

Algeria Cases
Last Updated: 10 July 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T481	TAKFIR WAL-HIJRA	1991	1966	2011
T378	PFLP		1967	2012
T249	KACH		1971	2005
T132	COMMITTEE OF COORDINATION		1972	1995
T3	ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION		1974	1998
T1375	CANARY ISLANDS INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT		1975	1980
T1349	ZIONIST RESISTANCE FIGHTERS		1980	1999
T2049	ALGERIAN AL-DAWA AL-SALAFIYAH GROUP		1985	0
T2072	ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS		1987	2011
T28	AL QAEDA		1989	2012
T233	ARMEE ISLAMIQUE DU SALUT (AIS)	10-Mar-92	1989	1997
T1928	TAYEB AL-AFGHANI'S ISLAMIST GROUP		1991	1991
T82	ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA)	31-Dec-93	1992	2011
T660	MOUVEMENT ISLAMIQUE ARM_E	10-Mar-92	1992	1992
T1603	ALGERIAN MOUJAHIDEEN FOR MOSLEMS		1992	1992
T2103	THE MARTYR'S BATTALION		1992	0
T1745	ISLAM LIBERATION FRONT		1992	1994
T1473	UNITED COMPANY OF JIHAD		1993	0
T1332	UNION OF PEACEFUL CITIZENS OF ALGERIA		1994	1994

T1360	AL-QA`IDA IN THE LANDS OF THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQLIM)		1996	2012
T446	SALAFIST GROUP FOR PREACHING AND COMBAT	4-Apr-99	1996	2012
T2435	SQUADRONS OF TERROR (KATIBAT EL AHOUAL)		1998	2000
T2100	GOD'S SQUADRON (KATIBA RABBANIA)		1998	0
T2592	GIA - EL AHD BATTALION		1998	1998
T78	ARMATA DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIUNALE (ALN)		1998	2001
T2102	GIA - EL FORKANE		1998	1998
T2317	HABIS ERROUB SERIAT		2001	2001
T2294	DRAA EL MIZAN SERIAT		2002	2002
T2295	ED'DAOUA ES'SALAFIA LILQADHA		2002	2002
T1500	FREE SALAFI GROUP (GSL)		2003	0
T669	SALAFI DAAWA GROUP		2004	2004
T2298	EL-FETH KATIBAT		2004	2006
T2236	AIBED ER-RAHMAN KATIBET		2006	2006
T287	23 MAY DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE		2009	2009
T1550	MOUHAJIROUNE BRIGADE		2010	2010
T2656	MOVEMENT FOR UNITY AND JIHAD IN WEST AFRICA (MUJWA)	4-Dec-12	2011	2012

- I. TAKFIR WAL-HIJRA
Min. Group Date: 1966
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: 1991

Aliases: Takfir Wal-Hijra (Excommunication And Exodus), Anathema And Exile, Excommunication And Emigration, Excommunication And Exodus, Martyrs For Morocco, Rejection Of Sins And Exodus, Takfir Wa Hijara, Takfir Wa Hijra, Takfir Wal Hijra, Takfir Wa'l Hijra

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Ex-Communication and Exodus.” Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4477, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
- Anneli Botha, “Terrorism in the Magrheb,” ISS Africa, 2008, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/103660/MONO144FULL.pdf>
- Hayder Milli, “Jihad without Rules,” Jamestown Foundation, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=822&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=181&no_cache=1
- Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, “Takfir wal-Hijra,” <http://timep.org/esw/profiles/terror-groups/takfir-wal-hijra/>
- Joshua Gleis, “National Security Implications of al-Takfir Wal-Hijra,” al-Nakhlah, Spring 2005
- Chelsea Daymon, “The Egyptian Sinai: A New Front for Jihadist Activity,” Small Wars Journal, 2013
- “Islamist militant group resurgent in Egypt,” 2011, CNN, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/08/09/egypt.islamists/index.html?iref=allsearch%29>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: “late 1960s”

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

**this might be a separate Algerian-specific group?

Group Formation

The group was founded in Egypt by Shukri Mustafa either in the late 1960s, or sometime between the 1970’s and 1980’s, depending on the source; the group resurfaced in 2011 due to the death of Mubarak (Gleis 2005; MIPT 2008). The group was allegedly a splinter of the Muslim Brotherhood (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010; Godsell 1981). The group rose up again in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (CNN 2011).

Mustafa was heavily influenced by the teachings of Sheikh Ali Ismael; Ismael argued Muslims and Islam were being suppressed by Egyptian President Nasser (Mili 2006). The group does not follow a specific ideology, but rather follows the words of organizational leaders, and punished people by torture who did not follow the way of the group. The group is still theorized to follow a fundamentalist Sunni Islamist ideology,

which was then branded as takfiri (Mili 2006; Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2004; Kimyungi N.d.; CNN 2011). Mustafa formed the group to punish apostates and wage jihad (Mili 2006; MIPT 2008). He was anti-modernity and Salafi jihadi. Mustafa and his followers moved to the desert in order to practice Islam and get around what they deemed “illegitimate” Egyptian law. The group’s aim was to wage jihad, overthrow the existing governments, and create an Islamic state. The date of the group’s first violent attack is unknown.

Geography

Al-Takfir wa al-Hira is a transnational terrorist group which provides support to different cells across Europe and northern Africa (Mili 2006; MIPT 2008; Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010; GTD 2017). The group originally formed in Egypt. The group has been active in Egypt’s Sinai as of 2011, and more specifically Sheikh Zuweid (TIMEP N.d.; Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2004; Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010)

The group conducted attacks in Benghazi, Libya; Rafah, Egypt; Mogadishu, Somalia; Kirkuk, Iraq; and Garaffa, Sudan (GTD 2017). The group re-emerged after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in the Rafah and Sheikh Zuweid regions of the Sinai Peninsula (Daymon 2013; CNN 2011).

Organizational Structure

The group was originally founded by Shukri Mustafa in Egypt (Gleis 2005; MIPT 2008; TIMEP N.d.; Kimyungi N.d.). Mustafa was heavily influenced by the teachings of sheikh Ali Ismael; Ismael argued Muslims and Islam was being suppressed by Egyptian President Nasser (Mili 2006). Mustafa formed the group to punish apostates, wage jihad, and create an Islamic caliphate (Mili 2006; CNN 2011). He was anti-modernity and Salafi jihadi.

During the 1980s and 1990s, Takfir cells emerged in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Kenya, and Morocco (Mili 2006). The group was composed of Egyptians, Syrians, Palestinians, Lebanese, and other Arabs (MIPT 2008). The group was led by Zakaria Miludi at an unknown time (Botha 2008). The group was more recently led by Abdel-Fattah Hasan Hussein Salem (TIMEP N.d.). The group was allegedly an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010; Godsell 1981).

External Ties

The group may have influenced the ideology of GIA in Algeria as well as Takfiris in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco (Mili 2006). It may also have had a tacit alliance with the GIA (MIPT 2008). The group was allegedly also linked to as-Sirat al-Mustaqim and Salafia Jihadia (Botha 2008).

Group Outcome

In 1977, Mustafa was executed by Egyptian police after that the group went underground (Mili 2006). The group has periodically engaged in violence. It may have influenced the ideology of GIA in Algeria as well as Takfiris in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco (Mili 2006). The group was attacked by a Lebanese group in 2000 that led to the death of several of its members (MIPT 2008). The group was responsible for five attacks on worshippers that started in 1994 (Mili 2006). The group was also linked to the death of Theo van Gogh in 2004 (MIPT 2008). On December 31, 2000, several Takfiri groups coordinated an attack (Mili 2006). As late as 2012, the group operated as a set of decentralized cells with little coordinated oversight (Daymon 2013).

The Egyptian government has typically “turned its head the other way” about violent activities in the Sinai and done little to address the concerns of Bedouins living in the Peninsula about economic discrimination (Daymon 2013). The group re-emerged after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in the Rafah and Sheikh Zuwaid regions of the Sinai Peninsula (Daymon 2013). It came to attention through a set of prominent attacks around El Arish, Egypt (CNN 2011). Egyptian intelligence officials said the group had members from Palestinian factions.

There is some confusion over whether Morocco’s Salafia Jihadia and Assirat al-Mustaqim are different from ATWAH because the ideology is so similar (Maroc Hebdo 2003; Mili 2008). It is also unclear whether Takfir refers to a single armed group or if it instead describes an ideology (Gleis 2005). Abdel-Fattah Hasan Hussein Salem was arrested in 2013 (TIMEP N.d.). The group was banned in Kazakhstan in 2014 (RFE/RL 2014). The group’s last violent attack was in 2013 in Libya (GTD 2017).

Notes for Iris:

- somewhat similar to Sunni Islam, but their own ideology
- attacks are typically in defense

II. PFLP

Min. Group Date: 1967

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Popular Front For The Liberation Of Palestine (Pflp), Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades, Al-Jabha Ash-Sha'abiya Li-Tahrir Falastin, Al-Jabna Al-Shabiyya Li-Tahrir Filastin, Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades Popular Front For The Liberation Of Palestine, Red Eagles, PFLP

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Profile: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),” BBC, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30099510>
- “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,” Para-States, Global Security, n.d., <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pflp.htm>

- “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,” International Terrorist Symbols Database, ADL, 2013, http://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/popular_front_pa1.html
- Julia Glum, “What Is The Popular Front For The Liberation Of Palestine?,” International Business Times, 2014, <http://www.ibtimes.com/what-popular-front-liberation-palestine-what-know-about-organization-behind-jerusalem-1725550>
- “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,” McKenzie Institute, 2016, <http://mackenzieinstitute.com/popular-front-liberation-palestine-pflp/>
- “PFLP Commemorates 46 years in Turkey,” PFLP, 2013, <http://pflp.ps/english/2013/12/18/pflp-commemorates-46th-anniversary-in-turkey/>
- “PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, Palestinian Leftists.” Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. 2005. <http://www.cfr.org/israel/pflp-dflp-pflp-gc-palestinian-leftists/p9128>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Halhul Gang, Halhul Squad, Palestinian Popular Resistance Forces, PPRF (Mackenzie Institute)

Group Formation: 1967

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PFLP was formed in 1967 by George Habash to fight and destroy Israel after the latter began to occupy parts of the West Bank (BBC 2014). It formed as a merger between two unnamed left-wing factions (IB Times 2014). The group came to attention in 1968 with a series of prominent airplane hijackings and were the first group to employ this tactic (BBC 2014). It was primarily secular, but Habash argued the group was founded on Marxist-Leninist ideals (Global Security n.d., BBC 2014).

