic Revolutionary Board

Part 1. Bibliography

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- GTD Perpetrator 100023. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=country&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&perpetrator=100023

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: no additional aliases

Group Formation: 1980 (Sydney Morning Herald)

Group End: 1989/1990 (merger into JI)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Komando Jihad was a DI splinter, which formed in the “mid-1970s” (Cribb and Kahin 2004, 18; MIPT 2008). There is dispute over whether Komando Jihad was established by former DI members wanting to continue DI’s mission to suppress threats to the government, or if the Indonesian Government created Komando Jihad to trick Islamic militants into fighting Communism and supporting an autocratic leader (MIPT 2008). The Government began to turn on Komando Jihad after the 1977 election (Daves 2014).

Komando Jihad is thought to be a renaming of a DI revival that was coerced by the government (Daves 2014). Ali Moertopo claimed he was using Komando Jihad to attract Muslims to Golkar (Daves 2014). It came to attention for its first violent attack in 1980 (Jenkins 2002). It turned violent in reaction to a massive government crackdown in 1980 or 1981.

Geography

Komando Jihad set off a time bomb in a Baptist Hospital in Bukittinggi (Daves 2014). Komando Jihad bombed a mosque and several heavily trafficked areas in 2014 (Daves 2014). Komando Jihad hijacked a plane and flew it to Bangkok (Jenkins 2002; Cribb 2004, pg 18; GTD 2017). Komando Jihad attacked a Cicendo Police station in Bandung (Cribb 2004, pg 18).

Organizational Structure

Ali Moertopo had extensive ties to Komando Jihad (Jenkins 2002; Cribb 2004, pg 18). Moertopo recruited influential Muslim leaders from jail, and coerced them into helping the military (Jenkins 2002). Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar were arrested for being Komando Jihad members (MIPT 2008). They went on to form JI (MIPT 2008). Daud Beureueh was selected to be the Komando Jihad commander (Daves 2014). Ismail Pranoto was a Komando Jihad commander who was tried by the Indonesian government (Daves 2014). Komando Jihad practiced fa’i to fund itself (Daves 2014). Komando Jihad was a DI splinter (Cribb 2004, pg 218). Members were ex-militants from DI or from the government. Komando Jihad may have received government funding.

External Ties

Komando Jihad had extensive ties to Indonesian Special Forces and Ali Moertopo before relations broke down between the two after 1977 (Daves 2014). Komando Jihad paved the way for JI (Cribb 2004 pg 18).

Group Outcome

The Government began to turn on Komando Jihad after the 1977 election (Daves 2014). Komando Jihad had a famous hijacking in 1981 (MIPT 2008). The hijacking brought

Komando Jihad a lot of publicity, which caused the Indonesia government to turn its attention to the group and respond (MIPT 2008).

Ismail Pranoto was a Komando Jihad commander who was tried by the Indonesian government (Daves 2014). The Indonesian Government kidnapped Daud Beureueh and kept him on house arrest (Daves 2014). Even Ali Moertopo's main Komando Jihad informant Danu Muhammad Hasan was arrested by the Indonesian government (Daves 2014). Komando Jihad leader Imran Muhammad Zein was executed for his involvement in Komando Jihad (Cribb 2004 pg 18). The group's last known attack was in 1989 (Cribbs 2014, 18). Komando Jihad may have formed the basis for JI and merged with it later (Cribb 2004 pg 18). Komando Jihad is no longer active (MIPT 2008).

Notes for Iris:

- This might just be another name for DI and not a distinct organization.
- This is a govt-sponsored militant group designed to fight the communists but it "got out of hand" and the government was forced to intervene
- This might just be a front organization because the government blames a lot of attacks on DI and Komando Jihad
- It's similar to some of the smaller paramilitary groups in Bangladesh

VIII. ARMED FORCES FOR LIBERATION OF EAST TIMOR (FALINTIL)

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 1995

Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is the armed wing of FRETILIN.

Group Formation: This is the armed wing of FRETILIN.

Group End: This is the armed wing of FRETILIN.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is the armed wing of FRETILIN.

Geography

This is the armed wing of FRETILIN.

Organizational Structure

This is the armed wing of FRETILIN.

External Ties

This is the armed wing of FRETILIN.

Group Outcome

This is the armed wing of FRETILIN.

IX. NINJAS

Min. Group Date: 1993

Max. Group Date: 2003

Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Note: error in TORG dataset - lists Congo Ninjas and Indonesia Ninjas as same group; the resources here are for the East Timor Ninjas

Part 1. Bibliography

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- "Indonesia Urged to Suppress 'Ninja' War." 1995(b). South China Morning Post (1946-Current), Feb 15, 13.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1535872282?accountid=14026>.
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<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1535872525?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases encountered

Group Formation: 1991 (South China Morning Post 1995-A, South China Morning Post 1995-B, South China Morning Post 1995-C)

Group End: 1999 in Indonesia, but still active in East Timor as late as 2010 (Keating 2010; Fisher 2010)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Ninjas was originally a term used to describe death squads that were prevalent in terrorizing citizens during East Timor's struggle for independence (Keating 2010; Fisher 2010). The group has no politicized opposition to the government. The group formed in 1991. During the mid 1990's Ninja outbreak, Ninjas would beat up citizens who were opposed to Indonesian rule (South China Morning Post 1995-A). It is unknown precisely when they form, but are first mentioned in 1991 (South China Morning Post 1995a; South China Morning Post 1995b; PGM 2014).

Geography

The Ninjas had an attack in Los Palos, Indonesia in 1998 (GTD 2017). The Ninjas attacked citizens and an NGO in Dili, East Timor (GTD 2017). The Ninjas murdered a 15- year-old girl in Bobonaro (Keating 2010). The Ninjas murdered a Baby in Covalima (Keating 2010). The Ninjas attacked a car of an Australian man in Dili in 1995 (South China Morning Post 1995-C)

Organizational Structure

There were at least 22 members in 2010 (Tharoor 2010; Keating 2010). No additional information could be about the group's organizational structure, leadership, funding, or membership.

External Ties

The Ninjas are suspected of having extensive ties with the Indonesian military (South China Morning Post 1995-B).

Group Outcome

During 1995, Ninja local vigilante groups fought the mysterious Ninjas in Dili (South China Morning Post 1995-A). Military officials told citizens to trust the military in response to the Ninja attacks in Dili (South China Morning Post 1995-C).

East Timor's Police Chief personally led an anti-Ninja operation in 2010 (Tharoor 2010). 20 Ninja members were arrested in 2010 (Tharoor 2010; Keating 2010). NGO's in Dili claim that the politicians are exaggerating the threat posed by the Ninjas to justify their actions (Tharoor 2010; Fisher 2010). The group's last known attack in Indonesia was in 1998 (GTD 2017). It was active and violent in East Timor as late as 2010 (Tharoor 2010; Keating 2010).

Notes for Iris:

- allegedly, the government has exaggerated the threat of this group to justify police brutality
- there is no evidence of politicized opposition

- X. JEMAAH ISLAMIYA
Min. Group Date: 1993
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Jemaah Islamiya (Ji), Jemaah Islamiah

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Jema'a Islamiyya, Jemaah Islamiyyah, Jemaah Islamiya, Jamaah Islamiyah, Jamaa Islamiya, Jemaah Islam, Jemahh Islamiyah, Jama'ah Islamiyah, Al-Jama'ah Al Islamiyyah, Islamic Group and Islamic Community (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Group Formation: JI was formed in 1993, but the first recorded attack was in December of 2000 (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Crenshaw 2015).

Group End: JI's last successful attack was in 2009 (Crenshaw 2015; Counter Extremism Project n.d.)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There are reports of groups calling themselves Jemaah Islamiyah as early as the 1970's, but these groups were informal gatherings of Indonesian Muslims with similar beliefs (Global Security n.d.). JI was founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in the late 1980s when they fled from Indonesia to Malaysia (Crenshaw 2015; Australian National Security n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 3), to escape prison sentences for their affiliation with Darul Islam (DI), a former Indonesian insurgency (Crenshaw 2015).

In 1992 Sungkar had an ideological dispute with fellow DI leader Ajengan Masduki, which led him to leave DI and form JI (Gordon 2011 pg 3). JI became an official group in 1993 (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

JI's goal was to overthrow the Indonesian government and establish an Islamic State encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and the southern Philippines (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Global Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016; MIPT Knowledge Base 2008). In Malaysia, they gathered a group of Southeast Asian Muslims to send to Afghanistan for military training and for fighting the USSR (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Gordon 2011, pg 3; Mackenzie Institute 2016). While training in Afghanistan JI members made lasting connections with Afghan militant leaders, including Osama Bin Laden (Gordon 2011, pg 3). Al Qaeda influenced JI leaders to use violent tactics to achieve their goals (BBC 2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2009).

JI relocated several training camps to the Philippines by the mid-1990's (Crenshaw 2015). The first verifiable attack by JI was a string of attacks on Christian Churches and clergy members throughout Southeast Asia in December of 2000 (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Refworld 2016 pg 3). In the early 2000s, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir announced the focus of JI attacks would shift from Southeast Asian Christians to Western and specifically American targets (Crenshaw 2015). The attacks then began to occur in public places, as JI became more willing to have Muslim lives become collateral damage in their attacks (Crenshaw 2015; Gordon 2011, pg 4). JI has also been recorded to have opposed Jewish interests (Australian National Security n.d.).

Geography

JI was founded in Malaysia by Indonesians (Crenshaw 2015; Gordon 2011, pg 3). JI recruits originally trained in Afghanistan (Crenshaw 2015; Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

JI established training camps in the southern Philippines by the mid 1990's (Crenshaw 2015; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 3). One such camp was within the MILF's Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao (Gordon 2011, pg 3). JI members also trained in Pakistan (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 3). JI relocated to Indonesia in 1998 in response to an economic and political crisis caused by the death of the Indonesian President (Crenshaw 2015; Gordon 2011 pg 3). JI has branches in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, and the Philippines (BBC 2012; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Global Security n.d.).

Jl members attacked Christian churches and clergy members in West Java, Sumatra and Lombok (Crenshaw 2015; Gordon 2000, pg 4), as well as in Maluku and Sulawesi (Australian National Security n.d.). The majority of Jl's members are concentrated in Java (Australian National Security n.d.). Jl bombed Christian churches in Indonesia and the Philippines in December 2000 (Crenshaw 2015; Australian National Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016). In 2002, Jl bombed nightclubs in Bali (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Australian National Security n.d.; Global Security n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 1; Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Jl unsuccessfully planned to attack the American, Australian, Israeli, and British embassies in Singapore (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Australian National Security n.d.; Global Security n.d.). Jl bombed hotels and the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Australian National Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016). In 2005, there was a suicide bomber attacked attributed to Jl in Bali (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Gordon 2011 pg 1; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Jl has sent members to fight in the Islamic resistance in Syria (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Jl had a cell in Australia (Australian National Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir founded Jl (Crenshaw 2015; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Abdullah Sungkar died from natural causes in 1998 in Indonesia (Crenshaw 2015; Gordon 2011, pg 3; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Noordin Top was the leader of the cell that perpetrated the 2004 Jakarta and 2005 Bali violent attacks (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Gordon 2011, pg 4). Noordin Top was a prominent Jl leader until he was killed by Indonesian police in 2009 (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Jl was estimated to have more than 900 members in Indonesia alone in 2007 (Refworld 2016, pg 1; Crenshaw 2015), and around 3,000 total members in 2012 (Crenshaw 2015). Jl recruits members from a network of Islamic boarding schools that teach an extremist interpretation of Islam (Crenshaw 2015; Australian National Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Jl also recruits from prisons and religious study groups (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Jl recruits from social outreach programs, such as providing relief after natural disasters or providing opportunities for the poor (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Global Security n.d.).

