

Guinea Cases

Last Updated: 9 October 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T438	REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT (RUF)		1991	2001
T1068	RASSEMBLEMENT DES FORCES D_MOCRATIQUES DE GUIN_E (RDFG)	17-Sep-00	2000	2001
T1941	UNITED LIBERATION MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY IN LIBERIA (ULIMO)		1992	1994
T320	NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF LIBERIA (NPFL)		1984	1996

- I. REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT (RUF)
 Min. Group Date: 1991
 Max. Group Date: 2001
 Onset: NA

Aliases: Revolutionary United Front (Ruf), RUF, Revolutionary United Front

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Se Young Jang. "The Causes of the Sierra Leone Civil War." E-IR. Senior Thesis. 2012. <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/25/the-causes-of-the-sierra-leone-civil-war-underlying-grievances-and-the-role-of-the-revolutionary-united-front/>
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- Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. "Non-State Actor Dataset Narratives." 2013. http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1989/1990 (Rashid 2016)

Group End (Outcome): 2002 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown precisely when the RUF formed, but it emerged in 1989 or 1990 when a group of students returned from guerrilla training in Libya (Rashid 2016). The leader, Foday Sankoh, modeled the group after the Liberian NPFL and decided to overthrow the Sierra Leone government (Waugh 2011, 203; Rashid 2016). The RUF opposed the APC regime because of strict austerity measures, corruption, and the denial of education to youth members (Jang 2012). Sankoh was heavily influenced by Mao's writings on revolution and pan-African revolutionary sentiment (Waugh 2011, 205-206). It's unclear if the group ascribed to these ideologies as well. The group's first violent incident was in 1991 when it invaded Sierra Leone from an external base in Liberia (Rashid 2016; Global Security n.d.).

Geography

RUF primarily operated out of Bo in the south of Sierra Leone. It is unclear when the RUF moved into Liberia, but they established an external base of operations in Liberia around 1990. In 1991, they launched an initial cross-border raid against the Sierra Leone government with 200 RUF members and a handful of Liberian foreign fighters (Waugh 2011, 208). Individuals in Sierra Leone initially thought the raid was a spillover incident of

the Liberian Civil War, which had been going on for over a year at this point, but it was actually the start of the Sierra Leone Civil War (Waugh 2011, 209). The RUF was active in Pujehun, Kailahun, Bo, Kenema, and Kono districts (Rashid 2016). The group was transnational. It is tied to a couple suspected attacks in Guinea against Sierra Leone refugees and refugee assistance programs (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

Corporal Foday Sankoh and other students founded the RUF in 1989 or 1990 (Waugh 2011, 203; Rashid 2006). Sankoh was heavily influenced by Mao's writings on revolution and pan-African revolutionary sentiment during the 1970s (Waugh 2011, 205-206). Sankoh was part of the Sierra Leone military in the 1960s, served on a UN PKO in the Congo, and received military training in Libya in 1988 (Waugh 2011, 206-207). Several other students had also traveled to Benghazi, Libya to receive guerrilla training from the Qaddafi regime (Rashid 2016). In 1991, the group initially started with 360 members (Rashid 2016). At its height, the group had thousands of members (FAS 2003). It forcibly recruited children to serve (Human Rights Watch 2000). The group notably funded itself through the sale of diamonds (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

Sankoh and other students initially received training from the Libyan government prior to the start of the RUF. The RUF heavily coordinated operations with Charles Taylor and the Liberian NPFL (FAS 2003; Rashid 2016). Two NPFL generals trained and oversaw RUF operations early on as well (Rashid 2016). The RUF had an external base of operations in Liberia that it shared with the NPFL. The group also shared training camps and resources with the NPFL (Rashid 2016). The group also allegedly received material support and weapons from Gambia and Burkina Faso (FAS 2003).