Geography

Today, the group primarily operates from the Gaza Strip attacking Israeli communities in the southern part of the country. It has also conducted prominent attacks in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Entebbe, Geha junction, Itamar, Ramallah, and Karnei Shomron (Global Security n.d., BBC 2014). Its headquarters were (are?) in Damascus (Global Security n.d.)

It’s unclear exactly what the ties to Turkey are, but there is a bastion of support in Istanbul according to the PFLP official website (PFLP 2013).

Organizational Structure

The PFLP is a faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (BBC 2014). It was originally created by George Habash - a Christian doctor - and merged with the PLO in 1968 (Global Security n.d.). Habash stepped down in 2000 and was replaced by Abu Ali Mustafa. It has an armed wing known as the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades which was particularly active during the Second Intifada (BBC 2014). The armed wing was led - at some point - by Abu Ali Mustafa and later Ahmed Sadaa (BBC 2014).

The group has an estimated 800 members with potentially more support throughout the West Bank and Gaza (Global Security n.d.). It is currently led by Ahmed Jibril who was formerly head of the PFLP-General Command (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group funds itself from local supporters as well as external sources in Libya and Syria.

The representative of the PFLP in Turkey is Hassan Tahrawi (PFLP 2013).

External Ties

The PFLP has a vast network of alliances including the German Baader-Meinhof organization and Japanese Red Army (BBC 2014). It fought against Hamas early on (BBC 2014). The group received external support from Syria, Libya, USSR, and China in the form of financial support, training, and an external base of operations.

The Turkish branch of the PFLP claims to have an alliance with Kurdish forces and parties in the country (PFLP 2013).

Group Outcome

After the fall of the Soviet Union and in-fighting between Palestinian groups during the First Intifada (Hamas, PIJ), the PFLP was very weakened and lost nearly all of its power and influence in the West Bank by 2000 (ADL n.d., IB Times 2014).

The US designated the group a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1995 (Global Security n.d.). The group became partially involved in politics in the 1990s when it sought to become a part of Arafat's government.

Israel killed Mustafa in 2001 and arrested Sadat in 2002 (Global Security n.d.). Today, the group continues to fight Israel and Saadat claims the group will not enter negotiations with the Israeli government (BBC 2014).

- III. KACH
Min. Group Date: 1971

Max. Group Date: 2005

Onset: NA

Aliases: Kach, Kakh

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Kach." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 61, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
- GTD Perpetrator 435, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2017, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=435>
- "Kach, Kahane Chai." Council on Foreign Relations. 2008. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/kach-kahane-chai-israel-extremists>
- "Kahane Chai (KACH)." Mackenzie Institute. 2016. <http://mackenzieinstitute.com/kahane-chai-kach/>
- "Kach/Kahane Chai." FAS. 2004. <https://fas.org/irp/world/para/kach.htm>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Israel: Information on the extremist organization Kahane Chai, 24 February 2004, ISR42395.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/41501c257.html>
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- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Israel: Information on the organization(s) "Kahane" or "Kahane-Jiv", 1 May 1993, ISR14223, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab6418.html>
- "Kahane Chai et al. vs US Department of State and Condoleezza Rice." US Court of Appeals No. 03-1392. <https://app.box.com/shared/i4f4setr5b>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Kahane Chai, Repression of Traitors, State of Yehuda, Sword of David, Dikuy Bogdim, DOV, Judea Police, Kahane Lives, Kfar Tapuah Fund, State of Judea, Judean Legion, Judean Voice, Qomemiyut Movement, Way of the Torah and Yeshiva of the Jewish Idea

Group Formation: 1971

Group End: 2002 (repression)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Kahane Chai formed in 1971 as the political wing of the Jewish Defense League (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's goal is to expel Arab Palestinians from Israel and expand Israeli settlements in the West Bank (Mackenzie Institute 2016). It adheres to a Jewish ideology (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group first came to attention as a violent organization in 1988 (GTD 2017). The group primarily operated as a far-right political organization in Israeli politics and tried to boost its representation in the Knesset (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Geography

The group is primarily active in Israel, West Bank, and the Gaza Strip (GTD 2017). The group has its headquarters around Qiryat Arba' in Hebron (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group had prominent attacks in Hebron and Shfaram, Israel (Mackenzie Institute 2016). It is implicated in one attack in Algiers in 1991 when it attacked a "building occupied by delegations of several guerrilla groups" (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group was originally formed as a splinter (affiliate?) of the Jewish Defense League by Rabbi Meir Kahane (Mackenzie Institute 2016). Kahane was assassinated in 1990 and replaced by his son Binyamin Kahane until his assassination in 2000 (Mackenzie Institute 2016; CFR 2008). The group's leader in 2004 was thought to be Noam Federman (Canada IRB 2004). The group had approximately 100 active members at an unknown date (Canada IRB 2004; MIPT 2008; CFR 2008; Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group may have had up to 700 supporters around the world (Canada IRB 2004).

The group primarily funds itself through a diaspora of individual supporters in the U.S., Israel, and Europe (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group has both a political wing and an armed wing. The political wing participates in Israeli politics and first gained significant support in 1984 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group was disqualified from politics after 1988 due to it being considered a hate group (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

External Ties

It is unclear whether Kahane Chai is a splinter or an armed wing of Kahane (CFR 2008). The group has "ties" to the Machteret, a similar Jewish militant group in Israel (CFR 2008).

Group Outcome

The group's last known violent incident was in 1994, but members have been arrested for smaller incidents since 1999 (CFR 2008; GTD 2017). There was a second incident in 2005 when a former Kach member attacked Arab bus passengers, but it is unclear if the

incident was sanctioned by the group or not (GTD 2017). In 2003, the group demanded former Ariel Sharon be tried and executed, but never followed through on this action (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group is banned in Israeli politics and has been designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. government (CFR 2008; Canada IRB 2004). In 2002, the Israeli government arrested several members of Kahane and the group went underground (Canada IRB 2004).

IV. COMMITTEE OF COORDINATION

Min. Group Date: 1972

Max. Group Date: 1995

Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 100013, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2017, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=100013>
- Fearon and Laitin. "Algeria." Random Narratives. 2006. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/AlgeriaRN2.4.pdf>
- Searched gScholar
 - Committee of coordination algeria
 - "Committee of coordination" algeria

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1995

Group End: 1995

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It first comes to attention in January 1995 when it carries out a series of bombings in Bougara, Algiers, and Ben Amara (GTD 2017). It is unknown why the group carried out these attacks, its organizational structure, external ties, or why it stopped using violence.

Geography

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in January 1995 when it carried out a series of bombings in Bougara, Algiers, and Ben Amara (GTD 2017). It is unknown why the group carried out these attacks, its organizational structure, external ties, or why it stopped using violence.

Organizational Structure

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External Ties

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Group Outcome

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in January 1995 when it carried out a series of bombings in Bougara, Algiers, and Ben Amara (GTD 2017). It is unknown why the group carried out these attacks, its organizational structure, external ties, or why it stopped using violence.

V. ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION

Min. Group Date: 1974

Max. Group Date: 1998

Onset: NA

Aliases: Abu Nidal Organization (Ano), Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Arab Revolutionary Council, Fatah Al-Majlis Al-Thawri, Fatah Al-Qiyadah Al-Thawriyyah, Fatah Revolutionary Council, Fatah Revolutionary Council (Frc/Ano), Frc/Ano, Revolutionary Organization Of Socialist Muslims

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Abu Nidal Organization,” Mackenzie Institute, 2015, <http://mackenzieinstitute.com/abu-nidal-organization-ano-k-fatah-revolutionary-council-ar-ab-revolutionary-brigades-revolutionary-organization-socialist-muslims-2/>
- “Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), aka Fatah Revolutionary Council, the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, or the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims,” Council

on Foreign Relations, 2009,

<http://www.cfr.org/israel/abu-nidal-organization-ano-aka-fatah-revolutionary-council-arab-revolutionary-brigades-revolutionary-organization-socialist-muslims/p9153>

- “Abu Nidal Organization,” Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/abunidal.htm>
- “Abu Nidal Organization,” FAS, 2004, <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/ano.htm>
- “Abu Nidal Organization,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, US State Department, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170264.htm>
- “Abu Nidal Organization,” Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Ed. Gus Martin, Sage 2011, 5-6
- GTD Event ID 199004250031, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2017, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199004250031>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1974

Group End (Outcome): 2002 (loss of leadership)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

ANO was founded in 1974 by Sabri al Banna as a splinter from the PLO (Martin 2011, 5). The group fought to destroy Israel in order to create a separate Palestinian state (Martin 2011, 5; CFR 2009). It was more extremist than Fatah, which in 1974 announced it would be willing to support a two-state solution (Martin 2011, 5). The group was heavily influenced by the Baathists in Iraq (Martin 2011, 5). It came to attention in 1974 following a hijacking of a TWA airplane (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

Geography

The group operated out of Baghdad, but was involved in attacks throughout Iraq, Israel, and Europe.

Organizational Structure

The group constructed a vast operation of resources in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. It had both a political and a military wing; the former was also responsible for recruitment, propaganda, and financing (Mackenzie Institute 2015). Banna helped the group partially fund itself through the establishment of a trade and investment company in Warsaw,

which engaged in arms deals during the Iran-Iraq War (Mackenzie Institute 2015). The group had approximately 500 members and was active in 20 countries across northern Africa, the Middle East, and Europe (Martin 2011, 5). Banna may have “coup-proofed” parts of his organization in 1989 to remove dissidents (Martin 2011, 5).

External Ties

ANO operated out of Baghdad and received external support from Saddam Hussein in exchange (Martin 2011, 5). The group also received external support from Libya and Syria (FAS 2004). The group was expelled from Baghdad in 1983, but was allowed to return after the Iraq-Iran war ended (CFR 2009). In 1999, Egypt and Libya expelled ANO from operating in the country (Mackenzie Institute 2015). Libya did so in order to secure some sanctions relief (CFR 2009). The Jordanian government responded to ANO with threats to kill Banna and his family if he did not cease operations (Martin 2011, 5). Iraqi and Libyan support for the ANO fell after the Cold War and Banna was forced to retrench to Egypt (Martin 2011, 6).