Al Qaeda provided funding for Jl during its' formation (Crenshaw 2015). Since then, Jl has acquired funding through charities, legal and illegal business, member contributions, and financiers from the Middle East, specifically Yemen and Saudi Arabia (Crenshaw 2015). Jl split into two factions; members who wanted to use violence to achieve their

goals, and proselytizers who wanted to spread JI ideology through preaching (BBC 2012; Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

JI has a charter and operational guide known as “General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah” (PUPJI) which describes JI’s governing religious principles and objectives (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 3). This charter describes the operational organization of JI; JI is divided into regional units referred to as Mantiqi (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 3). Each Mantiqi serves a different administrative purpose: Mantiqi I in Singapore and Malaysia finances JI operations; Mantiqi II in Indonesia is where most of JI’s attacks occur; Mantiqi III includes training camps in Mindanao, Borneo and Sulawesi; Mantiqi IV in Australia and West Papua provides fundraising (Ibid.). Each Mantiqi is divided into smaller cells known as Wakalah (Ibid.). The decentralized nature of JI allows it to continue its activities even when important leadership is arrested or killed (Ibid.).

External Ties

Al Qaeda provided tactical advice and funding for JI during its formation (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Australian National Security n.d.; Global Security n.d.). Some refer to JI as Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian wing (Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Gordon 2011 pg 3).

JI members continue to train with the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Gordon 2011 pg 3). Iraq, Libya, and Syria all financed and supported JI prior to 1987 (Global Security n.d.).

JI once had an Australian cell called Mantiqi IV that opposed Jewish interests in Australia but never committed a violent attack against them (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). JI regional leaders were involved with a second plane attack on the United States that was meant to follow the 9/11 bombings (Australian National Security n.d.).

JI and the MILF had strong ties (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012; Australian National Security n.d.; Gordon 2011 pg 3). JI also has ties to ASG (Australian National Security n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 3). After the Bali bombings, radical splinter groups and associates continued to perpetrate violent attacks in the name of JI (Crenshaw 2015); these are collectively known as non-structural JI (Gordon 2011, pg 4). JI members have worked with the Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI) (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Global Security n.d.).

JI has sent members to fight in the Islamic resistance in Syria (Australian National Security n.d.; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). In 2014, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir declared JI’s

allegiance to ISIS from prison, while active leadership of JI is firmly anti-ISIS (Crenshaw 2015). JI has ties to many other Southeast Asian groups also inspired by DI, including Jamaah Anshurat Tauhid, Front Pembela Islam, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, KOMPAK, Lashkar Jundullah, and Majelis Dakwah Umat Indonesia (Crenshaw 2015; Australian National Security n.d.). JI has extensive ties with the Nusra Front (Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

Group Outcome

The Singaporean, Philippine, and Malaysian governments have all actively opposed JI operations within their own country (Crenshaw 2015).

Indonesia resisted foreign pressure, especially from the United States, to take action against JI until the Bali bombings of 2002 (Crenshaw 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2009). After the government persecution following the Bali bombings, JI leaders wanted to shift the group's purpose to religious outreach rather than violent public attacks (Crenshaw 2015; Global Security n.d.; Gordon 2011, pg 2). The bombings and ensuing violence in Bali in 2005 shifted the public's view of JI and made it acceptable for politicians to persecute JI (Gordon 2011, pg 6). By the mid 2000s, JI was crippled by the national security efforts of several countries (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012). The Indonesian Government has targeted and disabled the Mantiqi system (Gordon 2011, pg 6). JI has been downsized to the territory of Mantiqi II, and is likely not growing in size (Refworld 2016 pg 1).

Southeast Asian governments have arrested over 400 members and essential leaders of JI since 2002 while also killing much of JI's leadership (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2012). JI splinter groups and other extremist groups in Indonesia have been more active than JI lately (Crenshaw 2015). In 2007, a suspected JI member, Wiwin Kalahe, turned himself in and informed the Indonesian authorities about a number of JI safe houses in Java (Refworld 2016 pg 1-2). The Indonesian government then put the safe houses under surveillance (Ibid.). They followed two men from the safe house and were led to a home with a weapon stockpile (Ibid.). There, the police arrested four men and killed one; one of the arrested men led them to a weapon and explosives cache (Ibid.). The last recorded attack by JI is in 2009 (Crenshaw 2015; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). In 2015, Philippine armed forces raided a JI camp in Mamasapano and forty-three Philippine police officers were killed (Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

XI. KUMPULAN MUJAHIDIN MALAYSIA

Min. Group Date: 1995

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (Kmm), KMM, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Malaysian Mujahideen Movement, Malaysian Mujahideen Group (Global Security n.d.) MASSA-Pakindo, Halaqoh-Pakindo (Aslan 2009, pg 119 & 121)

Group Formation: KMM was formed in 1995 (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; Abdullah 2016; Aslan 2009, pg 114). KMM was first discovered by the Malaysian government in 2001, KMM perpetrated attacks beforehand, but not all were recorded.

Group End: KMM stopped using violence in 2003. Arrests made by the Malaysian government crippled KMM and it is no longer active.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

KMM's goal is to establish an Islamic state (Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara) that includes Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Southern Philippines (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; Arosoaie 2016; MITP Knowledge Base 2008; US Department of State 2005). KMM wants to overthrow the Mahathir government (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). KMM also wants to kill Muslims who converted to another religion or denounced Islam (Abdullah 2016, pg 16; Aslan 2009, pg 120). The Malaysian police suspect that three Indonesian extremists inspired KMM to use militant strategies to achieve their goals (Federation of American Scientists 2003). KMM is influenced by the Salafi-Wahhabi tenets (Arosoaie 2016). KMM's first attack was a robbery in Selangor, which occurred no later than 2001 (Arosoaie 2016).

KMM was established by Zainon Ismail in 1995 (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; Abdullah 2016, pg; Aslan 2009 pg, 114). Other sources say the group was founded in 1996 (Arosoaie 2016). KMM was originally known as MASSA-Pakindo (Aslan 2009 pg, 119). KMM was originally a secret organization within the PAS (Aslan 2009 pg, 119). Zainon Ismail founded KMM by gathering members of Halaqah Pakindo, a group of Malaysian ex-Mujahidin who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets (Abdullah 2015 pgs 2 & 13). MASSA-Pakindo became KMM when Zainon Ismail handed over leadership to Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz in 1999 (Aslan 2009 pg, 121).

Geography

The group is transnational, but primarily operates in Malaysia with secondary operations in the Philippines and Indonesia.

KMM is reported to have branches in the Malaysian states of Perak, Johor, Kedah, Selangor, Terengganu, Kelantan, and the territory of Wilayah Persukutuan that includes Kuala Lumpur (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; US Department of State 2005). KMM had a meeting in Kampung Seri Aman, Puchong to appoint a leader (Global Security n.d.). KMM has sent members to fight Christians in Ambon, Indonesia (Global Security n.d.; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). KMM bombed the port city of Klang in 2000 (Global Security n.d.). KMM bombed a Hindu temple in Kuala Lumpur in 2000 (Global Security n.d.; Abdullah 2016 pg, 16; Aslan 2009 pg, 148). KMM killed a provincial assembly legislator and raided a police arsenal in Kedah in November of 2000 (Global Security n.d.; Aslan 2009 pg, 147; Jones 2005 pg, 175). KMM members train in the Southern Philippines at the Abu Bakar and Hudaibiyah camps (Arosoaie 2016).

KMM members from the Selangor cell trained in the Indonesian Mujahidin in Pulau Moti Halmahera, North Maluku, and then Pulau Ngele-ngele Maluku (Abdullah 2016, pg 16)

Organizational Structure

Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz became the leader of KMM in 1999 (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz is suspected to be a puppet leader appointed because of his father's reputation (Aslan 2009 pg, 124). Abu Bakar Bashir and Hambali were suspected to have the real power (Aslan 2009 pg, 124; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz studied in Pakistan, and visited Afghanistan even after the Russians were defeated (Global Security n.d.). KMM is estimated to have 70-80 members (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). KMM is suspected to be self-funded (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; US Department of State 2005). KMM bought weapons from arms dealers in Southern Thailand and Batam island, Indonesia (Aslan 2009, pg 126).

KMM members were recruited through the Halaqa Pakindon to avoid government detection (Abdullah 2016, pg 13). Many KMM members went to Islamic schools in Pakistan, Egypt, and India (Arosoaie 2016). The majority of KMM members originated from the Malaysian states of Selangor, Kedah, Terengganu, Perak, Kelantan and Johor (Arosoaie 2016). KMM members train in the Southern Philippines at the Abu Bakar and Hudaibiyah camps (Arosoaie 2016). In April 2000, the Selangor cell sent two groups to train in Indonesia (Abdullah 2016 pg 16). To gain proficiency in military strategy KMM members enlisted in the askar wataniya, a reserve of the Malaysian Army (Arosoaie 2016; Abdullah 2016 pg 23).

KMM became more organized with Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz as the leader (Abdullah 2016, pgs 14-17; Aslan 2009 pg, 125-135). He established committees known as "lujnah" (Ibid.). Zainuri Kamarudin headed the Economic Committee (Ibid.). The Economic Committee generated funds from donations and membership funds; each member was expected to contribute between nine and seventeen Australian dollars a month (Ibid.). Nik Adli himself was in charge of the Training Committee (Tarbiyyah) (Ibid.). The Training Committee increased membership, poaching university students and recruiting talented student leaders (Ibid.). Solehan Abd Ghafar was the head of the Communications Committee (Ibid.). The Communications Committee transported members to and from Pakistan for military training (Ibid.). The two committees permitted to use violence were the Operational Committee led by Zulkifli Abd Hir, and the Mu'askar Committee (Military) led by Tajudin Abu Bakar (Ibid.). The Operational Committee's job was to kill Muslims who converted to another religion or denounced Islam, use violence against non-Muslims, and be prepared to launch Jihad against the Mahathir government (Ibid.). The Mu'askar Committee's purpose was to assist the Operational Committee by obtaining weapons (Ibid.). There were KMM cells in the Malaysian states of Perak, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, Selangor, and Johore that were led by a leader with no committee members (Ibid.).

External Ties

KMM is reported to have connections with Laskar Jihad and the Thai separatist group PULO (Global Security n.d.; MITP Knowledge Base 2008.). KMM has sent members to fight Christians in Indonesia (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). Arrested members of KMM reported to have fought with the Afghan Mujahidin against the Soviets (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; Arosoaie 2016; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). Other arrested members reported having ties to Muslim separatist groups in Indonesia and the Philippines (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). The Malaysian government suspects smaller and more violent groups with the same ideology have splintered off KMM (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). KMM members became Malay IS members (Arosoaie 2016). KMM has ties with the KMK and the KPIP (Aslan 2009, pg 116). The Selangor cell of KMM, known as K3M, had close ties with JI and Al Qaeda (Arosoaie 2016). K3M became a more radical splinter of KMM (Aslan 2009, pg 141). KMM had close ties with JI and Al Qaeda (Abdullah 2016, pg 24; Aslan 2009, pg 114; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). JI and KMM members assisted KMM members with transportation to training camps (Abdullah 2016 pg 16). Relations between JI and KMM evolved through personal relationships of group members (Abdullah 2016, pg 23). JI then helped KMM meet with MILF leaders to work out a deal where KMM members could train at MILF camps, but the deal did not work out because KMM could not afford the payment the MILF requested (Abdullah 2016, pgs 23-24).

