

Bosnia-Herzegovina VNSA Cases
Last Updated: 1 February 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T28	AL-QA'IDA		1989	2012
T2429	SERBIAN RADICAL PARTY (SRS)	1992	1991	2000
T1311	CROAT DEMOCRATIC UNION		2001	2001
T2541	WAHHABI MOVEMENT		2010	2010

I. AL-QA'IDA

Min. Group Date: 1989
 Max. Group Date: 2012
 Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qa'ida, Al Qaeda, Al Qaida, Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qaidat Al-Jihad, The Base

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The group was founded by Osama Bin Laden on August 11, 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2015). The group’s goal has been to completely remove Western influence and ideas. The group conducted its first attacks on August 7, 1998, in which car bombs detonated outside the U.S. embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya (Crenshaw 2015). The August 7, 1998 bombs resulted in 223 killed and over 4,000 wounded, mostly in Nairobi (Crenshaw 2015). The group first came to global attention after 9/11, but was active prior to that in its region of origin (Crenshaw 2015).

Geography

The group has its headquarters within Peshawar, Pakistan and Afghanistan but is hidden within cities and in hills such as the Tora Bora mountains in Afghanistan. It is unknown what its connection to Bosnia-Herzegovina specifically is.

Organizational Structure

The radical Sunni Muslim group was headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was the sole leader until his assassination in 2011 (although rumors exist that he died prior to 2011 or didn’t die at all). He was originally from Saudi Arabia and had helped fight the Soviets in the Afghanistan war (Crenshaw 2015). UBL was later replaced by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2011 after bin Laden was killed (Crenshaw 2015). The group uses a complex system in which members, organized in cells often called Al-Qaeda “affiliates” (McCormick 2014) report to couriers and eventually make their way up to the head . Bin Laden himself provided significant funding for Al-Qaeda, using money from his father who was a wealthy Saudi businessman (Crenshaw 2015). Some sources allege that the C.I.A. gave over \$600 million to mujahideen with ties to Bin Laden, as part of anti-Soviet efforts during the 1980s (Crenshaw 2015). However, the C.I.A. and AQ leadership deny that the

group received U.S. funding (Ibid.). The U.S. 9/11 Commission Report did not find evidence that the Saudi government or high-level Saudi officials have funded Al-Qaeda, however the report does suggest that some wealthy individuals in Saudi Arabia provide donations to Al-Qaeda (Ibid.). Al-Qaeda had an estimated 75 members when it was first formed and up to 18,000 at its peak in 2004. Today, it is thought to have less than 1000 members, but these estimates vary widely (Crenshaw 2015).

External Ties

The U.S. 9/11 Commission found unsubstantiated allegations that the Saudi government or high-level Saudi government officials provided funding to AQ. The 9/11 Commission Report also did not find evidence of allegations that AQ engaged significantly in drug trafficking or trading in conflict diamonds (Crenshaw 2015). Furthermore, Iran allegedly trained AQ members in the early 1990s (Crenshaw 2015). As of 2013, the U.S. State Department accused Iran of allowing AQ leaders to operate an important pipeline enabling funds and fighters to reach South Asia and Syria via Iran (Crenshaw 2015).

Also, Afghanistan and Pakistan are known to have Al-Qaeda training camps within their borders, however there has been controversy over whether or to what extent AQ works with government officials or local tribal leaders in these countries (Crenshaw 2015).

Group Outcome

After the assassination of their leader Osama Bin Laden in 2011, Al-Qaeda lost its core leadership and eventually broke apart into multiple different individual terrorist groups, including ISIS. It still remains active to some extent today (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988 (McKenzie Institute)

Group End (Outcome): Active in 2016 (Crenshaw 2015)

II. SERBIAN RADICAL PARTY (SRS)

Min. Group Date: 1991

Max. Group Date: 2000

Onset: 1992

Aliases: Serb Radical Party, Serbian Radical Party, Serbian Radical Party (Srs), Srpska Radikalna Stranka, Srpska Radikalna Stranka (Srs), SRS

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Serbian Radical Party was founded on February 23, 1991, with the initial goal of creating a Greater Serbia (Bochsler 2013, University of Zurich). The party is also opposed to European integration and globalization. Instead, it advocates for closer ties

with Russia, and remains conservative and potentially even fascist as it is a far-right Serbian nationalist party (Global Security n.d.).