Group Outcome

Initially, the RUF quickly overran several districts in Sierra Leone and faced little resistance (Rashid 2016). The Sierra Leone government doubled the size of the military from 3,000 to 6,000 men in response (Global Security n.d.). In 1991, ULIMO formed in Sierra Leone to fight both the Sierra Leone government and the RUF (Global Security n.d.). The Sierra Leone government suffered a coup in 1992 due to discontent by military commanders over the counterinsurgency fight (Global Security n.d.). New militias known as kamajors formed to fight against the RUF (Global Security n.d.). In 1996, a private security firm known as the Executive Outcomes entered the fight to force back the RUF from the capital of Freetown (Global Security n.d.; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 623). In 1998, ECOMOG intervened in the conflict to help the government (Canada IRB 2003; BBC 2017). ECOMOG shifted troops from Liberia to Sierra Leone to combat the RUF (Rashid 2016). In 1999, the group launched a new offensive against ECOMOG and Sierra Leone

forces (Global Security n.d.). Soon after, the RUF signed the Lome Peace Agreement with the Sierra Leone government (Global Security n.d.; Canada IRB 2003). The group's last violent incident was in 2001 and ceased completely with the Declaration of the End of War in 2002 (Global Security n.d.; Canada IRB 2003; BBC 2017).

Notes for Iris:

-interesting second-order effects for popular support between ULIMO, RUF, and Sierra Leone government
-conventional student base here. Notable they had an education-tied grievance according to Jang (2012)

"The biggest victims of the patrimonial system collapse were, in fact, young people who were not able to be educated and employed in this deteriorating situation. To make things worse, President Momoh delivered a speech in the eastern district of Kailahun saying that education was not a right but a privilege and then, not surprisingly, the RUF promptly used his speech as 'one of its justification to go to war' (Peters 2011, p. 46)."

- II. RASSEMBLEMENT DES FORCES D_MOCRATIQUES DE GUIN_E (RDFG)
Min. Group Date: 2000
Max. Group Date: 2001
Onset: 2000

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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- "Guinea head blames neighbours." BBC. 2001. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1102574.stm>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: RDFG, RFDG

Group Formation: 2000

Group End: 2001 (disarm/peace agreement)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the RDFG formed, but it first came to attention in 2000 when it launched a series of attacks against the Guinea government from Liberia (BBC 2000; Armed Conflict Report 2014; GTD 2017). The RDFG’s goals were to overthrow Lansana Conte’s regime (Armed Conflict Report 2014; DADM Project n.d.).

Geography

The group had an external base in Liberia (BBC 2000). Fighting mostly occurred in southern Guinea along the Liberian border (BBC 2001).

Organizational Structure

The leader of the RDFG was Alpha Conde (Armed Conflict Report 2014). Conde was a member of the Malinke tribe, but it is unknown whether other members were as well (DADM Project n.d.). The group’s spokesman was Mohamed Lamine Fofana (BBC 2000). Members of the RDFG were primarily ex-soldiers (Armed Conflict Report 2014). No information could be found about group size. There is no evidence of a political wing.

External Ties

The RDFG allegedly received support from the RUF (Armed Conflict Report 2014). It seemed to have an external base in Liberia (BBC 2000). Guinea accused Liberia and Burkina Faso of providing support to the RDFG, but these countries denied it (BBC 2001; Armed Conflict Report 2014).

Group Outcome

Initially, the Guinea government denied the group existed and said it was experiencing conflict spillover from the Liberian and Sierra Leone civil wars (BBC 2000; Dixon and Sarkees 2015, 671). In 2000, ECOWAS announced it would send 1,600 peacekeepers to the Guinea border to stabilize the region (Armed Conflict Report 2014). These troops did not materialize by 2002. The Guinea and Liberia governments tried to negotiate a border and refugee agreement in 2002-2003, but talks faltered when Liberia accused Guinea of providing support for ULIMO (Armed Conflict Report 2014). The Guinea army launched cross-border raids into Liberia to disturb rebel bases (Armed Conflict Report 2014). The group's last reported violent incident was in April 2001 (Armed Conflict Report 2014).