Group Outcome

KMM was first discovered by the Malaysian government after a botched robbery on May 18th, 2001 (Aslan 2009, pg 114). In 2000, the Malaysian Government arrested 10 KMM members under the International security Act (ISA) (Global Security n.d.). 9 of the 10 members arrested in 2000 under the ISA had their detainments extended for two more years (Global Security n.d.). Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz was held by the Malaysian government under the ISA (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003; Aslan 2009, pg 114; MITP Knowledge Base 2008). In 2002, the Malaysian government investigated over 200 suspected members of KMM (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). In 2003, the Malaysian government held 48 members of KMM under the ISA (Global Security n.d.; Federation of American Scientists 2003). The Malaysian government held KMM sympathizers as well as members under the ISA (Arosoaie 2016). When the Royal Malaysian Police began arresting “terrorists” they did not know the difference between JI and KMM members (Aslan 2009, pg 124). The Malaysian government’s constant monitoring and 2001-2002 arrests of the KMM members and sympathizers crippled the group’s ability to carry out violent acts (Arosoaie 2016; Aslan 2009 pg 162). No information could be found about Indonesian counterinsurgency operations against the group.

- **Flag Malay IS → look up**
- **Selangor cell → favors Indonesia over Philippines → look up status of K3M in 2017**
- **2002 context (9/11) key**
- **NOTE: (LT) There is a super informative chart on the organizational structure on page 15 of the Abdullah source**

XII. NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB)

Min. Group Date: 1995

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: National Awakening Party (Pkb), National Awakening Party

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: There is no evidence this group was violent.

Group Formation: There is no evidence this group was violent.

Group End: There is no evidence this group was violent.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is no evidence this group was violent.

Geography

There is no evidence this group was violent.

Organizational Structure

There is no evidence this group was violent.

External Ties

There is no evidence this group was violent.

Group Outcome

There is no evidence this group was violent.

Indonesia Cases Part 2, 1997-2000
Last Updated: 23 July 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T1318	DAYAKS		1997	2001
T184	FRONT PEMBELA ISLAM (FPI)		1997	2006
T2011	KOMANDO LASKAR ISLAM		1998	0
T857	DYNAMIC YOUTH FORUM		1998	2010
T469	SOUTH MALUKU REPUBLIC		1998	0
T2013	MER-C		1998	0
T766	NUSANTARA ISLAMIC MUJAHIDEEN FRONT		1999	0
T2409	PEOPLE'S SOVEREIGNTY PARTY (PDR)		1999	1999
T2015	MUJAHEDIN COUNCIL OF INDONESIA (MMI)		2000	0
T603	MALUKU SOVEREIGNTY FRONT (FKM)		2000	0
T2012	BETAWI BROTHERHOOD FORUM (FBR)		2000	0
T753	LASKAR JIHAD		2000	2002
T340	ANTI-COMMUNIST COMMAND (KAK)		2000	2000
T1187	MUJAHIDEEN DIVISION KHANDAQ		2000	0

- I. DAYAKS
 Min. Group Date: 1997
 Max. Group Date: 2001
 Onset: NA

Aliases: Dayak Gang, Dayaks

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Dayak tribesmen (BBC 2001), Dayak raiders (Human Rights Watch 1997)

Group Formation: 1997 (Washington Post 2001; New York Times 2001; Human Rights Watch 1997)

Group End: The group was last active in 2001 (New York Times 2001)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Dayak tribes turned violent in 1997 (Washington Post 2001; New York Times 2001; Human Rights Watch 1997). Dayak tribesmen attack Madurese that immigrate to Borneo (BBC 2001; New York Times 2001; U.S Committee for Refugees 2002). Dayak tribes people feel that immigrants are a threat to their way of life (BBC 1999). Dayak tribes believe the immigrants are the result of a government policy, which encouraged migration (BBC 1999). The first recorded violent incident was in 1997 when Dayak gangs killed 3,000 immigrants (New York Times 2001).

Geography

Dayak tribesmen attacked Madurese immigrants in Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan (BBC 2001; Washington Post 2001; U.S Committee for Refugees 2002). Dayak is active in Borneo (BBC 2001; Washington Post 2001; U.S Committee for Refugees 2002). Dayak was active on the island of Madura (BBC 1999). Dayaks had attacks in Sampit

(Washington Post 2001). Dayaks roam the countryside (New York Times 2001). The group is not transnational.

Organizational Structure

Members of Dayak gangs are from the Dayak ethnic group (Washington Post 2001). Mohammed Usop is the appointed leader of the Dayaks (New York Times 2001). It is unknown how many members there are.

External Ties

Ethnic Malay and Dayak forces work together to drive out immigrants (BBC 2001; BBC 1999; U.S Committee for Refugees 2002). Malaysia increased its troop presence along the border to prevent spillover violence (BBC 2001).

Group Outcome

Police attempted to stop violence in Palangkaraya in 2001, but were overwhelmed (BBC 1999; Washington Post 2001; New York Times 2001). Three Dayak leaders were flown to Jakarta for questioning (Washington Post 2001). The Dayak leader, Mohammed Usop declared victory for the Dayaks in 2001 (New York Times 2001). Malaysia increased its troop presence along the border to prevent spillover violence (BBC 2001). The group's last violent attack was in 2001 (New York Times 2001).

Notes for Iris:

- government encouraged immigration after Asian Financial Crisis to Kalimantan in order to encourage farming and growth. This encroached on the Dayak way of life.
- Police were unable to quell the violence despite their efforts. Police tried to crush the Dayak immigrants - lots of indiscriminate violence.
- Dayaks just wanted immigrants to leave - never any clear politicized opposition.
- mostly communal violence

- II. FRONT PEMBELA ISLAM (FPI)
Min. Group Date: 1997
Max. Group Date: 2006
Onset: NA

Aliases: Islamic Defenders' Front (Fpi), Front For Defenders Of Islam, Front For Defenders Of Islam (Fpi), Front Pembela Islam (Fpi), Islamic Defenders Front

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Peter Chalk, Angela Rabasa, William Roseneau. The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment. RAND 2009. P. 71
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG846.pdf
- Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, Indonesia: 1. Please provide some general background about the Front Pembela Islam (FPI). Please also provide information on the relationship between the FPI and the police. 2. Please provide information on the relationship between the FPI and the Ahmadiyya. Please also provide information on the situation of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia more generally. 3. What is the situation in Indonesia with regard to inter-faith marriages? Specifically: what information is available on the marriage of a Muslim man to a Christian female?, 26 March 2009, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b6fe2045.html>
- Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, Indonesia: 1) Please provide information on Islam Muhammadiyah (or Muhammadiyah) 2) Please provide information on Front Pembela Islam (FPI) 3) Please provide information on the Nahdlatul Ulama Organisation of Islam (NU) 4) Please provide information on whether the authorities protect NU over Islam Muhammadiyah. 5) Please provide any further information which may be of assistance, 21 January 2009, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b6fe2010.html>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 1997 (MIPT 2008)

Group End: 2008 (violent), 2017 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

FPI was formed in 1997 (MIPT 2008) although some other sources say FPI was formed in 1998 (Chalk 2009, pg 71). FPI formed after the financial crisis (MIPT 2008). FPI was founded by Habib Muhammad, Rizieq Shihab, and KH Misbahul Anam (Chalk 2009, pg 71). FPI has an Islamist ideology. FPI's political aim is to implement and enforce Sharia Law (Chalk 2009, pg 710). FPI attacks businesses and other institutions that it deems has broken Islamic law (MIPT 2008). FPI attacks brothels, bars, nightclubs, and gambling outlets (Chalk 2009, pg 72). FPI members have persecuted members of the Ahmadiyah movement (Chalk 2009 pg 72). FPI's first recorded violent attacks were attacking student anti-government protests before 2002 (Chalk 2009, pg 72).

Geography

FPI was founded at Pesantren al-Umm Ciputat in South Jakarta (Chalk 2009 pg 71). FPI has members in 22 of Indonesia's provinces (Chalk 2009 pg 73). FPI attacked journalists in Jakarta (GTD 2017). FPI had an attack in Subang (GTD 2017). The group is not transnational.

Organizational Structure

FPI allegedly funds itself through business extortion (MIPT 2008). FPI has received funding from Saudi Arabia (Chalk 2009, pg 74).

FPI has approximately 3,000 members (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2009, pg 73). Other estimates say FPI membership is in the tens of thousands (Refugee Review Tribunal 2009). FPI members are mostly young men who perpetrate attacks while wearing white robes and armed with stones, machetes, and sticks (MIPT 2008). It does not systematically recruit from any background although members are often unemployed youth. FPI members come from the outskirts of Jakarta, including Ciputat and Bekasi (Chalk 2009, pg 73). FPI was founded by Habib Muhammad, Rizieq Shihab, and KH Misbahul Anam (Chalk 2009, pg 71). Sobri Lubis was the secretary general of FPI (Chalk 2009, pg 72). FPI has a militant wing called Komando Laskar Islam (Chalk 2009, pg 71).

FPI has four tiers of leadership: the central command (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat), the principal command (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat), the district command (Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah), and the subdistrict command (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang) (Chalk 2009, pg 73).

External Ties

FPI has spoken out against the United States presence in Indonesia and Afghanistan and has threatened to target Westerners in retaliation, but has never done so (MIPT 2008). FPI operated a refugee camp after the 2004 tsunami (MIPT 2008). FPI targeted Christian aid groups that tried to set up refugee camps after the 2004 tsunami (MIPT 2008). FPI has received funding from Saudi Arabia (Chalk 2009, pg 74).

FPI has allied with Hahdatul Ulama to oppose the Papernas (Chalk 2009, pg 74). FPU has also worked with HTI and Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah Pasuruan (Chalk 2009, pg 74).

Group Outcome

FPI was once used as a proxy for the military to attack anti-government protesters (Chalk 2009, pg 72). Rizieq Shihab was arrested in 2002, and jailed for seven months (Chalk 2009, pg 72). In 2006 police sponsored a speaking tour for Rizieq Shihab (Refugee Review Tribunal 2009). Police arrested 59 members of FPI (Refugee Review Tribunal 2009). The last recorded incident of violence was in 2008 (Chalk 2009, pg 73). It is believed to still be active as of 2017 (Foreign Policy 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- this is very similar to Hisba in Nigeria.
- this is very similar to Kashmir groups (LeT)
- the group mainly wants to shame individuals who don't participate in Sharia law
- there is no clear politicized opposition to the group
- they were very opposed to Christian aid groups because they thought they were proselytizing
- they moved to Aceh after the tsunami (there was a faction in Sumatra)

III. KOMANDO LASKAR ISLAM
Min. Group Date: 1998
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is the armed wing of the FPI (RAND 2009).

Group Formation: This is the armed wing of the FPI (RAND 2009).

Group End: This is the armed wing of the FPI (RAND 2009).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is the armed wing of the FPI (RAND 2009).

Geography

This is the armed wing of the FPI (RAND 2009).

Organizational Structure

This is the armed wing of the FPI (RAND 2009).

External Ties

This is the armed wing of the FPI (RAND 2009).

Group Outcome

This is the armed wing of the FPI (RAND 2009).