Group Outcome

Banna was killed in 2002 (Martin 2011, 5). The group is thought to be inactive with former leadership hiding in Lebanon (CFR 2009).

Note: Banna seems to have a cult of personality, loss of external support/base is devastating.

VI. CANARY ISLANDS INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

Min. Group Date: 1975

Max. Group Date: 1980

Onset: NA

Aliases: Canary Islands Independence Movement, Movement For The Independence And Autonomy Of The Canaries Archipelago

Part 1. Bibliography

- Phil Davison. “Antonio Cubillo: Activist who fought for the independence of the Canary Islands.” Independent. 2013.
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/antonio-cubillo-activist-who-fought-for-the-independence-of-the-canary-islands-8448650.html>
- GTD Perpetrator 3319, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2017,
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3319>

- “Canary Island Independence Movement.” Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3978, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: CIIM, MPAIAC, Movement for the Self-Determination and Independence of the Canarian Archipelago

Group Formation: 1964

Group End: 1978 or 1979 (disband)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

CIIM was founded in Algeria in 1964 by Antonio Cubillo (Davison 2013). It first came to attention in 1977 for a spate of violent attacks against Spain (GTD 2017; MIPT 2008). The group’s political aims is for the Canary Islands to secede from Spain and its ideology is ethno-nationalist since it fights on behalf of the ethnic Berber group (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group primarily conducted attacks in or around the Canary Islands including Las Palmas and on mainland Spain including Madrid (GTD 2017; MIPT 2008). The group’s base of operations may have been in Algiers, Algeria where Cubillo lived in exile (Davison 2013).

Organizational Structure

The CIIM was founded by Antonio Cubillo (Davison 2013). The group had both an armed wing and a political wing. The armed wing was known as Fuerzas Armadas Guanches and created in 1976 (Davison 2013). Members of the group are Berber (MIPT 2008). It is unknown how the group funded itself or how many members the group had.

External Ties

There is no evidence of external ties to other state or state actors. The group appeared to operate in exile from Algiers where Cubillo lived (Davison 2013).

Group Outcome

The group is most well known because their attack in Las Palmas led to the Tenerife disaster (MIPT 2008). In 1978, Spanish hit men attacked Cubillo in Algiers, Algeria (Davison 2013). The group is tied to a few hostage incidents in 1979 in Las Palmas (GTD 2017). The group formally dissolved in 1978 (Davison 2013). The Spanish government granted the Canary Islands autonomous status in 1982 (Davison 2013).

VII. ZIONIST RESISTANCE FIGHTERS

Min. Group Date: 1980

Max. Group Date: 1999

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20483. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20483>
- "Blast at Libyan Mission in Paris." 1980. New York Times (1923-Current File), May 07, 1980.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/121070047?accountid=14026>.
- Ganley, Elaine. 1999. "Killing is a Blow to Peace in Algeria, // 'A Bridge Toward Reconciliation has just been Destroyed,' Party Says of Opposition Leader's Assassination." Austin American Statesman, Nov 24, A7.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/255680812?accountid=14026>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1980

Group End: 1980

Note: GTD incident does not implicate the group according to Proquest findings.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 1980 when it bombed a Libyan Embassy in Paris, France (New York Times 1980). The group claims responsibility for the attack, but no information could be found about the group's goals, ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome. GTD

implicates the group in a 1999 assassination against Abdelkadar Hachani, but no evidence is found about the perpetrator behind this attack (GTD 2071; Ganley 1999).

Geography

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 1980 when it bombed a Libyan Embassy in Paris, France (New York Times 1980). The group claims responsibility for the attack, but no information could be found about the group's goals, ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

Organizational Structure

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 1980 when it bombed a Libyan Embassy in Paris, France (New York Times 1980). The group claims responsibility for the attack, but no information could be found about the group's goals, ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

External Ties

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 1980 when it bombed a Libyan Embassy in Paris, France (New York Times 1980). The group claims responsibility for the attack, but no information could be found about the group's goals, ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

Group Outcome

There is not much information available about this group. It last came to attention in 1980 when it bombed a Libyan Embassy in Paris, France (New York Times 1980). The group claims responsibility for the attack, but no information could be found about the group's goals, ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

VIII. ALGERIAN AL-DAWA AL-SALAFIYAH GROUP

Min. Group Date: 1985

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/09/28/has-algeria-taken-anti-vaccine>
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<http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/11/24/quietist-and-firebrand-salafism-in-algeria-pub-62075>

- Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck. "Why Algeria Isn't Exporting Jihadists." Salafism and Radical Politics in Postconflict Algeria. Carnegie. 2015.
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/salafism_radical_politics_algeria.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Dawa Salafiya

Group Formation: "1920s" or 1980s (Ghanem-Yazbeck 2015)

Group End: 2016 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Dawa Salafiya is a religious movement founded in the 1920s. It preached for the depoliticization of Islam in Algerian politics (Ghanem-Yazbeck 2015). It rejects the Algerian political system and wants to practice Islam without state interference (Ghanem-Yazbeck 2015). The group came to prominent attention in the 1980s and the 1990s during the Algerian Civil War (Ghanem-Yazbeck 2015). The group adheres to a Salafi Islamist ideology (Ghanem-Yazbeck 2015; Barkhis 2015). It does not appear to be a violent organization and condemns terrorism (Ghanem-Yazbeck 2015).

Geography

The group is primarily active in Algiers and Constantine (Ghanem-Yazbeck 2015),

Organizational Structure

The group's main leaders since the 1980s have been Ali Ferkous, Azzedine Ramdani, Lazhar Sounayquirat, and Abdelghani Aouissat (Ghanem-Yazbeck 2015). They are all religious leaders who amass supporters through local mosques (Ghanem-Yazbeck 2015). It is unknown how many members the group has, though it has grown considerably since the 2000s when it fed on the grievances of disenfranchised Algerian youth following the end of the civil war (Ghanem-Yazbeck 2015). Members are primarily young Algerians recruited through mosques (Ghanem-Yazbeck 2015).

External Ties

The group has recruited some members from FIS, but is nonviolent (Ghanem-Yazbeck 2015).

Group Outcome

The government tacitly supports the movement because it peacefully channels local anger away from the government (Barkhis 2015; Ghanem-Yazbeck 2015). It does not take major action, though popular opinion towards the Salafist movement is, on a whole, not very high and the group is seen to be as controversial as the GSPC/AQIM (Barkhis 2015).

Quote from Ghanem-Yazbeck and IRIN that Dawa Salafiya is an emerging threat:

“The memory of what happened in the 1990s is fading away a bit with every year, and new generations are growing up who did not experience the war, and violence will return. It is only a question of when.”

IX. ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS

Min. Group Date: 1989

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Group Formation: This name is too vague for research.

Group End: This name is too vague for research.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This name is too vague for research.

Geography

This name is too vague for research.

Organizational Structure

This name is too vague for research.

External Ties

This name is too vague for research.

Group Outcome

This name is too vague for research.

X. AL QAEDA

Min. Group Date: 1989

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qa'ida, Al Qaeda, Al-Qaida, Al Qaida, Al-Qa`Ida, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qa'idat Al-Jihad, The Base

Aliases: Al-Qa'ida, Al Qaeda, Al Qaida, Al-Qa`Ida, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qa'idat Al-Jihad, The Base

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/network/alqaeda/indictment.html>
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<http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaeda-k-al-qaida-al-qaida/p9126>
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<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm>

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http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
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<http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/al-qaida>

Part 2. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988 (Mackenzie Institute)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active) (Crenshaw 2015)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Osama Bin Laden founded al-Qaida in 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group’s initial goals were to completely remove Western influence/ideas and to abolish the United States and Israel (BAAD 2015). They conducted their first attacks against the US embassy in Africa in 1998 (BAAD 2015; Global Security N.D). Al-Qaida first came to global attention after 9/11 but was active prior to that in its region (FAS 2005). The group has a radical Sunni Muslim ideology (CFR 2012; Global Security N.D).

Geography

Al-Qaida operated mainly within Peshawar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (CFR 2012; PBS N.D). The group hid within cities and hills with particularly mountainous terrain in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan (as shepherds or farmers) (FAS 2005). Bin Laden had a base of operations in Sudan from 1991-1998 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Organizational Structure

Al-Qaida was headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was their sole leader until his assassination in 2011 (although rumors exist that he died earlier or didn’t die at all) (CFR 2012). He was from Saudi Arabia and had helped fight the Soviets in the Afghanistan war (Crenshaw 2015). He was replaced by Ayman al-Zawhiri in 2011. (Crenshaw 2015; CFR 2012). The group used a complex system in which members reported to couriers who reported to other couriers eventually making their way up to the head who was initially Bin Laden (RAND 2008). This is what we call a decentralized or cell-based organizational structure. Funding for the organization came from many places, including donations (FTO 2005). The group had different councils to deal with different aspects.

For example, they had a “military committee” to deal with “military” matters, and a “consultation council” to plan out terrorist attacks and deal with financial matters (PBS N.D). They have no formal political wing (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida can be considered an umbrella group that consisted of many other terrorist groups within (ibid; Global Security N.D). The organization had an estimated 75 members when it was first formed and up to 18,000 at its peak in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015). Today, it is thought to have less than 1000 members, but these estimates vary (Crenshaw 2015; BAAD 2015).

External Ties

Saudi Arabia allegedly gave some funding to AQ through drug trafficking and diamonds, but these were never proven true (Crenshaw 2015). Iran also allegedly trained and supported AQ members in the early 1990s (ibid; BAAD 2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan allow Al-Qaeda to operate training camps within their borders (ibid). The group has ties to several other terrorist organizations including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Jemaah Islamiya (CFR 2012; PBS N.D).

Group Outcome

The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to find and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements operating in Afghanistan (BAAD 2015). The group's first leader Osama bin Laden was killed during a raid in 2011 (CFR 2012; BAAD 2015). The group is still active today, though it has lost much support to ISIS.