III. UNITED LIBERATION MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY IN LIBERIA (ULIMO)

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 1994

Onset: NA

Aliases: United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia, ULIMO, ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K

Part 1. Bibliography

- [1] "Refworld | Liberia: The United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO)-J Faction including Its Leader, Known Activities in 1997, Treatment of Its Supporters by the Taylor Administration, and Whether Members of the Fante and Americo-Liberian Ethnic Groups Would Be Activists in the Faction (1997)." *Refworld*. Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, n.d. Web. 23 June 2016. <<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aad767.html>>.
- [2] Ellis, Stephen. "Liberia 1989-1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence." *African Affairs* 94.375 (1995): 165-97. Web. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/723778.pdf?_open=1466715531844>
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- [4] Gleditsch et al. NSA Data, "ULIMO", http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
- Colin Waugh, "Charles Taylor and Liberia", 2011

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1991

Group End (Outcome): 1994 (splinter)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

ULIMO was formed in 1991 by Krahn and Mandingo people. It was initially led by Alhaji G.V. Kromah though he did not fully consolidate control until 1992 (Waugh 2011, 158; Levitt 2005, 206; Refworld nd.). The group formed out of three existing components: the Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Muslims, the Liberian United Defense Force (LUDF), and the Liberian Peace Council (Levitt 2005, 206). They opposed the NPFL and Taylor (Waugh 2011, 158; Gleditsch et al.).

Geography

ULIMO fought around Monrovia, Cape Mount county, Bomi county, Bong Mines, and near Lofa county.

Organizational Structure

ULIMO was formed in 1991 by Krahn and Mandingo people. It was initially led by Alhaji G.V. Kromah though he did not fully consolidate control until 1992 (Waugh 2011, 158; Levitt 2005, 206; Refworld nd.). The group formed out of three existing components: the Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Muslims, the Liberian United Defense Force (LUDF), and the Liberian Peace Council (Levitt 2005, 206). The group recruited support from Krahn members of Doe's AFL (Waugh 2011, 158). The group primarily funded itself with diamonds and other resources (Waugh 2011, 158).

External Ties

Nigerian ECOMOG officers are also rumored to have supplied weapons and intel to members of ULIMO in exchange for profits from ULIMO's diamond industry (Ellis).

The group opposed the NPFL and Taylor (Waugh 2011, 158; Gleditsch et al.).

Group Outcome

In 1994, ethnic conflicts caused ULIMO to split into ULIMO-K, led by Kromah, which was largely Mandingo, and ULIMO-J, led by Roosevelt Johnson, which was Krahn (Ellis). In 1991, ULIMO began to receive combat training from the Guinean army and government at Kankan, Guinea. ULIMO, and especially ULIMO-K, under the leadership of Kromah, had a good relationship with Guinea and had many operatives and factions located in Guinea.

IV. NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF LIBERIA (NPFL)

Min. Group Date: 1984
Max. Group Date: 1986
Onset: NA

Aliases: NPFL

Part 1. Bibliography

- Ellis, Stephen. "Liberia 1989-1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence." *African Affairs* 94.375 (1995): 165-97. Web.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/723778.pdf?_=1466715531844>
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<https://books.google.com/books?id=IKq275PYZm8C&pg=PA59&lpg=PA59&dq=NPF+Liberia&source=bl&ots=hLpbZb8VGr&sig=6gNGjdiP06rzdyQBNT5-RagLRIk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjwIPz3vcHNahUE52MKHQD0CRM4ChDoAQgoMAI#v=snippet&q=NPFL&f=false>
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- Colin Waugh, "Charles Taylor and Liberia," 2011
- Gen. Prince Johnson, "The Rise and Fall of President Samuel Doe," 2003

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NPFL

Group Formation: 1984

Group End (Outcome): 1996 (splinter and peace agreement)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The NPFL was a militia founded in 1984 against then President Samuel Doe (Johnson 2003). It came to attention in 1989. It was led by Charles G. Taylor, a former government official, who was opposed to the contemporary presidency of Samuel Doe (Gleditsch et al.). Taylor had originally fled the Doe regime in the early 80s, but escaped from jail in

Massachusetts in 1985 and returned to Liberia (Waugh 2011, 114-115). From 1988 to December 1989, Taylor traveled to several West African states to recruit members, resources, and avoid detection by potential Liberian security forces trying to track him down (Waugh 2011, 119).

