

Guatemala Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 25 January 2018

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T197	PARTIDO GUATEMALTECO DEL TRABAJO		1952	1990
T397	NOVEMBER 13TH MOVEMENT OF THE REBEL ARMED FORCES	31-Jul-63	1962	1989
T702502	PROTESTANT EXTREMISTS		1970	2001
T199	EJERCITO GUERRILLERO DE LOS POBRES (EGP)	31-Dec-75	1975	1994
T87	ARMENIAN LIBERATION ARMY		1975	1997
T1045	COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS		1976	1977
T1423	MANO BLANCA		1978	1988
T1901	SECRET ANTI-COMMUNIST ARMY (ESA)		1978	1989
T575	ORGANISATION OF PEOPLE IN ARMS (ORPA)	31-Dec-79	1979	1990
T1458	ROQUE DALTON COMMANDO		1981	1981
T965	FRENTE POPULAR		1981	1982
T198	GUATEMALAN NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (URNG)	31-Dec-82	1982	1996
T1047	SOLIDARIDAD CONTRAREVOLUCIONARIA		1983	1983
T902	ISLAMIC BROTHERHOOD		1991	1991
T2386	GOLFOS		2004	2010
T2070	SINALOA CARTEL		2004	2010

Notes for Iris:

- leftist groups in the 1960s and 1970s → umbrella
- eventually join URNG

- CIA involved in 1954 coup and remains active for awhile
- US heavily involved in the conflict
- all groups merge together to form URNG umbrella
- in 1996, URNG disarms and transitions into a leftist political party
- November 13 movement (alias FAR) is center-seeking and they ended up merging with the URNG

I. PARTIDO GUATEMALTECO DEL TRABAJO

Torg ID: 197

Min. Group Date: 1952

Max. Group Date: 1990

Onset: NA

Aliases: Guatemalan Labor Party, Guatemalan Labor Party (Pgt), Partido Guatemalteco Del Trabajo, Partido Guatemalteco Del Trabajo (Pgt)

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Guatemalan Labor Party." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 225, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1F5OaS_pTJg52rjAbH1YPQBazAZ5sSpR29XXjD-p-d9E/edit
- GTD Perpetrator 2007. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2007>
- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Guatemala." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. P. 564. gDrive. PDF
- Philip Macleod. "A Brief History of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo: A Companion to an Exhibition of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo Papers." Tulane University. 1999. <https://web.archive.org/web/20030612104439/http://lal.tulane.edu/pgtexhibit.html>
- "The Communist Insurgency Movement in Guatemala." Declassified. Central Intelligence Agency. 1968. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000653094.pdf
- "Guatemala." DADM Project. University of Central Arkansas. N.d. <http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/guatemala-1903-present/>
- "Operational: Estatutos del Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT)." Declassified. Central Intelligence Agency. 1953. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000914606.pdf
- "COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, GUATEMALA." Intelligence Report Prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State. 1953. Foreign Relations of the United States. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d33>
- "Activities of the PGT." Declassified. Central Intelligence Agency. 1954. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000916092.pdf

- “Miscellaneous Communist Activities.” Declassified. Central Intelligence Agency. 1954. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000937508.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1949 (TOPS 2008; Tulane 1999; Foreign Relations of the United States 1953)

Group End: 1982 (merger to become URNG)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PGT formed in 1949 (Tulane 1999; Foreign Relations of the United States 1953; Schmid and Jongman 1988). In 1954, the group was banned and forced to go underground following Guzman’s removal from office (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 564). Its first violent attack was in 1961 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 564). The initial goals of the group can be characterized as central-seeking because it wanted to overthrow the Guatemalan government. The ideology of the group was communist/socialist (TOPS 2008; Foreign Relations of the United States 1953; Schmid and Jongman 1988; Tulane 1999).

Geography

The PGT has conducted operations within Guatemala City, Amatitlan, and San Jose del Golfo (GTF 2017).

Organizational Structure

The president of the PGT was Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzman (TOPS 2008; Tulane 1999; Foreign Relations of the United States 1953). In 1980, the group merged with three other militant organizations to form the URNG, which was led by Isaias de Leon (TOPS 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988). The PGT was originally a political movement that developed an armed wing after it was forced to go underground in 1954 (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The PGT has two splinter groups named Nucleo de Dirección del PGT (PGT-ND) and Comisión Militar del PGT (Tulane 1999).

External Ties

The PGT has two splinter groups named Nucleo de Dirección del PGT (PGT-ND) and Comisión Militar del PGT (Tulane 1999). Some members splintered in 1962 to form the

FAR (MacLeod 1999). The group experienced additional splintering in the 1970s (MacLeod 1999).

Group Outcome

The United States intervened in Guatemala's politics to degrade the PGT and Guzman's influence (CIA 1954; Schmid and Jongman 1988; Tulane 1999). The group went underground and began an armed campaign in 1961 (Schmid and Jongman 1988). In 1982, the group merged with three other militant organizations to form the URNG, which was led by Isaias de Leon (TOPS 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988).

II. NOVEMBER 13TH MOVEMENT OF THE REBEL ARMED FORCES

Torg ID: 397

Min. Group Date: 1962

Max. Group Date: 1989

Onset: 1963

Aliases: Rebel Armed Forces (Far), Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (Far), November 13th Movement Of The Rebel Armed Forces, Rebel Armed Forces Of Guatemala (Far), Revolutionary Armed Forces

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Rebel Armed Forces." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 226, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1F5OaS_pTJg52rjAbH1YPQBazAZ5sSpR29XXjD-p-d9E/edit
- GTD Perpetrator 2324. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2324>
- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Guatemala." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. P. 565. gDrive. PDF.
- "The Communist Insurgency Movement in Guatemala." Declassified. Central Intelligence Agency. 1968. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000653094.pdf
- "Rebel Armed Forces." Global Security. N.d. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/far.htm>
- Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. "Guatemala vs Leftist Insurgents." Non-State Actor Dataset. 2013. P. 75. http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
- "Renewal of State of Siege." Keesing's Record of World Events (Formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1931-2014). Volume 17 (1971), Issue No. 3 (March), Page 24499. http://keesings.com/index_new.php?page=article&article=24499n03gtm
- "Cabinet Changes - Resurgence of Guerrilla Activities." Keesing's Keesing's Record of World Events (Formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1931-2014). Volume

23(1977), Issue No. 6 (June), Page 28380.

http://keesings.com/index_new.php?page=article&article=28380n01gtm&search=%22Rebel%20Armed%20Forces%20Of%20Guatemala%20Far%22

- “Guatemalan Civil War.” Global Security. N.D.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/guatemala.htm>

-

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Rebel Armed Forces, Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, MR-13, Revolutionary Movement Alejandro de Leon-November 13,\ (TOPS 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988; GTD 2017; CIA 1968; Global Security n.d.; Gleditsch, Cunningham, Salehyan 2013)

Group Formation: 1962 - (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 565)

Group End: 1982 (merger with URNG)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In 1960, military officers launched a failed coup against the Guatemalan government (Global Security n.d.). Two military officers fled the country after the US dispatched warships to placate the coup and began organizing a new group, which became known as the November 13 Movement (Global Security n.d.). The Rebel Armed Forces were founded in 1962 as the armed wing of the November 13 Armed Forces (M-13) movement (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 565). The group formed when the two military officers - Marco Antonio Yon Sosa and Luis Augusto Turcios - began organizing another plan to overthrow the Guatemalan government (Global Security n.d.; Schmid and Jongman 1988).