- XI. ARMEE ISLAMIQUE DU SALUT (AIS)
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 1997
Onset: 1992

Aliases: Islamic Salvation Front, Al-Jabhah Al-Islamiyah Lil-Inqadh, Armee Islamique Du Salut (Ais), Army Of Islamic Salvation, Front Islamique Du Salut, Islamic Salvation Army, Islamic Salvation Front (Fis)

Part 1. Bibliography

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<http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0215.xml>
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<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad1518.html>
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<http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/14/world/islamic-party-in-algeria-defeats-ruling-group-in-local-elections.html?pagewanted=all>
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- GTD Perpetrator 1163, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2017,
<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1163>
- Gleditsch et al. "Non-State Actor Data." 2013.
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casesdesc.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Islamic Salvation Army; Armée Islamique du Salut

Min. Group Date: 1989 - FIS is founded, violence starts in 1991 (Ahmed Ben Aicha, amir of Western Algerian portion of AIS, cites early 1993 as the beginning of MIA and other groups and fighters uniting)

Max. Group Date: 21 Sept 1997 (declared an official ceasefire)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The FIS is a political party, formed in 1989, when the Algerian government allowed new political parties to form (Fromherz 2012). In 1990, it won the elections which displaced the National Liberation Front from power for the first time in 28 years (Ibrahim 1990). The political party adhered to an Islamist ideology and gained support quickly in the 1980s

after oil prices fell and a 1988 protest over food prices (Fromherz 2012). The group's goal was to overthrow the FLN and create an Islamic state in Algeria. Its first violent incident was in 1991 after the election results were nullified (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group was primarily active in Algiers, but conducted attacks throughout the country (GTD 2017). The group operated solely in Algeria and avoided the center of the country (GIA territory), though it had significant but tenuous control over the outer regions from 1994 to 1997.

Organizational Structure

The party was led by Colonel Chadli Bendjedid (Fromherz 2012). The group established its own armed wing known as the AIS a year after fighting had already begun (Fromherz 2012). The FIS received many legal donations from external actors including private individuals in other countries while it was a legal political party but many of those financial sources seemed to have dried up once the party was forced underground. The AIS specifically was in many ways a splinter of MIA. The group had approximately 10,000-15,000 members around 1993-1994 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 639).

Very little information exists about the group's leadership. While scholars seem to agree that Ben Aicha and Mezraq led the two portions of the AIS, the nature of their leadership and their backgrounds remain unclear. Most scholars call them "amirs" (see: Hafez) but this term seems to just refer to their relative power over the group. Interestingly, Ben Aicha himself has also said that while the AIS was the armed wing of the FIS, they were not completely controlled by the political party but rather had a significant amount of autonomy when conducting their operations. As a guerilla group, the group operated in a fairly concentrated way (as in, there seemed to be some sort of militaristic hierarchy in place), though different units operated in more cell-like ways and the FIS was, after being banned, an underground cell itself. The group started as a political party that became violent after legal civic engagement became impossible. Most if not all of their supporters were Algerian Islamic fundamentalists.

External Ties

The group originally allied with the GIA because the GIA was better armed, but eventually broke off (Fromherz 2012). The group allegedly received military training in Yemen and support from Iran and Sudan, but this is not confirmed (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 638).

Group Outcome

In 1992, the Algerian government banned the FIS and nullified the results of an election they won in order to protect the power of the FLN majority (Fromherz 2012). The army cracked down on FIS supporters and employed indiscriminate violence against villagers, which led to an increase in militant violence (Ireland RDC 2012).

The group began as a Salafist political party – the Front Islamique du Salut or FIS – that the government banned in 1992. The government also arrested a number of FIS leaders, including the third in command. After the ban and the emergence of other jihadist groups in the region (notably the GIA), the remaining then-underground FIS officials brought together fighters from MIA and other smaller Salafist groups to form the AIS, the armed wing of the party in 1993 (for the Western wing, under Ahmed Ben Aicha) and 1994 (for the Eastern wing, under Madani Mezraq). The group then engaged in traditional guerrilla warfare, notably against state officials that specifically kept the FIS from operating legally. They sent death threats (though whether or not they carried through with them is unclear) to said employees as well as attacking government buildings, though reports vary on whether any given act was the fault of the AIS or the GIA.

XII. TAYEB AL-AFGHANI'S ISLAMIST GROUP

Min. Group Date: 1991

Max. Group Date: 1991

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Arab Veterans of Afghanistan War Lead New Islamic Holy War.” FAS. 1994.
https://fas.org/irp/news/1994/afghan_war_vetrans.html
- GTD Perpetrator 2116. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2116>
- Hafez, Mohammed M. 2000. “Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria,” Middle East Journal 54, no. 4. Autumn 2000.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329544>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1991

Group End: 1991

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in 1991 for a military attack in Biskra, Algeria (GTD 2017). The group is the predecessor to the GIA, which fought to overthrow the Algerian government and create an Islamic state (FAS 1994).

Geography

The attack occurred in Biskra, Algeria (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The leader of the group was Tayeb al-Afghani, who had fought in the Afghan War and fielded an Arab group in battle in the war (FAS 1994). It is unknown how many members the group has; its organizational structure, funding, and membership are also unknown.

External Ties

The group's leader helped start GIA in late 1992 (FAS 1994; Hafez 2000).

Group Outcome

It is unknown how long this group survived, but the leader eventually left to start a new group, the GIA, which suggests this group might have merged with other factions to form the GIA in 1992 (FAS 1994; Hafez 2000). The group's last known attack was in 1991.

XIII. ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA)

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: 1993

Aliases: Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah Al-Musallah, Armed Islamic Group, GIA [Armed Islamic Group], Groupes Islamiques Armes (GIA)

Part 1. Bibliography

- Hafez, Mohammed M. 2000. "Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria," Middle East Journal 54, no. 4. Autumn 2000.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329544>
- Dalacoura, Katerina. 2011. Islamic Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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- Martinez, Luis. 2000. "Les causes de l'islamisme en Algerie," CERI. <http://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/f5vtl5h9a73d5ls97540430kj/resources/artlm3.pdf>
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- Lauren Vriens. "Armed Islamic Group (Algeria, Islamists)." Council on Foreign Relations. 2009. <https://www.cfr.org/background/armed-islamic-group-algeria-islamists>
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- "Armed Islamic Group (GIA)." Mackenzie Institute. 2015. <http://mackenzieinstitute.com/armed-islamic-group-gia-2/>
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- "Armed Islamic Group (GIA)." Foreign Terrorist Organizations Country Reports on Terrorism. US Department of State. 2006. <https://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/126/armed-islamic-group-gia>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Algeria: Information on the recent activities of the Islamic Armed Group (GIA) and the extent to which the GIA uses violence to discourage Algerian men from performing obligatory military service, 1 April 1996, DZA23616.E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6abe18c.html>
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Algeria: Update of DZA20230.E of 1 May 1995, in particular on the use of force by armed Islamic groups such as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in the recruitment of new members (1996-1999), 12 October 1999, DZA32813..E, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad5a24.html>
- Gleditsch et al. "Non-State Actor Data." 2013. P. 639. http://privatwww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Armed Islamic Group; Groupe Islamique Armé; al Muwahhidun, Groupe Islamique Armée; GIA; Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallah; Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallah; Green Khmer; Groupe Islamique Arme; Groupement Islamique Arme; Jama'a Islamiya Moussalaha

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 2005

Part 3. Narrative

As of 2012, the group was inactive. The Salafist group's goal was to create an Islamic state in Algeria. The group's media releases also specified, unlike their contemporary

AIS, that violence was necessary to the creation of this state as the current government was tainted both by infidels and French influence.

Group Formation

The GIA formed in 1992 by Afghan veterans to fight the Algerian government after they nullified the results of the 1991 elections (FAS 2004). The group came to attention for its first violent attack the same year (FAS 2004). The group was a more radical Islamist group than other factions in the Algerian Civil War (Mackenzie Institute 2015). Its political aim was to overthrow the Algerian government and establish an Islamic state (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

Geography

The group primarily operated in the center of Algeria. It allegedly had cells in Europe as well including France, Belgium, and Italy (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

The group operated violently in, broadly, two ways: within Algeria, they conducted a form of guerrilla warfare that included burning entire villages for having AIS sympathizers and massacring even children in order to control regions. Outside of Algeria, notably in France, they conducted a more traditional cell-based terror campaign, such as when they hijacked an Air France plane in 1994 or the 1995 Paris Métro bombings. The group was primarily urban and based in the center of the country (as opposed to AIS, which operated primarily outside of city centers).

The group may have had a transnational base of operations in Morocco, but this is never confirmed (Gleditsch et al. 2013).

Organizational Structure

Members of the group were ex-fighters from the Soviet-Afghanistan War (FAS 2004). In 1994, the group was recruiting approximately 500 members a week although it is unknown how many fighters this entailed (Mackenzie Institute 2015). In 2003, the group had fewer than 100 members (FAS 2004; Mackenzie Institute 2015). In 1996, it was forcibly recruiting young men to join its ranks (Canada IRB 1996). By 1999, it was no longer forcibly recruiting members (Canada IRB 1999). The group had a propaganda wing known as al-Ansar (Canada IRB 1996). The group primarily funds itself through extortion and criminal activities (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

The group had a number of leaders over the years, including Abdelhak Layada, Djafar al-Afghani, and Cherif Gousmi. After Gousmi's death in 1994, the group's most well known leader, Djamel Zitouni, gained control. Zitouni was the son of a chicken farmer in Algiers. He began the phase of attacks on French soil. After his death, the group split:

one faction condemned the group's continued senseless violence and formed the GSPC, led by Hattab; the other faction, led by Antar Zouabri, continued with their mission though with many fewer fighters (CFR 2009). The group operated in a cell-based fashion the group started as a political movement based on the beliefs of Salafi Islam that very quickly became violent. It does not have a formal political wing. Most of the group's supporters are Algerian men from urban areas.

External Ties

In 1998, a faction of the GIA splintered off to form the GSPC (CFR 2009; c.f. AQIM profile). The group originally assisted the FIS, but stopped after the FIS created its own armed wing, the AIS, in 1993 (Hafez 2000).

The group explicitly received support from Sudan in 1997 (Gleditsch et al. 2013). The group also allegedly received support from Iran but this is not specified.