Geography

The exact location of where the Serbian Radical Party operates is unknown. However, the group may operate in the areas of western Bosnia and central Croatia which includes geographical regions such as Banija, Kordun, Lika, and northern Dalmatia. They also had known attacks in Bratunac, Brcko, Prijedor, Visegrad, Zvornik, and Bijeljina (Global Security n.d.) The headquarters of the Serbian Radical Party is located at Zemun, Belgrade (Ristich et al. 2016).

Organizational Structure

The White Eagles, an armed paramilitary formation, is under the command of the neo-fascist Seselj (BBC 2007; Ristich et al. 2016). Seselj was the leader of these paramilitary groups during the time when war crimes were committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the leader of the formations, Seselj took part in ethnic cleansing, mass tortures, and killings, which were carried out in 34 municipalities (BBC 2007). The locations of these mass killings were Bratunac, Brcko, Prijedor, Visegrad, Zvornik, Bijeljina, and possibly Vogosca (Global Security n.d.).

The funding for the Serbian Radical party is unclear to the public as the SRS has been dishonest about who it has been receiving its funding from (Financial Times). However, the general sector it is getting its funding from are individual and company donations. The Serbian Radical Party is a far right Serbian nationalist political party (BBC 2007; Bochsler 2013).

External Ties

The White Eagles were equipped by the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs while at war with Bosnia (FAS 1998). The Serbian Radical Party has ties with Golden Dawn and other far-right parties across Europe (Stojanovic 2007; Ninkovic 2013).

Group Outcome

The Serbian Radical Party is still active in political affairs. In 2016, the Serbian nationalist leader Seselj backed Donald Trump for the United States presidency (Taylor 2016). While the group is still alive and participating actively, the last main violent attack that happened was in 1995 during the war between Serbia and Croatia (Global Security n.d.). In 1995, the Serbs and Croats decided to bury the hatchet and maintain peaceful relations between each other.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: White Eagles

Group Formation: No correction

Group End (Outcome): Active in 2016

III. CROAT DEMOCRATIC UNION

Min. Group Date: 2001

Max. Group Date: 2001

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ) was founded on August 18, 1990, and has since become the largest political party of Bosnian Croats (European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity). The initial goals of this party are not known. While the official ideology of the Croatian Democratic Union is nationalism, there are many nuances within that overlaying ideological principle. HDZ's leader, at first, described their party as right-wing, though later the party described itself as a more moderate or center-right. After the war, however, the party became mainly a socially conservative politically.

Geography

There is no geographical information available regarding the Croatian Democratic Union other than the fact that it has its headquarters in Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mostar is a city in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, straddling the Neretva River. The only attack that GTD attributes to the Croatian Democratic Union took place in the city Siroki Brijeg (START 2016, GTD ID 200104100003).

Organizational Structure

The HDZ, has an organizational structure that has changed dramatically since its creation in the 1990's. Under Franco Tudjman, the former president of Croatia, the HDZ was originally a hard-right nationalist party. For most of the 1990's, the HDZ remained a rather authoritarian party (BBC 2016). However, when Tudjman died in 1999, the Croatian Democratic Party re-oriented itself as a moderate, center-right, pro-European, Christian Democratic and Conservative party. Later, the HDZ governments under Ivo Sanader and Croatia's first female prime minister, Jadranka Kosor, prompted Croatia to make large strides towards European Union membership (BBC 2016). The Croatian Democratic Party is partially subsidized from the state budget.

External Ties

As the Croatian Democratic Union is a member of the European People's Party, it has external ties with all other political parties that too are a member of the European People's Party. Parties with EPP membership include influential groups such as the Christian Democratic Union in Germany (Chancellor Angela Merkel's party), The Republicans in France, Fine Gael in Ireland, and the People's Party in Spain. There are EPP members in every country in the European Union except the United Kingdom.