Geography

The Rebel Armed forces mainly operated within northern and eastern Guatemala; the group has conducted many attacks within the Peten Province (Schmid and Jongman 1988; GTD 2017; CIA 1968).

Organizational Structure

The original founders of the Rebel Armed Forces were junior officers from the Guatemalan military, including Luis Turcio Lima, Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, and Luis Trejo Esquivel (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 565; MIPT 2008). It later recruited from rural villages (MIPT 2008). The political wing was known as MR-13 and the armed wing was known as the Rebel Armed Forces (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 565).

It engaged in several high-profile kidnappings, which could also explain how the group partially funded itself (MIPT 2008). It never had more than 300 to 500 members at its height in the 1960s (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group worked with the PGT and 12 April Movement to coordinate efforts against the Guatemalan government (Global Security n.d.). The Rebel Armed Forces likely had external ties to the EGP and ORPA because those two groups also were under the UNRG umbrella after 1982 (Gleditsch, Cunningham, Salehyan 2013).

Group Outcome

In 1967, the Guatemalan government launched a massive counterinsurgency operation against the group, which forced the group to move away from the “foco” model to the standard prolonged rural war model (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 565). In 1967, Osorio died and in 1970 Sosa died (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 565). These two deaths hurt the group’s leadership and organization. In 1982, the Rebel Armed Forces joined the UNRG, also known as the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Party (Gleditsch, Cunningham, Salehyan 2013; Schmid and Jongman 1988). In 1996, the UNRG stopped engaging in militant activities and solely declared itself a political party. Additionally, in 1998, Cesar Montes came out and expressed his regret about the inhumane criminal activities that the Rebel Armed Forces committed during their period of activity.

Notes for Iris:

- difference between the Guatemalan Labor Party and FAR are social bases - PGT is a political party and FAR is rural poor (social classes)/disaffected indigenous parties
- eventually these groups just merge with each other to form URNG
- note this is not the Revolutionary Armed Forces

III. PROTESTANT EXTREMISTS

Torg ID: 702502

Min. Group Date: 1970

Max. Group Date: 2001

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Group Formation: This name is too vague for research.

Group End: This name is too vague for research.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This name is too vague for research.

Geography

This name is too vague for research.

Organizational Structure

This name is too vague for research.

External Ties

This name is too vague for research.

Group Outcome

This name is too vague for research.

IV. EJERCITO GUERRILLERO DE LOS POBRES (EGP)

Torg ID: 199

Min. Group Date: 1975

Max. Group Date: 1994

Onset: 1975

Aliases:

Aliases: Guerrilla Army Of The Poor (Egp), Ejercito Guerrillero De Los Pobres (Egp), People's Guerrilla Army

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Guatemalan Civil War." Global Security. N.D.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/queatemala.htm>
- The Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP). 1981. "The Guatemalan Revolution." Contemporary Marxism, no. 3: 33-36. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29765681> .
- Thomas M. Leonard. "EGP." Encyclopedia of the Developing World. Psychology Press. 2005. P. 726-728.

[https://books.google.com/books?id=3mE04D9PMpAC&pg=PA726&lpg=PA726&dq=GUERRILLA+ARMY+OF+THE+POOR+\(EGP\)&source=bl&ots=6ARTvMj8u-&sig=CruNnYkuqNJKdwN0n2_N_O5rEL0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwizrdCJ-5XUAhXJh1QKHZU3A7g4ChDoAQgwMAM#v=onepage&q=GUERRILLA%20ARMY%20OF%20THE%20POOR%20\(EGP\)&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=3mE04D9PMpAC&pg=PA726&lpg=PA726&dq=GUERRILLA+ARMY+OF+THE+POOR+(EGP)&source=bl&ots=6ARTvMj8u-&sig=CruNnYkuqNJKdwN0n2_N_O5rEL0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwizrdCJ-5XUAhXJh1QKHZU3A7g4ChDoAQgwMAM#v=onepage&q=GUERRILLA%20ARMY%20OF%20THE%20POOR%20(EGP)&f=false)

- GTD Perpetrator 356, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=1&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&perpetrator=356&count=100&expanded=no&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc#results-table
- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Guatemala." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. P. 564. gDrive. PDF

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No other aliases found

Group Formation: January 1972

Group End: 1982 - merger with other groups to form URNG (Global Security N.D.)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Guerilla Army of the Poor became active on January 19, 1972, when it began operating in a jungle around Ixcán, Guatemala (Leonard 2005 p. 726). The group was founded by Ricardo Moran, who espoused a Leftist ideology similar to Fidel Castro's ideologies with center seeking political aims, during the Guatemalan civil war (Leonard 2005 p. 727; Global Security N.D.). The group's first violent incident occurred as late as 1975 (GTD 2017).

Geography

The EGP largely recruited many landless peasants in the northeast of Guatemala in an area known as Ixcán (Leonard 2005 p. 727). The EGP later moved south to the highland parts of Guatemala known as the Maya-Quiché and Maya Ixil (Leonard 2005 p. 727). In 1966, opposition guerrilla groups launched a series of attacks in Guatemala City (Global Security N.D.). The group conducted additional attacks in Tecpan, Guatemala City, and San Juan Catzal (GTD 2016). It had two isolated transnational incidents in Lima, Peru in 1982 and San Vicente de Chucuri, Colombia in 1984 (GTD 2016). While the EGP can be considered a transnational group because of these operations, it does not have bases outside Guatemala.

Organizational Structure

The EGP was founded by Ricardo Moran in response to the political tensions in Guatemala highlighted by the 1954 coup of president Arbenz (Leonard 2005 p. 727; Global Security N.D.). The EGP largely recruited landless peasants in the northeast of Guatemala in an area known as Ixcán (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 564; Leonard 2005 p. 727). Many members were poor workers from Guatemala's highlands and were primarily indigenous Mayans (Leonard 2005 p. 727).

The EGP's organizational structure was hierarchical (Leonard 2005 p. 727). The group had four to eight military divisions and all were governed by representatives in the group's governing body named Dirección Nacional (Leonard 2005 p. 727). Under the military divisions was an armed villagers wing named the FIL. Finally, there was an unarmed villagers wing dedicated to education (Leonard 2005 p. 727). The EGP attained 400 members in 1983 (Leonard 2005 p. 727). The EGP used propaganda to gain support (Leonard 2005 p. 727). It is unclear how the group funded itself.

The group was later led by Valentín Ramos until his death in 1976 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 564). It had approximately 750 members in 1982 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 564).

External Ties

In 1982, four guerilla groups allied in order to fight the Guatemalan government, forming the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) (Global Security N.D.). The four groups were: The Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP), The Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (ORPA), The Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), and the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) (Global Security N.D.). The URNG used violence to attack government members and installations as well as the economy (Global Security N.D.). The EGP used propaganda to gain international support as well; however, the effectiveness of such propaganda is unknown (Leonard 2005 p. 727). The URNG was an enemy of the Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA) who captured and tortured anyone suspicious of supporting Leftist movements (Global Security N.D.).