IV. MUJAHIDEEN KOMPAK

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 2010

Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- "MUJAHIDEEN KOMPAK." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4141, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-gP05IM7aH41bHYL4ffcS-M8YqOHaFI4seuTSCvGAvs/edit>
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- Peter Chalk, Angela Rabasa, William Roseneau. The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment. RAND 2009. P. 75 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG846.pdf
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- International Crisis Group (ICG), Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso, 13 October 2005, Asia Report N°103, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/43bd25804.html>
- International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), 6 July 2010, Asia Briefing N°107, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c74b9d92.html>

- “Mujahidin KOMPAK.” Global Security. N.d.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kompak.htm>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Mujahedin Kompak, Crisis Management/Prevention Committee, Crisis Management-Prevention Committee, Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis, Kompac, Kompak, Laskar Mujahideen Kompak, Mujahideen Kompak, Dynamic Youth Forum

Group Formation: 2001 (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017; Global Security n.d.)

Group End: 2005 (MIPT 2008)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention for a violent attack in 2001 (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017; Global Security n.d.). Mujahideen Kompak is a splinter of JI (MIPT 2008; IG 2005 pg i; Global Security n.d.). Mujahideen Kompak wants to create an Islamic State in Indonesia (MIPT 2008). Mujahideen Kompak was a unit of JI that trained and equipped JI recruits (Mujahideen Kompak (MIPT 2008). Mujahideen Kompak splintered from JI citing its poor bureaucracy and slow operations (MIPT 2008). The first recorded attack was in 2001 (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017; Global Security n.d.).

Geography

Mujahideen Kompak is based in Central Sulawesi (MIPT 2008; Global Security n.d.). Mujahideen Kompak attacked a church in North Jakarta (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). Mujahideen Kompak conducted an attack in Poso (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2009, pg 76; ICG 2005, pg i). Mujahideen Kompak conducted an attack in Maluku (ICG 2005, pg i). Mujahideen Kompak set up a base in Kebun Cengkeh (ICG 2005 pg 7). The group has transnational ties, but does not conduct transnational attacks.

Organizational Structure

Mujahideen Kompak was formed by Abu Jibril (Chalk 2009 pg 76). Mujahideen Kompak leaders had previously been members of JI (MIPT 2008). Mujahideen Kompak members hail from Sulawesi, Java, Sumatra, and Maluku (ICG 2005, pg i). Mujahideen Kompak had religious outreach branches (ICG 2005, pg 9). No clear size estimates.

Mujahideen Kompak is the armed wing of KOMPAK, a Muslim charity (ICG 2005, pg 2). It poached donations meant for their charity wing, KOMPAK, to fund operations (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

Mujahideen Kompak has close ties with Laskar Mujahidin (ICG 2005, pg 2). Mujahideen Kompak has worked closely with JI and Mujahidin Kayamanya (ICG 2005, pg 9). Mujahideen rivals and sometimes has violent conflicts with JI and Laskar Jihad (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

The last recorded attack was in 2005 (MIPT 2008). The group is not considered violent after this date. There is no further evidence of counterinsurgency.

Notes for Iris:

- this was an originally specially trained unit of JI that perpetuated attacks in Ambon, but they became frustrated with the bureaucratic delay from JI which caused the splinter.
- they didn't like the bureaucracy
- most members are very highly trained elite fighters from JI; they also trained and equipped other members
- this was an amicable splinter; they worked closely with JI and they never had any fight
- there probably isn't a lot of info because they're probably misleadingly classified as still part of JI
- similar to India charity-armed wing relationship with laundering
- it's unknown what happened to the group. They may have re-merged with JI or evolved into another group.
- they are probably not well-equipped to continue fighting for a long time because they lose all the connections to JI

V. SOUTH MALUKU REPUBLIC

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: South Maluku Republic (Rms), Republik Maluku Selatan, South Maluku Republic

Part 1. Bibliography

- "SOUTH MALUKU REPUBLIC." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3665, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism,

<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-gP05IM7aH41bHYL4ffcS-M8YqOHaFI4seuTSCvGAvs/edit>

- International Crisis Group (ICG), Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso, 13 October 2005, Asia Report N°103, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/43bd25804.html>
- Searched Proquest
 - South maluku republic
 - "South maluku republic"
 - "South maluku republic" 1998
- Searched gScholar
 - South maluku republic
 - Republic of south maluku
 - Republic south moluccan

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Republik Maluku Selatan or RMS (MIPT 2008)

Group Formation: 1998 (MIPT 2008)

Group End: 2001 (MIPT 2008).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

South Maluku Republic was founded in 1998 (MIPT 2008). South Maluku Republic was a Christian Separatist group that wanted independence for the Maluku Islands (MIPT 2008). Fighting broke out in Maluku in 1999 (ICG 2005, 4). It is modeled off of the original RMS movement in the Malukus that rebelled in the 1950s.

Geography

South Maluku Republic was active in Maluku (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

South Maluku Republic members were later exiled to the Netherlands (MIPT 2008). Members were Christians who lived in Maluku (MIPT 2008). There is not much information about the group's organizational structure, funding, leadership, or size.

External Ties

No information was found about the group having external ties to other state or non-state actors.

Group Outcome

The last recorded instance of violence was a bombing in 2001 (MIPT 2008). The government cracked down on the South Maluku Republic in response (MIPT 2008). South Maluku Republic members were exiled to the Netherlands (MIPT 2008).

VI. MER-C

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Medical Emergency Relief Charity (Merc), Merc, Mer-C

Part 1. Bibliography

- Ed. Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert. Countering the Financing of Terrorism. Routledge. 2007. P. 81.
https://books.google.com/books?id=x14VhZbmzf4C&pg=PA79&lpg=PA79&dq=Medical+Emergency+Relief+Charity+indonesia+1998&source=bl&ots=wMzLV1J4I_&sig=edHWn_2wQQOVD_HcC6iCk8aFAP0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjC0cnu7aDVAhXnwVQKHVgnAdkQ6AEILzAB#v=onepage&q=Medical%20Emergency%20Relief%20Charity%20indonesia%201998&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This group fundraises for militants groups, but is not actively involved in violence (Biersteker et al. 2007, 81).

Group Formation: This group fundraises for militants groups, but is not actively involved in violence (Biersteker et al. 2007, 81).

Group End: This group fundraises for militants groups, but is not actively involved in violence (Biersteker et al. 2007, 81).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This group fundraises for militants groups, but is not actively involved in violence (Biersteker et al. 2007, 81).

Geography

This group fundraises for militants groups, but is not actively involved in violence (Biersteker et al. 2007, 81).

Organizational Structure

This group fundraises for militants groups, but is not actively involved in violence (Biersteker et al. 2007, 81).

External Ties

This group fundraises for militants groups, but is not actively involved in violence (Biersteker et al. 2007, 81).

Group Outcome

This group fundraises for militants groups, but is not actively involved in violence (Biersteker et al. 2007, 81).

VII. NUSANTARA ISLAMIC MUJAHIDEEN FRONT

Min. Group Date: 1999

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Nusantara Islamic Jihad Forces, Abu Bakar Battalion F Kompi, Angkatan Mujahideen Islam Nusantara (Amin), Force Of Indonesian Muslim Jihad Fighters, Nusantara Islamic Mujahideen Front

Part 1. Bibliography

- "NUSANTARA ISLAMIC MUJAHIDEEN FRONT." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3545, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-gP05IM7aH41bHYL4ffcS-M8YqOHaFI4seuTSCvGAvs/edit>
- International Crisis Group (ICG), Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing, 22 February 2005, Asia Report N° 92, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/422311ec4.html>
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http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG846.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: 1999 (ICG 2005 pg 25 B; Chalk 2009 pg 76)

Group End: 2004 (MIPT 2008; ICG 2005 pg 31)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

AMIN is a splinter of DI (MIPT 2008; ICG 2005, pg 1; ICG 2005, pg 25). AMIN has the same ideology as DI and is Islamist (MIPT 2008). AMIN wants to create a Muslim state in Southeast Asia (MIPT 2008). AMIN was an offshoot of the most successful Abu Bakar Battalion (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2009, pg 76). AMIN trained fighters specifically to fight in the Ambon conflict (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2009, pg 76). AMIN formed and became violent in 1999 in reaction to Christian-Muslim violence in Ambon (Chalk 2009, pg 76). Asadullah and Yoyok were the founders of AMIN (ICG 2005, pg 17).

Geography

AMIN members fought in Ambon (MIPT 2008; ICG 2005, pg 26; Chalk 2009, pg 76). AMIN set off an explosion in Jakarta (ICG 2005, pg 25). AMIN was active in Poso (ICG 2005, pg 30; Chalk 2009, pg 76).

Organizational Structure

AMIN procures funding through DI related groups, funneling money through charities (MIPT 2008) and bank robberies (MIPT 2008; ICG 2005, pg 25). AMIN was an offshoot of the most successful Abu Bakar Battalion (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2009, pg 76). AMIN members have trained at JI camps in Mindanao (MIPT 2008). AMIN procures weapons by raiding police stations (MIPT 2008). Asadullah and Yoyok were the founders of AMIN (ICG 2005, pg 17). Many AMIN members were “thugs and thieves” (Chalk 2009, pg 76).

External Ties

AMIN members train at JI camps in Mindanao at an unknown date (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

After the Ambon conflict was resolved, AMIN members were suspected to have reabsorbed back into other separatist groups (MIPT 2008). AMIN members were arrested in 2001, but Yoyok and Asadullah evaded arrest (ICG 2005 pg 30). AMIN had its last recorded violent incident in 2004 (MIPT 2008; ICG 2005, pg 31).

Notes for Iris:

- the Ambon conflict is in the Malukus and arises after the 1997 financial crisis
- it's primarily a Christian-Muslim intercommunal conflict
- AMIN splintered from DI because they were likely able to finance enough resources and supplies to branch out
- they maintained politicized opposition to the state, but they use criminal tactics to finance themselves so they get distracted often from their goal
- they avoided detection and were very good at being clandestine
- they *probably* absorbed into RMS, JI, Abu Bakr Battalion

VIII. PEOPLE'S SOVEREIGNTY PARTY (PDR)

Min. Group Date: 1999

Max. Group Date: 1999

Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20362. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20362>
- "Jakarta violence as campaigning ends." BBC. 1999.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/360624.stm>
- "Violence reported on last day of campaigning." CNN. 1999.
<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9906/04/indonesia.01/index.html?eref=sitesearch>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: 1999 (GTD 2017; BBC 1999; CNN 1999)

Group End: 1999 (GTD 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

PDR is an anti-GOLKAR political party (BBC 1999). The first recorded violent incident was in 1999 (GTD 2017; BBC 1999; CNN 1999).

Geography

In 1999, PDR attacked an NGO in Jakarta (GTD 2017). Indonesian troops fired on crowds of PDR supporters in Jakarta (BBC 1999).

Organizational Structure

PDR has at least 2,000 supporters and was a violent political party (BBC 1999). Minister Adi Sasono is a PDR leader (BBC 1999; CNN 1999).

External Ties

PDR opposes the GOLKAR party (BBC 1999; CNN 1999).

Group Outcome

Indonesian troops fired on crowds of PDR supporters (BBC 1999). There was no more violence perpetrated by PDR after the 1999 election (CNN 1999).