The political party HDZ 1990, founded by Bozo Ljubic on 8 April 2006, is an offshoot from the Croatian Democratic Union (Ramet and Valenta 2016, 130). HDZ 1990 split from the original HDZ because HDZ 1990 opposed proposed constitutional reforms,

which HDZ leadership considered supporting, to lessen power-sharing in favor of a more centralized national government (Ramet and Valenta 2016, 129-130). Božo Ljubić had recently lost a power struggle to HDZ party leader Dragan Cović as a result of an intra-party vote over who should hold HDZ leadership (Ramet and Valenta 2016, 130). HDZ 1990 has a pro-European and sometimes nationalist ideology that remains very similar to the original HDZ (Ramet and Valenta 2016, 130). Both HDZ and HDZ 1990 are EPP member parties (European Parliament 2015).

Group Outcome

The Croatian Democratic Union is one of the two major contemporary political parties in present-day Croatia, alongside the center-left Social Democratic Party (Balkan Insight 2016). There has been some minimal backlash from the states which accounts for the fact that the Croatian Democratic Union is somewhat corrupt. The group is presently active in political affairs and is a member of the European People's Party (EPP).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ, Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Britannica), HDZ BiH (European Parliament 2015)

Group Formation: August 18, 1990 (CCDU)

Group End (Outcome): Active in 2016

IV. WAHHABI MOVEMENT

Min. Group Date: 2001

Max. Group Date: 2001

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Wahhabi movement is an Islamic religious movement that had the ideology of "reviving the true tenets of Islam" and protecting the concepts the monotheism (ISCA n.d.). Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of the Wahhabi movement, encouraged his followers to seek their own understanding of the holy book and to act out what they understood in their own way (Ibid). Furthermore, al-Wahhab shunned anyone who did not believe his ideology as an "apostate, disbeliever, or idolater" and this allowed him to make membership into the Wahhabi movement extremely selective and solely based on true believers (Ibid). The group had one violent attack in 2010 (GTD 2017).

Geography

The leaders of the Wahhabi movement operate mainly in Saudi Arabia (Bardos 2014). However, entities such as Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab of Emirates, and Turkey are also popular sites of Wahhabi activism (Bardos 2014).

Organizational Structure

The original leader of the Wahhabi Movement is named Muhammad ibn Abd-al Wahhab.

Members of the Wahhabi movement call themselves the “unifiers of Islamic practice and they use the teachings of the reformer, Abd-al Wahhab to guide their lives (Global Security n.d.). Furthermore, al-Wahhab shunned anyone who did not believe his ideology as an “apostate, disbeliever, or idolater” and this allowed him to make membership into the Wahhabi movement extremely selective and solely based on true believers (Global Security n.d.). The Wahhabi movement mainly receives its funding from private individuals and foundations in Saudi Arabia (Shane 2016).

External Ties

The leaders of the Wahhabi movement have ties in Saudi Arabia and it is from here that the Wahhabi movement receives a majority of its funding (Shane 2016).

Group Outcome

As the Wahhabi movement is a global movement, there is no specific state response to the movement as a whole. However, the movement in itself exists worldwide, especially in places like Afghanistan and India.

Local Islamic leaders in Bosnia declared the Wahhabi movement illegitimate during the late 1990s, however Wahhabi leaders continued to retain followers in Bosnia (Alic 2007). Jusuf Barcic is a Bosnian national and Wahhabi leader who attempted to re-open the Careva mosque in Sarajevo in February 2007 (Ibid.). In response, local Islamic leaders shut down the mosque for the first time since the mosque opened more than five centuries ago (Ibid.).

In 2001, Italy requested the extradition of Kamel bin Ali, known as Abu Hazma, another Bosnian national, Wahhabi leader, and close associate of Jusuf Barcic in Bosnia (Alic 2007). However, the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina refused to extradite Abu Hazma, citing his Bosnian citizenship (Ibid.)

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1990's/early 2000's (Bosnian Institute)

Group End (Outcome): Active in 2016 (Almonitor)