Group Outcome

President Julio Cesar Montenegro in 1966 began a counterinsurgency program that lowered the amount of guerilla attacks in the countryside but not in cities like Guatemala City (Global Security N.D.). Later, Rins Mott's infamous presidency also sought to attack guerillas in a more notorious manner, saying that, "if you are with us we will feed you; if you are against us we will kill you" (Global Security N.D.). Under Mott's presidency, the PAC's, local civilian defense patrols, were instituted in order to fight leftist organizations

(Global Security N.D.). The group merged to join the URNG in 1982 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. 564).

In 1986, President Cerezo's presidency worked to use internal forces to lower violence but still did not put the violation of human rights to trial (Global Security N.D.). Finally, in 1994, the UN proposed peace to the URNG (Global Security N.D.). In 1996, a ceasefire was signed for the guerilla forces in Guatemala to only use their arms in defense of their country from external threats (Global Security N.D.; Leonard 2005 p.727). A peace agreement was made in 1996, but did not go into effect until 1997 (Leonard 2005 p. 727). The EGP dissolved in 1997 and the URNG became a political party (Leonard 2005 p. 727).

V. ARMENIAN LIBERATION ARMY

Torg ID: 87

Min. Group Date: 1975

Max. Group Date: 1997

Onset: NA

Aliases: Armenian Secret Army For The Liberation Of Armenia, Armenian Liberation Army, Armenian Secret Army For The Liberation Of Armenia (Asala), Hayastani Azatagrutyan Hay Gaghtni Banak, Hayastani Azatagrut'yan Hay Gaghtni Banak

Part 1. Bibliography

- Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda*. The RAND Corporation, 2008. 153.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- "Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia," CIA/FOIA, n.d., released 2013, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0005462031.pdf
- Michael Gunter, "Armenian Terrorism: A Reappraisal," *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 2007, <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewFile/10546/13296>
- "Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), Orly Group, 3rd October Organization," FAS, 1998, <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/asala.htm>
- "Recent Trends in Palestinian Terrorism," Bruce Hoffman, RAND, 1984, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2005/P6981.pdf>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Orly Group

Group Formation: 1975

Group End (Outcome): 1992 (splinter, leadership, other?) [J&L say 1997 but no evidence for that]

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

ASALA was formed in 1975 (CIA/FOIA iii). The group ascribes to a Marxist ideology (CIA/FOIA iii). It fought for an independent Armenian state as well as reparations from the Turkish government for the 1915 genocide (FAS 1998).

Geography

ASALA was based out of Beirut until 1982 (CIA/FOIA, 2). It primarily targeted Turks, but did so in France, US, and Turkey (FAS 1998).

Organizational Structure

ASALA's leader was Hagop Hagopian (FAS 1998). The group primarily engages in indiscriminate violence against diplomats, noncombatants, security officials, Turkish, and non-Turkish individuals (CIA/FOIA). CIA argues that there is not much popular support for the group among the Armenian community and Churches have, in fact, disavowed it (CIA/FOIA 9). It had a "few hundred members and sympathizers" (FAS 1998).

External Ties

ASALA has an external base in Lebanon and is thought to receive some external support from Syria (CIA/FOIA). The group has ties to the PFLP and PFLP-GC (FAS 1998).

Group Outcome

Initially, the Turkish government did very little to counter ASALA, but began investing in counterterrorism squads after other European leaders called them out on it (CIA/FOIA 9). Hagopian was assassinated in 1988 (FAS 1998). The group began to splinter by 1983 and was relatively inactive by 1990 (CIA/FOIA, FAS 1998). Their last known attack was in 1992 (FAS 1998).

VI. COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

Torg ID: 1045

Min. Group Date: 1976

Max. Group Date: 1977

Onset: NA

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography

- Bamford, James. (2016). Stand and deliver A cuban terrorist is living freely in miami. it's time to send him home. *Foreign Policy*, (219), 84-85. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1795688235?accountid=14026>.
- Bardach, Ann Louise. "Twilight of the Assassins," *The Atlantic*, November 2005. <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/11/twilight-of-the-assassins/305291/>.
- C.I.A., *International Terrorism in 1976*, CIA-RPD80T00942A000600050012-1, July 1997, accessed November 3, 2016 <http://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/MANPADS/CIANairobi.pdf>.
- Consortium News (?), <http://www.consortiumnews.com/2008/022108a.html>
- Martin, Douglas. "Orlando Bosch, Cuban Exile, Dies at 84," *The New York Times*, April 27, 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/us/28bosch.html>.
- Mckinley Jr., James C. "Terror Accusations, but Perjury Charges," *The New York Times*, January 9, 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/us/10posada.html>.
- NSA Archive (as publisher). F.B.I File No. 2-471, "CORU: Neutrality Matters Cuba (Anti-Castro)," August 16, 1978, George Washington University, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB153/19780816.pdf>.
- Schmid, Alex P., and Albert J. Jongman. *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & Literature*. (2008), 527.
- Sweig, Julia E. *Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), retrieved from <https://books.google.com/books?id=fBHMclIXHtMC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>.
- GTD Perpetrator 3554. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3554>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: CORU, United Revolutionary Organizations Commando (Anderson, 33)

Group Formation: 1975 or 1976

Group End: 1978

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Coordination Of United Revolutionary Organizations (CORU) ceased attacks in the 1990s and was inactive as of 2012. The founding of CORU is disputed, with most reports citing either 1975 in Chile (S&J 1998, 527) or June 11, 1976, in the Dominican Republic (NSA Archive 1, 1978). It was an umbrella organization for five anti-Castro paramilitary groups. These groups included: Acción Cuba; Cuban Nationalist Movement; Cuban National Liberation Front; Association of the Veterans of the Bay of Pigs Brigade 2506;

and the 17th of April Movement (NSA Archive 1, 1978). CORU's initial goal was the end of revolutionary leader Fidel Castro's communist regime (Sweig 2009, 83). Through acts of sabotage and misinformation about who was responsible, CORU sought to undermine Cuba's relationships with other states in the Americas (Schmid and Jongman 1998, 527; NSA Archives 1978). A C.I.A. report attributes CORU with 17 acts of international terrorism during 1976, three of which occurred in the U.S. (C.I.A. 1997, 5). The five groups in CORU officially united under the umbrella organization on June 11, 1976, at a meeting in the Dominican Republic (NSA Archive 1, 1978). Using false names and passports, CORU leaders traveled to countries with Cuban exile communities including Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Venezuela (Martin 2011; NSA Archives, 6 re: Venezuela).

Geography

Posada and Bosch are alleged to have organized the mid-flight bombing of Cubana Airlines Flight 455 on October 6, 1976, which killed all 73 people on board (Sweig 2009, 83). Cubana Airlines Flight 455 departed from Guayana en route to Havana, with layovers in Trinidad, Barbados and Jamaica. The plane crashed in the sea about 10 minutes after departing from Barbados. It was the first act of airline terrorism in the Americas (Bardach 2006). According to a declassified C.I.A. memo from June 22, 1976, a source told the C.I.A. that CORU was planning to bomb a Cubana Airline Flight (Bamford 2016). However, the bombing occurred despite this information.