- IX. MUJAHEDIN COUNCIL OF INDONESIA (MMI)
Min. Group Date: 2000
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Indonesian Mujahideen Council (Mmi), Indonesian Mujahedeen Council, Indonesian Mujahedeen Council (Mmi), Indonesian Mujahideen Council, Mujahedin Council Of Indonesia, Mujahedin Council Of Indonesia (Mmi)

Part 1. Bibliography

- International Crisis Group (ICG), Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia, 8 August 2002, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3de746c62.html>
- United States Department of State, U.S. Department of State Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 2006 - Indonesia , 15 September 2006, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/450fb0aa34.html>
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- "Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia." SITE Intel. https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/index.php?option=com_customproperties&view=search&tagId=314&ItemId=629

- Caleb Weiss. "US designates Indonesian-based Jihadist group." Long War Journal. 2017.
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<https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/CO17143.pdf>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: 2000 (ICG 2002, pg 1; Global Security. N.D)

Group End: 2016 (Global Security. N.D).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

MMI formed in 2000 as an umbrella organization of different political parties (ICG 2002, pg 1; Global Security. N.D). MMI was formed by Abu Bakar Bashir (Weiss 2017). Members of the Ngruki Network held an event called the Mujahidin Congress and formed MMI (ICG 2002, pg 17). MMI brought together every group that wanted the implementation of Islamic Law in Indonesia (ICG 2002, pg 17; Global Security. N.D). MMI advocates for the implementation of Sharia law (ICG 2002, pg 17; United States Department of State 2006). MMI sponsors anti-Semitic and anti-American publications (Global Security. N.D). MMI was responsible for the 2012 attack at the book launch by Canadian author Irshad Manji (Weiss 2017).

Geography

MMI was formed in Yogyakarta, Java (ICG 2002, pg 1; Global Security. N.D).

Organizational Structure

MMI members are members of other groups who are in the Ngruki network (ICG 2002, pg 17). MMI leaders are leaders in the Ngruki Network (ICG 2002, pg 17). Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (Bashir) was the commander of MMI (ICG 2002, pg 17; Global Security. N.D). The executive committee was comprised of Abdul Qadir Baraja, Abu Jibril, Mahasin Zaini, Aris Rahardjo, Shobbarin Syakur, Irfan Awwas Surya Hardy, and Agus Dwikarna (ICG 2002, pg 17). When Ba'asyir left in 2008, Abu Jibril became the MMI leader (Global Security. N.D).

Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia is an armed wing of MMI (Global Security. N.D).

External Ties

MMI leaders had ties to al-Qaeda (ICG 2002, pg 17; Weiss 2017). ICG has interacted with MMI (ICG 2002, pg 14). Ba'asyir attempted to turn MMI into JI's political wing, because he was the head of both organizations (Global Security. N.D). MMI lost many members after Ba'asyir formed JAT in 2008 due to leadership disputes (Global Security. N.D). MMI opposes al-Baghdadi and ISIS (Global Security. N.D). MMI has ties to al Nusra (Weiss 2017).

Group Outcome

Agus Dwikarna was arrested in Manila in March 2002 (ICG 2002, pg 17; Global Security. N.D). MMI lost many members after Ba'asyir formed JAT in 2008 (Global Security. N.D; Weiss 2017). MMI published articles in 2006 (SITE n.d.). The son of Abu Jibril was killed in a conflict in the Syrian Civil War in 2016 (Global Security N.D).

The US State Department designates this group as an FTO due to Al Qaeda ties (Long War Journal).

Notes for Iris:

- Ba'aysir had leadership disputes with other groups so he left to form his own group
- note the group opposes ISIS
- it's unclear if this group is violent apart from 2012 - it is mostly engaged in propaganda

- X. MALUKU SOVEREIGNTY FRONT (FKM)
Min. Group Date: 2000
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia: Violence Errupts Again in Ambon, 17 May 2004, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/40bca0252.html>
- "FKM." Global Security. N.D. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/fkm.htm>
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[https://books.google.com/books?id=tm8tSwyTa7AC&pg=PA128&lpg=PA128&dq=MALUKU+SOVEREIGNTY+FRONT+\(FKM\)&source=bl&ots=SfhSlroJ3v&sig=Wg7rHFwJubUnFCtwlIfSIVx3ml8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjQqPbN8aDVAhUj7IMKHSLXA-A4ChDoAQg2MAc#v=onepage&q=MALUKU%20SOVEREIGNTY%20FRONT%20\(FKM\)&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=tm8tSwyTa7AC&pg=PA128&lpg=PA128&dq=MALUKU+SOVEREIGNTY+FRONT+(FKM)&source=bl&ots=SfhSlroJ3v&sig=Wg7rHFwJubUnFCtwlIfSIVx3ml8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjQqPbN8aDVAhUj7IMKHSLXA-A4ChDoAQg2MAc#v=onepage&q=MALUKU%20SOVEREIGNTY%20FRONT%20(FKM)&f=false)
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<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1943504.stm>

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<http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/separatist-group-defies-indonesian-state-mark-independence-day>
- Patrick Goodenough. "Deadly Muslim-Christian Clashes Hit Indonesia's Maluku." CNS News. 2008.
<http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/deadly-muslim-christian-clashes-hit-indonesias-maluku>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2000 (ICG 2004 pg 2; Global Security. N.D)

Group End: 2008 (Goodenough 2008-a)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

FKM is an ethno-nationalist militant group that wants the Malukus to secede from Indonesia (ICG 2004, pg 2; BBC 2002). FKM was formed on December 18th, 2000 (ICG 2004, pg 2; Global Security. N.D; Goodenough 2008-b). Its first violent incident was in 2001. FKM was formed to oppose Laskar Jihad (ICG 2004, pg 2). FKM also wants to win rights for the Maluku Christian People and address discrimination (Global Security. N.D; A Muslim archipalego).

Geography

FKM held a meeting in the Kudamati area (ICG 2004, pg 2). FKM operated in Ambon (ICG 2004, pg 4; BBC 2002; Goodenough 2008-b). FKM is present in Maluku (Goodenough 2008-a; Goodenough 2008-b).

Organizational Structure

Alex Manputty was an FKM leader (ICG 2004, pg 2; BBC 2002). Moses Tuanakotta was the FKM secretary general (ICG 2004, pg 2). Louis Risakotta was an FKM leader (Goodenough 2008-a). FKM members are mostly Christian (ICG 2004, pg 2). FKM had a few hundred members in 2004 (ICG 2004, pg 2). No information could be found about funding or organizational structure.

External Ties

FKM celebrates the RMS anniversary (ICG 2004, pg 2). Forum Pemuda Muslim Baguala and Pemuda Reformasi Maluku issued statements that they would confront FKM with physical force (ICG 2004, pg 2). Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia attempted to stone FKM members, which resulted in clashes (ICG 2004, pg 3). KM Dorolonda, a ship, was attacked because it was rumoured to be bringing FKM reinforcements (ICG 2004, pg 3). FKM is accused of having foreign support, but there is no specific evidence of what this entails or who it comes from (ICG 2004, pg 6). FKM was formed to oppose Laskar Jihad (ICG 2004, pg 2).

Group Outcome

Alex Manputty was arrested in 2002 (ICG 2004, pg 2; A Muslim Archipalego; Goodenough 2008-a). FKM was officially banned on April 16th, 2001 (ICG 2004, pg 2). Police shut down an FKM ceremony in 2003 (ICG 2004, pg 2). Police arrested 25 FKM members for saying they supported RMS (ICG 2004, pg 2). After the 2004, anti-FKM violence, the Indonesian government focused on rounding up FKM members (ICG 2004, pg 4). FKM had supporters in the Police force (ICG 2004, pg 5). A police officer was arrested when caught sewing FKM uniforms (ICG 2004, pg 3). Corporal Benyamin Yakob Sinay was arrested for being an FKM member (ICG 2004, pg 5).

Nine men were sentenced up to 15 years in prison for involvement in FKM (Global Security. N.D). The Indonesian government imposed press curbs, extended curfews, and banned visits from foreigners in an attempt to stop the violence surrounding FKM (Goodenough 2008-a). Ambon residents have suggested that FKM is not violent, they just sought publicity (ICG 2004, pg 4). FKM activities purposely tried to provoke Muslim militants to attack them in 2008 (Goodenough 2008-b).

XI. BETAWI BROTHERHOOD FORUM (FBR)

Min. Group Date: 2000

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Betawi Brotherhood Forum, Betawi Brotherhood Forum (Fbr)

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: 2001 (Brown 2007, pg 9)

Group End: 2007 (Brown 2007, pg 27).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

FBR was first active in 2001 after ethnic clashes between the Betawi and Maduranese (Brown 2007, pg 9). 2001 is also when it likely formed. FBR claims to represent the economic and political interests of the Betawi ethnic group (Brown 2007, pg 9; Human Rights Watch 2006). FBR has used coercion and intimidation to achieve the political and economic rights of the Betawi (Brown 2007, pg 10). FBR opposes the majority Javanese ethnic group (Brown 2007, pg 19). FBR also attacks the Madurese minority group (Brown 2007, pg 20). FBR has attacked businesses and institutions it deems immoral (Brown 2007, pg 18; U.S. Department of State 2004-B). The group's ideology is ethno-nationalist.

Geography

FBR was formed during a conflict in East Jakarta (Brown 2007, pg 9). FBR was present in Cakung (Brown 2007, pg 20; Human Rights Watch 2006). There are FBR strongholds in Pulo Gadung, Cakung, and Pasar Senen (Brown 2007, pg 24). FBR has gardu posts set up throughout Jakarta (Brown 2007, pg 25). FBR threatened businesses in Cilincing and Muara Baru (U.S. Department of State 2004-B). The group is not transnational.

Organizational Structure

FBR was led by Fadloli el-Muhir (Brown 2007, pg 9). FBR members are primarily poor or unemployed from urban areas (Brown 2007, pg 9). FBR members are members of the Betawi ethnic group (Brown 2007, pg 9). FBR has 80,000-100,000 members (Brown 2007, pg 9). The police saw FBR gain an average of 500 members a week at one point

(Brown 2007, pg 25). Most FBR members are 20-40 year old unemployed males (Brown 2007, pg 9).

FBR has gardu posts set up throughout Jakarta (Brown 2007, pg 25). Each Gardu is organized by a district commander who reports to FBR's Central Board (Brown 2007, pg 26).

FBR funds itself through extortion it calls "protection dues" (Brown 2007, pg 24). Businesses are also pressured to hire FBR members (Brown 2007, pg 25). FBR provides its members with legal representation, subsidized health care, ambulance access, access to a publishing house, and assistance in rituals such as circumcision, weddings, and funerals (Brown 2007, pg 25). FBR has a rapid response team where a van with siren will deliver a group of men highly trained in martial arts to help out any FBR member (Brown 2007, pg 25).

External Ties

FBR fought Maduranese gangs over street vending space and parking (Brown 2007, pg 18). FBR met with FPI, the Indonesian Mujahedeen Council, and the Mer-C group to discuss sending men to Ambon during the Ambon Conflict (U.S. Department of State 2004).

Group Outcome

The Javanese Governor Sutisoyo of Jakarta and Fadloli el-Muhir were suspected to have a working relationship (Brown 2007, pg 21; Human Rights Watch 2006). FBR attacked a group that critiqued the Governor (Brown 2007, pg 22). Yet, seven FBR members were arrested for the attack (Brown 2007, pg 22; U.S. Department of State 2004-B). Fadloli el-Muhir could not be arrested without the President's command because he was a member of the Supreme Advisory Council (DAP) (Brown 2007, pg 22). President Megawati refused to arrest Fadloli, despite the police request to (Brown 2007, pg 22).

FBR supported Sutisoyo's re-election campaign in 2002, despite there being Betawi candidates (Brown 2007, pg 23; Human Rights Watch 2006). The relationship began to deteriorate after Governor Sutisoyo did not allow FBR to have training grounds (Brown 2007, pg 23). The last recorded violent incident was a threat to night club owners in 2003 (U.S. Department of State 2004; U.S. Department of State 2004-B). FBR was last active supporting an anti-pornography bill in 2007 (Brown 2007, pg 27). The 2007 activities appear nonviolent and lobbying rather than the use of violence.