Geography

The group operated around Monrovia and Nimble County, Liberia.

Organizational Structure

NPFL is made up of mostly ethnic Gios and Manos, and their members included former Liberian politicians and their militants were young boys and teenagers, who were often drunk when executing attacks (HRW 2003). Levitt (2005) argues Taylor assembled a coalition of multi-ethnic Liberians to create the group. The goal of the NPFL was to overthrow President Doe and establish a new regime in Liberia. The group formed in Cote D'Ivoire, and on Christmas Eve, 1989, NPFL invaded the Liberian Nimba County through Cote D'Ivoire (HRW 2003). There, they found support from ethnic Gios who, too, were opposed to the rule of President Doe, who was part of the Krahn ethnic tribe. Many of the NPFL's targets were supporters of Doe's regime and members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups (HRW 2003). Their initial attack was a cross-border raid from Cote D'Ivoire led by Prince Johnson. The group organized themselves into separate military units: Taylor led one; Prince Johnson and Paul Harris led another (Waugh 2011, 123). They also benefited from the advice of Elmer Johnson who had dual US-Liberian citizenship and also served in the US Marines for a number of years (Waugh 2011, 127). They primarily funded themselves with diamonds and other resources (Waugh 2011, 158).

External Ties

The group has alleged support from Libya and Cote D'Ivoire in terms of military arms and territory (Johnson 2003, 60). Taylor secured support from Mano and Gia individuals in Nimba county plus foreign fighters from Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana attracted by the idea of pan-African revolution (Waugh 2011, 124). Taylor traveled to Tripoli on multiple occasions where he met with Gaddafi and was able to train at al-Mathabh al Tahuriya al-Alamiya (Waugh 2011, 120). Taylor also secured support from Liberian exiles in Cote d'Ivoire (Waugh 2011, 121).

Group Outcome

There have been various attempts at counterinsurgency campaigns by the AFL (Armed Forces of Liberia) against the NPFL as well as attempts at peace agreements by ECOWAS' ECOMOG. The AFL employed indiscriminate tactics against Gio fighters and noncombatants which, unlike 1983 and 1985, backfired (Waugh 2011, 125-126). AFL was especially vulnerable to attacks because of their inexperience and openness during battle (Waugh 2011, 127; Johnson 2003, 50-51). After the NPFL's 1989 invasion of

Liberia, the AFL responded brutally in an attempt to limit the NPFL's reach through the use of scorched earth methods against residents in Nimba county (HRW 1993; Waugh 2011, 124). The Doe regime also denied they were under attack through multiple denials and counter-statements (Waugh 2011, 125).

In early July 1990, the NPFL rebels occupied the capital of Monrovia, engaging in bloody conflict with both the AFL, Liberia's army, and the INPFL. Additionally, in October 1992, the NPFL surprised the city of Monrovia with Operation Octopus, which were attacks against ECOMOG and the Interim government created by ECOWAS (Ellis 1995). In August 1990, ECOWAS agreed to send ECOMOG into Monrovia in order to impose a ceasefire, create an interim government, and hold a new election within a year. However, NPFL refused to respond to ECOMOG's presence, and continued fighting, forcing ECOMOG to use combat in an attempt to push NPFL out of Monrovia. In November 1990, NPFL finally agreed to a ceasefire, but it was broken in 1992 with Taylor's launch of Operation Octopus, which was a series of direct attacks on ECOMOG and the AFL. In October 1992, ECOMOG conducted a series of bombings and strafing raids using borrowed Nigerian planes, which were unresponded to by NPFL due to their lack of air force (HRW 1993).

In 1990, Prine Johnson, an ethnic Gio, splintered from the NPFL to form the INPFL, which later was responsible for the assassination of President Doe (Gleditsch et al.). Initially, the group only had 200 members, but quickly grew to 1500 (Waugh 2011, 128). The group splintered in 1990 due to leadership tensions between Taylor and Johnson (Waugh 2011, 129). Johnson formed the INPFL soon after.