Group Outcome

State responses were harsh: the Algerian government went so far as to detain and torture suspected GIA fighters and used media to vilify the group. The French also arrested, detained and questioned hundreds of people in the wake of attacks.

In 1998, the GIA lost many members when the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat splintered from the GIA (CFR 2009). In 2002, the Algerian Civil War ended when the FIS announced a ceasefire (CFR 2009). In 2004, the Algerian government launched a counterterrorism campaign, which involved a repressive crackdown against the GIA and led to the arrest of 400 members (CFR 2009). The group's last known violent attack was in 2005 (Mackenzie Institute 2005).

XIV. MOUVEMENT ISLAMIQUE ARM_E

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 1992

Onset: 1992

Aliases: Armed Islamic Movement, Mouvement Islamique Arm_e

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for AIS.

Group Formation: This is an alias for AIS.

Group End: This is an alias for AIS.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for AIS.

Geography

This is an alias for AIS.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for AIS.

External Ties

This is an alias for AIS.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for AIS.

XV. ALGERIAN MOUJAHIDEEN FOR MOSLEMS

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 1992

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 1912. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1912>
- Searched Proquest
 - ALGERIAN MOUJAHIDEEN FOR MOSLEMS
 - “Algeria mujahideen for muslims”

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1992

Group End: 1992 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 1992 for an attack on a government convoy in El-Kroub, Algeria (GTD 2017). It is unknown what the group's goals, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties are.

Geography

The attack occurred near El-Kroub, Algeria (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 1992 for an attack on a government convoy in El-Kroub, Algeria (GTD 2017). It is unknown what the group's goals, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties are.

External Ties

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 1992 for an attack on a government convoy in El-Kroub, Algeria (GTD 2017). It is unknown what the group's goals, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties are.

Group Outcome

There is not much information available about this group. It last came to attention in 1992 for an attack on a government convoy in El-Kroub, Algeria (GTD 2017). It is unknown what the group's goals, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties are.

XVI. THE MARTYR'S BATTALION

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: The Martyr's Battalion, The Martyrs Battalion

Part 1. Bibliography

- Searched proquest
 - "THE MARTYR'S BATTALION" algeria
 - Martyrs battalion algeria
- "Algeria: Thirty-Eight People in Court Charged with Supporting Terrorism." 2003.BBC Monitoring Middle East, Dec 17, 1.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/459248357?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This group either does not exist or is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (BBC 2003).

Group Formation: This group either does not exist or is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (BBC 2003).

Group End: This group either does not exist or is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (BBC 2003).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This group either does not exist or is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (BBC 2003).

Geography

This group either does not exist or is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (BBC 2003).

Organizational Structure

This group either does not exist or is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (BBC 2003).

External Ties

This group either does not exist or is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (BBC 2003).

Group Outcome

This group either does not exist or is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (BBC 2003).

XVII. ISLAM LIBERATION FRONT
 Min. Group Date: 1992
 Max. Group Date: 1994
 Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 1257, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2017, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1257>
- Searched proquest
 - “Islam liberation front” algeria
 - Islam liberation front algeria

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1992

Group End: 1994 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 1992 when it assassinated a police officer near Laghouat, Algeria (GTD 2017). There is no information available about the group’s political aims, ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

Geography

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 1992 when it assassinated a police officer near Laghouat, Algeria (GTD 2017). There is no information available about the group’s political aims, ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

Organizational Structure

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 1992 when it assassinated a police officer near Laghouat, Algeria (GTD 2017). There is no information available about the group’s political aims, ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

External Ties

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 1992 when it assassinated a police officer near Laghouat, Algeria (GTD 2017). There is no information available about the group's political aims, ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

Group Outcome

There is not much information available about this group. It last came to attention in 1994 when it assassinated a mayoral figure near Tiaret, Algeria (GTD 2017). It is unknown why the group stops using violence.

XVIII. UNITED COMPANY OF JIHAD

Min. Group Date: 1993

Max. Group Date: 0

Onset: NA

Aliases: Unified Unit Of Jihad, United Company Of Jihad

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Alex Schmid. Glossary. P. 698. Routledge Handbook of Terrorism. 2011.
https://books.google.com/books?id=MLY5MwXhtDsC&pg=PA698&lpg=PA698&dq=UNITED+COMPANY+OF+JIHAD+algeria&source=bl&ots=HuqQO0vAuY&sig=ny9oH24poJbUAmP5jf_juLsrChc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewjJ-uyM6YnVAhXEqVQKHQUiCAsQ6AEILTAB#v=onepage&q=UNITED%20COMPANY%20OF%20JIHAD%20algeria&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1993

Group End: 1993 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Unified Unit of Jihad formed in 1993 during the Algerian Civil War (MIPT 2008). The group's first violent incident occurred in 1993 when it murdered two French nationals (MIPT 2008). It is unknown what its ideology or political aims were, though it conducted

attacks in line with the GIA's call to action to overthrow the Algerian government (MIPT 2008).

Geography

It is unknown where the group's attacks occurred.

Organizational Structure

It is unknown how many members the group had, its organizational structure, source of funding, or leadership.

External Ties

The group has alleged links to the FIS (Schmid 2011, 698). The GIA claimed responsibility for several of the group's incidents (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

The group's last recorded incident was in 1993 when the group killed two Russian nationals (MIPT 2008). It is unknown what happens to the group after this incident.

XIX. UNION OF PEACEFUL CITIZENS OF ALGERIA

Min. Group Date: 1994

Max. Group Date: 1994

Onset: NA

Aliases: Union Of Peaceful Citizens Of Algeria, Committee Of Peace-Loving Algerians, Lajnat Al-Musalimin Al-Jaza'iriyin

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4300, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
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- "Algerian Hijackers Surrender." 1994. The Independent, Nov 14.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/313295245?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1994

Group End: 1994 (repress and turn themselves into authorities)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the Union of Peaceful Citizens of Algeria formed, but it first came to attention in 1994 when three members hijacked a flight flying between Algiers and Ouargla (GTD 2017). The group's political aims were for the Algerian government to recognize the results of the 1991 elections and release several political prisoners from the FLN (Independent 1994; GTD 2017). It is unknown what the group's ideology is.

Geography

The attack occurred while the plane was flying between Algiers and Ouargla, Algeria (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group consisted of three men who hijacked a flight by claiming the coffee grinder they were carrying was a bomb (MIPT 2008). There is no other information about how the group funded itself, its membership background, leadership, or other organizational information.

External Ties

The group supported the goals of the FIS in recognizing the results of the 1991 election (Independent 1994). There are no explicit ties to other groups.

Group Outcome

The group diverted the plane to Majorca, Spain where they opened negotiations with Spanish officials (Independent 1994). The group turned themselves in and released the prisoners in exchange for political asylum in Spain (Independent 1994).

- XX. AL-QA`IDA IN THE LANDS OF THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQLIM)
Min. Group Date: 1996
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qa`ida In The Lands Of The Islamic Maghreb (Aqlim), Al-Qaeda Committee In The Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaeda Committee In The Islamic Maghreb (Aqim), Al-Qaeda Organization In The Islamic Maghreb

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Gazdik, Gyula. "The Rise of Al-Qaida in North Africa: AQIM and its Role in the Region" in *Terrorist Threats in North Africa from a NATO Perspective*, 2015. Edited by J. Tomolya, L.D. White. IOS Press.
https://books.google.com/books?id=nQtRCwAAQBAJ&dq=AQIM&lr=&source=gb_s_navlinks_s
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- Filiu, Jean-Pierre. 2009. "The local and global jihad of Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghrib" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Spring).
- Thurston, Alexander and Andrew Lebovich. "A Handbook on Mali's 2012-2013 Crisis," *Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) Working Paper Series* no. 13-001. Sept. 2013.
<http://buffett.northwestern.edu/documents/working-papers/ISITA-13-001-Thurston-Lebovich.pdf>
- Harmon, Stephen. "From GSPC to AQIM: The Evolution of an Algerian Islamist Terrorist Group into an Al-Qa`ida Affiliate" in *Concerned African Scholars: US Militarization of the Sahara-Sahel: Security, Space and Imperialism*. 2010.
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.465.7833&rep=rep1&type=pdf#page=14>
- Gazdik, Gyula. "The Rise of Al-Qaida in North Africa: AQIM and its Role in the Region" in *Terrorist Threats in North Africa from a NATO Perspective*, 2015. Edited by J. Tomolya, L.D. White. IOS Press.
https://books.google.com/books?id=nQtRCwAAQBAJ&dq=AQIM&lr=&source=gb_s_navlinks_s
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<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/emergence-aqim-africa-160320090928469.html>
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb; Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb; Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat; GSPC; Groupe salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat

Group Formation: 1998

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed in 1998 as a splinter group of the GIA. As of 2012, AQIM is still active, mostly in Algeria. The group's original goal was to liberate the Algerian population from FLN rule and create an Islamic state, though now the goal seems to have shifted to global jihad in line with what al-Qaeda generally preaches. The group's ideology is Salafi jihadist. In June 2005, the then-GSPC (precursor to AQIM) killed 15 soldiers in an attack on a Mauritanian army base and, in early 2003, the group kidnapped 32 European tourists.

Geography

The group primarily operates in Algeria, though it has troops in Mali and Mauritania and has expanded somewhat into Tunisia and Libya. Most of its attacks are in Algeria, though many of its bases are in northern Mali. It had prominent attacks in Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal.

Organizational Structure

The leadership of the organization has changed over time. When the group first split from the GIA in 1998, Hassan Hattab (a former GIA member) was the leader. In 2003, however, Nabil Sahraoui ousted him but died less than a year later in 2004. After that, Abdelmalek Droukdal took power, sharing it in an al-Qaeda-like hierarchy, in which there

are different divisions (like the Sahara division or branch), all of which have their own commanders. The group operates mostly through cells – like al-Qaeda – with many suicide bombings and smaller group attacks, though at the beginning of the group (before it allied with and became a part of al-Qaeda), the group was more concentrated in Algeria. Given that the group split from the GIA (a brutal radical Islamist organization in Algeria) specifically because of its brutality, the movement seems to have started as a political issue of a difference of opinions on how to go about realizing an Islamic state and turned into a much more militaristic movement afterwards. The group does not seem to have a formal political wing. Many of its supporters are Algerians, mostly men, who fought against the US in Afghanistan and, upon their return, joined AQIM. Apart from that, the group does not seem to recruit from a specific class or ethnic group.