Great quote from Brown:

In a speech at FBR headquarters after a demonstration Fadloli said provocatively “it’s lucky that we do love Indonesia, because otherwise with our numbers we could really stir things up!”

Notes for Iris:

- very similar to Niger Delta groups in Nigeria
- they want economic rights which is probably policy-oriented
- there are social benefits to being a member like the van/criminal gang for hire
- originally sanctioned by the Javanese government so not originally politicized
- there’s a super corrupt backstory relationship between FBR and the Javanese government under Sutowo. [Iris - look up what happens to the relationship and Sutowo years later].
- they’re very good at coercion and rarely have to resort to using violence

XII. LASKAR JIHAD
Min. Group Date: 2000
Max. Group Date: 2002
Onset: NA

Aliases: Laskar Jihad, Army Of Jihad, Holy War Warriors

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f7d4da87.html>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Indonesia: Information on the "Laskar Jihad" or "Jihad Troopers": history, methods of operation and international connections (1999-2002), 22 February 2002, IDN38456.E, available at:
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3df4be3f18.html>
- Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, Indonesia: 1. Is there a group known as "Laskar Bali"? 2. Is this group part of, or the same as, the "Laskar Jihad" group? 3. I understand that the "Laskar Jihad" group was disbanded in 2002, has it re-formed since then? 4. Does either of these groups operate in Bali or Jakarta in 2006? 5. What is known about

their activities in Bali and/or Jakarta? 6. Are Muslims forced to join the group? 7. As Muslims are a minority group in Bali, which is predominantly Hindu, are they subjected to any discrimination, backlash, harassment or mistreatment in Bali? 8. What protection, if any, is available from the Indonesian authorities from the activities of Laskar Bali or Laskar Jihad? 9. How difficult would it be for a Muslim, or a person who fears Laskar Bali or Laskar Jihad, to relocate to Jakarta or elsewhere in Indonesia?, 23 November 2006, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b6fe1ecd.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Jihad Troopers (Immigration and Refugee Board 2002-b)

Group Formation: 2000 (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2009 pg 69)

Group End: Disbanded in 2002 (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2009 pg 70; Immigration and Refugee Board 2002; Refugee Review Tribunal 2006 pg 2)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Laskar Jihad was formed in January 2000 (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2009, pg 69). Its first violent incident was in July 2000 (Canada IRB 20002a). Laskar Jihad was the military wing of Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah (FKAWJ) (Chalk 2009, pg 69). Laskar Jihad wants to protect the Muslim population of Maluku (MIPT 2008). Laskar Jihad wants to implement and enforce Islamic Law (MIPT 2008). Laskar Jihad wants to convert Christians to Islam and uses indiscriminate violence against Christian villages to accomplish this (MIPT 2008). Laskar Jihad follows Salafist Islam (MIPT 2008). Jafar Umar Thalib founded Laskar Jihad (MIPT 2008).

Geography

Laskar Jihad was active in Maluku (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2009, pg 69; Immigration and Refugee Board 2002; Refugee Review Tribunal 2006 pg 1).

Laskar Jihad members trained in Java (MIPT 2008). Laskar Jihad wants to spread its influence to West Papua, Sulawesi and Aceh (MIPT 2008; Refugee Review Tribunal 2006, pg 4). Laskar Jihad was active in Central Sulawesi (Chalk 2009, pg 70). Laskar Jihad conducted attacks in Ambon (GTD 2017; Immigration and Refugee Board 2002; Refugee Review Tribunal 2006, pg 6). Laskar Jihad conducted attacks in Betalemba, Sanginora, Dewua, Padalembara, Tangkura, and Patiwunga (GTD 2017). Laskar Jihad had headquarters in Yogyakarta (Immigration and Refugee Board 2002). Laskar Jihad also had offices in Ambon and Poso (Immigration and Refugee Board 2002). The Laskar

Jihad training camps were south of Jakarta on Java (Immigration and Refugee Board 2002-b). The group is not transnational.

Organizational Structure

Laskar Jihad is allegedly funded by corruption in the Indonesian military (MIPT 2008). Laskar Jihad is composed mainly of volunteers from Java (MIPT 2008). Many Laskar Jihad members are veterans from conflicts in Bosnia and Afghanistan (Immigration and Refugee Board 2002-b). Laskar Jihad members are Muslims usually between the ages of 17 and 40 (Refugee Review Tribunal 2006, pg 5). Jafar Umar Thalib founded Laskar Jihad (MIPT 2008; Immigration and Refugee Board 2002; Refugee Review Tribunal 2006, pg 4).

Laskar Jihad allegedly had 10,000 members at its peak in 2001 (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2009, pg 69; Immigration and Refugee Board 2002-b; Refugee Review Tribunal 2006, pg 6). Laskar Jihad was the military wing of Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah (FKAWJ) (Chalk 2009 pg 69).

External Ties

Laskar Jihad had "links" with the Taliban, but no specific information could be found about what these entailed (MIPT 2008). Laskar Jihad has been linked to Abu Sayyaf and KMM (MIPT 2008). Laskar Jihad has been suspected of training al Qaeda members in Indonesia (MIPT 2008). Laskar Jihad was the military wing of Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah (FKAWJ) (Chalk 2009 pg 69). It fought against the FKM (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

The Indonesian government was hesitant to crack down on Laskar Jihad after the Maluku conflict, for fear of appearing anti-Muslim (MIPT 2008). Laskar Jihad was suspected to have ties with the President Abdurrahman Wahid (Immigration and Refugee Board 2002-b), and the military (Immigration and Refugee Board 2002-b; Refugee Review Tribunal 2006 pg 3). Laskar Jihad had its last confirmed recorded attack in 2002 (GTD 2017).

In March 2002, Laskar Jihad secured a peace deal with the Indonesian government, but continued fighting (MIPT 2008). Laskar Jihad announced that it was voluntarily disbanding after the peace treaty with the government in October 2002 (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2009, pg 70; Immigration and Refugee Board 2002; Refugee Review Tribunal 2006, pg 2). This was partially caused by dissatisfaction with Thalib's leadership (Chalk 2009, pg 69). There were unconfirmed reports of Laskar Jihad operating in the Solomon Islands and West Papua as late as 2005 (MIPT 2008). There are reports of the

government pressuring Laskar Jihad and other extremist groups to shut down their activities (Refugee Review Tribunal 2006, pg 3).

XIII. ANTI-COMMUNIST COMMAND (KAK)

Min. Group Date: 2000

Max. Group Date: 2000

Onset: NA

Aliases: Anti-Communist Command (Kak), Anti-Communist Command

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Searched gScholar
 - "Anti-communist command" indonesia
 - Anti-Communist Command (Kak) indonesia

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: 2000 (BBC 2000)

Group End: 2000 (BBC 2000)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

KAK attacked the Headquarters for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence on September 27th, 2000 (BBC 2000).

Geography

KAK conducted an attack in Jakarta (GTD 2017; BBC 2000). KAK was active in Central Java near Yogyakarta (Against the Current 2001).

Organizational Structure

No information available

External Ties

KAK threatened to attack bookstores that sell Communist books, and headquarters for Communist Political parties (Against the Current 2001).

Group Outcome

KAK contacted the police and the Commission for Missing Person and Victims of Violence Headquarters to take responsibility for the attack (BBC 2000). There have been no recorded attacks since the first and only recorded attack in September 2000.

XIV. MUJAHIDEEN DIVISION KHANDAQ

Min. Group Date: 2000

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- “MUJAHIDEEN DIVISION KHANDAQ.” Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4145, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism,
<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-gP05IM7aH41bHYL4ffcS-M8YqOHafI4seuTSCvGAvs/edit>
- Searched Proquest
 - Mujahideen Division Khandaq
 - “Mujahideen Division Khandaq”
 - Mujahideen Division Khandaq Indonesia
- Searched gScholar
 - “MUJAHIDEEN DIVISION KHANDAQ”
 - MUJAHIDEEN DIVISION KHANDAQ indonesia

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: 2000 (MIPT 2008)

Group End: 2000 (MIPT 2008)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Mujahideen Division Khandaq's first recorded attack was bombing the Philippine Ambassador's headquarters in Jakarta in August 2000 (MIPT 2008). Mujahideen Division Khandaq claims to be a MILF splinter (MIPT 2008).

Geography

Mujahideen Division Khandaq conducted an attack in Jakarta (MIPT 2008). Mujahideen Division Khandaq was headquartered in Kuala Lumpur (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

Mujahideen Division Khandaq claims to be an MILF splinter, which would imply Moro membership (MIPT 2008). MILF denies that Mujahideen Division Khandaq was ever involved with the MILF (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

Mujahideen Division Khandaq's attack was their attempt to "show solidarity" with the Muslim rebels in Mindanao (MIPT 2008). Mujahideen Division Khandaq claims to be an MILF splinter (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

Mujahideen Division Khandaq has had no recorded violent attack since their first and only recorded violent attack

Indonesia Cases, Part 3: 2001-2012 Last Updated: 8 August 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T735	MUJAHIDEEN KOMPAK		2001	2001
T2381	MUJAHIDIN AMBON		2005	2005

T2255	ANTI-APOSTATE MOVEMENT ALLIANCE (AGAP)		2005	2007
T2022	AL-QAEDA FOR THE MALAY ARCHIPELAGO		2007	0
T2024	TANZIM QAEDAT AL-JIHAD		2007	0
T2030	SARIYAH		2007	0
T1760	JEMAAH ANSHORUT TAUHID (JAT)		2011	2012

- I. MUJAHIDEEN KOMPAK
 Min. Group Date: 2001
 Max. Group Date: 2001
 Onset: NA

Aliases: Mujahedin Kompak, Crisis Management/Prevention Committee, Crisis Management-Prevention Committee, Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis, Kompac, Kompak, Laskar Mujahideen Kompak, Mujahideen Kompak

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for T857.

Group Formation: This is an alias for T857.

Group End: This is an alias for T857.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for T857.

Geography

This is an alias for T857.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for T857.

External Ties

This is an alias for T857.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for T857.

- II. MUJAHIDIN AMBON
Min. Group Date: 2005
Max. Group Date: 2005
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://jakartaglobe.id/archive/densus-88-arrest-six-terrorism-suspects-in-ambon/>
- "Indonesian Police Probing Ambon Blast Arrest Fourth Suspect." 2005.BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, Aug 28, 1. (2005)
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/461015706?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases

Group Formation: 2005 (GTD 2017)

Group End: 2005 (BBC 2005)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group's first recorded instance of violence occurred on August 25th, 2005 (GTD 2017). Mujahidin is said to be a continuation of the Muslim and Christian violence in Ambon (BBC 2005). The violence was largely communal. There is no evidence the group politically opposed the government.

Geography

Mujahidin Ambon had an attack in Ambon (GTD 2017; Jakarta Globe N.d.). Mujahidin Ambon attacked a Mobile Police Brigade post in Loki Village (Jakarta Globe N.d.). Mujahidin Ambon members were arrested in Luhu Village (BBC 2005). Mujahidin Ambon raided a house in Imran, Batu Merah village, Sirimau, Ambon (Jakarta Globe N.d.).

Organizational Structure

Mujahidin Ambon is led by Asep Dahlan, he is also known as Djaja (Jakarta Globe N.d.). Arsyad was a Mujahidin Ambon leader from East Java (BBC 2005). All the arrested members were said to not be local to Ambon (Jakarta Globe N.d.). Bakri Kaliki was a Mujahidin Ambon member who was arrested (BBC 2005). No evidence could be found about group size. Members were Muslim (BBC 2005).