Organizational Structure

The founders of CORU were Cuban exiles Orlando Bosch (a medical doctor) and Luis Posada Carriles (often known as Posada rather than Carriles). Bosch and Posada were schoolmates from the University of Havana, who became disillusioned by the Castro regime's unfulfilled promises and oppression (Bardach 2006).

External Ties

The right-wing military in Argentina and CORU both had strong ties to the covert paramilitary network Operation Condor, which reportedly aimed to weaken leftist groups and the Cuban government (Martin 2011; Kohut and Vilella 2010). U.S. Government investigators have considered it possible (although never confirmed), that the Argentine military may have provided support to CORU as part of the multinational Operation Condor (Bardach 2006). Bosch received housing and logistical support from the Chilean military in the latter half of the 1970s, following the 1973 military coup in Chile that deposed democratically-elected, socialist President Salvador Allende (Martin 2011; Bardach 2006). The Chilean secret police allegedly helped Bosch plan the assassination of Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier (a Castro sympathizer) in Washington, D.C., on September 21, 1976 (Bardach 2006; Bamford 2016; Kohut and Vilella 2010). A bomb

placed under Letelier's car detonated, killing him and his American aide Ronni Karpen Moffitt (Ibid.).

CORU also had supporters in the Cuban exile community in Miami, Florida (Martin 2011). The F.B.I. described the group as organized in "secret cells," but Bosch and Posada were familiar both to law enforcement and the Cuban exile community since the 1960s (NSA Archives 12, 1978; Bardach 2006).

Bosch and Posada allegedly had ties to the CIA beginning in the 1960s. Posada is alleged to have received payments from the C.I.A. for his work until 1976, according to declassified documents and an unclassified summary of his career from court records (McKinley). Bosch worked closely with Posada through the 1980s. Unlike Posada, Bosch claimed that he received direct support from the C.I.A. only briefly, for paramilitary training in Florida in the early 1960s (Bardach 2006).

Group Outcome

In 1968, Bosch was sentenced to ten years in federal prison in Miami (after six prior arrests) but earned parole in 1972. Florida's then-governor Claude Kirk was among those who lobbied for Bosch's parole (Bardach 2006; Martin 2011). Bosch and Posada were arrested in Caracas, Venezuela in connection with the bombing of Cubana Airlines Flight 455 (Bamford 2016). Posada fled Venezuela in 1985 and Bosch was released on appeal in 1987 (Bardach 2006). The U.S. Justice Department called for Bosch to be deported from Miami in 1989, alleging that Bosch was responsible for 30 acts of sabotage in the United States, Puerto Rico, Panama and Cuba between 1961 and 1968 (Martin 2011). However, both Bosch (who died in 2011) and Posada (alive as of 2012) were allowed to remain in Florida. The group's last attack occurred in 1978 (GTD 2017).

VII. MANO BLANCA
Torg ID: 1423
Min. Group Date: 1978
Max. Group Date: 1988
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Mano Blanca." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4122, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1F5OaS_pTJg52rjAbH1YPQBazAZ5sSpR29XXjD-p-d9E/edit

- GTD Perpetrator 2418. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2418>
- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Guatemala." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. P. 566. gDrive. PDF.
- "Right-wing terror unit flashes Guatemala power." News Clips. FOIA. 1968.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01315R000300490004-5.pdf>
- "Presidential elections - Internal developments - Foreign relations." Keesing's Record of World Events (Formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1931-2014) Volume 32 (1986), Issue No. 4 (April), Page 34285.
http://keesings.com/index_new.php?page=article&article=34285n01gtm&search=%22guatemala%20mano%20blanca%22
- "Renewal of State of Siege. - Continued Terrorist Violence." Keesing's Record of World Events (Formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1931-2014) Volume 17 (1971), Issue No. 3 (March), Page 24499.
http://keesings.com/index_new.php?page=article&article=24499n03gtm&search=%22guatemala%20mano%20blanca%22
- "Political Developments. - Widespread Violence by Left-wing and Right-wing Guerrillas. - Killing of U.S. Ambassador and U.S. Military Attaches." Keesing's Record of World Events (Formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1931-2014). Volume 14 (1968), Issue No. 12 (December), Page 23099.
http://keesings.com/index_new.php?page=article&article=23099n01gtm&search=%22guatemala%20mano%20blanca%22

-

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: La Mano, Secret Anti-Communist Party, Jaguar Justiciero (CIA 1968; TOPS 2008)

Group Formation: 1978

Group End: 5/1/1988 - Group withered away (TOPS 2008)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed. The initial goals of the group are somewhat unclear, but it opposed all left-wing militant organizations (TOPS 2008; CIA 1968). The ideology of the group is right-wing and pro-government (TOPS 2008; CIA 1968). The group first came to attention as a violent group in 1978 (GTD 2018).

Geography

The Mano Blanco has conducted operations in Guatemala City and Las Cumbres (TOPS 2008; CIA 1968; GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The Mano Blanco was created by Mario Sandoval Alarcon (TOPS 2008). It has been alleged that the military of Guatemala supports the group (TOPS 2008). There is no information about the different wings of the Mano Blanco.

External Ties

There is no explicit information about the source of funding of the Mano Blanco; however, it has been alleged that the military of Guatemala supports the group (TOPS 2008). There is no information about the different wings of the Mano Blanco.

Group Outcome

It has been stated that the Mano Blanco dissolved in the 1980s (TOPS 2008). The group was last active in 1988 (GTD 2017).

VIII. SECRET ANTI-COMMUNIST ARMY (ESA)

Torg ID: 1901

Min. Group Date: 1978

Max. Group Date: 1989

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Salvadorean Anti-Communist Army." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. P. 535. gDrive PDF.
- GTD Perpetrator 364. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=364>
- Lydia Chavez. "Argentina Offered Peronism Without Peron." New York Times. 1983.
<http://www.nytimes.com/1983/09/18/weekinreview/argentina-offered-peronism-without-peron.html>
- Michael Drudge. "Guerrillas charge US Embassy linked to death squads." UPI. 1984.
<https://www.upi.com/Archives/1984/04/29/Guerrillas-charge-US-Embassy-linked-to-death-squads/5293452062800/>
- International Federation for Human Rights, The resurgence of the death squads, 10 November 1999, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/482c5bdf14.html>

- “El Salvador: Controlling Right-wing Terrorism.” Declassified. Central Intelligence Agency. N.d. p. 11. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000075083.pdf

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA) first came to attention for violent activities on October 20, 1978, in Guatemala City, Guatemala (GTD 2017). The group had extreme anti-communist beliefs and supported the military governments in Guatemala and El Salvador (Carey et al. 2013). ESA was associated with other right-wing terror groups in El Salvador (Chavez 1983). Attacks were mostly directed at teachers, priests, and nuns (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 535).

Geography

ESA conducted attacks in Guatemala and El Salvador. The group most frequently targeted Guatemala City and San Salvador (GTD 2017). Other geographic information about ESA could not be found.

Organizational Structure

ESA, like other right-wing terror groups, operated as a militia and moved around in armed groups (IFHR 1999). By mid-1980, the Nationalist Republican Alliance in El Salvador (ARENA) is said to have integrated ESA into its paramilitary structure (CIA n.d., 11). The group also claimed to have been an umbrella organization for various right-wing terror groups (Chavez 1983).