Additionally, the group that was once the GSPC is now a part of al-Qaeda, announced in 2006 by bin Laden's deputy al-Zawahiri. It changed its name to AQIM in January 2007. It's not clear exactly why the merger occurred, though Gazdik states that it's evidence that the GSPC wanted a more global approach, especially because even at the founding of the GSPC, bin Laden and al-Qaeda ideologically supported the group.

External Ties

The group has no apparent external support from other countries, seeming to prefer making money through extortion and hostage-taking. However, the group does have a number of ties to other groups: as a splinter of the GIA, the GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in English) allegedly allied itself with a number of other Islamist groups in the region such as GICT, GICM, and LIFG in order to share resources. However, according to Harmon, there's evidence that these ties deteriorated after 2008 as the group lost some power.

Group Outcome

Governments have taken a number of different approaches to dealing with AQIM. The Algerian government has tried offering the group amnesty if they lay down their arms, raiding, and other military tactics often in conjunction with other governments, and even arresting suspected AQIM members. Other states affected by the AQIM have tried similar tactics, though few seemed to have an effect. The group suffered a major splinter in 2012 when a faction broke away to form the "Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade" (Crenshaw 2016).

XXI. SALAFIST GROUP FOR PREACHING AND COMBAT
Min. Group Date: 1996
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: 1999

Aliases: Salafist Group For Preaching And Fighting (Gspc), Groupe Salafiste Pour La Predication Et Le Combat, Salafist Group For Call And Combat, Salafist Group For Call

And Combat (Gspc), Salafist Group For Preaching And Combat, Salafist Group For Preaching And Combat [Gspc]

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for AQIM.

Group Formation: This is an alias for AQIM.

Group End: This is an alias for AQIM.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for AQIM.

Geography

This is an alias for AQIM.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for AQIM.

External Ties

This is an alias for AQIM.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for AQIM.

XXII. SQUADRONS OF TERROR (KATIBAT EL AHOUAL)

Min. Group Date: 1998

Max. Group Date: 2000

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/aug/25/terrorism.immigrationpolicy>
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https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/djamat-houmat-daawa-salafia-%28dhds%29
- GTD Perpetrator 10064. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=10064>
- Thomas Lynch. "The Islamic State as Icarus." Wilson Center. 2015.
<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/theislamicstateasicarus.pdf>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Dhamat Houmet Daawa Salafia (DHDS), Group Protectors of Salafist Preaching, Houmat Ed Daawa Es Salafiya, Katibat El Ahoual, Protectors of the Salafist Predication, El-Ahoual Battalion, Katibat El Ahouel, Houmate Ed-Daawa Es-Salafia, the Horror Squadron, Djamaat Houmat Eddawa Essalafia, Djamaatt Houmat Ed Daawa Es Salafiya, Salafist Call Protectors, Djamaat Houmat Ed Daawa Es Salafiya, Houmate el Da'awaa es-Salafiyya, Protectors of the Salafist Call, Houmat ed-Daaoua es-Salafia, Group of Supporters of the Salafiste Trend, Group of Supporters of the Salafist Trend

Min. Group Date: 1999 (split from GIA)

Max. Group Date: 2004 (violent), 2007 (present)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The DHDS splintered from GIA in 1996 due to ideological differences between GIA's leadership and an Afghan veteran named Kada Benchikha Larbi (Lynch 2015; Leuthard 2010, 902; UN Security Council 2010). It finished splintering in 1999. The group's ideology was Salafist and its political aim was to create an Islamic state in Algeria (RAND 2002, 125). It came to attention in 2001 for attacking 17 civilians in Arib (AllAfrica 2001).

Geography

The group's base of operations is centered in Western Algeria (Leuthard 2010, 902). It is active in Medea, Tipasa, and Chlef (AllAfrica 2001). The group also operated in the mountainous regions around Tiziouchir and Zaccar (AllAfrica 2001).

Organizational Structure

The group's original leader was an Afghan veteran known as Kada Benchikha Larbi (UN Security Council 2010; Leuthard 2010, 902). By 1999, the group was led by Mohammed Benslim (Leuthard 2010, 902). In 2007, the group had approximately 50 members (Leuthard 2010, 902). Members of the group were both ex-militants from GIA as well as former members of NGOs like the Saudi charity group Al-Haramain (UN Security Council 2010).

The group operated in cells (UN Security Council 2010). In 2001, the group had 15 cells with 3-7 members in each for an estimated membership of 45-105 members (AllAfrica 2001).

The group primarily funded itself through diaspora support from individuals in Italy, Spain, UK, and France as well as financial support from Al-Qaeda (UN Security Council 2010).

External Ties

The group had "links" to Al-Qaeda and also later AQIM (UN Security Council 2010; Leuthard 2010, 902). It pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and may have received financial assistance from the group (Lynch 2015). The group did not completely splinter away from GIA until 1999 after Mohammed Benslim took over the group (UN Security Council 2010).

Group Outcome

The US government also placed the group on the Terrorist Exclusion List and froze its assets, both in 2003 and 2004 (UN Security Council 2010). The group's last known attack was in 2004 when it attacked a civilian near Rhabet, Algeria (GTD 2017). The group's last known size estimate is in 2007 (Leuthard 2010, 902). The group disappeared after these incidents; however, it is still listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List in 2017.

XXIII. GOD'S SQUADRON (KATIBA RABBANIA)
Min. Group Date: 1998
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Searched Proquest
 - GOD'S SQUADRON (KATIBA RABBANIA)
 - "GOD'S SQUADRON" algeria
 - "KATIBA RABBANIA" algeria
- Searched gScholar
 - GOD'S SQUADRON (KATIBA RABBANIA)
 - "GOD'S SQUADRON" algeria
 - "KATIBA RABBANIA" algeria

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No information could be found about this group.

Group Formation: No information could be found about this group.

Group End: No information could be found about this group.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

No information could be found about this group.

Geography

No information could be found about this group.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about this group.

External Ties

No information could be found about this group.

Group Outcome

No information could be found about this group.

XXIV. GIA - EL AHD BATTALION
Min. Group Date: 1998
Max. Group Date: 1998
Onset: NA

Aliases: Armed Islamic Group - Covenant Battalion, Armed Islamic Group - Covenant Battalion, Armed Islamic Group - El Ahd Battalion, Gia - El Ahd Battalion, Groupe Islamique Arm_e - El Ahd Battalion

Part 1. Bibliography

- Searched Proquest
 - “Armed Islamic Group - Covenant Battalion”
 - GIA algeria "Covenant Battalion"
 - GIA algeria "ahd battalion"
 - armed islamic group algeria "ahd battalion"
- Searched gScholar
 - “Armed Islamic Group - Covenant Battalion”
 - GIA algeria "Covenant Battalion"
 - GIA algeria "ahd battalion"
 - armed islamic group algeria "ahd battalion"

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No information could be found about this group.

Group Formation: No information could be found about this group.

Group End: No information could be found about this group.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

No information could be found about this group.

Geography

No information could be found about this group.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about this group.

External Ties

No information could be found about this group.

Group Outcome

No information could be found about this group.

- XXV. ARMATA DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIUNALE (ALN)
Min. Group Date: 1998
Max. Group Date: 2001
Onset: NA

Aliases: Armata Di Liberazione Naziunale (Aln), Armata Di Liberazione Naziunale, Army Of National Liberation

Part 1. Bibliography

- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3016, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- GTD Perpetrator 20076. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20076>
- Alex Schmid. "Glossary." Routledge Handbook of Terrorism. Routledge. 2011.
https://books.google.com/books?id=_PXpFxFxKRSHgC&pg=PA602&lpg=PA602&dq=Armata+Di+Liberazione+Naziunale&source=bl&ots=mE7WKSibV8&sig=6o6qvojuOOMr2O2D8e4qpP8asyc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj7tim7InVAhXmhFQKHSeNDkY4ChDoAQhBMAU#v=onepage&q=Armata%20Di%20Liberazione%20Naziunale&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1999

Group End: 2002

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the ALN formed, but it first came to attention in 1999 when it detonated several explosives in Corsica (GTD 2017). The group is separatist and demands full autonomy for the Corsica state (MIPT 2008). It is also ethno-nationalist (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group's primary incidents occur in Ajaccio, Porto-Vecchio, Sartene and Calvi. The group is implicated in one attack in Souk Ahras, Algeria in 2001 when it assassinated a member of FIS; however, this attack doesn't really make a lot of sense in the context of the group (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

Members of the group are Corsican (MIPT 2008). It is not known how many members are in the group, its source of funding, leadership, or organizational structure.

External Ties

No information could be found about the group's external ties to other state or non-state actors.

Group Outcome

The group's last known violent activity was in 2002 (MIPT 2008). In 2003, Corsican voters received partial autonomy with the Matignon agreement, which granted Corsica autonomy (MIPT 2008).

XXVI. GIA - EL FORKANE
Min. Group Date: 1998
Max. Group Date: 1998
Onset: NA

Aliases: Armed Islamic Group - El Forkane Battalion, Armed Islamic Group - Holy Quran Battalion, Gia - El Forkane, Groupe Islamique Armee - El Forkane Battalion, Groupe Islamique Arm_e - El Forkane Battalion

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Algerian Security Forces Dismantle AQLIM Group in Batna." 2011.BBC Monitoring Middle East, Feb 07.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/849562005?accountid=14026>.
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<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1086338494?accountid=14026>.
- "Algeria: Security Forces Kill Five "Terrorists" in Tlemcen Province." 1998.BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political, Nov 06, 1.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/451291005?accountid=14026>.
- "British Intelligence Team to Visit Algeria Soon - Paper." 2009.BBC Monitoring Newsfile, Jun 06. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/452631524?accountid=14026>.
- "Senior AQIM Militant Surrenders to Security Forces in Algeria's Tizi Ouzou." 2012.Jane's Terrorism Watch Report.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1221804853?accountid=14026>.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: GSPC, AQIM, GIA

Group Formation: 1998

Group End: 2012 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the El Forkane Brigade formed, but it first came to attention in 1998 when it clashed with Algerian security forces in Tlemcen province, Algeria (BBC 1998). The group is a faction of the GIA and later GSPC/AQIM (BBC 1998; AllAfrica 2012). The group's goal is Salafist and it supports the GSPC's goal to create an Islamic state in Algeria (BBC 2011; AllAfrica 2012).