External Ties

Mujahidin Ambon is affiliated with JI (Jakarta Globe N.d.).

Group Outcome

Six members of Mujahidin Ambon were arrested by Denus 88, an anti-terrorism squad (Jakarta Globe. N.d.). Asep Dahlan was sentenced to life in prison (Jakarta Globe N.d.). The last recorded attack was on a police brigade in Loki village, though the exact date is unknown (Jakarta Globe n.d.).

Notes for Iris:

- no politicized opposition to the government
- mostly communal violence
- most of the attacks are guerrilla raids to get weapons
- in addition there are a couple attacks on police and military targets
- not organized
- their only political aim is to fight Christians
- unknown when they form and only violent activity is during 2005 but likely have a couple more violent attacks
- Iris: look up larger context on inter-ethnic fighting in 2005

- III. ANTI-APOSTATE MOVEMENT ALLIANCE (AGAP)
Min. Group Date: 2005
Max. Group Date: 2007
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20059. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20059>
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- Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, Indonesia: 1. What is the Christian/Muslim situation in Bandung, West Java? 2. What is the Christian/Muslim situation in Kupang, Nusa Tenggara? 3. Are there safer areas in Indonesia for Christians, e.g. Jakarta? 4. Are the authorities willing and able to protect Christians in Indonesia? 5. Are there any restrictions on relocating in Indonesia? 6. Is there a restriction on practicing Protestant religion in Indonesia?, 14 February 2007, available at:
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b6fe1efd.html>
- Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, Indonesia: 1. I would like information as to whether there has been any recent anti-Chinese or anti-Christian violence in Java. 2. If there have been such incidents what protection was available from the Indonesian authorities? 3. Please provide information on the treatment of Christians and ethnic Chinese in Java, 11 August 2006, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b6fe1e7d.html>
- Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, Indonesia: 1. Is there any record of Muslims targeting Christians? 2. Are Christians free to worship in Bali? 3. Any general information about Christians in Bali?, 7 February 2007, available at:
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b6fe1ef0.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Alliance of the Anti Apostasy Movement

Group Formation: 2005

Group End: 2007 (GTD 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

AGAP formed in April 2005 by Muhammad Mu'min (Crouch 2013 pg 27). AGAP targeted churches that violated a state law on church building (US State Department 2007;

Refworld 2007, pg 1; Refworld 2006, pg 4). AGAP is a right wing Muslim group (Refworld 2007 pg 5). Its first violent attack was in 2005 although AGAP denied responsibility for the incident (Australia RRT 2006).

Geography

AGAP conducted an attack in Soreang (GTD 2017). AGAP wants to close churches in West Java (Refworld 2007 pg 5; Refworld 2006 pg 4).

Organizational Structure

AGAP claimed to represent 27 Muslim groups and have 50,000 supporters (Crouch 2013, pg 27). It may have operated more as an umbrella organization rather than an independent group (Crouch 2013, pg 27). AGAP's leader was Muhammad Mu'min (Crouch 2013, pg 27).

External Ties

FPI was associated with AGAP as a member of the umbrella group (Refworld 2007, pg 7; Refworld 2006, pg 4). AGAP is supported by the local Muslim community (Refworld 2007-b pg 1).

Group Outcome

The last recorded attack was in 2007 (GTD 2017). Police refused to intervene when AGAP attacked different churches (Australia RRT 2007). The Indonesian government also denied attacks took place (Australia RRT 2007).

Notes for Iris:

- it's an umbrella group for 27 smaller groups, including FPI
- mostly want churches to close
- no politicized opposition to the government
- the police didn't really do anything
- AGAP didn't do anything terribly violence, which helps explain why they didn't do much
- increase the power of Muslims and decrease the power of Christians
- there is no good information about what the group may be doing today - if it was an umbrella group, then there might have been splintering or they lost the motivation to be violence

- IV. AL-QAEDA FOR THE MALAY ARCHIPELAGO
Min. Group Date: 2007
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Michael Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, and Philip Potter. "Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence." Working Paper. 2015.
http://watson.brown.edu/files/watson/imce/events/2015/TacticalDiversity_11_4_15.pdf
- "Terror mastermind Noordin Mohammed Top dead: Indonesian police." The Australian. 2009.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20091019124131/http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au:80/story/0.25197.26087158-601.00.html>
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<https://search.proquest.com/docview/364464831?accountid=14026>.
- Gearon, Eamonn. 2011. "The Al Qaeda Enigma." Middle East, 01, 28-30.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/847198405?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, Al Qaeda in the Archipelago, AQA (Johnson 2016 pg 52)

Group Formation: 2003 (Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter 2015)

Group End: 2009 (Johnson 2016 pg 9)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In 2003, Al Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago splintered from JI due to organizational differences over terrorist tactics (Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter 2015). The group ascribed to an Islamist ideology and sought to create a single Islamic state encompassing the current borders of Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Mindanao, and

Singapore (Johnson 2016, p 51; Australian 2009). The group's first violent attack was in 2003 (Johnson 2016, p. 52).

Geography

AQA attacked targets in Jakarta, Java and Kuta, and Bali (Johnson 2016, pg 52). The group had a base in Solo (Australian 2009). There is no evidence the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago was a splinter of JI (Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter 2015; Johnson 2016, pg 51). Noordin Top was the Al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago leader (Johnson 2016, pg 51). Top was an ex-JI commander who recruited other JI members into his new group (Johnson 2016, pg 51). The group splintered from JI due to differences over whether it was valid to attack noncombatants (Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter 2015; Johnson 2016, pg 9). No information could be found about group size or membership.

External Ties

The group splintered from JI (Johnson 2016, pg 51). The group may have continued to coordinate with JI as several attacks in Jakarta involved both parties (Johnson 2016, pg 51). The group received some financial assistance from Al Qaeda in 2003 (Wright 2009).

Group Outcome

In 2009, AQA attempted to assassinate the president of Indonesia, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Australian 2009). In response, Indonesia's elite CT force, Special Detachment 88, raided an AQA safehouse in Solo and killed Noordin Top in the process (Australian 2009). The group's last known violent attack was in 2009 (Australian 2009; Johnson 2016, pg 52).

Notes for Iris:

- it was affiliated with JI and it was a semi-splinter
- their political aims are more to intimidate and a lot more amorphous
- look at external ties and group outcome

- V. TANZIM QAEDAT AL-JIHAD
Min. Group Date: 2007
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for Al Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago.

Group Formation: This is an alias for Al Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago.

Group End: This is an alias for Al Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for Al Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago.

Geography

This is an alias for Al Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for Al Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago.

External Ties

This is an alias for Al Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for Al Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago.

VI. SARIYAH
Min. Group Date: 2007
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30751/b063_indonesia_jemaah_islamiyah_s_current_status.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for JI (Economist 2007; ICG 2007).

Group Formation: This is an alias for JI (Economist 2007; ICG 2007).

Group End: This is an alias for JI (Economist 2007; ICG 2007).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for JI (Economist 2007; ICG 2007).

Geography

This is an alias for JI (Economist 2007; ICG 2007).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for JI (Economist 2007; ICG 2007).

External Ties

This is an alias for JI (Economist 2007; ICG 2007).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for JI (Economist 2007; ICG 2007).

VII. JEMAAH ANSHORUT TAUHID (JAT)

Min. Group Date: 2011

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (Jat), Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid, Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (Jat)

Note: do not click on any links to their official website.

Part 1. Bibliography

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- International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), 6 July 2010, Asia Briefing N°107, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c74b9d92.html>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Laskar 99, Jat

Group Formation: 2008

Group End: 2017 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

JAT formed in 2008 as a splinter of the MMI due to a leadership dispute (Global Security n.d.; International Crisis Group 2010; UN Security Council 2015). It ascribes to a Salafist ideology and tries to promote Sharia law in Indonesia (International Crisis Group 2010, 4; Global Security n.d.). Its ultimate goal is to create an Islamic state in Indonesia (US State Department 2016; Johnson 2016, pg 52). Its first violent attack occurred in 2011 although it may have placed a supporting role in the 2009 Jakarta attacks (International Crisis Group 2010, pg 10 Johnson 2016, pg 97; Global Security n.d.). Police first discovered the group in 2010 when they stumbled on a training camp (International Crisis Group 2010).

Geography

The group is active in Solo, West Nusa Tenggara, and Java (Global Security n.d.). Its headquarters are in Sukoharjo, Java (International Crisis Group 2010, pg 5). It has conducted attacks in Poso, Sulawesi, and Jakarta (US State Department 2016; International Crisis Group 2010). It had a training camp in Aceh (International Crisis Group 2010).

Organizational Structure

The leader of JAT is Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (Global Security n.d.; UN Security Council 2015). Ba'asyir previously headed JI (Global Security n.d.; UN Security Council 2015). Members of JAT are a combination of ex-militants from MMI and JI as well as students and teachers from a pesantren in Ngruki, Java (International Crisis Group 2010, pg 3; Global Security n.d.). It primarily recruits by sponsoring taklims, which are religious meetings at local mosques. The group has a political wing, a military wing, and a hisbah wing to enforce religious law and ethical conduct (Global Security n.d.). Its military wing is organized in a series of cells while its political and religious wings operate more openly (Johnson 2016, pg 53). The group primarily funds itself through donations, cyber operations, and robbery (US State Department 2016). In 2014, the group had approximately 2,000 members (Witular 2014). In 2016, the group had approximately several thousand supporters although it is unclear how many of these are fighters (US State Department 2016).

External Ties

JAT was a splinter of MMI (Global Security n.d.). It also recruited members from JI (Global Security n.d.). It had poor relations with darul Islam (International Crisis Group 2010, pg 8). Ba'asyir pledged JAT's support for ISIS in 2014 (US State Department 2016; Emont 2014; Johnson 2016, pg 88).

Group Outcome

In 2011, Indonesian police arrested Ba'asyir and sentenced him to prison (Global Security n.d.. In 2012, the US State Department listed JAT as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (Global Security n.d.; Crawford 2012). In 2012, a splinter known as Jamaah Anshoraul Syariat (JAS) broke off from JAT (Johnson 2016, pg 76). After Ba'asyir pledged support for ISIS in 2014, some members broke off to form a new group known as Jamaah Anshoraul Syariat (JAS) (Witular 2014; Johnson 2016, pg 76). Allegedly, half of JAT formed the new group.

Indonesia Cases, Part 4: Miscellaneous Last Updated: 24 April 2018

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T9010	MUJAHIDIN INDONESIA TIMUR		0	0
T2017	RABITATUL MUJAHIDEEN		0	0
T650	ACEH SUMATRA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (ASNLF)		0	0
T2023	MUJAHIDIN KAYAMANYA		0	0
T712	KOPASSUS		0	0
T2019	WAHDAH ISLAMIAH	-	0	0
T2020	REPUBLIK PERSATUAN ISLAM INDONESIA		0	0

- I. MUJAHIDIN INDONESIA TIMUR
Torg ID: T9010
Min. Group Date: 0
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: 0

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Mujahidin Indonesian Timur (MIT) Security Council Subsidiary Organs." United Nations. United Nations, n.d. Web Last Updated 30 March 2017.

https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/mujahidin-indonesian-timur-%28mit%29

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- GTD Perpetrator 4017. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=1&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&perpetrator=40171&expanded=no&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc#results-table
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- Jakarta Post. "Poso Terrorist Group Responsible for 7 Incidents: Acting Police Chief." The Jakarta Post. N.p., 5 April 2015. Web. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/05/poso-terrorist-group-responsible-7-incidents-acting-police-chief.html>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: MIT (CTD n.d.; GTD 2017)

Group Formation: 2012 (GTD 2017)

Group End: 2015

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but first came to attention in 2012 (Zenn 2013; GTD 2017). The group was led by Santoso, also known as Abu Warda (Zenn 2013). The group tended to target police while avoiding civilians (Zenn 2013). The group opposed religions that were not Islam (Zenn 2013). The group seemed to be spreading the message of Islam (Zenn 2013).