Membership of Salvadoran right-wing groups, like the ESA, typically drew from the ruling class, particularly those from the military or those with economic clout (IFHR 1999).

Information on ESA's leadership could not be found.

External Ties

ESA had ties to other right-wing groups operating in El Salvador. The group conducted clandestine operations on behalf of ARENA (CIA n.d., 6). ESA claimed to be the umbrella group for the Death Squad, Anti-Communist Brigade, and White War Union (Chavez 1983).

ESA had links to the Guatemalan and Salvadoran governments (Carey et al. 2013). The U.S. Embassy in El Salvador was accused of complicity with ESA and other death squads (Drudge 1984).

Group Outcome

Between 1979 and 1981, violence of Salvadoran army-backed death squads, including ESA, resulted in the death of more than 30,000 people (BBC News 2017). The group's final documented attack was on December 28, 1989, in Guatemala City (GTD 2017). In 1991, the insurgents signed a peace agreement with the Salvadoran government. Death squads in El Salvador saw little legal action after the peace agreement and began to initiate criminal activities in the late 1990s (IFHR 1999).

IX. ORGANISATION OF PEOPLE IN ARMS (ORPA)

Torg ID: 575

Min. Group Date: 1979

Max. Group Date: 1990

Onset: 1979

Aliases: Organisation Of People In Arms (Orpa), Organizacion Revolucionario Del Pueblo En Armas, Organizaci_n Revolucionario Del Pueblo En Armas, Revolutionary Organization Of People In Arms, Revolutionary Organization Of People In Arms (Orpa)

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 525. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=525>
- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Guatemala." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. P. 565-566. gDrive. PDF
- "Guatemalan Civil War." Global Security. N.D.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/guatemala.htm>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Guatemala: The Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), including the situation of its former members, particularly those who were forcibly recruited, and its current targets (1997 to August 2000), 23 August 2000, GTM35359.E, available at:
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad5b24.html>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Guatemala: Information on the guerrilla group Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA), 1983-1993, 1 January 1993, GTM12913, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ace76b.html>
- "Internal developments - Cabinet and military appointments - Foreign relations." Keesing's Record of World Events (Formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1931-2014)
Volume 33 (1987), Issue No. 4 (April), Page 35053.
http://keesings.com/index_new.php?page=article&article=35053n01gtm&search=%22Revolutionary%20Organization%20of%20the%20People%20in%20Arms%20guatemala%22

2

- Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. "Guatemala vs Leftist Insurgents." Non-State Actor Dataset. 2013. P. 75.
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

-

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1972 (form), 1979 (first attack)

Group End: 1982 (merger with URNG)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The ORPA formed in 1972 (Canada IRB 1993). The ORPA is a splinter group of the Rebel Armed Forces; it has been alleged that this breakaway was due to ideological disputes (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The group had its first attack in 1979 (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Gleditsch, Cunningham, Salehyan 2013). The initial goals of the group could be considered central-seeking because it wanted to overthrow the Guatemalan government. It espoused both leftist and ethno-nationalist views, claiming to fight for "the development of the indigenous people's culture" (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 566).

Geography

The ORPA has conducted its areas of operations in Sierra Madre, Lake Attilan, and the San Marcos province (Schmid and Jongman 1988; GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The leader of ORPA is a man named Rodrigo Asturias (Refworld 2000). The group was started by ex-militants from the Rebel Armed Forces (Canada IRB 1993).

There is no explicit information about the membership of the group, but once source stated that the group is "weaker than the Guatemalan army" (Gleditsch, Cunningham, Salehyan 2013). In February 1982, ORPA became one of the four groups to join the URNG (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Gleditsch, Cunningham, Salehyan 2013). There is no information about how the group receives its source of funding.

It has been alleged that ORPA has its own splinter group called the People's Rebel Front but there has been no additional information to back this statement up (Refworld 2000).

External Ties

The ORPA, EGP, PGT, and FAR were all a part of the URNG (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Gleditsch, Cunningham, Salehyan 2013). The ORPA is a splinter group of the Rebel Armed Forces; it has been alleged that this breakaway was due to ideological disputes (Schmid and Jongman 1988). It has been alleged that ORPA has its own splinter group called the People's Rebel Front but there has been no additional information to back this statement up (Refworld 2000).

Group Outcome

In July 1981, the government cracked down on the group by demolishing the local fronts established by ORPA (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The group merged to join the URNG in 1982 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 80).

X. ROQUE DALTON COMMANDO

Torg ID: 1458

Min. Group Date: 1981

Max. Group Date: 1981

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Roque Dalton Commando." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4254, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1F5OaS_pTJg52rjAbH1YPQBazAZ5sSpR29XXjD-p-d9E/edit
- GTD Perpetrator 4670. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=4670>
- Search ProQuest
 - ROQUE DALTON COMMANDO
 - "ROQUE DALTON COMMANDO"
- Search Keesings
 - ROQUE DALTON COMMANDO

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: M-20

Group Formation: 1981

Group End: 1981 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 1981 for an attack against the El Salvador consulate in Guatemala (MIPT 2008). The group did not detail their claim, but the name (Roque Dalton) suggests ties to the FARN and the larger leftist insurgency in El Salvador seeking to overthrow the government (c.f. El Salvador Profiles).

Geography

The only known area of operation has been Guatemala City, Guatemala (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the group's organizational structure including membership, size, leadership, source of funding, or whether it had a political wing.

External Ties

There is no information available about the external ties of the group.

Group Outcome

The group's last - and only - attack was in 1981 when it attacked the El Salvador Consulate in Guatemala City, Guatemala (GTD 2017; MIPT 2008). It is unknown what happened to the group after this incident and it is not heard from again.

- XI. FRENTE POPULAR
Torg ID: 965
Min. Group Date: 1981
Max. Group Date: 1982
Onset: NA

Aliases: 31 January Popular Front, 31 De Enero, 31 January Peoples Front (Fp-31), 31 January People's Front (Fp-31), Fp-31, Frente Popular, January 31 Popular Front

Part 1. Bibliography

- "FP-31." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4606, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1F5OaS_pTJg52rjAbH1YPQBazAZ5sSpR29XXjD-p-d9E/edit
- GTD Perpetrator 3493. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3493>

- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Guatemala." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. P. 564. gDrive. PDF
- "Guatemala's 4 Main Rebel Groups Join Forces." New York Times. 1982. <http://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/03/world/guatemala-s-4-main-rebel-groups-join-forces.html>
- John Jessup. An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 1945-1996. Greenwood Publishing. 1996. https://books.google.com/books?id=hP7jJAKTd9MC&pg=PA355&lpg=PA355&dq=January+31+Popular+Front&source=bl&ots=PHqw9O77-N&sig=eY3XIhWh99nT6NYqDHViGHtCMg8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiHgLMyrvzYAhVGzoMKHVd_DtcQ6AEIPjAD#v=onepage&q=January%2031%20Popular%20Front&f=false
- "Presidential and Congressional Elections - Overthrow of Government - Installation of Military Junta and New Cabinet - Dissolution of Junta and Assumption of Presidency by Gen. Rios Montt - Internal security Developments." Keesing's Record of World Events. Volume 28 (1982), Issue No. 7 (July), Page 31605. http://keesings.com/index_new.php?page=article&article=31605n01gtm&search=%22January%2031%20Popular%20Front%22

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: January 1981 (Schmid and Jongman 1988; TOPS 2008)

Group End: 1982 (merger URNG)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Frente Popular was formed in January 1981 as an umbrella organization of several smaller groups (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 564). It is named after an Embassy attack in 1981 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 564). The group's aims were to overthrow the government (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 564). The group first came to attention as a violent group on April 28, 1981 (GTD 2017).