Geography

The Katibat is active in Batna, Algeria (BBC 2011). The Brigade primarily operated out of Biskra in southern Algeria (BBC 2009).

Organizational Structure

The leader of the El Forkane Brigade was Hedded Fodhil (AllAfrica 2012). Fodhil was a former fighter in the GIA before splintering off to become the GSPC (AllAfrica 2012).

Selmane El Yakouti held a leadership position in the El Katibat Brigade (BBC 2011). The group was primarily a financial wing for the GSPC and funded itself through kidnappings (AllAfrica 2012). It is not known how many members the group had. Members were likely ex-militants from the GIA since they were also a faction of the GSPC.

External Ties

The group was a faction of GSPC and does not appear to be independent (BBC 2011).

Group Outcome

The leader of the El Forkane Brigade renounced violence and surrendered to Algerian security forces in 2008 (AllAfrica 2012). The new leader of the El Forkane Brigade, Heddad Fodhill, surrendered to Algerian security forces in 2012 (AllAfrica 2012; Janes Terrorism Watch 2012). Algerian security forces announced in 2012 that they had killed 1600 GSPC/AQIM members and convinced 8500 to disarm (AllAfrica 2012).

XXVII. HABIS ERROUB SERIAT
Min. Group Date: 2001
Max. Group Date: 2001
Onset: NA

Aliases: Habi's Er'roub Seriat, Habi s Er roub Seriat, Habis Erroub Seriat

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20188. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20188>
- Searched Proquest
 - Habi's Er'roub Seriat algeria
 - Habi s Er roub Seriat algeria

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2001

Group End: 2001 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information about this group. It first came to attention in 2001 when it assaulted civilian motorcyclists in Granine, Algeria (GTD 2017). It is unknown what the group's political aim, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties are.

Geography

There is not much information about this group. It first came to attention in 2001 when it assaulted civilian motorcyclists in Granine, Algeria (GTD 2017). It is unknown what the group's political aim, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties are.

Organizational Structure

There is not much information about this group. It first came to attention in 2001 when it assaulted civilian motorcyclists in Granine, Algeria (GTD 2017). It is unknown what the group's political aim, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties are.

External Ties

There is not much information about this group. It first came to attention in 2001 when it assaulted civilian motorcyclists in Granine, Algeria (GTD 2017). It is unknown what the group's political aim, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties are.

Group Outcome

There is not much information about this group. It last came to attention in 2001 when it assaulted civilian motorcyclists in Granine, Algeria (GTD 2017). It is not known why the group stops using violence.

XXVIII. DRAA EL MIZAN SERIAT
Min. Group Date: 2002
Max. Group Date: 2002
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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- “Draâ El Mizan : démantèlement d’un réseau de soutien au GSPC.” 2002. Le Matin.
<http://www.kabyle.com/archives/revue-de-presse/afrique-du-nord-berbere/article/draa-el-mizan-demantelement-d-un>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: GSPC, AQIM

Group Formation: This is an alias for GSPC (Le Matin 2002).

Group End: This is an alias for GSPC (Le Matin 2002).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is a GSPC alias. The GTD database identifies “Hadj Ali” (actually Abdelkrim Hadj Ali) as the “emir” of the group, but the source above identifies Hadj Ali as a man whom Ahmed Baiche (another GSPC leader) brought into the terrorist underground in 1994. Hadj Ali then joined the GIA and finally the GSPC after the massacres of civilians. When Baiche died Hadj Ali took control of his region: Draa el Mizan. There is no evidence the group is an independent faction (Le Matin 2002).

Geography

This is a GSPC alias. The GTD database identifies “Hadj Ali” (actually Abdelkrim Hadj Ali) as the “emir” of the group, but the source above identifies Hadj Ali as a man whom Ahmed Baiche (another GSPC leader) brought into the terrorist underground in 1994. Hadj Ali then joined the GIA and finally the GSPC after the massacres of civilians. When Baiche died Hadj Ali took control of his region: Draa el Mizan. There is no evidence the group is an independent faction (Le Matin 2002).

Organizational Structure

This is a GSPC alias. The GTD database identifies “Hadj Ali” (actually Abdelkrim Hadj Ali) as the “emir” of the group, but the source above identifies Hadj Ali as a man whom Ahmed Baiche (another GSPC leader) brought into the terrorist underground in 1994. Hadj Ali then joined the GIA and finally the GSPC after the massacres of civilians. When Baiche died Hadj Ali took control of his region: Draa el Mizan. There is no evidence the group is an independent faction (Le Matin 2002).

External Ties

This is a GSPC alias. The GTD database identifies “Hadj Ali” (actually Abdelkrim Hadj Ali) as the “emir” of the group, but the source above identifies Hadj Ali as a man whom Ahmed Baiche (another GSPC leader) brought into the terrorist underground in 1994. Hadj Ali then joined the GIA and finally the GSPC after the massacres of civilians. When Baiche died Hadj Ali took control of his region: Draa el Mizan. There is no evidence the group is an independent faction (Le Matin 2002).

Group Outcome

This is a GSPC alias. The GTD database identifies “Hadj Ali” (actually Abdelkrim Hadj Ali) as the “emir” of the group, but the source above identifies Hadj Ali as a man whom Ahmed Baiche (another GSPC leader) brought into the terrorist underground in 1994. Hadj Ali then joined the GIA and finally the GSPC after the massacres of civilians. When Baiche died Hadj Ali took control of his region: Draa el Mizan. There is no evidence the group is an independent faction (Le Matin 2002).

XXIX. ED'DAOUA ES'SALAFIA LILQADHA

Min. Group Date: 2002

Max. Group Date: 2002

Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20149. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20149>
- Searched Proquest
 - ED'DAOUA ES'SALAFIA LILQADHA

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2002

Group End: 2002

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 2002 when it attacked civilians near Ammi Moussa, Algeria (GTD 2017). No information could be found about the group's political aims, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties.

Geography

The attack occurred near Ammi Moussa, Algeria (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

It first came to attention in 2002 when it attacked civilians near Ammi Moussa, Algeria (GTD 2017). No information could be found about the group's political aims, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties.

External Ties

It first came to attention in 2002 when it attacked civilians near Ammi Moussa, Algeria (GTD 2017). No information could be found about the group's political aims, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties.

Group Outcome

The group last came to attention in 2002 for an attack on civilians (GTD 2017). It is unknown why the group stops using violence.

XXX. FREE SALAFI GROUP (GSL)
Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Event ID 200606120006. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200606120006>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (GTD 2017).

Group Formation: This is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (GTD 2017).

Group End: This is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (GTD 2017).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (GTD 2017).

Geography

This is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (GTD 2017).

External Ties

This is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (GTD 2017).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for GSPC/AQIM (GTD 2017).

XXXI. SALAFI DAAWA GROUP
Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 2004
Onset: NA

Aliases: Salafi Daawa Group, Salafi Dawah Group

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 10064. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=10064>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Humat al-Daawa al-Salafia group, DHDS

Group Formation: This is an alias for Katibal el Ahoual (Squadrons of Terror) (GTD 2017).

Group End: This is an alias for Katibal el Ahoual (Squadrons of Terror) (GTD 2017).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for Katibal el Ahoual (Squadrons of Terror) (GTD 2017).

Geography

This is an alias for Katibal el Ahoual (Squadrons of Terror) (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for Katibal el Ahoual (Squadrons of Terror) (GTD 2017).

External Ties

This is an alias for Katibal el Ahoual (Squadrons of Terror) (GTD 2017).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for Katibal el Ahoual (Squadrons of Terror) (GTD 2017).

XXXII. EL-FETH KATIBAT
Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 2006
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20153. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20153>
- "Algerian Daily Reports Three "Terrorism" Incidents." 2009.BBC Monitoring Middle East, Jun 16. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/458612186?accountid=14026>.
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<https://search.proquest.com/docview/458813638?accountid=14026>.

- Anneli Botha. "Terrorism in Algeria." Terrorism in the Maghreb: The transnationalisation of domestic terrorism. 2008. ISS Africa.
<https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/MONO144CHAP2.PDF>

Faction of GSPC?

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: GSPC, AQIM

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2009

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The El-Feth Katibat is a faction of the GSPC and not an independent organization. It first came to attention in 2006 when it attacked a military convoy in Tidjelabine, Algeria (GTD 2017). As a faction of the GSPC/AQIM, its' ideology is Salafi-jihadist and its political aim is to establish an Islamic state in Algeria,

Geography

The group is active in Tijdelabine, Algeria (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

Two important leaders in the group are Omar Bentitraoui and Abdelhamid Saadaoui (Both 2008, 42). The group's leader in 2009 was briefly Tarek Ighil Larba until he was killed by security forces (BBC 2009). In 2007, the GSPC began to suffer from internal divisions (BBC 2009). This led to several defections by prominent members and saw the GSPC's leadership replace most of the leaders of the Katibat (BBC 2009).

External Ties

The group is a faction of the GSPC/AQIM (BBC 2009; Both 2008, 42).

Group Outcome

In 2007, the GSPC began to suffer from internal divisions (BBC 2009). This led to several defections by prominent members and saw the GSPC's leadership replace most

of the leaders of the Katibat (BBC 2009). The group's leader in 2009 was briefly Tarek Ighil Larba until he was killed by security forces (BBC 2009).

XXXIII. AIBED ER-RAHMAN KATIBET
Min. Group Date: 2006
Max. Group Date: 2006
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20012. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20012>
- Searched Proquest
 - AIBED ER-RAHMAN KATIBET
 - AIBED ER-RAHMAN KATIBET Algeria

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2006 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 2006 when a bomb killed three Algerian soldiers on patrol near Mount Bouhench, Algeria (GTD 2017). No information could be found about the group's political aims, ideology, or external ties.

Geography

The attack occurred near Mount Bouhench, Algeria (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group allegedly has 15 members (GTD 2017).