Geography

The group was based in Sulawesi (Zenn 2013; Jakarta Post 2015). The group conducted attacks in Jakarta, Maranda, Poso, Sausa, and several other spots in Indonesia (GTD 2017; United Nations Security Council 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group mainly targeted private citizens and the police (GTD 2017). The group was led by Santoso (Zenn 2013; Jakarta Post 2015). Santoso was the previous commander of Jamaat Ansaru Tawheed, a splinter of Jemaah Islamiyah (Zenn 2013). Santoso fled to Polso after a string of incidents the group was involved in (Jakarta Post 2015). Some members of the group were foreign fighters, Uighurs, who had traveled through Thailand to join (Kwok 2015). It is unknown who made up the brunt of the group's membership. The group resorted to beheading, shootings, and explosives (United Nations Security Council 2017). It had "dozens of fighters" (UN Security Council 2017).

External Ties

Santoso was the previous commander of Jamaat Ansaru Tawheed, a splinter of Jemaah Islamiyah (Zenn 2013). The group pledged allegiance to ISIS (Kwok 2015; United Nations Security Council 2017). The group's members trained with Jemaah Islamiyah (United Nations Security Council 2017). Some members of the group traveled to Syria to fight in the civil war (UN Security Council 2017).

Group Outcome

The group was most violent in 2013 (Zenn 2013). The Indonesian police have searched for members of the group and have conducted crackdowns in the past (Jakarta Post 2015). The group has been responsible for the deaths of hundreds of hundreds of civilians and police (Zenn 2013). The group was designated a terrorist group in 2017 (CTD n.d.). Its last violent attack was in 2016 (GTD 2017).

II. RABITATUL MUJAHIDEEN

Torg ID: 2017

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: 0

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Lumpkin, John J. "Homeland Security." Rabitatul Mujahidin. N.p., n.d. Web. https://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/rabitatul_mujahidin.htm

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<https://books.google.com/books?id=cAE-bxSXayMC&pg=PA154&lpg=PA154&dq=RABITATUL+MUJAHIDEEN&source=bl&ots=o6d8bS20A7&sig=NeZYsr89HKjfykBOzITLm5Kv9RQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiUwLrE6enZAhUKjlQKHZglCegQ6AEIODAC#v=onepage&q=RABITATUL%20MUJAHIDEEN&f=false>
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- "Sweeping Asian Terror Alliance Uncovered." CNN. Cable News Network, 19 September 2002 Web.
<http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/09/19/singapore.arrests/>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: League of Mujahidins (Lumpkin n.d.)

Group Formation: 1999

Group End: Active

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Rabitatul Mujahideen was an umbrella organization, formed by the head of JI to coordinate Islamic-based terrorism in southeast Asia. The group formed in 1999 at a conference (History Commons n.d.). It had meetings between 1999 and 2005 (Parashar and Wilson 2005). The umbrella group's main goal was to create tension between Singapore and Malaysia (CNN 2002). The group also opposed US influence and wanted to create an Islamic state in Indonesia (CNN 2002).

Geography

The group operated regionally in Indonesia (Lumpkin n.d.). It held a meeting in Selangor, Malaysia (History Commons n.d.).

Organizational Structure

Jl leadership founded the group sometime in the 1990s (CNN 2002). Abdullah Anshori was a leading member of the group (Lumpkin n.d.). A second leading member was Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin, aka Hambali, and the head of JI in Malaysia (History

Commons n.d.). The group had a central committee and several brigades (Parashar and Wilson 2005). The group is more of an umbrella as it consists of at least nine groups (CNN 2002).

External Ties

Jemaah Islamiya is an associate of the group (Lumpkin n.d.). The group formed alliances with other jihadist groups in Indonesia (Parashar and Wilson 2005). The group was allied with Al-Qaeda (CNN 2002).

Group Outcome

The umbrella group itself has not been violently active, but its factions were. The group's last known meetings were in the early 2000's (History Commons n.d.; Parashar and Wilson 2005).

Notes for Iris:

- the group was never violent
- the group disappeared after its last attack in 2005
- the group was an umbrella

III. ACEH SUMATRA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (ASNLF)

Torg ID: 650

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: 0

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- "UNPO: Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front's (ASNLF) Participation in Indonesia's UPR Review in Geneva." UNPO. N.p., 8 May 2017. Web. <http://unpo.org/article/20073>
- Higgins, Noelle. "Regulating the Use of Force in Wars of National Liberation: The Need for a New Regime." Google Books. N.p., 14 Dec. 2009. Web. https://books.google.com/books?id=NF6wCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA205&lpg=PA205&dq=aceh+sumatra+national+liberation+front&source=bl&ots=mf3q9QtwBD&sig=JHEKvrV_A-iyI_F4jHzAUOpo0M2k&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiEge286unZAhUps1QKHTRqD_84ChDoAQg-MAY#v=onepage&q=aceh%20sumatra%20national%20liberation%20front&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Alias for GAM

Aliases: Aceh National Armed Forces. Tentera Neugara Aceh, Aceh National Armed Forces

Group Formation: 2002

Group End: Active

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Note - this group seems to be a faction of GAM - more sources may be needed

Little is known about this group. The group seems to be a political group that is not violent but has an armed faction of GAM (Higgins 2009; UNPO 2017). The group was an ethnonationalist organization promoting the rights of the Acehnese (UNPO 2017). The group has at least been around since 2002 (Higgins 2009). The armed faction wanted the removal of Indonesian troops in Aceh (Higgins 2009). The ideology of the group is not known.

Geography

The group was based in Indonesia but attended conferences outside, including in Geneva (UNPO 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group consists of a political party and an armed faction (UNPO 2017; Higgins 2009). Not much else is known about the organizational structure of the group.

External Ties

The group was a part of the UNPO (UNPO 2017). It was often described as a faction of GAM (Higgins 2009).

Group Outcome

The group is active as a political party (UNPO 2017). The group did sign a peace agreement with the government in 2002 (Higgins 2009). The group does not seem to have faced opposition by the Indonesian government.

IV. MUJAHIDIN KAYAMANYA Torg ID: 2023

Min. Group Date: 0
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: 0

Aliases: KOMPAK

Part 1. Bibliography

- International Crisis Group (ICG), Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge, 24 January 2007, Asia Report N°127. Web. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/43bd25804.html>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: KOMPAK

Group Formation: 2005

Group End: 2005

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for KOMPAK (T857).

Little is known about the group. The group followed a Salafi Jihadi ideology (Solahudin 2013). The group was known for taking part in the 2005 attack in Ceram (ICG 2007).

Geography

The group was particularly active in Poso (Solahudin 2013).

Organizational Structure

The group's members were former thugs (Solahudin 2013). A leading member of the group was Abdullah Sunata (Solahudin 2013). Sofyan Djumpai, also known as Pian, was an alleged leader of the group (ICG 2007). Erwin Mardani, aka Muhamad Safri Dekua, was a member of the group (ICG 2007). The group followed a jihadist ideology (ICG 2007).

External Ties

The group was at odds with Jema'ah Islamiyah (Solahudin 2013). The group was closely tied to KOMPAK (ICG 2007). Mad Haji Sun had links to the group (ICG 2007).

Group Outcome

The group was banned by Jema'ah Islamiyah (Solahudin 2013). Pian was arrested in 2005 (ICG 2007). KOMPAK and the group often combined then disbanded, so little information is known specific to the group (ICG 2007). The group was involved in the 2005 attack in Ceram (ICG 2007).

V. KOPASSUS

Torg ID: 712

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

- Onishi, Elisabeth Bumiller and Norimitsu. "U.S. Lifts Ban on Contact With Indonesia's Kopassus Special Forces." The New York Times. The New York Times, 22 July 2010. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/world/asia/23military.html>
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Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Sandi Yudha Forces, KOPASSANDHA, Red Beret Corps (FAS n.d.)

Group Formation: 1952

Group End: Active

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group was founded on April 16, 1952 (FAS n.d.). The group sought to put down unrest within Indonesia (FAS n.d.). The group was seen as the special forces of the Indonesian government (Stewart 2018). It did not politically oppose the government.

Geography

The group's headquarters was in Cijantung in East Jakarta (FAS n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The group was led by the son in-law of the president of Indonesia at the time, Prabowo Subianto (FAS n.d.). The group was later led by Mayjen Syahrir (FAS n.d.). The group had about 2,500 members at an unknown time and 5,000 in 2010 (FAS n.d.; Bumiller and Onishi 2010). The group had two armed factions, and a training faction (FAS n.d.). The group has been involved in abductions and human rights abuses (FAS n.d.).

External Ties

The group was a special paramilitary branch of the Indonesian government (Stewart 2018).

Group Outcome

The group took hostages in the Himalayas in 1997 (FAS n.d.). The U.S. government placed a ban on the group, but later lifted it in 2010 (Stewart 2018; Bumiller and Onishi 2010). The group was restructured soon after to follow the laws and reduce human rights violations (Stewart 2018; Bumiller and Onishi 2010).

VI. WAHDAH ISLAMIAH

Torg ID: 2019

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: 0

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Harsono, Andreas. "Indonesia's Ban of Islamist Group Undermines Rights." Human Rights Watch. N.p., 19 July 2017. Web.
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/19/indonesias-ban-islamist-group-undermines-rights>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Hizbut Tahrir (Harsono 2017)

Group Formation: Unknown

Group End: 2018 (Active?)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

[to redo]

Geography

The group is transnational (Harsono 2017).

Organizational Structure

Little information is known about the group.

External Ties

Little information is known about the group.

Group Outcome

VII. REPUBLIK PERSATUAN ISLAM INDONESIA

Torg ID: 2020

Min. Group Date: 0

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: 0

Aliases: Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia, Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia (Rppi), United Islamic Republic Of Indonesia

Part 1. Bibliography

- Singh, Bilveer. "The Talibanization of Southeast Asia." Google Books. N.p., 2007. Web. https://books.google.com/books?id=-J-jxpelsaUC&pg=PA90&lpg=PA90&dq=%22REPUBLIK+PERSATUAN+ISLAM+INDONESIA%22&source=bl&ots=0F2NwZGUEH&sig=omm_mfBxs_hUiKI5q9YCn8mZBCuM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjv8aHndTaAhUpUt8KHWewDfUQ6AEIVzAL#v=onepage&q=%22REPUBLIK%20PERSATUAN%20ISLAM%20INDONESIA%22&f=false

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: RPII, Unitary Islamic Republic of Indonesia (Singh 2007)

Group Formation: 1962 (Buehler 2016)

Group End: 1965

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed in 1962 (Buehler 2016). The group sought to form an Islamic caliphate (Buehler 2016). The date when the group was first violent is not known.

Geography

The group was active in South Sulawesi (Buehler 2016).

Organizational Structure

The group splintered from DI (Singh 2007). The group's members were followers of Kahar Muzakkar (Singh 2007).

External Ties

The group was associated with AMIN, ABB, and supported the goals of AJAI (Singh 2007).

Group Outcome

The group was not very active due to the threat of the Indonesian army (Buehler 2016). Muzakkar was killed by the government in 1965, which led to the end of the group (Buehler 2016).