Geography

The Frente Popular conducted its operations mainly within Guatemala City (GTD 2017). There is no evidence the group is transnational.

Organizational Structure

There is no information available about the leadership of the Frente Popular. Membership of the group was estimated to be around 6,000 individuals; the group may have received support from labor movements (New York Times 1982; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 564).

The group allegedly had a very sophisticated set of propaganda operations (MIPT 2008). Member organizations of FP-31 included the Federation of Guatemalan Workers, Committee of Peasant Unity, Felipe Antonio Garcia Revolutionary Workers Nuclei, Trinidad Gomez Hernandez Settlers Coordinating Body, Vicente Menchu Revolutionary Christians, and Ruben Garcia Revolutionary Student Front (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 564). While the Frente Popular does not have different wings, it did consolidate with four other militant organizations to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (TOPS 2008; New York Times 1982).

External Ties

There is no explicit information available about the external ties of the Frente Popular. It later merged to join the URNG (New York Times 1982).

Group Outcome

The main interaction that the Frente Popular had was with the government in 1982 when the government negotiated a deal with the group that it would leave the country if it delivered certain hostages back to them (Jessup 1996). In 1982, the group merged with several other Guatemalan groups to launch the URNG (New York Times 1982). The last reported violent attack of the group occurred on May 12, 1982 (GTD 2017).

XII. GUATEMALAN NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (URNG)

Torg ID: 198

Min. Group Date: 1982

Max. Group Date: 1996

Onset: 1982

Aliases: Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Urng), Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Gautemalteca

Part 1. Bibliography

- "URNG." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3709, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1F5OaS_pTJg52rjAbH1YPQBazAZ5sSpR29XXjD-p-d9E/edit
- GTD Perpetrator 395. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=395>

- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Guatemala." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. P. 564. gDrive. PDF
- "Guatemalan Civil War." Global Security. N.D.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/guatemala.htm>
- Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. "Guatemala vs Leftist Insurgents." Non-State Actor Dataset. 2013. P. 75.
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
- "Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity." Global Security. N.d.
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/urng.htm>
- "Guatemala's 4 Main Rebel Groups Join Forces." New York Times. 1982.
<http://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/03/world/guatemala-s-4-main-rebel-groups-join-forces.html>
- Michael E. Allison. "The Guatemalan National Revolutionary unit: the long collapse," Democratization, 2016. 23:6, 1042-1058. Pdf. gDrive.
- Phil Gunson, Greg Chamberlain, and Andrew Thompson. "Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity." The Dictionary of Contemporary Politics of Central America and the Caribbean. Routledge. 2015.
[https://books.google.com/books?id=tEJACwAAQBAJ&pg=PT148&lpg=PT148&dq=Guatemalan+National+Revolutionary+Unity+\(Urng\)&source=bl&ots=laaEMbQJ04&sig=RGOdbxdsfZo6FhAuYuuxJF66sAk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjYxYH-rvzYAhXp44MKHc9TAuI4ChDoAQhIMAk#v=onepage&q=Guatemalan%20National%20Revolutionary%20Unity%20\(Urng\)&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=tEJACwAAQBAJ&pg=PT148&lpg=PT148&dq=Guatemalan+National+Revolutionary+Unity+(Urng)&source=bl&ots=laaEMbQJ04&sig=RGOdbxdsfZo6FhAuYuuxJF66sAk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjYxYH-rvzYAhXp44MKHc9TAuI4ChDoAQhIMAk#v=onepage&q=Guatemalan%20National%20Revolutionary%20Unity%20(Urng)&f=false)
- Amnesty International, Guatemala: The Guatemalan Peace Process Agreements: Elements most relevant to AI's concerns, 18 August 1997, AMR 34/024/1997, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/45bf710f2.html>
- "Cuba: Focal Point for Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean." Central Intelligence Agency. 1986.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90T00114R000800840001-8.pdf>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1982

Group End: 1996

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed on February 8, 1982, after the Guatemalan Labor Party merged with three other guerilla groups: the EGP, ORPA, and FAR (Schmid and Jongman 1988;

MIPT 2008; Global Security N.d.b; Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013; Gunson, Chamberlain, and Thompson 2015; Allison 2016). The group's first attack was on December 19, 1983 (GTD 2017). The group was ideologically Marxist (Global Security N.d.b; New York Times 1982; Allison 2016). The group fought to overthrow the Guatemalan government (New York Times 1982; Schmid and Jongman 1988; Allison 2016). Its first violent incident occurred in 1982.

Geography

The group was extremely active throughout Guatemala (GTD 2017). The group was specifically active in Agua Blanca, Ayal Bridge, Boca del Monte, Brito, Caba, Chichicastenango, Chimaltenango, Comalapa, Eastern Guatemala, El Porvenir, El Quetzal, El Subin, El Tumbador, El Zapote, Finca Chinan, Finca Santo Tomas, Fray Bartolome de las Casas, Gracias a Dios, Guatemala City, Huehuetenango, Jutiapa, La Cueva, La Democracia, La Gomera, La Libertad, La Reforma, Mixco, Nebaj, On Inter-American highway, Pajapita, Panajachel, Playa Grande, Raxruja, Rio Bravo, San Andres Itzapa, San Jose Belen, San Lucas Toliman, San Marcos, San Marlos, San Miguel Panan, San Miguel Uspantan, San Rafael Pie de la Cuesta, Santa Ana Belen, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Santa Elena, Santa Elena Barillas, Sayaxche, Serchil, Solola, Tejutla, Tenedores, Totonicapan, Unknown, Western Highlands and Xocoalchica (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

Because the URNG is a political front for four other militant organizations, it does not necessarily have a designated leader; however, the four militant organizations that it consists of are the EPG, ORPA, FAR, and PGT (TOPS 2008; New York Times 1982; Schmid and Jongman 1988; Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013; Gunson, Chamberlain, and Thompson 2015). It has been stated that the URNG consists of 6,000 members (Schmid and Jongman 1988). It has been alleged that the URNG receives its source of funding through bribery and donations (TOPS 2008). There is no information about the different wings of the URNG, but it is important to note that the URNG is a political front for the militant organizations listed above.

The specific leadership of the group is unknown (Global Security N.d.b). The four groups formed the Comandancia General Revolucionaria to coordinate activities (Global Security N.d.b). The appearance of teamwork between the four groups was important in securing financial support, especially from Cuba (Global Security N.d.b). The group was estimated to have 6,000 members in 1982 (New York Times 1982; Schmid and Jongman 1988). In 1980, prior to the merger, all four member groups had approximately 20,000 members (Allison 2016). The group consisted of a political wing and a military wing (Allison 2016). The group modeled its organization off the FDN (Contras) in Nicaragua (Schmid and Jongman 1988).