External Ties

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 2006 when a bomb killed three Algerian soldiers on patrol near Mount Bouhench, Algeria (GTD 2017). No information could be found about the group's political aims, ideology, or external ties.

Group Outcome

The group last used violence in 2006 (GTD 2017). It is not known why the group stops using violence.

XXXIV. 23 MAY DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (ALGERIA)

Min. Group Date: 2009

Max. Group Date: 2009

Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

This is an alias for ATNMC

- "Tuareg - Mali - 2006 - 2009." Global Security. N.d.
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/tuareg-mali-2006.htm>
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https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/MALIFINAL.pdf
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<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0020702013505431>
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<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7794057.stm>
- Thurston, Alexander and Andrew Lebovich. "A Handbook on Mali's 2012-2013 Crisis," *Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) Working Paper Series* no. 13-001. Sept. 2013.
<http://buffett.northwestern.edu/documents/working-papers/ISITA-13-001-Thurston-Lebovich.pdf>

- GTD Perpetrator 30082. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30082>
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<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/20131139522812326.html>
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https://web.archive.org/web/20120520064348/http://www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/org/org_69421.html
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- Alexander Thurston and Andrew Lebovich. "A Handbook on Mali's 2012-2013 Crisis." Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) Working Paper Series. Working Paper No. 13-001. 2013.
<https://buffett.northwestern.edu/documents/working-papers/ISITA-13-001-Thurston-Lebovich.pdf>
- Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin. "Chapter Two: A Brief History of Mali's Rebellions and the Implementation of Peace Accords." Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement." RAND. 2015.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR892/RAND_RR892.pdf
- Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joelle Zahar. "A Process in Search of Peace: Lessons from the Inter-Malian Agreement." International Peace Institute. 2017.
<https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/IPI-Rpt-Inter-Malian-Agreement.pdf>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: ADC, Democratic Alliance for Change

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2006

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Democratic Alliance for Change formed in May 2006 (Westerfield 2012; Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). The group formed in response to the government's perceived failure to uphold the 1992 National Pact peace agreement which had ended the previous uprising. Specifically, the group argued the Mali government had failed to invest in appropriate development funds for the Tuareg population in Northern Mali resulting in disproportionate development across the country (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). The group's demands included increased autonomy and additional resources for the Tuareg population (BBC 2008).

The group's first violent attack was on May 23, 2006, when it launched coordinated attacks against military bases in Kidal and Menaka (Thurston and Lebovich 2013).

Geography

The group's first violent attack was on May 23, 2006, when it launched a set of coordinated attacks against military bases in Kidal and Menaka (Global Security n.d.; Thurston and Lebovich 2013). Its main headquarters were in Kidal (AfDevInfo 2008). Between 2006 and 2007, Bahanga moved with several fighters to Libya (El Watan 2008). In Libya, he claimed he would only re-start negotiations with the Mali government if Libya would mediate.

Organizational Structure

Iyad ag Ghali, who had originally led the MPA during the 1990 uprising, reorganized the ADC in 2006 (Thurston and Lebovich 2013). Others allege that ag Ghali did not initially organize the group, but quickly usurped control after its founding (Thurston and Lebovich 2013). Members of the group had originally fought as part of the MPLA and ARLA during the 1990s Tuareg uprising (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). MPLA leadership had served in the Malian Army in between the 1990 uprising and the 2006 uprising.

External Ties

The group conducted attacks against AQIM during its short-lived 2006 uprising (Global Security n.d.; Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). The decision to attack AQIM led to internal divisions within the ADC who felt the attack severely weakened the group's ability to effectively fight against the Malian government (Global Security n.d.).

A faction of the group broke off in June 2006 following the signing of the Algiers Accord. The group opposed the government's military presence in Tinzawaten (El Watan 2008). This group, led by Ibrahim Bahanga, renamed their group the Northern Tuareg Alliance for Change (ATNMC) and began fighting in September 2007 (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429).

Group Outcome

The group began negotiations with the Mali government shortly after the May 23 attacks. Negotiations between the two actors resulted in the Algiers Agreement of 2006; the Malian government agreed to new concessions by the rebel groups. After the agreement was negotiated, the ADC disarmed in early 2007 (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 429). As part of the agreement, the Tuaregs had to disarm and stop demanding increased autonomy for northern Mali (El Watan 2008). In exchange, the Mali government had to expedite economic and political development in the north.

Some members of the group might have continued to fight as part of the ADC until 2009, but it is unclear whether these are rogue members or parts of the ATNMC faction (Global Security n.d.).

Some argue the decision to attack AQIM led to internal divisions within the ADC who felt the attack severely weakened the group's ability to effectively fight against the Malian government (Global Security n.d.). Iyad ag Ghali left the country and traveled to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia where he became radicalized, setting the scene for his eventual return to Mali in 2011 (Thurston and Lebovich 2013).

Interesting quote from Global Security;

Mali found itself as a crossroads in 2010. One of Mali's great mistakes, according to Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT), was to agree to demilitarize the north following peace agreements with the Tuareg rebellion in 1992 and to reinforce this move to demilitarize following the Algiers Accords in 2006. As things stood, the Malian army was confined to bases in the cities of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. The Government had failed to set up the special mixed units which were to have incorporated former Tuareg and Arab rebels.

XXXV. MOUHAJIROUNE BRIGADE
Min. Group Date: 2010
Max. Group Date: 2010
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 10075. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=10075>
- Searched Proquest
 - Terrorism: Two Citizens Assassinated in M'sila,

- Muhajiroun brigade algeria (n.b. results return unrelated UK group)
- MOUHAJIROUNE BRIGADE

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Muhajiroun brigade

Group Formation: 2010

Group End: 2010 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 2010 when it attacked a family near Qamra, Algeria (GTD 2017). No information could be found about the group's political aim, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties.

Geography

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 2010 when it attacked a family near Qamra, Algeria (GTD 2017). No information could be found about the group's political aim, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties.

Organizational Structure

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 2010 when it attacked a family near Qamra, Algeria (GTD 2017). No information could be found about the group's political aim, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties.

External Ties

There is not much information available about this group. It first came to attention in 2010 when it attacked a family near Qamra, Algeria (GTD 2017). No information could be found about the group's political aim, ideology, organizational structure, or external ties.

Group Outcome

There is not much information available about this group. It last came to attention in 2010 when it attacked a family near Qamra, Algeria (GTD 2017). It is unknown why the group stops using violence.

XXXVI. MOVEMENT FOR UNITY AND JIHAD IN WEST AFRICA (MUJWA)

Min. Group Date: 2011

Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 2012

Aliases: Movement For Oneness And Jihad In West Africa (Mujao), Jama'at At-Tawhid Wal-Jihad Fi Gharb 'Afriqqiya, Mojwa, Mouvement Pour Le Tawhid Et Du Jihad En Afrique De L'ouest, Mouvement Pour Le Tawhid Et Du Jihad En Afrique De L'ouest (Mujao), Movement For Oneness And Jihad In West Africa, Movement For Oneness And Jihad In West Africa, Movement For Oneness And Jihad In West Africa (Mojwa), Movement For Unity And Jihad In West Africa, Movement For Unity And Jihad In West Africa (Mujwa), Mujao, Mujwa

Part 1. Bibliography

- Thurston, Alexander and Andrew Lebovich. "A Handbook on Mali's 2012-2013 Crisis," *Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) Working Paper Series* no. 13-001. Sept. 2013.
<http://buffett.northwestern.edu/documents/working-papers/ISITA-13-001-Thurston-Lebovich.pdf>
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https://findresearcher.sdu.dk:8443/ws/files/96321248/Walther_Christopoulos_2014_TPV_proofs2.pdf
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https://books.google.com/books?id=nQtRCwAAQBAJ&dq=AQIM&lr=&source=gb_s_navlinks_s
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http://globalinitiative.net/download/Govdev/MENA/Strazzari_Clingendael-NOREF_Mali_Azawad_Dec2014.pdf
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<https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CTCSentinel-Vol6Iss3.pdf>
- "Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)." BAAD. Project on Violent Conflict. 2015.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/movement-oneness-and-jihad-west-africa-mujao>

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- “Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA).” Mackenzie Institute. 2016. <http://mackenzieinstitute.com/movement-for-oneness-and-jihad-in-west-africa-mojwa/>

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: 2011

Group End (Outcome): 2013 (merger)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

MUJWA was a splinter group of AQIM that aimed to overthrow Mali’s government and fight against its army forces. The reason the group splintered from AQIM is debated, but generally thought to have stemmed from either a lack of representation in the Malian government or difference in expansionist aims that AQIM could not accommodate (Crenshaw 2016).

MUJWA originally formed in October of 2011 as an offshoot of AQIM for jihadis to cross West Africa (START 2015). Like AQIM, their goal was to spread jihad to places AQIM failed to influence, as well as establish their own Shariah law (Crenshaw 2016; Al Jazeera 2013). The group’s first attack took place on October 22, 2011 in Tindouf, Algeria (GTD 2017). The group ascribed to a Salafist jihadist ideology (START 2015).

Geography

The group’s first attack took place in Tindouf, Algeria (GTD 2017). After the Malian coup in 2012, the group moved into Mali (Crenshaw 2016). The majority of MUJWA’s attacks occur in Mali, but some significant attacks take place in Niger and Algeria (GTD 2017). Their bases are located in Mali (START 2015). The group is transnational.

Organizational Structure

The two founders of the group, Hamad al-Khairi and Ahmed el-Tilemsi, were both former members of AQIM. Another significant leader included Oumar Hamaha, who

served as a spokesperson and a military commander before he was shot by French army (Crenshaw 2016; Mackenzie Institute 2016). In 2013, MUJWA merged with a similar wing, the Masked Men Brigade and formed the group: Al-Mourabitoun which was acknowledged as an alleged terrorist organization in 2014 (Northwestern 2013). The group was composed of former Arab fighters of AQIM (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The number of members ranged from 1,000-3,000 fighters (Crenshaw 2016). Members were mostly Tuareg (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

External Ties

The group received financing from AQIM.

Group Outcome

In 2013, the group merged with Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade to form al-Murabitoun which ended MUJWA's activity. However, the media continued to attribute the merged group's attacks to MUJWA (Refworld 2012; START 2015; UN Security Council 2012).