The indigenous peasant communities supported the group (Global Security N.d.b). The group was a merger of the Guatemalan Labor Party and three other guerilla groups, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT) (MIPT 2008; Global Security N.d.b; Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). Most members had already been fighting for up to 20 years.

External Ties

It has been alleged that the URNG funded itself through bribery and donations (TOPS 2008). There is no information about the different wings of the URNG, but it is important to note that the URNG is a political front for the militant organizations listed above.

The indigenous peasant communities supported the group (Global Security N.d.b). The group was a merger of the Guatemalan Labor Party and three other guerilla groups, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT) (MIPT 2008; Global Security N.d.b; Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). The URNG joined with the New Nation Alternative (ANN), Winaq, New Republic Movement, and other political groups in 2011 (Allison 2016). The group received political and military training from the Cubans (CIA 1986).

Group Outcome

The group was formed in 1982 after the Guatemalan Labor Party merged with three other guerilla groups (MIPT 2008). The group attacked government buildings and waged insurgent attacks against the group for years (Global Security N.d.b). The group campaigned for the presidency with Alvaro Colom Caballeros as their candidate (Allison 2016). The group's political presence declined over the years (Allison 2016). The government responded aggressively, but when that failed it aided the primary supporters of the group, the peasants and indigenous communities (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). In 1996, URNG signed a peace treaty with the government; the URNG now stands as a singular political party (TOPS 2008). The last reported violent attack of the URNG occurred on August 25, 1996 (GTD 2017). The group ended its violent activity after peace negotiations with the government on December 29, 1996, reforming as a political party (MIPT 2008; Global Security N.d.a; Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013; Allison 2016; Amnesty International 1997).

Notes for Iris:

- reason for merger: unclear but might be related to duration of war and progress made against Guatemalan government
- the group lost popular support in the community over time particularly in the late 1980s, but worth investigating more why this drop occurred

-foco tactics

XIII. SOLIDARIDAD CONTRAREVOLUCIONARIA

Torg ID: 1047

Min. Group Date: 1983

Max. Group Date: 1983

Onset: NA

Aliases: Counterrevolutionary Solidarity, Counterrevolutionary Solidarity (Sc), Solidaridad Contrarevolucionaria

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 100015. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=100015>
- Anthony Harrup. "El Salvador's leftist guerrillas attacked two main military bases." UPI. 1983.
<https://www.upi.com/Archives/1983/12/30/El-Salvadors-leftist-guerrillas-attacked-two-main-military-bases/9499441608400/>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: **Contras?**

Group Formation: 12/24/1983 (GTD 2017)

Group End: 12/24/1983 - Reason Unknown (GTD 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The exact founding date of the group is unknown. Its first and only recorded attack occurred on December 24, 1983, when it attacked the Nicaraguan Embassy (Harrup 1983; GTD 2017). The group was considered anti-Sandinista and opposed the Nicaraguan government (Harrup 1983). The group was also considered to be ideologically fascist (Harrup 1983).

Geography

The group's base of operations is unknown. The group was active in Guatemala City, Guatemala (Harrup 1983; GTD 2017). No other places of activity of the group are known.

The group's leadership, membership, source of funding, and different wings are unknown due to its short existence

External Ties

This may be an alias or related to the larger Contras movement in Nicaragua (Harrup 1983).

Group Outcome

The group was responsible for a threatening letter sent to Nicaraguan Ambassador Orlando Rojas Morales, demanding that he leave the country within two days, which he refused to do (Harrup 1983). The group claimed responsibility for a single attack, a bombing attack on the Nicaraguan embassy on December 24, 1983 (Harrup 1983). The group has not claimed responsibility for any other attack and is assumed to be inactive (Harrup 1983).

XIV. ISLAMIC BROTHERHOOD

Torg ID: 902

Min. Group Date: 1991

Max. Group Date: 1991

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Islamic Brotherhood." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4068, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1F5OaS_pTJg52rjAbH1YPQBazAZ5sSpR29XXjD-p-d9E/edit
- GTD Perpetrator 10019. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=10019>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No Proposed Changes

Group Formation: 1991 (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017)

Group End: 1991 (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group's exact founding date is unknown. The group is thought to have been against the Gulf War (MIPT 2008). The group's specific ideology is unknown. The group claimed responsibility for a single attack on February 21, 1991, a bombing attack on the British embassy in Guatemala (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017).

Geography

The group's base of operations is not known. The group was active in Guatemala City of Guatemala for the one attack for which it claimed responsibility (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group's leadership, membership, source of funding, and different wings are unknown due its short existence.

External Ties

The group's external support, alliances, and splinters are unknown due its short existence.

Group Outcome

The group claimed responsibility for a single attack, a bombing attack on the British embassy on February 21, 1991, which resulted in damage to the building but casualties (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). The group has not claimed responsibility for any other attack and is assumed to be inactive (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017).

XV. GOLFOS
Torg ID: 2386
Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 2010
Onset: NA

Aliases: Gulf Cartel, Cartel Del Golfo (Cdg), Golfos

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 30031. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30031>

- “Gulf Cartel.” InsightCrime. 2017.
<https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/gulf-cartel-profile/>
- Actor ID 782. Uppsala Armed Conflict Data. Last modified 2017.
<http://ucdp.uu.se/#/actor/782>
- Christopher Woody. “The breakdown of one of Mexico’s most powerful cartels is driving violence in a valuable border city.” Business Insider. 2017.
<http://www.businessinsider.com/breakdown-of-gulf-cartel-is-driving-violence-in-reynosa-mexico-2017-11>
- “The Gulf Cartel.” Drug Cartels. Frontline.
<https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/mexico/etc/gulf.html>
- Gustavo Castillo Garcia and Armando Torres Barbosa. “The History of the Gulf Cartel.” La Jornada. 2003.
<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2003/03/15/046n1soc.php?origen=soc-jus.html>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1984

Group End: 2017 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed in the 1970s. It was originally headed by Juan Nepomuceno Guerra, who smuggled alcohol in addition to marijuana and cocaine into the United States (Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017; Garcia and Barbosa 2003).

In 1984, Juan Garcia Abrego took control of a drug trafficking business that originally belonged to his uncle and formally established the Gulf Cartel (Insight Crime 2017). He went on to run a marijuana and heroin operation that was relatively small (Insight Crime 2017). Abrego went on to reportedly form a deal with a Colombian group known as Cali Cartel that attempts to search for ways to enter to the United State’s market after their Caribbean routes were attacked by the law enforcement of the United States (Insight Crime 2017; Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017; Frontline; Garcia and Barbosa 2003). Abrego took on the role of taking care of shipments of cocaine through the border between Mexico and the United States; he took on the entirety of risks as well as half of the profits (Insight Crime 2017).

The group is one of the oldest and largest drug cartels in Mexico (Insight Crime 2017; Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017). The group is also reportedly fighting another group

known as the Sinaloa Cartel for control over territory (Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017). It is unknown precisely when the group had its first attack.

Geography

The group launched an attack in the city of Morelia, Mexico (GTD 2017). The group is reportedly based in a state known as Tamaulipas, and its most crucial bases being located in Reynosa, Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, and Ciudad Victoria (Insight Crime 2017; Business Insider 2017). Another crucial base for the group is a city known as Monterrey (Insight Crime 2017).

The group is also reportedly trying to establish itself in cities known as Morelia in Michoacan and Miguel Aleman in addition to the Yucatan peninsula (Insight Crime 2017; Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017). The group has reportedly shipped products across the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean (Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017).

The group has shipped its products in the United States in places such as Texas, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York (Business Insider 2017). The group also reportedly operates in Nuevo Leon, Veracruz, Tabasco, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Jalisco, Zacatecas, Chiapas, and the Federal District (La Jornada 2003).

The group does not conduct any transnational attacks in the United States.

Organizational Structure

The group's origins date back to the 1970s when Juan Nepomuceno Guerra began smuggling alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine into the United States (Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017; Garcia and Barbosa 2003).

In 1984, Juan Garcia Abrego took over the group and formally established the Gulf Cartel (Insight Crime 2017; Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017; Frontline; Garcia and Barbosa 2003). A man named Cardenas took on the leadership role afterwards and was followed by Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sanchez, Antonio Cardenas Guillen, and then Mario Ramirez Trevino (InsightCrime 2017). Loisa Salinas was reportedly a leader of several factions of the drug cartel (Business Insider 2017). The group reportedly has approximately 1000 members (Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017).

External Ties

The group reportedly had ties with a group known as Familia Michoacana; the alliance was reportedly formed to combat the Zetas, a common rival of the two groups (Insight Crime 2017). The group was also formerly allied to groups known as the Tijuana Cartel

and Sinaloa Cartel (Insight Crime 2017). The group has reportedly splintered into smaller groups throughout the years (Business Insider 2017).

Group Outcome

The group has reportedly been able to push the Zetas out of some areas, but the Zetas are reportedly holding on tightly to their territory (Insight Crime 2017). One of the group's former leaders, Juan Garcia Abrego, was captured and brought to the United States on criminal charges (Insight Crime 2017; Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017; Frontline; Garcia and Barbosa 2003). The group is reportedly still intact and active as late as 2017 (Insight Crime 2017; UCDP 2017) .

XVI. SINALOA CARTEL
Torg ID: 2070
Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 2010
Onset: NA

Aliases: Sinaloa Cartel, Cartel De Sinaloa, Cartel De Sinaloa

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Sinaloa Cartel Profile." Insight Crime. N.d.
<https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/sinaloa-cartel-profile/>
- Actor ID 775. Uppsala Conflict Data. Last modified 2017. <http://ucdp.uu.se/#/actor/775>
- Patrick Keefe. "Cocaine Incorporated." New York Times Magazine. 2012.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/how-a-mexican-drug-cartel-makes-its-billions.html>
- Seth Harp. "Behind the Scenes of Mexico's Sinaloa Cartel." Rolling Stone. 2017.
<https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/behind-the-scenes-of-mexicos-sinaloa-cartel-w475345>
- "Sinaloa Cartel Cell Convicted." Justice. US Attorney Office. 2018.
<https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/sinaloa-cartel-cell-leader-convicted>
- Darren Foster. "The Sinaloa Cartel is Alive and Thriving without El Chapo." VICE News. 2017.
https://news.vice.com/en_ca/article/8xmzax/the-sinaloa-cartel-is-alive-and-thriving-without-el-chapo
- David Agren. "Mexico Captures Sinaloa Cartel Boss Who Launched Power Bid after El Chapo arrest." Guardian. 2017.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/02/mexico-captures-sinaloa-cartel-leader-el-chapo>
- Paul Wood. "Inside Mexico's Feared Sinaloa Drug Cartel." BBC. 2014.
<http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-27427123>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1989

Group End: 2018 (Still Intact and active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group reportedly formed in 1989 under the leadership of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman although its origins are slightly unclear (Keefe 2012; Uppsala Conflict n.d.). The group is often referred to as Mexico’s largest and most powerful drug cartel (Insight Crime n.d.). The group is currently fighting for smuggling routes and control over territory (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017).

The group was founded by a man named Joaquin Guzman-Loera, also known as “El Chapo” (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017). He originally started off as an air logistics expert for a group known as the Tijuana Cartel, but he then broke away and started the Sinaloa Cartel (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017). The group reportedly sells cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine (New York Times Magazine 2012). The group reportedly protects the people living in Sinaloa (BBC 2014). It has no political aim.

Geography

The group is based in the Mexican state of Sinaloa (Insight Crime n.d.; New York Times Magazine 2012). It exercises control over a large portion of the Pacific coast (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017). The group has fought another group known as the Gulf Cartel in states such as Guerrero, Nuevo Laredo, Michoacan, and Jalisco (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017). The group has also battled the Juarez Cartel in cities such as Juarez and in the Chihuahua State (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017). The group took control of Juarez in 2010 (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017). The group also reportedly gained territory in the Baja California State (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group was founded by a man named Joaquin Guzman-Loera, also known as “El Chapo” (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017; Insight Crime n.d.). He originally started off as an air logistics expert for a group known as the Tijuana Cartel, but he then broke away and started the Sinaloa Cartel (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017). At one point, the group consisted of various small cartels known as Milenio organization, Los Negros, Los Pelones, and Ismael Zambada, and the Juan Jose Esparragoza organization (Uppsala

Conflict Data 2017). The dominant group is still the Guzman-Loera group (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017).

The number of hitmen in the group reportedly ranges between 150-15,000, but the real number of people in the group is reportedly 15,000 (Harp 2017). A man named Damaso Lopez-Serrano, known as “Mini Lic,” was reportedly a leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, but he is now in prison (US Attorney Office 2018). Another former leader of the group, Damaso Lopez, was also arrested by Mexican police officers (Guardian 2017).

External Ties

The group makes payoffs to the federal police and military in order to avoid arrests (Insight Crime n.d.; New York Times Magazine 2012). The group reportedly had ties with groups such as the Gulf Cartel (from May 2007-May 2008) and the Juarez Cartel (ended in 2007). The group also had ties with Jalisco Cartel New Generation, La Barredora, and Los Caballeros (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017).

Group Outcome

The group makes payoffs to the federal police and military in order to avoid arrests (Insight Crime n.d.; New York Times Magazine 2012).

El Chapo was arrested multiple times, but he escaped from prison for the first time in 2001, and again in 2015 (Guardian 2017; Insight Crime n.d.). He was finally caught and arrested in 2016 (Guardian 2017; Insight Crime n.d.). However, the group remains powerful and active despite his arrest (BBC 2014).

A man named Damaso Lopez-Serrano, known as “Mini Lic,” was reportedly a leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, but he is now in prison (US Attorney Office 2018). This act was reportedly a huge blow to the leadership of the group (US Attorney Office 2018). The Mexican government has reportedly declared war on the drug cartels in the country (VICE 2017). However, despite this, the group still remains powerful and intact (VICE 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- Chapo was originally a member of the Tijuana Cartel and splintered away (for unspecified reasons)
- Chapo gets arrested a couple times but doesn't affect the strength of the group. It's still considered the strongest.
- it has a huge network with wildly varying ranges
- this group is one of the strongest and effective cartels - leadership is very strong, organized, controlling → key to strength?